Text

2012-10-Draft Operating Test
	ML13127A264
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/01/2012
From:	Brian Larson; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Entergy Operations
	laura hurley
References
	Download: ML13127A264 (289)
	v • d • e

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A1 Calculate Shutdown Margin with a Stuck CEA Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A1 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Calculate Shutdown Margin with a stuck CEA.

Task Standard: Applicant calculates Shutdown Margin in accordance with OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin. The results must conform to the answer key and conclude that reactor power is greater than the allowed power level.

References:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 2.1.25, Ability to interpret reference Importance Rating 3.9 materials, such as graphs, curves, RO tables, etc.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 2 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A1 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to calculate Shutdown Margin with 1 mechanically bound CEA. The results will indicate that Shutdown Margin is NOT met and Emergency Boration is required.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 3 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A1 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Core burnup is 335 EFPD.

TCOLD is 543.5 °F.

Power is 35%.

Power is being held due to a Chemistry hold.

Regulating Group P CEAs are being used for ASI control as xenon builds in.

CEA 24 failed to withdraw or insert on the last move.

I&C has completed troubleshooting and there are no problems associated with CEDMCS.

The Shift Manager has concluded that CEA 24 is mechanically bound.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, section 7.3.

Revision 0 Page 4 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A1 7.3.1 If an Untrippable CEA Condition exists and the other CEAs are not inserted, then determine Shutdown Margin and record on Attachment 10.3 as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD NOTE (1) Use 541°F when using PDB Figure 1.5.7.

(2) When using graphs and tables in the Plant Data Book (PDB), to obtain the necessary data, it may be necessary and is acceptable to Note reviewed.

interpolate (approximate between data points or curves). However, extrapolation (approximation outside of the bounds of the data or curves) should not be used.

Comment:

Use Figure 1.5.7.3 for MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.3.1.1 Using current Cycle Burnup and 541 °F temperature, determine 5.3 - 5.4 Net Worth Worst Pair Stuck out (WPSO) from Figure 1.5.7.

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT Use Figure 1.5.7.3 for MOC.

TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 7.3.1.2 Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR. 5.15 Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3.1.3 Subtract Step 7.3.1.2 from Step 7.3.1.1 to determine Shutdown 0.15 - 0.25 Margin Allowed Power Defect %K/K.

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.3.1.4 Record current Reactor Power on Attachment 10.3. Data recorded.

Revision 0 Page 5 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A1 Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 7.3.1.5 Using result from step 7.3.1.3 and Power Defect vs. Power Level, 10% - 18%

Figure 1.2.1, Determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 7.3.1.6 Verify Shutdown Margin greater than or equal to that required by Shutdown Margin is not the COLR by verifying that current power level is less than or equal to met.

the Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 7.3.2 If Shutdown Margin does not meet the requirements of Technical Communicate step to Specifications, then Commence Emergency Boration and go to OP-901-examiner.

103, Emergency Boration.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 6 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM Revision 1 Page 7 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A2 Calculation For Determining The Amount Of Pure Water That May Be Added To The Refuel Cavity Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A2 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Calculation for determining the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity Task Standard: Applicant calculates the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage operations. The results must conform to the answer key.

References:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations TS 3.9.1 COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system Importance Rating 4.3 and integrated plant procedures during RO all modes of plant operation.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 9 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A2 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations COLR TS 3.9.1

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to calculate the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage Operations. To perform this calculation the applicant will need to determine what the Refueling Minimum Boron concentration is from Tech Specs. The results will indicate that 1413 gallons of PMU may be added to the refuel cavity.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 10 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A2 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Waterford 3 is in a refueling outage.

Reactor engineering has determined that a boron concentration of 1985 ppm is required to maintain the refuel cavity at a Keff of < .95.

Refueling Cavity Water Level is 24 ft. and will be drained to 22 ft.

Refueling Cavity boron concentration is 2090 ppm.

INITIATING CUES:

RP has requested that the refuel cavity walls be washed down with PMU as level in the refueling cavity is lowered to 22 ft.

The CRS directs you to determine refueling minimum boron concentration per TS 3.9.1 and perform OP-010-006, Attachment 9.24 Refueling Cavity Boron concentration.

Revision 0 Page 11 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A2 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Note:

(1) This attachment provides guidance for calculating the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity without dilution to below shutdown margin requirements. This is typically used while Radiation Protection is using CMU to wash down the Refuel Cavity walls to mitigate airborne radioactivity while Note reviewed.

performing Refuel Cavity drain down.

(2) This calculation is only valid for water additions while the Refuel Cavity Water Level is > 20 MSL.

(3) This calculation includes a 50% margin.

SAT / UNSAT 9.24.1 Record the following:

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Final Refuel Cavity Water Level (Lf):

Comment:

Refer to A2 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Initial Refuel Cavity Boron Concentration (Ci)

Comment:

Refer to A2 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD Refueling Minimum Boron Concentration (Cf) 2050 ppm Comment: Critical Refer to A2 Key.

SAT / UNSAT The applicant will determine that 2050 ppm is the most restrictive requirement per TS 3.9.1.

Revision 0 Page 12 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A2 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 9.24.2 Calculate the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity (Vw) using the following formula:

Vw = (6954 gal/ft x Lf - 79,161 gal) x (1- Cf/Ci) 1402 to 1476 gallons Vw = [( 6954x___ ft) - 79,161]x [1-(___ppm/___ppm)]

Vw=____gallons Comment: Critical 73827 x .019139 = 1413 gallons SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 9.24.3 Select the lower of Vw calculated in Step 9.24.2 or 1500 gallons: 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 9.24.4 SM/CRS designate the allowable amount of pure water to add to the Refuel Cavity by specifying an amount that is < amount specified in less than or equal to value Step 9.24.3. calculated in step 9.24.2 SM/CRS designated allowable pure water limit to add to cavity:

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT If asked by the applicant if the CRS desires to limit the amount specified in step 9.24.3 the answer will be that it is not desired to limit the amount designated in step 9.24.3.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 13 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM Revision 0 Page 14 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 RO NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A3 Determine Acceptability of Containment Temperature In Accordance With OP-903-001 Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A3 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Determine Acceptability of Containment Temperature In Accordance With OP-903-001 Task Standard: Determines Containment Average Temperature does not meet acceptance criteria with instrument error accounted for and determines Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 needs to be entered.

References:

OP-903-001 TS 3.6.1.5 TS Bases 3/4.6 Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance Importance Rating 3.7 procedures. RO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 16 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam

JPM A3 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-001, Attachment 11.1 MODES 1-4 Technical Specification Surveillance Logs

OP-903-001, Attachment 11.20 MODES 1-4 PMC Technical Specification Surveillance Logs (page 149)

Waterford 3 Technical Specifications

==

Description:==

This JPM requires the candidate to use Containment temperature readings from the PMC (provided on the cue sheet), calculate the average temperature using 3 of the 4 readings, and determine compliance with TS 3.6.1.5 and OP-903-001. Based on the readings of the 3 running CFC intake temperatures and tighter acceptance criteria of OP-903-001 (based on instrument error) TS 3.6.1.5 ACTION a must be complied with.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

Provide all answers on the material provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet and Page 149 of OP-903-001 to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 17 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam

JPM A3 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

o Reactor power is at 100%.

I & C has just completed calibration of CFC Air Intake temperature loops.

Containment Fan Coolers A, C, and D are operating.

Primary Containment Average Air temperatures are as follows:

o PID A51115, CFC A Air Inlet Temp reads 97°F.

o PID A51119, CFC B Air Inlet Temp reads 100°F.

o PID A51123, CFC C Air Inlet Temp reads 101°F.

o PID A51127, CFC D Air Inlet Temp reads 98°F.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS requests that you determine compliance of Containment Average Temperature per OP-903-001.

Document results and actions required, if any, on OP-903-001, Attachment 11.20, and return to the examiner.

Revision 0 Page 18 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam

JPM A3 Evaluator Note The candidate will determine Containment Average Temperature using Containment Fan Cooler inlet temperatures from the PMC, Containment Fan Coolers running, and reactor power (all provided on the cue sheet)

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Determines Containment Average Temperature 98.3°F -99.7°F Comment: Critical

1. The applicant will use the provided CFC temperatures and SAT / UNSAT average the 3 running CFC temperatures (A, C and D). The average will be 98.7°F.

Note: Averaging the 3 running CFC temperatures is preferred but not required. Any 3 can be used. The range given covers the various combinations that can be averaged.

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Determines Average Containment Temperature does NOT meet Determines that 3.6.1.5 Acceptance Criteria. entry is required.

Comment: Critical If the candidate just compares the temperature to the 3.6.1.5 LCO they SAT / UNSAT will determine that no action is required and acceptance criteria is met.

However, Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 does not take into account instrument uncertainties. and notes 2.0 - 2.3 of OP-903-001, Attachment 11.1 should be reviewed to determine acceptability of Containment Temperature.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 19 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam

JPM A3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS None.

Revision 0 Page 20 of 289 2012 RO NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A4 Gaseous Release Evaluation Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Meteorological conditions are evaluated for gaseous release from the GWM System.

Task Standard: Applicant concludes that a release is permitted. The conclusions must include the restrictions on wind speed, wind direction, and stability class.

References:

OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases Importance Rating 3.8 Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 22 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A4 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management

==

Description:==

The setting will be in the classroom for this JPM. The applicant will be provided information from the PMC for the applicable meteorological conditions. The data will be used to evaluate the flow chart in OP-007-003, Attachment 11.5.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from this JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet, OP-007-003 attachment 11.5, and the met data printout to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 23 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A4 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 1.

Chemistry has requested a release of all 3 Gas Decay Tanks for planned maintenance.

Environmental conditions are as displayed on the METDATA handout.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to complete an evaluation of meteorological conditions for the release in accordance with OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management.

Document all information used and conclusions on OP-007-003, Attachment 11.5.

Revision 0 Page 24 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A4 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Concludes wind speed is 2.68 (or 2.75 from the B/U Evaluate 10 meter (33 foot) wind speed. met tower) m/s and continues down through the flow chart.

Comment: Critical The 199 foot reading (3.62 m/s) will conclude that there are no SAT / UNSAT restrictions on the release without using the rest of the flowchart. The procedure directs using the 33 foot parameters.

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Concludes wind direction is 331.1(or 330.7 from the Evaluate 10 meter (33 foot) wind direction. B/U met tower) deg and continues right through the flow chart.

Comment: Critical The 199 foot reading (314.5 deg) will also continue right through the flow SAT / UNSAT chart. The procedure directs using the 33 foot parameters.

TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Concludes T is -0.77 °C or -0.78 °C, stability class C, and that the release is Evaluate Pasquill Stability Class. permitted. If using the B/U met tower, T is -0.93 °C, stability class B, and that the release is permitted.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 25 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A5 Review and Approve a Shutdown Margin with a Stuck CEA Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A5 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review and Approve a Shutdown Margin with a stuck CEA.

Task Standard: Applicant reviews the completed Shutdown Margin in accordance with OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin. The applicant must identify that the incorrect Shutdown Margin was used and correct that error. The applicant must also identify that the plant is operating above the allowed power level and Emergency Boration is required.

References:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 2.1.25, Ability to interpret reference Importance Rating 4.2 materials, such as graphs, curves, SRO tables, etc.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 27 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A5 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin Plant Data Book COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to review a completed Shutdown Margin with 1 mechanically bound CEA. The review will indicate that Shutdown Margin is not met and Emergency Boration is required.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 28 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A5 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Core burnup is 335 EFPD.

TCOLD is 543.5 °F.

Power is 35%.

Power is being held due to a Chemistry hold.

Regulating Group P CEAs are being withdrawn for ASI control as xenon builds in.

CEA 24 failed to withdraw or insert on the last move.

I&C has completed troubleshooting and there are no problems associated with CEDMCS.

The Shift Manager has concluded that CEA 24 is mechanically bound.

INITIATING CUES:

The STA has provided you with a completed OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, for review.

Review and approve the completed surveillance or correct any errors and document any actions required on the worksheet given.

Revision 0 Page 29 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A5 7.3.1 If an Untrippable CEA Condition exists and the other CEAs are not inserted, then determine Shutdown Margin and record on Attachment 10.3 as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD NOTE (1) Use 541°F when using PDB Figure 1.5.7.

(2) When using graphs and tables in the Plant Data Book (PDB), to obtain the necessary data, it may be necessary and is acceptable to Note reviewed.

interpolate (approximate between data points or curves). However, extrapolation (approximation outside of the bounds of the data or curves) should not be used.

Comment:

Use Figure 1.5.7.3 due to MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.3.1.1 Using current Cycle Burnup and 541 °F temperature, determine Recorded correctly on Net Worth Worst Pair Stuck out (WPSO) from Figure 1.5.7. surveillance.

Comment:

Use Figure 1.5.7.3 due to MOC.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 7.3.1.2 Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR. 5.15 Comment: Critical Surveillance lists 4.6, the COLR Shutdown Margin for > 500 F with CEAs SAT / UNSAT inserted.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3.1.3 Subtract Step 7.3.1.2 from Step 7.3.1.1 to determine Shutdown 0.15 - 0.25 Margin Allowed Power Defect %K/K.

Comment: Critical Surveillance lists .751 because of previous error.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.3.1.5 Using result from step 7.3.1.3 and Power Defect vs. Power Level, 10% - 18%

Figure 1.2.1, Determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

Revision 0 Page 30 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A5 Comment: Critical Surveillance lists 58%.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 7.3.1.6 Verify Shutdown Margin greater than or equal to that required by Shutdown Margin is not the COLR by verifying that current power level is less than or equal to met.

the Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

Comment: Critical Surveillance lists 58% allowed, which is greater than the current power SAT / UNSAT level. Applicant must recognize that the actual limit is 10% - 18% which is below the current power level.

TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 7.3.2 If Shutdown Margin does not meet the requirements of Technical Specifications, then Commence Emergency Boration and go to OP-901- Direct Emergency Boration.

103, Emergency Boration.

Comment: Critical If the candidate does not state Emergency Boration is required but states SAT / UNSAT that Shutdown Margin is not met, then ask the candidate what actions are required for this condition, prior to the candidate leaving the area.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 31 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM Revision 0 Page 32 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A6 Review A Calculation For Determining The Amount Of Pure Water That May Be Added To The Refuel Cavity Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A6 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review a calculation for determining the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity Task Standard: Applicant reviews a calculation for determining the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage operations. The results must conform to the answer key.

References:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations TS 3.9.1 COLR Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system Importance Rating 4.4 and integrated plant procedures during SRO all modes of plant operation.

Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 34 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-010-006, Outage Operations COLR

==

Description:==

The applicant will be required to review a calculation for the amount of pure water that can be added to the refueling cavity in accordance with OP-010-006, Outage Operations. To perform this calculation the applicant will need to determine what the Refueling Minimum Boron concentration is from Tech Specs. The results will indicate that 1413 gallons of PMU may be added to the refuel cavity instead of the 1500 gallons indicated on the reviewed attachment.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue sheet, and then give the cue sheet and student handout to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 35 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Do not use Simulator data for this JPM INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Waterford 3 is in a refueling outage.

Reactor engineering has determined that a boron concentration of 1985 ppm is required to maintain the refuel cavity at a Keff of < .95.

Refueling Cavity Water Level is 24 ft. and will be drained to 22 ft.

Refueling Cavity boron concentration is 2090 ppm.

INITIATING CUES:

RP has requested that the refuel cavity walls be washed down with PMU as level in the refueling cavity is lowered to 22 ft.

