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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24032A4762024-02-0101 February 2024 Final Report of a Part 21 Evaluation Associated with Starter Contactors for the BFN Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Suppression Pool Inboard Suction Valve ML24023A2802024-01-23023 January 2024 Final Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with a Relay in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Condensate Pump CNL-24-017, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions2024-01-17017 January 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions ML24016A3042024-01-16016 January 2024 Final Report of a Part 21 Evaluation Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump CNL-23-071, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Inservice Inspection and Augmented Program Interval Revised Request for Alternative 0-ISI-472024-01-11011 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Inservice Inspection and Augmented Program Interval Revised Request for Alternative 0-ISI-47 ML24022A1732024-01-0303 January 2024 Receipt and Availability of the Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23319A1992024-01-0303 January 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 333, 356, and 316 Regarding the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.4.3.2 and 3.5.1.11 Regarding Safety Relief Valves ML23355A2062023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23348A3942023-12-14014 December 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Potential Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Starter Contactors for the High Pressure Coolant Injection Suppression Pool Inboard Suction Valve IR 05000259/20230102023-12-11011 December 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000259/2023010 and 05000260/2023010 and 05000296/2023010 ML23335A0722023-12-0101 December 2023 Interim Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with a Relay in the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Condensate Pump ML23334A2492023-11-30030 November 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision CNL-23-070, Submittal of Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program Plan2023-11-29029 November 2023 Submittal of Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program Plan ML23331A2532023-11-27027 November 2023 Summary Report for 10 CFR 50.9 Evaluations, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, Technical Requirement Manual Changes, and NRC Commitment Revisions CNL-23-067, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2023-11-27027 November 2023 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML23325A1102023-11-21021 November 2023 Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Commitment Revision ML23320A2542023-11-16016 November 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump IR 05000259/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2023003, 05000260/2023003 and 05000296/2023003 IR 05000259/20230402023-11-0202 November 2023 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000259 2023040 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter ML23292A2532023-10-18018 October 2023 BFN 2024-301, Corporate Notification Letter (210-day Ltr) ML23282A0022023-10-0606 October 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump ML23278A0122023-10-0505 October 2023 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 30 ML23271A1702023-09-28028 September 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23270A0702023-09-26026 September 2023 SLRA Pre-Application Meeting Summary 09-13-2023 ML23257A1232023-09-22022 September 2023 Administrative Changes to Technical Specification Pages Issued for License Amendment Nos. 332, 355, and 315 CNL-23-061, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision2023-09-20020 September 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23263B1042023-09-20020 September 2023 Special Report 260/2023-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ML23205A2132023-09-0808 September 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 332, 355, and 315 Regarding the Revision of Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-566-A and TSTF-580-A, Rev. 1 CNL-23-057, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions. Includes CECC-EPIP-1, Revision 76 and CECC-EPIP-9, Revision 642023-09-0505 September 2023 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions. Includes CECC-EPIP-1, Revision 76 and CECC-EPIP-9, Revision 64 IR 05000259/20230052023-08-29029 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Report 05000259/2023005, 05000260/2023005 and 05000296/2023005 ML23233A0432023-08-18018 August 2023 Enforcement Action EA-22-122 Inspection Readiness Notification ML23219A1542023-08-17017 August 2023 Request to Use Later Edition of ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance and Alternative Requests BFN-IST-01 Through 05 for the Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML23228A1642023-08-16016 August 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23228A0202023-08-15015 August 2023 (BFN) Unit 1 - Special Report 