ML17334A730

Rev 2 of Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan.

ML17334A730
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/06/1998
From:	SAMPSON J R INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
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ML17334A731	List: ML17334A730 ML17334A736
References
PROC-980506, NUDOCS 9806100446
Download: ML17334A730 (52)

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ATTACHMENT TOAEP:NRC:1303RESTARTPLAN-REVISION29806f00446 980506PDRADOCK05000315PPDR

'I CookNuclearPlantRestartPlanJ.RSampsonSiteVicePresident Revision2

Introduction andOverview1.1Purpose1.2Background 1.3RolesandResponsibilities 1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverview2.RestartWorkScopeDetermination 2.1RestartWorkScopeDetermination Process2.2PlantSystemReviews2.3Redefined RestartWorkScope3..RestartWorkScopePerformance 3.1WorkScopePerformance 4.RestartReadiness Assessment 4.14.24.34.4SystemReadiness Functional AreaReadiness Prograinmatic Readiness Containment Readiness 5.RestartAuthorization 5.1RestartOversight Committee (ROC)ReviewandApproval5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApproval5.3Executive VicePresident RestartAuthorization 6.StartupandPowerAscension 6.1Management Oversight andOrganizational Support6.2Operating Proficiency andExperience ReviewAttachments:

Asystemengineerreviewboard(SERB)charterBrestartoversight committee (ROC)charterCcriteriaforworkincludedinrestartscopeDplantsystemstobereviewedbyROCErestartprocessmapFplantperformance assurance oversight ofrestartRevisionBlock

1.0 Introduction

andOverview1.1PurposeTheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlandescribes theactivities andcontrolsthatwillbeimplemented toensurethefacilityisreadytosafelystartupandoperateinanevent&eemanner.Toprovideuswiththeassurance thatthiscanbeaccomplished wemustdetermine thatourpeople,plantandprogramsarereadytomeetthischallenge.

Theplanwillassesstheseareasandidentifyanyneededactiontoensurewecansafelystartupandoperatereliablyinanevent&eemanner.Theplanwillassessthefollowing:

~PeopleHaveweadequately preparedourpeoplesuchthattheyaretrainedonthechangesinourprogramsandprocedures andunderstand theissuesinvolvedinrestarting andoperating theplant?Arethefunctional areasstaffed,organized andfunctioning ataleveltosupportsafestartupandreliableoperation inanevent&eemanner?~'rogramsHaveourprogramsandprocedures beenadjustedtoincludethelessonslearned?Aretheyadequatetoallowustoreturntooperation andpreventfuturenonconforming conditions?

oPlantAreourmaterielcondition, configurations, restart.readiness ofsystemsandabilitytomeetdesignfunctionwhilecomplying withapplicable regulations adequatetoallowustoreturntoservice?Thisplanprovidesamaptoconducttheassessments neededtoassureourselves thatwearereadytorestart.Theactionsandactivities neededtodothisandanycorrective actionswillbeperformed inaccordance withapprovedprocedures.

1.2Background

DuringtheJuly-September, 1997,time&arne, theNRCconducted anarchitect engineering inspection atCookNuclearPlant.TheAEinspection focusedprimarily ontwosafetysystems,ECCSandCCW.SixweeksintotheAEinspection, aquestionsurfacedregarding ourabilitytosustainlong-term coolingofthecoreduringadesignbasisaccident.

Asaconservative measure,bothunitswereshutdownonSeptember 9andcooledtocoldshutdownuntilthisquestioncouldbeproperlyanswered.

OnSeptember 12,theNRCconcluded theAEinspection withapublicexit.meeting.Following thismeeting,CookNuclearPlantcommitted toaddressing andresolving seven(7)specificissuesidentified duringtheinspection priortorestartoftheunits.Itwasbelievedthatthesesevenissuescouldberesolvedwithinafewweeks.Subsequent toourlettertotheNRCcommitting totheseactions,theNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionletter(CAL)identifying theirapprovalwouldberequiredpriortorestarting theunits.TheNRCCALalsoidentified twoadditional actionstobetakenasacondition forrestarting theunits.Theunit2reactorwasscheduled forarefueling tobegininlateSeptember, 1997.Theunit2corewaswithintwoweeksofnormalburnupwindowatthetimeoftheunscheduled shutdown.Ourobjective wastoresolvetheCALitems,andrestartunit2fortheremaining twoweeksoffuelburnup,thencommencetherefueling outage.Overthenextseveralweeks,itbecameapparentthatarestartwouldnotbeachievable inthenearterm,andadecisionwasmadetobegintheunit2refueling outageanditsscheduled workonOctober20,1997.Inparallelwiththeoutagework,ourorganization workedthroughthemanyAEinspection/CAL issues.ItappearedthataJanuary1998restartofbothunitswouldbefeasible.

