ML17222A411

Responds to 880518 & 0622 Requests for Addl Info Re Atws. Info Includes Detailed Conceptual Design Info Covering Power Supplies,Failure Modes & Effects Analysis

ML17222A411
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	08/15/1988
From:	CONWAY W F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
L-88-343, NUDOCS 8808190233
Download: ML17222A411 (23)

Text

ACCELERATEDDISI'RIBUTIONDEMONSTRATIONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:8808190233DOC.DATE:88/08/15NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONCONWAY,W.F.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)DOCKET0500033505000389.,5.

SUBJECT:

Respondsto880518&0622requestforaddiinforeanticipatedtransientsw/oscram.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A055DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRQENCLjSIZE:cR+TITLE:OR/LicensingSubmittal:SalemATWSEventsGL-83-28NOTES:D8RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-2LATOURIGNY,EINTERNAL:ACRSNRRLASHER,DNRR/DEST/ICSB7NRR/DEST/RSB8ENRR/DOEA/GCB11OGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSIC-COPIES'LTTRENCL1011~661111111010111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-2PDARM/DAF/LFMBNRR/DEST/ESB8DNRR/DEST/PSB8DNRR/DLPQ/QAB10NUDOCS-BSTRACTGF01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL3310111010111111RIDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR26ENCL20 P.014000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408.0420+yOI/h<rirr~~~~+AUGUS:K151988L-88-343U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:Re:St.LuciePlantUnitNos.1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389RequestforAdditionalInformationAnticiatedTransientsWithoutScramByletterdatedMay18,1988(E.G.TourignytoW.F.Conway),theNRCrequestedadditionalinformationconcerningtheFloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)plantspecificconceptualdesignsubmittalofJuly15,1987.FPLprovidedaschedulefortheresponsetoquestionsla,3a,3b,4,5,6,7,Sb,andScbyletter(L-88-276)datedJune23,1988.Theremainingquestions(1b,2,and8a)arerelatedtothedetaileddesignandarenotpartoftheconceptualdesignsubmittedinJuly1987.FPLwillprovideaschedulefortheresponsetotheremainingquestionsaftertheconceptualdesignisapprovedbythestaff.Attachedistheresponsetoyourrequestforadditionalinformation.Shouldtherebefurtherquestions,pleasecontactus.Verytrulyyours,W.F.ConySeniorVicePresident-NuclearWFC/GRM/cmAttachmentcc:Dr.J.NelsonGrace,RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St..LuciePlantpoSS8808150233880815PDRADOCK05000335PPDCanFPLGroupcompany

~~Page1of9FLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEPLANT-UNITS1&2ATWS:RESPONSESTONRCQUESTIONSOFMAY18andJUNE22,1988QuestionsFromMa18,1988NRCLetter1.SafetClassification/LoicSchematics/PowerDistributionQuestion:TheStLucieUnits1&2diversescramsystem'(DSS)designusestheexistingreactorprotectionsystem(RPS)pressurizerpressuretransmitterinstrumentloops.Thebistablesandlogiccircuitryare'artoftheexistingengineeredsafetyfeaturesactuationsystem(ESFAS).Itisthestaff'sunderstandingthattheDSScircuitryfromthesensors,throughthelogic,uptoandincludingtheisolationdevices(thatprovidetheDSSoutputsignalstotheCEAdriveMGsetoutputbreakersandcontrolroomannunicators)is-safetyrelatedClass1E-a)Isthestaff'sunderstandingcorrect.Ifnot,pleaseexplain.b)Part1:Pleaseprovideelectricalschematic/elementarydiagramsfortheDSSthatclearlyshowallinstrumentchannels(includingbistables),logic,actuationcircuits,testcircuits,interlocks,bypasses,alarmsandindications.Part2:A1so,provideelectricalone-linediagramsshowingtheCEAdriveMGsetsandDSSactuatedoutputbreakers,andpowerdistributiontotheRPSandESFAS/DSS,includingvitalbuses,inverters,batteriesandchargers.Response:a)AlthoughtheDSSbistablesandlogiccomponentsarenotrequiredtobesafetyrelated,theyarebeingtreatedinthismannerbecausetheyarebeinginstalledinthesafetyrelatedESFAScabinets.TheDSScircuitrytherefore,fromthepressurizerpressuresensorstotheClass1EisolationdevicesthatseparatetheDSSlogicfromtheCEAdriveMGsetcontrolcircuits,willbeprocuredassafetyre1ated.Thisincludesthepressuretransmitters,signalconditioners,andcablestotheESFAS'cabinets.PowerfortheDSSlogiccomponentswillbefromnon-interruptible,non-safetysgppliesthroughappropriatesafetyrelatedisolationtoprotecttheESFAScabinets Page2of9b)Part1Theelectricalschematic/elementarydiagramsforthe'SSwhichwillshowindetailallofthecomponentsoftheDSSincludinglogic,actuationcircuits,test'ircuits,interlocks,bypasses,alarms,andindicationshavenotbeendevelopedandarenotconsideredtobepartoftheDSSConceptualDesign.ItisanticipatedthattheywillbeamajorportionofPhase2,whichisthedetaileddesign,engineeringandprocurementphaseoftheproject.Part2Figures1,2,3,and4includeelectricalone-linediagramsfortheRPSandESFAS/DSS,includingvitalbuses,inverters,batteries,andchargers.Figures5and6includeelectricalone-linediagramsfortheCEAdriveMGsets.2.PowerSuplies/FailureModesandEffectsAnalsisQuestion:EElectricalindependenceisrequiredbetweentheexistingRPSandtheATWSprevention/mitigationsystemsrequiredbytherule.Theelectricalschematic/elementarydiagramsprovidedinresponsetoItem1aboveshouldclearlyidentifyallpowersourcesused.WhereRPSpowersuppliesareused,itmustbedemonstratedthat1)faultswithintheDSS,diverseAFWactuation'ircuitsordiverseturbinetrip(DTT)circuitscannotdegradethereliability/integrityoftheexistingRPSbelowanacceptablelevel,and2)thatcommonmodefailureaffectingtheRPSpowerdistributionsystem(includingdegradedvoltageand/orfrequencyconditions,e.g.,overvoltageandundervoltage;theeffectsofdegradedvoltageconditionsovertimemustbeconsideredifsuchconditionscangoundetected)cannotcompromiseboththeRPSandATWSprevention/mitigationfunctions.IftheStLucieUnits1&2designsharescommonpowersuppliesfortheRPSandequipmentinstalledperATWSrulerequirements(i.e.,DSSexcludingsensors,anddiverseAFWSactuationandDTTexcludingsensorsandactuationdevices),providetheinformationforItems1and2above.

