ML071030397

Status of Unit 1 Restart Issues, Revision 12

ML071030397
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/13/2007
From:	Crouch W Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML071030397 (151)

Text

April 13, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN: Document Control Desk

Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority )

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - STATUS OF UNIT 1 RESTART ISSUES, REVISION 12 This letter updates the status of the Unit 1 Bulletins, Generic Letters, Nuclear Performance Plan Special Programs, and TMI Action Items identified in TVA's regulatory framework

letters to NRC (References 1 and 2). As documented in the

NRC's approval of TVA's regulatory framework (References 3

and 4), the staff requested and TVA agreed to provide formal

notification of the completion of each generic communication

within 90 days of its internal commitment completion. This

letter is part of the process that is being used to satisfy

this request. Additional items from the NRC's Browns Ferry

Unit 1 Recovery Issues List (Reference 5) have also been

included.

to this letter provides background information

regarding the regulatory framework for the restart of Unit 1, lists the individual issues cited in the framework letters and

the NRC's Recovery Issues List, describes TVA's commitment or

outstanding action for each issue, references key

correspondence, discusses the background of the issue, and

describes the completion or status of each issue, as

appropriate. A summary of the issues that will be completed

after restart for Unit 1 is provided as Enclosure 2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 April 13, 2007

TVA intends to periodically update this submittal until the

Unit 1 commitments related to restart or power operation are

completed (TVA committed actions are completed). The first

status of these generic communications was provided in

Reference 6. The updates will provide the formal notification

of the completion of each Unit 1 Bulletin, Generic Letter, Nuclear Performance Plan Special Program, and TMI Action Item

required for restart. Changes to the completion status and

newly added issues are bolded in the table of contents.

Changes to the completion status are also bolded in the text

which describes each item. Other changes are noted by

revision bars on the right hand side of the page.

There are no new positions or commitments contained in this

letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at

(205) 729-2636.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

William D. Crouch

Manager of Licensing

and Industry Affairs

References

1. TVA letter, T. E. Abney to NRC, dated December 13, 2002, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1 - Regulatory

Framework for the Restart of Unit 1 2. TVA letter, T. E. Abney to NRC, dated February 28, 2003, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1 - Regulatory

Framework for the Restart of Unit 1 3. NRC memorandum from K. N. Jabbour, dated May 13, 2003, Summary of April 24, 2003, Meeting Regarding the

Regulatory Framework for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart

Project (TAC No. MB7679) 4. NRC letter, K. N. Jabbour to J. A. Scalice, dated August 14, 2003, Regulatory Framework for the Restart of

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plan, Unit 1 (TAC MB7679)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 April 13, 2007

5. NRC letter, J. W. Shea to K. W. Singer, dated January 6, 2006, Meeting Summaries: 1.) Category 1 Public

Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) RE. Browns

Ferry Unit 1 Recovery Status; 2.) Meeting of the NRC

Restart Panel for the Browns Ferry Unit 1 Recovery -

Docket No. 50-259 6. TVA letter, T. E. Abney to NRC, dated November 19, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Status of Unit 1

Restart Issues

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

(Via NRC Electronic Distribution)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region II

Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center

61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3415

Mr. Malcolm T. Widmann, Branch Chief

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region II

Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center

61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931

NRC Senior Resident Inspector

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

10833 Shaw Road

Athens, AL 35611-6970

Ms. Margaret Chernoff, Senior Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)

One White Flint, North

11555 Rockville Pike

Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

Ms. Eva A. Brown, Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)

One White Flint, North

11555 Rockville Pike

Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 April 13, 2007

JEM:TLE:BAB

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

M. Bajestani, NAB 1A-BFN

A. S. Bhatnagar, LP 6A-C

R. H. Bryan, Jr., LP 4J-C

R. G. Jones, POB 2C-BFN

R. F. Marks, PAB 1A-BFN

B. J. O'Grady, PAB 1E-BFN

P. D. Swafford, LP 6A-C

J. Valente, NAB 1E-BFN

E. J. Vigluicci, WT 6A-K

B. A. Wetzel, BR 4X-C

NSRB Support, LP 5M-C

EDMS WT CA-K S:lic/submit/subs/Status of Unit 1 Restart Issues - R12.doc

Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-i INDEX TO ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

STATUS OF UNIT 1 ISSUES

TABLE OF COMMENTS TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Background E1-1 -

Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts E1-4 C-C Bulletin 79-12, Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities E1-5 C-C Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems E1-6 C-C Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)

Reset Controls E1-7 C-C Bulletin 84-02, Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Use in Class 1E Safety

Systems E1-8 Closed Bulletin 86-02, Static "O" Ring Differential Pressure Switches E1-9 C-C Bulletin 88-03, Inadequate Latch Engagement in HFA Type Relays Manufactured by General

Electric (GE) Company E1-11 Closed Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss E1-12 C-C Bulletin 88-07, Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors, and Supplement 1 E1-14 C-C Bulletin 88-10, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers E1-15 C-C Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-ii TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Bulletin 90-01, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount E1-16 C-C Bulletin 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers, and

Supplement 1 E1-18 C-C Bulletin 93-03, Resolution of Issues Related To Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in

BWRs E1-20 C-C Bulletin 95-02, Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer

While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling

Mode E1-21 C-C Bulletin 96-03, Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in

Boiling-Water Reactors E1-22 C-C Cable Ampacity E1-23 Complete Cable Installation Issue Number 1, Brand Rex Cable Issues E1-24 Open Cable Installation Issue Number 2, Cable Separations Issues E1-25 Complete Cable Installation Issue Number 3, Low Voltage Vertical Cable Supports E1-28 Open Cable Installation Issue Number 4, Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius E1-29 Open Cable Installation Issue Number 5, Missing Conduit Bushings E1-31 Open Cable Installation Issue Number 6, Sidewall Pressure, Cable Pullbys, Cable Jamming, Pulling Around 90 Degree Condulets and Thru

Mid-Run Flex Conduit Issues E1-32 Open Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-iii TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Cable Installation Issue Number 7, Use of Condulets as Pull Points E1-33 Open Cable Installation Issue Number 8, Medium Voltage Vertical Cable Supports E1-34 Open Cable Splices E1-35 Complete Cable Tray Supports E1-36 C-C Component and Piece Part Qualification E1-38 Complete Conduit Supports E1-39 C-C Configuration Management/Design Baseline E1-41 C-C Containment Coatings E1-42 Complete Control Rod Drive (CRD) Insert and Withdrawal Piping E1-43 C-C Design Calculation Review E1-44 C-C Environmental Qualification E1-45 Open Fire Protection / 10 CFR 50, Appendix R E1-46 Open Flexible Conduits E1-48 Complete Fuses E1-50 Complete Generic Letter 82-33, Instrumentation to Follow the Course of an Accident - Regulatory Guide

1.97 E1-51 C-C Generic Letter 83-08, Modification of Vacuum Breakers on Mark 1 Containments E1-54 C-C Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information

Capability)

E1-55 Closed Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-iv TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 4.5.2, Periodic On-Line Testing E1-56 Closed Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 4.5.3, Intervals for On-Line Testing E1-57 Closed Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical

Equipment In Operating Reactors, Unresolved

Safety Issue (USI) A-46 E1-58 Complete Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping E1-60 C-C Generic Letter 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on

Plant Operations E1-61 C-C Generic Letter 88-14, Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related

Equipment E1-63 Closed Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident

Vulnerabilities E1-64 Complete Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)

for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities E1-66 Complete Generic Letter 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display System E1-68 Closed Generic Letter 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning E1-70 Closed Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance E1-71 Closed Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment E1-73 C-C Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-v TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Generic Letter 89-16, Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent E1-74 C-C Generic Letter 92-01, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, Revision 1, and Revision 1

Supplement 1 E1-75 C-C Generic Letter 92-04, Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in BWRs E1-78 C-C Generic Letter 94-02, Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations

for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in

Boiling Water Reactors E1-79 Closed Generic Letter 94-03, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling

Water Reactors E1-80 C-C Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related and

Power-Operated Gate Valves E1-81 C-C Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits E1-83 Closed Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Motor-Operated

Valves E1-84 C-C Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During

Design-Basis Accident Conditions E1-85 C-C Generic Letter 97-04, Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core

Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps E1-87 C-C Generic Letter 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants E1-89 C-C Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-vi TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Generic Letter 98-04, Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the

Containment Spray System After a Loss-of-

Coolant Accident Because of Construction and

Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign

Material in Containment E1-90 C-C Generic Letter 2003-01, Control Room Habitability E1-92 Complete Generic Safety Issue 75 / Multi-Plant Action B085, Generic Letter 83-28, Item 1.2,

Post-Trip Review - Data and Information

Capability E1-94 Closed HVAC Duct Supports E1-95 C-C Instrument Sensing Lines E1-96 Complete Instrument Tubing E1-97 Complete Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) E1-98 C-C Large Bore Piping Supports E1-99 C-C License Renewal - Appendix F Commitments E1-100 Open License Renewal - Non-Appendix F Commitments E1-103 Open Long Term Torus Integrity Program E1-104 Complete Lower Drywell Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel E1-106 C-C Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) E1-108 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item I.D.1, Control Room Design Review E1-109 Closed NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item I.D.2, Safety Parameter Display Console E1-111 Closed Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-vii TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling System E1-112 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.E.4.2.1-4, Containment Isolation

Dependability - Implement Diverse Isolation E1-114 Open NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.C, Accident - Monitoring -

Containment High Range Radiation E1-115 Closed NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.D, Accident - Monitoring -

Containment Pressure E1-116 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.E, Accident - Monitoring -

Containment Water Level E1-117 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.2.4 (Generic Letter 84-23),

Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate

Core Cooling E1-118 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.13, HPCI/RCIC Initiation Levels E1-120 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.18, ADS Actuation Modifications E1-122 Closed NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.27, Common Reference Level for Vessel

Level Instrumentation E1-123 C-C NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS Accumulators E1-124 C-C Platform Thermal Growth E1-126 C-C Q-List E1-127 Complete Restart Test Program E1-128 Open Open: TVA committed actions are not complete.

Closed: Item has been closed by NRC document.

Complete: TVA committed actions are completed.

C-C: Issue is "Closed" and "Complete."

E1-viii TOPIC PAGE STATUS FOR RESTART Seismic Class II Over I / Spatial Systems Interactions and Water Spray E1-129 Complete Small Bore Piping E1-130 Complete Thermal Overloads E1-131 C-C Unresolved Safety Issue A-7, Mark I Long-Term Program E1-133 C-C Unresolved Safety Issue A-9, Anticipated Transients Without Scram E1-133 C-C Unresolved Safety Issue A-24, Qualification of Class 1E Safety Related Equipment E1-135 C-C Unresolved Safety Issue A-26, Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection E1-136 C-C Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Station Blackout E1-137 Complete Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating

Plants E1-138 Complete April 13, 2007 E1-1 ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

STATUS OF UNIT 1 ISSUES BACKGROUND T he Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) consists of three units.

Units 1 and 3 were voluntarily shut down by the Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA) in March 1985 because of questions about the

primary containment isolation leak rate testing for Unit 1 and

reactor water level instrumentation for Unit 3. Unit 2 was in a

refueling outage at the time. Additional questions and concerns

were subsequently raised about the overall adequacy of TVA's

nuclear program, and Browns Ferry remained shut down until

adequate corrective actions were defined to address the root

causes of TVA's nuclear program problems.

On September 17, 1985, NRC requested, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.54(f), that TVA submit information about its plans for

correcting Browns Ferry's problems and for correcting problems in

the overall management of its nuclear program. NRC also

requested that this information be submitted before TVA restarted

Browns Ferry. In response to this request, TVA prepared a

Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (CNPP) Volume 1 which

identified the root causes of the problems in the management of

TVA's nuclear program and described TVA's plans for correcting

those problems.

Additionally, TVA prepared a Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance

Plan (BFNPP) Volume 3 which identified the root causes of

problems specifically related to Browns Ferry, defined plans for

correcting those problems, and responded to the NRC's request for

Browns Ferry specific information. Taken together, these

two plans provided a complete account of the actions which TVA

undertook to improve its nuclear program for Browns Ferry.

The regulatory framework for the restart of Unit 2 after its

extended outage was unusual. TVA's submittal of the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Performance Plan and NRC's review and issuance of Safety

Evaluation Reports for each individual program was atypical.

While this level of NRC involvement did result in added

confidence for the approval of Unit 2 restart, it required

significant TVA and NRC resources for the approval of individual

programs and criteria. In most cases, TVA began the

implementation of these programs "at risk," which meant prior to

NRC approval. Significant redesign and additional modifications

were required whenever the criteria was changed during the

approval process. NRC evaluation of the BFNPP special programs

was documented by the issuance of issue specific Safety April 13, 2007 E1-2 Evaluation Reports (SERs) or in NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Safety Evaluation Report on the Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan, and its supplements. Following implementation of these recovery

programs, Unit 2 returned to service on May 24, 1991, and was

removed from the Problem Plant List in June 1992.

TVA's proposed regulatory framework for the restart of Units

1 and 3 (Reference 1) was more consistent with normal industry

practice. The proposed programs were established to provide a

high degree of confidence that the facility and personnel were

ready to restart and operate Units 1 and 3 in a safe and reliable

manner, and promote the efficient utilization of TVA and NRC

resources. TVA's plans for the restart of Units 1 and 3 were

based on the regulatory requirements, corrective action programs, commitments, Technical Specifications improvements, and

internally identified deficiencies and concerns that were

resolved prior to the restart of Unit 2. NRC approval of the

framework for the restart of Units 1 and 3 was documented in

Reference 2. Changes to the implementation of BFNPP special

programs on Unit 3 was documented by the issuance of issue

specific SERs. The NRC Staff's request that the Commission

authorize the Region II Administrator to allow restart of Unit 3

was forwarded by SECY 95-264. Following restart plan completion

and NRC restart approval, Unit 3 restarted on November 19, 1995.

Units 1 and 3 were removed from the Watch List in June 1996.

Since restart of Unit 3, there were changes in regulations, TVA's

processes, and NRC's processes which warranted revision to the

regulatory framework for restart of Unit 1. TVA's successful

restart and operation of Units 2 and 3 and the proposed revision

to the Unit 1 restart program (References 3 and 4) will establish

a high degree of confidence that the facility and personnel are

ready to restart and operate Unit 1 in a safe and reliable

manner, and promote the efficient utilization of TVA and NRC

resources. TVA's plans for the restart of Unit 1 continue to be

based on the regulatory requirements, corrective action special

programs, commitments, Technical Specifications improvements, and

internally identified deficiencies and concerns that were

resolved prior to restart of Units 2 and 3. TVA proposed that, at its discretion, it could modify the implementation precedent

for BFNPP Special Programs to incorporate efficiencies or

experience gained from use of those precedents in restarting

Unit 3 or from changes in TVA internal processes.

As documented in the NRC's approval of TVA's proposed regulatory

framework (References 5 and 6), the staff requested and TVA

agreed to provide formal notification of the completion of each

generic communication within 90 days of its internal commitment

completion. This letter provides the process that will be used

to satisfy this request. Additional items for restart were also

identified in the NRC's Browns Ferry Unit 1 Recovery Issues List (Reference 7).

April 13, 2007 E1-3 This enclosure lists the individual issues cited in the framework letters and the NRC's Recovery Issues List, describes TVA's

commitment or outstanding action for each issue, references key

correspondence, discusses the background of the issue, and

describes the completion or status of each issue, as appropriate.

A summary of the issues that will be completed after restart for

Unit 1 is provided as Enclosure 2.

TVA intends to update this submittal until the Unit 1 commitments

related to restart or power operation are completed (TVA

committed actions are completed). Changes to the completion

status and newly added issues are bolded in the table of

contents. Changes to the completion status are also bolded in

the text which describes each item. In addition, the bottom of

each page will contain a stamp that will show the submittal date.

Other changes are noted by revision bars on the right hand side

of the page. These updates will provide the formal notification

of the completion of each Unit 1 Bulletin, Generic Letter, Nuclear Performance Plan Special Program, and TMI Action Item

required for restart and listed in the regulatory framework

letters. REFERENCES

1. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 10, 1991, Regulatory Framework for the Restart of Units 1 and 3 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 1, 1992, Return to Service of Browns Ferry, Units 1 and 3 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 13, 2002, Regulatory Framework for the Restart of Unit 1 4. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 28, 2003, Regulatory Framework for the Restart of Unit 1 5. NRC memorandum from K. N. Jabbour, dated May 13, 2003, Summary of April 24, 2003, Meeting Regarding the Regulatory

Framework for Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Project (TAC No.

MB7679) 6. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 14, 2003, Regulatory Framework for the Restart of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit

1 7. NRC letter, J. W. Shea to K. W. Singer, dated January 6, 2006, Meeting Summaries: 1.) Category 1 Public Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) RE. Browns

Ferry Unit 1 Recovery Status; 2.) Meeting of the NRC Restart

Panel for the Browns Ferry Unit 1 Recovery - Docket No. 50-

259 April 13, 2007 E1-4 Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 79-02.

Discussion: TVA initiated programs in 1979 to comply with Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding the adequacy of

piping system supports and anchor bolts. BFN's

programs involved the reanalysis of pipe stress

problems using the as-built configuration and

amplified response spectra for Seismic Class I

structures and the evaluation of the acceptability

of the associated pipe supports. The scope of the

program included Unit 1 safety-related large bore (greater than 2 2 inches in diameter) piping and computer analyzed small bore piping that was not

included in the Small Bore Piping Program.

