Revision as of 16:27, 17 July 2018

Text

Waterford 3-2012-10-Draft Operating Test
	ML13127A264
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/01/2012
From:	Larson B T; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Entergy Operations
	laura hurley
References
	Download: ML13127A264 (289)
	v • d • e

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A1 Calculate Shutdown Margin with a Stuck CEA

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A1 Revision 0 Page 2 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Calculate Shutdown Margin with a stuck CEA.

Task Standard: Applicant calculates Shutdown Margin in accordance with OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin. The results must conform to the answer key and conclude that reactor power is greater than the allowed power level.

References:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book

COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time:15 mins.

K/A 2.1.25, Ability to interpret reference Importance Rating 3.9 materials, such as graphs, curves, RO tables, etc.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A1 Revision 0 Page 3 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to calculate Shutdown Margin with 1 mechanically bound CEA. The results will indicate that Shutdown Margin is NOT met and Emergency Boration is required.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

JPM A1 Revision 0 Page 4 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Core burnup is 335 EFPD.

TCOLD is 543.5 °F.

Power is 35%.

Power is being held due to a Chemistry hold.

Regulating Group P CEAs are being used for ASI control as xenon builds in.

CEA 24 failed to withdraw or insert on the last move.

I&C has completed troubleshooting and there are no problems associated with CEDMCS.

The Shift Manager has concluded that CEA 24 is mechanically bound.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, section 7.3.

JPM A1 Revision 0 Page 5 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 7.3.1 If an Untrippable CEA Condition exists and the other CEAs are not inserted, then determine Shutdown Margin and record on Attachment 10.3 as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD NOTE (1) Use 541°F when using PDB Figure 1.5.7.

(2) When using graphs and tables in the Plant Data Book (PDB), to obtain the necessary data, it may be necessary and is acceptable to interpolate (approximate between data points or curves). However, extrapolation (approximation outside of the bounds of the data or curves) should not be used.

Note reviewed.

Comment: Use Figure 1.5.7.3 for MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.3.1.1 Using current Cycle Burnup and 541 °F temperature, determine Net Worth Worst Pair Stuck out (WPSO) from Figure 1.5.7.

5.3 - 5.4 Comment: Refer to A1 Key. Use Figure 1.5.7.3 for MOC.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 7.3.1.2 Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR. 5.15 Comment: Refer to A1 Key.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3.1.3 Subtract Step 7.3.1.2 from Step 7.3.1.1 to determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Defect %K/K. 0.15 - 0.25 Comment: Refer to A1 Key.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.3.1.4 Record current Reactor Power on Attachment 10.3. Data recorded.

JPM A1 Revision 0 Page 6 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 7.3.1.5 Using result from step 7.3.1.3 and Power Defect vs. Power Level, Figure 1.2.1, Determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level. 10% - 18%

Comment: Refer to A1 Key.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 7.3.1.6 Verify Shutdown Margin greater than or equal to that required by the COLR by verifying that current power level is less than or equal to the Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level. Shutdown Margin is not met. Comment: Refer to A1 Key.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 7.3.2 If Shutdown Margin does not meet the requirements of Technical Specifications, then Commence Emergency Boration and go to OP-901-103, Emergency Boration. Communicate step to examiner.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM A1 Revision 1 Page 7 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A2 Calculation For Determini ng The Amount Of Pure Water That May Be Added To The Refuel Cavity

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 9 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Calculation for determining the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity Task Standard: Applicant calculates the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage operations. The results must conform to the answer key.

References:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations TS 3.9.1 COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time:20 mins.

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system Importance Rating 4.3 and integrated plant procedures during RO all modes of plant operation.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 10 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations COLR TS 3.9.1

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to calculate the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage Operations. To perform this calculation the applicant will need to determine what the Refueling Minimum Boron concentration is from Tech Specs. The results will indicate that 1413 gallons of PMU may be added to the refuel cavity.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 11 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Waterford 3 is in a refueling outage.

Reactor engineering has determined that a boron concentration of 1985 ppm is required to maintain the ref uel cavity at a Keff of < .95.

Refueling Cavity Water Level is 24 ft. and will be drained to 22 ft.

Refueling Cavity boron concentration is 2090 ppm.

INITIATING CUES:

RP has requested that the refuel cavity walls be washed dow n with PMU as level in the refueling cavity is lowered to 22 ft.

The CRS directs you to determine refueling minimum boron concentration per TS 3.9.1 and perform OP-010-006, Attachment 9.24 Ref ueling Cavity Boron concentration.

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 12 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Note: (1) This attachment provides guidance for calculating the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity without dilution to below shutdown margin requirements. This is typically used while Radiation Protection is using CMU to wash down the Refuel Cavity walls to mitigate airborne radioactivity while performing Refuel Cavity drain down. (2) This calculation is only valid for water additions while the Refuel Cavity Water Level is > 20' MSL. (3) This calculation includes a 50% margin.

Note reviewed.

SAT / UNSAT 9.24.1 Record the following:

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Final Refuel Cavity Water Level (Lf):

Comment: Refer to A2 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Initial Refuel Cavity Boron Concentration (Ci)

Comment: Refer to A2 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD Refueling Minimum Boron Concentration (Cf) 2050 ppm Comment: Refer to A2 Key. The applicant will determine that 2050 ppm is the most restrictive requirement per TS 3.9.1.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 13 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 9.24.2 Calculate the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity (Vw) using the following formula: Vw = (6954 gal/ft x Lf - 79,161 gal) x (1- Cf/Ci) Vw = [( 6954x___ ft) - 79,161]x [1-(___ppm/___ppm)]

Vw=____gallons 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: 73827 x .019139 = 1413 gallons Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 9.24.3 Select the lower of Vw calculated in Step 9.24.2 or 1500 gallons: 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: Refer to A1 Key.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 9.24.4 SM/CRS designate the allowable amount of pure water to add to the Refuel Cavity by specifying an amount that is < amount specified in Step 9.24.3. SM/CRS designated allowable pure water limit to add to cavity: less than or equal to value calculated in step 9.24.2 Comment: Refer to A1 Key. If asked by the applicant if the CRS desires to limit the amount specified in step 9.24.3 the answer will be that it is not desired to limit the amount designated in step 9.24.3.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM A2 Revision 0 Page 14 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM

Waterford 3 2012 RO NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A3 Determine Acceptability of Containment Temperature In Accordance With OP-903-001

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A3 Revision 0 Page 16 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Determine Acceptability of Containment Temperature In Accordance With OP-903-001 Task Standard: Determines Containmen t Average Temperature does not meet acceptance criteria with instru ment error accounted for and determines Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 needs to be entered.

References:

OP-903-001 TS 3.6.1.5

TS Bases 3/4.6

Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance Importance Rating 3.7 procedures. RO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A3 Revision 0 Page 17 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-001, Attachment 11.1 MODES 1-4 Technical Specification Surveillance Logs

OP-903-001, Attachment 11.20 MODES 1-4 PMC Technical Specification Surveillance Logs (page 149)

Waterford 3 Technical Specifications

Description:

This JPM requires the candidate to use C ontainment temperatur e readings from the PMC (provided on the cue sheet), calculate t he average temperature using 3 of the 4 readings, and determine compliance with TS 3.6.1.5 and OP-903-001. Based on the readings of the 3 running CFC intake temperat ures and tighter acceptance criteria of OP-903-001 (based on instrument error) TS 3.6.1.5 ACTION a must be complied with.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other acti ons when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

Provide all answers on the material provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet and Page 149 of OP-903-001 to the applicant.)

JPM A3 Revision 0 Page 18 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

o Reactor power is at 100%.

I & C has just completed calibration of CFC Air Intake temperature loops.

Containment Fan Coolers A, C, and D are operating.

Primary Containment Average Air temperatures ar e as follows:

o PID A51115, CFC A Air Inlet Temp reads 97

°F. o PID A51119, CFC B Air Inlet Temp reads 100

°F. o PID A51123, CFC C Air Inlet Temp reads 101

°F. o PID A51127, CFC D Air Inlet Temp reads 98

°F.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS requests that you determine compliance of Containment Average Temperature per OP-903-001.

Document results and actions requir ed, if any, on OP-903-001, Attachment 11.20, and return to the examiner.

JPM A3 Revision 0 Page 19 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam Evaluator Note The candidate will determine Containment Average Temperature using Containment Fan Cooler inlet temperatures from the PMC, Containment Fan Coolers running, and reactor power (all provided on the cue sheet)

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Determines Containment Average Temperature 98.3°F -99.7°F Comment: 1. The applicant will use the provided CFC temperatures and average the 3 running CFC temperatures (A, C and D). The average will be 98.7

°F. Note: Averaging the 3 running CFC temperatures is preferred but not required. Any 3 can be used. The range given covers the various combinations that can be averaged.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Determines Average Containment Temperature does NOT meet Acceptance Criteria. Determines that 3.6.1.5 entry is required.

Comment: If the candidate just compares the temperature to the 3.6.1.5 LCO they will determine that no action is required and acceptance criteria is met. However, Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 does not take into account instrument uncertainties. and notes 2.0 - 2.3 of OP-903-001, Attachment 11.1 should be reviewed to determine acceptability of Containment Temperature.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK JPM A3 Revision 0 Page 20 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS None.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A4 Gaseous Release Evaluation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A4 Revision 0 Page 22 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Meteorological conditions ar e evaluated for gaseous release from the GWM System.

Task Standard: Applicant concludes that a release is permitted. The conclusions must include the restrictions on wind speed, wind direction, and stability class.

References:

OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management Time Critical: No Validation Time:10 mins.

K/A 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases Importance Rating 3.8 Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A4 Revision 0 Page 23 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management

==

Description:==

The setting will be in the classroom for this JPM. The applicant will be provided information from the PMC for the applicable meteorological conditions. The data will be used to evaluate the flow chart in OP-007-003, Attachment 11.5.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from this JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet, OP-007-003 attachme nt 11.5, and the met data printout to the applicant.)

JPM A4 Revision 0 Page 24 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 1.

Chemistry has requested a release of all 3 Gas Decay Tanks for planned maintenance.

Environmental conditions are as displayed on the METDATA handout.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to complete an evaluation of meteorological conditions for the release in accordance with OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management.

Document all information used and c onclusions on OP-007-003, Attachment 11.5.

JPM A4 Revision 0 Page 25 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Evaluate 10 meter (33 foot) wind speed. Concludes wind speed is 2.68 (or 2.75 from the B/U met tower) m/s and continues down through the flow chart.

Comment: The 199 foot reading (3.62 m/s) will conclude that there are no restrictions on the release without using the rest of the flowchart. The procedure directs using the 33 foot parameters.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Evaluate 10 meter (33 foot) wind direction. Concludes wind direction is 331.1(or 330.7 from the B/U met tower) deg and continues right through the flow chart.

Comment: The 199 foot reading (314.5 deg) will also continue right through the flow chart. The procedure directs using the 33 foot parameters.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Evaluate Pasquill Stability Class. Concludes T is -0.77 °C or -0.78 °C, stability class C, and that the release is permitted. If using the B/U met tower, T is -0.93 °C, stability class B, and that the release is permitted.

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT

END OF TASK

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A5 Review and Approve a Shutdown Margin with a Stuck CEA

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 27 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review and Approve a Shutdown Margin with a stuck CEA.

Task Standard: Applicant reviews the co mpleted Shutdown Margin in accordance with OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin. The applicant must identify that the incorrect Shutdown Margin was used and correct that error. The applicant must also identify that the plant is operating above the allowed power level and Emer gency Boration is required.

References:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book

COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time:20 mins.

K/A 2.1.25, Ability to interpret reference Importance Rating 4.2 materials, such as graphs, curves, SRO tables, etc.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 28 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to review a completed Shutdown Margin with 1 mechanically bound CEA. The review will indica te that Shutdown Margin is not met and Emergency Boration is required.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 29 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Core burnup is 335 EFPD.

TCOLD is 543.5 °F.

Power is 35%.

Power is being held due to a Chemistry hold.

Regulating Group P CEAs are being withdrawn for ASI control as xenon builds in.

CEA 24 failed to withdraw or insert on the last move.

I&C has completed troubleshooting and there are no problems associated with CEDMCS.

The Shift Manager has concluded that CEA 24 is mechanically bound.

INITIATING CUES:

The STA has provided you with a completed OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, for review.

Review and approve the completed surveill ance or correct any errors and document any actions required on the worksheet given.

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 30 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 7.3.1 If an Untrippable CEA Condition exists and the other CEAs are not inserted, then determine Shutdown Margin and record on Attachment 10.3 as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD NOTE (1) Use 541°F when using PDB Figure 1.5.7.

(2) When using graphs and tables in the Plant Data Book (PDB), to obtain the necessary data, it may be necessary and is acceptable to interpolate (approximate between data points or curves). However, extrapolation (approximation outside of the bounds of the data or curves) should not be used.

Note reviewed.

Comment: Use Figure 1.5.7.3 due to MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.3.1.1 Using current Cycle Burnup and 541 °F temperature, determine Net Worth Worst Pair Stuck out (WPSO) from Figure 1.5.7. Recorded correctly on surveillance.

Comment: Use Figure 1.5.7.3 due to MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 7.3.1.2 Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR. 5.15 Comment: Surveillance lists 4.6, the COLR Shutdown Margin for > 500 F with CEAs inserted.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3.1.3 Subtract Step 7.3.1.2 from Step 7.3.1.1 to determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Defect %K/K. 0.15 - 0.25 Comment: Surveillance lists .751 because of previous error.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.3.1.5 Using result from step 7.3.1.3 and Power Defect vs. Power Level, Figure 1.2.1, Determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level. 10% - 18%

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 31 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: Surveillance lists 58%.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 7.3.1.6 Verify Shutdown Margin greater than or equal to that required by the COLR by verifying that current power level is less than or equal to the Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level. Shutdown Margin is not met. Comment: Surveillance lists 58% allowed, which is greater than the current power level. Applicant must recognize that the actual limit is 10% - 18% which is below the current power level.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 7.3.2 If Shutdown Margin does not meet the requirements of Technical Specifications, then Commence Emergency Boration and go to OP-901-103, Emergency Boration. Direct Emergency Boration.

Comment: If the candidate does not state Emergency Boration is required but states that Shutdown Margin is not met, then ask the candidate what actions are required for this condition, prior to the candidate leaving the area.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM A5 Revision 0 Page 32 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

There is no Simulator setup for this JPM

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A6 Review A Calculation For Determining The Amount Of Pure Water That May Be Added To The Refuel Cavity

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 34 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review a calculation for determining the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity Task Standard: Applicant reviews a calculation for determining the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage operations. The results must conform to the answer key.

References:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations TS 3.9.1 COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time:15 mins.

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system Importance Rating 4.4 and integrated plant procedures during SRO all modes of plant operation.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 35 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to review a ca lculation for the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage Operations. To perform this calculation the applicant will need to determine what the Refueling Minimum Boron concentration is from Tech Specs. The results will indicate that 1413 gallons of PMU may be added to the re fuel cavity instead of the 1500 gallons indicated on the reviewed attachment.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue sheet, and then give the cue sheet and student handout to the applicant.)

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 36 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Waterford 3 is in a refueling outage.

Reactor engineering has determined that a boron concentration of 1985 ppm is required to maintain the ref uel cavity at a Keff of < .95.

Refueling Cavity Water Level is 24 ft. and will be drained to 22 ft.

Refueling Cavity boron concentration is 2090 ppm.

INITIATING CUES:

RP has requested that the refuel cavity walls be washed dow n with PMU as level in the refueling cavity is lowered to 22 ft. The CRS is to review the calculati on for determining refueling minimum boron concentration per TS 3.9.1 and the per formance OP-010-006, Attachment 9.24 Refueling Cavity Boron concentration. IF necessary, correct any problems found on .24.

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 37 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Note: (4) This attachment provides guidance for calculating the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity without dilution to below shutdown margin requirements. This is typically used while Radiation Protection is using CMU to wash down the Refuel Cavity walls to mitigate airborne radioactivity while performing Refuel Cavity drain down. (5) This calculation is only valid for water additions while the Refuel Cavity Water Level is > 20' MSL. (6) This calculation includes a 50% margin.

Note reviewed.

SAT / UNSAT 9.24.1 Record the following:

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Final Refuel Cavity Water Level (Lf): value input verified Comment: Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Initial Refuel Cavity Boron Concentration (Ci) value input verified Comment: Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 38 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD Refueling Minimum Boron Concentration (Cf) 2050 ppm Comment: Refer to A6 Key. The applicant will determine that 2050 ppm is the most restrictive requirement per TS 3.9.1. The attachment being reviewed has 1985 ppm entered as the refueling minimum boron concentration. 1985 ppm is the reactor engineering boron concentration to maintain Keff < .95. TS 3.9.1 requires the most restrictive of 2050 ppm or the boron concentration to maintain Keff < .95 as the refueling minimum boron concentration. In this case, the most restrictive boron concentration is 2050 ppm.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 9.24.2 Calculate the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity (Vw) using the following formula:

Vw = (6954 gal/ft x Lf-79, 161 gal) x (1- Cf/Ci) Vw = [( 6954x___ ft) - 79,161]x [1-(___ppm/___ppm)] Vw=____gallons 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: The attachment being reviewed would have an error carried forward if 1985 ppm is used as the minimum required boron concentration.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 9.24.3 Select the lower of Vw calculated in Step 9.24.2 or 1500 gallons: 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: Refer to A6 Key.

The attachment being reviewed would have an error carried forward if 1985 ppm is used as the minimum required boron concentration.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 39 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 9.24.4 SM/CRS designate the allowable amount of pure water to add to the Refuel Cavity by specifying an amount that is < amount specified in Step 9.24.3. SM/CRS designated allowable pure water limit to add to cavity: Less than or equal to the number calculated in step 9.24.2 Comment: Refer to A1 Key. The CRS may desire to limit the amount specified in step 9.24.3.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM A6 Revision 0 Page 40 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A7 Review of Containment Pressure Calculation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 42 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review of Containment pressure calculation Task Standard: Reviews Containment pressu re calculation in accordance with OP-903-001, Technical Specific ation Surveillance Logs.

References:

OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs Technical Specif ication 3.6.1.4 Time Critical: No Validation Time:15 mins.

K/A 2.2.12 Knowledge of Surveillance Importance Rating 4.1 procedures SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 43 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

1. OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs

2. Copy of Attachment 11.15, Containm ent Pressure Calculation (performed by the ATC) 3. Calculator

==

Description:==

Applicant verifies Containment pressure calculation performed by the ATC.

READ TO APPLICANT

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 44 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Containment pressure reduction was secured during the previous shift.

Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A51000).

Barometric Pressure is reading is 29.

44 INHG as indicated on the (PMC Point C48516).

INITIATING CUES:

Verify the containment pressure calcul ation performed by the ATC using OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillanc e Logs and identify any TS actions required, if any.

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 45 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 11.15.1 Barometric Pressure as measured by PMC (PID C48516). If local reading used, then add 0.05 INHG to obtain a value equivalent to Met Tower PMC point. BP=___________

INHG 11.15.1.2 Record M&TE data on TS Logs Remarks and WR, if applicable Verified 29.44 entered.

Comment: Applicant should not add .05 INHG because the PMC is operable. If he adds .05 INHG, the final value of this calculation will be greater than the TS limit.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 11.15.2 Containment to Ambient Differential Pressure (PMC PID-A51000) C/A=____________

INWC Verified -5.4 entered Comment: Value is from initial conditions SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 11.15.3 Convert Barometric Pressure (BP) from INHG to PSIA by performing the following: BP(PSIA) = [BP(INHG) x 0.4912 PSIA/INHG] BP(PSIA) = [______________ INHG x 0.4912 PSIA/INHG] BP(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Verified BP (PSIA) in the range of 14.46 to 14.461.

Comment: 14.46 is rounded from 14.460928.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 11.15.4 Convert Containment to Ambient Differential pressure (C/A) from INWC to PSIA by performing the following: C/A(PSIA) = [CA(INWC) x 0.0361 PSIA/INWC] C/A(PSIA) = [______________

INWC x 0.0361 PSIA/INWC] C/A(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Recognize the wrong number inserted Comment: -.195 is rounded from -.19494. The applicant should indentify that a positive number has been inserted and calculated for this step. The number is correct but the value should be negative. If this error is not identified, the final value of this calculation will be greater than the TS limit.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 46 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 11.15.5 Calculate Absolute Containment Internal Pressure (CP) by performing the following: CP(PSIA) = BP(PSIA) + C/A(PSIA) CP(PSIA) = ______________ PSIA + _______________ PSIA CP(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Recognized the error carried forward from the previous step. Corrected value should be 14.265 (14.26-14.27)

Comment: CP(PSIA) should be 14.265 when corrected. This number is less than TS. Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD The applicant should identify the corrected value is less than the Technical Specification 3.6.14 limit for containment pressure (14.275 PSIA) and the actions for Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 are required. Identified corrected value is less than 14.275 PSIA and TS 3.6.1.4 entry required Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM A7 Revision 0 Page 47 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

None

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A8 Authorize Emergency Exposure as the Emergency Coordinator

Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM A8 Revision 0 Page 49 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Authorize Emergency Exposure as the Emergency Director Task Standard: Correctly determines t hat authorization is not appropriate

References:

EP-002-030, Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits Importance Rating 3.7 under normal or emergency conditions.

SRO .

Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A8 Revision 0 Page 50 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EP-002-030, Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls

DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

JPM A8 Revision 0 Page 51 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITONS:

You are the Emergency Coordinator.

The following conditions exist:

A stuck valve must be operated in a hi gh radiation area with dose rates of 45 REM/Hour.

The job will take 15 minutes.

The only available person to do this task is Joe Tallard, SSN # 111-22-3333, Badge # 0101, with Operations.

Radiation Protection has reported that they can ta ke no action to reduce the dose rate.

INITIATING CUE:

Evaluate authorizing Emergency Exposure as Emergency Director.

Document all work and results on this sheet.

JPM A8 Revision 0 Page 52 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 TASK ELEMENT STANDARD Emergency Director reviews EP-002-030, Emergency Exposure Guidelines & Controls, and authorizes emergency exposure if criteria is met. Candidate determines that emergency exposure limit of 10 REM TEDE would be exceeded (actual calculation would be 11.25 REM TEDE) and does not authorize emergency exposure.

Comment: Candidate may state that he could authorize Emergency Exposure if the job could be split between two personnel.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

A9 Determine Protective Action Recommendations

Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM A9 Revision 0 Page 54 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Determine protective action recommendations Task Standard: Satisfactorily uses Attach ment 7.2, Protective Action Guidelines Worksheet Release Occurring, to determine Protective Action Recommendations for the given conditions.

References:

EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.4.44, Knowledge of emergency plan Importance Rating 4.4 protective action recommendations.

SRO Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM A9 Revision 0 Page 55 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines

DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet and student handout to the applicant.)

JPM A9 Revision 0 Page 56 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You are the Emergency Director.

A release is in progress following a LOCA with a failed containment penetration.

You declared a General Emergency.

The following data is available for protective action recommendations:

Duration of release is unknown.

Wind Direction from 75°

The Field Teams have reported the following:

o EAB TEDE = 890 mr/hr

o EAB CDE Thyroid = 4800 mr/hr

o 2 Mile TEDE = 501 mr/hr

o 2 Mile CEDE Thyroid = 2485 mr/hr

o 5 Mile TEDE = 98 mr/hr

o 5 Mile CEDE Thyroid = 1410 mr/hr

INITIATING CUE:

Determine Protective Action Recommendations based on available data in accordance with EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines.

JPM A9 Revision 0 Page 57 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 TASK ELEMENT STANDARD Determine Protective Action Recommendations based on available data in accordance with EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines. Candidate should recommend evacuating areas A1, B1, C1, D1, and C2. Candidate should recommend sheltering all other protective response areas. Comment: Candidate should multiply dose rate by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (requirement for releases of unknown duration) and determine areas to evacuate. All other areas should be sheltered.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S1 Securing Emergency Boration

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 59 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Secure Emergency Boration in accordance with step 7 of OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.

Task Standard: Applicant se cured Emergency Boration and performed a flush of one standby charging pump per step 7 of OP-901-103 without tripping the running Charging Pump.

References:

OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, revision 2 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 004 A4.07 Boration/Dilution Importance Rating 3.9/3.7 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 60 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-901-103, Emergency Boration

==

Description:==

The applicant will perform step 7 of OP-901-103, securing Emergency Boration.

This task secures Emergency Boration and aligns the suction source of the Charging Pumps to the Volume Control Tank. All manipulations occur at CP-4. If an applicant does not follow the procedure sequence properly and trips the running Charging Pump, then that applicant would fail this task.

The plant will be emergency borating usi ng the Boric Acid Make-up Pumps.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3 The plant has been shutdown for 3 days

The plant is Emergency Borating due to an uncontrolled positive reactivity addition

The uncontrolled positive reactivity addition has been terminated and Emergency Boration termination criteria are met

The Standby Charging Pump Seal Pa ckages have been running for 30 minutes and an AO is standing by

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to secure Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, step 7

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 61 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 7. When Emergency Boration termination criteria (Step 6) are met, then secure Emergency Boration by performing the following: Applicant continues on with the procedure.

Comment: Termination criteria is met as given in the initial conditions SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.1 Place VCT Disch Valve, CVC-183, control switch to AUTO and verify valve opens CVC-183 is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 7.2 Stop both Boric Acid Pumps. Boric Acid Pumps are stopped. Comment: BAM Pump B is the critical element.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3 Verify the following valves closed: CVC-507 RWSP to Charging Pumps BAM-133 Emergency Boration Valve BAM-113A Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve A BAM-113B Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve B All valves in step are closed. Comment: BAM-133 will need to be closed. Other valves are not critical. because they are already in the correct position Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 62 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.4 Open the following valves: BAM-126A Boric Acid Makeup Pump A Recirc Valve BAM-126B Boric Acid Makeup Pump B Recirc Valve BAM-126A and B are open.

Comment: BAM-126B is the Critical Task because it is the only one that is closed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note Inform the candidate that the CRS directs him to start Char ging Pump AB first to flush boric acid out of the pump. TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 7.5 Operate each Charging Pump for at least 5 minutes to flush concentrated boric acid out of pump.

At least one standby Charging Pump is operated. Comment: The candidate may use OP-002-005 to swap charging pumps. Task elements 7 through 20 are the steps in OP-002-005, Charging and Letdown System, for swapping charging pumps. Time compression used for operation of each charging pump.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the applicant starts Charging Pump AB, cue the candidate that 5 minutes has elapsed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD Procdure Note The Charging Pump Seal System should be operated for at least 30 minutes prior to starting the Charging Pump. Reviewed the Note Comment: The seal package has been running for 30 minutes as indicated in the initial conditions. EVALUATOR CUE: If the candidate calls the RCA watch to verify the seal package running for 30 minutes, then inform him that all seal water pumps have been running for at least 30 minutes.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 63 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 6.2.1 At SM/CRS discretion, verify readiness for operation of each Charging Pump to be started as follows:

Verify crankcase oil level 1/2 in bulls eye.

Verify gear reducer oil level between low and high marks on dipstick.

Flush debris and fines from packing seal water system as follows: A. Place Seal Water Pump A(B)(AB) control switch to ON. B. Open Charging Pump A(B, AB) Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB). C. If packing cooling tank level continues to lower after makeup begins, then prior to tank level lowering below the bottom of the sight glass, Throttle Closed Charging Pump A(B, AB) Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB), as necessary to maintain packing cooling tank level visible but 1/2 in sightglass. D. After flushing the packing cooling tank for at least three minutes, then Close Charging Pump A(B, AB) Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB). E. Verify packing cooling tank water level 1/2 in sightglass.

Candidate communicates with the RCA to verify Charging Pump AB ready for a start.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: When the candidate calls the RCA watch to perform step 6.1, inform the candidate that step 6.1 is complete and Charging Pump AB is ready for a start.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 64 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD Procedure Note The purpose of securing the Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank is to minimize the impact of the Charging Pump start on Pressurizer pressure.

If the first pump is secured shortly (within approximately one minute) after starting the second pump or PZR boron equalization is in progress, then this step is not necessary when swapping Charging pumps. Note reviewed Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.2.2 At SM/CRS discretion, if a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank is operating, then secure the Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank by placing control switch in AUTO.

Step communicated with the CRS. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, Inform the candidate that securing a pressurizer backup heater is not desired.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD Procedure Caution (1) TO MINIMIZE THERMAL SHOCK OF CHARGING NOZZLES, ONLY ONE CHARGING PUMP SHOULD BE STARTED AT A

TIME. (2) EXTREME CAUTION SHALL BE USED WHEN STARTING ADDITIONAL CHARGING PUMPS WITH THE PRESSURIZER

SOLID. EXCESSIVE RCS PRESSURIZATION COULD RESULT. Caution reviewed Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.2.3 Start desired Charging Pump A(B)(AB) by placing control switch(es) to ON.

Charging Pump AB control switch in ON.