DuringthetimeperiodofJanuary-February1998,theCookNuclearPlantseniormanagement teamhadseveralmeetingswiththeNRC,andtheCALissueswerenearingresolution.

Itwasduringthistimeperiodthatseveralnewissuesarose,concerning orrelatingtoourcontainment systemsthatwouldrequiresignificant resources andfocustoreconcile.

Giventhesignificant periodthatbothunitshadbeenshutdownuptothispoint,andtheuncertainty foranear-term startupdate,itwasdecidedthatthescopeofbothunits'utages neededtobere-evaluated, andamorerigorousassessment ofplantreadiness wasrequiredpriortoanyrestart.Thesestepsarenecessary inordertoachievetheobjectives described inSection1.1.Thekeyfactorsthatledtothisdecisionare:Designbasisconcernsandequipment performance andtestingissueswhichhavecometolightinrecentmonthsraisedtheconcernthatadditional hardwareandnon-hardware activities mayneedtobecompleted duringthisextendedshutdown.Confirmation isrequiredthatprocedure inadequacies orequipment deficiencies thatmaychallenge plantoperators duringnormal,abnormal, oremergency conditions havebeenadequately identified andaddressed.

Lessonslearned&omothernuclearutilities intheimplementation ofanintegrated assessment ofreadiness torestartfollowing anextendedshutdown periodarebeingadoptedandappliedtoCookNuclearPlantonapilotbasisduringthisoutage.1.3RolesandResponsibilities Rolesandresponsibilities fortheexecution ofthisplanareasfollows:1.3.1AllNuclearGeneration Employees Responsible forsupporting therestartactivities byfocusingonsafeoperations andcontinuous improvement.

Allemployees areobligated toraiseanyandallqualityconcernstomanagement's actionthroughthecorrective actionprogram.1.3.2SystemEngineers Responsible forsuccessful completion ofrestartworkonselectedsystems,performing anassessment ofsystemreadiness tosupportunityrestartand,safe,reliablepoweroperations, implementing necessary corrective actionsandproviding affirmation ofreadiness.

1.3.3SystemEngineering ReviewBoard(SERB)Boardinternaltotheengineering organization responsible forassessing thereadiness ofplantsystemsandproviding recommendations foradditional restartscopetotheROC.TheSERBcharterisprovidedinattachment A.1.3.4RestartOversight Committee (ROC)Responsible fordetermining therestartscopeofworkusingconsistent standards andcriteriaapprovedbytheseniormanagement reviewteam(SMRT)andassessing thereadiness ofCookNuclearPlanttorestartandresumepoweroperations, usingtheprocessapprovedbytheSMRTinthisprocedure.

TheROCcharterisprovidedinattachment B.1.3.5SeniorManagement ReviewTeam(SMRT)Members:SiteVicePresident (Chairman)

VicePresident NuclearEngineering DirectorPerformance Assurance DirectorRegulatory Affairs*Independent SafetyReviewCommittee Member-*Thismemberwillactivelyparticipate asavailable, andwillperformacontinuous oversight role.Routinecommunication withthismembermay beaccomplished throughreviewofmeetingminutes,phoneconferencing andfollowupinterviews withtheSMRTmembers.TheSMRTisresponsible forgeneration andapprovals of:(a)criteriaforscreening workitemsrequiredforcompletion ofrestart;and,monitoring andoversight oftheprocessforaffirmation andapprovalofplantandstaffreadiness forrestart.1.3.6PlantManager,Engineering ManagersandDepartment Superintendents Responsibility forsuccessful completion oftherestartwork,performing anassessment offunctional areareadiness tosupportunitrestartandsafe,reliablepoweroperations, implementing necessary corrective actionsandproviding affirmation ofreadiness totheROC.1.3.7RestartManagerResponsibility forthemanagement andcontrolofrestartworkactivities including thescheduling ofactivities andcoordination ofresources.

1.3.8SiteVicePresident Overallresponsibility forthemanagement andimplementation oftherestartplantoachievethepurposedescribed insection1.1.Servesaschairmanofthe(SMRT).1.3.9Executive VicePresident NuclearGeneration Responsible forauthorizing startupandpowerascension, andproviding seniormanagement oversight oftherestartprocess.1.3.10PlantPerformance Assurance Responsible todischarge performance assurance responsibilities under10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurance thatactivities affecting qualityaresatisfactorily accomplished.

SeeAttachment Fforfurtherdetails.1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverviewTherestartplanconsistsofthefollowing majoractivities:

(1)scopedetermination (2)workperformance (3)readiness assessment

(4)startupauthorization (5)startupandpowerascension Following isaprocessmapandsummaryoftheactivities withmoredetailedinformation presented inlatersectionsofthisdocument.

f CookPlantRestartPlanOverviewL1srvBgheenPerformSystemReadiness Reviews15sERSRexxnmedRestartWorkScopesaRocAppmveRestartWorkScope2.1ReawQeneoerPerformRestartWorkMPerformRnatReviewRacerrvnendStartup41srNTReconvnend Restart$.1opearoeRestartAndPowerOperation 12IleagerPerformFnctionalAreaReadeessReviewsFinalReview12nanoyooPerformProgranmatic Rearfeess Reviews1AovRers~PerformContainment Readiness Review 1.1SysEngineers PerformSystem'eadiness ReviewsThe'objective oftherestartreadiness assessment istoensurethattheintegrated setofplantequipment, humanresources andworkprogramsarecapableofsupporting safeandreliablepoweroperations.