259/2023-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation IR 05000259/20230022023-08-10010 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2023002, 05000260/2023002, 05000296/2023002 and 07200052/2023001 ML23192A4472023-07-31031 July 2023 Staff Assessment of Updated Seismic Hazards at TVA Sites Following the NRC Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information CNL-23-055, Tennessee Valley Authority - Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revision. Includes EPDP-3, Revision 3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills2023-07-25025 July 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revision. Includes EPDP-3, Revision 3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills ML23171A8862023-07-24024 July 2023 Issuance of Amend. Nos. 331, 354, and 314; 365 and 359 Regarding Adoption of TSTF-541-A, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position ML23159A2552023-07-20020 July 2023 Proposed Alternative to the Requirements of the ASME Code Regarding Volumetric Inspection of Standby Liquid Control Nozzles ML23201A2182023-07-20020 July 2023 Registration of Use of Cask to Store Spent Fuel (MPC-298 and -299) ML23199A3072023-07-18018 July 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision CNL-23-053, Tennessee Valley Authority - Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions2023-07-18018 July 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions 2024-02-01
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML23192A4472023-07-31031 July 2023 Staff Assessment of Updated Seismic Hazards at TVA Sites Following the NRC Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information ML23025A0752023-01-25025 January 2023 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Section XI, Third 10 Year Inspection Interval, Inservice Inspection, System Pressure Test, Containment Inspection, and Repair and Replacement Programs, Owners Activity Report Cycle . ML22363A3922022-12-28028 December 2022 Cycle 14 Mellla+ Eigenvalue Tracking Data CNL-22-090, Request to Use a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance Code and Alternative Requests for the Fifth Inservice Testing Interval2022-12-12012 December 2022 Request to Use a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance Code and Alternative Requests for the Fifth Inservice Testing Interval CNL-22-100, to Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3,in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use at Browns Ferry (TS-535)2022-12-0909 December 2022 to Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3,in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use at Browns Ferry (TS-535) CNL-22-066, Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 for in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use Supplement 3, Response to Request for Additional Information2022-07-18018 July 2022 Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 for in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use Supplement 3, Response to Request for Additional Information ML22154A4042022-06-0303 June 2022 Unit 3 Cycle 20 Mellla+ Eigenvalue Tracking Data CNL-22-057, to Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use2022-05-27027 May 2022 to Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 in Support of Atrium 11 Fuel Use ML21277A1232021-10-0404 October 2021 Submittal of Browns Ferry Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Vertical Weld Flaw Evaluation ML21246A2952021-09-29029 September 2021 Memo to File ML21246A2942021-09-29029 September 2021 Enclosufinal Ea/Fonsi for Tva'S Initial and Updated Triennial Decommissioning Funding Plans for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant ISFSIs CNL-20-102, 10 CFR 71.95 Report for 3-60B Casks User2020-12-16016 December 2020 10 CFR 71.95 Report for 3-60B Casks User ML20255A0002020-09-24024 September 2020 Staff Review of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic ML20112F4852020-05-0606 May 2020 Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation CNL-19-074, Extended Power Uprate - Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report2019-09-0404 September 2019 Extended Power Uprate - Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report CNL-19-004, Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions2019-06-0707 June 2019 Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions CNL-19-041, Extended Power Uprate - Unit 1 Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report2019-04-16016 April 2019 Extended Power Uprate - Unit 1 Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report CNL-19-032, Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-510 - Request for License Amendments - Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus - Supplement 8, Additional Operator Training Information2019-03-13013 March 2019 Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-510 - Request for License Amendments - Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus - Supplement 8, Additional Operator Training Information CNL-18-134, Extended Power Uprate - Replacement Steam Dryer Revised Analysis and Limit Curves Report2018-11-29029 November 2018 Extended Power