The CRS is to review the calculation for determining refueling minimum boron concentration per TS 3.9.1 and the performance OP-010-006, Attachment 9.24 Refueling Cavity Boron concentration. IF necessary, correct any problems found on .24.

Revision 0 Page 36 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Note:

(4) This attachment provides guidance for calculating the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity without dilution to below shutdown margin requirements. This is typically used while Radiation Protection is using CMU to wash down the Refuel Cavity walls to mitigate airborne radioactivity while Note reviewed.

performing Refuel Cavity drain down.

(5) This calculation is only valid for water additions while the Refuel Cavity Water Level is > 20 MSL.

(6) This calculation includes a 50% margin.

SAT / UNSAT 9.24.1 Record the following:

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Final Refuel Cavity Water Level (Lf): value input verified Comment:

Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Initial Refuel Cavity Boron Concentration (Ci) value input verified Comment:

Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 0 Page 37 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD Refueling Minimum Boron Concentration (Cf) 2050 ppm Comment: Critical Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT The applicant will determine that 2050 ppm is the most restrictive requirement per TS 3.9.1.

The attachment being reviewed has 1985 ppm entered as the refueling minimum boron concentration. 1985 ppm is the reactor engineering boron concentration to maintain Keff < .95. TS 3.9.1 requires the most restrictive of 2050 ppm or the boron concentration to maintain Keff < .95 as the refueling minimum boron concentration. In this case, the most restrictive boron concentration is 2050 ppm.

TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 9.24.2 Calculate the amount of pure water that may be added to the Refuel Cavity (Vw) using the following formula:

Vw = (6954 gal/ft x Lf-79,161 gal) x (1- Cf/Ci) 1402 to 1476 gallons Vw = [( 6954x___ ft) - 79,161]x [1-(___ppm/___ppm)]

Vw=____gallons Comment: Critical The attachment being reviewed would have an error carried forward if SAT / UNSAT 1985 ppm is used as the minimum required boron concentration.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 9.24.3 Select the lower of Vw calculated in Step 9.24.2 or 1500 gallons: 1402 to 1476 gallons Comment: Critical Refer to A6 Key.

SAT / UNSAT The attachment being reviewed would have an error carried forward if 1985 ppm is used as the minimum required boron concentration.

Revision 0 Page 38 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 9.24.4 SM/CRS designate the allowable amount of pure water to add to the Refuel Cavity by specifying an amount that is < amount specified in Less than or equal to the Step 9.24.3. number calculated in step 9.24.2 SM/CRS designated allowable pure water limit to add to cavity:

Comment: Critical Refer to A1 Key.

SAT / UNSAT The CRS may desire to limit the amount specified in step 9.24.3.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 39 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS There is no Simulator setup for this JPM Revision 0 Page 40 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A7 Review of Containment Pressure Calculation Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM A7 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Review of Containment pressure calculation Task Standard: Reviews Containment pressure calculation in accordance with OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs.

References:

OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 2.2.12 Knowledge of Surveillance Importance Rating 4.1 procedures SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 42 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A7 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

1. OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs

2. Copy of Attachment 11.15, Containment Pressure Calculation (performed by the ATC)

3. Calculator

==

Description:==

Applicant verifies Containment pressure calculation performed by the ATC.

READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 43 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A7 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Containment pressure reduction was secured during the previous shift.

Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A51000).

Barometric Pressure is reading is 29.44 INHG as indicated on the (PMC Point C48516).

INITIATING CUES:

Verify the containment pressure calculation performed by the ATC using OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs and identify any TS actions required, if any.

Revision 0 Page 44 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A7 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 11.15.1 Barometric Pressure as measured by PMC (PID C48516). If local reading used, then add 0.05 INHG to obtain a value equivalent to Met Tower PMC point. BP=___________ INHG Verified 29.44 entered.

11.15.1.2 Record M&TE data on TS Logs Remarks and WR, if applicable Comment:

Applicant should not add .05 INHG because the PMC is operable. If he SAT / UNSAT adds .05 INHG, the final value of this calculation will be greater than the TS limit.

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 11.15.2 Containment to Ambient Differential Pressure Verified -5.4 entered (PMC PID-A51000) C/A=____________ INWC Comment:

Value is from initial conditions SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 11.15.3 Convert Barometric Pressure (BP) from INHG to PSIA by performing the following:

Verified BP (PSIA) in the BP(PSIA) = [BP(INHG) x 0.4912 PSIA/INHG]

range of 14.46 to 14.461.

BP(PSIA) = [______________ INHG x 0.4912 PSIA/INHG]

BP(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Comment:

14.46 is rounded from 14.460928.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 11.15.4 Convert Containment to Ambient Differential pressure (C/A) from INWC to PSIA by performing the following:

Recognize the wrong C/A(PSIA) = [CA(INWC) x 0.0361 PSIA/INWC]

number inserted C/A(PSIA) = [______________ INWC x 0.0361 PSIA/INWC]

C/A(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Comment: Critical

-.195 is rounded from -.19494.

SAT / UNSAT The applicant should indentify that a positive number has been inserted and calculated for this step. The number is correct but the value should be negative. If this error is not identified, the final value of this calculation will be greater than the TS limit.

Revision 0 Page 45 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A7 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 11.15.5 Calculate Absolute Containment Internal Pressure (CP) by Recognized the error performing the following: carried forward from the CP(PSIA) = BP(PSIA) + C/A(PSIA) previous step. Corrected CP(PSIA) = ______________ PSIA + _______________ PSIA value should be 14.265 (14.26-14.27)

CP(PSIA) = _______________ PSIA Comment: Critical CP(PSIA) should be 14.265 when corrected. This number is less than SAT / UNSAT TS.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD The applicant should identify the corrected value is less than the Identified corrected value is Technical Specification 3.6.14 limit for containment pressure (14.275 less than 14.275 PSIA and PSIA) and the actions for Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 are required. TS 3.6.1.4 entry required Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 46 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM A7 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS None Revision 0 Page 47 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A8 Authorize Emergency Exposure as the Emergency Coordinator Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM A8 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Authorize Emergency Exposure as the Emergency Director Task Standard: Correctly determines that authorization is not appropriate

References:

EP-002-030, Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits Importance Rating 3.7 under normal or emergency conditions. SRO Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 49 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A8 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EP-002-030, Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 50 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A8 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITONS:

You are the Emergency Coordinator. The following conditions exist:

A stuck valve must be operated in a high radiation area with dose rates of 45 REM/Hour.

The job will take 15 minutes.

The only available person to do this task is Joe Tallard, SSN # 111-22-3333, Badge # 0101, with Operations.

Radiation Protection has reported that they can take no action to reduce the dose rate.

INITIATING CUE:

Evaluate authorizing Emergency Exposure as Emergency Director.

Document all work and results on this sheet.

Revision 0 Page 51 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A8 TASK ELEMENT STANDARD Candidate determines that emergency exposure limit of 10 REM TEDE would be Emergency Director reviews EP-002-030, Emergency Exposure exceeded (actual Guidelines & Controls, and authorizes emergency exposure if criteria is calculation would be 11.25 met. REM TEDE) and does not authorize emergency exposure.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Candidate may state that he could authorize Emergency Exposure if the job could be split between two personnel.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 52 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE A9 Determine Protective Action Recommendations Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM A9 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Determine protective action recommendations Task Standard: Satisfactorily uses Attachment 7.2, Protective Action Guidelines Worksheet Release Occurring, to determine Protective Action Recommendations for the given conditions.

References:

EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: No K/A 2.4.44, Knowledge of emergency plan Importance Rating 4.4 protective action recommendations. SRO Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 0 Page 54 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A9 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

Each administrative JPM has a cue sheet with the instructions for that JPM. Each administrative JPM stands alone, and conditions from 1 JPM do not carry over to any other JPM. If you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come to your desk.

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

(Read the Initial Condition and Cues from the colored Applicant Cue Sheet, and then give the cue sheet and student handout to the applicant.)

Revision 0 Page 55 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A9 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Provide all answers on the sheets provided.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You are the Emergency Director.

A release is in progress following a LOCA with a failed containment penetration.

You declared a General Emergency.

The following data is available for protective action recommendations:

Duration of release is unknown.

Wind Direction from 75°

The Field Teams have reported the following:

o EAB TEDE = 890 mr/hr o EAB CDE Thyroid = 4800 mr/hr o 2 Mile TEDE = 501 mr/hr o 2 Mile CEDE Thyroid = 2485 mr/hr o 5 Mile TEDE = 98 mr/hr o 5 Mile CEDE Thyroid = 1410 mr/hr INITIATING CUE:

Determine Protective Action Recommendations based on available data in accordance with EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines.

Revision 0 Page 56 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM A9 TASK ELEMENT STANDARD Candidate should recommend evacuating areas A1, B1, C1, D1, and Determine Protective Action Recommendations based on available data C2. Candidate should in accordance with EP-002-052, Protective Action Guidelines. recommend sheltering all other protective response areas.

Comment: Critical Candidate should multiply dose rate by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (requirement for releases SAT / UNSAT of unknown duration) and determine areas to evacuate. All other areas should be sheltered.

END OF TASK Revision 0 Page 57 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S1 Securing Emergency Boration Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S1 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Secure Emergency Boration in accordance with step 7 of OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.

Task Standard: Applicant secured Emergency Boration and performed a flush of one standby charging pump per step 7 of OP-901-103 without tripping the running Charging Pump.

References:

OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, revision 2 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 004 A4.07 Boration/Dilution Importance Rating 3.9/3.7 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 59 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-901-103, Emergency Boration

==

Description:==

The applicant will perform step 7 of OP-901-103, securing Emergency Boration.

This task secures Emergency Boration and aligns the suction source of the Charging Pumps to the Volume Control Tank. All manipulations occur at CP-4. If an applicant does not follow the procedure sequence properly and trips the running Charging Pump, then that applicant would fail this task.

The plant will be emergency borating using the Boric Acid Make-up Pumps.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3 The plant has been shutdown for 3 days

The plant is Emergency Borating due to an uncontrolled positive reactivity addition

The uncontrolled positive reactivity addition has been terminated and Emergency Boration termination criteria are met

The Standby Charging Pump Seal Packages have been running for 30 minutes and an AO is standing by INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to secure Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, step 7 Revision 1 Page 60 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD

7. When Emergency Boration termination criteria (Step 6) are met, then Applicant continues on with secure Emergency Boration by performing the following: the procedure.

Comment:

Termination criteria is met as given in the initial conditions SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 7.1 Place VCT Disch Valve, CVC-183, control switch to AUTO and verify CVC-183 is open.

valve opens Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Boric Acid Pumps are 7.2 Stop both Boric Acid Pumps.

stopped.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT BAM Pump B is the critical element.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.3 Verify the following valves closed:

CVC-507 RWSP to Charging Pumps All valves in step are BAM-133 Emergency Boration Valve closed.

BAM-113A Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve A BAM-113B Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve B Comment: Critical BAM-133 will need to be closed. Other valves are not critical. because SAT / UNSAT they are already in the correct position Revision 1 Page 61 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.4 Open the following valves:

BAM-126A Boric Acid Makeup Pump A Recirc Valve BAM-126A and B are open.

BAM-126B Boric Acid Makeup Pump B Recirc Valve Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT BAM-126B is the Critical Task because it is the only one that is closed.

Evaluator Note Inform the candidate that the CRS directs him to start Charging Pump AB first to flush boric acid out of the pump.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD At least one standby 7.5 Operate each Charging Pump for at least 5 minutes to flush Charging Pump is concentrated boric acid out of pump.

operated.

Comment: The candidate may use OP-002-005 to swap charging Critical pumps. Task elements 7 through 20 are the steps in OP-002-005, Charging and Letdown System, for swapping charging pumps. SAT / UNSAT Time compression used for operation of each charging pump.

EVALUATOR CUE: After the applicant starts Charging Pump AB, cue the candidate that 5 minutes has elapsed.

TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD Procdure Note The Charging Pump Seal System should be operated for at least 30 Reviewed the Note minutes prior to starting the Charging Pump.

Comment:

The seal package has been running for 30 minutes as indicated in the SAT / UNSAT initial conditions.

EVALUATOR CUE: If the candidate calls the RCA watch to verify the seal package running for 30 minutes, then inform him that all seal water pumps have been running for at least 30 minutes.

Revision 1 Page 62 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 6.2.1 At SM/CRS discretion, verify readiness for operation of each Charging Pump to be started as follows:

Verify crankcase oil level 1/2 in bulls eye.

Verify gear reducer oil level between low and high marks on dipstick.

Flush debris and fines from packing seal water system as follows:

A. Place Seal Water Pump A(B)(AB) control switch to ON.

B. Open Charging Pump A(B, AB) Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB). Candidate communicates with the RCA to verify C. If packing cooling tank level continues to lower Charging Pump AB ready after makeup begins, then prior to tank level for a start.

lowering below the bottom of the sight glass, Throttle Closed Charging Pump A(B, AB)

Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB), as necessary to maintain packing cooling tank level visible but 1/2 in sightglass.

D. After flushing the packing cooling tank for at least three minutes, then Close Charging Pump A(B, AB) Packing Cooling Sump Drain, CVC-704A(B, AB).

E. Verify packing cooling tank water level 1/2 in sightglass.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: When the candidate calls the RCA watch to SAT / UNSAT perform step 6.1, inform the candidate that step 6.1 is complete and Charging Pump AB is ready for a start.

Revision 1 Page 63 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD Procedure Note The purpose of securing the Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank is to minimize the impact of the Charging Pump start on Pressurizer pressure. Note reviewed If the first pump is secured shortly (within approximately one minute) after starting the second pump or PZR boron equalization is in progress, then this step is not necessary when swapping Charging pumps.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.2.2 At SM/CRS discretion, if a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank is operating, then secure the Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank Step communicated with by placing control switch in AUTO. the CRS.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, Inform the candidate that securing a SAT / UNSAT pressurizer backup heater is not desired.

TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD Procedure Caution (1) TO MINIMIZE THERMAL SHOCK OF CHARGING NOZZLES, ONLY ONE CHARGING PUMP SHOULD BE STARTED AT A TIME. Caution reviewed (2) EXTREME CAUTION SHALL BE USED WHEN STARTING ADDITIONAL CHARGING PUMPS WITH THE PRESSURIZER SOLID. EXCESSIVE RCS PRESSURIZATION COULD RESULT.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.2.3 Start desired Charging Pump A(B)(AB) by placing control Charging Pump AB control switch(es) to ON. switch in ON.

Revision 1 Page 64 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.2.4 Verify Seal Water Pump operating for the Charging Pump Seal Water Pump AB A(B)(AB) started and Place Seal Water Pump A(B)(AB) control control switch has been switch in AUTO returned to auto.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that the seal water pump for Charging Pump AB is running.

When the candidate directs the RCA watch to place the Seal Water Pump for Charging Pump AB to auto, inform him that the Seal Water Pump for Charging Pump AB is in auto.

TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.2.5 If Charging Pump A(B)(AB) started will remain in service as Step reviewed Standby Charging Pump(s), then go to Step 6.2.9.

Comment:: Charging Pump AB will remain in service and Charging Pump B will be secured. Therefore, the applicant will continue to Step 6.2.6. SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that Charging Pump AB will be the lead pump.

TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 6.2.6 Secure desired Charging Pump A(B)(AB) by placing control Charging Pumps A and B switch(es) to OFF. control switches are taken to OFF.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 65 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD Procedure Note If there is an Inoperable Charging Pump, then at SM/CRS discretion the Standby Charging Pumps selector switch may be aligned so that Note reviewed the Operable Backup Charging Pump will be the first one selected for auto starting capability.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 6.2.8 Verify Standby Charging Pumps selector switch in the appropriate Position for the Charging Pump started (Pump in Lead) per Table 6.2.8.