Therestartreadiness assessment willbeinitiated inparallelwiththeexecution andcompletion ofrestartwork.Therestartreadiness assessment willfocusonthefollowing 1.2~ManagersPerformFunctional AreaReadiness Reviews~plantsystemreadiness

~functional areareadiness

~programmatic readiness

~containment readiness 1.3.ManagersPerformProgrammatic Readiness Reviews1.4DirPlantEngineering PerformContainment Readiness Reviews1.5SERBRecommend RestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemaybeincreased asaresultoftheplantsystemassessments orotherongoingwork.Thesystemengineers willrecommend therestartworkscopetotheSystemEngineerReviewBoard(SERB).

1.6'OC'pprove RestartWorkScopeAllrestartscopeadditions willbeapprovedbytheRestartOversight Committee (ROC).2.1RestartManagerPerformRestartWorkFollowing determination oftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsible forcoordinating theplanning, scheduling andcompletion ofthework.3.1ROC,PNSRC PerformFinalReviewRecommend StartupResultsoftherestartassessment willbepresented totheRestartOversight.

Committee (ROC)withanaf5rmation bytheresponsible systemengineerorengineering manager,andthefunctional areasuperintendent ofthereadiness ofthesystem'rorganization tosupportplantstartupandsafe,reliablepoweroperations.

4.1SMRTRecommend RestartFollowing presentation andacceptance oftheassessment resultsbytheROC,theSiteVicePresident willconvenetheSMRTtoperformanintegrated reviewoftheaffirmations, verifycompliance withregulatory commitments andanyotherspecialcriteriathatmayimpacttheinitiation ofstartupactivities.

4.2ExecVicePresAuthorize RestartBasedontheresultsofthisreview,theExecutive VicePresident NuclearGeneration willauthorize startupandpowerascension.

5.1OPSStartupandPowerAscension Startupandpowerascension following thecompletion ofstartupworkwillfollowadeliberate andcontrolled approachthatensuresoperational andpersonnel safety.ThenormalstartupprocessdefinedinCookNuclearPlantprocedures willbesupplemented withappropriate management oversight andsupport&omengineering andmaintenance organization suchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressed andthestartupcanbeaccomplished inasafe,controlled manner.

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2.0 RestartWorkScopeDetermination

2.1RestartWorkScopeDetermination ProcessTherestartworkscopeisbeingdefinedthroughadetermination processdrivenbytheROCconsistent withtheircharter.Outstanding workitemsandselectedprogranunatic issuesarereviewedagainstdefinedcriteriatodetermine whichitemsshouldbeincludedintherestartscope.Systemengineers havethelargestroleinthisprocess,butthereisalsoconsiderable involvement fromotherorganizations including operations, designengineering, andmaintenance.

Therestartworkscopedetermination processisoutlinedinattachment E..2.2PlantSystemReviewPlantsystemsarereviewedbythesystemengineerusingtheplantsystemreviewinstructions withresultsandrecommendations presented totheROC.Theplantsystemreviewprocessconsistsoffourprimlyelementsasdescribed below.2.2,1Selection ofPlantSystemsPlantsystemshavebeenselectedforadetailedreviewandaffirmation basedonthehistorical performance andrisksignificance ofthesystem.Thisreviewwillbeperformed inaccordance withtheplantsystemreadiness reviewinstructions.

Resultsoftheassessment ofselectedsystemswillbepresented firsttotheSERBand,uponapproval, totheROCwithappropriate recommendations foradditional actions'o beperformed afterrestart.Thesystemsarelistedinattachment D.Theremaining systemswillbeassessedandevaluated aspartofthelineresponsibility oftheengineering organization throughtheuseoftheSERB.Issuesthataffectrestartscopeonthesesystemswillbepresented totheROConacasebasis.2.2.2RestartWorkScopeAdditions Therestartworkscopeadditionforplantsystemsisfocusedonthoseitemsnotalreadyincludedintherestartworkscope.Itemsalreadyscheduled forcompletion priortorestartarenotevaluated againstthecriteriaprovidedinattachment Cunlessthereisaproposaltodeletethem.Thegoalofthesystemreviewandworkscopeadditionprocessistodefine'the worknecessary forcompletion priortorestartsuchthatthesystemiscapableofsupporting safeandreliablepoweroperation.