Uprate - Replacement Steam Dryer Revised Analysis and Limit Curves Report ML18283B5472018-10-10010 October 2018 Responding to Letter of 11/18/1977 from E. G. Case to G. Williams, Providing Environmental Qualification Information for Electrical Connectors in Reference of IE Bulletins 77-05 & 77-05A CNL-18-112, Extended Power Uprate - Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report2018-09-13013 September 2018 Extended Power Uprate - Flow Induced Vibration Summary Report CNL-18-060, Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions2018-05-31031 May 2018 Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions ML18079B1402018-02-23023 February 2018 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3: Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-510 - Request for License Amendments - Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus ML17222A3282017-09-0505 September 2017 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment ML17170A0732017-06-15015 June 2017 Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (a)(3) and (B) - Failure to Follow Conditions of TN-RAM Packaging Certificate of Compliance No. 9233 ML17114A3712017-04-20020 April 2017 Errata for BWRVIP-271NP: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Testing and Evaluation of the Browns Ferry, Unit 2, 120 Degree Capsule ML17033B1642017-02-0202 February 2017 American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI, Inservice Inspection, System Pressure Test, Containment Inservice Inspection, and Repair and Replacement - Cycle 11 Operation Programs ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 CNL-16-169, Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-505 - Request for License Amendments - Extended Power Uprate (EPU) - Supplement 35, Consolidated Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report Revision2016-10-28028 October 2016 Proposed Technical Specifications (TS) Change TS-505 - Request for License Amendments - Extended Power Uprate (EPU) - Supplement 35, Consolidated Power Uprate Safety Analysis Report Revision ML16196A0882016-08-0505 August 2016 Staff Assessment of Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request - Flood Causing Mechanism Reevaluation ML16146A0182016-05-25025 May 2016 Special Report 296/2016-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ML16028A2952016-01-29029 January 2016 10 CFR 71.95 Notification Associated with the Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Condition of the 8-120B Secondary Lid Test Port Configuration ML16027A0592016-01-27027 January 2016 Snubbers Added to Lnservice Testing Program ML15356A6542015-12-22022 December 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report CNL-15-056, Application to Modify Technical Specification 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Minimum Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits (TS-506)2015-09-25025 September 2015 Application to Modify Technical Specification 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Minimum Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits (TS-506) NL-15-169, Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3, Startup Test Plan2015-09-21021 September 2015 Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3, Startup Test Plan NL-15-169, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3, Flow Induced Vibration Analysis and Monitoring Program2015-09-21021 September 2015 Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3, Flow Induced Vibration Analysis and Monitoring Program ML15282A2392015-09-21021 September 2015 Flow Induced Vibration Analysis and Monitoring Program ML15282A2402015-09-21021 September 2015 Startup Test Plan ML15282A1812015-09-21021 September 2015 Non-Proprietary - Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 and 3, Extended Power Uprate, Attachment 7 NL-15-169, Non-Proprietary - Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 and 3, Extended Power Uprate, Attachment 72015-09-21021 September 2015 Non-Proprietary - Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 and 3, Extended Power Uprate, Attachment 7 ML15254A5432015-09-11011 September 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Biennial Summary Report Associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ML15282A1822015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3403NP, Revision 2, Fuel Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, Attachment 9 NL-15-169, NEDO-33824, Revision 0, Engineering Report, Browns Ferry Replacement Steam Dryer Stress Analysis.2015-08-31031 August 2015 NEDO-33824, Revision 0, Engineering Report, Browns Ferry Replacement Steam Dryer Stress Analysis. NL-15-169, ANP-3378NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3, LOCA-ECCS Analysis MAPLHGR Limits for Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu).2015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3378NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3, LOCA-ECCS Analysis MAPLHGR Limits for Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu). NL-15-169, ANP-3377NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3 LOCA Break Spectrum