Pipe stress analysis and pipe support evaluations

are based on walkdown inspection data for the

safety-related piping systems. The walkdown

inspections were instituted to determine the actual

field configuration of the Class I piping systems

and supports. NRC approval of TVA's program for

the resolution of Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 is

documented in Reference 1.

Status: C-C

Piping stress analysis and pipe support

calculations were prepared for Class I piping.

Where required, design modifications were

implemented.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 2).

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry, Unit 2, Section 2.2.3.1 (Page 2-8)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-5 Bulletin 79-12, Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 79-12.

Discussion: In response to Bulletin 79-12, TVA committed to perform unit and cycle specific analyses of control

rod withdrawal sequences in order to ensure that

rod notch worths were acceptable (References 1

and 2). In Reference 3, TVA notified NRC that it

was implementing the generic Banked Position

Withdrawal Sequence and Reduced Notch Worth

Procedure. The resulting withdrawal sequences

ensure that the notch worths are sufficiently small

so as to minimize the possibility of a fast period

scram. Therefore, cycle specific analyses of

control rod withdrawal sequences were no longer

required.

Status: C-C

The Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence and Reduced

Notch Worth Procedures have been incorporated into

plant procedures.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 30, 1979, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79

RII:JPO 50-259, -260, -296 - Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 19, 1981, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79

RII:JPO 50-259, -260, -296 - Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 4, 1990, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79

Commitment Revisions Regarding Fast Period

Scrams 4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-6 Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 79-14.

Discussion: TVA initiated programs in 1979 to comply with Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding the adequacy of

piping system supports and anchor bolts. BFN's

programs involved the reanalysis of pipe stress

problems using the as-built configuration and

amplified response spectra for Seismic Class I

structures and the evaluation of the acceptability

of the associated pipe supports. The scope of the

program included Unit 1 safety-related large bore (greater than 2 2 inches in diameter) piping and computer analyzed small bore piping that was not

included in the Small Bore Piping Program.

Pipe stress analysis and pipe support evaluations

were based on walkdown inspection data for the

safety-related piping systems. The walkdown

inspections were instituted to determine the actual

field configuration of the Class I piping systems

and supports. NRC approval of TVA's program for

the resolution of Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 is

documented in Reference 1.

Status: C-C

Piping stress analysis and pipe support

calculations were prepared for Class I piping.

Where required, design modifications were

implemented.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 2).

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry, Unit 2, Section 2.2.3.1 (Page 2-8)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-7 Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 80-06.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA stated that the need for modification to the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)

system was identified as a result of the reviews

performed for Bulletin 80-06. In Reference 2, TVA

committed to perform the modification to the TIP

system prior to restart.

Status: C-C

TVA modified TIP circuitry for ESF reset.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-008 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 4, 1981, in Regards to Bulletin 80-06

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 28, 1988, IE Bulletin No. 80 Engineered Safety

Feature (ESF) Reset Control

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 9, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006008

April 13, 2007 E1-8 Bulletin 84-02, Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Use in Class 1E Safety Systems

Commitment: TVA will replace relay coil spools in HFA relays in the reactor protection system (RPS) and other

safety systems.

Discussion: TVA responded to Bulletin 84-02 by Reference 1.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2004-009 (Reference 2).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 10, 1984, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 84

Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in

Use in Class 1E Safety Systems - Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte Nuclear

Plants 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 11, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2004009

April 13, 2007 E1-9 Bulletin 86-02, Static "O" Ring Differential Pressure Switches

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 86-02.

Discussion: TVA responded to Bulletin 86-02 by Reference 1.

Two Static "O" Ring (SOR) differential pressure

switches were installed (or planned for

installation) in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

system minimum flow recirculation lines. TVA

committed to:

1. Revise the RHR pump flow rate test to include steps to verify minimum flow switch operability;

2. Perform maintenance instructions semiannually until two consecutive tests were attained; and

3. Evaluate the SOR test report and adjust setpoints, as required.

Status: C-C

TVA installed two Static "O" Ring differential

pressure switches in the Unit 1 RHR system and the

RHR Pump Surveillance Instructions were revised to

include steps to verify proper switch operation.

TVA installed two Static "O" Ring differential

pressure switches in the Unit 1 Core Spray system

and the Core Spray Pump Surveillance Instructions

were revised to include steps to verify proper

switch operation.

The commitment to perform the maintenance

instruction semiannually has been evaluated in

accordance with the commitment management process

and deleted. NRC was notified of the commitment

deletion by Reference 2.

The SOR test report has been evaluated; the

accuracy values used for these switches are bounded

by the data used in the SOR test report.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-06 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 20, 1987, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE)

Bulletin 86 Static "O" Ring (SOR)

Differential Pressure Switches April 13, 2007 E1-10

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 17, 1995, BFN Revision to Commitments to Perform Testing of

Static-O-Ring Differential Pressure Switches and

Voltage Verification Testing of Reactor

Protective System Equipment

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-11 Bulletin 88-03, Inadequate Latch Engagement in HFA Type Relays Manufactured by General Electric (GE) Company

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 88-03.

Discussion: TVA originally responded to Bulletin 88-03 in Reference 1. TVA stated the BFN inspections and

the repair or replacement of the relays which fail

the inspection criteria are scheduled to be

completed before restart of each unit. In

Reference 2, NRC closed Bulletin 88-03. However, TVA was still required to notify the NRC of

inspection results for Unit 1.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2004-009 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 6, 1988, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)Bulletin 88-03, Inadequate Latch Engagement in HFA-Type Latching

Relays Manufactured by General Electric (GE)

Company 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 2, 1990, Closure of NRC Bulletin 88-03 for the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant (TAC Nos. 73852, 73853, and 73854)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 11, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2004009 April 13, 2007 E1-12 Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 88-04.

Discussion: NRC Bulletin 88-04 requested licensees to investigate and correct, as applicable, two

miniflow design concerns for safety-related system

pumps. The first concern involved the potential

for dead-heading one or more pumps. The second

concern was whether or not the installed miniflow

capacity was adequate.

TVA responded to the Bulletin (Reference 1),

endorsing the BWR Owners Group response and

providing BFN specific information. NRC requested

additional information in Reference 2, which was

provided by TVA in Reference 3. Reference 4

documents NRR closure of this issue for Unit 1.

NRC addressed this issue for Unit 1 in Inspection

Report 95-31 (Reference 5). TVA notified NRC that

its actions were complete in Reference 6.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2004-009 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

Letter from TVA to NRC dated September 30, 1988, Browns Ferry (BFN), Watts Bar (WBN), and

Bellefonte (BLN) Nuclear Plants - NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss

2. Letter from NRC to TVA dated March 1, 1989, Response to NRC Bulletin 88 Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3

3. Letter from TVA to NRC dated April 05, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 1 and 3 -

Additional Response to NRC Bulletin 88-04 (NRCB 88-04) - Potential Safety-Related Pump

Loss 4. Letter from NRC to TVA, dated May 8, 1989, Response to NRC Bulletin 88 Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 28, 1995, NRC Inspection Report 95-31 [Section 7.b., page 18]

April 13, 2007 E1-13

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 7, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Completion of

NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related

Pump Loss

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 11, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2004009 April 13, 2007 E1-14 Bulletin 88-07, Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors, and Supplement 1

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 88-07.

Discussion: TVA responded to Bulletin 88-07 by Reference 1 and confirmed that the actions required by the Bulletin

were implemented. TVA responded to Supplement 1 to

Bulletin 88-07 by Reference 2 and confirmed its

plans to implement the General Electric interim

stability recommendations. The proposed Technical

Specification changes to implement the reactor core

thermal-hydraulic stability recommendations

contained in Supplement 1 to Bulletin 88-07 were

provided by Reference 3 and approved in

Reference 4.

Status: C-C

Refer to the topic entitled Generic Letter 94

Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim

Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic

Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors for

additional actions TVA has taken to address this

issue.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 5).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 4, 1988, NRC Bulletin 88-07: Power Oscillations in Boiling

Water Reactors

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 6, 1989, NRC Bulletin 88-07, Supplement 1 - Power

Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 14, 1992, TVA BFN Technical Specification (TS) No. 300 Reactor

Core Thermal-Hydraulic Stability

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 31, 1994, Issuance of Technical Specification Amendments for the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3 (TS 300) 5. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-15 Bulletin 88-10, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 88-10.

Discussion: TVA provided a revised response to Bulletin 88-10 in Reference 1. TVA stated that it had completed

itsBulletin 88-10 effort for Units 1, 2 and 3.

TVA had removed the Class 1E Molded Case Circuit

Breakers (MCCBs) without adequate traceability from

installed service and the warehouse. NRC closed

this Bulletin for Unit 1 in Reference 2.

Status: C-C

For Unit 1, TVA has removed the Class 1E MCCBs

which did not have adequate traceability from both

installed service and the warehouse.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-009 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 29, 1990, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Revised

Response and Notification of Implementation of

NRC Bulletin 88-10 Nonconforming Molded Case

Circuit Breakers (MCCBs)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 10, 1992, NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/92-03,

50-260/92-03, and 50-296/92-03)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 13, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005009 April 13, 2007 E1-16 Bulletin 90-01, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 90-01.

Discussion: TVA originally responded to Bulletin 90-01 in Reference 1. TVA responded to Supplement 1 to

Bulletin 90-01 in Reference 2. The commitments

made in Reference 2 superseded the commitments made

in Reference 1. In Reference 2, TVA stated that it

would formally notify the NRC of the proposed

resolution of the Rosemount transmitter issue for

Unit 1 prior to Unit 1 startup. NRC's Safety

Evaluation (Reference 3) applied to all three units

but stated additional information would be required

on Unit 1.

In Reference 4, TVA notified NRC of its plan to

replace the BFN Unit 1 Rosemount transmitters that

meet the criteria specified in NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 with new or refurbished transmitters

prior to Unit 1 restart. NRC found TVA's response

acceptable in Reference 5.

Status: C-C TVA has replaced the BFN Unit 1 Rosemount

transmitters that meet the criteria specified in

NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 with new or

refurbished transmitters.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-009 (Reference 6).

April 13, 2007 E1-17

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 18, 1990, Response to NRC Bulletin No. 90-01: Loss of Fill-Oil in

Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 5, 1993, Response to NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1 - Loss

of Fill Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by

Rosemount

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 4, 1995, NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil

in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. M85361, M85362, and M85363)

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 7, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1 - Response to

NRC Bulletin no. 90-01, Supplement 1 - Loss of

Fill Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by

Rosemount

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 7, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Closeout of

Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil

in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount (TAC No. MC3381)

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 13, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005009

April 13, 2007 E1-18 Bulletin 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers, and Supplement 1

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 93-02 and Supplement 1 prior to restart.

Discussion: TVA responded to Bulletin 93-02 in Reference 1 and committed to:

1. Evaluate Unit 1 for permanent fibrous material.

2. Inspect Unit 1 and remove temporary fibrous material.

3. Confirm completion of the above listed activities before startup.

In TVA's response to Supplement 1 of Bulletin 93-02 (Reference 2), TVA committed to augment the

operator's required reading program, conduct

classroom and/or simulator training, revise

appendices in BFN's Emergency Operating

Instructions (EOIs) to include caution statements

and actions for monitoring net positive suction

head, and change the applicable design control

procedure to require evaluation of fibrous material

being introduced into the drywell.

In Reference 3, NRC stated that TVA's response to

Supplement 1 adequately addressed the actions TVA

would take to assure continued Emergency Core

Cooling System (ECCS) suction capability. TVA

notified NRC of the completion of the commitments

made in response to Supplement 1 of Bulletin 93-02

for all three units in Reference 4.

TVA updated its response to the Bulletin for Unit 1

in Reference 5.

Status: C-C

TVA has evaluated the drywell for permanent fibrous

material. The results were similar to Units

2 and 3. Limited amounts of fibrous material are

permanently installed in several containment

penetrations. Also, in accordance with the Units 2

and 3's precedent, TVA has revised its Unit 1

General Operating Instruction on Drywell Closeout

to ensure temporary fibrous air filters or other

temporary sources of fibrous material are removed.

April 13, 2007 E1-19 Inspection Report 2006-006 (Reference 6) stated "-

However, final closure of this item will be

deferred until NRR completes their review in this

area and any SERs, if required, are issued."

In a letter dated July 26, 2006 (Reference 7), NRR

issued an SER concluding BFN has satisfied this

Bulletin.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-008 (Reference 8).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 23, 1993, NRC Bulletin No. 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency

Core Cooling Suction Strainers

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 18, 1994, NRC Bulletin 93-02, Supplement 1 - Debris Plugging

of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Suction

Strainers

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 19, 1994, Response to NRC Bulletin 93 Supplement 1, Debris

Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction

Strainers

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 29, 1994, NRC Bulletin 93-02, Supplement 1 - Debris Plugging

of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Suction

Strainers - Commitment Completion

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 6, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Update to TVA

Response to NRC Bulletin No. 93-02, Debris

Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction

Strainers

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

7. NRC Letter To TVA, dated July 26, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Review Of Licensee

Response To NRC Bulletin 93-02, "Debris Plugging

of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers" (TAC No. Mc3393)

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 9, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006008

April 13, 2007 E1-20 Bulletin 93-03, Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs

Commitment: TVA intends to complete a modification which will prevent the buildup of non-condensibles in water

level reference legs by injecting CRD system

charging water into the reference legs.

Discussion: TVA's response to Bulletin 93-03 was provided by Reference 1. TVA committed to perform

modifications on Unit 1 prior to restart. NRC

accepted TVA's response to the Bulletin in

Reference 2. A detailed description of the

modification installed on Unit 2 was provided in

Reference 3.

Status: C-C

TVA completed the described modification.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 30, 1993, Response to NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 93-03, Resolution of

Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in Boiling Water Reactors

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 20, 1994, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 - Response

To NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution of Issues

Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in BWRs," (TAC Nos. M86882, M86883, and M86884)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 14, 1994, Hardware Modification Completion and Description

in Response to Bulletin 93-03, Resolution of

Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in Boiling Water Reactors

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-21 Bulletin 95-02, Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer While Operating in

Suppression Pool Cooling Mode

Commitment: Appropriate actions will be taken prior to Unit 1 restart.

Discussion: TVA's response to Bulletin 95-02 was provided in Reference 1. For Units 2 and 3, TVA committed to

clean the suppression pool and perform confirmatory

inspection and test prior to restart. TVA also

committed to perform a visual inspection of the

Emergency Core Cooling System pump suction

strainers during each refueling outage and a

program for suppression pool cleaning will be

developed prior to restart. TVA stated that the

programs established to ensure Emergency Core

Cooling System pump operability on Units 2 and 3

would apply to Unit 1 when it was returned to

service. NRC found TVA's response acceptable in

Reference 2.

Status: C-C

The Unit 1 suppression pool was drained, cleaned, inspected and recoated as necessary. Program to

ensure suppression pool cleanliness and control of

foreign material has been implemented.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-006 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 15, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - NRC Bulletin

95-02, Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat

Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer While Operating In

Suppression Pool Cooling Mode

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 14, 1996, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 - Response

to Bulletin 95-02 (TAC Nos. M93876, M93877, and

M93878) 3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

April 13, 2007 E1-22 Bulletin 96-03, Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers By Debris In Boiling-Water

Reactors Commitment: Appropriate modifications to addressBulletin 96-03 will be implemented on Unit 1 prior to its restart.

Discussion: TVA originally responded to the Bulletin in Reference 1 and committed to describing planned

actions and schedules to be utilized to resolve the

Bulletin within 90 days following the approval of

the Utility Resolution Guidelines. TVA described

its plans for resolution of the Bulletin in

Reference 2 and committed to resolve the Bulletin

prior to restart for Unit 1.

Status: C-C

TVA has installed new, high capacity passive

strainers on Unit 1, which are of the same design

as on Units 2 and 3.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 4, 1996, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - NRC Bulletin

No. 96-03, Potential Plugging of Emergency Core

Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in

Boiling-Water Reactors (TAC Nos. M96135, M96136, M96137) 2. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 25, 1997, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - NRC Bulletin No.

96-03, Potential Plugging of Emergency Core

Cooling Suction (ECCS) Strainers by Debris in

Boiling Water Reactors (TAC Nos. M96135, M96136, M96137) 3. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-23 Cable Ampacity Commitment: The cable ampacity issue will be resolved in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: TVA developed a new electrical design standard to address ampacities for cables in conduits, cable

trays, and duct banks, as well as derating factors

for cable coatings, fire wraps, cable tray covers, and cable tray bottoms. Approval of this program

is contained in NUREG-1232 (Reference 1).

Status: Complete

TVA has resolved the cable ampacity issue.

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry Unit 2 [Section 3.11.3, Page 3-9]

April 13, 2007 E1-24 Cable Installation Issue Number 1, Brand Rex Cable Issues Commitment: To resolve the Brand Rex cable issue, corrective actions will be implemented prior to the restart of

Unit 1 in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including Brand Rex, was

provided in Reference 1. The Safety Evaluation on

this program was provided by Reference 2. In

summary, the Staff found implementing the

corrective actions for the Brand Rex cable issue in

accordance with the Unit 2 precedent to be

acceptable pending the results of additional

qualification testing being performed by TVA.