TABLE 6.2.8 Selector switch should be selected to the AB as lead PUMP IN LEAD POSITION pump (A-B position)

B AB - A A B - AB AB A-B Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 6.2.9 Place control switch(es) for Standby Charging Pump Charging Pumps A and B A(B)(AB) to AUTO. control switches are returned to auto.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 66 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD 6.2.10 Place Pump AB Assignment switch to the appropriate Position for the Charging Pump A(B)(AB) to be Assigned to Trip on SIAS, per Table 6.2.10.

TABLE 6.2.10 ASSIGNED TO TRIP ON SIAS POSITION Step reviewed A A AB NORM B B Comment:: The switch does not require manipulation since no Charging Pumps are out of service.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 20 STANDARD 6.2.11 If a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank was secured in step 6.2.2, then restore a Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank to operation by placing control switch to ON. Step reviewed.

Comment:: No action required for this step since none of the heaters were taken to auto for task element 10.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 67 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-199

2. Verify Emergency Boration aligned per OP-901-103 using Boric Acid Pumps

3. There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

Revision 1 Page 68 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S1 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 3 The plant has been shutdown for 3 days

The plant is Emergency Borating due to an uncontrolled positive reactivity addition

The uncontrolled positive reactivity addition has been terminated and Emergency Boration termination criteria are met

The Standby Charging Pump Seal Packages have been running for 30 minutes and an AO is standing by INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to secure Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, step 7 Revision 1 Page 69 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S2 Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S2 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection aligned for Trains A and B per OP-902-009, Appendix 15.

Task Standard: Applicant aligned Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15.

References:

OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, revision 14 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 006 A4.07, ECCS pumps and valves Importance Rating 4.4/4.4 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 71 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15, Hot and Cold Leg Injection.

==

Description:==

This JPM occurs during a Loss of Coolant Accident. The applicant will receive direction to align simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Safety Injection. All manipulations will occur at CP-8.

Applicant must obtain keys for the valves manipulated in this JPM at the NPO Desk.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A Loss of Coolant Accident occurred 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ago

The crew has entered OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery

The conditions exist that require alignment of hot and cold leg injection per step 47, Hot and Cold Leg Injection

You are the BOP operator INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to establish Hot and Cold Leg Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15 Revision 1 Page 72 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 1.1 Establish simultaneous Hot and Cold leg injection for Train A by performing the following:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 1.1.a Close SI-219A, HPSI HEADER ORIFICE BYPASS valve. SI-219A is closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.1.b Open SI-502A, HOT LEG 1 INJECTION ISOLATION valve. SI-502A is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.1.c Open SI-506A, HOT LEG 1 INJECTION FLOW CONTROL valve. SI-506A is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 73 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 1.2 Establish simultaneous Hot and Cold leg injection for Train B by performing the following:

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 1.2.a Close SI-219B, HPSI HEADER ORIFICE BYPASS valve. SI-219B is closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 1.2.b Open SI-502B, HOT LEG 2 INJECTION ISOLATION valve. SI-502B is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.2.c Open SI-506B, HOT LEG 2 INJECTION FLOW CONTROL valve. SI-506B is open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 74 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD The sum of all cold leg 1.3 WHEN hot and cold leg injection has been established, THEN adjust flows is approximately SI-506 A and SI-506 B to obtain the sum of ALL cold leg flows equal to equal to the sum of the hot the sum of the hot leg flows.

leg flows.

Comment:

Applicant can obtain Hot and Cold Leg flows from either the PMC, the SAT / UNSAT meters on CP-8, or QSPDS.

Due to the flow balance that is performed on these valves each outage flow balance between Hot and Cold Leg injection will be close. The candidate may not adjust flow. They should however, verify the flows.

END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 75 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-198 Place the Simulator in Run on the lead examiners cue.

Revision 1 Page 76 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S2 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A Loss of Coolant Accident occurred 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ago

The crew has entered OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery

The conditions exist that require alignment of hot and cold leg injection per step 47, Hot and Cold Leg Injection

You are the BOP operator INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to establish Hot and Cold Leg Injection in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 15 Revision 1 Page 77 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S3 OP-902-009, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S3 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform OP-902-009 Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control.

Task Standard: Applicant completed OP-902-009 Appendix 25 and restored Pressurizer backup and proportional heaters to service.

References:

OP-902-009 Appendix 25, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 mins.

K/A 010 A4.02 Pzr Heaters Importance Rating 3.6, 3.4 RO/SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 79 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S3 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009 Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control, revision 307

==

Description:==

The applicant will perform OP-902-009 Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control. This task restores Pressurizer Heaters to service following a SIAS. All manipulations occur at CP-1 and CP-2. If an applicant does not restore all Pressurizer heaters to service, then that applicant would fail this task.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITION:

The plant is shutdown following an Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control.

Revision 1 Page 80 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S3 Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Note Pressurizer heaters can NOT be restored with a LOOP concurrent with a Note reviewed.

SIAS.

Comment:

Only a SIAS will be initiated.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.1 Verify pressurizer level is greater than 33%. Level verified.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.2 Monitor EDG loading to ensure EDG does not exceed 4 MW. Step reviewed Comment: CP-1 The EDGs will be running but not connected to the safety busses. No SAT / UNSAT LOOP has occurred.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD Verifies 200 Second Block 1.3 Check SEQUENCER has timed out for each energized safety bus. illuminated for both Sequencers Comment: CP-1 SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 81 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S3 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD A32 FEEDER breaker 1.4 Close SST A32 FEEDER breaker.

closed.

Comment: CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD B32 FEEDER breaker 1.5 Close SST B32 FEEDER breaker.

closed.

Comment: CP-1 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD Both Proportional Heater Bank control switches 1.6 Place PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS control switches to ON taken to ON and Proportional Heaters are energized.

Comment: CP-2 Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD All Backup Heater Bank 1.7 Momentarily place each BACKUP HEATER BANKS control switches control switches taken to to OFF and then to AUTO. OFF and then to AUTO or ON.

Comment: CP-2 Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 82 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-197 Verify SIAS is initiated and both Sequencers are timed out.

There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

Revision 1 Page 83 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S3 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITION:

The plant is shutdown following an Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 25, Restore Pressurizer Heater Control.

Revision 1 Page 84 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S4 Place Shutdown Cooling Train A in Service Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Place Shutdown Cooling Train A in Service Task Standard: Applicant correctly performed the identified critical steps for placing Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005 and secured Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A after SI-405A fails closed.

References:

OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, revision 31 OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, revision 302 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No Validation Time: 20 mins.

K/A 005 A4.01, Controls and indication for RHR Importance Rating 3.6 / 3.4 pumps RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision1 Page 86 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, revision 302

==

Description:==

This task is performed at CP-8. The applicant must place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service. The fault in this task is that SI-405A, RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Inside Containment Isol, will fail closed, requiring the applicant to secure Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A. The task can be stopped after LPSI Pump A is secured.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 4

Protected Train is A

RCS temperature is 280 °F

RCS pressure is 340 PSIA

RCS boron concentration is 2027 ppm

SDC Train A suction penetration piping has been manually vented

Shutdown Cooling Train A has been placed in Standby in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, section 5.3 INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, Section 6.1 Revision1 Page 87 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD Procedure Caution:

THE FOLLOWING SECTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT Caution reviewed.

CORE REACTIVITY Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Note: The Shutdown Cooling Train placed in service Note reviewed.

should be on the Protected Train.

Comment:

Protected Train is A as given in initial conditions. SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Procedure Caution:

FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS TORNADO EVENT, DELAYING THE INITIATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) FOR UP TO 7 DAYS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING Caution reviewed.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DECAY HEAT. THE ACTUAL DELAY TIME WILL DEPEND ON UHS DAMAGE AND AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND WILL BE DETERMINED BY ENGINEERING.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SUPPORTS DECAY HEAT REMOVAL UNTIL SDC CAN BE INITIATED.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 6.1.1: Verify Shutdown Cooling Train A has been aligned to Standby Notes Section 5.3 is complete condition in accordance with Section 5.3, Alignment of and continues in procedure.

Shutdown Cooling Train A to Standby Condition.

Comment:

Cue sheet lists this as complete. SAT / UNSAT Revision1 Page 88 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 6.1.2: Verify sufficient number of Dry Cooling Tower Fans running to Continues in procedure after accept increased heat load on CCW System. cue.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate to leave the Dry SAT / UNSAT Cooling Tower Fans in automatic and allow Auxiliary Component Cooling Water to pick up the heat load.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD Procedure Caution:

CC-963A IS REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINED OPEN WHILE IN MODE 4 TO PRESERVE THE DESIGN TEMPERATURE BASIS OF PIPING AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS AT THE CCW OUTLET Caution reviewed.

OF SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A. WITH CC-963A OPEN, FLOW THROUGH SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER A WILL BE MAINTAINED ABOVE 2305 GPM.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 6.1.3: Place Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control CC-963 A is open.

switch to Open.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision1 Page 89 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD Procedure Caution:

(1) The following Reactor Coolant System limits shall be met for Shutdown Cooling Entry:

RCS temperature limit: < 350 °F

RCS pressure limit: < 392 psia

If Containment harsh environment conditions (>200°F) have Caution reviewed.

been exceeded then RCS pressure limit: <358 Psia (2) If Containment Spray Header A Isolation, CS-125 A, is open while Shutdown Cooling Train A is operating, then Containment Spray A riser may fill and possibly spray water into Containment, due to leakage past Containment Spray Pump A discharge stop check, CS-117A.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD Procedure Caution: To minimize the effect of air introduction to a LPSI pump, the piping between SI-405A AND SI-407A should be Caution reviewed.

placed in-service with one of the following conditions:

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.1.4: Verify RC Loop 2 SDC suction piping meets one of the following conditions:

The SDC Train is placed in-service with RCS pressure > 100 PSIA by PMC indication (PIDs A12203, A12204, A12222) or

> 110 PSIA by board indication (RC-IPI0103,-0104,-0105,- One of the conditions is 0106). verified. Cue sheet lists SDC or Train A suction penetration The SDC Trains suction penetration has been manually has been manually vented.

vented.

or The SDC Train was previously in-service since the unit has been shutdown.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT Revision1 Page 90 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 6.1.5: Unlock and Open RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside SI-407 A is open.

Containment Isol, SI-407A.

Comment: Critical Key 133 required.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.1.6: Notify Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Call is made.

Train A is being placed in service.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.1.7: Start LPSI Pump A. LPSI Pump A is started.

Comment: Critical Annunciator LPSI Pump A Flow Lost (Cabinet M, F-3) is expected. It will clear when the applicant raises flow > 2900 gpm. SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 6.1.8: Raise Shutdown Cooling flow by Manually adjusting LPSI Header Flow controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, output until Shutdown Cooling Header A Flow indicates 4100 GPM, as Flow is raised to ~ 4100 GPM.

indicated by RC Loop 2 Shdn Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD Setpoint potentiometer is ~

6.1.9: Adjust LPSI Header Flow Controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, 73%, and controller is in setpoint potentiometer to 73%, and place controller to AUTO.

AUTO Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision1 Page 91 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 6.1.10: Verify LPSI Header Flow Controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, is maintaining 4100 GPM Shutdown Cooling Header A flow, as Flow is verified.

indicated by RC Loop 2 Shdn Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD Procedure note: If a sample was drawn prior to shutdown and no interim shutdown has occurred where SDC was placed in service and Note reviewed.

boron concentration could have been reduced, then sampling is not required.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 6.1.11: At SM/CRS discretion, direct Chemistry Department to sample Shutdown Cooling Train A for boron concentration.

Determines that boron 6.1.11.1 When Chemical Analysis results indicate that concentration meets the Shutdown Cooling Train A boron concentration is greater than requirement.

Reactor Coolant boron concentration or >2050 ppm (required for Mode 6), then proceed to next step.

Comment:

EVALUATOR CUE: When requested, inform the applicant that SAT / UNSAT Shutdown Cooling Train A boron concentration is 2060 ppm. RCS boron concentration is in the initial conditions and is 2027 ppm.

TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD Procedure Note: Shutdown Cooling Train A requires one operable Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve for the train to be Note reviewed.

operable.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT Revision1 Page 92 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 TASK ELEMENT 20 STANDARD Procedure Caution: The Reactor Coolant System shall not exceed the Caution reviewed.

100 °F per hour cooldown rate of Technical Specification 3.4.8.1.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the applicant that the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs.

6.1.12 Raise Shutdown Cooling Train A temperature to within 100 °F of Reactor Coolant Hot temperature as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 21 STANDARD 6.1.12.1: Open the following valves:

SI-139 A and SI-138 A are

SI-139A LPSI Header to RC Loop 2A Flow Control open.

SI-138A LPSI Header to RC Loop 2B Flow Control Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 22 STANDARD 6.1.12.2: Throttle Closed RC Loop 2 Shdn Cooling Warmup, SI-135A, until one of the following is within 100°F of Shutdown Cooling Train A temperature, as indicated by LPSI Pump A Discharge Header Temperature Indicator, SI-ITI-0351X:

Hot Leg 2 temperature, as indicated by RC Loop 2 Temperature is within 100 °F Hot Leg Temperature Indicator, RC-ITI-0122-HA or Hot Leg 1 temperature, as indicated by RC Loop 1 Hot Leg Temperature Indicator, RC-ITI-0122-HB Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT SI-135 A is a large gate valve with a very long stroke.

TASK ELEMENT 23 STANDARD 6.1.12.3: Close RC Loop 2 Shdn Cooling Warmup, SI-135 A. SI-135 A is closed Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Evaluator Note Coordinate with the simulator operator to initiate trigger 1 to close SI-405 A five seconds after SI-135A closes.

Revision1 Page 93 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 Evaluator Note The following step represents the alternate path portion of the JPM.

TASK ELEMENT 24 STANDARD Secure LPSI Pump A LPSI Pump A is off.

Comment: Critical This is an immediate operator action in accordance with OP-901-131, SAT / UNSAT Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, section D.1.

END OF TASK Revision1 Page 94 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-195 Verify the following Malfunctions:

SI23A for SI-405A on Trigger 1 Coordinate with the examiner so that when SI-135 A is fully closed at step 6.1.11.3 for 5 seconds, initiate event Trigger 1 to close SI-405A. (Use Extreme View to monitor SI-135A position)

Revision1 Page 95 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S4 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is in Mode 4

Protected Train is A

RCS temperature is 280 °F

RCS pressure is 340 PSIA

RCS boron concentration is 2027 ppm

SDC Train A suction penetration piping has been manually vented

Shutdown Cooling Train A has been placed in Standby in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, section 5.3 INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place Shutdown Cooling Train A in service in accordance with OP-009-005, Shutdown Cooling, Section 6.1 Revision1 Page 96 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S5 Balance of Plant Operator Immediate Operator Actions on Control Room Evacuation Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S5 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform balance of plant operators immediate operator action on Control Room evacuation with fire conditions.

Task Standard: Applicant performed immediate operator actions for BOP position for a fire in the Control Room in accordance with OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

Applicant manually tripped the turbine due the turbine failing to trip on a Reactor trip. Applicant placed Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 in manual and lowered output to zero due to Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 spuriously opening.

References:

OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown, Revision 22 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No Validation Time: 5 mins.