Thisreviewwillincludethefollowing:

10 (a)(c)themagnitude, significance andriskofitemswhichwillberesolvedaAerrestartshouldbedefinedandevaluated; assurance thatrecurring problemsonthesystemthatcouldaffectsafeandreliableoperations arebeingfixed;assurance thatanydesignbasisandlicensing issuesonthesystemarebeingaddressed withinatimeframethatisappropriate fortheissue;andassurance thatoperators willnotbeunnecessarily challenged intheoperation ofthesystemduringnormal,abnormal, oremergency conditions.

Basedonthereviewofopenworkitemsagainstthecriteriapresented inattachment C,thesystemengineeristoproviderecommendations fortherestartscopechangesfortheselectedsystemsinattachment DtotheSERBanduponapprovaltotheROC.Itemsrecommended foradditiontotherestartscopeforremaining plantsystemswillbehandledonanitemspecificbasisbytheROCfollowing aninitialreviewbylinemanagement.

Itshouldbenotedthat.itwasnottheintentofthisprogramtoresolvealldesignbasisissues.Wearecommitted toalongrangeprogramtoaccomplish thisresolution.

2.2.3Monitoring RestartWork,Addressing EmergentIssuesandPerforming aMoreDetailedAssessment ofSystemReadiness Systemengineering istomonitortheprogressofworkonassignedsystemandaddressemergentissuesasrequired.

AnymajorrestartscopeimpactsdefinedbyemergentissuesshouldbebroughttotheROCfollowing linemanagement review.Allotheremergentissuesareassesseddailybytheengineering managers.

Also,thesystemengineeristousethisperiodtocompletetheassessment andevaluation ofsystemreadiness inpreparation forthefinalsystemreadiness reviewandaffirmation ofreadiness forrestart.2.2.4FinalSystemReadiness ReviewandAffirmation Thisaspectofthesystemreadiness reviewprocessissummarized insection4.1.Althoughitisnotexpectedthatanysignificant restartworkscopeissueswillbeidentified duringthisfinalreview,ifanyareidentified, theyaretobebroughttotheimmediate attention oftheROC(following linemanagement review).11

2.3Redefined RestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemayberedefined basedontheevaluation processdescribed above.Decisions madeby,theROCregarding therestartworkscopearedocumented inmeetingminutesandworkitemstatusistracked.3.0RestartWorkScopePerformance 3.1WorkScopePerformance Following determination oftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsible forcoordinating theplanning, scheduling andcompletion ofthework,including theimplementation ofprograinmatic changes.Therestartworkscopeperformance processisoutlinedinattachment E.4.0RestartReadiness Assessment

'herestartieadiness assessment isanintegrated linemanagement assessment thatassistsstationmanagement indetermining thereadiness toinitiatestartupandachievesafe,reliablepoweroperation throughthenextoperating cycle.Therestartreadiness assessment processisoutlinedinattachment E,Thisformofassessment isoneelementofacomprehensive plantassessment programthatisthefoundation ofourcontinuous improvement philosophy.

Implementation ofthisactionisconsistent withtheexperience andlessonslearnedofothernuclearutilities.

Therestartreadiness assessment isbeingimplemented atCookNuclearPlantbasedonlessonslearnedandwillbecapturedsuchthatthisprocesscanbeimplemented onaroutinebasisinthefuture.Therestartreadiness assessment forrestartwillverifythecompletion ofalldefinedrestartworkandtheaffirmation ofsystem,department andrestartreadiness forstartupandpoweroperations.

Resultsoftheassessment andafBrmation ofreadiness willbepresented totheROCbytheresponsible systemengineer, functional areamanagerandoperations shiftsupervisor.

-Following acceptance bytheROC,thesitevicepresident willconveneanSMRTmeetingtoreviewtheseaffirmations andverifycompliance withregulatory commitments andanyotherapplicable criteria.

Thesitevicepresident willrecommend startupoftheunitsbasedonthisreview,andassurance regarding thereadiness ofthestationtoinitiatestartupandsafely,reliablyoperatethroughthenextoperating cycle.Following isasummaryofthekeyelementsoftheprogram.4.1SystemReadiness Systemreadiness affirmations bythesystemengineeraretoconfirmthatplantsystemsmeetfunctional designrequirements, havebeensuitablytestedandarereadytosupportsafeandreliablestartupandoperation throughthenextcycle.ThisafIirmation isbasedontheworkcompleted asdescribed insection2.2,andisto12

includeacoordinated systemwalkdownofthesystemwithoperations andmaintenance personnel onsystemsdefinedbytheplantengineering manager.Wherenecessary, compensatory actionsforrescheduled workorotherareasofperformance riskaretobedefinedandaddressed.

Systemreadiness affirmations aretobepresented bythesystemengineertotheSERBanduponitsapprovaltotheROCforthesystemsidentified inattachment D.Affirmation ofsystemreadiness isdocumented withthesignature ofthesystemengineerandmanager.Affirmation ofindividual systemreadiness fortheremaining plantsystemswillbeaddressed aspartofthesystemengineering linemanagement responsibility andwillbeoneelementofthefunctional areareadiness evaluation.