TVA has identified contract number 80K6-825419 as

the source of the Brand Rex cables issue for BFN.

Additional testing demonstrated the ability of the

cables to perform their intended safety function

for a qualified life of 40 years. TVA has removed

all non-installed Brand Rex cable furnished on

contract 80K6-825419. Administrative controls are

in place to prevent future applications of this

cable type and manufacturer from being installed at

BFN.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-25 Cable Installation Issue Number 2, Cable Separations Issues

Commitment: TVA committed to the following:

1. Prior to fuel load of Unit 1, TVA will implement all corrective actions in accordance

with the Unit 2 criteria and implementation

precedent for the following cable separations

issues:

• V4 and V5 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies,

• Nondivisional V4 and V5 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power

supplies,

• V3 cables which originate from safety-related and from nonsafety-related

power supplies,

• Nondivisional V1 and V2 cables which originate from both safety-related and

nonsafety-related power supplies,

• Divisional and nondivisional cables designated with an IE and IES suffix, and

• Divisional V1 and V2 cables. 2. As documented in References 1 through 6, Unit 2 validated the use of the cable schedule

drawings (45C800 series) in determining the

installed configuration of cables in the plant.

Unit 1 cables were included in the population

of cables that were used in the validation

process during the Unit 2 restart effort. As

documented in Reference 7, the Unit 1 cables

have always been routed manually. The Unit 1

circuit schedule was not an electronic

database. Therefore, TVA will use the 45C800

series drawings as the document of record in

the determination of acceptable routing for

Unit 1.

April 13, 2007 E1-26

3. The Unit 1 Master Equipment List (MEL) will establish the list of equipment and device IDs

for safety-related and quality-related systems.

For nondivisional V1, V2, V3, V4 and V5 cables

identified in the MEL as safety-related for

Unit 1, cable separation issues will be

resolved by analyzing design drawings to

identify cables required to support the

safety-related and quality-related devices.

The resulting list will be compared against the

45C800 drawings to determine if cables are

correctly identified as divisional. If it is

determined that a change in divisional status

is required, the respective cables will be

evaluated against separations criteria.

Corrective actions will be completed prior to

fuel load.

4. For cables contained in divisional and nondivisional cable trays that physically

connect on Unit 1, corrective actions will be

implemented prior to Unit 1 fuel load.

Discussion: TVA had identified instances where the electrical separation requirements had not been met at BFN.

The Units 1 and 3 specific action plan to

disposition concerns related to cable installation

issues, including cable separation, was provided

in Reference 1. The Safety Evaluation on this

program was provided by Reference 2. Additional

information was requested regarding the corrective

actions to be implemented for discrepancies

associated with the two cables contained in

divisional and nondivisional cable trays that

physically connect. This additional information

was provided by TVA in Reference 3. The NRC Staff

accepted this information in Reference 4.

Status: Complete

Evaluations have been completed and noted

discrepancies have been completed.

April 13, 2007 E1-27

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated January 6, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Electrical

Cable Separation

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 9, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Electrical Cable

Separation

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 23, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Electrical

Cable Separation

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 14, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Electrical

Cable Separation

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 23, 1990, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-260/89-59

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 1990, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-260/90-13

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 29, 1992, Response to Request for Additional Information

on Electrical Cables in Divisional and

Nondivisional Trays Which Are Physically

Connected

April 13, 2007 E1-28 Cable Installation Issue Number 3, Low Voltage Vertical Cable Supports Commitment: TVA will resolve the low voltage vertical cable supports issue in accordance with the Unit 2

precedent.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including vertical cable

supports, was provided in Reference 1. The Safety

Evaluation on this program was provided by

Reference 2. In summary, since no Unit 2 cables

with acceptable sidewall bearing pressure failed

Hi-Pot testing, the walkdown and evaluation of

Unit 1 safety-related low voltage power, control

and instrumentation cable is adequate to

satisfactorily resolve the vertical support issue.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-29 Cable Installation Issue Number 4, Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius Commitment: Safety-related medium voltage cables will be identified, walked down and evaluated against the

bend radius criteria used for Unit 2 (General

Construction Specification G-38). The following

corrective actions will be completed:

A. Group 1 cables with bend radius of less than 6 times the cable outside diameter (OD) will be

replaced.

B. Group 2 cables with bend radius from 6 times the cable OD to less than 8 times the cable OD will

be tested prior to restart and during subsequent

outages to facilitate a trend analysis.

C. Group 3 cables, with bend radius 8 times or greater than the cable OD will be allowed to

remain in service and be subjected to only

normal maintenance testing.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including medium voltage

cable bend radius, was provided in Reference 1.

The Safety Evaluation of this program was provided

by Reference 2. In summary, since safety-related

medium voltage cables are to be identified, walked

down and evaluated against the bend radius

acceptance criteria contained in Construction

Specification G-38 and dispositioned in accordance

with the same criteria used for Unit 2, the

proposed corrective actions are adequate.

In Reference 3, TVA proposed a new program and

corrective actions for medium cable bend radius

issues. Results of reinspections were presented to

NRC and Hi-Pot testing was replaced with Load Cycle

and Corona Testing. Additional information

regarding the revised program was requested in

Reference 4, which was provided by TVA in

Reference 5. NRC issuance of a Safety Evaluation

for this program and a request for additional

information was contained in Reference 6. TVA

replied in Reference 7, and the Supplemental Safety

Evaluation Report was provided in Reference 8.

Status: Open

April 13, 2007 E1-30

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 17, 1993, Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius Issues

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 23, 1993, Request for Additional Information Regarding

Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 10, 1994, Response to Request for Additional Information

Regarding Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 1, 1994, Safety Evaluation and Request for Additional

Information Regarding Medium Voltage Cable Bend

Radius Issues

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 15, 1994, Reply to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Medium Voltage Cable Bend Radius

Issues 8. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 9, 1995, Supplemental Safety Evaluation for Medium

Voltage Cable Bend Radius

April 13, 2007 E1-31 Cable Installation Issue Number 5, Missing Conduit Bushings

Commitment: Type PN cables in 10 CFR 50.49 circuits will be replaced under the Environmental Qualification

program.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including missing

conduit bushings, was provided in Reference 1. The

Safety Evaluation on this program was provided by

Reference 2. In summary, the only cables found

damaged on Unit 2 as a result of pulling the cables

over a conduit end with a missing bushing were the

Type PN. Replacing this type of cable in Unit 1

10 CFR 50.49 circuits was considered adequate to

resolve this issue.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-32 Cable Installation Issue Number 6, Sidewall Pressure, Cable Pullbys, Cable Jamming, Pulling Around 90 Degree

Condulets and Thru Mid-Run

Flex Conduit Issues

Commitment: The cables identified in the Master Equipment List (MEL) as safety-related cables for Unit 1, which are not replaced by other programs, will be

reviewed to determine the configuration of their

associated raceway. If the design of the raceway

meets the criteria for sidewall pressure, jamming, pullbys, mid-run flex or pulling around 90 degree

condulet concerns, a walkdown will be performed to

confirm the installed configuration. Confirmatory

walkdowns will be completed prior to Unit 1

restart.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including sidewall

pressure, cable pullbys, cable jamming, pulling

around 90 degree condulets and thru mid-run flex

conduit issues, was provided in Reference 1.

Information regarding cable walkdowns and cable

routing system database validation was provided in

Reference 2.

A Safety Evaluation on cable installation and

separation and request for additional information

on divisional/nondivisional separation

discrepancies was provided in Reference 3. In

summary, cable damage was not identified on Unit 2

during the resolution of the sidewall pressure, cable pullbys, cable jamming and pulling around

90-degree condulets and through mid-run flex

conduits issues.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 6, 1992, Additional Information on TVA's Action Plan for

Units 1 and 3 Cable Installation Issues

Including Cable Separations

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-33 Cable Installation Issue Number 7, Use of Condulets as Pull Points Commitment: The 600V safety-related cables that are susceptible to damage from the use of condulets as pull points

will be resolved in accordance with the Unit 2

precedent.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including the use of

condulets as pull points, was provided in

Reference 1. The Safety Evaluation on this program

was provided by Reference 2. In summary, TVA's

evaluation of this issue for Unit 2 determined that

the type of conduit configurations susceptible to

this problem was limited to several cases of large

600 volt cables in three inch conduits. Therefore, TVA will review the Unit 1 600 volts cables

installed in conduit in accordance with the Unit 2

program guidelines / The required corrective

actions will be completed prior to fuel load.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-34 Cable Installation Issue Number 8, Medium Voltage Vertical Cable Supports Commitment: The medium voltage vertical cable supports issue will be resolved by evaluating cables not meeting

the vertical cable support criteria for static

sidewall bearing pressure (SSBP). Cables with

unacceptable SSBP will be Hi-Pot tested. Cables

passing the Hi-Pot test will be supported in

accordance with G-38. Cables failing the

Hi-Pot test will be replaced.

Discussion: The action plan to disposition concerns related to cable installation issues, including medium voltage

vertical cable supports, was provided in

Reference 1. The Safety Evaluation on this program

was provided by Reference 2. In summary, since no

Unit 2 cables with acceptable sidewall bearing

pressure failed Hi-Pot testing, the walkdowns and

evaluation of Class 1E medium voltage cables is

adequate to satisfactorily resolve the vertical

support issue.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 10, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Installation Issues Including Cable

Separations

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 8, 1992, Safety Evaluation of TVA Plans to Resolve Electrical

Cable Installation and Separation Issues

April 13, 2007 E1-35 Cable Splices

Commitment: TVA will identify Class IE cable splices located in harsh environment and ensure they are qualified for

their intended service during a design basis

accident (DBA).

Discussion: TVA's program to resolve the splice issue was submitted in Reference 1. TVA performed a field

walkdown of safety-related conduits to identify and

document Class 1E cable splices which are required

to be environmentally qualified and to verify the

installed splice configuration. The field data was

evaluated against construction specification

requirements to determine which splices require

rework. Actions were taken to either rework the

splice or rework both the splice and raceway system

to accommodate a qualified splice.

Status: Complete

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 28, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Electrical Issues (NRC TAC No. 62260)

April 13, 2007 E1-36 Cable Tray Supports

Commitment: TVA intends to utilize the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Generic Implementation

Procedure (GIP) for seismic qualification of cable

trays.

Discussion: The original action plan to disposition concerns related to Unit 1 cable tray supports was provided

in Reference 1. However, due to the issuance of

Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification

of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical

Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety

Issue (USI) A-46, BFN submitted a revised program

in order to take advantage of the NRC approved

process for resolving USI A-46 (Reference 2). NRC

accepted the schedule for implementing the revised

program for Unit 1 in Reference 3 and requested

additional information regarding the revised

methodology and criteria. This information was

provided in Reference 4 and accepted by NRC in

Reference 5.

Status: C-C

The Unit 1 cable tray supports have been evaluated

utilizing the GIP in accordance with USI A-46. A

summary report was provided to NRC in Reference 6.

Necessary modifications and repairs have been

completed.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated March 27, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1

and 3 Cable Tray Supports

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1992, Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical

and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and

Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, Individual

Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant April 13, 2007 E1-37

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 19, 1993, Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, 120-Day

Response, Request for Additional Information

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 19, 1993, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response - Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 7, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to

NRC Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1 that

Transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report

No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic

Implementation Procedure, Revision 2, as

corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2)

7. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-38 Component and Piece Part Qualification

Commitment: TVA will implement a component and piece part qualification program.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA provided a change in methodology in performing the component and piece

part qualification for safety-related components in

10 CFR 50.49 applications. TVA proposed to use

statistical sampling techniques to achieve a 95/95

confidence level of qualification adequacy as

opposed to the 100% verification performed for

Unit 2. Additional information was requested by

the NRC Staff in Reference 2, which was provided by

TVA in Reference 3. In Reference 4, NRC responded

that this issue would be addressed by inspection

rather than a revision to the Safety Evaluation.

Since this correspondence, TVA decided to perform

a 100% verification as performed on Unit 2.

Status: Complete

The Unit 1 component and piece part qualification

program for safety-related components in

10 CFR 50.49 applications has been implemented.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated June 12, 1992, Request for Revision to Safety Evaluation Issued by NRC

on January 10, 1990, Related to Component and

Piece Part Qualification Plan

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated October 29, 1992, Request for Additional Information Regarding

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3

Component and Piece Parts Qualification Program

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 17, 1992, Request for Additional Information (RAI)

Regarding BFN Units 1 and 3 Component and Piece

Parts Qualification Plan

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 7, 1993, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3

Component and Piece Parts Qualification Program

April 13, 2007 E1-39 Conduit Supports

Commitment: TVA intends to utilize the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Generic Implementation

Procedure (GIP) for seismic qualification of

conduit supports.

Discussion: The original action plan to disposition concerns related to Unit 1 conduits and conduit supports was

provided in References 1 through 3 and approved in

Reference 4. However, due to the issuance of

Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification

of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical

Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety

Issue (USI) A-46, BFN submitted a revised program

in order to take advantage of the NRC approved

process for resolving USI A-46 (Reference 5). NRC

requested additional information regarding the

schedule for implementing the revised program in

Reference 6.

In Reference 7, TVA committed to implement the

long-term qualification of conduits and conduit

supports prior to Unit 1 restart. In Reference 8, NRC determined that it was acceptable for TVA to

complete the portion of its USI A-46 program that

pertain to conduits and conduit supports, prior to

Unit 1 restart in lieu of its prior restart

commitments.

Status: C-C

The Unit 1 conduit supports have been evaluated

utilizing the GIP in accordance with USI A-46.

A summary report was provided to NRC in

Reference 9. Necessary modifications and repairs

have been completed.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 10).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 6, 1991, Program for Resolving Conduit and Conduit Supports Issue

Prior to the Restart of Units 1 and 3

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 12, 1991, Small Bore Piping Program, Tubing, and Conduit

Support Plans for Units 1 and 3 - Additional

Information April 13, 2007 E1-40

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 29, 1992, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to

Units 1 and 3 Conduit and Conduit Support -

Additional Information

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 20, 1992, Safety Evaluation of Action Plan to Resolve Conduit and

Conduit Supports Issues for the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1992, Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical

and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and

Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, Individual

Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 19, 1993, Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, 120-Day

Response, Request for Additional Information

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 19, 1993, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response - Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant

9. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 7, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to

NRC Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1 that

Transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report

No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic

Implementation Procedure, Revision 2, as

corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2) 1 0. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-41 Configuration Management/Design Baseline

Commitment: The Unit 1 Design Baseline Verification Program (DBVP) will consolidate the two-phase (pre- and

post-restart) approach performed on Unit 2.

Discussion: The objective of the DBVP was to re-establish the design basis and evaluate the plant configuration

to ensure that it satisfies the design basis. The

DBVP, including a discussion of lessons learned

from the Unit 2 precedent, was provided in

Reference 1. In Reference 2, NRC determined that

this commitment was more comprehensive than that

accepted by the staff for Unit 2, and was therefore

acceptable.

Status: C-C

Unit 1 satisfies its design basis, safety related

structures, systems, and components are supported

by engineering analysis and documentation, and the

plant configuration is in conformance with TVA's

commitments.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated June 13, 1991, Design Baseline Verification Program (DBVP)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 21, 1991, Assessment of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3 Design Baseline Verification

Program 3. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-42 Containment Coatings

Commitment: The containment coating program will be implemented in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: The containment coatings program was described in the Nuclear Performance Plan (Reference 1). TVA

performed walkdown inspections of unqualified

coating on components installed inside primary

containment on Unit 2 to baseline the uncontrolled

coating log. An analysis was performed to

determine the maximum allowable quantity of coating

debris which could be transported to the suction

strainers without affecting the ability of the ECCS

pumps to perform their post-Loss of Coolant

Accident (LOCA) function. Corrective actions were

taken to ensure that the amount of unqualified

coating is maintained below the maximum allowable

quantity. NRC approval of the program is

documented in Reference 2.

Status: Complete

The containment coatings program was completed, and

the Uncontrolled Coatings Log was issued.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated October 24, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Nuclear

Performance Plan, Revision 2

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 - Browns

Ferry, Unit 2, Section 3.7 (Page 3-7)

April 13, 2007 E1-43 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Insert and Withdrawal Piping

Commitment: The seismic qualification of the CRD insert and withdrawal piping will be implemented in accordance

with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: TVA's program for the seismic qualification of the 185 CRD insert and withdrawal lines on Unit 2 was

provided in Reference 1 and approved by NRC in

Reference 2.

Status: C-C

Based on reanalysis, pipe supports for CRD insert

and withdrawal piping were replaced with new

support frames.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 11, 1989, Revised Program Plan - Seismic Qualification of

the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRDH) Piping

System 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry, Unit 2, Section 2.2.3.2 (Page 2-9)

3. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-44 Design Calculation Review

Issue: Complete a design calculation review.

Discussion: The objective of the design calculation review was to: a. Identify calculations considered to be essential;

b. Ensure that essential calculations support the plant licensing commitments and design basis

requirements;

c. Ensure that essential calculations are technically adequate and consistent with the

plant configuration; and

d. Ensure that essential calculations supporting the Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) are consistent with the plant functional

configuration.