K/A 039 A4.01 Main Steam Supply Valves Importance Rating 2.9 / 2.8 RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 98 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S5 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

None

==

Description:==

The applicant will be cued that there is a fire in CP-33. The CRS will direct him to carry out his immediate operator actions as BOP operator. The main turbine will not trip when the reactor is tripped. The applicant will be required to manually trip the main turbine using the turbine trip buttons. Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 will spuriously open requiring Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 controller to be placed in manual and output lowered to zero. The task will end when the applicant obtains a key ring and communicates his intention to proceed to the RAB +35 Relay room.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at 100% power

A fire has started in CP-33

The CRS has entered OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown

The At-The-Controls Operator will perform his immediate operator actions

You are the Balance of Plant Operator INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform the BOP immediate operator actions for OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

Revision 1 Page 99 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S5 Evaluator Note Cue the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in RUN and initiate Trigger 1.

Evaluator Note The Alternate Path becomes applicable when the applicant addresses the turbine not tripping on a Reactor Trip.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 2.1 Verify Turbine trip:

Governor valves Closed Turbine tripped.

Throttle valves Closed Comment: Critical The applicant will trip the turbine using the trip buttons at CP-1 SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 2.2 Verify Generator trip:

Exciter Field Breaker Tripped Verification complete.

Generator Breaker A Tripped

Generator Breaker B Tripped Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD RESET pushbutton depressed and 2.3 RESET Moisture Separator Reheater controls.

Temperature Control Valves are closed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 100 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S5 2.4 IF evacuating the Control Room due to fire, THEN perform the following:

Evaluator Note The second Alternate Path becomes applicable when the applicant addresses MS-116A SG 1 Atmospheric Dump spuriously opening.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 2.4.1 IF EITHER of the following valves has spuriously Opened, THEN MS-116A verified operating place the applicable controller(s) in MANUAL AND lower the output properly.

to zero: MS-116B controller in MS-116A SG 1 Atmospheric Dump Manual and output lowered MS-116B SG 2 Atmospheric Dump (critical path) to zero.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 2.4.2 Close the following valves:

MS-124A & MS-124B are MS-124A Main Steam Isol Valve #1 closed.

MS-124B Main Steam Isol Valve #2 Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 2.5 Obtain Operations Security Key Ring AND proceed to RAB +35 Keys obtained.

Relay Room.

Comment:

The examinee should obtain a Key Locker key from the Key locker on SAT / UNSAT left side of the Control Room Desk and simulate getting key from the locker in the Shift Managers Office represented by the photo posted in the SM office.

END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 101 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-196

1. Set Trigger 1 to actuate on Rx Tripped

2. Verify the following Malfunctions:

RP03 - ACTIVE

MS23B - 0 PSIG with a 10 Second Ramp on Trigger 1 Revision 1 Page 102 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S5 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is at 100% power

A fire has started in CP-33

The CRS has entered OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown

The At-The-Controls Operator will perform his immediate operator actions

You are the Balance of Plant Operator INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform the BOP immediate operator actions for OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown.

Revision 1 Page 103 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S6 Perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check Candidate:

Examiner:

JPM S6 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check Task Standard: Candidate correctly completed the identified critical tasks of OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check.

References:

OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check, revision 5 OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System, revision 301 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 022 A4.01 CCS Fans Importance Rating 3.6/3.6 RO/SRO Candidate:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 105 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check, revision 5 OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System, revision 301

==

Description:==

This task is performed at CP-18. The candidate must perform surveillance OP-903-037, which will require logging differential pressure for the 3 running fans. The candidate will then have to secure a running Containment Cooling Fan and start Containment Cooling Fan D, at which time the data for CCS Fan D can be recorded.

The candidate should then leave the CCS Fans in an alignment with A, B, and D running, as specified in OP-903-037.

READ TO CANDIDATE DIRECTION TO CANDIDATE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 3 INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check.

Align the final Containment Fan Cooler configuration for the month of October.

Revision 1 Page 106 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 7.1 Record differential pressure (DP) and CCW flow rate for operating Values are recorded on Att. 1.

CFC units on Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD Procedure Note: Attachment 10.2, Run Time Equalization Schedule Determine correct alignment Sheet, should be referenced in determining which CFC operating for the month of October.

unit(s) is secured.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD Procedure Caution: To prevent vibration alarms, and damage to containment cooling unit duct work, limit configuration to only three (3) Caution reviewed of four (4) units operating at a time.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 7.2 Adjust CFC operating unit configuration to operate idle CFC CCS Fan C is off and CCS unit(s). Fan D is running.

Comment:

Evaluator: This is written for the candidate to secure CCS Fan C, which is the most reasonable fan for him to stop. It is acceptable for SAT / UNSAT the candidate to secure CCS Fan A or B at this point. This would require the candidate to maneuver fans later in the task to leave fans A, B, and D running.

The applicant will use OP-008-003 to first secure a CCS fan and then to start a CCS fan. Task elements 5-6 are for securing a CCS fan.

Task elements 7-14 are for starting a CCS fan.

Revision 1 Page 107 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 7.1 Securing Containment Fan Coolers TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 7.1 1 Stop desired Containment Fan Coolers (CFC), from CP-18, by placing Fan Cooler A(B)(C)(D) control switch CCS-0003 One CCS fan is secured A(B)(C)(D) to Stop.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 7.1 2 Verify at CP-18, that Component Cooling Water Inlet and Outlet Valves for all secured Containment Fan Coolers are Closed.

CFC VALVES A Inlet CC-808A Outlet CC-822A Inlet and Outlet valves closed B Inlet CC-807B Outlet CC-823B C Inlet CC-807A Outlet CC-823A D Inlet CC-808B Outlet CC-822B SAT / UNSAT 6.1 Starting Containment Fan Coolers TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD Procedure Note Note reviewed Normal Containment Cooling System Configuration in modes 1-4 is three (3) Containment Fan Coolers operating and one (1) in standby.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 108 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD Procedure Caution TO PREVENT VIBRATION ALARMS AND DAMAGE TO CONTAINMENT COOLING UNIT DUCT WORK, LIMIT Caution reviewed.

CONFIGURATION TO ONLY THREE (3) OF FOUR (4)

CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS OPERATING AT ONE TIME WHEN IN FAST SPEED.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 6.1.1 Start desired Containment Fan Coolers (CFC), from CP-18, by placing Fan Cooler A(B)(C)(D) control switch CCS-0003 A(B)(C)(D) to CCS fan started.

Start/ Fast.

Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 6.1.2 Verify at CP-18 that the Component Cooling Water Inlet and Outlet Valves Open for the in-service coolers:

CFC VALVES A Inlet CC-808A Outlet CC-822A B Inlet CC-807B Inlet And Outlet Valves open.

Outlet CC-823B C Inlet CC-807A Outlet CC-823A D Inlet CC-808B Outlet CC-822B SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 109 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD Procedure Note If Containment Fan Coolers are being started with slow speed Note reviewed.

jumpers installed for Containment cooling with Temporary Chilled Water, then steps 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 are not applicable.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 12 STANDARD 6.1.3 Check in-service Containment Fan Coolers A (B, C, D)

Verified proper differential differential pressures within expected range of 5.0 INWC to 8.0 pressure.

INWC, as indicated on CCS-IDPR-5154A(B).

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 13 STANDARD 6.1.4 Check Component Cooling Water flow is > 625 gpm as Verified proper flow.

indicated on CC-IFI-7570A(B).

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 14 STANDARD 7.4 When CFC unit(s) have operated for > 15 minutes, then record Attachment 10.1 data updated CFC unit(s) differential pressure for unit(s) started in Step 2, on for differential pressure.

Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet.

Perform Time Compression and state that the fan has been running Critical for > 15 minutes.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 15 STANDARD 7.5 Verify all four CFC units were operated and data recorded on Attachment 10.1 data updated Attachment 10.1, CFC Data Sheet. for all CCS Fans.

Critical Note: Only 2 fans will be operated. One will be secured and the non-SAT / UNSAT running fan will be started.

TASK ELEMENT 16 STANDARD 7.6 Verify each CFC Unit CCW flow rate is > 625 GPM Satisfactory flow rates verified.

Revision 1 Page 110 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 17 STANDARD 7.7 Refer to Attachment 10.2, Run Time Equalization Schedule Determine that CFC A, B and Sheet, to obtain CFC unit alignment for the upcoming month. D to be left running.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 18 STANDARD 7.8 Verify that CFC units are aligned as required on Attachment 10.1, CFC A, B and D running.

CFC Data Sheet.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 19 STANDARD Steps 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 0.1 of OP-903-037: completed and initialed.

Steps 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 completed and initialed.

The performed by line The performed by line signed.

signed.

SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 111 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-199 Verify CFC A, B, and C are running initially There are no malfunctions or overrides for this JPM.

Revision 1 Page 112 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

JPM S6 CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER TO UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITION:

Plant is in Mode 3 INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Check.

Align the final Containment Fan Cooler configuration for the month of October.

Revision 1 Page 113 of 289 NRC Exam 2012

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S7 Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power following a Station Blackout Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S7 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power following a Station Blackout.

Task Standard: The candidate restored power to the 1A and 2A busses from offsite power and then energized the 4.16 KV Safety Bus (3A bus) from offsite power

References:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-A: 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Restoration, revision 307 OP-902-009 Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power, revision 307 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 mins.

K/A 062 A4.01, All breakers (including available Importance Rating 3.3 / 3.1 switchyard) RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 115 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-A: 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Restoration, revision 307 OP-902-009 Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B: Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power, revision 307

==

Description:==

The JPM begins with the plant in a station blackout. The applicant will restore power to the 3A Safety Bus from offsite using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12-A and 12-B. Actions for this task take place at CP-1 and CP-8. (This JPM is a site specific priority as an operator action for preventing core damage)

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is performing actions in OP-902-005, Station Blackout.

Power to the Offsite Grid has been restored.

Lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3 has been reset.

The station blackout has been occurring for 30 minutes. All time critical actions required by OP-902-005, Station Blackout, have been completed.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to energize the A1 and A2 busses from offsite power and then energize the 3A bus in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12A and 12B.

Revision 1 Page 116 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 Evaluator Note When Applicant is ready, cue the simulator operator to place the simulator in RUN.

Task element 1-4 are applicable to OP-902-009 Appendix 12-A, 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV Nonsafety Bus Restoration 1.1 IF offsite power is available AND 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV nonsafety buses A1 and A2 are deenergized, THEN energize the 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV nonsafety buses as follows:

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD

a. Locally reset lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3. local relay reset Comment: The 86STA Lockout Relay has been RESET as indicated in the initial conditions.

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: If asked, inform the candidate that the 86STA Lockout Relay has been RESET.

TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD

b. Verify SUT A DISCONNECT closed. disconnect closed Comment: Critical Indication is in the control room on CP-1.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD

c. Verify loads have stripped from SWGR A1 and SWGR A2.

loads verified stripped Comment:

Verified in the field.

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee requests verification from the Auxiliary Operator, cue the examinee that all loads have stripped from Busses A1 and A2.

TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD

d. Place BUS A TRANSFER switch to SUT. Switch taken to SUT.

Comment: Critical Switch on CP-1 SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 117 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD

e. Locally reset lockout relays:

86A1/HR on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-2 relays reset 86A2/HR on 4KV-ESWGR-2A-2 Comment:

Relays are reset in the field.

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee requests the Auxiliary Operator reset the relays, cue the examinee that the 86A1/HR and 86A2/HR relays are reset.

Evaluator Note The following steps are applicable to OP-902-009, Appendix 12B, Energize 4.16KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power.

TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.1 IF containment pressure is less than 17.7 PSIA, THEN verify BOTH Both CS Pump control CS pump control switches are in OFF. switches are in OFF Comment: Critical Control switches are on CP-8.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.2 IF CCW flow to the RCP seals has been interrupted for greater than 10 minutes, THEN close the following valves:

CC 641, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP INLET OUTSIDE ISOL Required valves closed CC 710, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP OUTLET INSIDE ISOL CC 713, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RCP OUTLET OUTSIDE ISOL Comment: Critical Control switches on CP-8.

SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 118 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 1.3 IF DC Loads have been stripped per Appendix 7 THEN Open the following breakers prior to AC power restoration to 4.16 KV Safety 3 buses: Both breakers are open.

EGF-EBKR-312A-3F, EG A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump EGF-EBKR-312B-3F, EG B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Comment:

Performed in the field.

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: After the examinee communicates the task to the Auxiliary Operator, cue the examinee that both breakers are open.

1.4 IF 4.16KV nonsafety bus A2 energized AND the 4.16 KV safety bus A3 is deenergized, THEN perform the following:

TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD Verifies BUS A2 TO A3S

a. Verify BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR Open TIE BKR is open.

Comment:

Breaker switch and indication are on CP-1.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR

b. Close BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR is closed.

Comment: Critical Breaker switch is on CP-1.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR

c. Close BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR is closed.

Comment: Critical Breaker switches are on CP-1.

SAT / UNSAT EVALUATOR CUE: After the BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR is closed, cue the examinee that the task is complete.

END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 119 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-200.

2. Place Simulator in RUN and allow PMC initiation.

3. After PMC has completed initialization acknowledge all annunciators and place the Simulator in FREEZE.

4. Place the Simulator in RUN on the lead examiners cue.

Initial IC Setup

1. Reset to a MODE 3 IC.

2. Insert Malfunctions ED01A-D to ACTIVE.

3. Insert Malfunctions EG10A and EG10B to ACTIVE.

4. Insert Malfunction ED02C to ACTIVE.

5. Place Simulator in RUN.

6. Verify all Malfunctions are ACTIVE and the Simulator indicates Station Blackout conditions with SUT A isolated.

7. Remove Malfunctions ED01A-D and ED02C.

8. Set Remotes EDR01, EDR02, EDR50, and EDR51 to CLOSE.

9. Set Remotes EDR59A SWGR on Trigger 1.

10. Set Remote EDR59B to SWGR on Trigger 2.

11. Acknowledge Annunciators.

12. Place Simulator in Freeze.

13. Snap to the desired IC using current exam passwords for read and write protection.

Revision 1 Page 120 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S7 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is performing actions in OP-902-005, Station Blackout.

Power to the Offsite Grid has been restored.

Lockout relay 86STA handswitch on 7KV-ESWGR-1A-3 has been reset.

The station blackout has been occurring for 30 minutes. All time critical actions required by OP-902-005, Station Blackout, have been completed.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to energize the A1 and A2 busses from offsite power and then energize the 3A bus in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachments 12A and 12B.

Revision 1 Page 121 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Waterford 3 2012 NRC Exam JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S8 Reset Emergency Feedwater Actuation Applicant:

Examiner:

JPM S8 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATA PAGE Task: Reset Emergency Feedwater Actuation Task Standard: The candidate reset the EFAS actuation in accordance with OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C.

References:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, Revision 307 OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery, Revision 12 Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 mins.

012 A4.04, Bistable, trips, reset and test K/A Importance Rating 3.3 / 3.3 switches RO / SRO Applicant:

Time Start: Time Finish:

Performance Time: minutes Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Comments:

Examiner: Date:

Signature Revision 1 Page 123 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 EXAMINER COPY ONLY Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, revision 307

==

Description:==

The JPM begins after a Reactor trip on an Inadvertent Safety Injection. EFAS-1 and EFAS-2 are actuated. Steam Generator Levels are being controlled by Main Feedwater. The applicant will be directed to reset EFAS 1 and 2. Actions for this task take place at CP-7, CP-8 and CP-33.

DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Indicate to me when you understand your assigned task.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A reactor trip has occurred due to an inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal

The crew is implementing OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

Emergency Feedwater is not required to maintain Steam Generator levels

EFAS-1 has been manually initiated

EFAS-2 has automatically initiated INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you, to perform OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, and reset EFAS 1 and 2.