4.2Functional AreaReadiness rFunctional areareadiness byselectedfunctional areasisanaffirmation thatthedepartment isinanappropriate stateofreadiness tosupportstartupandsafeandreliablepoweroperation throughthenextcycle.Functional areareadiness willincludeitemssuchas:(a)(c)(d)adequacyofstaffinglevels,personnel experience andqualifications todemonstrate compliance withregulatory requirements andcommitments; completion ofpersonnel trainingonnormalstartupevaluations, powerascension requirements, industryoperating experience including extendedshutdownandunusualeventsatsimilarplants,emergency preparedness, changesinplantconfiguration, changesinplantoperating andemergency procedures, andchangesinkeyadininistrative procedures andprocesses; resolution ofsignificant performance deficiencies andreduction ofbacklogs(corrective action,corrective maintenance etc.)tomanageable levels;andestablishment ofgoalsandpriorities forthecontinued improvement ofthedepartment including useofcriticalassessment methods.Functional Areareadiness willbeaffirmedtotheROCbythefollowing functional

~operations outagemanagement

~maintenance licensing plantengineering fuelsdesignengineering

~plantprotection

~production engineering information management chemistry plantperformance assurance radiation protection Affirmation offunctional areareadiness isdocumented withthesignature ofthefunctional areamanager.13

4.3Programmatic Readiness Programmatic readiness reviewwillconfirmthatprogramsareinplacetosupportidentification andcorrection ofproblems.

Programmatic issuesidentified duringtheunitshutdownhavebeenevaluated andnecessary corrective orpreventive actionshavebeencompleted.

Programsinplaceatthetimeofunitstart-upwillensurethattheplantwillbeoperatedinconformance withitsdesignbasesandinaccordance withtheAEPqualityassurance program.A/Eprogrammatic issuespotential bypassof50.59safetyevaluations 50.59safetyevaluation qualitycorrective actionprogramimprovements surveillance programassessment 4.4Containment Readiness Thecontainment readiness reviewwillfocusontheabilityofthecontainment systemtomeettheintendedfunctional designrequirements.

Thecriticalpointsofthereviewwillfocusonthesystemmaterielcondition, adequatesurveillance testing,andthesystemconfiguration control,5.0RestartAuthorization Therestartauthorization processisoutlinedinattachment E.5.1RestartOversight Committee (ROC)ReviewandApprovalTheROCwillreviewandaccepttheassessment affirmations in4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4.Arestartrecommendation willbemadetotheSMRTbasedontheresultsofthefunctional areaassessments.

5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApprovalUponreviewandacceptance oftheassessment affirmations in4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4bytheROC,thesitevicepresident willconveneanSMRTmeetingtoperformanintegrated reviewandapproval.

5.3Executive VicePresident RestartAuthorization Basedonthisreviewtheexecutive vicepresident nucleargeneration willprovide-theauthorization forrestartandpowerascension.

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6.0 StartupandPowerAscension

Startupandpowerascension, following thecompletion oftherestartworkwillfollowadeliberate andcontrolled approachthatensuresoperational andpersonnel safety.Thenormalstartupmanagement teamwillbeaugmented withashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineering managersuchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressed andthestatuscanbeaccomplished inasafe,controlled manner.Thestartupandpowerascension actionssummarized inthissectiondonotchangeoralteranyrequirements ofthestartupprocedures definedabove.6.1Management Oversight andOrganizational SupportTheCookNuclearPlantmanagement structure willbesupplemented withashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineering managertocompliment theshiftmaintenance managerduringthestartupandpowerascension phase.Theresponsibilities ofthesepositions areasfollows:6.1.1ShiftPlantManagerTheshiftplantmanagerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative oftheplantmanagerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofthestartupprocess.Ifnecessary, theshiftplantmanagerisauthorized torequestoperations todelaythestartup,reducepower,orshutdowntomakenecessary repairs.6.1.2ShiftEngineering ManagerTheshiftengineering managerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative oftheplantengineering managerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofengineering supportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftengineering managerwillcontrolon-shiftengineering resources asnecessary tosupportscheduled startuptestingactivities, resolveemergentoperability issues,supportmaintenance andmanagenecessary reactorengineering testactivities.

6.1.3ShiftMaintenance ManagerTheshiftmaintenance managerprovideson-shift(24-hour) presenceasadirectrepresentative ofthemaintenance managerandisresponsible formaintaining anoverallperspective ofmaintenance supportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftmaintenance managerwillcontrolon-shiftmaintenance resources asnecessary tosupportscheduled startuptestingactivities, resolveemergentequipment issues,andsupportoperations.