Status: C-C

The design calculation review was incorporated into

the Configuration Management / Design Baseline

Verification Program in Reference 1.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 2).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated June 13, 1991, Design Baseline Verification Program (DBVP)

2. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-45 Environmental Qualification

Commitment: TVA will complete the qualification of Class IE safety-related equipment.

Discussion: The qualification of Class IE safety-related equipment will be accomplished when BFN certifies

compliance with 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental

qualification of electric equipment important to

safety for nuclear power plants.

Status: Open

References:

None

April 13, 2007 E1-46 Fire Protection / 10 CFR 50, Appendix R

Commitment: TVA will comply with License Condition 2.C(13).

Discussion: License Condition 2.C(13) states:

"Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant shall implement

and maintain in effect all provisions of the

approved Fire Protection Program as described

in the Final Safety Analysis Report for BFN

as approved in the SEs dated December 8, 1988, March 6, 1991, March 31, 1993, November 2, 1995 and Supplement dated

November 3, 1989 subject to the following

provision:

The licensee may make changes to the

approved fire protection program

without prior approval of the

Commission only if those changes would

not adversely affect the ability to

achieve and maintain safe shutdown in

the event of a fire."

NRC issued its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for

BFN's Safe Shutdown Analysis in Reference 1 and

approved the associated License Amendment in

Reference 2. The SER for the BFN Fire Protection

Plan and Fire Hazards Analysis was provided in

Reference 3. The NRC staff issued a License

amendment for the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Post-fire

Safe Shutdown Program in Reference 4 and issued a

supplemental Safety Evaluation in Reference 5.

---

As requested by the NRC in a letter to TVA dated September 21, 2006 (Reference 6), TVA will notify

the NRC of each of the following items:

1. TVA, in its letter of April 24, 2006 (Reference 7), committed to identify the

Appendix R, Paragraph III.G.2, noncompliances

involving operator manual actions, to place them

into TVA's corrective action program, and to

implement compensatory measures. Therefore, TVA

should complete the commitments made in its

April 24, 2006, letter, as well as any other

restart related commitments made previously to

the NRC regarding post-fire operator manual

actions.

April 13, 2007 E1-47

2. Safe Shutdown Instructions used to direct those actions needed to bring the unit to safe

shutdown in the event of a fire will be

completed by January 1, 2007.

3. Concerning the Unit 1 safe-shutdown analysis design assumptions.

Status: Open

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated December 8, 1988, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Appendix R Safe Shutdown

System Analysis (TAC 60627, 60628, 60629)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 6, 1991, Issuance of Amendment (TAC No. 72965) (TS 268)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 31, 1993, Fire Protection Program - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Units 1, 2 and 3 (TAC Nos. M82687, M82688 and

M82689) 4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 2, 1995, Safety Evaluation of Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Capability and Issuance of Technical

Specification Amendments for the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos.

M85254, N87900, M87901, and M87902) (TS 337)

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 3, 1989, Supplemental Safety Evaluation on Post-Fire Safe

Shutdown Systems and Final Review of the

National Fire Protection Association Code

Deviations - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (TAC Nos. 72908 and 00459)

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated September 21, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Status of

Fire Protection Program (TAC No. MC8826)

7. TVA letter to NRC dated April 24, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2 and 3 -

Fire Protection Program - Post-Fire Operator

Manual Actions

April 13, 2007 E1-48 Flexible Conduits

Commitment: Actions necessary to disposition flexible conduit concerns for the 10 CFR 50.49 equipment will be

completed prior to restart. Flexible conduits

attached to safety-related electrical equipment not

covered by 10 CFR 50.49 and within the scope of USI

A-46 will be evaluated for seismic adequacy using

BFN's A-46 program.

Discussion: The program and schedule for the resolution of flexible conduit issues for Unit 1 has been

provided to the NRC as part of the resolution of

Generic Letter 87-02. In Reference 1, TVA provided

a schedule for flexible conduits associated with

the resolution of USI A-46. NRC requested

additional information regarding the schedule in

Reference 2. In Reference 3, TVA provided the

schedule for completing flexible conduit concerns

in two phases. Flexible conduits attached to

electrical equipment covered by 10 CFR 50.49 would

be resolved prior to restart of Unit 1. Seismic

qualification of flexible conduit other than those

connected to electrical equipment covered by 10 CFR

50.49 (i.e., important to safety, but in a mild

environment) and within the scope of USI A-46 would

be included as part of the resolution of USI A-46.

In Reference 4, NRC found this program acceptable;

however, additional information was requested

regarding two separate issues regarding flexible

conduit. TVA provided the requested information in

Reference 5. Additional information was provided

by TVA in Reference 6. NRC subsequently provided a

supplemental safety evaluation in Reference 7.

Status: Complete

Safety related flexible conduits were evaluated.

Breakages (conduit failures) from this evaluation

were resolved.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1992, Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical

and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and

Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, Individual

Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.

April 13, 2007 E1-49

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 19, 1993, Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, 120-Day

Response, Request for Additional Information

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 19, 1993, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response - Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 15, 1993, Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical

and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A Response to

Request for Additional Information Regarding the

Evaluation of the Seismic Adequacy of Flexible

Conduit 6. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 28, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)- Units 1, 2,

and 3 - Seismic Adequacy of Flexible Conduits

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated October 3, 1995, Supplemental Safety Evaluation of Flexible

Conduit Seismic Design and Installation Criteria

April 13, 2007 E1-50 Fuses Commitment: The fuse issue will be resolved in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: NRC approval of TVA's fuse program is documented in NUREG-1232 (Reference 1). The completion plan for

the fuse program was provided by Reference 2. TVA

has removed the reference to amperage from drawings

and replaced them with the appropriate unique

identifier for Class 1E fuses. TVA has installed

permanent fuse labeling.

Status: Complete

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 - Browns

Ferry, Unit 2, Section 3.11.2 (Page 3-9)

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 29, 1992, Completion Plan for the Fuse Program

April 13, 2007 E1-51 Generic Letter 82-33, Instrumentation to Follow the Course of an Accident - Regulatory Guide 1.97 Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 82-33.

Discussion: Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, which included the request to review Regulatory Guide 1.97, was sent

to TVA in Generic Letter 82-33 (Reference 1). TVA

originally responded to Generic Letter 82-33 in

Reference 2.

TVA was ordered to submit a report to NRC

describing how the requirements of Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0737 have been or will be met and an

implementation schedule (Reference 3).

NRC requested additional information and/or

justification in Reference 4. TVA responded to

this request in Reference 5. TVA provided updated

information regarding Reactor Coolant System

pressure indication in Reference 6. A Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) was issued by NRC in

Reference 7. As part of this SER, TVA was directed

to qualify the instrumentation that measures seven

variables in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. TVA

either provided additional justification or

committed to upgrade the instrumentation discussed

in the SER in Reference 8. A revised SER was

issued as part of the NRC's February 8, 1990 letter (Reference 9). This revised SER also directed TVA

to install a qualified neutron monitoring system.

In Reference 10, TVA requested further BFN specific

actions regarding the neutron flux monitoring

instrumentation be deferred pending the resolution

of the BWR Owners' Group appeal.

In Reference 11, TVA identified previously

submitted deviation to Regulatory Guide 1.97 for

which NRC review was still required, addressed

discrepancies between TVA letters and NRC SERs, and

identified new deviations for NRC review.

Additional information regarding emergency damper

position indication was provided by TVA in

Reference 12. The deviations addressed above were

addressed in the NRC's May 10, 1991, SER (Reference 13). In addition, implementation of

qualified neutron flux monitoring capability was

deferred pending review of an appeal by the BWR

Owners Group.

April 13, 2007 E1-52 A revised SER regarding neutron flux monitoring instrumentation was issued in Reference 14. TVA's

review of BFN's neutron flux monitoring

instrumentation against the criteria referenced by

the SER was provided in References 15 and 16. As

part of Reference 16, TVA committed to evaluate the

neutron monitoring system cables, electrical

penetrations and connectors for conformance to the

criteria reference by the SER. This evaluation has

been completed. Consistent with the conclusions

reached for Units 2 and 3, the Unit 1 neutron

monitoring system cables, electrical penetrations, and electrical connectors are capable of operating

throughout the one hour duration of the ATWS event.

NRC acceptance of the deviation requested by TVA

was documented in the May 3, 1994 SER (Reference 17).

Status: C-C TVA has replaced the subject instrumentation with

qualified devices.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-07 (Reference 18).

References:

1.

NRC letter to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and

Holders of Construction Permits, dated

December 17, 1982, Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 -

Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33)

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 30, 1984, in regards to Generic Letter 82-33

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 12, 1984, Issuance of Orders Confirming Licensee Commitments on

Emergency Response Capability

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1985, Emergency Response Capability - Conformance to

R.G. 1.97, Rev. 2

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 7, 1985, in regards to conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.97

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 20, 1985, in regards to conformance with Regulatory

Guide 1.97

7. NRC letter to TVA, date June 23, 1988, Generic Letter 82-33, Request for Compliance with the

Guidelines of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97 as

Applied to Emergency Response Facilities April 13, 2007 E1-53

8. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 23, 1988, Response to NRC's Safety Evaluation Report on

Regulatory Guide 1.97 as Applied to Emergency

Response Facilities Dated June 23, 1988

9. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 8, 1990, Emergency Response Capability - Conformance to

Regulatory Guide 1.97. Revision 3 1 0. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 14, 1990, Response to NRC's February 8, 1990 Safety

Evaluation Report Regarding Conformance to

Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 - Neutron Flux

Monitoring Instrumentation 1 1. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 15, 1990, Response to NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation

Report (SER) on Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97

Compliance dated February 8, 1990 1 2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 21, 1990, Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 Emergency Ventilation

Dampers Position Indication 1 3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 10, 1991, Safety Evaluation of Emergency Response Capability -

Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 1 4. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 27, 1993, Regulatory Guide 1.97 - Boiling Water Reactor

Neutron Flux Monitoring 1 5. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 30, 1993, Regulatory Guide 1.97 - Boiling Water Reactor

Neutron Flux Monitoring 1 6. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 10, 1994, Regulatory Guide 1.97 - Boiling Water Reactor

Neutron Flux Monitoring 1 7. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 3, 1994, Boiling Water Reactor Neutron Flux Monitoring for the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1 8. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 15, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005007

April 13, 2007 E1-54 Generic Letter 83-08, Modification of Vacuum Breakers on Mark I Containments

Commitment: TVA will modify the torus vacuum breakers.

Discussion: TVA responded to the Generic Letter in Reference 1 and committed to modify the torus vacuum breakers.

NRC requested additional information in

Reference 2, which was provided by TVA in

Reference 3. The NRC Safety Evaluation Report was

issued in Reference 4. It concluded that TVA's

actions would be adequate to restore the original

design margin of safety for its vacuum breakers

under the revised loadings in the Mark I

containment.

Status: C-C

TVA modified the torus vacuum breakers.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-006 (Reference 5).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 5, 1984, in regards to Generic Letter 83-08

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 17, 1986, Modification of Vacuum Breakers on Mark I

Containments (Generic Letter 83-08)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 7, 1986, in regards to Generic Letter 83-08

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 25, 1986, Modification of Vacuum Breakers on Mark I

Containments (Generic Letter 83-08); MPA D-20

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-55 Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information Capability)

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter, Item 1.2.

Discussion: In response to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 1.2, TVA committed in Reference 1 to the installation of an

upgraded process computer and an enhanced sequence

of events recording capability. TVA's response was

found to be acceptable in the NRC's Safety

Evaluation provided by Reference 2.

As discussed in Reference 3, the Unit 2 equipment

was replaced with more modern and sophisticated

hardware, since the time of the original TVA

submittal. The previously described upgrade to a

Digital VAX 11/750 process computer system was

accomplished using a Digital VAX 6000 system. The

functions previously performed by the sequence of

events and time history recorder are now

accomplished using the process computer system.

However, the guidance contained in the Generic

Letter and the requirements of the Safety

Evaluation continue to be met.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 7, 1983, in regards to Generic Letter 83-28

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 12, 1985, Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 83-28, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information

Capability)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 9, 1993, Completion of Unit 2 Commitment for Generic

Letter 83-28, Item 1.2 - Post-Trip Review - Data

and Information Capability (GSI 75 / MPA B-085)

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-56 Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 4.5.2, Periodic On-Line Testing Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter, Item 4.5.2.

Discussion: The NRC's position on this item was that plants not currently designed to permit periodic on-line

testing shall justify not making modifications to

permit such testing. Alternatives to on-line

testing proposed by licensees will be considered

where special circumstances exist and where the

objective of high reliability can be met in another

way. TVA's initial response to this item (Reference 1) stated that on-line testing was being

evaluated. A description of the Reactor Protection

System (RPS) functional testing and reliability was

provided by TVA in Reference 2.

The NRC Safety Evaluation states the on-line

testing capability of BFN's RPS meets the intent of

this item and is therefore acceptable (Reference 3).

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 7, 1983, in regards to Generic Letter 83-28

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 15, 1984, in regards to Generic Letter 83-28

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated September 2, 1986, Reactor Trip System Reliability, On-Line

Testing, Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.5.2

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-57 Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 4.5.3, Intervals for On-Line Testing

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.5.3.

Discussion: The NRC Staff has reviewed the General Electric Topical Reports NEDC-30844, BWR Owners'

Group (BWROG) Response to NRC Generic Letter

83-28, Item 4.5.3, and NEDC-30851P, Technical

Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Reactor

Protection System, and issued a favorable Safety

Evaluation Report (Reference 1).

In Reference 2, TVA endorsed the BWROG position and

stated the analysis presented in NEDC-30851P were

applicable to BFN. No Technical Specifications

instrument calibration frequency extensions were

requested based on these reports. Differences

between the parts of BFN's Reactor Protection

System (RPS) that perform the trip functions and

those of the base case plant were analyzed using

the procedures of Appendix K of NEDC-30851P to

demonstrate no appreciable change in RPS

availability or public risk. The Safety Evaluation

that closed this item was provided by Reference 3.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

NRC letter to BWR Owners Group, dated July 15, 1987, General Electric Company (GE)

Topical Reports NEDC-30844, BWR Owners'

Group Response to NRC Generic Letter 83-28, and

NEDC-30851P, Technical Specifications

Improvement Analysis for BWR RPS

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 5, 1990, Generic Letter 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic

Implications of Salem ATWS Events, Item 4.5.3, Reactor Trip System Reliability

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 17, 1990, Safety Evaluation of Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.5.3, Reactor Trip Reliability - On-Line Functional

Testing of the Reactor Trip System

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-58 Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in

Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46

Commitment: TVA will resolve USI A-46.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA committed to use the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) methodology as

documented in the Generic Implementation

Procedure (GIP) to resolve USI A-46 at Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant. NRC requested clarification

regarding TVA's approach in Reference 2, which TVA

supplied in Reference 3. In Reference 4, the staff

considered TVA's commitment to comply with GIP-2 an

acceptable method for resolving USI A-46 at BFN.

TVA provided its response to Generic Letter 87-02

for Unit 1 in Reference 5.

TVA completed the USI-A46 review and resolved

outliers. TVA completed the operations review of

Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) following the

A-46 verification. The review determined that Unit

1 can be safely shutdown to Mode 3 and maintained

while using only the equipment in the SSEL.

IR 2006-006 (Reference 6) stated "- However, final closure of these items will be deferred until NRR

completes their review in this area and any SERs, if required, are issued."

Status: Complete

The Safety Evaluation on this program was provided

by Reference 7.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1992, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Supplement 1

to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic

Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment

in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and Supplement 4 to Generic

Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examination of

External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident

Vulnerabilities

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (TAC Nos. M69430, M69431, and M69432)

April 13, 2007 E1-59

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 19, 1993, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Generic

Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, 120-Day

Response, Request for Additional Information

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 19, 1993, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response - Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant (TAC Nos. M69430, M69431, and M69432)

5. TVA letter, T. E. Abney to NRC, dated October 7, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1 that Transmits

Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic Implementation

Procedure, Revision 2, as Corrected on

February 14, 1992 (GIP-2)

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 8, 2006, Review of Licensee Response to NRC Generic

Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 That Transmits

Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 on

SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure Revision

2, As Corrected on February 14, 1992

April 13, 2007 E1-60 Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 88-01.

Discussion: TVA's program to address Generic Letter 88-01 was provided by Reference 1. The Safety Evaluation

documenting the acceptability of the program was

included in Reference 2. Supplemental information

regarding Unit 1 was submitted in Reference 3. The

Safety Evaluation for Unit 1 was provided by

Reference 5.

Status: C-C

TVA has completed the Generic Letter 88-01 program.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 28, 1992, Supplemental Response to Generic Letter (GL)

88-01, NRC Position on Intergranular Stress

Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) in BWR Austenitic

Stainless Steel Piping

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 3, 1993, Safety Evaluation of Supplemental Response to

Generic Letter 88-01

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 21, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Supplemental

Response to Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position

on Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking In

BWR Austentic Stainless Steel Piping

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

5. NRC letter to TVA dated May 30, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 - Supplemental

Response to Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position

on Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in

BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] Austenitic Stainless

Steel Piping

April 13, 2007 E1-61 Generic Letter 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant

Operations

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 88-11.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 88-11 in Reference 1. TVA concluded that the current

pressure-temperature curves in each plant's

Technical Specifications were valid through the

next two fuel cycles when compared to the

Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology.