Revision 1 Page 124 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 Evaluator Note When Applicant is ready, cue the simulator operator to place the simulator in RUN.

TASK ELEMENT 1 STANDARD 1.1 Verify steam generator level is being maintained or restored to 50%

Levels verified.

to 70% NR using MFW.

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 2 STANDARD 1.2. Verify EFAS-1 manual actuation switches in NORM position. (CP-Switches returned to 7 and CP-8)

NORM.

Comment: EFAS-1 has been manually initiated. The EFAS-1 switches Critical must be restored to NORM.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 3 STANDARD 1.3 Verify EFAS-2 manual actuation switches in NORM position. (CP-7 Verify switches.

and CP-8)

Comment:

SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 125 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 TASK ELEMENT 4 STANDARD 1.4 Press BOTH EFAS-1 reset pushbuttons. (CP-33) Pushbuttons depressed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 5 STANDARD 1.5 Press BOTH EFAS-2 reset pushbuttons. (CP-33) Pushbuttons depressed.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 6 STANDARD 1.6 Verify EFW Pump A is secured and place the control switch to EFW Pump A secured and normal. (mid position) switch in mid position.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 7 STANDARD 1.7 Verify EFW Pump B is secured and place the control switch to EFW Pump B secured and normal (mid position) switch in mid position.

Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 126 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 TASK ELEMENT 8 STANDARD 1.8 Verify MS-401A, EFW PUMP AB TURB STM SUPPLY SG 1 is MS-401A is closed.

closed.

Comment: Critical Control switch must be taken to CLOSE and then to the mid position.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 9 STANDARD 1.9 Verify MS-401B, EFW PUMP AB TURB STM SUPPLY SG 2 is MS-401B is closed.

closed .

Comment: Critical Control switch must be taken to CLOSE and then to the mid position.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 10 STANDARD 1.10 Verify EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW control valves closed:

EFW 223A, SG1 BACKUP EFW 224A, SG1 PRIMARY Valves are closed.

EFW 223B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 224B, SG2 PRIMARY Comment: The applicant should use both controller output position and PMC indication to verify valves closed.

SAT / UNSAT TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 1.11 Place EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW control valves in AUTO.

EFW 223A, SG1 BACKUP (critical)

EFW 224A, SG1 PRIMARY (critical) Valves in AUTO.

EFW 223B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 224B, SG2 PRIMARY Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT Revision 1 Page 127 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 TASK ELEMENT 11 STANDARD 1.12 Close EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ISOLATION valves.

EFW 229A, SG1 BACKUP EFW 228A, SG1 PRIMARY Valves closed.

EFW 229B, SG2 BACKUP EFW 228B, SG2 PRIMARY Comment: Critical SAT / UNSAT END OF TASK Revision 1 Page 128 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to IC-197 Verify SIAS, EFAS1, and EFAS2 are initiated Place the Simulator in Run on the lead examiners cue.

Revision 1 Page 129 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

JPM S8 APPLICANT CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

A reactor trip has occurred due to an inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation Signal

The crew is implementing OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

Emergency Feedwater is not required to maintain Steam Generator levels

EFAS-1 has been manually initiated

EFAS-2 has automatically initiated INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you, to perform OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 5-C, EFAS Reset Procedure, and reset EFAS 1 and 2.

Revision 1 Page 130 of 289 2012 NRC Exam

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford 3 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Reactor power is 100%, EOC Turnover:

Protected Train is B, AB Busses are aligned to Train B, HPSI Pump A is OOS, maintain 100%

power Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Steam Generator 1 Pressure Instrument, I - BOP SG-IPT-1013C, fails low requiring Technical I - SRO Specification entry and bypass of multiple Plant 1 SG04G TS - SRO Protection System C trip bistables.

Hot Leg 1 Temperature, RC-ITI-0111X, fails low affecting PZR level setpoint. OP-901-110, Pressurizer 2 RC21A I - All Level Control Malfunction.

C - BOP Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Lower Seal fails.

3 RC08C C - SRO OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction.

Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON 4 H_H08 TS - SRO requiring Technical Specification actions.

Feedwater Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to heater shell causing isolation of the Low Pressure R - ATC heater string. OP-901-221, Secondary System N - BOP Transient and OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power 5 FW35B N - SRO Reduction to 72% power.

Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Middle Seal fails, requiring C - ATC a manual reactor trip, and securing of Reactor Coolant 6 RC09C C - SRO Pump 2A.

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, fails open. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. All Reactor Coolant Pumps must be secured. (Critical 7 RC11A1 M - All Task 1)

High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to AUTO C - BOP start on the Safety Injection Actuation Signal requiring 8 SI02B C - SRO a manual start. (Critical Task 2)

RC-606, Control Bleedoff Containment Isolation and I-ATC FP-601B, Fire Water B Containment Isolation fail to 9 RP09D I-BOP auto close.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is out of service and danger tagged, due to high pump bearing vibration during its quarterly IST. Since it occurred just prior to shift turnover and the AB bus is aligned to Train B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump AB has not yet been aligned for service. The Work Management Center is working in that direction.

After taking the shift, Steam Generator 1 Pressure Instrument, SG-IPT-1013C, fails low. The SRO should review and enter Technical Specifications 3.3.1 action 2 and 3.3.2 actions 13 and 19 and direct the BOP to bypass the Steam Generator 1 Pressure Lo, Steam Generator 1 P, and Steam Generator 2 P trip bistables in Plant Protection System Channel C within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System. The SRO should review Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, and determine that Technical Specification entry for 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 is not required.

After Technical Specifications are addressed, Loop 1 Thot instrument, RC-ITI-0111X, fails low. This affects the Reactor Regulating System Tave calculation and the Pressurizer Level Setpoint. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and implement Section E2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction. The crew should take manual control of Pressurizer Level, select the non-faulted Thot instrument (Loop 2) in both Reactor Regulating System cabinets, verify normal setpoint is restored and restore Pressurizer Level Control to Auto after returning Pressurizer Level to setpoint.

After the crew addresses the Thot instrument failure, Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Lower Seal fails. The crew should enter OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction and implement Section E1, Seal Failure.

After the crew is in Section E1 of OP-901-130 AND the BOP has adjusted Component Cooling Water Temperature, Annunciator H-8 on Panel H, Power Dependent Insertion Limit, fails ON. The crew should determine that no Control Element Assemblies are below the Transient Insertion Limits and declare the alarm inoperable. The SRO should review Technical Specification 3.1.3.6 and determine that the surveillance interval for Technical Specification Surveillance 4.1.3.6 has changed from every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months with the alarm inoperable.

Once the SRO has addressed Technical Specifications, a tube leak occurs in Feedwater Heater 5B, causing Condensate flow to isolate through Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters 5B and 6B. The crew should enter OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, and implement Section E1, Loss of Feedwater Preheating. This also requires a power reduction to < 72% power using OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Middle Seal fails. The crew should trip the reactor, implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions AND secure Reactor Coolant Pump 2A.

After Reactor Coolant Pump 2A is secured, Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, fails open. The crew should return to diagnostics and diagnose to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. The crew should secure an additional Reactor Coolant Pump in the opposite loop (preferably 1A) when RCS Pressure lowers to < 1621 PSIA and secure all Reactor Coolant Pumps when Reactor Coolant System pressure no longer supports operation as indicated by pump vibration alarms or within 3 minutes of the Containment Spray Actuation (CRITICAL TASK 1).

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 When Safety Injection occurs, either manually or automatically, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to Auto Start. The BOP should manually start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B (CRITICAL TASK 2). RC-606, Controlled Bleedoff Containment Isolation and FP-601B, Fire Water B Containment Isolation fail to auto close on the Containment Isolation Actuation Signal. The ATC should close RC-606 and the BOP should close FP-601B.

The scenario can be terminated after the crew starts a cooldown or at the examiners discretion.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 CRITICAL TASKS

1. TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs when implementing procedural step 8 OP-902-002 or within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow whichever occurs first. This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR Containment Spray is initiated.

The vibration alarms indicate the possibility for additional Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary degradation through the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

2. ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This task is satisfied by starting High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B to establish Reactor Coolant System inventory control before exiting the step to verify Safety Injection Actuation Signal Actuation in OP-902-002 (Step 7). This task becomes applicable following the initiation of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 9

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 SCENARIO SETUP A. Reset Simulator to IC-191.

B. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline.

C. Verify the following Remotes and Overrides:

1. SIR29, HPSI PUMP A - RACKOUT

2. SIR24, SI-203A_SI-208A HPSI PUMP A SUCT/DISCH ISOL VLVS - CLOSE D. Verify HPSI Pump A Control Switch (C/S) in OFF and place Danger Tag on C/S.

E. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

F. Verify EOOS is 8.7 Yellow G. Ensure the Log Printer Toggle Switch on the rear of the printer is in the UP position.

H. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

I. Start Insight, open file PlantParameters.tis.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Steam Generator Pressure Instrument, SG-IPT-1013C, Fails Low

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1.

2. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

3. If sent to LCP-43, report all S/G 1 Pressures read ~ 800 PSIA.

Event 2 Hot Leg 1 Temperature, RC-ITI-0111X, Fails Low

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2.

2. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 3 RCP 2A Lower Seal Fails

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3.

2. If the Duty Engineering or RCP Engineer is called inform the caller that you will monitor RCP 2A for further degradation.

3. If the Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled for the next forced outage.

Event 4 Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4.

2. If Work Week Manager, Computer Technician, or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 5 Feedwater Heater 5B Tube Leak, Rapid Plant Power Reduction

1. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5.

2. If called to verify Low Pressure Heater levels, verify levels using the PMC and report levels to the Control Room.

3. If called to verify position of the Normal and Alternate Control Valves, verify valve positions using the PMC and report the position of the valves to the Control Room.

4. If requested to monitor Polisher Vessel D/P and remove as necessary, acknowledge the report.

5. If Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled.

6. If Chemistry is called to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent Iodine due to the down power, acknowledge and report that samples will be taken 2-6 hours from notification time and if asked tell the caller your name is Joe Chemist.

Event 6 RCP 2A Middle Seal Fails

1. After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied and on lead examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 6.

2. If the Duty Engineering or RCP Engineer is called inform the caller that you will monitor RCP 2A for further degradation.

3. If the Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 Event 7-9 Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A, Fails Open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B Fails To AUTO Start/RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close

1. After the crew secures RCP 2A and on Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 7.

2. If the Duty Plant Manager is called, inform the caller that you will make the necessary calls.

3. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request.

4. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, end data collection and save the file as 2012 Scenario 1-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save the file into the folder for the appropriate crew

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 SCENARIO TIMELINE DELAY RAMP EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER FINAL HH:MM:SS HH:MM:SS EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 SG04G MS LINE IPT-1013C FAIL (0-100%) 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 0%

SG 1 PRESSURE INSTRUMENT SG-IPT-1013C FAILS LOW 2 RC21A RCS HOT LEG 1 CONTROL TT 111X FAILS (0-100%) 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 0%

HOT LEG 1 TEMPERATURE FAILS LOW 3 RC08C RCP 2A LOWER SEAL FAILURE (0-100%) 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100%

RCP 2A LOWER SEAL FAILS 4 H_H08 POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 FAIL ON POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT ALARM FAILS ON 5 FW35B LP FW HEATER 5B TUBE LEAK (100% = 10% OF TUBES) 5 00:00:00 00:00:30 15%

FW HTR 5B TUBE LEAK FROM CONDENSATE TO HEATER SHELL, RAPID DOWN POWER TO < 72% POWER 6 RC09C RCP 2A MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE (0-100%) 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100%

RCP 2A MIDDLE SEAL FAILS 7 RC11A1 CODE SAFETY RC-317A FAIL OPEN 7 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY, RC-317A, FAILS OPEN, 8 SI02B HPSI PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B FAILS TO AUTO START 9 RP09D RELAY K202 FAILED, CIAS TRAINN B (CVC/RC/FP) NA 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE RC-606, CONTROL BLEEDOFF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND FP-601B, FIRE WATER B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAIL TO AUTO CLOSE

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

NRC Scenario 1 REFERENCES Event Procedures 1 OP-009-007, Plant Protection System, Rev. 15 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Technical Specification 3.3.1 Technical Specification 3.3.2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 2 OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, Rev. 6 OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Malfunction, Rev. 12 3 OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Rev. 7 4 OP-500-008, Annunciator Response Procedure, Control Room Panel H, Att. 4.78, Rev. 26 OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Malfunction, Rev. 12 Technical Specification 3/4.1.3.6 5 OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Rev. 0 OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction, Rev. 4 6 OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Rev. 7 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart 7 OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure, Rev. 14 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 2, Figures OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart 8 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedures Operations Expectation/Guidance, Rev. 5 9 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OI-038-000, Emergency Operating Procedures Operations Expectation/Guidance, Rev. 5

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 1 D-1 Rev 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 140 of 289 Event

Description:

SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-IPT-1013C fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP Recognizes and reports indications of failed channel.

Alarms:

RPS CHANNEL TRIP SG 1 PRESSURE LO (Cabinet K, E-15)

SG 1 PRESSURE LO PRETRIP A/C (Cabinet K, F-15)

RPS CHANNEL C TROUBLE (Cabinet K, G-18)

ESFAS CHANNEL TRIP PRESS SG 2 > SG 1 (Cabinet K, L-16)

PRESS SG 2 > SG 1 ESFAS PRETRIP A/C (Cabinet K, M-16)

Indications:

0 PSIA indicated on SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-ILI-1013C on CP-8

SG 1 Pressure Instruments, SG-ILI-1013A, B, and D reading ~800 PSIA on CP-8

SG 1 Press LO Trip and Pretrip Bistable lights illuminated on PPS Channel C ROM on CP-7.

Examiner Note All BOP manipulations for OP-009-007 are located at CP-10 except as noted.

OP-009-007, Plant Protection System ,Section 6.2, Trip Channel Bypass Operation SRO 6.2.1 Refer to Attachment 11.11, PPS Bistable Bypass Chart to assist in determination of Trip Channels requiring placement in bypass.

Determines the following bistables are affected and need to be bypassed:

11 - LO SG-1 PRESS

19 - HI SG-1 P

20 - HI SG-2 P SRO Directs BOP to bypass the LO SG 1 Pressure, HI SG 1 P, and HI SG 2 P bistables in PPS Channel C within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in accordance with OP-009-007, Plant Protection System.

BOP 6.2.2 To place a bistable in or remove a bistable from bypass, go to Attachment 11.10, Trip Channel Bypass Operation.

BOP 11.10.1 To Bypass a Trip Channel, perform the following:

11.10.1.1 Circle the bistable numbers selected for bypass under Step 11.10.1.4. (Circles bistable numbers 11, 19, and 20 in Step 11.10.1.4 table)

BOP 11.10.1.2 Check desired Trip Channel is not Bypassed on another PPS Channel.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 141 of 289 Event

Description:

SG 1 Pressure Instrument SG-IPT-1013C fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 11.10.1.3 Open key-locked portion of BCP in desired PPS Channel.

NOTE The crew should expect annunciator RPS CABINET CONDITION ABNORMAL (Cabinet L, B-1) to actuate when PPS Channel C door is opened.

BOP 11.10.1.4 Depress Bypass push buttons for the desired Trip Channels NOTE The crew should expect annunciator RPS BISTABLE BY-PASS (Cabinet K, B-18) to actuate when the first bistable is bypassed in PPS Channel C.

BOP 11.10.1.5 Check all selected bistable Bypass push buttons remain in a Depressed state.