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 65 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.2.4 Verify Seal Water Pump operating for the Charging Pump A(B)(AB) started and Place Seal Water Pump A(B)(AB) control switch in AUTO Seal Water Pump AB control switch has been returned to auto.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that the seal water pump for Charging Pump AB is running. When the candidate directs the RCA watch to place the Seal Water Pump for Charging Pump AB to auto, inform him that the Seal Water Pump for Charging Pump AB is in auto.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.2.5 If Charging Pump A(B)(AB) started will remain in service as Standby Charging Pump(s), then go to Step 6.2.9. Step reviewed Comment:: Charging Pump AB will remain in service and Charging Pump B will be secured. Therefore, the applicant will continue to Step 6.2.6. EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that Charging Pump AB will be the lead pump.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 6.2.6 Secure desired Charging Pump A(B)(AB) by placing control switch(es) to OFF.

Charging Pumps A and B control switches are taken to OFF. Comment: SAT / UNSAT

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 66 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD Procedure Note If there is an Inoperable Charging Pump, then at SM/CRS discretion the Standby Charging Pumps selector switch may be aligned so that the Operable Backup Charging Pump will be the first one selected

for auto starting capability. Note reviewed Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 6.2.8 Verify Standby Charging Pumps selector switch in the appropriate Position for the Charging Pump started (Pump in Lead) per Table 6.2.8. TABLE 6.2.8 P UMP IN LEAD POSITION B AB - A A B - AB AB A - B Selector switch should be selected to the AB as lead pump (A-B position)

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 6.2.9 Place control switch(es) for Standby Charging Pump A(B)(AB) to AUTO.

Charging Pumps A and B control switches are returned to auto.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 67 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD 6.2.10 Place Pump AB Assignment switch to the appropriate Position for the Charging Pump A(B)(AB) to be Assigned to Trip on SIAS, per Table 6.2.10. TABLE 6.2.10 ASSIGNED TO T RIP ON SIAS POSITION A A AB NORM B B Step reviewed Comment:: The switch does not require manipulation since no Charging Pumps are out of service.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 20 STANDARD 6.2.11 If a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank was secured in step 6.2.2, then restore a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank to operation by placing control switch to ON.

Step reviewed. Comment:: No action required for this step since none of the heaters were taken to auto for task element 10.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 68 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-199

2. Verify Emergency Boration aligned per OP-901-103 using Boric Acid Pumps 3. There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

JPM S1 Revision 1 Page 69 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3 The plant has been shutdown for 3 days

The plant is Emergency Borating due to an uncontrolled positive reactivity addition

The uncontrolled positive reactivity addition has been terminated and Emergency Boration terminat ion criteria are met

The Standby Charging Pump Seal Packages have been running for 30 minutes and an AO is standing by

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to secure Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, step 7

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S2 Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 71 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection aligned for Trains A and B per OP-902-009, Appendix 15.

Task Standard: Applicant aligned Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Ap pendices, Appendix 15.

References:

OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, revision 14 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 006 A4.07, ECCS pumps and valves Importance Rating 4.4/4.4 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 72 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15, Hot and Cold Leg Injection.

==

Description:==

This JPM occurs during a Loss of Coolant Accident. The applicant will receive

direction to align simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection. All manipulations will occur at CP-8.

Applicant must obtain keys for the valv es manipulated in this JPM at the NPO Desk.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A Loss of Coolant Acci dent occurred 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ago

The crew has entered OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery

The conditions exist that require alignment of hot and cold leg injection per step 47, Hot and Cold Leg Injection

You are the BOP operator

INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to establish Hot and Cold Leg Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 73 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 1.1 Establish simultaneous Hot and Cold leg injection for Train A by performing the following:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 1.1.a Close SI-219A, HPSI HEADER ORIFICE BYPASS valve.

SI-219A is closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.1.b Open SI-502A, HOT LEG 1 INJECTION ISOLATION valve.

SI-502A is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.1.c Open SI-506A, HOT LEG 1 INJECTION FLOW CONTROL valve.

SI-506A is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 74 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 1.2 Establish simultaneous Hot and Cold leg injection for Train B by performing the following:

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 1.2.a Close SI-219B, HPSI HEADER ORIFICE BYPASS valve.

SI-219B is closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 1.2.b Open SI-502B, HOT LEG 2 INJECTION ISOLATION valve.

SI-502B is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.2.c Open SI-506B, HOT LEG 2 INJECTION FLOW CONTROL valve.

SI-506B is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 75 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.3 WHEN hot and cold leg injection has been established, THEN adjust SI-506 A and SI-506 B to obtain the sum of ALL cold leg flows equal to the sum of the hot leg flows. The sum of all cold leg flows is approximately equal to the sum of the hot leg flows.

Comment: Applicant can obtain Hot and Cold Leg flows from either the PMC, the meters on CP-8, or QSPDS. Due to the flow balance that is performed on these valves each outage flow balance between Hot and Cold Leg injection will be close. The candidate may not adjust flow. They should however, verify the flows.

SAT / UNSAT

END OF TASK JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 76 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-198

Place the Simulator in Run on the lead examiner's cue.

JPM S2 Revision 1 Page 77 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A Loss of Coolant Acci dent occurred 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ago

The crew has entered OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery

The conditions exist that require alignment of hot and cold leg injection per step 47, Hot and Cold Leg Injection

You are the BOP operator

INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to establish Hot and Cold Leg Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S3 OP-902-009, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 79 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform OP-902-009 Appendix 25 , Restore Pressurizer Heater Control. Task Standard: Applicant completed OP-902-009 Appendix 25 and restored Pressurizer backup and proportional heaters to service.

References:

OP-902-009 Appendix 25, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 010 A4.02 Pzr Heaters Im portance Rating 3.6, 3.4 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 80 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009 Appendix 25, Restore Pressuri zer Heater Contro l, revision 307

==

Description:==

The applicant will perform OP-902-009 Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control. This task restores Pressurizer Heaters to service following a SIAS. All manipulations occur at CP-1 and CP-2. If an applicant does not restore all Pressurizer heaters to service, then that applicant would fail this task.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITION:

The plant is shutdown following an Inadver tent Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control.

JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 81 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Note Pressurizer heaters can NOT be restored with a LOOP concurrent with a SIAS. Note reviewed.

Comment: Only a SIAS will be initiated.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.1 Verify pressurizer level is greater than 33%. Level verified.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.2 Monitor EDG loading to ensure EDG does not exceed 4 MW. Step reviewed Comment: CP-1 The EDGs will be running but not connected to the safety busses. No LOOP has occurred.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 1.3 Check SEQUENCER has timed out for each energized safety bus. Verifies 200 Second Block illuminated for both Sequencers Comment: CP-1 SAT / UNSAT

JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 82 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 1.4 Close SST A32 FEEDER breaker. A32 FEEDER breaker closed. Comment: CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.5 Close SST B32 FEEDER breaker. B32 FEEDER breaker closed. Comment: CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.6 Place PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS control switches to "ON" Both Proportional Heater Bank control switches taken to ON and Proportional Heaters are energized.

Comment: CP-2

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 1.7 Momentarily place each BACKUP HEATER BANKS control switches to "OFF" and then to "AUTO." All Backup Heater Bank control switches taken to OFF and then to AUTO or ON. Comment: CP-2 Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 83 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-197

Verify SIAS is initiated and both Sequencers are timed out.

There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

JPM S3 Revision 1 Page 84 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITION:

The plant is shutdown following an I nadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-902-009, Appendi x 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S4 Place Shutdown Cooling Train A in Service

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 86 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Place Shutdown Cooling Train A in Service Task Standard: Applicant correctly performed the identified critical steps for placing Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005

and secured Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A after SI-405A fails closed.

References:

OP-009-005, Shutdow n Cooling, revision 31 OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooli ng Malfunction, revision 302 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical:No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 005 A4.01, Controls and indication for RHR Importance Rating 3.6 / 3.4 pumps RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 87 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, revision 302

==

Description:==

This task is performed at CP-8. The applicant must place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service. The fault in this ta sk is that SI-405A, RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Inside Containment Isol, will fail closed, requiring the applicant to secure Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A. The task can be st opped after LPSI Pump A is secured.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 4

Protected Train is A

RCS temperature is 280 °F

RCS pressure is 340 PSIA

RCS boron concentration is 2027 ppm

SDC Train A suction penetration piping has been manually vented

Shutdown Cooling Train A has been placed in Standby in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown C ooling, section 5.3

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, Section 6.1

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 88 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Caution:

THE FOLLOWING SECTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT CORE REACTIVITY Caution reviewed.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Note: The Shutdown Cooling Train placed in service should be on the Protected Train.

Note reviewed.

Comment: Protected Train is A as given in initial conditions.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Procedure Caution: FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS TORNADO EVENT, DELAYING THE INITIATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) FOR UP TO 7 DAYS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DECAY HEAT. THE ACTUAL DELAY TIME WILL DEPEND ON UHS DAMAGE AND AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND WILL BE DETERMINED BY ENGINEERING.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SUPPO RTS DECAY HEAT REMOVAL UNTIL SDC CAN BE INITIATED. Caution reviewed.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 6.1.1: Verify Shutdown Cooling Train A has been aligned to Standby condition in accordance with Section 5.3, Alignment of Shutdown Cooling Train A to Standby Condition. Notes Section 5.3 is complete and continues in procedure.

Comment: Cue sheet lists this as complete.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 89 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 6.1.2: Verify sufficient number of Dry Cooling Tower Fans running to accept increased heat load on CCW System. Continues in procedure after cue. Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate to leave the Dry Cooling Tower Fans in automatic and allow Auxiliary Component Cooling Water to pick up the heat load.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD Procedure Caution: CC-963A IS REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINED OPEN WHILE IN MODE 4 TO PRESERVE THE DESI GN TEMPERATURE BASIS OF PIPING AND ASSOCIATED COMPON ENTS AT THE CCW OUTLET OF SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A. WITH CC-963A OPEN, FLOW THROUGH SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A WILL BE MAINTAINED ABOVE 2305 GPM. Caution reviewed.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 6.1.3: Place Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control switch to Open. CC-963 A is open.

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 90 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD Procedure Caution: (1) The following Reactor Coolant System limits shall be met for Shutdown Cooling Entry:

RCS temperature limit: < 350 °F

RCS pressure limit: < 392 psia

If Containment harsh environment conditions (>200°F) have been exceeded then RCS pressure limit: <358 Psia (2) If Containment Spray Header A Isolation, CS-125 A, is open while Shutdown Cooling Train A is operating, then Containment Spray A riser may fill and possibly spray water into Containment, due to leakage past Containment Spray Pump A discharge stop check, CS-117A. Caution reviewed.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD Procedure Caution: To minimize the effect of air introduction to a LPSI pump, the piping between SI-405A AND SI-407A should be placed in-service with one of the following conditions: Caution reviewed.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.1.4: Verify RC Loop 2 SDC suction piping meets one of the following conditions: The SDC Train is placed in-service with RCS pressure >

100 PSIA by PMC indication (PIDs A12203, A12204, A12222) or

> 110 PSIA by board indication (RC-IPI0103,-0104,-0105,-0106). or The SDC Train's suction penetration has been manually vented. or The SDC Train was previously in-service since the unit has been shutdown. One of the conditions is verified. Cue sheet lists SDC Train A suction penetration has been manually vented.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 91 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 6.1.5: Unlock and Open RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside Containment Isol, SI-407A. SI-407 A is open.

Comment: Key 133 required.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.1.6: Notify Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service. Call is made.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.1.7: Start LPSI Pump A. LPSI Pump A is started.

Comment: Annunciator LPSI Pump A Flow Lost (Cabinet M, F-3) is expected. It will clear when the applicant raises flow > 2900 gpm.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.1.8: Raise Shutdown Cooling flow by Manually adjusting LPSI Header Flow controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, output until Shutdown Cooling Header A Flow indicates 4100 GPM, as indicated by RC Loop 2 Shdn Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1. Flow is raised to ~ 4100 GPM.

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 6.1.9: Adjust LPSI Header Flow Controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, setpoint potentiometer to 73%, and place controller to AUTO. Setpoint potentiometer is ~ 73%, and controller is in

AUTO Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 92 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 6.1.10: Verify LPSI Header Flow Controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, is maintaining 4100 GPM Shutdown Cooling Header A flow, as indicated by RC Loop 2 Shdn Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1. Flow is verified.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD Procedure note: If a sample was drawn prior to shutdown and no interim shutdown has occurred where SDC was placed in service and boron concentration could have been reduced, then sampling is not required.

Note reviewed.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 6.1.11: At SM/CRS discretion, direct Chemistry Department to sample Shutdown Cooling Train A for boron concentration. 6.1.11.1 When Chemical Analysis results indicate that Shutdown Cooling Train A boron concentration is greater than Reactor Coolant boron concentration or

>2050 ppm (required for Mode 6), then proceed to next step. Determines that boron concentration meets the requirement.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: When requested, inform the applicant that Shutdown Cooling Train A boron concentration is 2060 ppm. RCS boron concentration is in the initial conditions and is 2027 ppm.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD Procedure Note: Shutdown Cooling Train A requires one operable Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve for the train to be operable.

Note reviewed.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 93 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 20 STANDARD Procedure Caution: The Reactor Coolant System shall not exceed the 100 °F per hour cooldown rate of Technical Specification 3.4.8.1. Caution reviewed.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the applicant that the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs.

SAT / UNSAT 6.1.12 Raise Shutdown Cooling Train A temperature to within 100 °F of Reactor Coolant Hot temperature as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 21 STANDARD 6.1.12.1: Open the following valves:

SI-139A LPSI Header to RC Loop 2A Flow Control

SI-138A LPSI Header to RC Loop 2B Flow Control SI-139 A and SI-138 A are open. Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 22 STANDARD 6.1.12.2: Throttle Closed RC Loop 2 Shdn Cooling Warmup, SI-135A, until one of the following is within 100°F of Shutdown Cooling Train A temperature, as indicated by LPSI Pump A Discharge Header Temperature Indicator, SI-ITI-0351X:

Hot Leg 2 temperature, as indicated by RC Loop 2 Hot Leg Temperature Indicator, RC-ITI-0122-HA or Hot Leg 1 temperature, as indicated by RC Loop 1 Hot Leg Temperature Indicator, RC-ITI-0122-HB Temperature is within 100 °F Comment:

SI-135 A is a large gate valve with a very long stroke.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 23 STANDARD 6.1.12.3: Close RC Loop 2 Shdn Cooling Warmup, SI-135 A. SI-135 A is closed Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note Coordinate with the simulator operator to initiate trigger 1 to close SI-405 A five seconds after SI-135A closes.

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 94 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note The following step represents the alternate path portion of the JPM.

TASK ELEMENT 24 STANDARD Secure LPSI Pump A LPSI Pump A is off.

Comment:

This is an immediate operator action in accordance with OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, section D.1.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

END OF TASK

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 95 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-195

Verify the following Malfunctions:

SI23A for SI-405A on Trigger 1

Coordinate with the examiner so that when SI-135 A is fully closed at step 6.1.11.3 for 5 seconds, initiate event Trigger 1 to close SI-405A. (Use Extreme View to monitor SI-135A position)

JPM S4 Revision1 Page 96 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 4

Protected Train is A

RCS temperature is 280 °F

RCS pressure is 340 PSIA

RCS boron concentration is 2027 ppm

SDC Train A suction penetration piping has been manually vented

Shutdown Cooling Train A has been placed in Standby in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown C ooling, section 5.3

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, Section 6.1

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S5 Balance of Plant Operator Immediate Operator Actions on Control Room Evacuation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 98 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform balance of plant oper ator's immediate operator action on Control Room evacuation with fire conditions.

Task Standard: Applicant performed immediate operator actions for BOP position for a fire in the Control Room in accordance with OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

Applicant manually tripped the turbi ne due the turbine failing to trip on a Reactor trip. Applicant placed Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 in

manual and lowered output to zero due to Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 spuriously opening.

References:

OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown, Revision 22 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical:No Validation Time: 5 mins.

K/A 039 A4.01 Main Steam Supply Valves Importance Rating 2.9 / 2.8 RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 99 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

None

==

Description:==

The applicant will be cued that there is a fire in CP-33. The CRS will direct him to carry out his immediate operator actions as BOP operator. The main turbine will not trip when the reactor is tripped. The applic ant will be required to manually trip the main turbine using the turbine trip buttons. Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 will spuriously open requiring Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 controller to be placed in manual and output

lowered to zero. The task will end when the applicant obtains a key ring and communicates his intention to proceed to the RAB +35 Relay room.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at 100% power

A fire has started in CP-33

The CRS has entered OP-901-502, Evacuati on of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown

The At-The-Controls Operator will per form his immediate operator actions

You are the Balance of Plant Operator

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform the BOP immediate operator actions for OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 100 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN and initiate Trigger 1.

Evaluator Note The Alternate Path becomes applicable when the applicant addresses the turbine not tripping on a Reactor Trip.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 2.1 Verify Turbine trip:

Governor valves Closed

Throttle valves Closed Turbine tripped.

Comment: The applicant will trip the turbine using the trip buttons at CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 2.2 Verify Generator trip:

Exciter Field Breaker Tripped

Generator Breaker A Tripped

Generator Breaker B Tripped Verification complete.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 2.3 RESET Moisture Separator Reheater controls.

RESET pushbutton depressed and Temperature Control Valves are closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 101 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 2.4 IF evacuating the Control Room due to fire, THEN perform the following:

Evaluator Note The second Alternate Path becomes applicable when the applicant addresses MS-116A SG 1 Atmospheric Dump spuriously opening.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 2.4.1 IF EITHER of the following valves has spuriously Opened, THEN place the applicable controller(s) in MANUAL AND lower the output to zero: MS-116A SG 1 Atmospheric Dump MS-116B SG 2 Atmospheric Dump (critical path)

MS-116A verified operating properly. MS-116B controller in Manual and output lowered to zero. Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 2.4.2 Close the following valves: MS-124A Main Steam Isol Valve #1 MS-124B Main Steam Isol Valve #2 MS-124A & MS-124B are closed. Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 2.5 Obtain Operations Security Key Ring AND proceed to RAB +35 Relay Room. Keys obtained.

Comment: The examinee should obtain a Key Locker key from the Key locker on left side of the Control Room Desk and simulate getting key from the locker in the Shift Manager's Office represented by the photo posted in the SM office.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 102 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-196

1. Set Trigger 1 to actuate on Rx Tripped 2. Verify the following Malfunctions:

RP03 - ACTIVE

MS23B - 0 PSIG with a 10 Second Ramp on Trigger 1

JPM S5 Revision 1 Page 103 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at 100% power

A fire has started in CP-33

The CRS has entered OP-901-502, Evacuati on of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown

The At-The-Controls Operator will per form his immediate operator actions

You are the Balance of Plant Operator INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform the BOP immediate operator actions for OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S6 Perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check

Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 105 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform OP-903-037, Containment C ooling Fans Operability Check Task Standard: Candidate correctly complet ed the identified crit ical tasks of OP-903-037, Containment Cooling F ans Operability Check.

References:

OP-903-037, Containment C ooling Fans Operability Check, revision 5 OP-008-003, Containment Cool ing System, revision 301 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 022 A4.01 CCS Fans Importance Rating 3.6/3.6 RO/SRO Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 106 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check, revision 5 OP-008-003, Containment Cool ing System, revision 301

==

Description:==

This task is performed at CP-18. The candidate must perform surveillance OP-903-037, which will require logging differential pressure for the 3 running fans. The candidate will then have to secure a r unning Containment Cooling Fan and start Containment Cooling Fan D, at which time the data for CCS Fan D can be recorded.

The candidate should then leave the CCS Fans in an alignment with A, B, and D running, as specified in OP-903-037.

READ TO CANDIDATE

DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be pe rformed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 3

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP

-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check.

Align the final Containment Fan Cooler configuration for the month of October.

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 107 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 7.1 Record differential pressure (DP) and CCW flow rate for operating CFC units on Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet.

Values are recorded on Att. 1.

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Note: Attachment 10.2, Run Time Equalization Schedule Sheet, should be referenced in determining which CFC operating unit(s) is secured. Determine correct alignment for the month of October.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Procedure Caution: To prevent vibration alarms, and damage to containment cooling unit duct work, limit configuration to only three (3) of four (4) units operating at a time. Caution reviewed Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.2 Adjust CFC operating unit configuration to operate idle CFC unit(s). CCS Fan C is off and CCS Fan D is running.

Comment: Evaluator: This is written for the candidate to secure CCS Fan C, which is the most reasonable fan for him to stop. It is acceptable for the candidate to secure CCS Fan A or B at this point. This would require the candidate to maneuver fans later in the task to leave fans A, B, and D running. The applicant will use OP-008-003 to first secure a CCS fan and then to start a CCS fan. Task elements 5-6 are for securing a CCS fan. Task elements 7-14 are for starting a CCS fan.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 108 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 7.1 Securing Containment Fan Coolers TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.1 1 Stop desired Containment Fan Coolers (CFC), from CP-18, by placing Fan Cooler A(B)(C)(D) control switch CCS-0003 A(B)(C)(D) to Stop. One CCS fan is secured Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 7.1 2 Verify at CP-18, that Component Cooling Water Inlet and Outlet Valves for all secured Containment Fan Coolers are Closed. CFC VALVES A Inlet CC-808A Outlet CC-822A B Inlet CC-807B Outlet CC-823B C Inlet CC-807A Outlet CC-823A D Inlet CC-808B Outlet CC-822B Inlet and Outlet valves closed SAT / UNSAT 6.1 Starting Containment Fan Coolers

TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD Procedure Note Normal Containment Cooling System Configuration in modes 1-4 is three (3) Containment Fan Coolers operating and one (1) in standby. Note reviewed SAT / UNSAT

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 109 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD Procedure Caution TO PREVENT VIBRATION ALARMS AND DAMAGE TO CONTAINMENT COOLING UNIT DUCT WORK, LIMIT CONFIGURATION TO ONLY THREE (3) OF FOUR (4) CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS OPERATING AT ONE TIME WHEN IN FAST SPEED. Caution reviewed.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 6.1.1 Start desired Containment Fan Coolers (CFC), from CP-18, by placing Fan Cooler A(B)(C)(D) control switch CCS-0003 A(B)(C)(D) to Start/ Fast. CCS fan started.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.1.2 Verify at CP-18 that the Component Cooling Water Inlet and Outlet Valves Open for the in-service coolers:

CFC VALVES A Inlet CC-808A Outlet CC-822A B Inlet CC-807B Outlet CC-823B C Inlet CC-807A Outlet CC-823A D Inlet CC-808B Outlet CC-822B Inlet And Outlet Valves open.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 110 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD Procedure Note If Containment Fan Coolers are being started with slow speed jumpers installed for Containment cooling with Temporary Chilled Water, then steps 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 are not applicable.

Note reviewed.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.1.3 Check in-service Containment Fan Coolers A (B, C, D) differential pressures within expected range of 5.0 INWC to 8.0 INWC, as indicated on CCS-IDPR-5154A(B). Verified proper differential pressure.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.1.4 Check Component Cooling Water flow is > 625 gpm as indicated on CC-IFI-7570A(B). Verified proper flow.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 7.4 When CFC unit(s) have operated for > 15 minutes, then record CFC unit(s) differential pressure for unit(s) started in Step 2, on Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet. Attachment 10.1 data updated for differential pressure. Perform Time Compression and state that the fan has been running for > 15 minutes.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 7.5 Verify all four CFC units were operated and data recorded on Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet. Attachment 10.1 data updated for all CCS Fans.

Note: Only 2 fans will be operated. One will be secured and the non-running fan will be started.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 7.6 Verify each CFC Unit CCW flow rate is > 625 GPM Satisfactory flow rates verified.

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 111 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 7.7 Refer to Attachment 10.2, Run Time Equalization Schedule Sheet, to obtain CFC unit alignment for the upcoming month. Determine that CFC A, B and D to be left running.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 7.8 Verify that CFC units are aligned as required on Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet. CFC A, B and D running.

SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD Attachment 10.1 of OP-903-037: Steps 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 completed and initialed. The "performed by" line signed. Steps 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 completed and initialed. The "performed by" line signed. SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 112 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-199

Verify CFC A, B, and C are running initially There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

JPM S6 Revision 1 Page 113 of 289 NRC Exam 2012 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITION:

Plant is in Mode 3

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP

-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check.

Align the final Containment Fan Cooler configuration for the month of October.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S7 Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power following a Station Blackout

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 115 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus fr om Offsite Power following a Station Blackout.

Task Standard: The candidate restored power to the 1A and 2A busses from offsite power and then energized the 4.16 KV Safety Bus (3A bus) from offsite power

References:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendic es, Attachment 12-A: 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Rest oration, revision 307 OP-902-009 Standard Appendices, Attach ment 12-B: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 062 A4.01, All breakers (including available Importance Rating 3.3 / 3.1 switchyard)

RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 116 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachm ent 12-A: 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Restoration, revision 307 OP-902-009 Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power, revision 307

==

Description:==

The JPM begins with the plant in a station blackout. The applicant will restore power to the 3A Safety Bus from offsite using OP

-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12-A and 12-B. Actions for th is task take place at CP-1 and CP-8. (This JPM is a site specific priority as an operator action for preventing core damage)

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other acti ons when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is performing actions in OP-902-005, Station Blackout.

Power to the Offsite Grid has been restored.

Lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3 has been reset.

The station blackout has been occurring fo r 30 minutes. All time critical actions required by OP-902-005, Station Blackout, have been completed.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to energize the A1 and A2 busses from offsite power and then energize the 3A bus in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12A and 12B.

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 117 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note When Applicant is ready, cue the simulator operator to place the simulator in RUN. Task element 1-4 are applicable to OP-902-009 Appendix 12-A, 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Restoration 1.1 IF offsite power is available AND 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV nonsafety buses A1 and A2 are deenergized, THEN energize the 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV nonsafety buses as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD a. Locally reset lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3. local relay reset Comment: The 86STA Lockout Relay has been RESET as indicated in the initial conditions.

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that the 86STA Lockout Relay has been RESET.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD b. Verify SUT A DISCONNECT closed. disconnect closed Comment: Indication is in the control room on CP-1.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD c. Verify loads have stripped from SWGR A1 and SWGR A2.

loads verified stripped Comment: Verified in the field.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee requests verification from the Auxiliary Operator, cue the examinee that all loads have stripped from Busses A1 and A2.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD d. Place BUS A TRANSFER switch to "SUT". Switch taken to SUT.

Comment: Switch on CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 118 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD e. Locally reset lockout relays: 86A1/HR on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-2 86A2/HR on 4KV-ESWGR-2A-2 relays reset Comment: Relays are reset in the field.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee requests the Auxiliary Operator reset the relays, cue the examinee that the 86A1/HR and 86A2/HR relays are reset.

SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note The following steps are applicable to OP-902-009, Appendix 12B, Energize 4.16KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.1 IF containment pressure is less than 17.7 PSIA, THEN verify BOTH CS pump control switches are in "OFF". Both CS Pump control switches are in OFF Comment: Control switches are on CP-8.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.2 IF CCW flow to the RCP seals has been interrupted for greater than 10 minutes, THEN close the following valves: CC 641, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP INLET OUTSIDE ISOL CC 710, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP OUTLET INSIDE ISOL CC 713, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP OUTLET OUTSIDE ISOL Required valves closed Comment: Control switches on CP-8.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 119 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 1.3 IF DC Loads have been stripped per Appendix 7 THEN Open the following breakers prior to AC power restoration to 4.16 KV Safety 3 buses: EGF-EBKR-312A-3F, EG A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump EGF-EBKR-312B-3F, EG B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Both breakers are open.

Comment: Performed in the field.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee communicates the task to the Auxiliary Operator, cue the examinee that both breakers are open.

SAT / UNSAT 1.4 IF 4.16KV nonsafety bus A2 energized AND the 4.16 KV safety bus A3 is deenergized, THEN perform the following:

TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD a. Verify BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR Open Verifies BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR is open.

Comment: Breaker switch and indication are on CP-1.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD b. Close BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR is closed.

Comment: Breaker switch is on CP-1.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD c. Close BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR is closed.

Comment: Breaker switches are on CP-1.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR is closed, cue the examinee that the task is complete.

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 120 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-200.

2. Place Simulator in RUN and allow PMC initiation.

3. After PMC has completed initialization acknowledge all annunciators and place the Simulator in FREEZE. 4. Place the Simulator in RUN on the lead examiner's cue.

Initial IC Setup

1. Reset to a MODE 3 IC.

2. Insert Malfunctions ED01A-D to ACTIVE.

3. Insert Malfunctions EG10A and EG10B to ACTIVE.

4. Insert Malfuncti on ED02C to ACTIVE. 5. Place Simulator in RUN.

6. Verify all Malfunctions are ACTIVE and the Simulator indicates Station Blackout conditions with SUT A isolated. 7. Remove Malfunctions ED01A-D and ED02C. 8. Set Remotes EDR01, EDR02, EDR50, and EDR51 to CLOSE. 9. Set Remotes EDR59A SWGR on Trigger 1.