Analysis Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu).2015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3377NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3 LOCA Break Spectrum Analysis Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu). NL-15-169, ANP-3403NP, Revision 2, Fuel Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, Attachment 92015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3403NP, Revision 2, Fuel Uprate Safety Analysis Report for Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, Attachment 9 ML15282A2362015-08-31031 August 2015 NEDO-33824, Revision 0, Engineering Report, Browns Ferry Replacement Steam Dryer Stress Analysis. ML15282A1852015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3378NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3, LOCA-ECCS Analysis MAPLHGR Limits for Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu). ML15282A1842015-08-31031 August 2015 ANP-3377NP, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 and 3 LOCA Break Spectrum Analysis Atrium 10XM Fuel (Epu). 2023-07-31
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARML23025A0752023-01-25025 January 2023 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Section XI, Third 10 Year Inspection Interval, Inservice Inspection, System Pressure Test, Containment Inspection, and Repair and Replacement Programs, Owners Activity Report Cycle . CNL-22-090, Request to Use a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance Code and Alternative Requests for the Fifth Inservice Testing Interval2022-12-12012 December 2022 Request to Use a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance Code and Alternative Requests for the Fifth Inservice Testing Interval CNL-18-060, Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions2018-05-31031 May 2018 Completion of Required Action for NRC Order EA-13-109, Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions ML17170A0732017-06-15015 June 2017 Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (a)(3) and (B) - Failure to Follow Conditions of TN-RAM Packaging Certificate of Compliance No. 9233 ML17033B1642017-02-0202 February 2017 American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI, Inservice Inspection, System Pressure Test, Containment Inservice Inspection, and Repair and Replacement - Cycle 11 Operation Programs ML17024A0362016-12-31031 December 2016 Operating Data Report for 2016 ML16146A0182016-05-25025 May 2016 Special Report 296/2016-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ML16028A2952016-01-29029 January 2016 10 CFR 71.95 Notification Associated with the Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Condition of the 8-120B Secondary Lid Test Port Configuration ML15356A6542015-12-22022 December 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 50.46 30-Day Report ML15254A5432015-09-11011 September 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Biennial Summary Report Associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation CNL-15-106, 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information2015-07-0808 July 2015 3, Sequoyah and Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2 - Provides Service List Update for Routine Information ML14356A3622015-02-11011 February 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) CNL-14-210, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.2014-12-22022 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima. CNL-14-129, Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant2014-08-28028 August 2014 Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant L-14-254, 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the TN-RAM Package2014-08-15015 August 2014 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the TN-RAM Package NRC-14-0058, 10 CFR 71.95 Report - Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Conditions for the TN-RAM Cask Due to As-Built Discrepancies Identified by Cask Certificate Holder2014-08-13013 August 2014 10 CFR 71.95 Report - Failure to Observe Certificate of Compliance Conditions for the TN-RAM Cask Due to As-Built Discrepancies Identified by Cask Certificate Holder LR-N14-0175, CFR 71.95 Report for Packaging and Transporting a Shipping Cask (Model TN-RAM) Without Meeting a Required Condition in Certificate of Compliance 71-92332014-08-11011 August 2014 CFR 71.95 Report for Packaging and Transporting a Shipping Cask (Model TN-RAM) Without Meeting a Required Condition in Certificate of Compliance 71-9233 ML13177A3522013-07-16016 July 2013 Review of Commitment Submittal for License Renewal Regarding the One-Time Inspection Procedure (TAC ME7797, ME7798, and ME7799) ML13144A5762013-05-22022 May 2013 Watt Bar, Units 1 & 2, Report of Drug Testing Error in Accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(1) ML13115A9552013-05-16016 May 2013 Final ASP Analysis-Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Reactor Trip and Subsequent Loss of Offsite Power Due Failure of Unit Station System Transformer Differential Relay (LER 296/12-004) ML13092A3922013-03-27027 March 2013 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) - NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition - Transition Report