BOP 11.10.1.6 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on BCP for the desired Trip Channels.

CREW 11.10.1.7 Check all selected bistable Bypass lights Illuminate on ROM for the desired Trip Channels. (Verifies correct bistables lit on CP-7 PPS Channel C Remote Operator Module)

SRO Reviews the following Technical Specifications and determines applicable actions:

3.3.1 action 2

3.3.2 actions 13 and 19

3.3.3.5 - no actions required

3.3.3.6 - no actions required Examiner Note This event is complete after the BOP bypasses the associated Trip Bistables in PPS Channel C Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 142 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report indications of failed instrument.

Alarms:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI/LO (Cabinet H, B-1)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-HI (Cabinet H, A-1)

LETDOWN HX OUTLET PRESSURE HI (Cabinet G, B-1)

REACTOR COOLANT TAVG/TREF LO (Cabinet H, L-1)

Indications

Mismatch between Charging (CVC-IFI-0212) AND Letdown (CVC-IFI-0202) flow indications. Letdown rises to maximum, with 1 charging pump running.

Deviation between actual level AND programmed level as indicated on Pressurizer level recorder (RC-ILR-0110). Pressurizer level is slowly lowering toward setpoint.

Deviation of setpoint on Pressurizer level controller (RC-ILIC-0110) from programmed level.

Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize.

Hot Leg Loop 1 RC-ITI-0111 reads < 525 °F on CP-2.

SRO May direct the ATC to take manual control of Pressurizer Level Controller, RC-ILIC-0110 and match Letdown flow and Charging flow prior to entering procedure.

SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

OP-901-110, E0 - General Actions N/A 1. Stop Turbine load changes.

N/A 2. IF malfunction is due to failure of Letdown Flow Control valve, THEN GO TO OP-901-112, CHARGING/LETDOWN MALFUNCTION.

N/A 3. IF malfunction is due to failure of Pressurizer Level Control Channel (incorrect readings on EITHER RC-ILI-0110X OR RC-ILI-0110Y), THEN GO TO Subsection E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction.

SRO 4. IF malfunction is due to failure of Pressurizer Level Setpoint (RC-ILIC-0110), THEN GO TO Subsection E2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 143 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-901-110, E2 - Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction ATC 1. Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in MAN AND adjust OUTPUT to slowly adjust letdown flow to restore Pressurizer level.

ATC 2. Verify normal indications on ALL Safety Measurement Channel Hot Leg AND Cold Leg temperature indicators.

ATC 3. Determine affected channel(s) by checking Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Tavg recorders (RC-ITR-0111 AND RC-ITR-0121).

CAUTION PRIOR TO SECURING ALL CHARGING PUMPS ENSURE LETDOWN IS ISOLATED. LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC-101) WILL AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE ON HIGH LETDOWN TEMPERATURE.

ATC 4. Start OR stop Charging Pumps as necessary to maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

N/A 5. IF unable to control Pressurizer level with Letdown in service, THEN perform the following:

5.1 Close Letdown Stop valve (CVC-101).

5.2 Prior to starting Charging Pump(s), complete Attachment 2, Charging Nozzle Thermal Cycling Evaluation Data.

5.3 Cycle Charging Pump(s) to maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

N/A 6. IF malfunction is due to failure of Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110), THEN perform the following:

6.1 Place Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in MAN.

6.2 Maintain Pressurizer level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

N/A 7. IF backup Charging Pumps have started, THEN secure unnecessary Charging Pumps.

ATC 8. IF Pressurizer Backup Heaters have energized, THEN place unnecessary BACKUP HEATER BANKS to OFF.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 144 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE (1) Selecting the non-faulted channel may cause automatic actions to occur if actual level is not at program level.

(2) If a Tc or Th instrument fails, refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Malfunction, E2, Loss of COLSS (PMC Available).

ATC 9. Check Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Hot Leg indicators (RC-ITI-0111-X AND RC-ITI-0121-X) for abnormal readings AND perform the following:

BOP 9.1 IF RCS Temperature Loop 1 Hot Leg (RC-ITI-0111-X) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN select LOOP 2 for TAVE LOOP SELECTOR on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B).

N/A 9.2 IF RCS Temperature Loop 2 Hot Leg (RC-ITI-0121-X) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN select LOOP 1 for TAVE LOOP SELECTOR on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B).

N/A 10. Check Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Cold Leg indicators (RC-ITI-0111-Y AND RC-ITI-0121-Y) for abnormal readings AND perform the following:

10.1 IF RCS Temperature Loop 1 Cold Leg (RC-ITI-0111-Y) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN perform EITHER of the following:

Select presently non-selected position (ALT OR NORM) on TCOLD LOOP 1 selector switch located behind CP-2, Reactor Control (Preferred Method).

OR Select LOOP 2 on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B) 10.2 IF RCS Temperature Loop 2 Cold Leg (RC-ITI-0121-Y) indicates abnormally high OR low, THEN perform EITHER of the following:

Select presently non-selected position (ALT OR NORM) on TCOLD LOOP 2 selector switch located behind CP-2, Reactor Control (Preferred Method).

OR Select LOOP 1 on BOTH RRS local cabinets (CP-12A AND CP-12B).

ATC 11. Verify setpoint on Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) returns to program setpoint in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve AND perform the following:

11.1 Slowly adjust Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110)

OUTPUT to match PROCESS AND place in AUTO.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 145 of 289 Event

Description:

Hot Leg 1 Temperature fails low affecting PZR level setpoint Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior N/A 11.2 Place desired backup Charging Pumps in AUTO.

ATC 11.3 Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in AUTO AND verify Pressurizer level being controlled at setpoint.

ATC 11.4 Place desired Pressurizer BACKUP HEATER BANKS in AUTO.

N/A 11.5 IF necessary, THEN reset BOTH PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS.

N/A 12. IF setpoints from BOTH Reactor Regulating Systems are faulty, THEN place CP-31 switches 1 AND 2 on Cardframe 1, Slot 36, in DEFEAT AND perform the following:

12.2 Check RTGB light illuminates AND RRS light extinguishes on CP-2.

12.3 Adjust setpoint on Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

12.4 Slowly adjust Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110)

OUTPUT to match PROCESS AND place in AUTO.

12.5 Place desired backup Charging Pumps in AUTO.

12.6 Place Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110) in AUTO AND verify Pressurizer level being controlled at setpoint.

12.7 Place desired Pressurizer BACKUP HEATER BANKS in AUTO.

12.8 IF necessary, THEN reset BOTH PROPORTIONAL HEATER BANKS.

Examiner Note This event is complete when Pressurizer Level Controller is in AUTO Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 146 of 289 Event

Description:

RCP 2A Lower Seal fails Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognizes and reports indications of failed lower seal on RCP 2A Alarms:

RCP 2A Upper Seal Pressure (PMC)

RCP 2A Middle Seal Pressure (PMC)

RCP 2A CBO Flow (PMC)

Indications:

RCP Controlled Bleedoff temperature slowly rising on CP-2

RCP 2A seal pressures outside of normal parameters on CP-2 and PMC SRO Enters and Implements OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E0, Subsequent Operator Actions N/A 1. IF Reactor Coolant Pump trips, THEN verify Reactor tripped AND GO TO OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS.

N/A 2. IF loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps occurs, THEN GO TO OP-901-510, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

SRO 3. IF Reactor Coolant Pump Seal has failed, THEN GO TO section E1, Seal Failure.

OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E1, Seal Failure NOTE

1. RCP Seal pressure and Control Bleedoff temperature and flow are normally as follows:

(assuming normal operating RCS temperature and pressure):

Vapor Seal pressure: 25 to 45 PSIG

Upper Seal pressure: 585 to 915 PSIG

Middle Seal pressure: 1237 to 1815 PSIG

CBO temperature: 135° to 190°F

CBO flow: 1.2 to 1.8 GPM

2. (If only one Reactor Coolant Pump Seal has failed on a Reactor Coolant Pump, THEN pump operation may continue provided the seal package is monitored for further degradation.

SRO 1. Inform System Engineer of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal failure.

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Description:

RCP 2A Lower Seal fails Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION (1) CCW TEMPERATURES OF < 75°F COULD LEAD TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIPS ON EVAPORATOR LOW REFRIGERANT PRESSURE.

(2) CCW TEMPERATURE SHOULD BE CHANGED AT A RATE OF 10°F IN ONE HOUR TO PREVENT DEGREDATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS.

BOP 2. IF Controlled Bleedoff temperature is rising, THEN lower Component Cooling Water temperature by ANY of the following:

Start Dry Cooling Tower Fans.

Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump(s) AND associated Wet Cooling Tower Fans.

Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump(s) AND lower ACC-126A(B) setpoint.

Examiner Note This event is complete after Component Cooling Water Temperature is lowered OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 148 of 289 Event

Description:

Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report indications of failed annunciator Alarms

POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT (Cabinet H, H-8)

Indications

No change in actual or indicated Rod Position (CEAC CRT, CEACs, CPCs)

Reactor Power stable (CP-2, CP-7, PMC)

PREPOWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT ALARM (Cabinet H, H-9) is not actuated SRO/ATC Enter and direct the implementation of OP-500-008, Attachment 4.78, Power Dependent Insertion Limit.

OP-500-008, Annunciator Response Procedure Cabinet H, Att. 4.78, Power Dependent Insertion Limit N/A 1. One or more CEA Regulating subgroups or Group P inserted below the Transient Insertion Limit 1.1 Refer to Technical Specification. 3.1.3.6.

NOTE Technical Specification 4.1.3.6 requires CEA group positions verification every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SRO 2. PDIL alarm inoperable 2.1 Refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Inoperable.

SRO 2.2 Contact Electrical Maintenance.

N/A 3. PMC/MUX hardware or software problem 3.1 Refer to OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Inoperable.

3.2 Direct CS&S Maintenance Group to repair failed equipment.

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Description:

Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm fails ON Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior N/A 4. Possible dilution occurring 4.1 Inform SM/CRS.

4.2 Secure any dilution in progress.

4.3 Refer to OP-901-104, Inadvertent Positive Reactivity Addition.

N/A 5. Failed instrument 5.1 Direct PMI to repair failed equipment.

N/A 6. CEA/CEDMCS malfunction 6.1 Go to OP-901-102, CEA or CEMCS malfunction.

SRO Reviews Technical Specification 3.1.3.6 and 4.1.3.6 or OP-901-501 Section E2, Step 4 and determines Regulating Group and Group P CEA position must be verified every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and initiates a Technical Specification Addendum Log per OP-903-001 or OP-901-501, Attachment 4, Transient Insertion Limit Four-Hour Log.

NOTE Delete malfunction and report as Electrical Maintenance that the annunciator card associated with the Power Dependent Insertion Limit alarm was inoperable and has been replaced.

Examiner Note This event is complete when the SRO determines TS Requirements Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 150 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report indications of isolation of 5B and 6B Feedwater Heaters.

Alarms

Heater 5B Level Hi-Hi (Cabinet A, B-9)

Heater 5B Level Hi/Lo (Cabinet A, C-9)

Heater 5B Alt Drain Vlv Open (Cabinet A, D-9)

Numerous other heater level related alarms actuate as a result of cascading heater drains being affected Indications

Loss of 5B and 6B LP Feedwater Heater by closure of the following valves on CP-33:

o CD-175B, Low Pressure Heater 6B Inlet Isolation o CD-189B, Low Pressure Heater 5B Outlet Isolation SRO Enters and implements OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient.

OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Section E0, General Actions NOTE (1) Some steps of this procedure may not be applicable due to plant conditions. In these cases SM/CRS may NA the step.

(2) Steps within this procedure may be performed concurrently or out of sequence with SM/CRS concurrence.

N/A 1. If Reactor trip occurs, then go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

N/A 2. If Reactor Power Cutback occurs, then perform OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback, concurrently with this procedure.

N/A 3. If an Atmospheric Dump Valve fails or begins to fail Open, then place the respective controller to MANUAL with minimum output.

N/A 4. If a Steam Bypass Valve fails or begins to fail Open, then perform any of the following (in preferred order) to close the valve.

Place the respective Valve Mode Select switch to OFF.

Place the respective valve controller to MANUAL with minimum output.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 151 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior N/A 5. If an uncontrollable RCS cooldown exists, then perform the following:

5.1 Manually trip Reactor.

5.2 Commence Emergency Boration in accordance with OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.

5.3 If Steam Generator Pressures continue to lower following the trip, then initiate Main Steam Isolation (MSIS).

5.4 Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

NOTE (1) The following are initial turbine load reductions to be considered depending on the current power level, time in core life, and equipment malfunction.

Transient Initial Load Reduction Rate Two or more Heater Drain Pumps Tripping FW Heater #1 or #2 Extraction Steam 100 MW 40 MW/min Valve Closure Atmospheric Dump Valve Fails Open Steam Bypass Valve Fails Open (2) With COLSS in service, utilize the following to observe instantaneous power changes for power levels 40%. Reference Attachment 3, COLSS Maneuvering Power Indications, for all other power levels.

Reactor Power UFM in service UFM not in service MSBSRAW 95%

(PMC PID C24631)

USBSRAW FWBSRAW

< 95% and 40%

(PMC PID C24629) (PMC PID C24630)

BOP 6. If Main Turbine is available, then adjust Turbine load as necessary to maintain the following:

Reactor Power 100%

Match Tavg with Tref

FWPT Suction Pressure > 300 PSIG(monitored on CP-1 via CD IPI1280, IP Htrs Outlet Hdr)

RCS Tcold 536F - 549F Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 152 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior N/A 7. If needed, then concurrently perform OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, until a power level is reached in which the plant can be stabilized.

SRO 8. If a loss of Feedwater preheating occurs, then go to E1, Loss of Feedwater Preheating.

OP-901-221, Secondary System Transient, Section E1, Loss of Feedwater Preheating ATC 1. Verify the following:

1.1 Pressurizer Pressure Control System maintaining or restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2250 PSIA.

ATC 1.2 Pressurizer Level Control System maintaining or restoring Pressurizer level to program level.

BOP 1.3 Steam Generator levels being maintained or restored to 50% to 70% Narrow Range level.

BOP 1.4 Steam Bypass Control System responding to maintain Steam Generator pressure.

NOTE If the following valve(s) close on a Hi Hi Heater level, then the respective valve will stop movement when the associated Hi Hi Heater Level condition clears. Thereafter the valve(s) may be re-opened with SM/CRS permission.

Extraction Steam Valve Annunciator ES-109 ES to HP Heaters #1 Isolation Heater 1A(1B)(1C) Level Hi-Hi

[Cabinet A G-2 (G-3) (G-4)]

ES-205 ES TO #2 Heaters Isolation Heater 2A(2B)(2C) Level Hi-Hi

[Cabinet A L-2 (L-3) (L-4)]

SRO 2. If a Feedwater Heater has isolated, then refer to Attachment 1, and concurrently perform OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, until Generator Gross Load is less than the Power Limitation listed on Attachment 1, Feedwater Heater Power Limitations. (Determines from Attachment 1 that power must be reduced to 893 MWe (72%) for loss of one LP Heater String)

SRO Enters and implements OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power, concurrently with OP-901-221.

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Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power NOTE (1) A rapid power reduction is defined as approximately 30 MW/minute load reduction on the main turbine.

(2) Power Reduction may be stopped at any point.

(3) Some Steps of this procedure may not be applicable due to plant conditions. In these cases SM/CRS may NA the step.

(4) Steps within this procedure may be performed concurrently or out of sequence with SM/CRS concurrence.