10. Set Remote EDR59B to SWGR on Trigger 2.

11. Acknowledge Annunciators.

12. Place Simulator in Freeze.

13. Snap to the desired IC using curr ent exam passwords for read and write protection.

JPM S7 Revision 1 Page 121 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is performing actions in OP-902-005, Station Blackout.

Power to the Offsite Grid has been restored.

Lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3 has been reset.

The station blackout has been occurring fo r 30 minutes. All time critical actions required by OP-902-005, Station Blackout, have been completed.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to energize the A1 and A2 busses from offsite power and then energize the 3A bus in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12A and 12B.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

S8 Reset Emergency Feedwater Actuation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 123 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Reset Emergency Feedwater Actuation

Task Standard: The candidate reset the EFAS actuation in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C.

References:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, Revision 307 OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery, Revision 12 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 012 A4.04, Bistable, trips, reset and test switches Importance Rating 3.3 / 3.3 RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 124 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, revision 307

==

Description:==

The JPM begins after a Reactor trip on an Inadvertent Safety Injection. EFAS-1 and EFAS-2 are actuated. Steam Generator Levels are being controlled by Main Feedwater. The applicant will be directed to reset EFAS 1 and 2. Actions for this task take place at CP-7, CP-8 and CP-33.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other acti ons when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A reactor trip has occurred due to an inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal

The crew is implementing OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

Emergency Feedwater is not required to maintain Steam Generator levels

EFAS-1 has been m anually initiated

EFAS-2 has automatically initiated

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you, to perform OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, and reset EFAS 1 and 2.

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 125 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note When Applicant is ready, cue the simulator operator to place the simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 1.1 Verify steam generator level is being maintained or restored to 50% to 70% NR using MFW. Levels verified.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.2. Verify EFAS-1 manual actuation switches in "NORM" position. (CP-7 and CP-8)

Switches returned to NORM. Comment: EFAS-1 has been manually initiated. The EFAS-1 switches must be restored to NORM.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.3 Verify EFAS-2 manual actuation switches in "NORM" position. (CP-7 and CP-8) Verify switches.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 126 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 1.4 Press BOTH EFAS-1 reset pushbuttons. (CP-33) Pushbuttons depressed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 1.5 Press BOTH EFAS-2 reset pushbuttons. (CP-33) Pushbuttons depressed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.6 Verify EFW Pump A is secured and place the control switch to normal. (mid position) EFW Pump A secured and switch in mid position.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.7 Verify EFW Pump B is secured and place the control switch to normal (mid position) EFW Pump B secured and switch in mid position.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 127 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 1.8 Verify MS-401A, EFW PUMP AB TURB STM SUPPLY SG 1 is closed. MS-401A is closed.

Comment: Control switch must be taken to CLOSE and then to the mid position.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 1.9 Verify MS-401B, EFW PUMP AB TURB STM SUPPLY SG 2 is closed . MS-401B is closed.

Comment: Control switch must be taken to CLOSE and then to the mid position.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 1.10 Verify EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW control valves closed: EFW 223A, SG1 BACKUP EFW 224A, SG1 PRIMARY EFW 223B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 224B, SG2 PRIMARY Valves are closed. Comment: The applicant should use both controller output position and PMC indication to verify valves closed.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 1.11 Place EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW control valves in "AUTO." EFW 223A, SG1 BACKUP (critical)

EFW 224A, SG1 PRIMARY (critical)

EFW 223B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 224B, SG2 PRIMARY Valves in AUTO.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 128 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 1.12 Close EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ISOLATION valves. EFW 229A, SG1 BACKUP EFW 228A, SG1 PRIMARY EFW 229B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 228B, SG2 PRIMARY Valves closed.

Comment:

Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 129 of 289 2012 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-197

Verify SIAS, EFAS1, and EFAS2 are initiated

Place the Simulator in Run on the lead examiner's cue.

JPM S8 Revision 1 Page 130 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A reactor trip has occurred due to an inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal

The crew is implementing OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

Emergency Feedwater is not required to maintain Steam Generator levels

EFAS-1 has been m anually initiated

EFAS-2 has automatically initiated

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you, to perform OP-902-009, Standard Appendic es, Appendix 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, and reset EFAS 1 and 2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

- 131 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 Facility: Waterford 3 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Reactor power is 100%, EOC Turnover: Protected Train is B, AB Busses are aligned to Train B, HPSI Pump A is OOS, maintain 100% power Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 SG04G I - BOP I - SRO TS - SRO Steam Generator 1 Pressure Instrument, SG-IPT-1013C, fails low requiring Technical Specification entry and bypa ss of multiple Plant Protection System C trip bistables. 2 RC21A I - All Hot Leg 1 Temperature, RC-ITI-0111X, fails low affecting PZR level setpoint. OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

3 RC08C C - BOP C - SRO Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Lower Seal fails. OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction. 4 H_H08 TS - SRO Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON requiring Technical Specification actions.

5 FW35B R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Feedwater Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to heater shell causing isolation of the Low Pressure heater string. OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient and OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction to 72% power. 6 RC09C C - ATC C - SRO Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Middle Seal fails, requiring a manual reactor trip, and securing of Reactor Coolant Pump 2A. 7 RC11A1 M - All Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, fails open. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. All Reactor Coolant Pumps must be secured. (Critical Task 1) 8 SI02B C - BOP C - SRO High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to AUTO start on the Safety Injection Actuation Signal requiring a manual start. (Critical Task 2) 9 RP09D I-ATC I-BOP RC-606, Control Bleedoff Containment Isolation and FP-601B, Fire Water B Containment Isolation fail to auto close. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1

- 132 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is out of service and danger tagged, due to high pump bearing vibration during its quarterly IST. Since it occurred just prior to shift turnover and the AB bus is aligned to Train B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump AB has not yet been aligned for service. The Work Management Center is working in that direction.

After taking the shift, Steam Generator 1 Pressure Instrument, SG-IPT-1013C, fails low. The SRO should review and enter Technical Specifications 3.3.1 action 2 and 3.3.2 actions 13 and 19 and direct the BOP to bypass the Steam Generator 1 Pressure Lo, Steam Generator 1 P, and Steam Generator 2 P trip bistables in Plant Protection System Channel C within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System. The SRO should review Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, and determine that Technical Specification entry for 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 is not required.

After Technical Specifications are addressed, Loop 1 T hot instrument, RC-ITI-0111X, fails low. This affects the Reactor Regulating System Tave calculation and the Pressurizer Level Setpoint. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and implement Section E2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction. The crew should take manual control of Pressurizer Level, select the non-faulted T hot instrument (Loop 2) in both Reactor Regulating System cabinets, verify normal setpoint is restored and restore Pressurizer Level Control to Auto after returning Pressurizer Level to setpoint.

After the crew addresses the T hot instrument failure, Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Lower Seal fails. The crew should enter OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction and implement Section E1, Seal Failure.

After the crew is in Section E1 of OP-901-130 AND the BOP has adjusted Component Cooling Water Temperature, Annunciator H-8 on Panel H, Power Dependent Insertion Limit, fails ON. The crew should determine that no Control Element Assemblies are below the Transient Insertion Limits and declare the alarm inoperable. The SRO should review Techni cal Specification 3.1.3.6 and determine that the surveillance interval for Technical Specification Surveillance 4.1.3.6 has changed from every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months with the alarm inoperable.

Once the SRO has addressed Technical Specifications, a tube leak occurs in Feedwater Heater 5B, causing Condensate flow to isolate through Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters 5B and 6B. The crew should enter OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, and implement Section E1, Loss of Feedwater Preheating. This also requires a power reduction to < 72% power using OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Middle Seal fails. The crew should trip the reactor, implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions AND secure Reactor Coolant Pump 2A. After Reactor Coolant Pump 2A is secured, Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, fails open. The crew should return to diagnostics and diagnose to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. The crew should secure an additional Reactor Coolant Pump in the opposite loop (preferably 1A) when RCS Pressure lowers to < 1621 PSIA and secure all Reactor Coolant Pumps when Reactor Coolant System pressure no longer supports operation as indicated by pump vibration alarms or within 3 minutes of the Containment Spray Actuation (CRITICAL TASK 1).

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1

- 133 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 When Safety Injection occurs, either manually or automatically, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to Auto Start. The BOP should manually start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B (CRITICAL TASK 2). RC-606, Controlled Bleedoff Containment Isolation and FP-601B, Fire Water B Containment Isolation fail to auto close on the Containment Isolation Actuation Signal. The ATC should close RC-606 and the BOP should close FP-601B.

The scenario can be terminated after the crew starts a cooldown or at the examiner's discretion.

NRC Scenario 1

- 134 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 CRITICAL TASKS

1. TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs when implementing procedural step 8 OP-902-002 or within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow whichever occurs first. This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR Containment Spray is initiated. The vibration alarms indicate the possibility for additional Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary degradation through the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

2. ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This task is satisfied by starting High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B to establish Reactor Coolant System inventory control before exiting the step to verify Safety Injection Actuation Signal Actuation in OP-902-002 (Step 7). This task becomes applicable following the initiation of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 9 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 4. Major transients (1-2) 1 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

NRC Scenario 1

- 135 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO SETUP A. Reset Simulator to IC-191. B. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline. C. Verify the following Remotes and Overrides: 1. SIR29, HPSI PUMP A - RACKOUT

2. SIR24, SI-203A_SI-208A HPSI PUMP A SUCT/DISCH ISOL VLVS - CLOSE D. Verify HPSI Pump A Control Switch (C/S) in OFF and place Danger Tag on C/S. E. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window. F. Verify EOOS is 8.7 Yellow G. Ensure the Log Printer Toggle Switch on the rear of the printer is in the UP position. H. Complete the simulator setup checklist. I. Start Insight, open file PlantParameters.tis.

NRC Scenario 1

- 136 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument, SG-IPT-1013C, Fails Low

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1. 2. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room. 3. If sent to LCP-43, report all S/G 1 Pressures read ~ 800 PSIA.

Event 2 Hot Leg 1 Temperature, RC-ITI-0111X, Fails Low

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2. 2. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 3 RCP 2A Lower Seal Fails

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3. 2. If the Duty Engineering or RCP Engineer is called inform the caller that you will monitor RCP 2A for further degradation. 3. If the Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the call er that a work package will be assembled for the next forced outage.

Event 4 Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4. 2. If Work Week Manager, Computer Technician, or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 5 Feedwater Heater 5B Tube Leak, Rapid Plant Power Reduction

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5. 2. If called to verify Low Pressure Heater levels, verify levels using the PMC and report levels to the Control Room. 3. If called to verify position of the Normal and Alternate Control Valves, verify valve positions using the PMC and report the position of the valves to the Control Room. 4. If requested to monitor Polisher Vessel D/P and remove as necessary, acknowledge the report. 5. If Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled. 6. If Chemistry is called to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent Iodine due to the down power, acknowledge and report that samples will be taken 2-6 hours from notification time and if asked tell the caller your name is Joe Chemist.

Event 6 RCP 2A Middle Seal Fails

1. After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied and on lead examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 6. 2. If the Duty Engineering or RCP Engineer is called inform the caller that you will monitor RCP 2A for further degradation. 3. If the Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the call er that a work package will be assembled.

NRC Scenario 1

- 137 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 Event 7-9 Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, Fails Open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B Fails To AUTO Start/RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close

1. After the crew secures RCP 2A and on Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 7. 2. If the Duty Plant Manager is called, inform the caller that you will make the necessary calls. 3. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request. 4. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, end data collection and save the file as 2012 Scenario 1-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save the file into the folder for the appropriate crew

.

NRC Scenario 1

- 138 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO TIMELINE EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER DELAY HH:MM:SS RAMP HH:MM:SS FINAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 SG04G MS LINE IPT-1013C FAIL (0-100%)

1 00:00:00 00:00:00 0% SG 1 PRESSURE INSTRUMENT SG-IPT-1013C FAILS LOW 2 RC21A RCS HOT LEG 1 CONTROL TT 111X FAILS (0-100%) 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 0%

HOT LEG 1 TEMPERATURE FAILS LOW 3 RC08C RCP 2A LOWER SEAL FAILURE (0-100%)

3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100% RCP 2A LOWER SEAL FAILS 4 H_H08 POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 FAIL ON POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT ALARM FAILS ON 5 FW35B LP FW HEATER 5B TUBE LEAK (100% = 10% OF TUBES) 5 00:00:00 00:00:30 15% FW HTR 5B TUBE LEAK FROM CONDENSATE TO HEATER SHELL, RAPID DOWN POWER TO < 72% POWER 6 RC09C RCP 2A MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE (0-100%) 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100%

RCP 2A MIDDLE SEAL FAILS 7 RC11A1 CODE SAFETY RC-317A FAIL OPEN 7 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY, RC-317A, FAILS OPEN, 8 SI02B HPSI PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START 9 RP09D RELAY K202 FAILED, CIAS TRAINN B (CVC/RC/FP) NA 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE RC-606, CONTROL BLEEDOFF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND FP-601B, FIRE WATER B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAIL TO AUTO CLOSE

NRC Scenario 1

- 139 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2 REFERENCES Event Procedures 1 OP-009-007, Plant Protection System, Rev. 15 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Technical Specification 3.3.1 Technical Specification 3.3.2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 2 OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, Rev. 6 OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Malfunction, Rev. 12 3 OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Rev. 7 4 OP-500-008, Annunciator Response Procedure, Control Room Panel H, Att. 4.78, Rev. 26 OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Malfunction, Rev. 12 Technical Specification 3/4.1.3.6 5 OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Rev. 0 OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction, Rev. 4 6 OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Rev. 7 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart 7 OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure, Rev. 14 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 2, Figures OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart 8 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedures Operations Expectation/Guidance, Rev. 5 9 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedures Operations Expectation/Guidance, Rev. 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 140 of 289 Event

Description:

SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-IPT-1013C fails low.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC/BOP Recognizes and reports indications of failed channel. Alarms:

RPS CHANNEL TRIP SG 1 PRESSURE LO (Cabinet K, E-15)

SG 1 PRESSURE LO PRETRIP A/C (Cabinet K, F-15)

RPS CHANNEL C TROUBLE (Cabinet K, G-18)

ESFAS CHANNEL TRIP PRESS SG 2 > SG 1 (Cabinet K, L-16)

PRESS SG 2 > SG 1 ESFAS PRETRIP A/C (Cabinet K, M-16) Indications:

0 PSIA indicated on SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-ILI-1013C on CP-8

SG 1 Pressure Instruments, SG-ILI-1013A, B, and D reading ~800 PSIA on CP-8

SG 1 Press LO Trip and Pretrip Bistable lights illuminated on PPS Channel C ROM on CP-7. Examiner Note All BOP manipulations for OP-009-007 are located at CP-10 except as noted. OP-009-007, Plant Protection System ,Section 6.2, Trip Channel Bypass Operation SRO 6.2.1 Refer to Attachment 11.11, PPS Bistable Bypass Chart to assist in determination of Trip Channels requiring placement in bypass.

Determines the following bistables are affected and need to be bypassed:

11 - LO SG-1 P RESS

19 - H I SG-1 P

20 - H I SG-2 P SRO Directs BOP to bypass the LO SG 1 Pressure, HI SG 1 P, and HI SG 2 P bistables in PPS Channel C within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System. BOP 6.2.2 To place a bistable in or remove a bistable from bypass, go to Attachment 11.10, Trip Channel Bypass Operation. BOP 11.10.1 To Bypass a Trip Channel, perform the following: 11.10.1.1 Circle the bistable numbers selected for bypass under Step 11.10.1.4. (Circles bistable numbers 11, 19, and 20 in Step 11.10.1.4 table)

BOP 11.10.1.2 Check desired Trip Channel is not Bypassed on another PPS Channel.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 141 of 289 Event

Description:

SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-IPT-1013C fails low.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP 11.10.1.3 Open key-locked portion of BCP in desired PPS Channel. NOTE The crew should expect annunciator RPS CABINET CONDITION ABNORMAL (Cabinet L, B-1) to ac tuate when PPS Channel C door is opened. BOP 11.10.1.4 Depress Bypass push buttons for the desired Trip Channels NOTE The crew should expect annunciator RPS BISTABLE BY-PASS (Cabinet K, B-18) to actuate when the first bi stable is bypass ed in PPS Channel C. BOP 11.10.1.5 Check all selected bistable Bypass push buttons remain in a Depressed state. BOP 11.10.1.6 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on BCP for the desired Trip Channels. CREW 11.10.1.7 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on ROM for the desired Trip Channels. (Verifies correct bistables lit on CP-7 PPS Channel C Remote Operator Module) SRO Reviews the following Technical Specifications and determines applicable actions:

3.3.1 action 2

3.3.2 actions 13 and 19

3.3.3.5 - no actions required

3.3.3.6 - no actions required Examiner Note This event is complete after the BOP bypasses the associated Trip Bistables in PPS Channel C Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 142 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of failed instrument. Alarms:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI/LO (Cabinet H, B-1)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-HI (Cabinet H, A-1)

LETDOWN HX OUTLET PRESSURE HI (Cabinet G, B-1)

REACTOR COOLANT TAVG/TREF LO (Cabinet H, L-1) Indications

Mismatch between Charging (CVC-IFI-0212) AND Letdown (CVC-IFI-0202) flow indications. Letdown rises to maximum, with 1 charging pump running.

Deviation between actual level AND programmed level as indicated on Pressurizer level recorder (RC-ILR-0110). Pressurizer level is slowly lowering toward setpoint.

Deviation of setpoint on Pressurizer level controller (RC-ILIC-0110) from programmed level.

Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize.

Hot Leg Loop 1 RC-ITI-0111 reads < 525 °F on CP-2. SRO May direct the ATC to take manual control of Pressurizer Level Controller, RC-ILIC-0110 and match Letdown flow and Charging flow prior to entering procedure. SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. OP-901-110, E0 - General Actions N/A 1. Stop Turbine load changes. N/A 2. IF malfunction is due to failure of Letdown Flow Control valve, THEN GO TO OP-901-112, CHARGING/LETDOWN MALFUNCTION. N/A 3. IF malfunction is due to failure of Pressurizer Level Control Channel (incorrect readings on EITHER RC-ILI-0110X OR RC-ILI-0110Y), THEN GO TO Subsection E 1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction. SRO 4. IF malfunction is due to failure of Pressurizer Level Setpoint (RC-ILIC-0110), THEN GO TO Subsection E 2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 143 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-901-110, E 2 - Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction ATC 1. Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in MAN AND adjust OUTPUT to slowly adjust letdown flow to restore Pressurizer level. ATC 2. Verify normal indications on ALL Safety Measurement Channel Hot Leg AND Cold Leg temperature indicators. ATC 3. Determine affected channel(s) by checking Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Tavg recorders (RC-ITR-0111 AND RC-ITR-0121). CAUTION PRIOR TO SECURING ALL CHARGING PUMPS ENSURE LETDOWN IS ISOLATED. LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC-101) WILL AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE ON HIGH LETDOWN TEMPERATURE.

ATC 4. Start OR stop Charging Pumps as necessary to maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve. N/A 5. IF unable to control Pressurizer level with Letdown in service, THEN perform the following: 5.1 Close Letdown Stop valve (CVC-101). 5.2 Prior to starting Charging Pump(s), complete Attachment 2, Charging Nozzle Thermal Cycling Evaluation Data. 5.3 Cycle Charging Pump(s) to maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve. N/A 6. IF malfunction is due to failure of Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110), THEN perform the following: 6.1 Place Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in MAN. 6.2 Maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve. N/A 7. IF backup Charging Pumps have started, THEN secure unnecessary Charging Pumps. ATC 8. IF Pressurizer Backup Heaters have energized, THEN place unnecessary BACKUP HEATER BANKS to OFF.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 144 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE (1) Selecting the non-faulted channel may cause automatic actions to occur if actual level is not at program level. (2) If a Tc or Th instrument fails, refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Malfunction, E2, Loss of COLSS (PMC Available). ATC 9. Check Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Hot Leg indicators (RC-ITI-0111-X AND RC-ITI-0121-X) for abnormal readings AND perform the following: BOP 9.1 IF RCS Temperature Loop 1 Hot Leg (RC-ITI-0111-X) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN select LOOP 2 for TAVE LOOP SELECTOR on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B). N/A 9.2 IF RCS Temperature Loop 2 Hot Leg (RC-ITI-0121-X) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN select LOOP 1 for TAVE LOOP SELECTOR on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B). N/A 10. Check Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Cold Leg indicators (RC-ITI-0111-Y AND RC-ITI-0121-Y) for abnormal readings AND perform the following: 10.1 IF RCS Temperature Loop 1 Cold Leg (RC-ITI-0111-Y) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN perform EITHER of the following: Select presently non-selected position (ALT OR NORM) on TCOLD LOOP 1 selector switch located behind CP-2, Reactor Control (Preferred Method).

OR Select LOOP 2 on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B) 10.2 IF RCS Temperature Loop 2 Cold Leg (RC-ITI-0121-Y) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN perform EITHER of the following: Select presently non-selected position (ALT OR NORM) on TCOLD LOOP 2 selector switch located behind CP-2, Reactor Control (Preferred Method).

OR Select LOOP 1 on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B). ATC 11. Verify setpoint on Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) returns to program setpoint in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve AND perform the following: 11.1 Slowly adjust Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) OUTPUT to match PROCESS AND place in AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 145 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 11.2 Place desired backup Charging Pumps in AUTO. ATC 11.3 Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in AUTO AND verify Pressurizer level being controlled at setpoint. ATC 11.4 Place desired Pressurizer BACKUP HEATER BANKS in AUTO. N/A 11.5 IF necessary, THEN reset BOTH PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS. N/A 12. IF setpoints from BOTH Reactor Regulating Systems are faulty, THEN place CP-31 switches 1 AND 2 on Cardframe 1, Slot 36, in DEFEAT AND perform the following: 12.2 Check RTGB light illuminates AND RRS light extinguishes on CP-2. 12.3 Adjust setpoint on Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve. 12.4 Slowly adjust Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) OUTPUT to match PROCESS AND place in AUTO. 12.5 Place desired backup Charging Pumps in AUTO. 12.6 Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in AUTO AND verify Pressurizer level being controlled at setpoint. 12.7 Place desired Pressurizer BACKUP HEATER BANKS in AUTO. 12.8 IF necessary, THEN reset BOTH PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS. Examiner Note This event is complete when Pressurizer Level Controller is in AUTO Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 146 of 289 Event

Description:

RCP 2A Lower Seal fails Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognizes and reports indications of failed lower seal on RCP 2A Alarms:

RCP 2A Upper Seal Pressure (PMC)

RCP 2A Middle Seal Pressure (PMC)

RCP 2A CBO Flow (PMC) Indications:

RCP Controlled Bleedoff temperature slowly rising on CP-2

RCP 2A seal pressures outside of normal parameters on CP-2 and PMC SRO Enters and Implements OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E0, Subsequent Operator Actions N/A 1. IF Reactor Coolant Pump trips, THEN verify Reactor tripped AND GO TO OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS. N/A 2. IF loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps occurs, THEN GO TO OP-901-510, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. SRO 3. IF Reactor Coolant Pump Seal has failed, THEN GO TO section E1, Seal Failure. OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E1, Seal Failure NOTE 1. RCP Seal pressure and Control Bleedoff temperature and flow are normally as follows: (assuming normal operating RCS temperature and pressure):

Vapor Seal pressure: 25 to 45 PSIG

Upper Seal pressure: 585 to 915 PSIG

Middle Seal pressure: 1237 to 1815 PSIG

CBO temperature: 135° to 190°F

CBO flow: 1.2 to 1.8 GPM 2. (If only one Reactor Coolant Pump Seal has failed on a Reactor Coolant Pump, THEN pump operation may continue provided the seal package is monitored for further degradation.

SRO 1. Inform System Engineer of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal failure.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 147 of 289 Event

Description:

RCP 2A Lower Seal fails Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 CAUTION (1) CCW TEMPERATURES OF < 75°F COULD LEAD TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIPS ON EVAPORATOR LOW REFRIGERANT PRESSURE. (2) CCW TEMPERATURE SHOULD BE CHANGED AT A RATE OF 10°F IN ONE HOUR TO PREVENT DEGREDATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS.

BOP 2. IF Controlled Bleedoff temperature is rising, THEN lower Component Cooling Water temperature by ANY of the following:

Start Dry Cooling Tower Fans.

Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump(s) AND associated Wet Cooling Tower Fans. Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump(s)

AND lower ACC-126A(B) setpoint. Examiner Note This event is complete after Component Cooling Water Temperature is lowered OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 148 of 289 Event

Description:

Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of failed annunciator Alarms

POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT (Cabinet H, H-8) Indications

No change in actual or indicated Rod Position (CEAC CRT, CEACs, CPCs)

Reactor Power stable (CP-2, CP-7, PMC)

PREPOWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT ALARM (Cabinet H, H-9) is not actuated SRO/ATC Enter and direct the implementation of OP-500-008, Attachment 4.78, Power Dependent Insertion Limit. OP-500-008, Annunciator Response Procedure Cabinet H, Att. 4.78, Power Dependent Insertion Limit N/A 1. One or more CEA Regulating subgroups or Group P inserted below the Transient Insertion Limit 1.1 Refer to Technical Specification. 3.1.3.6. NOTE Technical Specification 4.1.3.6 requires CEA group positions verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . SRO 2. PDIL alarm inoperable 2.1 Refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Inoperable. SRO 2.2 Contact Electrical Maintenance. N/A 3. PMC/MUX hardware or software problem 3.1 Refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Inoperable. 3.2 Direct CS&S Maintenance Grou p to repair failed equipment.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 149 of 289 Event

Description:

Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 4. Possible dilution occurring 4.1 Inform SM/CRS. 4.2 Secure any dilution in progress. 4.3 Refer to OP-901-104, Inadvertent Positive Reactivity Addition. N/A 5. Failed instrument 5.1 Direct PMI to repair failed equipment. N/A 6. CEA/CEDMCS malfunction 6.1 Go to OP-901-102, CEA or CEMCS malfunction. SRO Reviews Technical Specification 3.1.3.6 and 4.1.3.6 or OP-901-501 Section E2, Step 4 and determines Regulating Group and Group P CEA position must be verified every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and initiates a Technical Specification Addendum Log per OP-903-001 or OP-901-501, Attachment 4, Transient Insertion Limit Four-Hour Log. NOTE Delete malfunction and report as Electrical Maintenance that the annunciator card associated with the Power Dependent Insertion Limit alarm was inoperable and has been replaced. Examiner Note This event is complete when the SRO determines TS Requirements Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 150 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP Recognize and report indications of isolation of 5B and 6B Feedwater Heaters. Alarms

Heater 5B Level Hi-Hi (Cabinet A, B-9)

Heater 5B Level Hi/Lo (Cabinet A, C-9)

Heater 5B Alt Drain Vlv Open (Cabinet A, D-9)

Numerous other heater level related alarms actuate as a result of cascading heater drains being affected Indications

Loss of 5B and 6B LP Feedwater Heater by closure of the following valves on CP-33:

o CD-175B, Low Pressure Heater 6B Inlet Isolation o CD-189B, Low Pressure Heater 5B Outlet Isolation SRO Enters and implements OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient. OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Section E0, General Actions NOTE (1) Some steps of this procedure may not be applicable due to plant conditions. In these cases SM/CRS may NA the step. (2) Steps within this procedure may be performed concurrently or out of sequence with SM/CRS concurrence. N/A 1. If Reactor trip occurs, then go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. N/A 2. If Reactor Power Cutback occurs, then perform OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback, concurrently with this procedure. N/A 3. If an Atmospheric Dump Valve fails or begins to fail Open, then place the respective controller to MANUAL with minimum output. N/A 4. If a Steam Bypass Valve fails or begins to fail Open, then perform any of the following (in preferred order) to close the valve.

Place the respective Valve Mode Select switch to OFF.

Place the respective valve controller to MANUAL with minimum output.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 151 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 5. If an uncontrollable RCS cooldown exists, then perform the following: 5.1 Manually trip Reactor. 5.2 Commence Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.

5.3 If Steam Generator Pressures continue to lower following the trip, then initiate Main Steam Isolation (MSIS).

5.4 Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. NOTE (1) The following are initial turbine load reductions to be considered depending on the current power level, time in core life, and equipment malfunction.

Transient Initial Load Reduction Rate Two or more Heater Drain Pumps Tripping 100 MW 40 MW/min FW Heater #1 or #2 Extraction Steam Valve Closure Atmospheric Dump Valve Fails Open Steam Bypass Valve Fails Open

(2) With COLSS in service, utilize the following to observe instantaneous power changes for power levels 40%. Reference Attachment 3, COLSS Maneuvering Power Indications, for all other power levels.