ML12356A1762012-11-30030 November 2012 Kld TR-505, Rev. 1, Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, Part 6 of 8 ML12335A3402012-11-27027 November 2012 Tennessee Valley Authority - Fleet Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Walkdown Results of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML1108712502011-03-24024 March 2011 BWR Vessel and Internals Inspection Summaries for Spring 2010 Outages ML1100502872010-06-22022 June 2010 Investigation of Tritium Releases to Groundwater ML1019304172010-05-0606 May 2010 Tritium Database Report ML12171A1892010-03-31031 March 2010 Integrated Resource Plan, Tva'S Environmental & Energy Future ML1008800282010-03-24024 March 2010 Day Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes ML1002010142010-01-15015 January 2010 Attachment 2, Browns Ferry, Unit 1 Response to NRC Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Technical Specification Change TS-467 - Utilization of Areva Fuel and Associated Analysis Methodologies ML1002010152010-01-15015 January 2010 NEDO-32484, Rev. 7, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis. ML1002010162010-01-15015 January 2010 Gnf 0000-0111-8036-R0-NP, GE14 Fuel Thermal-Mechanical Information ML1011602102009-10-0606 October 2009 51-9121503-002, Engineering Information Record, Responses to NRC Comments Regarding Browns Ferry Unit 1 Proposed Fuel Transition Amendment ML0924605002009-08-31031 August 2009 CDI Report No. 09-25NP, Rev. 0, Stress Assessment of Browns Ferry Nuclear, Unit 1 Steam Dryer to 120% OLTP Power Level, Enclosure 5 ML0834600222008-11-30030 November 2008 Enclosure 2 - Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, & 3 - Technical Specifications Changes TS-418 and TS-431 - Extended Power Uprate - CDI Report 07-11NP, Revision 1, Dynamics of BWR Steam Dryer Components, Non-Proprietary Version ML0711503692007-04-23023 April 2007 Units 1, 2, & 3 - Submittal of Unit 1 Periodic Inspection Program for License Renewal Procedure in Fulfillment of License Renewal Commitment ML0710303972007-04-13013 April 2007 Status of Unit 1 Restart Issues, Revision 12 ML0635300372006-12-14014 December 2006 Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 7 Operation ML0631004422006-11-0101 November 2006 Supplemental Information - Changes to Instrumentation Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times ML0622002772006-07-26026 July 2006 Technical Specifications (TS) Changes TS-431 & TS-418 - Extended Power Uprate (EPU) - Response to Round 7 Requests for Additional Information ML0616701512006-06-12012 June 2006 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) - Reload Analysis Report ML0625103852006-05-31031 May 2006 Enclosure 3, Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2 & 3 - CDI Report No. 05-28P, Rev 1, Bounding Methodology to Predict Full Scale Steam Dryer Loads from In-Plant Measurements. ML0614503972006-05-15015 May 2006 0043-8325-SRLR, Revision 1, Supplemental Reload Licensing Report for Brown Ferry 1, Reload 6 Cycle 7, Pages 123 Through End ML0614503952006-05-15015 May 2006 0043-8325-SRLR, Revision 1, Supplemental Reload Licensing Report for Brown Ferry 1, Reload 6 Cycle 7, Cover Through Page 122 ML0608804132006-03-21021 March 2006 EPU Containment Overpressure Credit Risk Assessment, Rev. 1 ML0607204302006-03-0101 March 2006 March 1, 2006 Public Meeting Slides for Proposed Generic Letter Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analysis Spurious Actuations. ML0513004622005-04-27027 April 2005 Technical Specifications Change 438- Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Excess Flow Check Valve Surveillance Test Frequency ML0511702442005-04-25025 April 2005 (BFN) - Unit 1 - Response to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information Related to Technical Specifications (TS) Change No. TS-431 - Request for Extended Power Uprate Operation ML0511702422005-04-25025 April 2005 (BFN) - Units 2, and 3 - Response to Nrc'S Request for Additional Information Related to Technical Specifications (TS) Change No. TS-418 - Request for Extended Power Uprate Operation ML0606805962005-02-28028 February 2005 Hydrothermal Modeling of Browns Ferry with Units 1, 2, and 3 at Extended Power Uprate 2023-01-25
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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 June 15, 2017 10 CFR 71 .95(c)
ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Washington, DC 20555-000 1 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR -33, DPR -52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296
SUBJECT:
Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 71.95 (a)(3) and (b) Failure to Follow Conditions of TN -RAM Packaging Certificate of Compliance No. 9233
REFERENCE:
Certificate of Compliance No. 9233 for the TN -RAM Packaging, Revision 14 The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting this report pursuant to 10 CFR 71 .95(a)(3) and (b) with respect to Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 9233, Revision 14, for the TN-RAM Packaging, Docket No. 71-9233. WA is an authorized user of the TN-RAM packaging under the provisions of 10 CFR 71.17, General License: NRC-approved package.