(5) During power reduction PMC PID C24650, COLSS DESCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT19),

will automatically select and display the correct power indication. OP-010-003, Plant Startup, provides greater detail on which power indications are displayed by PID C24650 based on power level and whether or not the UFM is in service.

ATC 1. Begin RCS Boration by one of the following methods:

N/A 1.1 0 up to 170 EFPD:

1.1.1 Direct Boration Or 1.1.2 Emergency Boration using two Charging Pumps N/A 1.2 171 up to 340 EFPD:

1.2.1 Direct Boration Or 1.2.2. Emergency Boration using one Charging Pump SRO/ATC 1.3 341 EFPD:

1.3.1 Direct Boration Or 1.3.2 Borate from the RWSP using one Charging Pump as follows:

1.3.2.1 Open RWSP to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507.

1.3.2.2 Close Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation, CVC-183.

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Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 6.7, Direct Boration CAUTION (1) THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4.

(2) AT LEAST ONE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IN EACH LOOP SHOULD BE OPERATING PRIOR TO PERFORMING DIRECT BORATION OPERATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER CHEMICAL MIXING.

ATC 6.7.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed.

NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at BOC (<30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at EOC (340 EFPD)

ATC 6.7.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Boric Acid to be added on Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Boric Acid Volume for Direct Boration or VCT Borate Makeup Mode.

ATC 6.7.3 Set Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter to volume of Boric Acid desired.

ATC 6.7.4 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pumps selector switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B).

ATC 6.7.5 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to AUTO.

ATC 6.7.6 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to BORATE.

ATC 6.7.7 Verify selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Starts.

ATC 6.7.8 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Opens.

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Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer will not register below 3 GPM. The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer is most accurate in the range of 10 - 25 GPM.

ATC 6.7.9 If manual control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following:

6.7.9.1 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual.

6.7.9.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output to

>3 GPM flow rate.

N/A 6.7.10 If automatic control of Boric Acid flow is desired, then perform the following:

6.7.10.1 Place Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Auto.

6.7.10.2 Adjust Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, setpoint potentiometer to >3 GPM flow rate.

ATC 6.7.11 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open.

ATC 6.7.12 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication.

ATC 6.7.13 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed.

Examiner Note The step below is only applicable if the ATC adds acid in small batches.

NOTE Step 6.7.14 may be repeated as necessary to achieve desired total boron addition for plant conditions.

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Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 6.7.14 If additional boric acid addition is required and with SM/CRS permission, then perform the following:

6.7.14.1 Reset Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter.

6.7.14.2 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Intermediate or Open.

6.7.14.3 Observe Boric Acid flow rate for proper indication.

6.7.14.4 When Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter has counted down to desired value, then verify Boric Acid Makeup Control Valve, BAM-141, Closed.

ATC 6.7.15 Verify Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in Manual.

ATC 6.7.16 Verify both Boric Acid Flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, output and setpoint potentiometer set to zero.

ATC 6.7.17 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to MANUAL.

ATC 6.7.18 Verify Selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Stops.

ATC 6.7.19 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Closed.

ATC 6.7.20 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to CLOSE.

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power NOTE To prevent Pressurizer heater cutout, avoid operating with Pressurizer pressure near the heater cutout pressure of 2270 PSIA while on Boron Equalization. CR-WF3-2012-01861]

ATC 2. Perform Boron Equalization as follows:

2.1 Place available Pressurizer Pressure Backup Heater Control Switches to ON.

ATC 2.2 Reduce Pressurizer Spray Valve Controller (RC-IHIC-0100) setpoint potentiometer to establish spray flow and maintain RCS pressure 2250 PSIA (2175 - 2265).

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Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION REFER TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.3.6 FOR TRANSIENT INSERTION LIMITS.

ATC 3. Operate CEAs in accordance with OP-004-004, Control Element Drive, to maintain ASI using CEA Reg. Group 5, 6 or Group P Control Element Assemblies in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, Attachment 9.9, Axial Shape Control Guidelines.

CREW 4. Notify the Load Dispatcher (Woodlands) that a rapid power reduction is in progress.

CREW 5. Announce to Station Personnel over the Plant Paging System that a rapid plant power reduction is in progress.

ATC/BOP 6. Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature 536°F to 549°F.

BOP 7. Commence Turbine load reduction by performing the following:

7.1 Depress LOAD RATE MW/MIN pushbutton.

BOP 7.2 Set selected rate in Display Demand Window.

BOP 7.3 Depress ENTER pushbutton.

BOP 7.4 Depress REFERENCE pushbutton.

BOP 7.5 Set desired load in Reference Demand Window.

BOP 7.6 Depress ENTER pushbutton.

BOP 7.7 Depress GO pushbutton.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 158 of 289 Event

Description:

FW Heater 5B tube leak from Condensate to Heater Shell/

OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Down Power (to 72 %)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE If USBSCAL is not in service, the COLSS Steam Calorimetric will be automatically disabled when MSBSCAL, PMC PID C24246, drops below 95% Power, and will revert back to FWBSCAL, PMC PID C24235. This may result in a step change in COLSS indicated Plant Power (BSCAL) of up to 1.0%

when this occurs.

8. When Reactor Power consistently indicates less than 98% power, as indicated on PMC PID C24631 [MAIN STEAM RAW POWER (MSBSRAW)], or an alternate point provided by Reactor Engineering, then verify the value of C24648 [BSCAL SMOOTHING VAL. APPLD (DUMOUT17)] automatically changes to 1.

9. If C24648 does not automatically change to 1, then inform Reactor Engineering and set the value of 1 for COLSS power smoothing constant K24250, [ADDRSSBL SMOOTHING FOR BSCAL (ALPHA)] in accordance with OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits Supervisory System.

Examiner Note After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, direct the Booth Operator to initiate Trigger 6.

10. Following a Reactor Power change of >15% within a one hour period, direct Chemistry Department to sample Reactor Coolant System (RCS) for an isotopic iodine analysis two to six hours later.

11. When Condensate flow is <18,000 gpm, verify Gland Steam Condenser Bypass, CD-154, Closed (PMC PID D02404).

12. Monitor Condensate Polisher differential pressure and remove Polishers from service to maintain system pressure in accordance with OP-003-031, Condensate Polisher/Backwash Treatment.

13. When Reactor Power is approximately 70% or Heater Drain Pump flow is unstable, then remove Heater Drain Pumps from service by taking pump control switches to Stop.

Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactivity Manipulation is satisfied OR At Lead Examiners Discretion Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 159 of 289 Event

Description:

RCP 2A Middle Seal fails Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognizes and reports indications of failed lower seal on RCP 2A Alarms:

NONE Indications:

RCP Controlled Bleedoff temperature slowly rising on CP-2

RCP 2A Middle and Upper Seal pressures indicate approximately 2235 psig on CP-2 and PMC SRO Returns to OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, or orders a manual reactor trip based on previous review of the procedure.

OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Section E1, Seal Failure ATC 3. IF TWO OR MORE seals fail in rapid succession, (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months )

THEN perform the following:

3.1 Trip the Reactor ATC 3.2 Secure affected Reactor Coolant Pump.

CREW 3.3 GO TO OP-902-000, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS.

SRO Directs ATC and BOP to carry out Standard Post trip Actions.

Examiner Note This event is complete after the Reactor is tripped and RCP 2A is secured OR As directed by the Lead Evaluator Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 160 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report indications of Loss of Coolant Accident.

Alarms:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI/LO (Cabinet H, B-1)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI-HI (Cabinet H, A-1)

LETDOWN FLOW HI/LO (Cabinet G, C-1)

QUENCH TANK LEVEL HI/LO

QUENCH TANK PRESSURE HI Indications

Mismatch between Charging (CVC-IFI-0212) AND Letdown (CVC-IFI-0202) flow indications. Letdown rises to maximum, with 1 charging pump running

Deviation between actual level AND programmed level as indicated on Pressurizer level recorder (RC-ILR-0110). Pressurizer level slowly lowering toward setpoint

Deviation of setpoint on Pressurizer level controller (RC-ILIC-0110) from programmed level

Pressurizer Backup Heaters energize OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC 1. Determine Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check reactor power is dropping.

b. Check startup rate is negative.

c. Check less than TWO CEAs are NOT fully inserted.

BOP 2. Determine Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check the Main Turbine is tripped:

Governor valves closed

Throttle valves closed BOP b. Check the Main Generator is tripped:

GENERATOR BREAKER A tripped

GENERATOR BREAKER B tripped

EXCITER FIELD BREAKER tripped Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 161 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP c. Check station loads are energized from offsite electrical power as follows:

Train A

A1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

A2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

A3, 4.16 KV safety bus

A-DC electrical bus

A or C vital AC Instrument Channel Train B

B1, 6.9 KV non safety bus

B2, 4.16 KV non safety bus

B3, 4.16 KV safety bus

B-DC electrical bus

B or D vital AC Instrument Channel ATC 3. Determine RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that BOTH the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer level is 7% to 60%

Pressurizer level is trending to 33% to 60%

b. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF.

CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH RCS INVENTORY CONTROL This task is satisfied by starting HPSI Pump B to establish RCS inventory control before exiting the step to verify SIAS Actuation flow in OP-902-002.

This task becomes applicable following the initiation of Safety Injection Actuation.

ATC 4. Determine RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met by checking that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Pressurizer pressure is 1750 psia to 2300 psia

Pressurizer pressure is trending to 2125 psia to 2275 psia Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 162 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.2 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN verify the following have initiated.

SIAS

CIAS BOP Following initiation of Safety Injection Actuation Signal (auto or manual) start High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B.

Momentarily place HPSI Pump B C/S to START.

ATC 4.3 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1621 psia, THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR within 3 of Containment Spray actuation. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

ATC 4.4 IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2-A, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs.

ATC 5. Determine Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check at least one RCP is operating.

b. Check operating loop T is less than 13ºF.

c. Check RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to 28ºF.

Note The above step can be skipped if RCPs are secured.

BOP 6. Determine RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check that at least one steam generator has BOTH of the following:

Steam generator level is 5% to 80% NR

Main Feedwater is available to restore level within 50%-70%

NR.

ATC b. Check RCS TC is 530 ºF to 550 ºF BOP c. Check steam generator pressure is 885 psia to 1040 psia.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 163 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP d. Check Feedwater Control in Reactor Trip Override:

MAIN FW REG valves are closed

STARTUP FW REG valves are 13% to 21% open

Operating main Feedwater pumps are 3800 rpm to 4000 rpm Note If MSIS has occurred, the Feedwater Regulating valves will be closed and the Feedwater pumps will be coasting due to no steam supply.

BOP e. Reset moisture separator reheaters, and check the temperature control valves closed.

ATC 7. Determine Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

b. Check NO containment area radiation monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity.

c. Check NO steam plant activity monitor alarms OR unexplained rise in activity.

a1. IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify the following:

CIAS is initiated

SIAS is initiated

MSIS is initiated ATC Closes RC-606, Controlled Bleedoff Inside Containment Isolation BOP Closes FP-601B, Firewater to Containment Isolation BOP 8 Determine Containment Temperature and Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met:

a. Check containment temperature is less than or equal to 120ºF.

b. Check containment pressure is less than 16.4 psia.

BOP 8.2 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia, THEN verify ALL available containment fan coolers are operating in emergency mode.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 164 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK TRIP ANY RCP NOT SATISFYING RCP OPERATING LIMITS.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs This task becomes applicable after either running Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration alarms actuate OR within 3 of Containment Spray actuation. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

ATC/BOP 8.3 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, THEN verify ALL of the following:

CSAS is initiated

ALL available containment spray pumps are delivering flow greater than 1750 gpm

ALL RCPs are secured Note The Reactor Coolant Pumps may have already been secured.

N/A 9. IF ALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO OP-902-001, "Reactor Trip Recovery" procedure.

SRO 10. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OR ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Appendix 1, "Diagnostic Flowchart.

Proper use of chart will result in use of OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery SRO Enter and direct the implementation of OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery.

BOP Secure AH-12 A or B on SRO direction after initiation of SIAS at CP-18.

CREW When Containment Temperature rises above 200 F, update crew on need to use bracketed parameters due to harsh environment in Containment.

OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery SRO 1. Confirm diagnosis of a LOCA :

a. Check Safety Function Status Check Acceptance criteria are satisfied.

b. IF Steam Generator sample path is available, THEN direct Chemistry to sample BOTH Steam Generators for activity.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 165 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW 2. Announce a Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress using the plant page.

SRO 3. Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition &

Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency Plan.

N/A 4. IF power has been interrupted to either 3A or 3B safety buses, THEN perform Appendix 20, "Operation of DCT Sump Pumps".

SRO 5. REFER TO Section 6.0, "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip.

Note The CRS will typically perform a brief at this point in the EOP. Brief should not be held until RCPs and HPSI Pump B are addressed.

SRO During brief in OP-902-002, should discuss necessary strategy of using Steam Generators to cool RCS.

SRO/ATC 6. IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1684 psia, THEN check SIAS has initiated.

SRO/BOP 7. IF SIAS has initiated, THEN:

a Verify safety injection pumps have started.

b. Check safety injection flow is within the following:

Appendix 2-E, "HPSI Flow Curve"

Appendix 2-F, "LPSI Flow Curve"

c. Verify ALL available charging pumps are operating.

ATC 8. IF pressurize r pressure is less than 1621 psia, AND SIAS is actuated, THEN:

a. Verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

b. IF pressurizer pressure is less than the minimum RCP NPSH of Appendix 2A-D, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits", THEN stop ALL RCPs.

ATC 9. IF RCPs are operating, THEN:

a. Verify CCW available to RCPs.

b. IF a CSAS is initiated, THEN stop ALL RCPs.

c. IF RCS TC is less than 382ºF [384ºF], THEN verify no more than two RCPs are operating.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 166 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 10. Check a CCW pump is operating for each energized 4.16 KV safety bus.

BOP/ATC 11. Isolate the LOCA:

a. Verify the following letdown containment isolation valves are closed:

CVC 101, LETDOWN STOP VALVE

CVC 103, LETDOWN ISOL VALVE

CVC 109, LETDOWN ISOL VALVE

b. Verify the following RCS sampling containment isolation valves are closed:

Train A

PSL 107, HOT LEG

PSL 204, PZR SURGE

PSL 304, PZR STEAM Train B

PSL 105, HOT LEG

PSL 203, PZR SURGE

PSL 303, PZR ISOL VLV

c. Check the following CCW Radiation Monitor AB indications:

Hi Alarm clear

No abnormal rise in radiation monitor reading.

N/A 12. IF LOCA is outside of containment as indicated by ANY of the following:

Auxiliary building radiation monitor alarm

Unexplained rise in auxiliary building sump levels

Rising waste tank level THEN:

a. Locate and isolate the leak.

b. REFER TO Appendix 4-D, "CIAS Automatic Actions" and verify CIAS is actuated.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 167 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 13. Place Hydrogen Analyzers in service by performing the following:

Train A

a. Place Train A H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to "OPEN". (Key 216)

b. Place H2 ANALYZER A POWER to "ON".

c. Check H2 ANALYZER A PUMPS indicate ON.

Train B

a. Place Train B H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to "OPEN". (Key 217)

b. Place H2 ANALYZER B POWER to "ON".

c. Check H2 ANALYZER B PUMPS indicate ON.

ATC/BOP 14. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia

Containment area radiation monitors greater than the Hi Alarm THEN:

a. Verify CIAS is initiated.

b. Verify ALL available containment fan coolers operating in emergency mode SRO b.1 IF ANY containment fan cooler is NOT operating AND containment pressure is greater than 17.1 psia, THEN REFER TO Appendix 21-B, "CFC CCW Override" and close the associated Containment Fan Cooler CCW Isolation Valves.