Reactor Power UFM in service UFM not in service 95% MSBSRAW (PMC PID C24631)

< 95% and 40% USBSRAW (PMC PID C24629) FWBSRAW (PMC PID C24630)

BOP 6. If Main Turbine is available, then adjust Turbine load as necessary to maintain the following:

Reactor Power 100%

Match Tavg with T ref

FWPT Suction Pressure > 300 PSIG(monitored on CP-1 via CD IPI1280, IP Htrs Outlet Hdr)

RCS T cold 536F - 549F Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 152 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 7. If needed, then concurrently perform OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, until a power level is reached in which the plant can be stabilized. SRO 8. If a loss of Feedwater preheating occurs, then go to E 1 , Loss of Feedwater Preheating. OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Section E1, Loss of Feedwater Preheating ATC 1. Verify the following: 1.1 Pressurizer Pressure Control System maintaining or restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2250 PSIA. ATC 1.2 Pressurizer Level Control System maintaining or restoring Pressurizer level to program level. BOP 1.3 Steam Generator levels being maintained or restored to 50% to 70% Narrow Range level. BOP 1.4 Steam Bypass Control System responding to maintain Steam Generator pressure. NOTE If the following valve(s) close on a Hi Hi Heater level, then the respective valve will stop movement when the associated Hi Hi Heater Level condition clears. Thereafter the valve(s) may be re-opened with SM/CRS permission.

Extraction Steam Valve Annunciator ES-109 ES to HP Heaters #1 Isolation Heater 1A(1B)(1C) Level Hi-Hi [Cabinet A G-2 (G-3) (G-4)] ES-205 ES TO #2 Heaters Isolation Heater 2A(2B)(2C) Level Hi-Hi [Cabinet A L-2 (L-3) (L-4)]

SRO 2. If a Feedwater Heater has isolated, then refer to Attachment 1, and concurrently perform OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, until Generator Gross Load is less than the Power Limitation listed on Attachment 1, Feedwater Heater Power Limitations. (Determines from Attachment 1 that power must be reduced to 893 MWe (72%) for loss of one LP Heater String)

SRO Enters and implements OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, concurrently with OP-901-221.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 153 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power NOTE (1) A rapid power reduction is defined as approximately 30 MW/minute load reduction on the main turbine. (2) Power Reduction may be stopped at any point.

(3) Some Steps of this procedure may not be applicable due to plant conditions. In these cases SM/CRS may NA the step. (4) Steps within this procedure may be performed concurrently or out of sequence with SM/CRS concurrence. (5) During power reduction PMC PID C24650, COLSS DESCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT19), will automatically select and display the correc t power indication. OP-010-003, Plant Startup, provides greater detail on which power indications are displayed by PID C24650 based on power level and whether or not the UFM is in service. ATC 1. Begin RCS Boration by one of the following methods: N/A 1.1 0 up to 170 EFPD: 1.1.1 Direct Boration Or 1.1.2 Emergency Boration using two Charging Pumps N/A 1.2 171 up to 340 EFPD: 1.2.1 Direct Boration Or 1.2.2. Emergency Boration using one Charging Pump SRO/ATC 1.3 341 EFPD: 1.3.1 Direct Boration Or 1.3.2 Borate from the RWSP using one Charging Pump as follows: 1.3.2.1 Open RWSP to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507. 1.3.2.2 Close Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation, CVC-183.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 154 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 6.7, Direct Boration CAUTION (1) THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4. (2) AT LEAST ONE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IN EACH LOOP SH OULD BE O PERATING PRIOR TO PERFORMING DIRECT BORATION OPERATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER CHEMICAL MIXING. ATC 6.7.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed. NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at BOC (<30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at EOC (340 EFPD)

ATC 6.7.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Boric Acid to be added on Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Boric Acid Volume for Direct Boration or VCT Borate Makeup Mode. ATC 6.7.3 Set Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter to volume of Boric Acid desired. ATC 6.7.4 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pumps selector switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B). ATC 6.7.5 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to AUTO. ATC 6.7.6 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to BORATE. ATC 6.7.7 Verify selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Starts. ATC 6.7.8 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Opens.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 155 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer will not register below 3 GPM. The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer is most accurate in the range of 10 - 25 GPM. ATC 6.7.9 If manual control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.9.1 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. 6.7.9.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output to >3 GPM flow rate. N/A 6.7.10 If automatic control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.10.1 Place Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Auto. 6.7.10.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, setpoint potentiometer to >3 GPM flow rate. ATC 6.7.11 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. ATC 6.7.12 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication. ATC 6.7.13 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed. Examiner Note The step below is only applicable if the ATC adds acid in small batches.

NOTE Step 6.7.14 may be repeated as necessary to achieve desired total boron addition for plant conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 156 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC 6.7.14 If additional boric acid addition is required and with SM/CRS permission, then perform the following: 6.7.14.1 Reset Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter. 6.7.14.2 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. 6.7.14.3 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication. 6.7.14.4 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed. ATC 6.7.15 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. ATC 6.7.16 Verify both Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output and setpoint potentiometer set to zero. ATC 6.7.17 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to MANUAL. ATC 6.7.18 Verify Selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Stops. ATC 6.7.19 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Closed. ATC 6.7.20 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to CLOSE. OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power NOTE To prevent Pressurizer heater cutout, avoid operating with Pressurizer pressure near the heater cutout pressure of 2270 PSIA while on Boron Equalization. CR-WF3-2012-01861]

ATC 2. Perform Boron Equalization as follows: 2.1 Place available Pressurizer Pressure Backup Heater Control Switches to ON. ATC 2.2 Reduce Pressurizer Spray Valve Controller (RC-IHIC-0100) setpoint potentiometer to establish spray flow and maintain RCS pressure 2250 PSIA (2175 - 2265).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 157 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 CAUTION REFER TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.3.6 FOR TRANSIENT INSERTION LIMITS.

ATC 3. Operate CEAs in accordance with OP-004-004, Control Element Drive, to maintain ASI using CEA Reg. Group 5, 6 or Group P Control Element Assemblies in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, Attachment 9.9, Axial Shape Control Guidelines. CREW 4. Notify the Load Dispatcher (Woodlands) that a rapid power reduction is in progress. CREW 5. Announce to Station Personnel over the Plant Paging System that a rapid plant power reduction is in progress. ATC/BOP 6. Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature 536

°F to 549°F. BOP 7. Commence Turbine load reduction by performing the following: 7.1 Depress LOAD RATE MW/MIN pushbutton. BOP 7.2 Set selected rate in Display Demand Window. BOP 7.3 Depress ENTER pushbutton. BOP 7.4 Depress REFERENCE pushbutton. BOP 7.5 Set desired load in Reference Demand Window. BOP 7.6 Depress ENTER pushbutton. BOP 7.7 Depress GO pushbutton.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 158 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/ OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE If USBSCAL is not in service, the COLSS Steam Calorimetric will be automatically disabled when MSBSCAL, PMC PID C24246, drops below 95% Power, and will revert back to FWBSCAL, PMC PID C24235. This may result in a step change in COLSS indicated Plant Power (BSCAL) of up to 1.0%

when this occurs. 8. When Reactor Power consistently indicates less than 98% power, as indicated on PMC PID C24631 [MAIN STEAM RAW POWER (MSBSRAW)], or an alternate point provided by Reactor Engineering, then verify the value of C24648 [BSCAL SMOOTHING VAL. APPLD (DUMOUT17)] automatically changes to 1. 9. If C24648 does not automatically change to 1, then inform Reactor Engineering and set the value of 1 for COLSS power smoothing constant K24250, [ADDRSSBL SMOOTHING FOR BSCAL (ALPHA)] in accordance with OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits Supervisory System. Examiner Note After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, direct the Booth Operator to initiate Trigger 6. 10. Following a Reactor Power change of >15% within a one hour period, direct Chemistry Department to sample Reactor Coolant System (RCS) for an isotopic iodine analysis two to six hours later. 11. When Condensate flow is <18,000 gpm, verify Gland Steam Condenser Bypass, CD-154, Closed (PMC PID D02404). 12. Monitor Condensate Polisher differential pressure and remove Polishers from service to maintain system pressure in accordance with OP-003-031, Condensate Polisher/Backwash Treatment. 13. When Reactor Power is approximately 70% or Heater Drain Pump flow is unstable, then remove Heater Drain Pumps from service by taking pump control switches to Stop. Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactivity Manipulation is satisfied OR At Lead Examiner's Discretion

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 159 of 289 Event

Description:

RCP 2A Middle Seal fails Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognizes and reports indications of failed lower seal on RCP 2A Alarms:

NONE Indications:

RCP Controlled Bleedoff temperature slowly rising on CP-2

RCP 2A Middle and Upper Seal pressures indicate approximately 2235 psig on CP-2 and PMC SRO Returns to OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, or orders a manual reactor trip based on previous review of the procedure. OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E1, Seal Failure ATC 3. IF TWO OR MORE seals fail in rapid succession, (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) THEN perform the following: 3.1 Trip the Reactor ATC 3.2 Secure affected Reactor Coolant Pump. CREW 3.3 GO TO OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS.

SRO Directs ATC and BOP to carry out Standard Post trip Actions.

Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactor is tripped and RCP 2A is secured OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 160 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of Loss of Coolant Accident. Alarms:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI/LO (Cabinet H, B-1)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-HI (Cabinet H, A-1)

LETDOWN FLOW HI/LO (Cabinet G, C-1)

QUENCH TANK LEVEL HI/LO

QUENCH TANK PRESSURE HI Indications

Mismatch between Charging (CVC-IFI-0212) AND Letdown (CVC-IFI-0202) flow indications. Letdown rises to maximum, with 1 charging pump running

Deviation between actual level AND programmed level as indicated on Pressurizer level recorder (RC-ILR-0110). Pressurizer level slowly lowering toward setpoint

Deviation of setpoint on Pressurizer level controller (RC-ILIC-0110) from programmed level

Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC 1. Determine Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check reactor power is dropping.

b. Check startup rate is negative. c. Check less than TWO CEAs are NOT fully inserted. BOP 2. Determine Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria are met: a. Check the Main Turbine is tripped:

Governor valves closed

Throttle valves closed BOP b. Check the Main Generator is tripped:

GENERATOR BREAKER A tripped

GENERATOR BREAKER B tripped

EXCITER FIELD BREAKER tripped Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 161 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP c. Check station loads are energized from offsite electrical power as follows: Train A

A1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

A2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

A3, 4.16 KV safety bus

A-DC electrical bus

A or C vital AC Instrument Channel

Train B

B1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

B2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

B3, 4.16 KV safety bus

B-DC electrical bus

B or D vital AC Instrument Channel ATC 3. Determine RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that BOTH the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer level is 7% to 60%

Pressurizer level is trending to 33% to 60%

b. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This task is satisfied by starting HPSI Pump B to establish RCS inventory control before exiting the step to verify SIAS Actuation flow in OP-902-002.

This task becomes applicable following the initiation of Safety Injection Actuation.

ATC 4. Determine RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by checking that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer pressure is 1750 psia to 2300 psia

Pressurizer pressure is trending to 2125 psia to 2275 psia Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 162 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 4.2 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify the following have initiated.

SIAS

CIAS BOP Following initiation of Safety Injection Actuation Signal (auto or manual) start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B.

Momentarily place HPSI Pump B C/S to START. ATC 4.3 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR within 3 of Containment Spray actuation. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

ATC 4.4 IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2-A, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs. ATC 5. Determine Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check at least one RCP is operating.

b. Check operating loop T is less than 13ºF. c. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. Note The above step can be skipped if RCPs are secured. BOP 6. Determine RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that at least one steam generator has BOTH of the following:

Steam generator level is 5% to 80% NR

Main Feedwater is available to restore level within 50%-70% NR. ATC b. Check RCS TC is 530 ºF to 550 ºF BOP c. Check steam generator pressure is 885 psia to 1040 psia.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 163 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP d. Check Feedwater Control in Reactor Trip Override:

MAIN FW REG valves are closed

STARTUP FW REG valves are 13% to 21% open

Operating main Feedwater pumps are 3800 rpm to 4000 rpm Note If MSIS has occurred, the Feedwater Regulating valves will be closed and the Feedwater pumps will be coasting due to no steam supply. BOP e. Reset moisture separator reheaters, and check the temperature control valves closed. ATC 7. Determine Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

b. Check NO containment area radiation monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. c. Check NO steam plant activity monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. a1. IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify the following:

CIAS is initiated

SIAS is initiated

MSIS is initiated ATC Closes RC-606, Controlled Bleedoff Inside Containment Isolation BOP Closes FP-601B, Firewater to Containment Isolation BOP 8 Determine Containment Temperature and Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment temperature is less than or equal to 120ºF.

b. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia. BOP 8.2 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify ALL available containment fan coolers are operating in emergency mode.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 164 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR within 3 of Containment Spray actuation. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

ATC/BOP 8.3 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, THEN verify ALL of the following:

CSAS is initiated

ALL available containment spray pumps are delivering flow greater than 1750 gpm

ALL RCPs are secured Note The Reactor Coolant Pumps may have already been secured. N/A 9. IF ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO OP-902-001, "Reactor Trip Recovery" procedure. SRO 10. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OR ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Appendix 1, "Diagnostic Flowchart. Proper use of chart will result in use of OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. BOP Secure AH-12 A or B on SRO direction after initiation of SIAS at CP-18. CREW When Containment Temperature rises above 200 F, update crew on need to use bracketed parameters due to harsh environment in Containment. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery SRO 1. Confirm diagnosis of a LOCA : a. Check Safety Function Status Check Acceptance criteria are satisfied.

b. IF Steam Generator sample path is available, THEN direct Chemistry to sample BOTH Steam Generators for activity.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 165 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 CREW 2. Announce a Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress using the plant page. SRO 3. Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency Plan. N/A 4. IF power has been interrupted to either 3A or 3B safety buses, THEN perform Appendix 20, "Operation of DCT Sump Pumps". SRO 5. REFER TO Section 6.0, "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip. Note The CRS will typically perform a brief at this point in the EOP. Brief should not be held until RCPs and HPSI Pump B are addressed. SRO During brief in OP-902-002, should discuss necessary strategy of using Steam Generators to cool RCS. SRO/ATC 6.

IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN check SIAS has initiated. SRO/BOP 7.

IF SIAS has initiated, THEN: a Verify safety injection pumps have started. b. Check safety injection flow is within the following:

Appendix 2-E, "HPSI Flow Curve"

Appendix 2-F, "LPSI Flow Curve" c. Verify ALL available charging pumps are operating. ATC 8. IF pressurize r pressure is less than 1621 psia, AND SIAS is actuated, THEN: a. Verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

b. IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs. ATC 9. IF RCPs are operating, THEN: a. Verify CCW available to RCPs.

b. IF a CSAS is initiated, THEN stop ALL RCPs. c. IF RCS TC is less than 382ºF [384ºF], THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 166 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP 10. Check a CCW pump is operating for each energized 4.16 KV safety bus. BOP/ATC 11. Isolate the LOCA: a. Verify the following letdown containment isolation valves are closed:

CVC 101, LETDOWN STOP VALVE

CVC 103, LETDOWN ISOL VALVE

CVC 109, LETDOWN ISOL VALVE b. Verify the following RCS sampling containment isolation valves are closed: Train A

PSL 107, HOT LEG

PSL 204, PZR SURGE

PSL 304, PZR STEAM Train B

PSL 105, HOT LEG

PSL 203, PZR SURGE

PSL 303, PZR ISOL VLV c. Check the following CCW Radiation Monitor AB indications:

Hi Alarm clear

No abnormal rise in radiation monitor reading. N/A 12. IF LOCA is outside of containment as indicated by ANY of the following:

Auxiliary building radiation monitor alarm

Unexplained rise in auxiliary building sump levels

Rising waste tank level THEN: a. Locate and isolate the leak. b. REFER TO Appendix 4-D, "CIAS Automatic Actions" and verify CIAS is actuated.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 167 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP 13. Place Hydrogen Analyzers in service by performing the following:

Train A a. Place Train A H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to "OPEN". (Key 216) b. Place H2 ANALYZER A POWER to "ON".

c. Check H2 ANALYZER A PUMPS indicate ON.

Train B a. Place Train B H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to "OPEN". (Key 217) b. Place H2 ANALYZER B POWER to "ON". c. Check H2 ANALYZER B PUMPS indicate ON. ATC/BOP 14.

IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia

Containment area radiation monitors greater than the Hi Alarm THEN: a. Verify CIAS is initiated. b. Verify ALL available containment fan coolers operating in emergency mode SRO b.1 IF ANY containment fan cooler is NOT operating AND containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia, THEN REFER TO Appendix 21-B, "CFC CCW Override" and close the associated Containment Fan Cooler CCW Isolation Valves. ATC/BOP 15.

IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, THEN: a. Verify CSAS is initiated.

b. Verify ALL operating containment spray pumps are delivering flow greater than 1750 gpm. N/A 16. IF Condenser Vacuum is less than 14" Hg, THEN: a. Verify MSIVs are closed. b. Verify following steam generator blowdown isolation valves are closed:

BD 102A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1 (IN)

BD 102B, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 2 (IN)

BD 103A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1 (OUT)

BD 103B, SG BLOWDOWNISOL STM GEN 2 (OUT)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 168 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP 17. Verify instrument air is available: a. Check BOTH of the following are operating:

TCW pump

CW pump b. Check instrument air pressure is greater than 95 psig.

c. Check IA 909, CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR valve is open. N/A 18. IF LOCA Condition Isolated GO TO step 53. NOTE The following RCS cooldown rates apply:

Natural Circulation: RCS < 50°F/hr Pressurizer < 100°F/hr

Forced Circulation: RCS < 100°F/hr Pressurizer < 200°F/hr NOTE The following forms may be required during the cooldown and depressurization:

Appendix 3-A, "Pressurizer/RCS Cooldown Log"

OP-010-004 Attachment 9.9, "Design Cycle Transient Logsheet" N/A 19. Cooldown the RCS to less than 350ºF TH or CET temperature using the steam bypass control valves. BOP/ATC 19.1 Cooldown the RCS to less than 350ºF TH or CET temperature using the atmospheric dump valves. Examiner Note This event is complete when an RCS cooldown has been initiated Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

- 169 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 Facility: Waterford 3 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Reactor power is 60%, MOC Turnover: Protected Train is B, AB Bus is aligned to Train B, HPSI Pump A is OOS Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Lower power to 50% in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown. 2 CV30A2 C - ATC C - SRO Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, fails closed requiring entry into OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction.

3 CC01A C - BOP C - SRO TS - SRO Component Cooling Water Pump A trips requiring entry into OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction. 4 NI01H I - BOP I - SRO TS - SRO Channel D Excore Nuclear Instrument Safety Channel, ENI-IJI-0001D, middle detector fails low.

5 MS13A M - All Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery. (Critical Task 1 and 2) 6 RP08G C-BOP C-SRO Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Steam Generator 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS.

7 CC12E2 I-ATC I-SRO Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch, CC-ILS-7013A, fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps, requiring the ATC to secure all running Reactor Coolant Pumps. (Critical Task 3) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2

- 170 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 The crew assumes the shift at ~ 60% power with instructions to lower power to ~ 50% in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, and remove Main Feedwater Pump B from service. The plant is at 60% due to rising vibration on Main Feedwater Pump B at > 80% power. The System Engineer reports pump vibration monitoring indicates a possible impeller imbalance. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is out of service and danger tagged, due to high pump bearing vibration during its quarterly IST. Since it occurred just prior to shift turnover and the AB bus is aligned to Train B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump AB has not yet been aligned for service. The Work Management Center is working in that direction.

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, the in-service letdown flow control valve, CVC-113A, fails closed. The SRO should enter OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction and implement Section E2, Letdown Malfunction, and place the backup flow control valve, CVC-113B, in-service.

After the backup letdown flow control valve has been placed in service, Component Cooling Water Pump A trips on overcurrent. The SRO should enter OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, and direct the start of Component Cooling Water Pump AB to replace Component Cooling Water Pump A. The SRO should enter Technical Specification 3.7.3, TRM 3.7.3, and cascading Technical Specifications per OP-100-014, Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Compliance.

After Component Cooling Water Pump AB is running and the SRO has reviewed Technical Specifications (or at examiner discretion), Channel D Safety Excore Nuclear Instrument Middle Detector fails low resulting in DNBR and LPD Trips on Plant Protection System Channel D and Startup Channel 1 energizes. The SRO should direct Startup Channel 1 be de-energized by placing the High Volts Selector switch in the Startup Channel 1 drawer to PRIMARY. The SRO should review Technical Specification 3.3.1 and Table 3.3-1 and determine that Action 2 should be entered for Functional Units of Linear Power, DNBR - Low, Local Power Density - High, and the Core Protection Calculator. The SRO should direct that at a minimum Linear Power, DNBR - Low, and Local Power Density - High trip bistables be bypassed in Channel D. Additionally the Logarithmic Power - High channel is also inoperable but the Technical Specification does not apply in MODE 1. However, the SRO may elect to place the Logarithmic Power - High Bistable in bypass as a conservative measure because this action would be applicable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following a reactor trip or shutdown. The SRO should review OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks and Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and determine that Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, action 29 should be entered.

After the trip bistables in Plant Protection System Channel D are bypassed, a Main Steam line break outside Containment occurs on Main Steam Line 1, resulting in a reactor trip, Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS). FW-184A, Feedwater Isolation Valve A fails to close automatically on the MSIS requiring the BOP to manually close the valve. The SRO should diagnose to OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure. The crew should take action to stabilize Reactor Coolan t System temperature (CRITICAL TASK 1) and pressure (CRITICAL TASK 2) when Reactor Coolant System pressure AND Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures start to rise.

During the implementation of OP-902-004, CC-ILS-7013A, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch fails low isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The ATC should secure all running Reactor Coolant Pumps within 3 minutes (CRITICAL TASK 3). The SRO may refer to OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Attachment 1, CCW Surge Tank Level Switch Failures to verify the failed instrument.

The scenario can be terminated after the crew secures all running Reactor Coolant Pumps or at the lead examiner's discretion.

NRC Scenario 2

- 171 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 CRITICAL TASKS

3. ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature Limits curve using Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator 2. Action to address this task should prevent lifting a Pressurizer safety (2500 psia) or Steam Generator safety (1070 psig).

4. ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE CONTROL

This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System P/T curve and additionally maintain Reactor Coolant System pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task shall prevent lowering Subcooled Margin to < 28°F. 5. TRIP ANY REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NOT SATISFYING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all running Reactor Coolant Pumps within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow. This task becomes applicable after CC-ILS-7013A fails. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without Component Cooling Water cooling.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes 8. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 9. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 10. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 11. Major transients (1-2) 1 12. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 13. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 14. Critical tasks (2-3) 3

NRC Scenario 2

- 172 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 SCENARIO SETUP J. Reset Simulator to IC-192. K. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline. L. Verify the following Remotes and Overrides: 1. SIR29, HPSI PUMP A - RACKOUT

2. SIR24, SI-203A_SI-208A HPSI PUMP A SUCT/DISCH ISOL VLVS - CLOSE M. Verify HPSI Pump A Control Switch (C/S) is in OFF and place Danger Tag on C/S. N. Verify Startup Channel 1 High Volt Selector Switch is in ALTERNATE. O. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window. P. Verify EOOS is 8.7 Color Yellow with HPSI Pump A OOS.

Q. Ensure gloves are available for using the simulator ladder. R. Complete the simulator setup checklist. S. Start Insight, select file PlantParameters.tis.

NRC Scenario 2

- 173 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Power Reduction to 50%

4. If contacted to place Feedwater Pump B Local Governor Control in manual, insert Remote FWR88 to MANUAL.

Event 2 Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, Fails Closed

3. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1. 4. If Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room. 5. If contacted to place the alternate letdown flow control valve in service Run CAEP file OP-901-112 Local Operator Actions\Placing Alternate LDFCV in Service.sch.

Event 3 Component Cooling Water Pump A Trips

3. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2. 4. If Work Week Manager or PME are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 4 Safety Channel D Excore Nuclear Instrument, ENI-IJI-0001D, Middle Detector Fails Low

7. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3. 8. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled. 9. If requested to verify Log Channel readings at LCP-43, report that Log Channel D is pegged low; all other channels are reading normally.

Event 5/6 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment, SG 1/Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Fails to Auto Close

4. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4. 5. If called as a Nuclear Auxiliary Operator to verify break location, inform the caller that a large amount of steam is issuing from the MSIV Area on the West Side of the RAB and it does not appear to be coming from a Secondary Safety or Atmospheric Dump Valve. 6. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request.

Event 7 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch, CC-ILS-7013A, Fails Low

5. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5. 6. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, complete data collection by saving the file as 2012 Scenario 2-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save th e file into the folder for the appropriate crew.

NRC Scenario 2

- 174 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 SCENARIO TIMELINE EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER DELAY HH:MM:SS RAMP HH:MM:SS FINAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A DOWNPOWER FROM 60% TO 50% 2 CV30A2 LTDN FLOW CONTROL VALVE CVC-113A FAILS CLOSED 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVE, CVC-113A, FAILS CLOSED 3 CC01A CCW PUMP A TRIP 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP A TRIPS 4 NI01H MIDDLE DETECTOR (D2) SAFETY CHANNEL D FAIL (0-100%) 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 CHANNEL D EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT SAFETY CHANNEL, ENI-IJI-0001D, MIDDLE DETECTOR FAILS LOW 5 MS13A MS A BREAK OUTSIDE CNTMT BEFORE MSIV (0-100%)

4 00:00:00 00:03:00 10 MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT , SG 1 6 RP08G RELAY K305 FAILED, MSIS TRAIN A (MS/FW) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 1, FW-184A FAILS TO AUTO CLOSE ON MSIS 7 CC12E2 CCW SURGE TNK LVL 7013AS FAILS LO 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK LEVEL SWITCH, CC-ILS-7013A, FAILS LOW NRC Scenario 2

- 175 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2 REFERENCES Event Procedures 1 OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, Rev. 317 (Copy with applicable steps marked up through Step 9.1.16) OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev. 36, Section 6.7, Direct Boration OP-005-007, Main Turbine and Generator, Rev. 301, Section 6.2, Main Turbine and Generator Operation 2 OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Rev. 4 3 OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Rev. 301 Technical Specification 3.7.3 Technical Requirement 3.7.3 OP-100-014, Technical Specification and Technical Requirement Compliance, Rev. 317 4 OP-009-007, Plant Protection System, Rev. 15 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Technical Specification 3.3.1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 5 OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, Rev. 2 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure, Rev. 12 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart, and Appendix 13, Stabilize RCS Temperature 6 OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure, Rev. 12 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 2, Figures 7 OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Rev. 301

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 176 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-010-005,Attachment 9.1 Steps 9.1.1 - 9.1.6 NOTE Power may be stabilized at SM/CRS discretion at any point during performance of this section. The Senior Line Manager for Plant Shutdown shall be the Operations Manager or designee, or a qualified Duty Plant Manager. Performance of an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE) Brief shall not preclude full compliance with any Technical Specification or procedurally required Plant Shutdown. CAUTION THE FOLLOWING SECTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT CORE REACTIVITY.

N/A 9.1.1 If performing a planned Plant Shutdown involving power reduction of

>30%, then the Operations Manager (OM) shall evaluate the use of IPTE controls in accordance with EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions. At the direction of the OM the following Infrequently Performed Test or Evolutions (IPTE) controls should be complied with: CREW 9.1.2 Prior to commencing power reduction, notify Load Dispatcher. CREW 9.1.3 Announce to Station Personnel that a power reduction is in progress over the Plant Paging System. CREW 9.1.4 Maintain Reactor Coolant System T cold 536°F to 549°F during the downpower. N/A 9.1.5 Perform Boron Equalization in accordance with Attachment 9.13, Boron Equalization.

NOTE Boron Equalization is already in progress from down power to 60%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 177 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE (1) BSCAL is not a good indication of instantaneous power during power maneuvers.

Additionally, once the smoothing factor is applied at approximately 98% MSBSRAW (PMC PID C24631), BSCAL becomes a time weighted average of power recorded over approximately 20 minutes. The following tables list COLSS calculated powers available during power maneuvering to monitor instantaneous power: (2) During power ascension PMC PID C24649 COLSS ASCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT 18) will automatically select and display the correct power indication. During power reduction PMC PID C24650 COLSS DESCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT19) will automatically select and display the correct power indication

. UFM not in service Reactor Power 95% MSBSRAW PMC PID C24631 Reactor Power <95% and 35% FWBSRAW PMC PID C24630 Reactor Power <35% BDELT PMC PID C24104 UFM in service Reactor Power 95% MSBSRAW PMC PID C24631 Reactor Power <95% and 40% USBSRAW PMC PID C24629 Reactor Power <40% and 35% FWBSRAW PMC PID C24630 Reactor Power <35% BDELT PMC PID C24104 ATC 9.1.6 Begin Reactor Coolant System boration in accordance with OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control to reduce Reactor power. OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 6.7, Direct Boration CAUTION (1) THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4. (2) AT LEAST ONE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IN EACH LOOP SH OULD BE O PERATING PRIOR TO PERFORMING DIRECT BORATION OPERATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER CHEMICAL MIXING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 178 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC 6.7.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed. NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at BOC (<30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at EOC (340 EFPD)

ATC 6.7.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Boric Acid to be added on Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Boric Acid Volume for Direct Boration or VCT Borate Makeup Mode. ATC 6.7.3 Set Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter to volume of Boric Acid desired. ATC 6.7.4 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pumps selector switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B). ATC 6.7.5 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to AUTO. ATC 6.7.6 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to BORATE. ATC 6.7.7 Verify selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Starts. ATC 6.7.8 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Opens.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 179 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer will not register below 3 GPM. The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer is most accurate in the range of 10 - 25 GPM. ATC 6.7.9 If manual control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.9.1 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. 6.7.9.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output to >3 GPM flow rate. N/A 6.7.10 If automatic control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.10.1 Place Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Auto. 6.7.10.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, setpoint potentiometer to >3 GPM flow rate. ATC 6.7.11 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. ATC 6.7.12 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication. ATC 6.7.13 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed. Examiner Note The step below is only applicable if the ATC adds acid in small batches.