Only one TN-RAM packaging has been fabricated and in use since 1989, prior to the discovery that the attachment points not intended for package lifting or tie-down were not rendered inoperable for transport operations as required by 10 CFR 71.87(h) and 49 CFR 173.41(b). The failure to render the impact limiter lifting lugs inoperable was noted during routine operations by a party other than WA. Further review of the design determined that the attachment points intended for lifting the impact limiters will not withstand the static force required for lifting and tie-down in 10 CFR 71.45.
Immediate action was taken to install a cover on each impact limiter lifting lug retained by a bolt installed in the lifting lug through hole, which renders the attachment point inoperable. In addition to installing the cover, a durable marking, stating "IMPACT LIMITER LIFTING ONLY,"
was placed near each impact limiter lifting lug to identify the intended use of the lifting lugs.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 15, 2017 A written report, as required by 10 CFR 71 .95(c), is provided as Enclosure 1.
There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal. If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ed Schrull at (423) 751-3850.
Enclosure:
10 CFR 71.95 Report cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager for TN -RAM, SFM Licensing Branch
Enclosure 10 CFR 71.95 Written Report Information required by 10 CFR 71.95(c) was prepared by TN Americas LLC and is included as an attachment to this enclosure. Additional licensee -specific information is provided below.
(2)(ii) Dates and approximate times of occurrences The TN-RAM cask was used for shipments from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) on the following dates:
10/11/2012 12/17/2012 1/14/2013 1/23/2013 2/4/2013 2/13/2013 2/18/2013 2/28/2013 3/11/2013 (6) Contact information Please contact WA Corporate Nuclear Licensing Manager Ed Schrull at (423) 751-3850 with any questions regarding this report.
Attachment (6 pages follow): 10 CFR 71.95 Written Report
10 CFR 71.95 Written Report (1) Abstract The TN -RAM package has trunnions intended as attachment points for lifting and tie -down. The trunnions are a structural part of the package that is designed to meet the requirements of the regulation for lifting and tie-down. Attachment points for lifting the impact limiters during installation and removal are a structural part of the impact limiters that are part of the TN -RAM package. An evaluation of the TN -RAM lifting attachment points demonstrates that the trunnions and impact limiter lifting lugs have been designed only for their intended use. Inadvertent use of the impact limiter lifting tugs to lift or tie-down the TN -RAM would impair the ability of the package to meet requirements for transport. However, operation of the TN -RAM has not included any controls to render the impact limiter lifting tugs inoperable during transport operations as required by transport regulations. An evaluation of the lifting and tie -down operations has been done to determine the extent of the condition and appropriate corrective actions to render the impact limiter tugs inoperable. A review of the NRC 10 CFR Part 71.78(h) regulatory requirements for Operating Controls and Procedures determined that use of the cask without rendering the impact limiter tugs inoperable is a practice that did not follow the conditions of the certificate of compliance.
(2) Description of the event (i) Status of components or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event The TN RAM cask system is a Type 8 transportation package design approved by the NRC (71-9233). The package is a steel encased lead shielded cask with wood impact limiters attached at both ends. The impact limiters are a packaging component that is required by the NRC approval of the package design. Impact limiters protect the cask shell and contents by absorbing shocks from impacts incidental to normal and accident transportation conditions. The cask shell is a right circular cylinder with trunnions welded to the outer shell for lifting and tie -down. The overall dimensions of the packaging are approximately 178 inches long and 92 inches diameter with the impact limiters installed.
The cask body is approximately 129 inches long with an outer diameter of 51 inches. The maximum gross weight of the package is approximately 80,000 lbs. The structural evaluation for tie -down and lifting devices in the TN -RAM SAR states that there are no other structural parts of the package which can be used for tie down attachments.
(ii) Dates and approximate times of occurrences The TN -RAM package first use was on or about 1989. The lifting lugs were not rendered inoperable during the period of operation since first use.
(iii) The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error The TN -RAM SAR contains loading and handling guidelines that include general instructions for removal of the impact limiters using a "suitable crane and two legged sling", rotating and lifting the cask using a "suitable crane hook" to "engage the lift beam to the two front trunnions", and removal and installation of "front and rear trunnion tie -downs." The Operations and Maintenance Manual for the TN -RAM (OM -7) expands on the handling guideline and describes the trunnions intended purpose for lifting and tie -down of the cask.