Supplemental information was provided for BFN in

References 2 and 3.

In Reference 4, TVA proposed Technical

Specifications changes for BFN Units 1, 2 and 3 to

incorporate pressure-temperature curves calculated

using Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology. NRC requested additional information

in Reference 5, which was provided by TVA in

Reference 6. The proposed Technical Specifications

were issued by Reference 7.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 8).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated November 30, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant (SQN), and Watts Bar Nuclear

Plant (WBN) - Response to Generic Letter

88 NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement

of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on

Plant Operations

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 28, 1991, TVA Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 88-11, NRC Position of Radiation Embrittlement of

Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant

Operations

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 30, 1991, TVA Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 88-11, NRC Position of Radiation Embrittlement of

Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant

Operations

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 19, 1991, TVA BFN Technical Specification (TS) No. 293

April 13, 2007 E1-62

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 28, 1991, Pressure-Temperature Limits Pursuant to Generic

Letter 88-11 as Reflected in Proposed Amendment

to Technical Specification (TS 293)

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 24, 1991, TVA BFN Technical Specification (TS) No. 293 -

Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel

Material and its Impact on Plant Operations -

Response to Request for Additional Information

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 8, 1993, Issuance of Amendments for the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant (TS 293)

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-63 Generic Letter 88-14, Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 88-14.

Discussion: The original response to Generic Letter 88-14 was included as part of Reference 1. Additional

information regarding the dew point of air being

supplied to certain components was provided in

Reference 2. NRC confirmed TVA's commitments in

Reference 3.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-008 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated February 23, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant (SQN), and Watts Bar Nuclear

Plant (WBN) - Response to Generic Letter

88 Instrument Air Supply System Problems

Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 30, 1993, Supplemental Response to Generic Letter (GL)

88-14, Instrument Air Supply System Problems

Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 9, 1989, Generic Letter 88 Instrument Air Supply System

Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment (TAC Nos. 71631/71632/71633)

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 14, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005008

April 13, 2007 E1-64 Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

Issue: TVA will respond to Generic Letter 88-20.

Discussion: Generic Letter 88-20 requested licensees:

1. Perform a systematic examination to identify any plant specific vulnerabilities to severe

accidents; and

2. Identify and review proposed plant improvements (design changes and changes to operating

procedures, maintenance, surveillance, training, or staffing).

The Generic Letter did not request individual IPEs

be performed for each unit at a multi-unit site.

The BFN facility has been extensively reviewed by

the staff, beginning with an interim reliability

evaluation in 1982. This was followed by the

subsequent submittal of the November 20, 1986, BFN Unit 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and

its subsequent NRC audit. TVA subsequently

submitted BFN's IPE in 1992 and the Multi-unit PRA (MUPRA) in 1995. Since then, TVA has performed

individual Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs. Neither the

MUPRA, nor the subsequently performed individual

Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs have identified plant

vulnerabilities when single or multiple units are

in operation. These analyses have provided the

staff with more than reasonable assurance that TVA

has adequately analyzed the plant design and

operations.

In Reference 1, NRC identified the specific

information needed for the closeout of Generic

Letter 88-20 for Browns Ferry Unit 1. This

information was provided in Reference 2.

Status: Complete

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated June 21, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Request for

Additional Information Related to Generic

Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examination For

Severe Accident Vulnerability April 13, 2007 E1-65

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 17, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1 - Response to

Request for Additional Information Related to

Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant

Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability April 13, 2007 E1-66 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe

Accident Vulnerabilities

Commitment: TVA will complete an Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE).

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA described BFN's program and schedule for completing the internal fires, high

winds, external floods, and transportation and

nearby facility accidents portions of the IPEEE.

NRC acceptance of the methods and schedules for the

addressed portions of the IPEEE was documented in

Reference 2.

TVA provided its initial program and schedule for

responding to the seismic portion of the IPEEE in

Reference 3. NRC requested additional information

on this subject in Reference 4, which TVA provided

in Reference 5.

The summary report for the high winds, external

floods, and transportation and nearby facility

accidents IPEEE was provided by TVA in Reference 6

for all three BFN units. The seismic IPEEE Report

and the Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation were

provided in Reference 7.

Status: Complete

TVA completed corrective actions to address the

seismic-induced fire vulnerability associated with

the emergency lighting battery racks located in the

BFN Unit 1 cable spreading room prior to restart.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 20, 1991, Individual Plant Examination of External

Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident

Vulnerabilities (Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 2, 1992, Review of Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement

No. 4 - Individual Plant Examinations for

External Events

April 13, 2007 E1-67

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1992, Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical

and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 and

Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, Individual

Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 19, 1993, Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Supplement 1, 120-Day

Response, Request for Additional Information

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 24, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of

External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident

Vulnerabilities - Partial Submittal of Report

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 14, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 -

Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, Supplement 4 - Individual Plant Examination of

External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident

Vulnerabilities - Submittal of Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Seismic and Internal Fires

IPEEE Reports

April 13, 2007 E1-68 Generic Letter 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display System

Commitment: TVA will install and make operational a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and certify that

the SPDS fully meets the requirements of

NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, taking into account the

information provided in NUREG-1342.

Discussion: Certification that BFN's SPDS fully meets the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, taking

into account the information provided in

NUREG-1342, was requested by Generic Letter

89-06 (Reference 1). TVA's commitment to implement

an SPDS on Unit 1 before restart is contained in

Reference 2. The final design description for the

SPDS was provided by TVA in References 3 and 4.

The initial Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the

SPDS design description was documented in

Reference 5. TVA responded to the SER open items

in Reference 6. NRC concluded in a Supplemental

SER that TVA's SPDS design description fully met

the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 7).

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 8).

References:

1.

NRC letter to All Licensees of Operating Plants, Applicants for Operating Licenses and Holders of

Construction Permits, dated April 12, 1989, Task

Action Plan Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter

Display System - 10 CFR 50.54(f) - (Generic

Letter No. 89-06)

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 8, 1987, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) - Schedule for

Response to Request for Additional Information

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 22, 1990, Notification of Implementation of NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Item I.D.2.1, Safety

Parameter Display System (SPDS), Phase I

Installation and Final Design Description

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 11, 1990, Notification of Implementation of NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Item I.D.2.1, Safety

Parameter Display System (SPDS), Final Design

Description

April 13, 2007 E1-69

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 6, 1991, Interim and Final Design of the Safety Parameter Display

System at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 17, 1991, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Response

to NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Open Items

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 5, 1992, Safety Parameter Display System - Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3)

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-70 Generic Letter 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 89-08.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 89-08 in Reference 1 and committed to implement a

long-term monitoring program (single and dual phase

piping). NRC acceptance of the program was

provided in Reference 2.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-009 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 19, 1989, Response to Generic Letter 89 Erosion/Corrosion-

Induced Pipe Wall Thinning

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 21, 1989, Licensee Confirmation of its Response to NRC

Generic Letter 89-08

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 13, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005009

April 13, 2007 E1-71 Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 89-10.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 89-10 in Reference 1 and committed to implement a

comprehensive motor operated valve program within

the requested 5-year implementation schedule.

Additional schedule information was provided by NRC

in Reference 2. TVA provided the 30-day response

to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3 by

Reference 3 and informed the Staff that the plant

specific safety assessment was available for

review. TVA also responded to Reference 2 and

informed the Staff in Reference 4 that the program

description for implementing Generic Letter 89-10

was also available for review.

The 120-day response requested in Supplement 3 to

the Generic Letter was provided by TVA in

Reference 5. It stated that no deficiencies were

identified in the motor-operated valves for primary

containment isolation for the High Pressure Coolant

Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling steam

supply lines or the Reactor Water Cleanup water

supply line.

In Reference 6, TVA clarified the implementation

schedule for Unit 1. Based on test requirements

and system configurations, it would be necessary to

perform differential pressure testing on some motor

operated valves during the power ascension test

program. Consequently, TVA committed to complete

the required testing within 30 days following the

completion of the power ascension test program.

This implementation schedule was acknowledged by

the NRC Staff in Reference 7.

TVA submitted a Unit 1 specific program description

in Reference 8. The Generic Letter 89-10 program

for BFN Unit 1 has been developed.

TVA's review and documentation of the design basis

for the operation of each Unit 1 MOV within the

scope of the Generic Letter 89-10 program, the

valves included in the program, the methods for

determining and adjusting switch settings, testing, surveillance, and maintenance are the same as with

the Units 2 and 3 program.

April 13, 2007 E1-72 Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 9).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 21, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Sequoyah

Nuclear Plant (SQN), and Watts Bar Nuclear

Plant (WBN) - Response to Generic Letter

89 Safety-Related Motor-Operated

Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated September 14, 1990, Response to Generic Letter 89-10,

Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and

Surveillance for the Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants (MPA B-110)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 10, 1990, Response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Supplement 3 - Consideration of the Results of

NRC-Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves (MOV) 4. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 21, 1990, Response to Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related

Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 13, 1991, Response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Supplement 3 - Consideration of the Results of

NRC-Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves (MOV) 6. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 14, 1992, Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated

Valve Testing and Surveillance - Implementation

Schedule 7. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 30, 1992, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 -

Implementation Schedule for Generic Letter 89-10 (TAC Nos. M75635, M75636 and M75637)

8. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 5, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Generic

Letter 89-10 and Supplements 1 to 7,

Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)

Testing and Surveillance

9. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-73 Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 89-13.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 89-13 in Reference 1. Three of the near-term commitments

were rescheduled in Reference 2. NRC was notified

of the completion of the majority of the

commitments made in response to Generic Letter

89-13 in Reference 3. The remaining commitment on

Unit 1 is to verify that the Unit 1 portions of the

Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) and

Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) systems

satisfy their design criteria. Completion of NRC's

review is documented in Reference 4.

Status: C-C

The Unit 1 RHRSW and EECW systems' ability to

satisfy their design basis has been verified.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 5).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated March 16, 1990, Response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 Service

Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related

Equipment

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 31, 1990, Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, Service Water System

Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 17, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Response to Generic

Letter (GL) 89 Service Water System (SWS)

Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 23, 1990, Licensee's Response To Generic Letter 89-13

Regarding Service Water Systems (TAC Nos. 73970, 73971, and 73972)

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-74 Generic Letter 89-16, Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent

Commitment: TVA will complete Generic Letter 89-16.

Discussion: In Reference 1, NRC requested licensees with Mark I containments to voluntarily install a hardened

vent. In response, TVA committed to install a

hardened vent prior to restart in Reference 2.

Status: C-C

TVA installed a hardened wetwell vent.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-006 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

NRC letter to All Operating Licensees with Mark I Containments, dated September 1, 1989, Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent (Generic

Letter 89-16)

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 30, 1989, Response to Generic Letter 89-16, Installation

of Hardened Wetwell Vent

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-75 Generic Letter 92-01, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, Revision 1, and Revision 1 Supplement 1

Commitment: TVA will submit a summary evaluation of the time and accumulated fluence during intervals of BFN operation below 525 F and its effect on the reference temperature and on the Charpy upper shelf

energy.

Discussion: TVA provided an initial response to Generic Letter 92-01 in Reference 1 and made the commitment reiterated above. The summary evaluation of the

time and accumulated fluence during intervals of BFN operation below 525 F was provided by TVA in Reference 2. Additional information was requested

by the NRC Staff in Reference 3 , which was provided by TVA in Reference 4.

In Reference 5, NRC requested TVA verify the data

entered into the Reactor Vessel Integrity Database.

TVA responded to this request in References 6

and 7. Updated material and fluence data was

provided by TVA in Reference 8.

In Reference 9, NRC requested Licensees verify the

completeness of the information previously

submitted by November 15, 1995. TVA's response was

provided in References 10 and 11.

As a result of new industry data, NRC again

requested updated information in Reference 12. The

requested information was provided by TVA in

Reference 13 for Browns Ferry.

Status: C-C for restart.

As committed in TVA's May 23, 1 994 letter, TVA will inform NRC of the applicability of NEDO 32205

within 90 days of the final surveillance capsules

analysis report.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 14).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated July 7, 1992, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Sequoyah Nuclear

Plant (SQN), and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -

Response to generic Letter 92-0 1 (Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity)

April 13, 2007 E1-76

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 1, 1992, Completion of Commitment Made in Response to

Generic Letter 92-01, Reactor Vessel Structural

Integrity

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 27, 1993, Request for Additional Information Regarding TVA

Response to Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 2, 1993, Response to Request for Additional Information, Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 19, 1994, Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Reactor Vessel

Structural Integrity

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 23, 1994, TVA's Response to NRC's Letter Dated April 19, 1994, Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1 , Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 28, 1994, Supplemental Response to TVA letter Dated

May 23, 1994, Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity

8. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 27, 1995, Generic Letter 92-01, Reactor Vessel Structural

Integrity - Update to the Initial Reference

Nil-Ductility Temperature (RT NDT), Chemical Composition and Fluence Values

9. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 19, 1995, NRC Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1:

Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity 1 0. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 7, 1995, in regards to Generic Letter 92-01 1 1. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 7, 1995, Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1; Reactor Vessel

Structural Integrity - Browns Ferry (BFN),

Watts Bar (WBN), and Sequoyah (SQN) Nuclear

Plants 1 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 10, 1998, Request for Additional Information Regarding Pressure

Vessel Integrity at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. MA1179, MA1180, and

MA1181)

April 13, 2007 E1-77 1 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 8, 1998, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, and 3 - Generic Letter (GL) 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1, Reactor Vessel Structural

Integrity - Response to NRC Request for

Additional Information (TAC Nos. MA1179, MA1180, and MA1181) 1 4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-78 Generic Letter 92-04, Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs

Commitment: TVA will continue to support the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) program of analysis, testing, and

development of possible hardware changes which is

being conducted by the BWROG.

TVA will review the results of the BWROG program

for potential training requirements for operators.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 92-04 by Reference 1. NRC approval of TVA's program for the

resolution of Generic Letter 92-0 4 is documented in Reference 2. Interim training of the operators was

provided as documented in Inspection Report 93-16 (Reference 3).

Long-term actions were addressed as part of the resolution of Bulletin 93-03 -Resolution of Issues

Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in BWRs.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated September 28, 1992, Response to Generic Letter (GL) 92

Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor

Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 25, 1993, Response to Generic Letter 92-04, Resolution of

the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in Boiling Water Reactors

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 18, 1993, NRC Inspection Report No. 259/93-16, 260/93-16 and

296/93-16

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-79 Generic Letter 94-02, Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for

Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling

Water Reactors

Commitment: 1.

TVA will modify BFN operating procedures and training programs to make them consistent or

more conservative than the BWR Owners'

Group (BWROG) interim guidelines.

2. TVA will implement the BWROG Option III methodology for the stability long-term

solution.

Discussion: TVA responded to Generic Letter 94-02 in Reference 1. In Reference 2 , TVA notified NRC that the Unit 1 procedure revisions would be completed

prior to restart. In Reference 3, TVA stated its

intent to implement the long-term stability

solution on Unit 1 before the restart of that unit.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated September 8, 1994, Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 94

Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim

Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic

Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 22, 1994, NRC Generic Letter (GL) 94-02, Long-Term Solutions

and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations

for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling

Water Reactors - Completion of Requested

Action 1, Interim Corrective Actions

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 4, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, and 3 -

TVA Confirmation of the Installation Schedule

for the Stability Long-Term Solution for NRC

Generic Letter (GL) 94-02

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-80 Generic Letter 94-03, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water Reactors

Commitment: TVA will inspect 100% of the accessible areas on core shroud welds Hl through H7. The inspections

will be conducted using the best available

technology (i.e., Smart-2000 system, suction cup

scanners, Westinghouse 1250 camera, etc.) prior to

restart.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA committed to inspect the accessible areas of the core shroud prior to Unit 1 restart. The NRC's Safety Evaluation is contained

in Reference 2.

Status: C-C

TVA inspected 100% of the accessible areas on core

shroud welds Hl through H7. A structural margin

analysis of the core shroud inspections results was

performed. This analysis determined Unit 1 can

resume operation without repair.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-008 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated August 23, 1994, Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 94

Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

of Shrouds in Boiling Water Reactors.

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 13, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3

Safety Evaluation of Response to Generic Letter

94-03 (IGSCC of Core Shroud in BWRs)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 14, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005008

April 13, 2007 E1-81 Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves

Commitment: Unit 1 will be evaluated for the requirements of Generic Letter 95-07 prior to restart.

Discussion: TVA provided response to NRC in References 1 through 5 for BFN Units 2 and 3, Sequoyah Units 1

and 2, and Watts Bar. The NRC's Safety Evaluation

for Generic Letter 95-07 was provided in

Reference 6.

TVA responded to Generic Letter 95-07 for BFN

Unit 1 in Reference 7 and provided additional

information in Reference

8. The review methodology used for Unit 1 is the same as that used for TVA's

other operating nuclear plants.