NOTE Step 6.7.14 may be repeated as necessary to achieve desired total boron addition for plant conditions. ATC 6.7.14 If additional boric acid addition is required and with SM/CRS permission, then perform the following: 6.7.14.1 Reset Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter. 6.7.14.2 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. 6.7.14.3 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication. 6.7.14.4 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 180 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC 6.7.15 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. ATC 6.7.16 Verify both Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output and setpoint potentiometer set to zero. ATC 6.7.17 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to MANUAL. ATC 6.7.18 Verify Selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Stops. ATC 6.7.19 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Closed. ATC 6.7.20 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to CLOSE. OP-010-005, Attachment 9.1 Step 9.1.7 -9.1.8 CAUTION CONTROL RODS SHOULD NEVER BE WITHDRAWN OR MANUALLY INSERTED EXCEPT IN A DELIBERATE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED MANNER WHILE CLOSELY MONITORING THE REACTOR'S RESPONSE. ATC 9.1.7 Maintain ASI using CEA Reg. Group 5, 6 or Group P Control Element Assemblies in accordance with Attachment 9.9, Axial Shape Control Guidelines. (Refer to T.S. 3.1.3.6). BOP 9.1.8 When Average Reactor Coolant Temperature (Tavg) begins to drop, then reduce Generator load to match T avg and Reference Temperature (T ref) in accordance with OP-005-007, Main Turbine and Generator. OP-005-007, Main Turbine and Generator, Section 6.2 BOP 6.2.1 To change Load/Rate perform the following: 6.2.1.1 Depress LOAD/RATE MW/MIN pushbutton. BOP 6.2.1.2 Depress appropriate numerical pushbuttons for desired load rate. BOP 6.1.2.3 Depress ENTER pushbutton.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 181 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE Prior to changing Reference Demand, Main Turbine load must not be changing. BOP 6.2.2 To change Main Turbine load, perform the following:

6.2.2.1 Depress REF pushbutton. BOP 6.2.2.2 Depress appropriate numerical pushbuttons for desired MW load. BOP 6.2.2.3 Depress ENTER pushbutton. BOP 6.2.2.4 Depress GO pushbutton. BOP 6.2.2.5 Verify Turbine load change stops at the desired MW load. OP-010-005,Attachment 9.1 Steps 9.1.16 - 9.1.17 SRO 9.1.16 Remove Polishers from service to maintain system pressure in accordance with OP-003-031, Condensate Polisher/Backwash Treatment. BOP 9.1.17 When Reactor power is approximately 55%, then remove one Main Feedwater Pump from service in accordance with OP-003-033, Main Feedwater. Examiner Note This event is complete when the Reactivity Manipulation is met.

OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 182 of 289 Event

Description:

Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of failed Letdown Flow Control Valve. Alarms:

Letdown Flow Hi/Lo (Cabinet G, C-1)

Letdown HX Outlet Pressure Lo (Cabinet G, B-2) Indications

Letdown flow goes to 0 gpm

CVC-113A indicates closed

Letdown Flow Control valve not responding to changes in controller output

Abnormal Charging AND Letdown flow mismatch.

Pressurizer level changing SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction.

OP-901-112, Section E0, General BOP 1. Stop turbine load changes.

N/A 2. IF malfunction is due to failure of the Pressurizer Level Control System, THEN go to OP-901-110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION.

N/A 3. IF a Charging Malfunction is indicated, THEN go to Subsection E1, Charging Malfunction.

SRO 4. IF a Letdown Malfunction is indicated, THEN go to Subsection E2, Letdown Malfunction.

OP-901-112, Section E2, Letdown Malfunction ATC 1. IF necessary, THEN maintain Pressurizer level by placing LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVES controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in MAN, and

control manually.

NOTE THE ATC may take manual control of the controller but the letdown valve will not respond.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 183 of 289 Event

Description:

Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE If all Charging Pumps are secured, then LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC 101) will close on high REGEN HX TUBE OUTLET temperature if RCS is 470°F. ATC 2. Operate Charging Pumps as necessary to maintain Pressurizer level in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

NOTE This should not be applicable. If the crew delays taking action due to the failure, Pressurizer level will rise and they may choose to take action.

SRO/ATC 3. IF Pressurizer level falls below the minimum level for operation of Attachment 1, THEN perform the following: 3.1. Trip the Reactor. 3.2. Manually initiate Safety Injection Actuation.

3.3. Go to OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS.

NOTE This should not be applicable.

N/A 4. IF a leak exists in Letdown System, THEN attempt to locate AND isolate leak. N/A 5. IF leak has been isolated, THEN re-establish Letdown in accordance with OP-002-005, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL.

ATC 6. IF the in service Letdown Flow Control valve (CVC 113A) OR (CVC 113B) is NOT controlling, THEN place standby Letdown Flow Control valve in service as follows:

NOTE To minimize thermal transients in the system, Letdown and Charging flows should be started as close together as possible.

ATC 6.1 IF restoring Letdown, THEN verify at least one charging pump in operation.

ATC 6.2 IF necessary to maintain Letdown Backpressure, THEN Letdown Backpressure Controller (CVC-IPIC-0201) may be controlled in MAN.

ATC 6.3 Place Letdown Flow Control Valve Selector switch to BOTH.

SRO 6.4 Verify open standby Letdown Flow Cntrl Vlv A(B) Outlet Isolation (CVC 114A) OR (CVC 114B). (Coordinates with NAO to perform)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 184 of 289 Event

Description:

Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 SRO 6.3 Slowly open standby Letdown Flow Control Valve Inlet Isolation (CVC 111A) OR (CVC 111B). (Coordinates with NAO to perform)

SRO 6.4 Close in service Letdown Flow Cntrl Vlv A(B) Outlet Isolation (CVC 114A) OR (CVC 114B). (Coordinates with NAO to perform)

ATC 6.5 Position Letdown Flow Control Valve Selector switch to select operable flow control valve placed in service.

ATC 6.6 IF letdown is still in service and Letdown Flow Control valve operates properly, THEN place Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in AUTO. ATC 6.7 Close in service Letdown Flow Cntrl Vlv A(B) Outlet Isolation (CVC 114A) OR (CVC 114B).

ATC 6.8 Position Letdown Flow Control Valve Selector switch to select operable flow control valve placed in service.

ATC 6.9 IF letdown is still in service and Letdown Flow Control valve operates properly, THEN place Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in AUTO. Examiner Note This event is complete when Letdown Flow Control Valve is in Service Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 185 of 289 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water Pump A trips Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP Recognize and report indications of tripped CCW Pump. Alarms:

CCW PUMP A TRIP/TROUBLE (Cabinet M, B-2 )

RCP 1A CCW FLOW LO (Cabinet H, H-3)

RCP 1B CCW FLOW LO (Cabinet H, H-5)

RCP 2A CCW FLOW LO (Cabinet H, H-7)

RCP 2B CCW FLOW LO (Cabinet H, H-10) Indications

Amber trip/trouble light on CCW Pump A control switch

CCW System pressure abnormally low and dropping

CCW System and component flows abnormally low NOTE Based on how long the crew takes to align CCW Pump AB, red RCP Low Flow alarms may come in on CP-2. This should be called out by the ATC.

SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction.

OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Section E0 N/A 1. IF ANY of the following occur, THEN GO TO Subsection E 1, System Leakage: CCW Surge Tank level dropping CCW Dry Cooling Towers isolated due to low CCW Surge Tank level CMU-226, WATER STORAGE MAKEUP CCW SURGE TANK, cycling frequently CCW header isolates due to low CCW Surge Tank level

Local observation of CCW leak reported to Control Room

2. IF ANY of the following occur, THEN GO TO Subsection E 2, Loss of CCW Pump(s):

CCW system OR component flows low

Amber trip/trouble light on CCW PUMP A(B)(AB) Control Switch Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 186 of 289 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water Pump A trips Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Section E2

1. IF CCW is lost to in-service Shutdown Cooling train, THEN implement OP-901-131, SHUTDOWN COOLING MALFUNCTION, AND perform concurrently with this procedure.

N/A 2. IF Component Cooling Water Pump AB has tripped, THEN Start standby CCW Pump.

2.1 Place CCW ASSIGNMENT Switch to NORM Position.

BOP 3. IF Component Cooling Water Pump A has tripped, THEN align CCW Pump AB for Operation as follows:

3.1 Position CCW ASSIGNMENT switch to position A.

BOP 3.2 Verify Open the following valves:

CC-126A/CC-114A CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A

CC-127A/CC-115A CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A BOP 3.3 Start CC-0001AB, Component Cooling Water Pump AB.

SRO 3.4 Evaluate AB Electrical Bus alignment for Technical Specification Operability requirements.

With the AB Safety Bus aligned to Train B, credit cannot be taken for CCW Pump AB

The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.7.3, TRM 3.7.3 and Cascading Tech Specs per OP-100-014.

This includes a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months requirement to verify off site electrical power. The CRS should vocalize this requirement and assign the OP-903-066 surveillanc e to either the BOP or ATC operator. The BOP is preferred.

Cascading Tech Specs also includes a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months requirement to verify components that rely on Train B safety power operable per 3.8.1.1.d. Examiner Note This event is complete when the SRO has addressed Technical Specifications OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 187 of 289 Event

Description:

Channel D ENI Safety Channel middle detector fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 Recognize and report indications of Log Channel Failure. Alarms (The first 3 alarms are power dependent and may not actuate)

RPS CHANNEL TRIP LOCAL PWR DENSITY HI (Cabinet K, A-11)

LOCAL POWER DENSITY HI PRETRIP B/D (Cabinet K, C-11)

RPS CHANNEL D TROUBLE (Cabinet K, H-18)

STARTUP CHANNEL 1 NEUTRON FLUX HI (Cabinet H, K-3)

RCS BORON CHNL 1 DILUTION HI (Cabinet G, L-3) Indications

Startup Channel 1 energized CP-2, RRS 1 Cabinet

Channel D Log Power Indicator on CP-7 failed low

Channel D Linear Power recorder reading low on CP-7 SRO Directs BOP to select High Volts Select Switch in Startup Channel 1 drawer to non-faulted channel (PRIMARY). OP-500-008, Attachment 4.83, STARTUP CHANNEL 1 NEUTRON FLUX HI BOP 1. Either failure of log channel governing 5.3X10

-6% relay or failure of 5.3X10-6% relay. 1.1 If reactor power is > 5.3X10

-6% then select Primary (Log Channel C) or Alternate (Log Channel D) as appropriate in Startup Channel 1 drawer to de-energize Startup Channel 1. N/A 1.2 If reactor power < 5.3X10

-6% then allow continued operation of Startup Channel 1. Examiner Note All BOP manipulations for OP-009-007 are located at CP-10 except as noted. OP-009-007, Plant Protection System ,Section 6.2, Trip Channel Bypass Operation SRO 6.2.1 Refer to Attachment 11.11, PPS Bistable Bypass Chart to assist in determination of Trip Channels requiring placement in bypass.

Determines the following bistables are affected and need to be bypassed:

1 - HI LN POWER

2 - HI LOG POWER+

3 - HI LOCAL POWER

4 - LOW DNBR Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 188 of 289 Event

Description:

Channel D ENI Safety Channel middle detector fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE + Hi Log Power is not required to be bypassed in MODE 1. However, the failed detector supplies the Log Power Channel which is applicable in MODE 2 and below. If a reactor trip were to occur, action would be required to bypass the channel in one hour. It is normal practice to bypass the channel for this reason. SRO Directs BOP to bypass the HI LN POWER, HI LOG POWER+, HI LOCAL POWER, and LOW DNBR bistables in PPS Channel D within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System. BOP 6.2.2 To place a bistable in or remove a bistable from bypass, go to Attachment 11.10, Trip Channel Bypass Operation. BOP 11.10.1 To Bypass a Trip Channel, perform the following: 11.10.1.1 Circle the bistable numbers selected for bypass under Step 11.10.1.4. BOP 11.10.1.2 Check desired Trip Channel is not Bypassed on another PPS Channel. BOP 11.10.1.3 Open key-locked portion of BCP in desired PPS Channel. BOP 11.10.1.4 Depress Bypass push buttons for the desired Trip Channels BOP 11.10.1.5 Check all selected bistable Bypass push buttons remain in a Depressed state. BOP 11.10.1.6 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on BCP for the desired Trip Channels. CREW 11.10.1.7 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on ROM for the desired Trip Channels. (Verifies correct bistables lit on CP-7 PPS Channel D Remote Operator Module) SRO Reviews the following Technical Specifications and determines applicable actions:

3.3.1 - Action 2

3.3.3.5 - No action required

3.3.3.6.a - Action 29 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 189 of 289 Event

Description:

Channel D ENI Safety Channel middle detector fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 Examiner Note This event is complete when the SRO has evaluated Technical Specifications and the PPS Trip Bistables are bypassed.

OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 190 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC / BOP Recognize and report indications of a Main Steam Line Break. Alarms (The fifth annunciator may come in if not already in from the previous event)

EXCORE /CPC CHNL D POWER DEVIATION (Cabinet K, K-14)

EXCORE /CPC CHNL B POWER DEVIATION (Cabinet K, K-12)

EXCORE /CPC CHNL C POWER DEVIATION (Cabinet K, K-13)

EXCORE /CPC CHNL A POWER DEVIATION (Cabinet K, K-11)

LOCAL POWER DENSITY HI PRETRIP B/D (Cabinet K, C-11) Indications

Lowering Steam Generator Pressure CP-1, CP-8

Lowering Steam Generator Level CP-1, CP-8

Lowering Reactor Coolant System temperatures Tavg, Th, Tc CP-2, CP-7

Reactor Power Rising CP-2, CP-7 SRO Directs a manual reactor trip. Note The SRO may also direct a manual actuation of SIAS and CIAS. If not the SRO should direct Emergency Boration per OP-901-103, Emergency Boration due to the uncontrolled cooldown. The following steps are applicable after the reactor is tripped and the crew is performing Standard Post Trip Actions. OP-901-103, Emergency Boration 1. Place Makeup Mode selector switch to MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 191 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1

2. Align borated water source by performing one of the following (a. or b.):

a. Initiate Emergency Boration using Boric Acid Pump as follows:

Open Emergency Boration Valve, BAM-133.

Start one Boric Acid Pump.

Close recirc valve for Boric Acid Pump started:

BAM-126A Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve A or

BAM-126B Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve B

or

b. Initiate Emergency Boration using Gravity Feed as follows:

Open the following Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed valves:

BAM-113A Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve A

BAM-113B Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve B 3. Close VCT Disch Valve, CVC-183. 4. Verify at least one Charging Pump operating and Charging Header flow 40 GPM. OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC 1. Determine Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check reactor power is dropping.

b. Check startup rate is negative. c. Check less than TWO CEAs are NOT fully inserted. BOP 2. Determine Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria are met: a. Check the Main Turbine is tripped:

Governor valves closed

Throttle valves closed BOP b. Check the Main Generator is tripped:

GENERATOR BREAKER A tripped

GENERATOR BREAKER B tripped

EXCITER FIELD BREAKER tripped

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 192 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP c. Check station loads are energized from offsite electrical power as follows: Train A

A1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

A2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

A3, 4.16 KV safety bus

A-DC electrical bus

A or C vital AC Instrument Channel

Train B

B1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

B2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

B3, 4.16 KV safety bus

B-DC electrical bus

B or D vital AC Instrument Channel ATC 3. Determine RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that BOTH the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer level is 7% to 60%

Pressurizer level is trending to 33% to 60%

b. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF.

NOTE This safety function may or may not be met, depending on the speed the crew is working Standard Post Trip Actions. Either way, there are no contingencies necessary for this step. ATC 4. Determine RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by checking that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer pressure is 1750 psia to 2300 psia

Pressurizer pressure is trending to 2125 psia to 2275 psia SRO/ATC 4.2 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify the following have initiated.

SIAS

CIAS ATC If directed by SRO, initiate Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS), Main Steam Isolation (MSIS) and Containment Isolation Actuation (CIAS) at CP-7.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 193 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC 4.3 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating ATC 5. Determine Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check at least one RCP is operating.

b. Check operating loop T is less than 13ºF. c. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. BOP 6. Determine RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that at least one steam generator has BOTH of the following:

Steam generator level is 5% to 80% NR

Main Feedwater is available to restore level within 50%-70% NR. NOTE The contingency for this step, since there will be a Main Steam Isolation Signal, is to verify Emergency Feedwater is available. This does not require a manual initiation of EFAS. ATC b. Check RCS TC is 530 ºF to 550 ºF SRO b2.

IF RCS TC is less than 530 ºF, THEN perform the following:

IF RCS TC is being controlled by an ESD, THEN REFER TO Appendix 13, "Stabilize RCS Temperature" and stabilize RCS temperature using the least affected steam generator. NOTE Appendix 13 directs steps to address PTS after Representative CET temperature and Pressurizer pressure have both started to rise. The steps are also contained in the excess steam demand recovery procedure. BOP c. Check steam generator pressure is 885 psia to 1040 psia.

BOP c1. IF steam generator pressure is less than 885 psia, THEN perform ALL of the following:

1) Verify steam bypass valves are closed.

2) Verify ADVs are closed.

c2. IF steam generator pressure is less than or equal to 666 psia, THEN verify MSIS is initiated.

NOTE When MSIS has initiated the BOP should verify that both MSIVs and both MFIVs, FW-184 A(B) close. FW-184A does not close automatically requiring BOP action to close FW-184A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 194 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP d. Check Feedwater Control in Reactor Trip Override:

MAIN FW REG valves are closed

STARTUP FW REG valves are 13% to 21% open

Operating main Feedwater pumps are 3800 rpm to 4000 rpm NOTE With a MSIS, MAIN FW REG valves and STARTUP FW REG valves will be closed. Both MFW Pumps will be coasting down. BOP e. Reset moisture separator reheaters, and check the temperature control valves closed. ATC 7. Determine Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

b. Check NO containment area radiation monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. c. Check NO steam plant activity monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity.

BOP 8 Determine Containment Temperature and Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment temperature is less than or equal to 120ºF.

b. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

N/A 9. IF ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO OP-902-001, "Reactor Trip Recovery" procedure.

SRO 10. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OR ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Appendix 1, "Diagnostic Flowchart.

"Proper use of chart will result in use of OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery BOP Secure AH-12 A or B at CP-18 on SRO direction after initiation of SIAS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 195 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 SRO After Excess Steam Demand is identified, direct ATC and BOP to monitor for the trigger points for the need to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature. Critical parameters are Pressurizer pressure rising and Reactor Coolant System Representative CET temperature rising. Steps for stabilizing Reactor Coolant System temperature following an excess steam demand are contained in 2 procedures.

Appendix 13 is used if the critical parameters are both rising before the SRO has entered OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.

Step 16 of OP-902-004 is used if both parameters start rising after the crew has entered OP-902-004. CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature Limits curve using Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator 2. Action to address this task should prevent lifting a Pressurizer safety (2500 psia) or Steam Generator safety (1070 psig). BOP When directed by the SRO to take action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature:

Place the Atmospheric Dump Valve for Steam Generator 2 to manual and fully open Atmospheric Dump Valve 2.

Manually initiate Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal for Steam Generator 2.

Place Emergency Feedwater Flow Control Valve to manual and commence feeding Steam Generator 2. CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System P/T curve and additionally maintain Reactor Coolant System pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task shall prevent lowering Subcooled Margin to < 28°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 / 6/ 7 Page 196 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS/ CC-ILS-7013A fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC When directed by the SRO to take action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature:

IF Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1500 psia, THEN stabilize Reactor Coolant System pressure at a value not to exceed 1600 psid between the Reactor Coolant System and the lowest SG pressure.

IF Reactor Coolant System pressure is < 1500 psia, THEN stabilize Reactor Coolant System pressure at > HPSI shutoff head (1500-1600 psia). Examiner Note Direct Simulator Operator to initiate Trigger 5 CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of CCW flow. This task becomes applicable after CC-ILS-7013A fails. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the RCP operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

BOP Reports that the A to AB CCW Loop Isolations have closed. Reports RCP 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B CCW Lost alarms on CP-18 ATC Momentarily places running Reactor Coolant Pump control switches on CP-2 to STOP and verifies the RCP secures. Examiner Note This scenario is complete after Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure have been stabilized and all RCPs are secured OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

- 197 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 Facility: Waterford Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: ~ 4% Reactor Power, MOC Turnover: Protected Train is B, AB Bus is aligned to Train B, Raise power to ~ 10% to roll the Main Turbine Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Secure the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine in accordance with OP-010-003, Plant Startup and OP-010-004, Power Operations. 2 CH08E1 I - BOP I - SRO TS - SRO Plant Protection System Channel D Containment Pressure (CIAS), CB-IPI-6701SMD, fails high requiring Technical Specification entry and bypass of channel trip bistables.

3 CV01B C - ATC C - SRO TS - SRO Charging Pump B trips on overcurrent requiring implementation of OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction. 4 FW20A2 C - BOP C - SRO Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 fails closed requiring implementation of OP-901-201, Feedwater Control Malfunction 5 RC23A L_L10 L_M10 M - All Large RCS Cold Leg break requiring implementation of OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

6 RP05A3 RP05B3 RP05C3 RP05D3 I - ATC I - SRO Containment Spray fails to AUTO Actuate requiring manual actuation. (Critical Task 1 and 2) 7 MS11B M - All Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment requiring entry into OP-902-008, Functional Recovery Procedure.

8 CS01A C - BOP C - SRO Containment Spray Pump A trips requiring action to close CS-125A. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

- 198 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 The crew assumes the shift at ~ 4% power with instructions to raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine. All requirements have been met to change modes from MODE 2 to MODE 1. The Shift Manager has given permission to change modes. The SRO should direct raising power using Control Element Assemblies and/or dilution in accordance with OP-010-003, Plant Startup and OP-010-004, Power Operations.

After the reactivity manipulation has been satisfied, CB-IPI-6701SMD, Containment Pressure (CIAS) fails high. The SRO should review Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Per Table 3.3-1 under Containment Pressure - High (Functional Unit 6) the SRO should enter Techni cal Specification 3.3.1 action 2. Per Table 3.3-3 under Functional Units 1b (Safety Injection, Containment Pressure-High), 3b (Containment Isolation, Containment Pressure-High), and 4c (Main Steam Line Isolation, Containment Pressure High) the SRO should enter Tech 3.3.2 action 13. The SRO should direct the BOP to bypass the Containment Pressure High (R PS) and Containment Pressure High (ESF) trip bistables in PPS Channel D within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The BOP should bypass the trip bistables in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System.

After the trip bistables have been placed in bypass, Charging Pump B trips on overcurrent. The SRO should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Section E1, Charging Malfunction. The SRO should direct the ATC to start a standby charging pump after verifying a suction path available or isolate Letdown using CVC-101, Let down Stop Valve. If Letdown is isolated, Charging and Letdown will be re-initiated using Attachment 2 of OP-901-112. The SRO should review and enter Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 and Technical Requirement Manual 3.1.2.4. Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 may be exited after aligning Charging Pump AB to replace Charging Pump B. However, Technical Requirement Manual 3.1.2.4 should not be exited while Charging Pump B remains inoperable.

After Charging and Letdown are re-established, FW-166A, Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 fails closed. The SRO should direct the BOP to match Feed and Steam Flows to SG 1 by manually throttling open FW-173A, Feedwater Regulating Valve 1. The SRO should implement OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, Attachment 1, General Actions.

After the BOP has control of SG 1 level, an RCS leak occurs on RCS Cold Leg 1A that progresses rapidly to a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident. A Seismic Event Annunciator will come in at the time of the break. When Containment Pressure exceeds the Containment Spray (CSAS) setpoint, Containment Spray fails to actuate. The ATC should manually initiate Containment Spray (CRITICAL TASK 1) and secure any running Reactor Coolant Pumps (CRITICAL TASK 2). The SRO should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

After the crew diagnoses to OP-902-002, Main Steam Line 2 breaks inside Containment. Containment Spray Pump A will trip on overcurrent. The SRO should either go to OP-902-009 Appendix 1, Diagnostics Flowchart and diagnose to OP-902-008, Functional Recovery OR go directly to the procedure based on two events in progress per OP-100-017, Emergency Operating Procedures Implementation Guide. When the SRO performs prioritization Containment Isolation (CI-1) should be the highest priority. (CRITICAL TASK 3) The scenario can be terminated after the CRS has performed prioritization of Safety Functions and implements the first success path or at the lead examiner's discretion.

NRC Scenario 3

- 199 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 CRITICAL TASKS

6. ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by manually initiating Containment Spray Actuation Signal prior to exiting OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions or Containment pressure exceeds 44 PSIG. This task becomes applicable after Containment Pressure rises above 17.7 PSIA. OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, directs this activity to satisfy the Containment Pressure and Temperature Control safety function.

7. TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow. This task becomes applicable after Containment Spray is initiated. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without Component Cooling Water cooling. 8. ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ISOLATION This task is satisfied by prioritizing CI-1 as Priority 1 after performing Step 11 of OP-902-008, Functional Recovery. This task becomes applicable after the Main Steam Line Break occurs.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes 15. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7 16. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 17. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 18. Major transients (1-2) 2 19. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 20. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 21. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 NRC Scenario 3

- 200 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO SETUP T. Reset Simulator to IC-193. U. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline. V. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window. W. Verify PMC is set to MODE 2.

X. Verify EOOS is 10.0 Green Y. Complete the simulator setup checklist. Z. Start Insight, select file PlantParameters.tis.

NRC Scenario 3

- 201 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Raise Power To 10% To Roll The Main Turbine

5. If requested to verify a charging pump is ready for a start acknowledge the request but do not report back that the charging pump is ready for a start until after event 3 is triggered.

Event 2 Containment Pressure PPS Channel D (CIAS) CB-IPI-6701SMD Fails High

6. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1. 7. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 3 Charging Pump B Trips On Instantaneous Overcurrent

5. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2. 6. If Work Week Manager or PME are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled. 7. If called as an NAO to investigate the trip at the breaker, report overcurrent flags on all 3 phases. 8. If called as an NAO to investigate the trip at the pump, report that the paint on the motor is discolored and there is a strong odor of burnt insulation, but no fire.

Event 4 Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 Fails Closed

10. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3. 11. If Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled.

Event 5/6 Large RCS Cold Leg break), Containment Spray Fails to AUTO Actuate

7. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4. 8. If the Duty Plant Manager is called, inform the caller that you will make the necessary calls. 9. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request.

Event 7/8 Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment/Containment Spray Pump A Trips

7. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5. 8. If the Duty Plant Manager is called, inform the caller that you will make the necessary calls. 9. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request. 10. If called as an NAO to investigate the trip at the breaker, report overcurrent flags on all 3 phases. 11. If called as an NAO to investigate the trip at the pump, report that the paint on the motor is discolored and there is a strong odor of burnt insulation, but no fire.

12. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, complete data collection by saving the file as 2012 Scenario 3-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save th e file into the folder for the appropriate crew.