OM -7 also describes the impact limiter lifting lugs as "located such that the limiter is
10 CFR 71.95 Written Report balanced when it is lifted." The glossary of terms in OM -7 defines lifting lugs as "attachments provided on the impact limiters for handling operations," lift beams as "devices for cask lifting and handling operations," and trunnions as "handling attachments provided for cask primary lifting, support and tie -down." These definitions describe the intended purpose of attachment points. The design of the impact limiter rigging equipment is sized for attachment to the lifting lugs, and lift beams are specialized lifting devices that are designed for attachment to the trunnions. A dynamometer is installed between the crane hook and sling that is attached to the lifting lugs. The dynamometer is used to support the weight to allow removal of impact limiter bolts, and the procedure requires "lift up on the sling until a reading of 3700, +0, -100 pounds is indicated on the dynamometer." Any attempt to lift the weight of the TN -RAM package would exceed 3700 pound reading on the dynamometer. Tie -down members for the TN -RAM are trailer support pedestals specially designed for attachment to the trunnions.
The tarp installed over the support frame during transport has been considered a control to render the impact limiter lugs inoperable. The tarp when installed blocks access to the impact limiter lugs, but the lifting tugs are accessible when the tarp and support frame are removed for handling operations. Transport operations include the preparation of the package for transport (installing impact limiters), securing the package to the trailer for transit (tie -down), and receiving the package (removing impact limiters). During preparation for transport and receipt of the TN -RAM, the impact limiters are installed without the tarp in place. Prior to removal of the impact limiters and after installation the lift lugs are accessible.
Rigging equipment or tie -down members could inadvertently be attached to the lift tugs.
However, lifting or tie-down of the TN -RAM using the lifting lugs would require intentional misuse of the rigging equipment and tie-down members, and violate operational controls and procedures for handling the cask. A method for rendering the lift lugs inoperable is required to prevent attachment to these points during preparation and receipt phases of transport operations. The tarp does not meet the intent of the requirement in the regulation to render the attachment point inoperable during all phases of transport operations.
(iv) The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component The impact limiter attachment points are intended only for lifting the impact limiter during removal and installation white the TN -RAM package is attached to the transportation trailer. Each impact limiter weighs approximately 3700 lbs. The impact limiter shell is a structural part of the packaging that retains the wood shock absorber. The shell is sealed to protect the wood material from environmental conditions incident to routine use.
The impact limiter lifting lugs are designed for a safety factor against yield that is consistent with accepted industry standards for material handling using standard rigging equipment.
10 CFR 71.95 Written Report The nominal design weight of the impact limiter is 3695 lbs. The most likely failure mechanism or "weak link" in the attachment point on the impact limiter would be a tensile breakage of the lifting lug. Attempting to lift the package using the impact limiter lifting lugs would not result in damage to the structural inipact limiter shell that would impair the ability to meet transport requirements.
The lifting lugs were not intended to tie -down of the TN -RAM during for transport. The stress applied to the lifting lugs used at attachment points for tie -down would be different than for the intended use to lift the impact limiters. A review of the impact limiter lifting design basis indicates that the lifting lugs would not withstand the stress applied by static forces required for tie-down in 71.45(a) or static force required by DOT for Protection Against Shifting and Falling Cargo (49 CFR 393).
(v) A list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected for failures of components with multiple functions Lifting lugs are designed for the single purpose of lifting the impact limiter.
(vi) The method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error Failure to render the impact limiter lugs inoperable was noted during routine operation of the TN -RAM.
(vii) For each human performance -related root cause, a discussion of the cause(s) and circumstances Approved operational procedures and controls in place were followed since first use of the cask. There is no known instance of lifting or tie -down of the TN -RAM using the lifting lugs during nearly 30 years operating experience.
(viii) The manufacturer and model number (or other identification) of each component that failed during the event No failure of the impact limiter lifting lugs occurred on the TN -RAM No. 001.
