ML15254A543

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Submittal of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Biennial Summary Report Associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
ML15254A543
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/2015
From: Bono S
Tennessee Valley Authority
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
Download: ML15254A543 (3)


Text

Tennessee Valley Aulhority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 September 11, 2015 10 CFR 72.4 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)

ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos.50-259, 50-260, 50-296, and 72-052

Subject:

10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Biennial Summary Report Associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation In accordance with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 72.48(d)(2), the Tennessee Valley Authority is providing a summary report of changes, tests, and experiments performed at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, from July 1, 2013, until June 30, 2015, associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation .

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal , please contact J. L. Paul, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Enclosure:

10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Summary Report cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

ENCLOSURE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Summary Report See Enclosed

Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report BFN LIVING HI-STORM FW FSAR REV 2.1, 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation, Revision 0 (ROG 150619 152)

Executive Summary:

Holtec International submitted ten Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) to the Tennessee Valley Authority that revise language in the Holtec International Storage, and Transfer Operation Reinforced Module Flood-Wind (HI-STORM FW) Cask System Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) , Revision 2.

Of these proposed changes, nine had no impact on the draft Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

HI-STORM FW 72.212 Report, and therefore may be adopted without separate screening/evaluations (reference NEI 96-07 Appendix B Section 84.1.7, "Cask Design Changes Made by a CoC Holder and Adopted by a General Licensee") .

One ECO, ECO 5018-32 R2 , clarifies the definition and application of the terms "high integrity" and "single-failure-proof' as they pertain to lifting and handling devices, particularly the Vertical Cask Transporter (VCT). The proposed change aligns the HI-STORM FW FSAR text with the requirements of the HI-STORM FW Certificate of Compliance Appendix A Section 5.2, Transport Evaluation Program. This ECO resulted in no physical changes to the BFN VCT, but did affect site frequent and periodic inspection procedures. It also resulted in changes to the draft BFN FW 72.212 Report, and therefore a site-specific 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation was performed prior to adoption. Since Holtec performed a full evaluation for ECO 5018-32 R2, a full evaluation was performed for BFN adoption of this change.

Summary of Evaluation :

A cask handling accident remains non-credible, so accident consequences will not change.

Methods of handling and operating the cask system are not affected, so no new accidents are created. There are no physical changes to the BFN VCT or the HI-STORM FW hardware or operations, so malfunction likelihood , consequences , or results remain unchanged. The Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) spent fuel containment boundary remains unchanged, cask system temperatures (including fuel cladding) are not increased , and MPC internal pressures are not increased, so no fission product boundary limit is exceeded. No new evaluation methods were used .

The conclusion of this evaluation was that prior NRC approval was not necessary for implementation of this change .

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