NRC Scenario 3

- 202 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO TIMELINE EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER DELAY HH:MM:SS RAMP HH:MM:SS FINAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A RAISE POWER TO 20% TO ROLL THE MAIN TURBINE 2 CH08E1 CNTMT PRESS TRANSMITTER 6701 SMD FAILS HI 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PPS CHANNEL D (CI AS) CB-IPI-6701SMD FAILS HIGH 3 CV01B CHARGING PUMP B TRIPPED 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CHARGING PUMP B TRIPS ON INSTANTANEOUS OVERCURRENT 4 FW20A2 SU FW REG. VALVE A FAILS CLOSED 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE 1 FAILS CLOSED 5 RC23A RCS COLD LEG 1A RUPTURE 4 00:02:00 00:00:00 14% LARGE RCS COLD LEG BREAK 5 L_L10 SEISMIC RECORDERS IN OPERATION (Delete after 30 Seconds) 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 FAIL_ON LARGE RCS COLD LEG BREAK 5 L_M10 SEISMIC EVENT 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 FAIL_ON LARGE RCS COLD LEG BREAK 6 RP05A3 FAILS TO TRIP CH A HI-HI CONT. PRESS (CSAS) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE 6 RP05B3 FAILS TO TRIP CH B HI-HI CONT. PRESS (CSAS) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE 6 RP05C3 FAILS TO TRIP CH C HI-HI CONT. PRESS (CSAS) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE 6 RP05D3 FAILS TO TRIP CH D HI-HI CONT. PRESS (CSAS) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE NRC Scenario 3

- 203 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER DELAY HH:MM:SS RAMP HH:MM:SS FINAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 7 MS11B MS LINE B BREAK INSIDE CNTMT (0-100% = 40 IN) 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 10 MAIN STEAM LINE 2 BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT 8 CS01A LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP A 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP A TRIPS

NRC Scenario 3

- 204 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3 D-1 Rev 2 REFERENCES Event Procedures 1 OP-010-003, Plant Startup, Rev. 324 (Copy marked up through Step 9.4.61) OP-010-004, Power Operations, Rev. 315 OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev. 37 2 OP-009-007, Plant Protection System, Rev. 15 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Technical Specification 3.3.1 Technical Specification 3.3.2 3 OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Rev. 4 Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 Technical Requirement 3.1.2.4 4 OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, Rev. 5 5 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure, Rev. 14 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart, and Appendix 2, Figures 6 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedures Operations Expectation/Guidance, Rev. 5 7 OP-902-008, Functional Recovery Procedure, Rev. 18 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart, and Appendix 2, Figures

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 205 of 289 Event

Description:

Raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 OP-003-035, Auxiliary Feedwater, Section, 7.0 SRO Directs the BOP to secure the Auxilia ry Feedwater Pump in accordance with OP-003-035, Auxiliary Feedwater. BOP 7.1.1 Secure Aux iliary Feedwater Pump. BOP 7.1.2 Place Auxiliary Feedwater Controller, FW-IFIC-8202, in Manual (MAN). BOP 7.1.2.1 Set controller to minimum setting. BOP 7.1.3 Open Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure Cntrl, AFW-125. OP-010-003, Plant Startup, Attachment 9.4 ATC 9.4.62 Raise Reactor power to 6% Calibrated Nuclear Power (PID 171) by CEA withdrawal or boron dilution. ATC Commences adding PMU per reactivity plan per OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control. OP-002-005, Section 6.9, VCT Makeup Using the Dilute Makeup Mode CAUTION THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4. 6.9.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 206 of 289 Event

Description:

Raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at BOC (< 30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at EOC (340 EFPD) 6.9.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Primary Makeup water to be added on Attachment 11.7, Calculation of Primary Makeup Water Volume for Direct Dilution or VCT Dilute Makeup Mode. 6.9.3 Set Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter to volume of Primary Makeup water desired. 6.9.4 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to DILUTE. 6.9.5 Open VCT Makeup Valve, CVC-510. NOTE The Dilution Flow Totalizer will not register below 5 GPM. The Dilution Flow Totalizer is most accurate at >10 GPM. CAUTION DILUTION SHALL IMMEDIATELY BE STOPPED IF PRE-POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT (H-9, CABINET H) ALARM IS INITIATED OR ANY UNEXPECTED REACTIVITY CHANGE OCCURS. 6.9.6 If manual control of Primary Makeup Water flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.9.6.1 Verify Primary Makeup Water Flow controller, PMU-IFIC-0210X, in Manual. 6.9.6.2 Adjust Primary Makeup Water Flow controller, PMU-IFIC-0210X, output to > 5 GPM flow rate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 207 of 289 Event

Description:

Raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 6.9.7 If automatic control of Primary Makeup Water flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.9.7.1 Place Primary Makeup Water Flow controller, PMU-IFIC-0210X, in Auto. 6.9.7.2 Adjust Primary Makeup Water Flow controller, PMU-IFIC-0210X, setpoint potentiometer to > 5 GPM flow rate. 6.9.8 Verify Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, PMU-144, Intermediate or Open 6.9.9 Observe Primary Makeup water flow rate for proper indication 6.9.10 Operate VCT Inlet/Bypass to Holdup Tanks, CVC-169 Control Switch to BMS/Auto positions as necessary to maintain VCT pressure and level within normal operating bands. 6.9.11 When Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, PMU-144, Closed. NOTE Step 6.9.12 may be repeated as necessary to achieve desired total Primary Makeup Water addition for plant conditions. 6.9.12 If additional Primary Makeup Water addition is required and with SM/CRS permission, then perform the following: 6.9.12.1 Reset Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter. 6.9.12.2 Verify Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, PMU-144, Intermediate or Open. 6.9.12.3 Observe Primary Makeup water flow rate for proper indication. 6.9.12.4 When Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, PMU-144, Closed. OP-010-003, Plant Startup, Attachment 9.4 9.4.62.1 Set Plant Monitoring Computer to Mode 1 in accordance with OP-004-012, Plant Computer System. 9.4.63 At 6% power, verify CPCs are calculating PQASI (PID 266). 9.4.64 As directed by SM/CRS, initiate ASI control in accordance with Attachment 9.13, Axial Shape Control Guidelines.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 208 of 289 Event

Description:

Raise power to 10% to roll the Main Turbine Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 9.4.65 If PQASI is outside the band of -0.48 to +0.48, then limit Reactor power to maintain CPC Total Raw Flux, DKSUM (PID 272) <43 on the most limiting channel. CAUTION IF CPC TOTAL RAW FLUX, DKSUM (PID 272) IS GREATER THAN 51, AND PQASI (PID 266) EXCEEDS THE BAND OF -0.5 TO +0.5, THEN A CPC AUX TRIP WILL OCCUR. 9.4.66 If PQASI is within the band of -0.48 to +0.48, then continue power increase to ~10%. Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactivity Manipulation is satisfied OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 209 of 289 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure PPS Channel D (CIAS), CB-IPI-6701SMD, fails high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC/BOP Recognizes and reports indications of failed channel. Alarms:

RPS CHANNEL TRIP CNTMT PRESSURE HI (Cabinet K, A-17)

CNTMT PRESSURE HI PRETRIP B/D (Cabinet K, C-17)

RPS CHANNEL D TROUBLE (Cabinet K, H-18)

ESFAS CHANNEL TRIP CNTMT PRESSURE HI (Cabinet K, L-17)

CNTMT PRESSURE HI ESFAS PRETRIP B/D (Cabinet K, N-17) Indications:

PPS Channel D Containment Pressure (CIAS), CB-IPI-6701SMD failed high on CP-7

All other Containment Pressure instruments reading normal on CP-7

Pretrip and Trip Bistable Lights illuminated for Containment Pressure HI CNT PRESS (RPS and ESF) on Channel D CP-7 ROM. Examiner Note All BOP manipulations for OP-009-007 are located at CP-10 except as noted. OP-009-007, Plant Protection System ,Section 6.2, Trip Channel Bypass Operation SRO 6.2.1 Refer to Attachment 11.11, PPS Bistable Bypass Chart to assist in determination of Trip Channels requiring placement in bypass.

Determines the following bistables are affected and need to be bypassed:

13 - HI CNT PRESS (RPS)

16 - HI CNT PRESS (SIAS/CIAS/MSIS) SRO Directs BOP to bypass the HI CNT PRESS (RPS) and HI CNT PRESS (SIAS/CIAS/MSIS) bistables in PPS Channel D within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System. BOP 6.2.2 To place a bistable in or remove a bistable from bypass, go to Attachment 11.10, Trip Channel Bypass Operation. BOP 11.10.1 To Bypass a Trip Channel, perform the following: 11.10.1.1 Circle the bistable numbers selected for bypass under Step 11.10.1.4. (Circles bistable numbers 13 and 16 in Step 11.10.1.4 table)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 210 of 289 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure PPS Channel D (CIAS), CB-IPI-6701SMD, fails high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP 11.10.1.2 Check desired Trip Channel is not Bypassed on another PPS Channel. BOP 11.10.1.3 Open key-locked portion of BCP in desired PPS Channel. BOP 11.10.1.4 Depress Bypass push buttons for the desired Trip Channels BOP 11.10.1.5 Check all selected bistable Bypass push buttons remain in a Depressed state. BOP 11.10.1.6 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on BCP for the desired Trip Channels. CREW 11.10.1.7 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on ROM for the desired Trip Channels. (Verifies correct bistables lit on CP-7 PPS Channel D Remote Operator Module) SRO Reviews the following Technical Specifications and determines applicable actions:

3.3.1 action 2

3.3.2 actions 13

3.3.3.5 - no actions required

3.3.3.6 - no actions required Examiner Note This event is complete when bistables are bypassed and Technical Specifications have been addressed OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 211 of 289 Event

Description:

Charging Pump B trips on Instantaneous Overcurrent Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 Note All controls for the Charging manipulations are on CP-4 ATC Recognize and report indications of Charging Pump B trip. Alarms:

Charging Pump B Trip/Trouble (Cabinet G, B-6)

Charging Pumps Header Flow Lo (Cabinet G, H-5) Indications:

Charging flow and Charging Header pressure drop

Charging Pump B control switch indicates stop

REGEN HX TUBE OUTLET temperature (CVC-ITI-0221) rising Examiner Note There are steps in off normal OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, to manually start a standby Charging Pump after verifying a suction path. It is acceptable for the SRO to direct this action prior to entering OP-901-112 to avoid isolating the Charging and Letdown system on high temperature. If this is directed, the SRO should still enter OP-901-112 even after a Charging Pump is running. SRO Enters and directs the implementation of OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction. OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction SRO 1. Stop turbine load changes. N/A 2. IF malfunction is due to failure of the Pressurizer Level Control System, THEN go to OP-901-110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION SRO 3. IF a Charging Malfunction is indicated, THEN go to Subsection E 1 , Charging Malfunction. SRO should evaluate E 0 and go to sub-section E

1. NOTE If all Charging Pumps are secured, then LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC 101) will close on high REGEN HX TUBE OUTLET temperature if RCS is 470°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 212 of 289 Event

Description:

Charging Pump B trips on Instantaneous Overcurrent Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 This condition is applicable to the plant conditions. Regen Heat Exchanger temperature will rise to the 470 °F setpoint. Time is available for the crew to take action prior to isolation. CAUTION THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WILL BE BORATED IF A CHARGING PUMP IS STARTED WITH THE RWSP AS THE MAKEUP WATER SOURCE. ATC 1. IF Charging Pumps have tripped, THEN perform the following: 1.1 Verify open EITHER VCT DISCH VALVE (CVC 183) OR RWSP TO CHARGING PUMP (CVC 507). 1.2 IF Letdown has NOT isolated, THEN attempt to restart Charging Pump(s). 1.3 IF the Charging Pump can NOT be restarted, THEN verify closed LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC 101). 1.4 IF the reason for the Charging pump trip is corrected AND Pressurizer level is in normal operating band, THEN place Charging and Letdown in service in accordance with

The ATC operator should verify a Charging Pump suction path via CVC-183 prior to starting another Charging Pump. Either Charging Pump A or AB can be started. This action is typically directed by the SRO.

If the crew does not start another Charging Pump prior to Letdown isolating at 470 °F, then the crew should re-establish Charging and Letdown in accordance with Attachment 2. SRO 2. IF normal Charging flow can NOT be established AND Pressurizer level falls below minimum Pressurizer level for operation in accordance with , Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve, THEN perform the following: This step should not be applicable due to the duration of the malfunction. CREW 3. IF the PMC is available, THEN display PMC Group CVCS and monitor Charging System parameters to determine cause of Charging malfunction. This data can be retrieved by any member of the crew. PMC point D39704, CVCS CHG PMP MTR B OVLD TRIP and D39702, CVCS CHG PMP MTR B TRP/TRBL will provide indication of the electrical failure of Charging Pump B. SRO Evaluates Tech Spec and TRM 3.1.2.4 and enters both. Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 can be exited by aligning Charging Pump AB to replace B for SIAS. The SRO should remain in TRM 3.1.2.4 after this operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 213 of 289 Event

Description:

Charging Pump B trips on Instantaneous Overcurrent Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Align Charging Pump AB to replace B on SIAS by aligning the Pump AB Assignment switch to the B position on CP-4. SRO Exit Tech Spec 3.1.2.4. Crew must remain in TRM 3.1.2.4. Examiner Note This event is complete after Charging Pump AB is aligned to replace Charging Pump B Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 214 of 289 Event

Description:

Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP Recognize and report indications of Startup Feedwater Reg Valve failure. Alarms:

Steam Generator 1 Steam/FW Flow Signal Dev (Cabinet F, T-17)

Steam Generator 2 Steam/FW Flow Signal Dev (Cabinet F, U-17) Indications:

Steam Generator 1 Level Lowering (SG-ILR1-1105 and 1111)

Deviation between steam flow AND feedwater flow on SG 2 SRO Directs BOP to match Feedwater flow and Steam flow on Steam Generator 1 and restore level to 50-70% NR. BOP Adjusts Main Feed Reg Valve 1 to Match Feedwater Flow and Steam Flow. SRO Enters and directs the implementation of OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Malfunction OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Malfunction, E0, General N/A 1. If Steam Generator level is < 41% NR and there is no Feedwater flow to the Steam Generator, then perform the following: 1.1 Trip the Reactor.

1.2 Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions SRO 2. Go to Attachment 1, General Actions. OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Malfunction, Attachment 1, General Actions SRO Did a Reactor Trip occur? NO - Continues though flowchart

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 215 of 289 Event

Description:

Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 SRO/BOP Observe the affected Steam Generator FWCS controllers AND note ANY controllers that are behaving erratically. Steam Generator 1 FW IFIC 1111 , S/G 1 FWCS Master Controller FW IHIC 1111 , S/G 1 Main FRV Controller FW IHIC 1105 , S/G 1 S / U FRV Controller FW IHIC 1107 , SGFP A Speed Controller Steam Generator 2 FW IFIC 1121 , S/G 2 FWCS Master Controller FW IHIC 1121 , S/G 2 Main FRV Controller FW IHIC 1106 , S/G 2 S / U FRV Controller FW IHIC 1108 , SGFP B Speed Controller NOTE Should determine that no controllers are malfunctioning. N/A Place appropriate controllers for the affected FWCS in manual AND establish control of S/G level. (controllers in MANUAL prior to the event)

SRO/BOP Is the output of the affected FWCS Master Controller behaving erratically?

No SRO/BOP Verify SGFP Discharge pressure for BOTH SGFP ' s is matched AND is greater than S / G pressures. The BOP should verify the running FW Pump Discharge pressure is greater than Steam Generator Pressure. Only one FW pump is running at this time. SRO Stop turbine load changes except to match Tave and Tref. May be applicable if the crew has recommenced the power ascension. Otherwise this is N/A. SRO/BOP Review the following guidelines AND restore S /G level to 50-70% NR:

1. IF one SGFP Speed controller is in auto, THEN use its output to help set the SGFP Speed controller that is in manual. 2. Momentary taps on the raise AND lower buttons of the Main Feedwater Reg Valve Controller have a noticeable impact on associated Steam Generator level. 3. Use the Startup Feedwater Reg Valve Controller to control Steam Generator level at low power levels. 4. Use indications on the unaffected FWCS controllers to help set affected FWCS controllers. Only 2 apples in this case Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 216 of 289 Event

Description:

Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 1 fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 SRO/BOP Check the following Control Channel indicators to determine if a Control Channel has failed: (See Note 3)

FW IFR 1111, Steam Generator 1 Feedwater Flow (green pen )

FW IFR 1011, Steam Generator 1 Steam Flow (red pen )

FW IFR 1121, Steam Generator 2 Feedwater Flow (green pen )

FW IFR 1021, Steam Generator 2 Steam Flow (red pen )

SG ILR1111, Steam Generator 1 Downcomer Level (green pen )

SG ILR1105, Steam Generator 1 Downcomer Level (red pen )

SG ILR1121, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (green pen )

SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen )

Note Should determine no failed instruments. SRO Control Channel level deviation of > 7%?

NO N/A Verify applicable controllers shifted to manual per automatic actions. Note The Main Feed Reg Valve B, Startup Feed Reg Valve B, and Main Feedwater Pump B were already in manual.

SRO/BOP Determine AND correct the cause of the malfunction.

BOP should note that Startup Feedwater Reg Valve 1 is not responding to controller output.

The SRO should discuss with the BOP necessary contingency actions necessary due to c ontrolling Feedwater Reg Valve 1 in MANUAL Examiner Note This event is complete after the SRO has completed the flowchart and Steam Generator 1 level is being controlled OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 217 of 289 Event

Description:

Large RCS Cold Leg Break/CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of Loss of Coolant Accident. Alarms:

Pressurizer Pressure Hi/Lo (Cabinet H, E-1)

Pressurizer Level Hi/Lo (Cabinet H, B-1)

Containment Pressure Hi/Lo (Cabinet M, H-4, Cabinet N, H-14)

Containment Water Leakage Hi (Cabinet N, L-20)

Containment Water Leakage Hi-Hi (Cabinet N, K-20) Indications:

RCS pressure dropping (CP-7, CP-2)

Pressurizer level lowering (CP-2, CP-8, QSPDS 1)

Backup Charging Pump starts (CP-4)

Letdown flow goes to minimum (CP-4) SRO Directs ATC and BOP to carry out Standard Post trip Actions. OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC 1. Determine Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check reactor power is dropping.

b. Check startup rate is negative. c. Check less than TWO CEAs are NOT fully inserted. BOP 2. Determine Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria are met: a. Check the Main Turbine is tripped:

Governor valves closed

Throttle valves closed BOP b. Check the Main Generator is tripped:

GENERATOR BREAKER A tripped

GENERATOR BREAKER B tripped

EXCITER FIELD BREAKER tripped Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 218 of 289 Event

Description:

Large RCS Cold Leg Break/CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP c. Check station loads are energized from offsite electrical power as follows: Train A

A1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

A2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

A3, 4.16 KV safety bus

A-DC electrical bus

A or C vital AC Instrument Channel Train B

B1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

B2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

B3, 4.16 KV safety bus

B-DC electrical bus

B or D vital AC Instrument Channel ATC 3. Determine RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that BOTH the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer level is 7% to 60%

Pressurizer level is trending to 33% to 60%

b. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. Note This will not be met due to the LOCA ATC 4. Determine RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by checking that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer pressure is 1750 psia to 2300 psia

Pressurizer pressure is trending to 2125 psia to 2275 psia 4.2 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify the following have initiated.

SIAS

CIAS 4.3 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating 4.4 IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2-A, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 219 of 289 Event

Description:

Large RCS Cold Leg Break/CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 ATC 5. Determine Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check at least one RCP is operating.

b. Check operating loop T is less than 13ºF. c. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. Note If Reactor All Coolant Pumps are secured, this step can be skipped. BOP 6. Determine RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that at least one steam generator has BOTH of the following:

Steam generator level is 5% to 80% NR

Main Feedwater is available to restore level within 50%-70% NR. Note Main Feedwater will be isolated on MSIS a2. Verify Emergency Feedwater is available to restore level in at least one steam generator within 50%-70% NR [60-80% NR]. ATC b. Check RCS TC is 530 ºF to 550 ºF BOP c. Check steam generator pressure is 885 psia to 1040 psia. BOP d. Check Feedwater Control in Reactor Trip Override:

MAIN FW REG valves are closed

STARTUP FW REG valves are 13% to 21% open

Operating main Feedwater pumps are 3800 rpm to 4000 rpm Note After MSIS Feedwater pumps will be coasting down and feedwater control valves will be closed. BOP e. Reset moisture separator reheaters, and check the temperature control valves closed. ATC 7. Determine Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

b. Check NO containment area radiation monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. c. Check NO steam plant activity monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. Note Won't be met because of Containment Pressure and activity Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 220 of 289 Event

Description:

Large RCS Cold Leg Break/CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 a1. IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify the following:

CIAS is initiated

SIAS is initiated

MSIS is initiated BOP 8 Determine Containment Temperature and Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment temperature is less than or equal to 120ºF. lsutgr-4 b. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia. 8.1 Verify at least three containment fan coolers are operating. 8.2 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify ALL available containment fan coolers are operating in emergency mode. CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by manually initiating Containment Spray Actuation Signal prior to exiting OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions or Containment pressure exceeds 44 PSIG.

This task becomes applicable after Containment Pressure rises above 17.7 PSIA.

CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow. This task becomes applicable after Containment Spray is initiated.

The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without Component Cooling Water cooling.

8.3 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, THEN verify ALL of the following:

CSAS is initiated

ALL available containment spray pumps are delivering flow greater than 1750 gpm

ALL RCPs are secured Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 221 of 289 Event

Description:

Large RCS Cold Leg Break/CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 N/A 9. IF ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO OP-902-001, "Reactor Trip Recovery" procedure. SRO 10. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OR ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Appendix 1, "Diagnostic Flowchart.

Proper use of chart will result in use of OP-902-002, Loss of cooling Accident Recovery. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery SRO 1. Confirm diagnosis of a LOCA: a. Check Safety Function Status Check Acceptance criteria are satisfied.

b. IF Steam Generator sample path is available, THEN direct Chemistry to sample BOTH Steam Generators for activity. CREW 2. Announce a Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress using the plant page. SRO 3. Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency Plan. N/A 4. IF power has been interrupted to either 3A or 3B safety buses, THEN perform Appendix 20, "Operation of DCT Sump Pumps". SRO 5. REFER TO Section 6.0, "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip. Examiner Note This event is complete after the SRO enters OP-902-002 Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 222 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment/Containment Spray Pump A Trips/OP-902-008 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 BOP Recognizes and reports indication of Main Steam Line Break on SG 2 Alarms

SG 2 Pressure Lo Pretrip and Trip Alarms on CP-2

SG 2 Level Lo Pretrip and Trip Alarms

Indications

SG 2 Pressure lowering on CP-8 and CP-1 indicators

SG 2 Level lowering on CP-8 and CP-1 indicators SRO Recognize two events in progress and either goes directly to OP-902-008, Functional Recovery, or returns to the diagnostics flowchart and diagnoses into OP-902-008. OP-902-008, Functional Recovery CREW 1. Announce that the Functional Recovery Procedure is in progress using the plant page. SRO 2 Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency

Plan. SRO 3 REFER TO the "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip. N/A 4. IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, AND SIAS is actuated, THEN a. Verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

b. IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs. N/A 5. IF RCPs are operating, THEN: a. IF a CSAS is initiated, THEN stop ALL RCPs.

b. Verify CCW available to RCPs. c. IF RCS TC is less than 382ºF [384ºF], THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 223 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment/Containment Spray Pump A Trips/OP-902-008 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 NOTE The Shift Chemist should be notified if a SIAS or CIAS has occurred. The secondary sampling containment isolation valves should not be opened following an SIAS or CIAS until directed by the Shift Chemist. SRO 6. Direct Chemistry to sample BOTH steam generators for activity and boron. N/A 7. IF power is lost to both 3A and 3B safety buses and NOT expected to be restored within 30 minutes, THEN perform the following: N/A 8. IF power is lost to both 3A and 3B safety buses and NOT expected to be restored within 30 minutes, THEN perform the following to reduce unnecessary station loads: N/A 9. IF power has been interrupted to either 3A or 3B safety buses, THEN perform Appendix 20, "Operation of DCT Sump Pumps". BOP 10. Place Hydrogen Analyzers in service as follows:

Train A a. Place Train A H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to OPEN. b. Place H2 ANALYZER A POWER to ON. c. Check H2 ANALYZER A Pumps indicate ON.

Train B a. Place Train B H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to OPEN. b. Place H2 ANALYZER B POWER to ON. c. Check H2 ANALYZER B Pumps indicate ON.

CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ISOLATION This task is satisfied by prioritizing CI-1 as Priority 1 after performing Step 11 of OP-902-008, Functional Recovery This task becomes applicable after the Main Steam Line Break occurs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 224 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment/Containment Spray Pump A Trips/OP-902-008 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 SRO 11. Identify success paths to be used and prioritize Safety Functions.

SRO should determine priorities and paths as follows on the Safety Function Tracking Sheet: (Priorities may vary depending on time parameters checked; however, Priority1 should be CI-1)

Reactivity Control, RC-1 = 5

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (DC), MVA-DC-1 = 6

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (AC), MVA-AC-1 = 7

RCS Inventory Control, IC-2 = 2

RCS Pressure Control, PC-2 = 8

RCS and Core Heat Removal, HR-2 = 3

Containment Isolation, CI-1 = 1 (CRITICAL) Containment Temperature and Pressure Control, CTPC-2 = 4 Note The SRO may choose to two address safety functions in parallel CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, CI-1 SRO/BOP 1. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia

Pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia

Containment area radiation monitors greater than the Hi Alarm setpoint THEN perform BOTH of the following:

a. Verify CIAS is initiated. b. Verify that an isolation valve is closed for each containment penetration required to be closed.

b1. IF ANY containment fan cooler is NOT operating AND containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia, THEN REFER TO Appendix 21-B, "CFC CCW Override" and close the associated Containment Fan Cooler CCW Isolation Valves.

b2. IF ANY CS-125, Containment Spray Header Isolation is open AND the associated CS pump is NOT operating, THEN REFER TO Appendix 21-A, "CS-125 Override," and close the valve. N/A 2. IF a SGTR is indicated by ANY of the following: SRO/ATC 3. Check the following CCW Radiation Monitor AB indications:

Hi Alarm clear

No abnormal rise in radiation monitor reading Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 225 of 289 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line 2 Break Inside Containment/Containment Spray Pump A Trips/OP-902-008 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Revision 1 4. Check CI-1, Automatic/Manual Isolation is satisfied by ANY of the following:

Condition 1

a. IF steam plant activity monitor alarms or an unexplained rise in steam plant activity exists, THEN ALL release paths from the most affected steam generator to the environment are closed. b. Containment pressure is less than 17.1 psia.

c. NO Containment area radiation monitor alarms or unexplained rise.

d. IF SGTR diagnosed, THEN steam generator pressure less than 1000 psia

[960 psia] AND NOT steaming via ADV.

Condition 2

a. IF steam plant activity monitor alarms or an unexplained rise in steam plant activity exists, THEN ALL release paths from the most affected steam generator to the environment are closed. b. Each containment penetration required to be closed for current plant conditions has an isolation valve closed. c. IF SGTR diagnosed, THEN steam generator pressure less than 1000 psia

[960 psia] AND NOT steaming via ADV. Examiner Note This event is complete after SRO prioritizes Safety Functions and implements highest priority path Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

- 226 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 Facility: Waterford 3 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: ~ 100% Reactor Power, BOC Turnover: Protected Train is B, AB Bus is aligned to Train B, HPSI Pump A is OOS Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 SG05B I - BOP I - SRO Steam Generator 2 Level Control Transmitter, SG-ILT-1106, fails low requiring implementation of OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction. 2 RC15A1 I - ATC I - SRO TS - SRO Pressurizer Level Control Channel Level Transmitter, RC-ILT-0110X, fails high requiring implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

3 SG01B TS - SRO Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak requiring implementation of OP-901-202, Steam Generator Tube Leakage.

4 N/A R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Steam Generator 2 tube leakage requires implementation of OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

5 IA03D IAR28 C - ATC C - SRO Instrument Air Leak requiring implementation of OP-901-511, Instrument Air Malfunction and a manual reactor trip. After the reactor trip the leak is located and isolated. 6 SG01B M - All Primary to Secondary Leakage in Steam Generator 2 rises to greater than Charging Pump Capacity (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) (Critical Task 2 and 3) 7 ED02D EG08B C - BOP C - SRO A Startup Transformer B fault occurs, causing loss of power to the B3 bus which powers the only OPERABLE HPSI Pump. Emergency Diesel Generator B fails to AUTO start requiring operator action to re-energize the B3 bus. (Critical Task 1) 8 SI02B C - BOP C - SRO High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start requiring action to start the HPSI Pump. (Critical Task 1) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4

- 227 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is out of service and danger tagged, due to high pump bearing vibration during its quarterly IST. Since it occurred just prior to shift turnover and the AB bus is aligned to Train B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump AB has not yet been aligned for service. The Work Management Center is working in that direction.

After taking the shift, Steam Generator 2 Level Control Transmitter, SG-ILT-1106 fails low. The SRO should direct the BOP to match feedwater and steam flow using Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, FW-173B and stabilize SG 2 level 50-70% Narrow Range. The SRO should enter OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction and implement Attachment 1, General Actions.

After the crew has restored Steam Generator 2 to between 50 and 70% Narrow Range, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Level Transmitter, RC-ILT-0110X, fails high. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and implement Section E1. The crew should take manual control of the Pressurizer Level Controller and/or operate Charging Pumps to restore Pressurizer level, swap control to the Channel Y level channel, and return the Pressurizer Level Controller back to AUTO. The SRO should review Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks. The SRO should determine that TS 3.3.3.6 requirements are met, but enter TS 3.3.3.5 Action a.

After Pressurizer Level Control is in AUTO, Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak at ~ 11 gpm. The SRO should implement OP-901-202, Steam Generator Tube Leakage or High Activity. The SRO should determine that based on leak indications, Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 is not met for Primary-to-Secondary Leakage or Identified Leakage and enter TS 3.4.5.2 Action a. The SRO should also determine that the current leakage requires implementation of OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

After the reactivity manipulation has been satisfied, an Instrument Air leak occurs. The SRO should implement OP-901-511, Instrument Air Malfunction. SA-125, Station Air to Instrument Air cross-connect valve, fails to open at set pressure and Instrument Air Header Pressure drops to less than 65 psig. The SRO should order a manual reactor trip and the crew should perform the actions of OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. If a leak location investigation is initiated, the leak will be found and isolated. If an operator is sent to SA-125 the operator will be able to open the valve by adjusting the local controller. Neither of these actions will be performed prior to reaching the reactor trip criteria of OP-901-511.