(ix) For events occurring during use of a packaging, the quantities and chemical and physical form(s) of the package contents Quantities of radioactive material in form of activated metals shipped during use of the package varied during use. During this period of use the package contents was limited to about 14,000 Ci Co -60 equivalent activity that was recently increased in 2015 to a allow up to 30,000 Ci Co -60 equivalent activity.
(3) Safety Significance The lifting lugs when used as intended have been evaluated to meet industry standards for rigging and material handling. Attempting to lift the TN -RAM using the lifting lugs would result in a yielding and tensile failure of the lifting lug. The structural shell of the impact limiter would not likely be damaged due to attempting to lift the package using the lifting lugs. Stresses generated in the impact limiter shell when used as a tie-down attachment point for securement of load during
10 CFR 71.95 Written Report transport have not been analyzed. Using the impact limiter lifting lugs as tie -down attachment points could generate stresses in the impact limiter shell that could result in tears or cracks.
Undetected during the normal use or periodic inspections, these defects would allow moisture ingress and eventual degradation of the wood impact absorbing material that would impair the performance of the package during normal and accident transport conditions.
(4) Corrective Actions Both engineering and administrative controls have been implemented to prevent inadvertent use of the impact limiter lugs for lifting or tie -down of the package. The engineering control is a cover for each impact limiter lifting lug that is retained by a bolt installed in the lifting lug through hole to render the attachment point inoperable. The lifting lug covers prevent attachment of rigging equipment or tie down members to the impact limiters lift lugs during transport (Figure 1).
Figure 1 -
Lifting Lug Cover An administrative control identifies the intended use of the impact limiter lifting lugs by a durable marking near each impact limiter lifting lug stating "IMPACT LIMITER LIFTING ONLY" (Figure 2).
Additionally a statement should be added in the SAR Chapter 7- Operations and Operations and Maintenance Manual, OM -07 "TN RAM Operations Manual" subsection 8.5 that would require rendering the impact limiter lifting lugs inoperable and stating the allowed attachment points for lifting and tie-down of the TN -RAM. The SAR Chapter 7 is a condition of the § 71.17, General license: NRC -approved package, and OM -7 is provided to the cask users as a guide with more detailed instructions on implementing the operations requirements in the SAR.
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10 CFR 71.95 Written Report Neither TN -RAM SAR Ch. 7 -Operations or previous versions of Operations and Maintenance manual OM -7 include a requirement to render inoperable attachment points that are structural part of the package and not designed for intended package lifting or tie -down. The most recent version of OM -7 however, did add a requirement to render the lifting lugs inoperable by installing a bolt through the lug, or other similar method.
Figure 2- Lifting Lug Marking (5) Extent of the Condition Operating procedures and design of the lift beam that are intended for lifting the cask and the lifting lugs make it improbable that the lift beam would be attached to the lifting lugs.
Furthermore, the trailer trunnion pedestals are tie -down members specifically designed for attachment to the trunriions making it improbable that generic tie -down members attached to the lifting lugs would be used to secure the TN -RAM to the trailer.
The design and operation of the TN -RAM limits the possibility of inadvertent use of the impact limiter lifting lugs as package lifting or tie-down attachment points. All lifting and tie -down operations are controlled by detailed operating procedures and performed by trained and qualified personnel. The TN -RAM cask shell is lifted without the impact limiters installed. Impact limiters are removed from the cask shell prior to lifting operations to remove the cask shell from the trailer, and likewise the impact limiters are installed after lifting operations to place cask shell on the trailer is complete. Handling is done exclusively by persons trained in operation of the TN -RAM at the loading facility and unloading facilities, and transport is by exclusive use on a specialized trailer.
(6) Contact information
[The name and telephone number of a person within the licensee's organization who is knowledgeable about the event and can provide additional information]
10 CFR 71.95 Written Report (7) Extent of exposure of individuals to radiation or to radioactive materials No individuals were exposed to radiation or to radioactive materials as a consequence of not rendering the impact limiter lifting lugs inoperable during transport operations.