The safety related power operated gate valves in

Unit 1 have been reviewed for potential

susceptibility to the pressure locking and thermal

binding phenomenon. There is one High Pressure

Coolant Injection valve in Unit 1 which is

susceptible to thermal binding. Prior to restart, this valve wasreplaced with a double disc valve of

similar design as Units 2 and 3. Two Core Spray

minimum flow valves in Unit 1 were replaced with

double disc valves prior to Unit 1 restart. In

addition, five safety related power operated gate

valves were modified prior to Unit 1 restart to

preclude the potential for pressure locking. The

reactor side disc face of these five valves was

modified by drilling a hole in the disc face into

the cavity between the disc faces to avoid pressure

locking. NRC found TVA's responses to be an

acceptable resolution to the GL 95-07 concerns (Reference 9).

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-006 (Reference 10).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated October 16, 1995, Browns Ferry (BFN), Sequoyah (SQN), and Watts

Bar (WBN) Nuclear Plants - Response to Generic

Letter, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of

Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves

April 13, 2007 E1-82

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 15, 1995, Browns Ferry (BFN), Sequoyah (SQN), and Watts Bar (WBN) Nuclear Plants -Supplemental Response

to Generic Letter, Pressure Locking and Thermal

Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate

Valves 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 13, 1996, Browns Ferry (BFN), Sequoyah (SQN), and Watts

Bar (WBN) Nuclear Plants - 180-Day Response to

Generic Letter, Pressure Locking and Thermal

Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate

Valves 4. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 30, 1996, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 2 and 3, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-

Related Power-Operated Gate Valves - Response to

Request for Additional Information (TAC Nos. M93437 and M93438)

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 19, 1999, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 2 and 3

- Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, Pressure Locking

and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-

Operated Gate Valves - Supplemental Response (TAC Nos. M93437 and M93438)

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 23, 1999, Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter, Pressure Locking

and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-

Operated Gate Valves, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - (TAC Nos. M93436, M93437 and M93438)

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 11, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Generic

Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal

Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate

Valves 8. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 29, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to

Request for Additional Information Regarding

Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and

Thermal Binding of Safety-R elated Power Operated Gate Valves

9. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 28, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Closeout of

Generic Letter 95-07, "Pressure Locking and

Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated

Gate Valves," Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (TAC No. MC3125) 1 0. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

.

April 13, 2007 E1-83 Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits

Commitment: BFN Unit 1 will implement the recommendations of Generic Letter 96-01 prior to restart.

Discussion: TVA committed to implement the recommendations of Generic Letter 96-01 prior to restart in

Reference 1.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 2).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 18, 1996, Response to Generic Letter (GL) 96-01, Testing

of Safety-Related Logic Circuits (TAC Nos.

M94650, M94651, M95652, M94732, M94733, M94750)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-84 Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Motor-Operated Valves

Commitment: BFN Unit 1 will implement the Joint Owner's Group recommended GL 96-0 5 Periodic Verification Program, and begin testing during the first refueling outage

after restart.

Discussion: TVA responded for all its nuclear facilities in Reference 1 and supplemented the response in

Reference 2. TVA was a member of the Joint Owners'

Group (JOG), which culminated in the dynamic

testing of 176 Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) at 98

BWR and PWR plants. Each valve was tested three

times over five years to address potential

degradation in required thrust or torque. The

final Topical Report and recommendations for

periodic testing were submitted by Reference

3. No additional interim testing is required for Unit 1

since the industry program has been completed.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-009 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated March 17, 1997, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) (TAC Nos. M97020, M97021, M97022), Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN),

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), and Bellefonte

Nuclear Plant (BLN) 180-Day Response to NRC

Generic Letter (GL) 96-0 5, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related

Motor-Operated Valves, Dated September 18, 1996

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 28, 1998, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) (TAC Nos. M97020, M97021, M97022), Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN),

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), and Bellefonte

Nuclear Plant (BLN) Response to NRC's Safety

Evaluation Dated October 30, 1997, on Joint

Owners Group's (JOG) Program for Generic Letter (GL) 96-05, Periodic Verification (PV) of

Motor-Operated Valves (MOV) Described in Topical

Report MPR-1807 (Revision 2)

3. JOG letter to NRC, dated February 27, 2004, Joint Owners Group Program on Motor-Operated

Valve Periodic Verification

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 13, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005009

April 13, 2007 E1-85 Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis

Accident Conditions

Commitment: TVA will address Generic Letter 96-06 prior to restart.

Discussion: On September 30, 1996, NRC issued Generic Letter 96-06, which requested licensees address the

susceptibility for waterhammer and two-phase flow

in the containment air cooler system and over

pressurization of piping that penetrates

containment.

As described in Reference 1, TVA evaluated the

Unit 1 cont a inment air cooler cooling water systems to determine if they are susceptible to either

water hammer or two-phase flow conditions during

postulated accident conditions. TVA has also

evaluated piping systems that penetrate containment

to determine if they are susceptible to thermal

expansion of fluid such that overpressurization of

piping may occur. Two commitments resulted from

this evaluation:

The Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains system is acceptable based on leakage through valves which

will avoid thermally induced pressure increases

above the rated design pressure of the system.

However, TVA will modify the system to provide a

designed method of overpressure protection.

The Demineralized Water system has the potential to be affected by overpressurization during a

postulated LOCA if the piping is completely

filled with water and isolated. In response, TVA will implement procedure changes to assure

the system is sufficiently drained following use

and is open to containment during power

operation.

In Reference 2 , NRC stated that TVA had provided an acceptable resolution to the concerns of the

Generic Letter.

April 13, 2007 E1-86 Status: C-C TVA modified the Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains system to provide a designed method of

overpressure protection.

Demineraliz e d water piping in the Unit 1 drywell has been either removed or abandoned. Procedure

changes were not required.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-008 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 12, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Generic

Letter 96-0 6, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis

Accident Conditions

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 7, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Closeout of

Generic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment

Operability and Containment Integrity During

Design-basis Accident Conditions" (TAC No. MC3186)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 14, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005008

April 13, 2007 E1-87 Generic Letter 97-04, Assurance Of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head For Emergency Core Cooling and

Containment Heat Removal Pumps

Commitment: TVA will address Generic Letter 97-04 prior to restart.

Discussion: On October 7, 1997, NRC issued Generic Letter 97-04, which requested licensees review the current

design-basis analyses used to determine the

available net positive suction head for the

emergency core cooling (including core spray and

decay heat removal) and containment heat removal

pumps.

TVA replied to Generic Letter 97-04 for BFN Unit 1

in Reference 1. TVA stated that it would request

approval to credit containment overpressure as part

of proposed Technical Specifications (TS) 431, the

BFN Unit 1 Extended Power Uprate application, which

was submitted in Reference 2.

U pon approval of the requested change, no additional information should

be required to close Generic Letter 97-04 for BFN

Unit 1.

Status: C-C

In a letter dated July 26, 2006 (Reference 3), NRR

issued an SER concluding BFN has satisfied this

Bulletin.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-009 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 6, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to

NRC Generic Letter (GL) 97-04, Assurance of

Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) for

Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat

Removal Pumps

2. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1- Proposed Technical

Specifications (TS) Change TS - 431 - Request

For License Amendment - Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Operation," dated June 28, 2004 April 13, 2007 E1-88

3. NRC Letter to TVA, dated July 27, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 -Review of Licensee

Response To NRC Generic Letter 97-04, "Assurance

Of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for

Emergency Core Cooling And Containment Heat

Removal Pumps" (TAC No. MC3392)

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 5, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006009

April 13, 2007 E1-89 Generic Letter 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Commitment: None

Discussion: Generic Letter 98-01 requested information regarding year 2000 readiness at nuclear power

plants. TVA certified the readiness of its nuclear

facilities in Reference 1. In Reference 2, the NRC

concluded that all requested information had been

provided. Therefore, NRC considered GL 98-01 to

be closed for TVA's nuclear facilities.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-006 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated June 29, 1999, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 1, 2, and 3, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1, Final

Response to Generic Letter (GL) 98-01, Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear

Power Plants

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated October 18, 1999, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry and Sequoyah - Response to

Generic Letter 98-01, "Year 2000 Readiness of

Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants" (TAC Nos. MA1810, MA1811, MA1812, MAl888, MA1889

and MA1906)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -

NRC Integrated Inspection Report

05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-90 Generic Letter 98-04, Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the Containment

Spray System after a Loss-Of-Coolant

Accident Because of Construction and

Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign

Material in Containment

Commitment: TVA will address Generic Letter 98-04 prior to restart.

Discussion: NRC issued GL 98-04 to alert licensees to concerns with the material condition of Service Level 1

protective coatings inside the containment.

GL 98-04 requested that licensees describe their

programs for ensuring that Service Level 1

protective coatings inside containment do not

detach from their substrate and adversely affect

the ability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and the safety-related Containment Spray

System to perform their function following a Design

Basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

TVA responded to GL 98-04 for Unit 1 in

Reference 1. In summary, TVA has implemented

controls for the procurement, application, and

maintenance of Service Level 1 protective coatings

used inside the primary containment in a manner

that is consistent with the licensing basis and

regulatory requirements applicable to BFN. The NRC

Safety Evaluation (Reference 3) concluded that BFN

had provided the information required by GL 98-04.

Status: C-C IR 2006-006 (Reference 2) stated "- However, final closure of this item will be deferred until NRR

completes their review in this area."

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-008 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated May 11, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Response to

NRC Generic Letter (GL) 98-04, Potential for

Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System

and the Containment Spray System After a Loss-

Of-Coolant Accident Because of Construction and

Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign

Material in Containment

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC April 13, 2007 E1-91 Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

3. NRC letter to TVA dated September 27, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Review of

Licensee Response to NRC Generic Letter 98-04, "Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core

Cooling System and the Containment Spray System

After a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident Because of

Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies

and Foreign Material in Containment"

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 9, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006008

April 13, 2007 E1-92 Generic Letter 2003-01, Control Room Habitability

Commitment: TVA will address Generic Letter 2003-01 prior to restart.

Discussion: NRC issued GL 2003-01 to:

1. alert addressees to findings at U.S. power reactor facilities suggesting that the control

room licensing and design bases, and applicable

regulatory requirements may not be met, and that

existing technical specification surveillance

requirements (SRs) may not be adequate, 2. emphasize the importance of reliable, comprehensive surveillance testing to verify

control room habitability, 3. request addressees to submit information that demonstrates that the control room at each of

their respective facilities complies with the

current licensing and design bases, and

applicable regulatory requirements, and that

suitable design, maintenance and testing control

measures are in place for maintaining this

compliance, and

4. collect the requested information to determine if additional regulatory action is required.

TVA responded to GL 2003-01 in Reference 1. In

summary, the BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 design basis and

licensing basis are in compliance with the

applicable regulatory requirements. The plant is

constructed and maintained in accordance with its

design, and the testing performed in accordance

with the BFN Technical Specifications (TS) and

their bases is adequate to demonstrate this

compliance and material condition.

In Reference 2, the NRC provided a request for

additional information (RAI) to TVA. TVA answered

this RAI in Reference 3.

Status: Complete

April 13, 2007 E1-93

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 8, 2003, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 1, 2, and 3 Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL)

2003 Control Room Habitability

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 9, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Request

For Additional Information Regarding Generic

Letter 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability"

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 8, 2007, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2 and 3 -

Request For Additional Information Regarding

Generic Letter 2003-01, "Control Room

Habitability"

April 13, 2007 E1-94 Generic Safety Issue 75 / Multi-Plant Action B085, Generic Letter 83-28, Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review -

Data and Information Capability

Issue: This issue arose from the staff concerns resulting from analysis of events that occurred at the Salem

Nuclear Power Plant on February 22 and 25, 1983.

The study of these events resulted in the issuance

of NUREG-1000 and Generic Letter 83-28. Item 1.2

of the Generic Letter requests licensees have the

capability to record, recall, and display data and

information to permit diagnosing the causes of

unscheduled reactor shutdowns and the proper

functioning of safety-related equipment during

these events using systematic safety assessment

procedures.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information Capability) (Page E1-55).

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information Capability) (Page E1-55).

References:

Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS, Item 1.2, Post Trip Review (Data and Information Capability) (Page E1-55).

April 13, 2007 E1-95 HVAC Duct Supports

Commitment: The HVAC Duct Supports program will be implemented in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: The approval of the program for the seismic qualification of HVAC duct supports is contained in

References 1 and 2. The design criteria for the

seismic qualification of the HVAC and supports was

submitted in Reference 3. The NRC staff's Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) on the criteria was

included in Reference 4.

Status: C-C

For Unit 1, a review was performed to identify the

areas of Class I HVAC ductwork that were not

previously qualified for Units 2 and 3 operation.

The only areas specific to Unit 1 thus identified

were the ductwork associated with the pump motor

coolers for the Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal system

and Core Spray system. Based upon the seismic

qualification calculations, modifications have been

completed to ensure that this ductwork is qualified

to the long term requirements of the design

criteria.

NRC closed this item in document dated

March 9, 2007 (Reference 5).

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated August 22, 1990, Safety Evaluation of Inspection Open Item Regarding

HVAC Ductworks and Supports for Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (TAC No. 62259)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 - Browns

Ferry, Unit 2, Section 2.2.2.4 (Page 2-5)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 15, 1991, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)

Seismic Design Criteria

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 16, 1992, Evaluation of Seismic Design Criteria for

Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning

5. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-96 Instrument Sensing Lines

Commitment: 1.

The H 2 O 2 analyzers will be modified in accordance with the Unit 2 precedent.

2. Where satisfactory operation can not be justified, the sensing lines will be reworked.

3. The 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, FSAR Appendix M, and Generic Evaluation of Internally Generated

Missiles programs will require evaluations to

maintain the integrity of instrument sense line

separation.

Discussion: The action plan for dispositioning instrument sensing line issues, including a discussion of

lessons learned from the Unit 2 precedent, was

provided in Reference 1. In Reference 2, NRC

concluded that the program to address concerns

related to instrument sensing lines was adequate.

Status: Complete

The sample lines to the H 2 O 2 analyzers were modified to assure that there are no moisture traps

which would block the air sample flow from the

drywell/torus to the analyzers.

Safety-related sensing lines were evaluated in

order to maintain the integrity of instrument

sensing line separation as required by the

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, FSAR Appendix M, and Generic

Evaluation of Internally Generated Missiles

programs. Sensing lines were either justified for

use-as-is, or modified as required.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated February 13, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Related to

Instrument Sensing Lines for Units 1 and 3

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 10, 1991, Safety Evaluation - TVA Action Plan to Resolve

Concerns Related to Instrument Sensing Lines for

the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3

April 13, 2007 E1-97 Instrument Tubing

Commitment: Safety-related instrument tubing will be seismically qualified to meet the final design

criteria.

Discussion: The action plan for dispositioning concerns regarding the seismic qualification of instrument

tubing, including a discussion of lessons learned

from the Unit 2 precedent, was provided in

Reference 1. Additional information regarding

inspection attributes and sampling sizes was

provided in Reference 2. In Reference 3, NRC

concluded that the program was an acceptable basis

for restart of Unit 1 provided that the licensee

also evaluates the instrument tubing populations in

all units for any new attributes which may be

identified during the implementation of the revised

program.

Status: Complete

The affected systems / supports were analyzed for

Seismic Class I qualification, and necessary

modifications were completed.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated February 27, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition Concerns Regarding

the Seismic Qualification of Units 1 and 3

Instrument Tubing

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 12, 1991, Small Bore Piping Program, Tubing, and Conduit

Support Plans for Units 1 and 3 - Additional

Information

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 4, 1992, Safety Evaluation of Small Bore Piping and

Seismic Qualification of Instrument Tubing

Programs for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3 April 13, 2007 E1-98 Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

Commitment: The Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) program will be implemented in accordance with the

Unit 2 precedent.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88 NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic

Stainless Steel Piping (Page E1-60).

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88 NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic

Stainless Steel Piping (Page E1-60).

References:

None

April 13, 2007 E1-99 Large Bore Piping Supports

Commitment: TVA will complete Bulletin 79-14.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping

Systems (Page E1-6).

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping

Systems (Page E1-6).

References:

None

April 13, 2007 E1-100 License Renewal - Appendix F Commitments

Commitment: TVA will implement the License Renewal - Appendix F commitments prior to Unit 1 restart.

Discussion: On April 21, 2006, TVA sent the NRC a revised list of commitments for License Renewal (Reference 1).

Table 3 of Enclosure 1 of the letter contains the

list of License Renewal commitments which are

required for Unit 1 restart. The items originate

from Appendix F of the License Renewal Application

and are required to make the current licensing

basis (CLB) of Unit 1 at restart the same as the

CLB for Units 2 and 3. These commitments are

contained in Table 3 of Appendix A of the Safety

Evaluation Report related to the License Renewal of

BFN (Reference 2).

Status: Each of the 13 Appendix F commitments and its status is as follows: F.1 Evaluate and modify, as required, main steam leakage path piping to ensure structural

integrity.

Status: Open F.2 Implement Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System modification.

Status: Complete TVA completed the modifications to the CAD system. F.3 Revise Fire Protection Report per Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.13.

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Fire Protection / 10 CFR 50, Appendix R (Page E1-46). F.4 Implement Environmental Qualification Program. Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Environmental Qualification (Page E1-45).

April 13, 2007 E1-101 F.5 Address GL 88-01, and make necessary plant modifications.

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88-01, NRC Position

on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic

Stainless Steel Piping (Page E1-60). F.6 BWRVIP Programs used for Units 2 and 3 will be used for Unit 1.