After the SRO has entered OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery, Primary to Secondary leakage rises to greater than Charging Pump capacity. The SRO should order a manual actuation of Safety Injection and Containment Isolation. After Safety Injection is actuated, Startup Transformer B fails and Emergency Diesel Generator B fails to AUTO start. Additionally, when power is restored High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start. The BOP should perform a manual start of Emergency Diesel Generator B, verify that the Emergency Diesel Generator automatically loads, and manually start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B (CRITICAL TASK 1). The crew should start a rapid cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to less than 520°F T-hot. Since MS-319A is out of service due to the IA line rupture the BOP should select an alternate Steam Bypass Valve to perform the cooldown. The crew should also depressurize the Reactor Coolant System to prevent lifting secondary safety valves on Steam Generator 2 (CRITICAL TASK 2), and isolate Steam Generator 2 (CRITICAL TASK 3). The scenario can be terminated after Steam Generator 2 is isolated or at the lead examiner's discretion.

NRC Scenario 4

- 228 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 CRITICAL TASKS

9. ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This task applies upon loss of power to the B3 bus. This task is satisfied by the crew taking action to start and load Emergency Diesel Generator B and manually start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B.

10. PREVENT OPENING MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES.

This task is satisfied by the crew taking action to maintain Steam Generator 2 pressure below the lowest secondary safety valve setpoint by taking action to reduce RCS pressure to < 1085 psia.

11. ISOLATE RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR

This task is satisfied by isolating Steam Generator 2 in accordance with OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery, Step 17 after RCS T HOT is reduced below 520°F.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes 22. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7 23. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 24. Abnormal events (2-4) 4 25. Major transients (1-2) 1 26. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 27. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 28. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 NRC Scenario 4

- 229 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO SETUP AA. Reset Simulator to IC-194. BB. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline. CC. Verify the following Remotes and Overrides: 1. SIR29, HPSI PUMP A - RACKOUT

2. SIR24, SI-203A_SI-208A HPSI PUMP A SUCT/DISCH ISOL VLVS - CLOSE DD. Verify HPSI Pump A Control Switch (C/S) in OFF and place Danger Tag on C/S. EE. Ensure Event Trigger 6 is set up as below to initiate when Safety Injection is actuated: 1. ((RP_ESFASIAS == 1) I (RP_ESFBSIAS == 1)) FF. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

GG. Verify EOOS is 8.7 Yellow. HH. Complete the simulator setup checklist. II. Start Insight, select file PlantParameters.tis.

NRC Scenario 4

- 230 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Steam Generator 2 Level Control Transmitter, SG-ILT-1106, fails low

6. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1. 7. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 2 Pressurizer Level Control Channel Level Transmitter, RC-ILT-0110X, Fails High

8. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2. 9. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 3/4 Steam Generator 2 Tube Leak, OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction

9. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3. 10. If Chemistry is called to sample the Steam Generators for activity, acknowledge and wait 30 minutes and report leakage into Steam Generator 2 is ~ 11 GPM. 11. If called as DPM or Duty OPS Manager acknowledge the communication and tell contact person that you will make the additional communications per OI-035-000, Attachment 1. 12. If requested to verify BD-1162, position locally, report that BD-1162 is closed. 13. If requested as Programs & Components Engineering to monitor for loose parts in the Stay Cavity Area of Steam Generator, acknowledge the request and inform the caller that will monitor and evaluate data as necessary. 14. If Chemistry is called to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent Iodine due to the down power, acknowledge and report that samples will be taken 2-6 hours from notification time and if asked tell the caller your name is Dustan Milam. 15. If called as DPM or Duty OPS Manager acknowledge the communication and in form the caller that you will make your required communications per OI-035-000, Attachment 1. 16. If notified as Load Dispatcher (Woodlands) acknowledge the communications and inform the caller that the grid will remain stable with available backup generation. 17. If requested to remove polisher vessels from service, inform the caller that you will monitor Polisher D/P and remove vessels as necessary.

Event 5 Instrument Air Leak

10. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4. 11. If the Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the call er that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room. 12. If the caller requests PMM assistance locating the leak inform the caller that 2 PMM persons will be provided to support leak location as soon as possible. 13. If requested to open the bypass valve around the SA to IA Cross-Connect Valve, wait until the reactor trip has occurred and set Remote IAR23 to OPEN and report that SA-127 is open. 14. If Operators are dispatched to locate the Instrument Air Leak, wait until after the reactor trip and report to the Control Room that the leak is on the Supply line to Steam Bypass Valve, MS-319A and can be isolated by closing IA-4916. 15. If directed to isolate the leak, set Remote IAR17 to CLOSED, LO-01A09A04DS1-1is set to ON, DI-01A09S08-1 is set to OFF, and delete Malfunction IA03D. Report to the Control Room that the leak is isolated.

NRC Scenario 4

- 231 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 Event 6/7 Primary to Secondary Leakage in Steam Generator 2 Rises to Greater Than Charging Pump Capacity, Startup Transformer B Fault, Emergency Diesel Generator B and HPSI Pump B Fail To AUTO Start

13. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5. 14. When Safety Injection is actuated, ensure Event Trigger 6 goes active. 15. If the Duty Plant Manager or Duty OPS Manager is called, inform the caller that you will make the necessary calls in accordance with, OI-035-000. 16. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request. 17. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, end data collection and save the file as 2012 Scenario4-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save the file into the folder for the appropriate crew

NRC Scenario 4

- 232 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 SCENARIO TIMELINE EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER DELAY HH:MM:SS RAMP HH:MM:SS FINAL EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 SG05B SG LEVEL ILT-1106 FAILS (0-100%)

1 00:00:00 00:01:00 0 STEAM GENERATOR 2 LEVEL CONTROL TRANSMITTER, SG-ILT-1106 FAILS LOW 2 RC15A1 PZR CONTROL LT 0110X FAILS HI 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL LEVEL TRANSMITTER, RC-ILT-0110X FAILS HIGH 3/4 SG01B SG2 TUBE LEAK (100% = 3200 GPM) 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.35 STEAM GENERATOR 1 TUBE LEAK, OP-901

-212, RAPID PLANT POWER REDUCTION 5 IA03D RUPTURE AIRLINE TO STM BYPASS VLV MS-319A 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 INSTRUMENT AIR LEAK 5 IAR28 SA-125 SETPOINT N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 INSTRUMENT AIR LEAK 6 SG01B SG2 TUBE LEAK (100% = 3200 GPM) 5 00:00:00 00:02:00 8 PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE IN STEAM GENERATOR 1 RISES TO GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY 7 ED02D LOSS OF SUT B TRANSFORMER 6** 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE SUT B FAULT, EDG B FAILS TO AUTO START

- SEE SIMULATOR SETUP NOTES 7 EG08B FAILURE OF DG B TO AUTOSTART N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE SUT B FAULT, EDG B FAILS TO AUTO START 8 SI02B HPSI PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START

NRC Scenario 4

- 233 - 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 4 D-1 Rev 2 REFERENCES Event Procedures* 1 OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, Rev. 5 2 OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, Rev. 6 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Tech Spec 3.3.3.5 Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 3 OP-901-202, Steam Generator Tube Leakage or High Activity, Rev. 9 Tech Spec 3.4.5.2 4 OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction, Rev. 4 5 OP-901-511, Instrument Air Malfunction, Rev. 9 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 6 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart and Appendix 2, Figures OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery Procedure, Rev. 13 7 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedure Operations Expectations/Guidance, Rev. 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 234 of 289 Event

Description:

FWCS 2 Steam Generator Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1106 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 BOP Recognize and report indications of failed Steam Generator level instrument. Alarms

SG 2 FW Contl Lvl Signal Dev/Pwr Lost (Cabinet F, T-19)

SG 2 Level Hi/Lo (Cabinet F, U-18) Indications

Controllers for Steam Generator 2 shift to MANUAL.

o Main Feedwater Regulating Valve B Controller.

o Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve B Controller o Main Feedwater Pump B Speed Controller SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, Section E0, General N/A 1. If Steam Generator level is <41% NR and there is no Feedwater flow to the Steam Generator, then perform the following: 1.1 Trip the Reactor.

1.2 Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions SRO 2. Go to Attachment 1, General Actions. OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, Attachment 1, General Actions SRO Did a Reactor Trip occur? NO - Continues though flowchart Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 235 of 289 Event

Description:

FWCS 2 Steam Generator Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1106 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 SRO/BOP Observe the affected Steam Generator FWCS controllers AND note ANY controllers that are behaving erratically. Steam Generator 1 FW IFIC 1111 , S/G 1 FWCS Master Controller FW IHIC 1111 , S/G 1 Main FRV Controller FW IHIC 1105 , S/G 1 S / U FRV Controller FW IHIC 1107 , SGFP A Speed Controller Steam Generator 2 FW IFIC 1121 , S/G 2 FWCS Master Controller FW IHIC 1121 , S/G 2 Main FRV Controller FW IHIC 1106 , S/G 2 S / U FRV Controller FW IHIC 1108 , SGFP B Speed Controller NOTE Should determine that no controllers are malfunctioning. SRO/BOP Place appropriate controllers for the affected FWCS in manual AND establish control of S/G level. (Determines proper controllers in MANUAL) SRO/BOP Is the output of the affected FWCS Master Controller behaving erratically?

No SRO/BOP Verify SGFP Discharge pressure for BOTH SGFP's is matched AND is greater than S/G pressures.

N/A Stop turbine load changes except to match Tave and Tref. SRO/BOP Review the following guidelines AND restore S /G level to 50-70% NR:

4. IF one SGFP Speed controller is in auto, THEN use its output to help set the SGFP Speed controller that is in manual. 5. Momentary taps on the raise AND lower buttons of the Main Feedwater Reg Valve Controller have a noticeable impact on associated Steam Generator level. 6. Use the Startup Feedwater Reg Valve Controller to control Steam Generator level at low power levels. 7. Use indications on the unaffected FWCS controllers to help set affected FWCS controllers.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 236 of 289 Event

Description:

FWCS 2 Steam Generator Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1106 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 SRO/BOP Check the following Control Channel indicators to determine if a Control Channel has failed: (See Note 3)

FW IFR 1111, Steam Generator 1 Feedwater Flow (green pen )

FW IFR 1011, Steam Generator 1 Steam Flow (red pen )

FW IFR 1121, Steam Generator 2 Feedwater Flow (green pen )

FW IFR 1021, Steam Generator 2 Steam Flow (red pen )

SG ILR1111, Steam Generator 1 Downcomer Level (green pen )

SG ILR1105, Steam Generator 1 Downcomer Level (red pen )

SG ILR1121, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (green pen )

SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen )

Note

SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen ) is the failed instrument. SRO Control Channel level deviation of >7%?

YES SRO Verify applicable controllers shifted to manual per automatic actions. Note The Main Feed Reg Valve B, Startup Feed Reg Valve B, and Main Feedwater Pump B will have shifted to manual.

SRO Determine AND correct the cause of the malfunction.

Coverage of the flow chart in Attachment 1 should conclude that the failed instrument is the problem.

The SRO should discuss with the BOP necessary contingency actions necessary with the listed controllers in MANUAL. This should include actions on a Reactor trip or on Steam Generator High Level Override. Examiner Note This event is complete when the flow chart in Attachment 1 has been completed and the contingencies have been discussed and the BOP has performed manual control during the power reduction Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator This failure requires additional actions by the BOP during the power reduction and after the Reactor trip later in the scenario.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 237 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Control Channel Level Transmitter, RC-ILT-0110X fails high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of failed instrument. Alarms:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI/LO (Cabinet H, B-1)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-HI (Cabinet H, A-1)

LETDOWN FLOW HI/LO (Cabinet G, C-1)

LETDOWN HX OUTLET PRESS HI (Cabinet G, A-2) Indications

Mismatch between Charging (CVC-IFI-0212) AND Letdown (CVC-IFI-0202) flow indications. Letdown rises to maximum, with 1 charging pump running

Deviation between indicated level AND programmed level as indicated on Pressurizer level recorder (RC-ILR-0110).

RC-ILI-0110X reading ~ 100%

Actual Pressurizer level RC-ILI-0110Y slowly lowering.

Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize SRO May direct the ATC to take manual control of Pressurizer Level Controller, RC-ILIC-0110 and match Letdown flow and Charging flow prior to entering procedure. SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. OP-901-110, Section E0, General Actions N/A 1. Stop Turbine load changes. N/A 2. IF malfunction is due to failure of Letdown Flow Control valve, THEN GO TO OP-901-112, CHARGING/LETDOWN MALFUNCTION.

SRO 3. IF malfunction is due to failure of Pressurizer Level Control Channel (incorrect readings on EITHER RC-ILI-0110X OR RC-ILI-0110Y), THEN GO TO Subsection E 1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction. OP-901-110, Section E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction NOTE Selecting the non-faulted channel may cause automatic actions to occur if actual level is not at program level.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 238 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Control Channel Level Transmitter, RC-ILT-0110X fails high Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 1. Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in MAN AND adjust OUTPUT to slowly adjust letdown flow to restore Pressurizer level. ATC 2. Transfer Pressurizer Level Control CHANNEL SELECT switch to non-faulted channel. ATC 3. Transfer Pressurizer CHANNEL SELECT LO LEVEL HEATER CUTOFF switch to non-faulted channel. ATC 4. Verify desired backup Charging pumps in AUTO. ATC 5. Verify ALL PROPORTIONAL AND BACKUP HEATER BANKS reset. ATC 6. Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in AUTO and verify Pressurizer Level is being restored to setpoint. ATC 7. Verify Pressurizer level controlling at program setpoint in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve. SRO 8. Refer to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 for Remote Shutdown and Accident Monitoring operability determination.

Note The SRO should review Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks. The SRO should determine that TS 3.3.3.6 requirements are met, but enter TS 3.3.3.5 Action a. Examiner Note This event is complete after Pressurizer Level Control System is selected to non-faulted channel and returned to automatic operation and Technical Specifications have been addressed OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 239 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC Recognize and report indications of Steam Generator Tube Leakage. Alarms:

RAD MONITORING SYS ACTIVITY HI-HI (Cabinet L, A-9)

VACUUM PUMPS EXHAUST ACTIVITY HI (Cabinet E, C-3) Indications

RM-11 Rad Monitor indication will display rising activity on Main Steam Rad Monitor 2, Steam Generator 2 N-16 Rad Monitor, Main Condenser Vacuum Pumps WRGM, and the Blowdown radiation monitor.

Steam Generator tube leakage indication rising as indicated on PMC Group PSLR (PMC PID C48304). SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-202, Steam Generator Tube Leakage or High Activity. OP-901-202, Steam Generator Tube Leakage or High Activity SRO 1. IF Pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained with available Charging Pumps, THEN perform the following: 1.1 Manually trip Reactor. 1.2 Manually initiate Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) AND Containment Isolation Actuation (CIAS).

1.3 GO TO OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS. NOTE (1) The calculated Primary to Secondary Leak Rate values must be considered valid, unless the reading can be quickly diagnosed as incorrect due to an obvious malfunction of the PMC or AE Discharge Rad Monitor. (2) The AE Discharge Rad Monitor is considered the primary Rad Monitor which has the sensitivity to measure small Primary to Secondary Leakage. The AE Discharge Rad Monitor reading inputs into the Primary to Secondary Leak Calculation on PMC Group PLSR. The MS Line N16 Rad Monitors may be used as verification of AE Discharge Rad Monitor or as primary indication if the AE Discharge Rad Monitor is OOS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 240 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 2. Determine RCS leak rate using ANY of the following:

Calculated Steam Generator leakage displayed on PMC Group PSLR (PMC PID C48304)

Calculated Steam Generator leakage displayed on PMC PID C48251 (RE5501 CH1 LEAK RATE) and C48252 (RE5501 CH2 LEAK RATE)

Approximate RCS leak rate by subtracting total of Letdown flow AND RCP CBO flow from Charging Flow

Calculated Charging / Letdown Mismatch displayed on PMC Group Leakrate (PMC PID S13001)

RCS Leak Rate calculation in accordance with OP-903-024, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WATER INVENTORY BALANCE

Calculated steam generator leakage based upon chemistry sample, per CE-003-705, DETERMINATION OF PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE NOTE Any rise >30 GPD/HR followed by a subsequent lowering of the rate of change would indicate a spike and a rapid power reduction is not required. SRO 3. IF Primary to Secondary Leakage in any Steam Generator is 75 GPD (~0.05 GPM) AND the rate of change is rising by 30 GPD/HR (~0.02 GPM/HR), THEN perform the following: 3.1 Commence a rapid plant shutdown in accordance with OP-901-212, RAPID PLANT POWER REDUCTION, AND concurrently with this Procedure, reduce Plant Power to 50% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . 3.2 WHEN Plant Power is 50%, THEN in accordance with OP-901-212, RAPID PLANT POWER REDUCTION, AND concurrently with this Procedure, be in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months AND Mode 5 in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Examiner Note

These conditions will be met. The CRS should enter OP-901-212 and perform it concurrently with OP-901-202.

Steps 4-6 are not applicable to the event. Steps 7 through 15 of Steam Generator Tube Leakage or High Activity are listed here. The CRS should begin the steps of Rapid Plant Power Reduction before working these steps. The steps of OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction follow step 15 of OP-901-202.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 241 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 SRO 7. Notify Chemistry Depar tment to perform the following: 7.1 Provide current Plant status including the following:

Primary to Secondary Leakrate

Primary to Secondary Leakage Rate of Change

Plant action(s) Operations is OR will be implementing (example: plant shutdown, rapid plant shutdown, monitoring) 7.2 Carry out actions in accordance with UNT-005-032, STEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE. 7.3 Begin sampling Steam Generators for activity. 7.4 Quantify Steam Generator Tube leakage. SRO 8. Notify Radiation Protection to carry out the actions of UNT-005-032, STEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE. BOP 9. Verify BD-303, DISCHARGE TO WASTE, Locked Closed. BOP 10. Verify BD-1162, BD FLASH TANK VENT, Closed. BOP 11. Verify CD-145, CD DUMP TO WASTE POND, Closed. 11.1 Notify Chemistry prior to dumping Condensate from the Condenser Hotwell to the CST. BOP 12. Establish AND monitor a PMC Trend of the following PMC points:

C48304 PRI TO SEC LEAKAGE

C48305 PRI TO SEC LEAK RATE CHANGE (GPD/HR)

C48251 RE5501 CH1 LEAK RATE

C48252 RE5501 CH2 LEAK RATE N/A 13. IF Primary to Secondary Leakage is 5 GPD AND <15 GPD THEN monitor the N-16 and Condenser Air Evacuation Radiation Monitors every 15 minutes for rising trends SRO 14. Advise Shift Manager to perform the following:

Review EP-001-001, RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

Review OI-035-000, NOTIFICATION MATRIX, AND as a minimum notify the Duty Plant Manager AND Duty Operations Manager as soon as possible.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 242 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 NOTE Until arrangements are made for disposal of radioactively contaminated resin, Condensate Polisher Vessels should NOT be placed in service with resin loaded in the vessel. N/A 15. Remove from service ANY Condensate Polisher Vessels which are loaded with resin in accordance with OP-003-031, CONDENSATE POLISHER/BACKWASH TREATMENT. 15.1 Do not place in service any condensate polisher vessel loaded with resin without the coordination of Chemistry. OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction NOTE (1) A rapid power reduction is defined as approximately 30 MW/minute load reduction on the main turbine. (2) Power Reduction may be stopped at any point. (3) Some Steps of this procedure may not be applicable due to plant conditions. In these cases SM/CRS may NA the step. (4) Steps within this procedure may be performed concurrently or out of sequence with SM/CRS concurrence. (5) During power reduction PMC PID C24650, COLSS DESCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT19), will automatically select and display the correc t power indication. OP-010-003, Plant Startup, provides greater detail on which power indications are displayed by PID C24650 based on power level and whether or not the UFM is in service. ATC 1. Begin RCS Boration by one of the following methods: SRO/ATC 1.1 0 up to 170 EFPD: 1.1.1 Direct Boration Or 1.1.2 Emergency Boration using two Charging Pumps OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 6.7, Direct Boration CAUTION (1) THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4. (2) AT LEAST ONE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IN EACH LOOP SH OULD BE O PERATING PRIOR TO PERFORMING DIRECT BORATION OP ERATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER CHEMICAL MIXING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 243 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 6.7.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed. NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at BOC (<30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. T mod at EOC (340 EFPD)

ATC 6.7.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Boric Acid to be added on Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Boric Acid Volume for Direct Boration or VCT Borate Makeup Mode. ATC 6.7.3 Set Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter to volume of Boric Acid desired. ATC 6.7.4 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pumps selector switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B). ATC 6.7.5 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to AUTO. ATC 6.7.6 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to BORATE. ATC 6.7.7 Verify selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Starts. ATC 6.7.8 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Opens. NOTE The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer will not register below 3 GPM. The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer is most accurate in the range of 10 - 25 GPM.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 244 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 6.7.9 If manual control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.9.1 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. 6.7.9.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output to >3 GPM flow rate. N/A 6.7.10 If automatic control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following: 6.7.10.1 Place Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Auto.

6.7.10.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, setpoint potentiometer to >3 GPM flow rate. ATC 6.7.11 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. ATC 6.7.12 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication. ATC 6.7.13 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed. Examiner Note The step below is only applicable if the ATC adds acid in small batches. NOTE Step 6.7.14 may be repeated as necessary to achieve desired total boron addition for plant conditions. ATC 6.7.14 If additional boric acid addition is required and with SM/CRS permission, then perform the following: 6.7.14.1 Reset Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter. 6.7.14.2 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open. 6.7.14.3 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication.

6.7.14.4 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 245 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 6.7.15 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual. ATC 6.7.16 Verify both Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output and setpoint potentiometer set to zero. ATC 6.7.17 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to MANUAL. ATC 6.7.18 Verify Selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Stops. ATC 6.7.19 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Closed. ATC 6.7.20 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to CLOSE. OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power NOTE To prevent Pressurizer heater cutout, avoid operating with Pressurizer pressure near the heater cutout pressure of 2270 PSIA while on Boron Equalization. ATC 2. Perform Boron Equalization as follows: 2.1 Place available Pressurizer Pressure Backup Heater Control Switches to ON. ATC 2.2 Reduce Pressurizer Spray Valve Controller (RC-IHIC-0100) setpoint potentiometer to establish spray flow and maintain RCS pressure 2250 PSIA (2175 - 2265). CAUTION REFER TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.3.6 FOR TRANSIENT INSERTION LIMITS.

ATC 3. Operate CEAs in accordance with OP-004-004, Control Element Drive, to maintain ASI using CEA Reg. Group 5, 6 or Group P Control Element Assemblies in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, Attachment 9.9, Axial Shape Control Guidelines. CREW 4. Notify the Load Dispatcher (Woodlands) that a rapid power reduction is in progress.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 246 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 CREW 5. Announce to Station Personnel over the Plant Paging System that a rapid plant power reduction is in progress. ATC/BOP 6. Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature 536

°F to 549°F. BOP 7. Commence Turbine load reduction by performing the following: 7.1 Depress LOAD RATE MW/MIN pushbutton. BOP 7.2 Set selected rate in Display Demand Window. BOP 7.3 Depress ENTER pushbutton. BOP 7.4 Depress REFERENCE pushbutton. BOP 7.5 Set desired load in Reference Demand Window. BOP 7.6 Depress ENTER pushbutton. BOP 7.7 Depress GO pushbutton. NOTE If USBSCAL is not in service, the COLSS Steam Calorimetric will be automatically disabled when MSBSCAL, PMC PID C24246, drops below 95% Power, and will revert back to FWBSCAL, PMC PID C24235. This may result in a step change in COLSS indicated Plant Power (BSCAL) of up to 1.0% when this occurs. CREW 8. When Reactor Power consistently indicates less than 98% power, as indicated on PMC PID C24631 [MAIN STEAM RAW POWER (MSBSRAW)], or an alternate point provided by Reactor Engineering, then verify the value of C24648 [BSCAL SMOOTHING VAL. APPLD (DUMOUT17)] automatically changes to 1. N/A 9. If C24648 does not automatically change to 1, then inform Reactor Engineering and set the value of 1 for COLSS power smoothing constant K24250, [ADDRSSBL SMOOTHING FOR BSCAL (ALPHA)] in accordance with OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits Supervisory System. SRO 10. Following a Reactor Power change of >15% within a one hour period, direct Chemistry Department to sample Reactor Coolant System (RCS) for an isotopic iodine analysis two to six hours later.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3/4 Page 247 of 289 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 2 develops a tube leak/ Rapid Plant Power Reduction Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 BOP 11. When Condensate flow is <18,000 gpm, verify Gland Steam Condenser Bypass, CD-154, Closed (PMC PID D02404). BOP 12. Monitor Condensate Polisher differential pressure and remove Polishers from service to maintain system pressure in accordance with OP-003-031, Condensate Polisher/Backwash Treatment. BOP 13. When Reactor Power is approximately 70% or Heater Drain Pump flow is unstable, then remove Heater Drain Pumps from service by taking pump control switches to Stop. Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactivity Manipulation is satisfied OR At Lead Examiner's Discretion

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 248 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC / BOP Recognize and report indications of the Instrument Air Leak. Alarms

INST AIR DRYERS BYPASSED (CABINET L, H-7)

VALVE OPERATORS NITROGEN BACKUP ACTUATED/TROUBLE (CABINET L, G-5)

INST AIR RECEIVER PRESSURE HI/LO (CABINET E, F-5)

Indications

Instrument Air Header Pressure lowering as indicated on IA-IPI-9700 on CP-1

Possible repositioning of air operated valves OP-901-511, Instrument Air Malfunction SRO 1. IF Instrument Air pressure drops to 65 psig, THEN trip the Reactor AND perform OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS, concurrently with this procedure. ATC If directed by CRS, trip Reactor using 2 Reactor Trip pushbuttons at CP-2. SRO Direct ATC and BOP to carry out Standard Post trip Actions. SRO 2. Dispatch an operator to the Air Compressors AND verify the following:

ALL Instrument Air AND Station Air Compressors running loaded with normal separator levels

SA Backup Supply for IA Press Cntl valve (SA 125) Open

IF Instrument Air pressure is less than 95 PSIG, THEN Instrument Air Dryers Bypass Solenoid valve (IA 123) Opens CREW 3. IF ALL of the actions of step 2 have occurred AND Instrument Air pressure is still dropping, THEN, using the Plant Paging System, announce the following two times: "Attention Station Personnel, Attention Station Personnel. The plant is experiencing a loss of Instrument Air Pressure. Discontinue use of Instrument Air AND Station Air. Report all air usage OR ANY air leaks to the Control Room".

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 249 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 Examiner Note Provided a Plant Page was made or personnel are requested to identify the leak, the leak will be found and isolated after the reactor is tripped.

Examiner Note At Step 2 of OP-902-000, Steam Generator Tube Recovery, inform the Simulator Operator to initiate Trigger 5 (SG01B to 8%)

OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC 1. Determine Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check reactor power is dropping.

b. Check startup rate is negative. c. Check less than TWO CEAs are NOT fully inserted. BOP 2. Determine Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria are met: a. Check the Main Turbine is tripped:

Governor valves closed

Throttle valves closed BOP b. Check the Main Generator is tripped:

GENERATOR BREAKER A tripped

GENERATOR BREAKER B tripped

EXCITER FIELD BREAKER tripped Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 250 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 BOP c. Check station loads are energized from offsite electrical power as follows: Train A

A1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

A2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

A3, 4.16 KV safety bus

A-DC electrical bus

A or C vital AC Instrument Channel Train B

B1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

B2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

B3, 4.16 KV safety bus

B-DC electrical bus

B or D vital AC Instrument Channel CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This Task applies upon loss of power to the B3 bus. This task is satisfied by the crew taking action to start and load Emergency Diesel Generator B and manually start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B. BOP Manually starts EDG B using Control Switch on CP-1, verifies EDG B starts and load, and manually starts HPSI Pump B. NOTE After Safety Injection occurs SU T B fails and EDB B fails to AUTO start. The BOP needs to manually start EDG B to power HPSI Pump B which is the only available High Pressure Safety injection Pump. HPSI Pump B also fails to auto start after power is restored. ATC 3. Determine RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that BOTH the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer level is 7% to 60%

Pressurizer level is trending to 33% to 60%

b. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 251 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 4. Determine RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by checking that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer pressure is 1750 psia to 2300 psia

Pressurizer pressure is trending to 2125 psia to 2275 psia 4.2 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify the following have initiated.