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Thisorganization willbeimplemented asdirectedbytheplantmanageratcriticalevolutions duringstartupsuchaschangetomode4,initialcriticality, turbineroll,andparalleltogrid.Theorganization willbedisbanded asdirectedbytheplantmanagerbutnotbeforemode4to30%power.6.2Operating Proficiency andExperience ReviewTominimizethepotential forperformance errorsduringtheplantstartup,thefollowing actionswillbetaken:~operations personnel willutilizethesimulator topracticethestartupevolution andensureunderstanding andproficiency withapplicable startupprocedures andspecialrequirements; areviewofpastCookNuclearPlantstartupissuesrelevantindustryoperating experience willbeperformed duringthefunctional areareviewstoensureunderstanding ofpastexperience andlessonslearned;department communication meetingswillbeconducted witheachplantdepartment todiscussmanagement expectations regarding thestartupandpowerascension processes,

schedule, andresponsibilities.

These~meetingswillbecompleted priortoinitiating thestartupevolution.

16 ATTACHMENT APURPOSE:Performasystem-based, multi-disciplinary technical reviewofpotential restartissuesassociated withrisksignificant plantequipment.

Thisboardwillensureconsistent application oftherestartcriteriacontained inAttachment CoftheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlanamongsystemengineers, andensurethatrestartdecisions reflectthesharedconcernsofOperations, Maintenance andEngineering.

Theresultofthisreviewwillbetodefinetheequipment relatedworkwhichisneededtoensureasafeandeventfreestartupandachieveareliablepoststartupoperating cycle.MEMBERS:DirectorPlantEngineering (Chair)Mechanical Component ManagerElectrical SystemManager.SafetyandAnalysisManagerI&CManagerPerformance TestingManagerPreventive Maintenance ManagerBoardSecretary Non-Member:

Additional attendance bymembersofRestartOversight Committee isexpectedtoreinforce expectations andprovideoversight fortherestartIssuereviewprocess.Alternate chair:SiteEngineering ManagersAlternate safetyandanalysismanager:Engineers intheSafetyandAnalysisSection,subjecttoacceptance oftheSERBchairoralternate chair.QUORUM:Chair(oralternate),

twoOnsiteManagers, SafetyandAnalysisManager(oralternate),

andSecretary.

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ACTIONS:3.5.6.Reviewallpotential restartitemsidentified bySystemEngineers basedoncriteriadefinedintherestartplan;theSystemEngineerwillpresenttheproposedrestartitemsfordiscussion.

Arepresentative ofOperations andMaintenance knowledgeable ofthesystem'srestartissueswillsupportthesystemengineerandensuretheperspective oftheotherproduction groupsisconsidered.

TheOperations representative willnormallybeanSSoraUSoftheOperations crewresponsible forthesystem,butcanbeanSSassignedtothe%orkControlCenter.Designate systemsthatarerequiredtobepresented totheSERBbysystemengineer, Maintenance andOperations.

TheSERBwillreviewallitemsidentified aspotential restartissuesbythesystemengineersystemreadiness review.Thesystemengineer, Operations orMaintenance representatives willalsoidentifyotherissueswhicharenotidentified aspotential restMtissuesbutmaybequestioned.

Acompletelistofopenissuesoneachsystemwillbeavailable duringSERBmeetings.

TheSERBwillreviewandquestionadditional itemsasdesiredtodetermine iftheyshouldberestartissues.Ensurearecordofalldecisions andconcernsraisedbytheSERBreviewisdocumented forfuttuereview.Asaiesultofthereview,recommend specificpotential restartitemsforapprovalbytheROC.Reviewandapprovethecharterandanyrevisions neededtosupporttherestartplan.DisbandthisboardafterstartupwhendirectedbytheSiteVicePresident.

D.R.HaferDirectorofPlantHnginccting 18

ATTACHMENT BPURPOSE:Exercisemanagement oversight andapprovalofphysicalandprogrammatic workscopenecessary toensureasafeanduneventful unitstartup,andachieveareliableoperating cycle.PositionPlantManager,ChairOperations Superintendent ViceChairProduction Engineering DirectorPlantEngineering DirectorMaintenance Superintendent Licensing ManagerChemistry Superintendent Radiation Protection Superintendent TrainingSuperintendent RestartManagerRestartPlanProjectManager*Secretary*

DougCooperBobGillespie KenBakerDonHaferJohnBoeschMarkAckermanDaveMoreyDougNobleDennisLoopeJohnStubblefield PhilGoraBettyClarkAlternate BobGillespie GuyTollasAlbertoVerteramo MikeFinissiMarkStarkGordonArentBobClaesPaulHollandDennisWilleminDickStrasserSandyMcClintock

• Indicates non-voting membersQUORUM:Chairperson orvicechairperson, andthree(3)additional votingmembers,twoofwhichmustbeprimarymembers.Attendance

&omPerformance Assurance andBusinessPerformance isstronglyencouraged toperformanactiveoversight role.ACTIONS:2.Setandcommunicate expectations fortheorganization toevaluateworkitemsagainsttherestartscopecriteria.