Status: Complete Required inspections have been completed, and examination reports

have been filed. The required

Unit 1 examinations have been

incorporated into applicable

procedure. F.7 Install ATWS features.

Status: Refer to the topic entitled Unresolved Safety Issue A-9, Anticipated Transients Without

Scram (Page E1-134). F.8 Remove Reactor Vessel Head Spray piping in drywell, and seal the primary containment

penetrations.

Status: Complete Piping has been removed, and penetrations have been capped. F.9 Implement the Hardened Wetwell Vent modification.

Status: C-C Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 89-16, Installation

of a Hardened Wetwell Vent (Page E1-74).

April 13, 2007 E1-102 F.10 Cap Service Air and Demineralized Water Primary Containment Penetrations.

Status: Complete The Service Air and Demineralized Water Primary Containment

Penetrations were capped. F.11 Modify Auxiliary Decay Heat Removal (ADHR)

System to serve Unit 1.

Status: Complete ADHR has been modified to serve Unit 1. F.12 Fully implement the Maintenance Rule.

Unit 1's temporary exemption ceases to be

effective.

Status: Open F.13 Replace RWCU piping outside of primary containment with IGSCC resistant piping.

Status: Complete Implement actions requested in GL 89-10 for RWCU.

Status: Complete

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 21, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, AND 3 -

License Renewal Application (LRA) - Revised

Commitment List (TAC Nos. MC1704, MC1705, and

MC1706) 2. NUREG-1843, Supplement 1, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296"

April 13, 2007 E1-103 License Renewal - Non-Appendix F Commitments

Commitment: TVA will implement applicable License Renewal -

Non-Appendix F Commitments prior to Unit 1 restart.

Discussion: On April 21, 2006, TVA sent the NRC a revised list of commitments for License Renewal (Reference 1).

of the letter contains the list of

License Renewal commitments which are required for

Unit 1 restart. Certain of those commitments are

not Appendix F items but are required to be

implemented prior to Unit 1 restart. These

commitments are contained in Appendix A of the

Safety Evaluation Report related to the License

Renewal of BFN (Reference 2).

The applicable commitments are as follow: Table 1, Item 24., last portion; and Table 2 items with an Implementation Schedule of "Prior to Unit 1 restart."

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 21, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, AND 3 -

License Renewal Application (LRA) - Revised

Commitment List (TAC Nos. MC1704, MC1705, and

MC1706) 2. NUREG-1843, Supplement 1, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296"

April 13, 2007 E1-104 Long Term Torus Integrity Program

Commitment: TVA committed to resolve torus attached piping support discrepancies in accordance with the Unit 2 criteria precedent. The inspection of the

nonsafety-related catwalk will be limited to welds

and bolted connections associated with maintaining

the integrity of the safety-related structures.

The resolution of catwalk discrepancies will be in

accordance with the Unit 2 criteria.

Discussion: On January 13, 1981 (Reference 1), the Commission issued an Order that required the reassessment of

the containment design for suppression pool

hydrodynamic loading conditions. In Reference 2 , a subsequent Order extended the modification

completion date until prior to the start of

Cycle 6. NRC conducted a post-i mplementation audit review of the BFN Plant Unique Analysis Report for

the Mark I containment long-term program (Reference 3). The staff determined that all but a few of the modifications made by TVA were in

accordance with the generic acceptance criteria and

the deviations from the acceptance criteria were

found acceptable. Discrepancies were identified

between design drawings and the actual

modifications. The action plan for dispositioning

the long-term torus integrity discrepancies was

provided by TVA in Reference 4 and approved by NRC

in Reference 5.

In Reference 6, NRC identified a Violation with

regards to activities associated with the Unit 1

LTTIP corrective actions. TVA responded in

Reference 7.

Status: Complete

TVA performed modifications to resolve torus

attached piping support discrepancies, safety-

related torus and torus related structure

discrepancies, and nonsafety-related catwalk

discrepancies in accordance with the Unit 2

precedent.

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated January 13, 1981, in regards to Orders for Modification of Licenses

and Grant of Extension of Exemptions

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 19, 1982, in regards to Order Modifying the January 13, 1981

Order April 13, 2007 E1-105

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 6, 1985, Mark I Containment Long Term Program

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 29, 1991, Program for Resolving Long-Term Torus Integrity Issue

Prior to the Restart of Units 1 and 3

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 10, 1992, Evaluation of Long-Term Torus Integrity Program

for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 3

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 12, 2004, Notice of Violation (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1

Recovery - NRC Inspection Report

No. 5000259/2004011)

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 2, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - NRC Inspection

Report 50-259/2004-011 - Reply to Notice Of

Violation (NOV) EA-04-063

April 13, 2007 E1-106 Lower Drywell Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel

Commitment: The lower drywell steel platforms and miscellaneous steel will be evaluated and modified, if required, to meet the design criteria.

Discussion: The action plan for dispositioning the Lower Drywell Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel issue was

provided in Reference 1. Additional information

requested by the Staff was provided in Reference 2.

Additional information was requested by the Staff

in Reference 3 and provided by TVA in Reference 4.

An NRC position regarding the design criteria was

issued by Reference 5 and a subsequent Safety

Evaluation and request for additional information

was issued as Reference 6. This additional

information was provided by TVA in Reference 7.

A supplemental Safety Evaluation was issued by NRC

in Reference 8. Additional information was

provided by TVA in References 9 and 10. The final

Safety Evaluation was issued in Reference 11 and

the issue was closed after an audit of the design

criteria implementation as documented in

Reference 12.

Status: C-C

The lower drywell steel platforms and miscellaneous

steel were evaluated and modified, if required, to

meet the design criteria.

NRC closed this item in document dated March 9, 2007 (Reference 13).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated June 12, 1991, Corrective Action Plan and Design Criteria for

Lower Drywell Steel Platforms and Miscellaneous

Steel 2. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 8, 1991, Seismic Design Criteria for Lower Drywell Steel

Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 12, 1991, Request for Additional Information Regarding

Browns Ferry Drywell and Miscellaneous Steel

Design Criteria April 13, 2007 E1-107

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 6, 1992, Lower Drywell Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel

Seismic Criteria

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 19, 1992, NRC Staff Position on Proposed Ductility Ratio

Design Criteria

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 13, 1992, Safety Evaluation and Request for Additional

Information Regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Units 1, 2, and 3 Design Criteria for Lower

Drywell Steel Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel

7. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 31, 1992, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding

Design Criteria for Lower Drywell Steel

Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated October 29, 1992, Supplemental Safety Evaluation of Steel Design

Criteria for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power

Plant 9. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 30, 1992, Resolution of the Thermal Growth Issue Outside

Containment 1 0. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 29, 1993, Resolution of the Thermal Growth Issue 1 1. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 7, 1993, Supplemental Safety Evaluation of Structural

Steel Thermal Growth Design Criteria 1 2. NRC letter to TVA, dated April 20, 1994, Audit of Structural Steel Design Criteria

Implementation 1 3. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of the

Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel - Docket No.

50-259" April 13, 2007 E1-108 Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB)

Commitment: The Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) program will be implemented in accordance with the Unit 2

precedent.

Discussion: As part of the restart effort on Unit 2, TVA committed to review the effects of flooding due to

breaks in moderate energy lines outside primary

containment (Reference 1). NRC approval of the

program was documented in Reference 2.

The critical plant features that are required to

mitigate or limit the consequences of moderate

energy piping failures exist in the current BFN

design. The results of the Unit 1 evaluation

concluded that Browns Ferry conforms to the

original licensing basis for MELB flooding and t h at the existing flooding studies and protective

measures are adequate to justify continued

operations (Reference 3).

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated October 24, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Nuclear

Performance Plan, Revision 2

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 - Browns

Ferry, Unit 2, Section 3.8 (Page 3-8)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 25, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Completion of

the Program - Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB)

Flooding Evaluation

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-109 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item I.D.1, Control Room Design Review

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item I.D.1 - Control Room Design Review.

Discussion: Pursuant to NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan) and Supplement 1, TVA provided its Control Room Design

Review (CRDR) corrective action plan and

commitments in Reference 1. NRC's initial Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) was issued as Reference 2.

TVA provided additional information in Reference 3.

In Reference 4, TVA also committed to complete all

safety and non-s afety significant Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) prior to the restart of

Units 1 and 3. The final SER for the BFN CRDR was

provided in Reference 5.

As part of BFN's Operating and Maintenance Cost

Reduction Program, TVA submitted a Cost Beneficial

Licensing Action to discontinue the cost-benefit

analysis of non-safety significant HEDs (Reference 6). NRC approval of this request was

contained in Reference 7.

Status: Closed

TVA is implementing its CRDR c o rrective action plan for Unit 1 and all safety significant HEDs will be

corrected.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 8).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 30, 1986, Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) -

NUREG-0737, Item I.D.1

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 9, 1988, Safety Evaluation for the Detailed Control Room Design, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 (TACs 56104, 56105, 56106)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 3, 1988, Response to NRC Safety Evaluation for the BFN

Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated August 22, 1991, Supplemental Response to NRC Safety Evaluation

for the BFN Detailed Control Room Design

Review (DCRDR)

April 13, 2007 E1-110

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated October 29, 1991, Safety Evaluation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear

Plant Detailed Control Room Design Review

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 15, 1993, Operating & Maintenance (O&M) Cost Reduction

Program - Cost Beneficial Licensing Action -

Revision of Detailed Control Room Design

Review (DCRDR) Program to Discontinue Cost-

Benefit Analysis of Non-S afety Significant Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs)

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 4, 1994, Revision of Detailed Control Room Design Review

Program to Discontinue Cost-Benefit Analysis of

Non-Safety Significant Human Engineering

Discrepancies

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-111 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action ItemI.D.2, Safety Parameter Display Console

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display

Console.

Discussion: Refer to the previous item entitled Generic Letter 89 Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - Safety

Parameter Display System (Page E1-68).

Status: Refer to the previous item entitled Generic Letter 89 Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - Safety

Parameter Display System (Page E1-68).

References:

None

April 13, 2007 E1-112 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling System

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.B.3 - Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).

Discussion: A description of BFN's PASS design was provided in References 1 and 2. The Safety Evaluation Report

for this system was provided by Reference 3.

TVA submitted a request to decommit to the

requirement for a PASS in Reference 4. NRC

approved this request in Reference 5.

TVA committed to:

Develop contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor

coolant, the suppression pool, and containment

atmosphere prior to Unit 1 fuel load; and Describe in emergency plan implementing procedures the capability for classifying fuel

damage events at the Alert level threshold at

radioactivity levels of 300 uCi/ml dose

equivalent I-131 prior to Unit 1 fuel load.

Status: C-C

TVA has implemented contingency plans for obtaining

and analyzing highly radioactiv e samples of reactor coolant, the suppression pool, and containment

atmosphere.

Emergency plan implementing procedures contain the capability for classifying fuel damage events at

the Alert level threshold at radioactivity levels

of 300 uCi/ml dose equivalent I-131.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-006 (Reference 6).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 19, 1986, NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 - Postaccident Sampling

System 2. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 1, 1987, NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 - Postaccident Sampling System

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 27, 1987, Post Accident Sampling System April 13, 2007 E1-113

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 19, 2003, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1, 2, and 3 - Technical Specifications (TS) Change 423

- Eliminate Requirements for Post Accident

Sampling System (PASS) using the Consolidated

Line Item Improvement Process and Delete

Regulatory Commitment

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 9, 2003, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3,

Re: Issuance of Amendments Eliminating

Requirements for Postaccident Sampling (TAC Nos. MB7747, MB7748 and MB7749)

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

April 13, 2007 E1-114 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.E.4.2.1-4, Containment Isolation

Dependability - Implement Diverse

Isolation

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.E.4.2.1 Containment Isolation

Dependability - Implement Diverse Isolation.

Discussion: In Reference 1, NRC requested additional information regarding Units 1 and 3 conformance

with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In order to minimize the number and

scope of updates that would have to be provided to

NRC on this issue, TVA replied in Reference 2 using

the anticipated configuration at the time of the

restart of Unit 1. NRC approval of the Unit 1

containment isolation design is provided in

Reference 3. NRC was notified of subsequent

changes to the containment isolatio n configuration, which were being made under the provisions of

10 CFR 50.59, in Reference 4.

Status: Open

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated May 5, 1992, Request for Additional Information to Review Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3 Compliance

with NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2 and 10CFR50, Appendix J

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 1, 1992, Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information Regarding Units 1 and 3 Conformance

with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2 and 10CFR50, Appendix J

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 6, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3 - NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation

Dependability

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 24, 2004, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 - Supplemental

Information for Conformance with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J

April 13, 2007 E1-115 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.C, Accident - Monitoring -Containment High Range

Radiation

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.F.1.2.C - Accident - Monitoring -

Containment High Range Radiation.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA committed to install a containment high range radiation monitor. In

Reference 2, NRC stated no deviations from NRC

requirements had been identified; hence no NRC

review was required. Reference 3 issued a

Confirmatory Order for the installation of the

radiation monitors prior to start-up in Cycle 6.

Status: Closed

TVA will upgrade the two Unit 1 drywell radiation

monitor loops to meet the requirements of

NUREG-0737 for Containment High Range Radiation

Monitors (CHRRM). The modifications will ensure

that the CHRRMs are capable of detecting and

measuring the radiation level within the drywell

during and following an accident.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-006 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 23, 1980, in regards to post-TMI requirements

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 8, 1982, Re: Status of NUREG-0737 ItemII.F.1.3 at Browns Ferry Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 25, 1983, in regards to Confirmatory Order for Post-TMI

Related Items Set Forth in NUREG-0737

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 15, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006006

April 13, 2007 E1-116 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.D, Accident -

Monitoring - Containment Pressure

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.F.1.2.D - Accident - Monitoring -

Containment Pressure.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA committed to install a containment pressure monitor. NRC requested

additional information in Reference 2, which was

provided by TVA in Reference 3. Reference 4 issued

a Confirmatory Order for the installation of the

pressure monitor prior to start-up in Cycle 6. The

Safety Evaluation Report for this item was issued

in Reference 5. NRC closed this item in Inspection

Report 90-29 (Reference 6).

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-006 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 23, 1980, in regards to post-TMI requirements

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 22, 1982, NUREG-0737, Items I I.F.1.4, Containment Pressure Monitor; II.F.1.5, Containment Water Level

Monitor, and II.F.1.6, Containment Hydrogen

Monitor 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 26, 1982, in regards to NUREG-0 737, Items II.F.1.4, II.F.1.5, and II.F.1.6

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 25, 1983, in regards to Confirmatory Order for Post-TMI

Related Items Set Forth in NUREG-0737

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 16, 1983, NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1.4 Containment Pressure

Monitor, II.F.1.5 Containment Water Level

Monitor, and II.F.1.6 Containment Hydrogen

Monitor 6. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 8, 1990, Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report Nos.

50-259/90-29, 50-260/90-29, and

50-296/90-29)

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-117 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.1.2.E, Accident -

Monitoring - Containment Water

Level Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.F.1.2.E - Accident - Monitoring -

Containment Water Level.

Discussion: In Reference 1, TVA committed to install a containment water level monitor. NRC requested

additional information in Reference 2, which was

provided by TVA in Reference 3. In Reference 4, NRC issued a Confirmatory Order for the

installation of the water level monitor prior to

start-up in Cycle 6 (July 1983). The Safety

Evaluation Report for this item was issued in

Reference 5. A Technical Specifications amendment

was issued to reflect the modifications performed

during that outage (Reference 6).

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-006 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 23, 1980, in Regards to Post-TMI Requirements

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 22, 1982, NUREG-0737, Items I I.F.1.4, Containment Pressure Monitor; II.F.1.5, Containment Water Level

Monitor, and II.F.1.6, Containment Hydrogen

Monitor 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated April 26, 1982, in regards to NUREG-0 737, Items II.F.1.4, II.F.1.5, and II.F.1.6

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 25, 1983, in regards to Confirmatory Order for Post-TMI

Related Items Set Forth in NUREG-0737

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated June 16, 1983, NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1.4 Containment Pressure

Monitor II.F.1.5 Containment Water Level Monitor

II.F.1.6 Containment Hydrogen Monitor

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 12, 1983, in regards to Amendment 92 for Browns Ferry Unit 1

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 16, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005006

April 13, 2007 E1-118 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.F.2.4 (Generic Letter 84-23), Instrumentation for

Detection of Inadequate Core

Cooling Commitment: TVA committed to:

1. Convert level instruments which initiate the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Emergency

Core Cooling System (ECCS) and provide class 1E

level indication in the control room to analog

trip units.

2. Minimize the effects of high drywell temperature on level indications by limiting the vertical

drop of the reference legs inside the drywell to

no more than two feet.

Discussion: The long-term modifications to improve the reliability and accuracy of BWR water level

measurement and instrumentation were requested by

Generic Letter 84-23. TVA committed in Reference 1 to replace the RPS and ECCS instruments with analog

trip units. TVA committed in Reference 2 to

minimize the vertical drop of the reference legs

inside containment by bringing the reference legs

outside the drywell at higher elevations. This

commitment was modified in accordance with the

commitment management process to limit the vertical

drop inside the drywell to be no more than 2 feet 5

inches. NRC found TVA's proposed modifications

acceptable in Reference

3. The NRC was notified of this change by Reference 4.

Status: C-C TVA has: 1. Converted level instruments which initiate the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Emergency

Core Cooling System (ECCS) and provided class 1E

level indication in the control room to analog

trip units.