SIAS

CIAS 4.3 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating 4.4 IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2-A, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs. ATC 5. Determine Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check at least one RCP is operating.

b. Check operating loop T is less than 13ºF. c. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF. BOP 6. Determine RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that at least one steam generator has BOTH of the following:

Steam generator level is 5% to 80% NR

Main Feedwater is available to restore level within 50%-70% NR. ATC b. Check RCS TC is 530 ºF to 550 ºF BOP c. Check steam generator pressure is 885 psia to 1040 psia. BOP d. Check Feedwater Control in Reactor Trip Override:

MAIN FW REG valves are closed

STARTUP FW REG valves are 13% to 21% open

Operating main Feedwater pumps are 3800 rpm to 4000 rpm BOP e. Reset moisture separator reheaters, and check the temperature control valves closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 252 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 ATC 7. Determine Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

b. Check NO containment area radiation monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity. c. Check NO steam plant activity monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity.

NOTE Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are not met due to steam plant activity; however, there are no contingencies associated with

this. BOP 8 Determine Containment Temperature and Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met: a. Check containment temperature is less than or equal to 120ºF.

b. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

N/A 9. IF ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO OP-902-001, "Reactor Trip Recovery" procedure.

SRO 10. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OR ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Appendix 1, "Diagnostic Flowchart. Proper use of chart will result in use of OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery.

SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery. OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery CREW 1. Confirm diagnosis of a SGTR:

a. Check Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are satisfied.

b. IF steam generator sample path is available, THEN direct Chemistry to sample BOTH steam generators for activity. CREW 2. Announce a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress using the plant page.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 253 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 SRO 3. Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition", and implement the Emergency Plan. SRO 4. IF power has been interrupted to either 3A or 3B safety buses, THEN perform Appendix 20, "Operation of DCT Sump Pumps". SRO 5. REFER TO Section 6.0, "Placekeeper", and record the time of the reactor trip. SRO/ATC 6.

IF Pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify SIAS has initiated.

BOP 7. IF SIAS has initiated, THEN: a. Verify safety injection pumps have started. b. Check safety injection flow is within the following:

Appendix 2-E, "HPSI Flow Curve"

Appendix 2-F, "LPSI Flow Curve" c. Verify ALL available charging pumps are operating. ATC 8. IF Pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, AND SIAS is actuated, THEN: a. Verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

b. IF Pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs. ATC 9. IF RCPs are operating, THEN: a. Verify CCW available to RCPs.

b. IF a CSAS is initiated, THEN stop ALL RCPs. c. IF RCS TC is less than 382ºF, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating. BOP 10. Check a CCW pump is operating for each energized 4.16 KV safety bus. BOP 11. Commence a rapid RCS cooldown to less than 520°F T H using Steam Bypass valves.

Take OFF-AUTO-MAN switch for 1 Steam Bypass Valve to MAN Take M/A station for that same valve to MAN Raise output on that M/A station to achieve 50% output Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 254 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 NOTE MS-319A was the source of the Instrument Air Leak and is not available. The BOP will have to select an alternate valve to perform the cooldown.

Critical Task PREVENT OPENING THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES This task is satisfied by taking action to lower RCS pressure in accordance with step 12.

ATC 12. Depressurize the RCS:

a. Maintain pressurizer pressure within ALL of the following criteria:

Within Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits"

Less than 945 psia

Within 50 psi of the most affected steam generator pressure

IF RCPs are operating greater than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits" b. Operate Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer spray. Note The ATC operator should receive direction from the CRS to perform this step. He should evaluate plant conditions and decide on a minimum RCS pressure. The critical task is satisfied when the applicant takes action to start reducing RCS pressure (< 945 PSIA does not need to be reached in the scenario).

SRO/ATC 13. IF MSIS is NOT present, THEN lower the automatic initiation setpoints as the cooldown and depressurization proceed for MSIS (low SG Pressure).

The SRO should direct the ATC to perform this action during the rapid cooldown to < 520°F THOT. N/A 14.

IF SIAS is NOT present, THEN lower the automatic initiation setpoints as the cooldown and depressurization proceed for SIAS (low PZR Pressure). N/A 15.

IF offsite power has been lost, THEN: a. Verify MSIVs are closed.

b. Verify following steam generator blowdown isolation valves are closed:

BD 102A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1 (IN)

BD 102B, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 2 (IN)

BD 103A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1(OUT)

BD 103B, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 2 (OUT)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 255 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 SRO/BOP 16. Determine the most affected steam generator by considering ALL of the following:

Steam generator activities

Main steam line radiation levels

Steam generator blowdown radiation monitor readings

Steam generator level rise when NOT feeding

One steam generator level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for both

Feed flow mismatch between steam generators

Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a steam generator prior to the reactor trip CRITICAL TASK ISOLATE RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR This task is satisfied by isolating Steam Generator 2 in accordance with step 17 after RCS T HOT is reduced below 520 °F.

BOP 17. When the RCS T H is less than 520°F, THEN isolate Steam Generator 2:

Steam Generator 2 BOP a. Place the ADV setpoint to 980 psig and verify the controller in AUTO. BOP b. Verify the MSIV is closed. (CRITICAL)

BOP c. Verify the MFIV is closed. (CRITICAL)

BOP d.

IF EFAS-2 is NOT initiated, THEN close EFW Isolation Valves:

EFW-228B SG 2 PRIMARY

EFW-229B SG 2 BACKUP BOP e. Place EFW Flow Control Valves in MAN and close

(CRITICAL)

EFW-224B SG 2 PRIMARY

EFW-223B SG 2 BACKUP BOP f. Close MS 401B, PUMP AB TURB STM SUPPLY SG 2. (CRITICAL)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6/7 Page 256 of 289 Event

Description:

Instrument Air Leak/Reactor Trip/Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Failure of SUT B/EDG B fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Scenario 4, Revision 1 BOP g. Close Main Steam Line 2 Drains:

MS 120B NORMAL

MS 119B BYPASS Note These valves should already be closed. BOP h. Close Steam Generator Blowdown isolation valves:

BD 103B STM GEN 2 (OUT)

BD 102B STM GEN 2 (IN) Note These valves should already be closed. BOP i. Check the Main Steam Safety valves are closed. Note This will be accomplished by dispatching a non-licensed operator.

Examiner Note This event is complete after Steam Generator 2 is isolated Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

P1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Local Operation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 258 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Locally Operate At mospheric Dump Valve A Task Standard: Opened Atmospheric Dump Valve A to 25% in accordance with OP-005-004, Main Steam. Local pneumat ic control failed during the evolution, requiring local handwheel control.

References:

OP-005-004, Main Steam, revision 22 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical:No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 041 Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass Control Importance Rating 2.9 / 3.1 A4.06 Atmospheric relief valve controllers RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 259 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-005-004, Main Steam, revision 22

==

Description:==

Applicant will be directed to open Atmo spheric Dump Valve A to 25% open.

During the task, local pneumatic control wil l not function requiri ng local handwheel operation. Task will occur in Main Steam Isolation Valve A room and does require climbing ladders to access the platform. Gloves are required.

When performing JPM validation, actions are necessary to ensure exam security is maintained.

Prior to commencing in plant JPM validation, contact Health Physi cs and direct them to disable all cameras in the RCA in a manner that prevents anyone from viewing any of the RCA cameras.

After all in plant JPMs are complete, cont act Health Physics to restore the disabled cameras.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All steps for this JPM will be simulated

do not manipulate any plant components. Make all necessary communications to me. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3

RCS temperature is being controlled by Atmospheric Dump Valve A and B

The CP-8 controller for Atmospheric Dump Valve A is not responding

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to locally open MS

-116A, Atmospheric Dump Valve A, to 25% open using OP-005-004, Main Steam, section 8.7

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 260 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Note Refer to T.S. 3.7.1.7 prior to performing this section.

Note reviewed.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Control Room staff is addressing all Tech Specs. SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Caution OPENING ADV MAY CAUSE AN RCS COOLDOWN, R ESULTING IN A CHANGE IN REACTIVITY AND STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS. Caution reviewed.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 8.7.1 Establish communications with the Control Room. Control Room contacted.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Control Room is standing by for local operation of MS-116A, ADV 1.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 8.7.2 If desired to operate MS-116A locally using pneumatic operation, then perform the following : 8.7.2.1 Record the pressure at the outlet of the transducer: Pressure recorded.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Pressure reads as it is displayed (~ 3 psig).

SAT / UNSAT

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 261 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 8.7.2.2 Adjust the pressure at Air Regulator outlet on the front of the panel to the pressure noted in step 8.7.2.1. Pressure adjusted to pressure from preceding step. Comment: Turning the regulator operator counter clockwise will lower pressure.

EVALUATOR CUE: When handle is turned in the correct direction, cue that pressure lowers to required pressure.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 8.7.2.3 Turn the Pneumatic Permissive Valve above the Transducer to Manual. Pneumatic Permissive Valve is in manual.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Valve handle is rotated from Auto to Manual.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 8.7.2.4 Turn the Pneumatic Permissive Valve above the Air Regulator to Manual. Pneumatic Permissive Valve is in manual.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Valve handle is rotated from Auto to Manual.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 262 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD Procedure Note The ADV will be closed when pressure at outlet of Air Regulator is < 4.5 PSIG and full open when pressure at outlet of Air Regulator is > 15 PSIG. Note reviewed.

Comment: SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note The next step introduces the fault. When the air regulator is adjusted, provide the cue that there is no change in pressure and that MS-116A, ADV 1 is not moving.

Evaluator Note If the applicant reports to the Control Room that local pneumatic control is not functioning without a recommendation, ask the applicant if there is an alternate method to operate the ADV. If local handwheel operation is identified, then direct the applicant to open ADV A to 25% open using the handwheel.

TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 8.7.2.5 Adjust the Air Regulator pressure to obtain desired valve position by performing any of the following:

Open MS-116A by turning air regulator adjusting screw in the clockwise direction to raise air pressure.

Close MS-116A by turning the air regulator adjusting screw in the counterclockwise direction to lower air pressure. Applicant attempts to adjust pressure. Comment: Applicant attempts to open the ADV by rotating the regulator in the clockwise position.

EVALUATOR CUE: Air regulator pressure and ADV position are not changing. Applicant should go to step 8.7.4.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 8.7.4 If desired to operate MS-116A(B) using local handwheel, then perform the following: Applicant proceeds with local handwheel operation of MS-116A.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE:

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 263 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 8.7.4.1 Close Local NG/IA Isolation to the positioner for applicable MS-116A(B) SG 1(2) MS Atm Dump Valve: NG-8271C, NG/IA Isolation to MS-116A or NG-8281D, NG/IA Isolation to MS-116B NG-8271 C is closed Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Valve closes when operated.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 8.7.4.2 Open Filter Petcock Drain and bleed off Air/N2 pressure by opening Filter Petcock Drain. Filter Petcock Drain is open. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Air is heard coming from the drain when opened. Pressure lowers to zero and air flow stops and the sound of the air goes away. Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 8.7.4.3 Open MS-116A(B) SG 1(2)

MS Atm Dump Valve Local Valve Positioner Equalizing Valve. Positioner Equalizing Valve is open. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Valve open when operated.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 8.7.4.4 Engage local handwheel and Open MS-116A(B) SG 1(2) MS Atm Dump Valve to desired position by performing the following:

8.7.4.4.1 Unscrew clevis from top of the Manual Override Shaft. Clevis removed.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Clevis unscrews when operated counter clockwise.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 8.7.4.4.2 Turn handwheel to expose actuator shaft above manual override shaft. Actuator shaft exposed.

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 264 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: As handwheel is turned counter-clockwise, actuator shaft is exposed. When shaft is fully exposed, notch at the bottom of the shaft is visible.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 8.7.4.4.3 Slide clevis onto actuator shaft. Clevis installed.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Clevis fits into notch.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 8.7.4.4.4 Turn handwheel to open MS-116A(B) to desired position.

MS-116A, ADV 1 is 25% open. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: As handwheel is turned clockwise, MS-116 A, ADV 1 opens. Steam issues from ADV 1 exhaust pipe. Applicant will observe a loud noise and some heat.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

END OF TASK

JPM P1 Revision 1 Page 265 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET Do Not Manipulate Any Plant Components (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3

RCS temperature is being controll ed by Atmospheric Dump Valve A and B

The CP-8 controller for Atmospheric Dump Valve A is not responding

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to locally open MS-116A, Atmospheric Dump Valve A, to 25% open using OP-005-004, Main Steam, section 8.7

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

P2 Placing Shutdown Cooling Purification in Service Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 267 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Placing Shutdown Coolin g Purification in service Task Standard: Applicant performed all identified critical action steps correctly per OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling. Shut down Cooling Purification is in service and Shutdown Cooling Puri fication is aligned to Shutdown Cooling Train A.

References:

OP-009-005, Shutdow n Cooling, revision 31 Alternate Path: No Time Critical:No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 005 K1.04 CVCS Importance Rating 2.9/3.1 G2.1.30 RO/SRO 4.4/4.0 Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 268 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, revision 31

==

Description:==

This task is performed on the -4 and -15 levels of the RCA.

When performing JPM validation, actions are necessary to ensure exam security is maintained.

Prior to commencing in plant JPM validation, contact Radiation Protection and direct them to disable all cameras in the RCA in a manner that prevent s anyone from viewing any of the RCA cameras.

After all in plant JPMs are complete, contac t Radiation Protection to restore the disabled cameras.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All steps for this JPM will be simulated , do not manipulate any plant components. Make all necessary communications to me. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Shutdown Cooling Train A is in service

Shutdown Cooling Purification Ion Exchanger A is aligned for service

RCS Hot Leg Temperature is 105°F

INITIATING CUES:

The following conditions exist: -Reactor Coolant System is at atmospheric pressure -Normal Letdown and Charging is secured -Sufficient room is available in the Boron Management System to flush Chemical and Volume Control System Purification Ion Exchanger(s)

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Purification in service using Purification Ion Exchanger A in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling Purification, Section 6.6.

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 269 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Caution THE FOLLOWING SECTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT CORE REACTIVITY. Caution reviewed Comment: EVALUATOR CUE:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Note The following are prerequisites for placing Shutdown Cooling Purification System in service: (1) Reactor Coolant System is at atmospheric pressure. (2) Normal Letdown and Charging is secured.

(3) One Shutdown Cooling train in service. (4) Sufficient room in Boron Management System to flush Chemical and Volume Control System Purification Ion Exchanger(s).

Note reviewed Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: All perquisites are met for placing Shutdown Cooling Purification in service. The prerequisites are identified in the initiating cue and initial conditions.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Procedure Caution PLACING SHUTDOWN COOLING PURIFICATION IN SERVICE WITH EITHER HYDROGEN PEROXIDE OR HYDRAZINE PRESENT IN REACTOR COOLANT WILL DAMAGE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PURIFICATION ION EXCHANGER(S). Caution reviewed Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, there is no hydrogen peroxide or hydrazine present in the reactor coolant system.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 6.6.1 Verify Letdown Stop Valve, CVC-101, Closed. Contacts Control Room Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Letdown Stop Valve, CVC-101, is Closed.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 270 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD Procedure Note Both of the following valves must be open to meet the Open permissive interlock for Letdown HX Temperature Control, CC-636. CVC-103 Letdown Inside Containment Isolation CVC-109 Letdown Outside Containment Isolation Note Reviewed Comment: SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 6.6.2 If RCS Hot Leg temperature is > 120°F, then perform the following: 6.6.2.1 Verify the following valves Open: CVC-103 Letdown Inside Containment Isolation CVC-109 Letdown Outside Containment Isolation 6.6.2.2 Verify Regen HX Outlet Header to Letdown HX Temperature Indicator Controller, CVC-ITIC-0223, in Auto, and set potentiometer to maintain < 120

°F. Contacts Control Room to determine RCS Hot Leg temperature.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: RCS Hot leg temperature is 105

°F. SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 6.6.3 Unlock and Open Letdown to LPSI Pumps Suction Isol, CVC-164. Valve is unlocked and open. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Provide cue to the applicant of valve position moving from closed to open.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 6.6.4 Unlock and Open Shdn Cooling Purification Supply Isol, SI-423. Valve is unlocked and open. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Provide cue to the applicant of valve position moving from closed to open.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 6.6.5 Place Letdown Backpressure Controller, CVC-IPIC-0201, to Manual, and adjust output to Zero. Contacts Control Room JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 271 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that the Letdown Backpressure Controller, CVC-IPIC-0201, is in Manual, and output is adjusted to Zero.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.6.6 Unlock and slowly open RC Loop 2(1) Shdn Cooling Purification Supply Isol, SI-418A(B). Valve is open.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: RC Loop 2, Shdn Cooling Purification Supply Isol, SI-418A is open. Note: The placard on the valve informs the applicant to verify the same valve on the opposite train valve closed. The applicant should identify SI-418B closed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 6.6.7 Verify Letdown HX Outlet temperature < 120

°F, as indicated by Letdown HX Tube Outlet Temperature indicator, CVC-ITI-0224. Contacts Control Room Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that Letdown HX Outlet temperature is 105

°F, as indicated by Letdown HX Tube Outlet Temperature indicator, CVC-ITI-0224.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.6.8 Verify Purification Ion Exchanger(s) is in service, in accordance with appropriate section of this procedure. Recognizes Purification Ion Exchanger A is in service.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Purification Ion Exchanger A is in service per the initial conditions.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.6.9 Verify Letdown to Ion Exchangers Inlet/Bypass, CVC-140, control switch in AUTO. Contacts Control Room Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that Letdown to Ion Exchangers Inlet/Bypass, CVC-140, control switch is in AUTO.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 272 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.6.10 At SM/CRS discretion, direct Chemistry Department to sample CVC Ion Exchanger effluent for boron, chlorides, and fluorides as follows: Contacts control room and applicant recognizes that steps 6.6.10.1 through 6.6.10.6.3 are not required

since sampling is completed with SAT results. Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that Chemistry has completed their sample for CVC Ion Exchanger effluent and samples indicate that fluorides and chlorides are within limits and boron concentration is greater than Reactor coolant boron concentration.

SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note The next step directs the applicant to Unlock and Close Purification Ion Exchs Outlet Header Isolation, CVC-1661. CVC-1661 is in the VCT room which is a High Radiation Room. The room is not accessible but the applicant should have knowledge that CVC-1661 is in the VCT room.

TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 6.6.11 Unlock and Close Purification Ion Exchs Outlet Header Isolation, CVC-1661. Applicant identifies that CVC-1661 is in the VCT room and indicates that he would unlock and close CVC-1661.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Purification Ion Exchs Outlet Header Isolation, CVC-1661 is unlocked and closed. After the applicant identifies that CVC-1661 is in the VCT room, tell him that CVC-1661 is unlocked and closed. Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 6.6.12 Unlock and Open Letdown to LPSI Pump A (B) Suction Isol, CVC-1654A(B). Valve is open.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Letdown to LPSI Pump A (B) Suction Isol, CVC-1654A(B) is unlocked and open. Note: The placard on the valve informs the applicant to verify the same valve on the opposite train valve closed. The applicant should identify CVC-1654B closed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 273 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 6.6.13 Verify Letdown HX Outlet temperature < 120

°F, as indicated by Letdown HX Tube Outlet Temperature indicator, CVC-ITI-0224. Contacts Control Room Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that Letdown HX Outlet temperature is 105

°F, as indicated by Letdown HX Tube Outlet Temperature indicator, CVC-ITI-0224.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD Procedure Caution FLOW RATE THROUGH CVC ION EXCHANGER(S) SHOULD NOT

EXCEED 126 GPM. Caution reviewed Comment: EVALUATOR CUE:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD 6.6.14 Adjust Letdown Backpressure Controller, CVC-IPIC-0201, to obtain flow as required by SM/CRS. Contacts Control Room Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that the Letdown Backpressure Controller, CVC-IPIC-0201, has been adjusted to 80 gpm.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 20 STANDARD 6.6.15 Verify Purification Ion Exchanger A(B)(C) differential pressure, as indicated on CVC-IDPI-0207(0205)(0203) is <20 PSID. Satisfactory D/P is verified Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Purification Ion Exchanger A differential pressure, as indicated on CVC-IDPI-0207 is reading 5 PSID.

SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 21 STANDARD 6.6.16 If Alternate Shutdown Cooling Purification is required, then perform Section 6.14, Alternate Shutdown Cooling Purification. Contacts Control Room JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 274 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The control room reports that Alternate Shutdown Cooling Purification is not desired.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM P2 Revision 1 Page 275 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET

Do Not Manipulate Any Plant Components (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Shutdown Cooling Train A is in service

Shutdown Cooling Purification Ion Exchanger A is aligned for service

RCS Hot Leg Temperature is 105°F

INITIATING CUES:

The following conditions exist: -Reactor Coolant System is at atmospheric pressure -Normal Letdown and Charging is secured -Sufficient room is available in the Boron Management System to flush Chemical and Volume Control System Purification Ion Exchanger(s)

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Purification in service using Purification Ion Exchanger A in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling Purification, Section 6.6.

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

P3 SUPS 014 AB Operation

Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 277 of 289 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Transfer SUPS 014 AB from Alternate to Normal AC power Task Standard: All id entified critical steps for aligning SUPS 014 AB from the Alternate to Normal AC alignmen t in accordance with OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution has been performed correctly.

References:

OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution. revision 306 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical:No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 062 A3.04, Operation of inverter Importance Rating 2.7 / 2.9 RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes

Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date: Signature

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 278 of 289 2012 NRC Exam EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-006-005, Inverters and Dis tribution, revision 306

==

Description:==

SUPS 014 AB will be simulated in the Alternate AC power alignment. Applicant will transfer SUPS 014 AB to the Normal AC a lignment. All steps will be simulated in Switchgear Room A. No special PPE will be required for this task. The first figure in this JPM package is a figure of the SUPS, depicting meters and the initial position of SUPS breakers. The se cond figure is a line diagram representation of the SUPS AB, including breakers and meter locations.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be per formed. All steps for this JPM will be simulated

do not manipulate any plant components. Make all necessary communications to me. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

SUPS 014 AB is in the Alternate AC alignment

The inverter was isolated in acco rdance with OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution, Step 6.5.2.7

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place SUPS 014 AB in the Normal AC alignment in accordance with OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution, Section 6.5.3

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 279 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 280 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 281 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Indications METERS Item Designation Comment M1 Inverter Input Voltage (0-150 VDC) Voltage reads zero until AC power is applied to the rectifier at step 6.5.3.1.1. M2 Inverter Input Current (0-400 DC Amps) Current reads zero until AC power is applied to the rectifier at step 6.5.3.1.1. Current increases momentarily and then

goes back to zero. M3 Battery Current (400 amps discharge to 400 amps charge) Reads as displayed throughout evolution.M4 Battery Recharge Timer (0-30 Hours) Reads as displayed throughout evolution.M5 AC Voltage (0-250 VAC) In the Inverter position, Voltage reads zero until step 6.5.3.9 is complete. In the UPS position, voltage reads zero until step 6.5.3.4. M6 Frequency (57-63 Hz) Frequency reads 57 until step 6.5.3.9. Will read 60 when step 6.5.3.9 is completed M7 UPS Output Current (0-150 Amps AC) System load current reads zero until step 6.5.3.6.

INDICATOR LIGHTS

Item Designation Indication I-1 Inverter Phase Locked Illuminates at step 6.5.3.9. I-2 High-Low DC Voltage Illuminated at the start of the JPM, clears at step 6.5.3.1. I-3 Inverter Output Overload Remains OFF during JPM. I-4 Over temperature Remains OFF during JPM. I-5 Static Switch Inhibited Illuminated at the start of the JPM, clears at step 6.5.3.3. I-6 Static Switch On Reserve Cl ear at the start of the JPM, illuminates at step 6.5.3.4.

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 282 of 289 2012 NRC Exam 6.5.3 Transfer SUPS 014AB from Alternate to Normal AC Power as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 6.5.3.1. If SUPS 014AB inverter has been isolated in accordance with step 6.5.2.7, then perform the following: Step referred to. Comment: The initial conditions state that SUPS 014AB has been isolated in accordance with step 6.5.2.7.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 6.5.3.1.1 Place Normal Feeder breaker, ID-EBKR9335-1 to ON. Breaker is ON.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Breaker will be OFF on ar rival, provide cue of breaker being moved from OFF to ON. Inverter input voltage (M1) reads as is after this step is performed. Inverter input current (M2) reads zero.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 6.5.3.1.2 Verify Inverter Input Voltage > 121 VDC, then place Emergency Feeder breaker, ID-EBKR9335-2 to ON. Breaker is ON.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: When meter checked Inverter Voltage reads as you see it. EVALUATOR CUE: Breaker will be OFF on ar rival, provide cue of breaker being moved from OFF to ON.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 6.5.3.1.3 Depress and release Inverter Operate pushbutton. Pushbutton is pressed and released.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Pushbutton moved in when depressed and popped out when released.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 6.5.3.2 Verify SUPS 014AB Static Switch Retransfer toggle switch in INHIBIT. Verification complete.

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 283 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Static Switch Retransfer toggle switch is in INHIBIT. SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 6.5.3.3 Place SUPS 014AB Alternat e Feeder breaker, ID-EBKR9335-3 to ON. Breaker is ON.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Breaker will be OFF on ar rival, provide cue of breaker being moved from OFF to ON.

The Static Switch Inhibited light goes OFF when this is performed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 6.5.3.4 Depress and release SUPS 014AB Static Switch Transfer Test pushbutton. Test pushbutton depressed and released.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Pushbutton moved in when depressed and popped out when released.

The Static Switch On Reserve light illuminates when this is performed.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 6.5.3.4.1 Verify Static Switch On Reserve light Illuminates. Verification complete.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Static Switch On Re serve light is illuminated.

SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 6.5.3.5 Depress and release SUPS 014AB Lamp Test/Reset pushbutton.Pushbutton depressed and released.

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 284 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Pushbutton moved in when depressed and popped out when released.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.5.3.5.1 Verify Static Switch On Reserve light remains Illuminated. Verification complete.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Static Switch On Re serve light is illuminated.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 6.5.3.6 Place SUPS 014AB Output To PDP014AB, ID-EBKR9335-4 breaker to ON. Breaker is ON.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Breaker will be OFF on ar rival, provide cue of breaker being moved from OFF to ON.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.5.3.7 Place SUPS 014AB Bypass breaker, ID-EBKR9335-5 to OFF. Breaker is OFF.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Breaker will be ON on arrival, provide cue of breaker being moved from ON to OFF.

Critical SAT / UNSAT

TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.5.3.8 Place SUPS 014AB AC Voltage Select Switch to INVERTER.

Select Switch is verified in INVERTER.

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 285 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: AC Voltage Select Switch is in INVERTER The AC Voltage Select Switch could be in what ever position the last watch stander left it in.

SAT / UNSAT

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 286 of 289 2012 NRC Exam Evaluator Note When applicant observes the SUPS Output Voltage meter, provide indication of zero volts. If the applicant presses the Operate pushbutton, provide the indications provided in Task Element 14. If the applicant does not press the Operate pushbutton, then provide the indication that the Static Switch On Reserve light is still illuminated at Task Element 16.

TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.5.3.9 If no voltage is indicated, then depress and release SUPS 014AB Inverter Operate pushbutton, and verify the following:

Inverter Phase Locked light Illuminated

Inverter Output voltage CN ~120 VAC (118.8 to 121.2 VAC)

Inverter Output voltage AN ~120 VAC (118.8 to 121.2 VAC)

Inverter Output voltage BN ~120 VAC (118.8 to 121.2 VAC)

Inverter Output frequency ~60 Hz (59.97 to 60.03 Hz) Depresses the Inverter Operate pushbutton and verifies proper voltage.

Comment: The applicant must use the multi-selector switch and move through these positions.

EVALUATOR CUE: When the applicant initially checks voltage there is no voltage indicated in any Inverter position. Once the Inverter Operate pushbutton is depressed and released the voltages indicate the values given in the step.

EVALUATOR CUE: If the applicant observes any UPS position, voltage will be as indicated.

EVALUATOR CUE: Pushbutton moved in when depressed and popped out when released.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 6.5.3.10 Place SUPS 014AB Static Switch Retransfer toggle switch to AUTO. Toggle Switch is in Auto.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: Static Switch Retransfer toggle switch will be in INHIBIT at this point, cue that the switch is moved from INHIBIT to AUTO. Critical SAT / UNSAT

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 287 of 289 2012 NRC Exam TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 6.5.3.11 After approximately 30 seconds, depress and release SUPS 014AB Lamp Test/Reset pushbutton. Pushbutton pressed and released.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: 30 seconds have elapsed. After this pushbutton is depressed, the Static Switch On Reserve light will extinguish.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 6.5.3.11.1 Verify Static Switch On Reserve light Extinguished. Verification complete.

Comment: EVALUATOR CUE: The Static Switch On Reserve light is extinguished.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 288 of 289 2012 NRC Exam APPLICANT CUE SHEET

Do Not Manipulate Any Plant Components (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

SUPS 014 AB is in the Alternate AC alignment

The inverter was isolated in acco rdance with OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution, Step 6.5.2.7

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place SUPS 014 AB in the Normal AC alignment in accordance with OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution, Section 6.5.3

JPM P3 Revision 1 Page 289 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

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