Ensurescreening criteriaareconsistently appliedviatherestartoversight committee review,meetingandapprovalprocess.19 4I Someitemsthatmeetoneormoreofthecriteriamaybedeferreduntilafterrestartifthereisspecialconsideration thatprovidesthebasisforthisdecision.

Examplesmayincludeitemsthatareonlyaconcernduringcertainseasons,reducedriskofperforming theworkduringasystemoutage,orimplementation ofadequate compensatory actionsuntilalong-termsolutionisdefined.Aclearbasisfordeferraloftheseitemsistobeprovided.

3.Reviewandapprove:A.Restartactionitemstobecompleted priortostar{up.B.Stationreadiness toinitiateuntilstartupandpowerascension asdetermined bytheresultsoftheassessment ofreadiness tostartup,4.Maintainarecotdofpresentations, discussions, deliberations andbasisfordecisions andrecommendations.

5,Reviewcharterasnecessary toaccommodate changingconditions.

Conveneasnecessary toaccomplish thischarterpriortoandduringstarship.

Disbandafterunitstartupwhendirectedbythesitevicepresident..

SiteVicedentDate20 ATTACHMENT C.Tobeincludedintheplantrestartworkscope,itemsmustmeetthefollowing criteria:

1.Level1Screening Resolvesanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafety,operability orregulatory issue.Theseissueswillbemandatory restartitems.1.Necessaiy toaddressthevoluntary shutdownfortheA/Einspection andrelatedprogrammatic issues.I2.Necessary toaddresstheconfirmatory actionletter.3.RequiredtoreturnanINOPERABLE system,subsystem orcomponent toOPERABLEstatus.4.Requiredtoresolveanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafetyconcern.5.Necessary toaddressregulatory commitments.

2.Level2Screening Notanimmediate industrial ornuclearsafety,operability orregulatory issue.Theseissueswillbeconsidered foradditiontotherestartitemlistbasedonthereviewandrecommendations ofplantengineering, operations, andmaintenance iftheaction:1~Eliminates anexistingcomponent failure,deficiency, orcondition thatcouldresultinoperation in,orentryto,anLCOactionstatement.

'2.Resolvesexistingdeficiencies orconditions that:a.wouldresultinfailureorinability toperformarequiredsurveillance testduringthecurrentoutageorthefollowing operating cycleinaccordance withtheplanttechnical specifications; b.wouldincreasetherisktooperation forsafetyassociated withperforming asurveillance; orc.wouldresultinthefailuretomeetalicenserequirement orarestartcommitment toanoutsideagency.21

3.Restoresdegradedcriticalcomponents orconditions thatcouldresultinaplanttransient, powerreduction orshutdown.

4.Resolvesconditions thathaveresultedinrepetitive safetysystemorequipment failures.

5.Restoreshcensingbasisdeficiencies toconforming conditions (extended programmatic reviewsandscheduled coirective actionsmaybecompleted post-restart withtheproperjustification ofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactory OPERABILITY determination, andappropriate regulatory communication).

6.Correctsequipment withdesignbasisdeficiencies; i.L,deficiencies insafety-related ortechnical specification equipment notinconformance withdesignbasisdocuments suchastheFSAR(extended programmatic reviewsandscheduled comctiveactionsmaybecompleted post-restart withjustification ofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactory OPERABILITY determination andappropriate regulatory communication).

7.Correctsdeficiencies inconfiguration management

programs, processes, engineering analysiscodes,oroperating, maintenance, ortestprocedures thathaveareasonable probability ofaffecting equipment OPERABILITY (documentation deficiencies, whichhavenosafetyimpact,maybecompleted post-restart).

8,Eliminates conditions thatcreateapotential forpeieonnel radiation

exposure, radioactivity release,orefHuentdischarge inexcessoflimits.9.Reducesaunulative deficiencies, backlogsorconditions that,intheaggri~te, areevaluated tohavesignificant negativeimpactonsafety,operability orreliableplantoperation.

(Notapplicable toindividual workitems).Appaved:Siteident22 23 ATTACHhgNT D.120Vac/CRIDInverters AirRecirculation/Hydrogen SkimmerAuxiliary Feedwater 250VdcStationBatteries Component CoolingWaterContainment Containment SprayControlAirECCSAccumulators ECCSChargingModes1,2,3/CVCSHigh-head Injection ECCSRHRECCSSIElectrical SafetyBusses(4000V/600V)Emergency DieselGenerators Essential ServiceWaterIceCondenser MainSteamNon-essential ServiceWaterPlantAirCompressors ReactorCoolantSystem/RCS PressureReliefReactorProtection System/Solid-state Protection/ESFAS 24

ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap(1)RestartWorkScopeDetermination 1.1BeniEngheenrc SelectPlantSystemsForReviewApprovePlantSystemForReview1.3SYSENO~OPS,MrPerformSystemReviewsAddithnal WorkScoRequired?