ATC/BOP 15. IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, THEN:

a. Verify CSAS is initiated.

b. Verify ALL operating containment spray pumps are delivering flow greater than 1750 gpm.

N/A 16. IF Condenser Vacuum is less than 14" Hg, THEN:

a. Verify MSIVs are closed.

b. Verify following steam generator blowdown isolation valves are closed:

BD 102A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1 (IN)

BD 102B, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 2 (IN)

BD 103A, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 1 (OUT)

BD 103B, SG BLOWDOWN ISOL STM GEN 2 (OUT)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7/8/9 Page 168 of 289 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Code Safety, RC-317A fails open, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS, RC-606 and FP-601B Fail to Auto Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 17. Verify instrument air is available:

a. Check BOTH of the following are operating:

TCW pump

CW pump

b. Check instrument air pressure is greater than 95 psig.

c. Check IA 909, CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR valve is open.

N/A 18. IF LOCA Condition Isolated GO TO step 53.

NOTE The following RCS cooldown rates apply:

Natural Circulation: RCS < 50°F/hr Pressurizer < 100°F/hr

Forced Circulation: RCS < 100°F/hr Pressurizer < 200°F/hr NOTE The following forms may be required during the cooldown and depressurization:

Appendix 3-A, "Pressurizer/RCS Cooldown Log"

OP-010-004 Attachment 9.9, "Design Cycle Transient Logsheet" N/A 19. Cooldown the RCS to less than 350ºF TH or CET temperature using the steam bypass control valves.

BOP/ATC 19.1 Cooldown the RCS to less than 350ºF TH or CET temperature using the atmospheric dump valves.

Examiner Note This event is complete when an RCS cooldown has been initiated Or As directed by the Lead Evaluator Revision 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford 3 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Reactor power is 60%, MOC Turnover:

Protected Train is B, AB Bus is aligned to Train B, HPSI Pump A is OOS Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description R - ATC N - BOP Lower power to 50% in accordance with OP-010-005, 1 N/A N - SRO Plant Shutdown.

Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, fails closed C - ATC requiring entry into OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown 2 CV30A2 C - SRO Malfunction.

C - BOP Component Cooling Water Pump A trips requiring C - SRO entry into OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water 3 CC01A TS - SRO System Malfunction.

I - BOP I - SRO Channel D Excore Nuclear Instrument Safety 4 NI01H TS - SRO Channel, ENI-IJI-0001D, middle detector fails low.

Main Steam line break outside Containment, SG 1, OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.

5 MS13A M - All (Critical Task 1 and 2)

C-BOP Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Steam Generator 1, 6 RP08G C-SRO FW-184A fails to AUTO close on MSIS.

Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch, CC-ILS-7013A, fails low, isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps, requiring the I-ATC ATC to secure all running Reactor Coolant Pumps.

7 CC12E2 I-SRO (Critical Task 3)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The crew assumes the shift at ~ 60% power with instructions to lower power to ~ 50% in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, and remove Main Feedwater Pump B from service. The plant is at 60%

due to rising vibration on Main Feedwater Pump B at > 80% power. The System Engineer reports pump vibration monitoring indicates a possible impeller imbalance. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is out of service and danger tagged, due to high pump bearing vibration during its quarterly IST. Since it occurred just prior to shift turnover and the AB bus is aligned to Train B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump AB has not yet been aligned for service. The Work Management Center is working in that direction.

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, the in-service letdown flow control valve, CVC-113A, fails closed. The SRO should enter OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction and implement Section E2, Letdown Malfunction, and place the backup flow control valve, CVC-113B, in-service.

After the backup letdown flow control valve has been placed in service, Component Cooling Water Pump A trips on overcurrent. The SRO should enter OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, and direct the start of Component Cooling Water Pump AB to replace Component Cooling Water Pump A. The SRO should enter Technical Specification 3.7.3, TRM 3.7.3, and cascading Technical Specifications per OP-100-014, Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Compliance.

After Component Cooling Water Pump AB is running and the SRO has reviewed Technical Specifications (or at examiner discretion), Channel D Safety Excore Nuclear Instrument Middle Detector fails low resulting in DNBR and LPD Trips on Plant Protection System Channel D and Startup Channel 1 energizes. The SRO should direct Startup Channel 1 be de-energized by placing the High Volts Selector switch in the Startup Channel 1 drawer to PRIMARY. The SRO should review Technical Specification 3.3.1 and Table 3.3-1 and determine that Action 2 should be entered for Functional Units of Linear Power, DNBR - Low, Local Power Density - High, and the Core Protection Calculator. The SRO should direct that at a minimum Linear Power, DNBR - Low, and Local Power Density - High trip bistables be bypassed in Channel D. Additionally the Logarithmic Power - High channel is also inoperable but the Technical Specification does not apply in MODE 1. However, the SRO may elect to place the Logarithmic Power - High Bistable in bypass as a conservative measure because this action would be applicable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following a reactor trip or shutdown. The SRO should review OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks and Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 and determine that Technical Specification 3.3.3.6, action 29 should be entered.

After the trip bistables in Plant Protection System Channel D are bypassed, a Main Steam line break outside Containment occurs on Main Steam Line 1, resulting in a reactor trip, Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS).

FW-184A, Feedwater Isolation Valve A fails to close automatically on the MSIS requiring the BOP to manually close the valve. The SRO should diagnose to OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure. The crew should take action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature (CRITICAL TASK 1) and pressure (CRITICAL TASK 2) when Reactor Coolant System pressure AND Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures start to rise.

During the implementation of OP-902-004, CC-ILS-7013A, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch fails low isolating Component Cooling Water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The ATC should secure all running Reactor Coolant Pumps within 3 minutes (CRITICAL TASK 3). The SRO may refer to OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Attachment 1, CCW Surge Tank Level Switch Failures to verify the failed instrument.

The scenario can be terminated after the crew secures all running Reactor Coolant Pumps or at the lead examiners discretion.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

NRC Scenario 2 CRITICAL TASKS

3. ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature Limits curve using Atmospheric Dump Valve 2 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator 2. Action to address this task should prevent lifting a Pressurizer safety (2500 psia) or Steam Generator safety (1070 psig).

4. ESTABLISH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE CONTROL This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the Reactor Coolant System P/T curve and additionally maintain Reactor Coolant System pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task shall prevent lowering Subcooled Margin to <

28°F.

5. TRIP ANY REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NOT SATISFYING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATING LIMITS This task is satisfied by securing all running Reactor Coolant Pumps within 3 minutes of loss of Component Cooling Water flow. This task becomes applicable after CC-ILS-7013A fails. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the Reactor Coolant Pump operating limit of 3 minutes without Component Cooling Water cooling.

Scenario Quantitative Attributes

8. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6

9. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2

10. Abnormal events (2-4) 2

11. Major transients (1-2) 1

12. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1

13. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0

14. Critical tasks (2-3) 3

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO SETUP J. Reset Simulator to IC-192.

K. Verify Scenario Malfunctions are loaded, as listed in the Scenario Timeline.

L. Verify the following Remotes and Overrides:

1. SIR29, HPSI PUMP A - RACKOUT

2. SIR24, SI-203A_SI-208A HPSI PUMP A SUCT/DISCH ISOL VLVS - CLOSE M. Verify HPSI Pump A Control Switch (C/S) is in OFF and place Danger Tag on C/S.

N. Verify Startup Channel 1 High Volt Selector Switch is in ALTERNATE.

O. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

P. Verify EOOS is 8.7 Color Yellow with HPSI Pump A OOS.

Q. Ensure gloves are available for using the simulator ladder.

R. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

S. Start Insight, select file PlantParameters.tis.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR BOOTH INSTRUCTIONS Event 1 Power Reduction to 50%

4. If contacted to place Feedwater Pump B Local Governor Control in manual, insert Remote FWR88 to MANUAL.

Event 2 Letdown Flow Control Valve, CVC-113A, Fails Closed

3. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 1.

4. If Work Week Manager or PMM are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

5. If contacted to place the alternate letdown flow control valve in service Run CAEP file OP-901-112 Local Operator Actions\Placing Alternate LDFCV in Service.sch.

Event 3 Component Cooling Water Pump A Trips

3. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 2.

4. If Work Week Manager or PME are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 4 Safety Channel D Excore Nuclear Instrument, ENI-IJI-0001D, Middle Detector Fails Low

7. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 3.

8. If Work Week Manager or PMI are called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled.

9. If requested to verify Log Channel readings at LCP-43, report that Log Channel D is pegged low; all other channels are reading normally.

Event 5/6 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment, SG 1/Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Fails to Auto Close

4. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 4.

5. If called as a Nuclear Auxiliary Operator to verify break location, inform the caller that a large amount of steam is issuing from the MSIV Area on the West Side of the RAB and it does not appear to be coming from a Secondary Safety or Atmospheric Dump Valve.

6. If Chemistry is called to perform samples acknowledge the request.

Event 7 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch, CC-ILS-7013A, Fails Low

5. On Lead Examiner's cue, initiate Event Trigger 5.

6. At the end of the scenario, before resetting, complete data collection by saving the file as 2012 Scenario 2-(start-end time).tid. Export to .csv file. Save the file into the folder for the appropriate crew.

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO TIMELINE DELAY RAMP EVENT KEY DESCRIPTION TRIGGER FINAL HH:MM:SS HH:MM:SS EVENT DESCRIPTION 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A DOWNPOWER FROM 60% TO 50%

2 CV30A2 LTDN FLOW CONTROL VALVE CVC-113A FAILS CLOSED 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL VALVE, CVC-113A, FAILS CLOSED 3 CC01A CCW PUMP A TRIP 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP A TRIPS 4 NI01H MIDDLE DETECTOR (D2) SAFETY CHANNEL D FAIL (0-100%) 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 CHANNEL D EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT SAFETY CHANNEL, ENI-IJI-0001D, MIDDLE DETECTOR FAILS LOW 5 MS13A MS A BREAK OUTSIDE CNTMT BEFORE MSIV (0-100%) 4 00:00:00 00:03:00 10 MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT , SG 1 6 RP08G RELAY K305 FAILED, MSIS TRAIN A (MS/FW) N/A 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 1, FW-184A FAILS TO AUTO CLOSE ON MSIS 7 CC12E2 CCW SURGE TNK LVL 7013AS FAILS LO 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 ACTIVE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK LEVEL SWITCH, CC-ILS-7013A, FAILS LOW

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

NRC Scenario 2 REFERENCES Event Procedures 1 OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown, Rev. 317 (Copy with applicable steps marked up through Step 9.1.16)

OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev. 36, Section 6.7, Direct Boration OP-005-007, Main Turbine and Generator, Rev. 301, Section 6.2, Main Turbine and Generator Operation 2 OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Rev. 4 3 OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Rev. 301 Technical Specification 3.7.3 Technical Requirement 3.7.3 OP-100-014, Technical Specification and Technical Requirement Compliance, Rev. 317 4 OP-009-007, Plant Protection System, Rev. 15 OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, Rev. 16 Technical Specification 3.3.1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 5 OP-901-103, Emergency Boration, Rev. 2 OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 13 OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure, Rev. 12 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart, and Appendix 13, Stabilize RCS Temperature 6 OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure, Rev. 12 OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Rev. 307, Appendix 2, Figures 7 OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Rev. 301

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2012 NRC Exam Scenario 2 D-1 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 176 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-010-005,Attachment 9.1 Steps 9.1.1 - 9.1.6 NOTE Power may be stabilized at SM/CRS discretion at any point during performance of this section. The Senior Line Manager for Plant Shutdown shall be the Operations Manager or designee, or a qualified Duty Plant Manager. Performance of an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE) Brief shall not preclude full compliance with any Technical Specification or procedurally required Plant Shutdown.

CAUTION THE FOLLOWING SECTION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT CORE REACTIVITY.

N/A 9.1.1 If performing a planned Plant Shutdown involving power reduction of

>30%, then the Operations Manager (OM) shall evaluate the use of IPTE controls in accordance with EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions. At the direction of the OM the following Infrequently Performed Test or Evolutions (IPTE) controls should be complied with:

CREW 9.1.2 Prior to commencing power reduction, notify Load Dispatcher.

CREW 9.1.3 Announce to Station Personnel that a power reduction is in progress over the Plant Paging System.

CREW 9.1.4 Maintain Reactor Coolant System Tcold 536°F to 549°F during the downpower.

N/A 9.1.5 Perform Boron Equalization in accordance with Attachment 9.13, Boron Equalization.

NOTE Boron Equalization is already in progress from down power to 60%.

Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 177 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE (1) BSCAL is not a good indication of instantaneous power during power maneuvers.

Additionally, once the smoothing factor is applied at approximately 98% MSBSRAW (PMC PID C24631), BSCAL becomes a time weighted average of power recorded over approximately 20 minutes. The following tables list COLSS calculated powers available during power maneuvering to monitor instantaneous power:

(2) During power ascension PMC PID C24649 COLSS ASCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT

18) will automatically select and display the correct power indication. During power reduction PMC PID C24650 COLSS DESCENDING PWR TRACK (DUMOUT19) will automatically select and display the correct power indication.

UFM not in service Reactor Power 95% MSBSRAW PMC PID C24631 Reactor Power <95% and 35% FWBSRAW PMC PID C24630 Reactor Power <35% BDELT PMC PID C24104 UFM in service Reactor Power 95% MSBSRAW PMC PID C24631 Reactor Power <95% and 40% USBSRAW PMC PID C24629 Reactor Power <40% and 35% FWBSRAW PMC PID C24630 Reactor Power <35% BDELT PMC PID C24104 ATC 9.1.6 Begin Reactor Coolant System boration in accordance with OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control to reduce Reactor power.

OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 6.7, Direct Boration CAUTION (1) THIS SECTION AFFECTS REACTIVITY. THIS EVOLUTION SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO LEAVING CP-4.

(2) AT LEAST ONE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP IN EACH LOOP SHOULD BE OPERATING PRIOR TO PERFORMING DIRECT BORATION OPERATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER CHEMICAL MIXING.

Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 178 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 6.7.1 Inform SM/CRS that this Section is being performed.

NOTE When performing a Plant down power where final RCS Boron Concentration needs to be determined, the following Plant Data Book figure(s) will assist the Operator in determining the required RCS Boron PPM change.

1.2.1.1 Power Defect Vs Power Level

1.4.3.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at BOC (<30 EFPD)

1.4.4.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at Peak Boron (30 EFPD up to 170 EFPD)

1.4.5.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at MOC (170 EFPD up to 340 EFPD)

1.4.6.1 Inverse Boron Worth Vs. Tmod at EOC (340 EFPD)

ATC 6.7.2 At SM/CRS discretion, calculate volume of Boric Acid to be added on Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Boric Acid Volume for Direct Boration or VCT Borate Makeup Mode.

ATC 6.7.3 Set Boric Acid Makeup Batch Counter to volume of Boric Acid desired.

ATC 6.7.4 Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pumps selector switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B).

ATC 6.7.5 Place Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, control switch to AUTO.

ATC 6.7.6 Place Makeup Mode selector switch to BORATE.

ATC 6.7.7 Verify selected Boric Acid Makeup Pump A(B) Starts.

ATC 6.7.8 Verify Direct Boration Valve, BAM-143, Opens.

Revision 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 179 of 289 Event

Description:

Lower Power to 50% using OP-010-005 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer will not register below 3 GPM. The Boric Acid Flow Totalizer is most accurate in the range of 10 - 25 GPM.