2. Minimized the effects of high drywell temperature on level indications by limiting the

vertical drop of the reference legs inside the

drywell to no more than two feet.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-007 (Reference 5).

April 13, 2007 E1-119

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 8, 1995, in regards to Generic Letter 84-23

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 12, 1986, in regards to Generic Letter 84-23

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 18, 1986, NUREG-0731, Item II.F.2, Inadequate Core Cooling

Instrumentation (Generic Letter 84-23); MPA-F-26 4. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 5, 1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Units 1 and 3

Revision to Commitments Concerning The Senior

Management Assessment of Readiness Team (SMART)

and The Vertical Drop of Reactor Vessel

Reference Legs (Generic Letter 84-23)

5. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 15, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005007

April 13, 2007 E1-120 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.13, HPCI/RCIC Initiation Levels

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.K.3.13 - HPCI/RCIC Initiation

Levels.

Discussion: In Reference 1 , TVA states that it concurs with the BWR Owners' Group recommendation that separation of

the HPCI/RCIC level setpoints had no substantial

benefit and committed to implement an automatic

restart of RCIC. In Reference 2, NRC concurred

that no significant benefit would be gained by the

separation of the HPCI/RCIC initiation levels and

requested TVA evaluate the acceptance criteria

provided for the RCIC automatic restart. One

exception to the criteria was identified in

Reference 3 and approved by NRC in Reference 4.

TVA clarified Technical Specifications Bases Section 4.2 in Reference

5. The Bases were revised to state that the automatic restart feature is

tested during the performance of logic system

functional tests. The issuance of these Bases

changes was documented in Reference 6. TVA

modified the RCIC logic in order to automatically

restart the RCIC system on vessel low water level (without operator action) following a vessel high

water trip.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-007 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 23, 1980, in Regards to Post-TMI Requirements

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated March 16, 1983, NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.13, RCIC Automatic

Restart 3. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 24, 1983, in Regards to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.13

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated September 19, 1983, NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.13, RCIC Automatic

Restart 5. TVA letter to NRC, dated January 14, 1992, TVA BFN Technical Specification (TS) No. 300 Reactor

Core Thermal-Hydraulic Stability April 13, 2007 E1-121

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 31, 1994, Issuance of Technical Specification Amendments for the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3 (TS 300) 7. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 15, 2005, B r owns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005007

April 13, 2007 E1-122 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.18, ADS Actuation Modifications

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.K.3.18 - ADS Actuation

Modifications.

Discussion: In response to Item II.K.3.18, the BWR Owners' Group performed an evaluation of options for

compliance. Two of these options were found to be

acceptable by the NRC Staff and TVA was requested

in Reference 1 to commit to one of these options.

TVA chose Option 2, to modify the ADS logic to

allow the ADS to initiate vessel depressurization, automatically bypassing the high drywell pressure

signal 10 minutes after a sustained lo-lo-lo

reactor vessel water level signal (Reference 2).

TVA will perform modifications to the ADS logic

that will allow the ADS to initiate vessel

depressurization.

Status: Closed

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-007 (Reference 3).

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated June 3, 1983, NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.18, ADS Logic

Modifications

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated March 5, 1987, Modifications to Automatic Depressurization

System (ADS) Logic - NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.18

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 15, 2005, Brown s Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005007

April 13, 2007 E1-123 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.27, Common Reference Level for Vessel Level

Instrumentation

Issue: Provide level instruments that are referenced to the same point.

Discussion: In Reference 1, NRC proposed that TVA incorporate the requirements of Action Item II.K.3.27 into the

control room design review to be performed per

NUREG-0737, Action Item I.D.1. This approach

eliminates the possibility of changing water level

instrument scales twice; once per Item II.K.3.27

and then possibly again per Item I.D.1. TVA

accepted this proposal in Reference 2.

Status: C-C

NRC letter to TVA, dated December 30, 1982 (Reference 3), incorporated this item into

NUREG-0737, Action Item I I.K.3.27, Common Reference Level.

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-008 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated October 28, 1982,

Subject:

NUREG-0737 Action Item II.K.3.27 (Common Reference Level)

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 3, 1982, in regards to NUREG-0737, Item II.I.3.27 (Common

Reference Level)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated December 30, 1982, NUREG-0737, Action Item II.K.3.27, Common

Reference Level

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 14, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery -NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005008

April 13, 2007 E1-124 NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan), Action Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS Accumulators

Commitment: TVA will complete NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Plan)

Action Item II.K.3.28 - Qualification of ADS

Accumulators.

Discussion: TVA responded to Item II.K.3.28 by Reference

1. The NRC Staff requested additional information in

Reference 2, which was provided by TVA in

Reference 3. Additional information was requested

in Reference 4 and provided in Reference 5. TVA

responded to a verbal request for additional

information in Reference 6. The Safety Evaluation

that documents the acceptability of TVA's plan to

satisfy Item II.K.3.28 was provided in Reference 7.

TVA performed modifications to upgrade the ADS

accumulator system. This was accomplished by

splitting the ring header into two sections, and

providing an alternate nitrogen supply to the

Drywell Control Air System.

Status: C-C

NRC closed this item in Inspection Report 2005-007 (Reference 8).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated December 30, 1981, in regards to NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.24, II.K.3.28 and II.B.4

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 11, 1983, Request for Additional Information - NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS

Accumulators

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 8, 1983, in regards to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.28

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated May 29, 1984, Request for Additional Information - MPA F-55 (TMI II.K.3.28) Qualification of ADS

Accumulators

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 12, 1984, in regards to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.28

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 11, 1985, in regards to NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.28

7. NRC letter to TVA, dated July 24, 1985, NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS

Accumulators

April 13, 2007 E1-125

8. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 15, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2005007

April 13, 2007 E1-126 Platform Thermal Growth

Issue: TVA will address thermal growth in drywell platforms and miscellaneous steel frames.

Discussion: In Reference 1 , TVA informed NRC that TVA's program for the resolution of issues associated with

drywell steel platforms for Unit 3 was incorporated

into the program "Lower Drywell Platforms and

Miscellaneous Steel." This program includes upper

drywell platforms and platform thermal growth as

well.

Status: C-C

Refer to previous topic entitled Lower Drywell

Platforms and Miscellaneous Steel (Page E1-106).

References:

1.

TVA letter, T. E. Abney to NRC, dated December 13, 2002, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Unit 1 - Regulatory Framework for the

Restart of Unit 1

April 13, 2007 E1-127 Q-List Commitment: TVA will develop a Q-list which provides a list of safety-related systems, structures, and components

necessary to ensure: The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; and The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in

potential offsite radiation exposures comparable

to the 10 CFR 100 limits.

Discussion: BFN's Q-List Program is described in Section III.14.1 of the Browns Ferry Nuclear

Performance Plan (Reference 1).

Status: Complete TVA has incorporated Unit 1 into BFN's Q-List

Program.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated October 24, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Nuclear

Performance Plan, Revision 2

April 13, 2007 E1-128 Restart Test Program

Commitment: For those systems that support safe shutdown, administrative controls for the Restart Test

Program will be implemented to insure that an

assessment of the Unit 3 System Test

Specifications, test procedures, and test results

is performed. Administrative controls will be used

to insure that the sta t us of the operating units is considered during the planning and scheduling of

restart tests.

Discussion: The restart test program was submitted in Reference 1 and supplemented by References 2

through 6.

Status: Open

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated September 27, 1991, Restart Test Program (RTP) Description for

Units 1 and 3

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 18, 1992, Request for Additional Information Regarding the

Restart Test Program for Units 1 and 3

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 28, 1992, Update of Restart Test Program (RTP) Submittal

for Units 1 and 3

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated July 19, 1993, Restart Test Program (RTP) Update for Units 1 and 3

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 2, 1994, Restart Test Program (RTP) Update for

Units 1 and 3

6. TVA letter to NRC, dated June 15, 2005, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Request for

Additional Information Regarding Restart Testing

Program April 13, 2007 E1-129 Seismic Class II Over I / Spatial Systems Interactions and Water Spray

Commitment: The Seismic Class II Over I / Spatial Systems Interactions and Water Spray program will be

implemented in accordance with the Unit 2

precedent.

Discussion: TVA is utilizing a two phase program to address Class II systems. The action plan for Unit 1 was

provided to th e NRC in Reference 1. The first part involves the evaluation of potential

seismic-induced water spray effects of Class II

systems on Class I systems. The second part

involves the evaluation of potential

seismic-induced, spatial interaction effects of

Class II systems on Class I systems. The approval

of the Seismic Class II Over I / Spatial Systems

Interactions and Water Spray program is contained

in References 2 and 3.

Status: Complete

Walk downs were completed. Outliers were resolved

by either further analysis, plant modification, or

maintenance action.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC dated February 27, 1991, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Action Plan

to Disposition Concerns Related to Units 1 and 3

Seismic Class II Piping Over Class I Commodities

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry, Unit 2, Section 2.2.4.2 (Page 2-10)

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated November 19, 1992, Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 Response -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (TAC Nos. M69430, M69431, and M69432)

April 13, 2007 E1-130 Small Bore Piping

Commitment: The Seismic Class I small bore piping will be qualified to meet the final design criteria.

Discussion: TVA's action plan to disposition concerns related to Units 1 and 3 small bore piping was provided in

Reference 1 and augmented by Reference 2. NRC

approval of this program is documented in the

Safety Evaluation transmitted by Reference 3.

Status: Complete

TVA qualified the Class I small bore piping to meet

the final design criteria.

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated February 27, 1991, Action Plan to Disposition concerns Related to

Units 1 and 3 Small Bore Piping

2. TVA letter to NRC, dated December 12, 1991, Small Bore Piping Program, Tubing, and Conduit

Support Plans for Units 1 and 3 - Additional

Information

3. NRC letter to TVA, dated February 4, 1992, Safety Evaluation of Small Bore Piping and

Seismic Qualification of Instrument Tubing

Programs for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,

Units 1 and 3

April 13, 2007 E1-131 Thermal Overloads

Commitment: TVA will resolve the thermal overload issue on Unit 1 prior to restart.

Discussion: A review of BFN design drawings identified that thermal overload (TOL) heater sizes for 480 VAC and

250 VDC motor control centers (MCs) were not

specified. Consequently, there was no

documentation to verify that TOL heater

installations are properly sized.

TVA's plan for addressing the TOL issue was

submitted in Reference

1. NRC requested additional information in Reference 2, which TVA provided in

Reference 3. Supplemental information was provided

in References 4 and 5. NRC approval of the program

is documented in Reference 6.

Status: C-C

TVA completed a walkdown program to document the

nameplate data for each load and replaced the TOLs

with ones of the proper size. The criteria for

sizing has been determined and documented.

Calculations have been performed to ensure the TOL

heaters are the proper size for their loads.

NRC closed this item in document dated March 9, 2007 (Reference 7).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated April 28, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)- Electrical Issues (NRC TAC No. 62260)

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 1988, Request For Additional Information - Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated September 21, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Response to

Request for Additional Information - Electric

Circuit Protection by Current Limiting Fuses (TAC No. 62260-F)

4. TVA letter to NRC, dated February 28, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Thermal

Overload (TOL) Heaters (TAC No. 62260-F)

5. TVA letter to NRC, dated May 15, 1989, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Thermal Overload (TOL) Heaters - Sizing Criteria Clarification -

(TAC No. 62260-F)

April 13, 2007 E1-132

6. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 23, 1991, NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2 -

Browns Ferry, Unit 2, Section 3.11.1 (Page 3-8)

7. NRC Meeting Summary dated March 9, 2007, "Meeting Summary - Internal Meeting of

the Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Panel -

Docket No. 50-259"

April 13, 2007 E1-133 Unresolved Safety Issue A-7, Mark I Long-Term Program

Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved in August 1982, with the publication of Supplement 1 to

NUREG-0661, "Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I

Containment Long-Term Program" and Standard Review

Plan Section 6.2.1.1.C.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Long Term Torus Integrity Program (Page E1-104).

Status: C-C

Refer to previous topic entitled Long Term Torus

Integrity Program (Page E1-104).

NRC administratively c l osed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 1). Since this item was

added only as a tracking means for this Unresolved

Safety Issue, TVA considers it complete also.

References:

1. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-134 Unresolved Safety Issue A-9, Anticipated Transients Without Scram Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved in June 1983, with the publication of a final rule

(10 CFR 50.62) to require improvements in plants to

reduce the likelihood of failure of the reactor

protection system (RPS) to shut down the reactor

following anticipated transients and to mitigate

the consequences of an anticipated transient

without scram (ATWS) event.

Discussion: TVA provided conceptual design information for conformance with the ATWS Rule in Reference 1. In

Reference 2, the NRC found that TVA's design

conformance with the ATWS Rule with exception that

the Browns Ferry's Alternate Rod Injection and

Reactor Pump Trip designs utilized the same analog

trip units for both the ATWS system and the reactor

trip system (RTS). TVA's response to the diversity

issue was provided in Reference 3.

Status: C-C

TVA implemented the requirements, actions, and

conceptual design modifications submitted. The

analog trip units utilized for the ATWS and RPS

systems were from different manufacturers.

NRC administratively closed this item in Inspection

Report 2006-007 (Reference 4).

References:

1.

TVA letter to NRC, dated March 1, 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Anticipated

Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Rule

(10 CFR 50.62) - Plant Specific Design

2. NRC letter to TVA, dated January 22, 1989, Compliance with Rule 10 CFR 50.62 Relating to

Alternate Rod Injection and Reactor Pump Trip

Systems (TAC 59072, 59073 and 59074)

3. TVA letter to NRC, dated November 29, 1990, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Response to

NRC Followup Items Received During ATWS

Inspection

4. NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, B r owns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

April 13, 2007 E1-135 Unresolved Safety Issue A-24, Qualification of Class 1E Safety Related Equipment

Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved in July 1981, with the publication of NUREG-0588, Revision 1, "Interim Staff Position on

Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related

Electrical Equipment." In summary, the resolution

of A-24 is embodied in 10 CFR 50.49.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Environmental Qualification (Page E1-45).

Status: C-C

Refer to previous topic entitled Environmental

Qualification (Page E1-45).

NRC administratively closed this item in Inspection

Report 2006-007 (Reference 1). Since this item was

added only as a tracking means for this Unresolved

Safety Issue, TVA considers it complete also.

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

2. Refer to previous topic entitled Environmental Qualification (Page E1-45).

April 13, 2007 E1-136 Unresolved Safety Issue A-26, Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection

Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved in September 1978, with the publication of

NUREG-0224, "Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient

Protection for PWRs," and Standard Review Plan

Section 5.2. NRC subsequently issued Generic

Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation

Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its

Impact on Plant Operations," which provided

guidance regarding the review of

pressure-temperature limits.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel

Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations (Page E1-61).

Status: C-C

Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel

Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations (Page E1-61).

NRC administrat i vely closed this item in Inspection Report 2006-007 (Reference 1). Since this item was

added only as a tracking means for this Unresolved

Safety Issue, TVA considers it complete also.

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated August 10, 2006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Recovery - NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2006007

2. Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 88-1 1, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant

Operations (Page E1-61).

April 13, 2007 E1-137 Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Station Blackout

Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved in June 1988,with the publication of the Station Blackout

Rule (10 CFR 50.63) and Regulatory Guide 1.155.

Discussion: In Reference 1, the staff Safety Evaluation concluded that TVA's proposed methodology for

coping with a Station Blackout event at BFN,

Units 1, 2, and 3 conforms with 10 CFR 50.63. As

requested in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report, TVA provided its implementation schedule in

Reference 2. This letter included a commitment to

complete the Unit 1 equipment and associated

procedure modifications required for SBO rule

compliance prior to restart.

Status: Complete TVA implemented the modifications to the DC power supply system and the DC connected loads.

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA, dated September 16, 1992, Station Blackout - Browns Ferry Units 1, 2,

and 3 (MPA-A022) (TAC Nos. M68517, M68518, and

M68519) 2. TVA letter to NRC, dated October 15, 1992, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) - Response to

NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation on the

Conformance of BFN with the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule

April 13, 2007 E1-138 Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants

Issue: This Unresolved Safety Issue was resolved with the issuance of Generic Letter 87-02 on

February 19, 1987, which endorsed the approach of

using the seismic and test experience data proposed

by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)

and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). This

approach was endorsed by the Senior Seismic Review

and Advisory Panel (SSRAP) and approved by the NRC

staff.

Discussion: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of

Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating

Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 (Page E1-58).

Status: Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of

Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating

Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 (Page E1-58).

References:

Refer to previous topic entitled Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of

Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating

Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 (Page E1-58).

April 13, 2007 E2-1 ENCLOSURE 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

SUMMARY

OF REMAINING UNIT 1 RESTART ISSUES

TOPIC COMMITMENT SCHEDULE PAGE Generic Letter 92-01, Reactor Vessel

Structural Integrity, Revision 1, and

Revision 1 Supplement 1 TVA has submitted the available data requested by NRC. TVA

will inform NRC of the

applicability of NEDO 32205

within 90 days of the final

surveillance capsules analysis

report. Ninety days after the final

surveillance

capsules analysis

report. E1-75