PerformReadiness Assessment

)sadnessAssessmara 11.2ROCValidateExistingRestaWorkScopeYES1.5SERBSERBReviewAndApprovalApproveRestartWorkScopeAdditions ApprovedRestartScopeAdditions 1.7SYSENGRMonitorWork,AddressEmergentIssuesPerformWorkScopApprovedRestartWorkScope(2)RestartWorkScopePerformance 2.1Mr,ISPlanRestartWorkScheduleRestartWo2.3AlOqyConductRestartWorkPerformReadiness Assessment I3IeennessAssessnenl 3.125

ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap(3)Readiness Assessment 3.1SyeEny'neerAffirmPlantSystemReadiness saSERBSERBConfirmsReadiness PlantSystemReady?SERBnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination 3AMenegeaAffirmFunctional AreaReadiness Functional AreasReady1oeienlIoeen 1AYesYesS.euORBSAffirmProgrammatic Readiness ProgramsReady?noRestartWorkScopeDetermination 1oeienneieeen 1AYesS.laMenderCompliieAndPresentResultsRestartAuthorization 4eeienALerertzeiion AAnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination 1oeienTwLteen 1AYesAffirmContainment Readiness Containment Ready?26noRestartWorkScopeDetermination Oe~1A

ATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMapATTACHMENT ERestartProcessMap{4)RestartAuthorization

{5)PowerOperation 4.1ROCPerformFinalReadinesReview42ROC,PNSRCPerformFinalReviewRecommend StartupRecommend Restart4AExecVlccPresa%Authorize Restart5.1OexeSNNStartupandPowerAscension 27 V.~

ATTACHMENT FPerfoanceAssurance Oversight ofRestartPerformance Assurance Oversight ofRestartThepurposeofthisoversight effortistodischarge Performance Assurance responsibilities, under10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurance thatactivities afffecting qualityaresatisfactorily accomplished.

Thisoversight willincludeproviding independent feedbacktolinemanagement concerning theadequacyoftherestartplanandhoweffective theplanisbeingimplemented.

Toenhanceindependence, personnel conducting thisoversight willincludethosewhohavenotbeeninvolvedwiththeevolution ofpractices andlessonslearnedastheRestartPlanhasbeenimplemented.

Criticalactivities wereidentified

&omtherestartplan.Criticalattributes oftheseactivities wereidentified andscheduled foroversight asfollows:ListofCriticalActivities SystemReadiness ReviewsFunctional AreaReviewsProgrammatic ReviewsContainment Readiness ReviewsDetermination ofRestartWorkScopeRestartWorkSERBROCIntegration ofReviewsStartupandPowerAscension CriticalAttributes ofCriticalActivities SystemReadiness ReviewsAretherightsystemsbeingreviewed?

Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective?

Functional AreaReviewsAretherightareasbeingreviewed?

Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffectlve2 Programmatic ReviewsAretherightprogramsbeingreviewed?

Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2 Containment Readiness ReviewsIstherightscopebeingreviewed2 Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2 Determination ofRestartWorkScopeIstherightcriteriabeingusedtodetermine restartworkscope?Arethereanyhiddeninventories ofitemsthatarenotbeingconsidered?

Reviewworknotincludedinrestart?Adherence toCriteriaExpertJudgement 28

ATTACHMZYI' PerfceAssurance Oversight ofRestartRestartWorkIsrestartworkbeingperformed toproperstandards?

Engineering Maintenance Operations OtherSERBIsthecharteradequate?

IstheSERBeffectively carryingoutthecharter2ROCIsthecharteradequate?

IstheROCeffectively carryingoutthecharter2Integration ofReviewsIsthemethodofintegrating reviewsadequate?

PlantEquipment HumanResources WorkProgramsStartupandPowerAscension Isitadequately Planned2Isitadequately Scheduled?

Isisadequately Performed (OnshiftObservations)?

29 RevisionBlockRestartPlanRevisions RevisionNumberDescription Page26:Newpage.AddedRevisionBlockPage8"Authorize Restart":

DeletedExecutive VicePresident NuclearEngineering.

AddedExecutive VicePresident NuclearGeneration.

Pages20and21:Addedreference numberstorestartcriteria.

Sect1.3.5:AddedDirectorRegulatory AffairstoSMRTAttachment A:AddedPreventive Maintenance ManagertoSERBcharterSect1.3.10:AddedPlantPerformance Assurance responsibilities AddedAttachment F,Performance Assurance Oversight OfRestartIndex:AddedAttachment FAttachment C:Added"operability orregulatory" tolevel1screening.

Added5.Necessary toaddressregulatory commitments.

Added"regulatory" tolevel2screening.

Date4/7/9830 e.