Page3of9Response:Theone-linediagramsprovidedinresponsetoquestion1identifythepowersourcesfor.theRPSandDSSlogic(Figures1through4).Asshowninthediagrams,powerfortheDSSlogicinbothunitswillbethroughisolationdevicesfromvital,non-ClasslE120Vacbuses,whicharedifferentbusesthantheClasslEbusesfeedingtheRPS.ThenormaldistributionpathforDSSpowerwillbethroughanuninterruptablepowersupplyconnectedtobothsafety(SAB)andnon-safetybuses(Figures2and4).Ifthereisafailureatthe480Vacor4160Vaclevels,thenon-ClasslEstationbattery(1Dor2D)willprovidetemporarypowertotheDSSlogicwhiletheClass1EstationbatteriesprovidetemporarypowertotheRPSandESFASloads.Theemergencydieselgeneratorswillprovidelong-teanbackuppowerthroughthesafetyABbusestotheDSSlogic+Theexactinterconnectionsincludedonelectricalschematics/elementarydiagrams,andrequiredtosupplypowertothe"DSSlogicandbistablecircuitryhavenotbeenengineeredandarenotconsideredtobepartoftheDSSConceptualDesign.ItisanticipatedthattheywillbepartofPhase2,whichisthedetaileddesign,engineering,andprocurementphase.'.ElectricalIsolationQuestion:Electricalindependenceofnon-safetyrelatedATWScircuitsfromsafetyrelatedcircuitsisrequiredinaccordancewiththeguidanceprovidedinIEEEStandard384,"IEEEStandardCriteriaforIndependenceofClasslEEquipmentandCircuits,"assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.75,Revision1,"PhysicalIndependenceofElectricalSystems."a)Informationmustbeprovidedtodemonstratetheadequacyofallisolationdevicesusedtoprotecttheintegrityofsafetyrelatedcircuitsfromnon-safetyrelatedATWScircuits.TherequiredinformationisidentifiedinAttachment1".Iftheisolationdevicesareidenticaltoisolationdevicesusedinotherapplications(e.g.,toisolatethesafetyparameterdisplaysystemfromsafetyrelatedcircuits),andtherequestedinformationhasbeenpreviouslysubmittedforstaffreview,andtheisolationdeviceshavebeenapprovedfortheirapplications,therelatedcorrespondenceshouldbereferenced,andnoadditionalinformationneedbeprovided.*Attachment1oftheMay18,1988NRCletter.b)Attachment6ofFPL'sJuly15,'987letterisablockdiagramoftheStLucieUnits1&2DSS.The.DSSisshowntoprovideisolatedoutputsignalstotheCEAdriveHQsetoutputbreakers,however,thereisnoisolationshownbetweentheDSSandthecontrolroomannunciator.Isthediagramcorrectinthisregards Page4of9Response.')Thisquestionisconcernedwithprotectingtheintegrityofsafetyrelatedcircuitsfromnon-safetyrelatedATWScircuits.IntheStLuciedesign,theDSScircuitrywillbeprocuredassafetyrelated.(SeeQuestionla).Furthermore,theDSScircuitrywillbeelectricallyisolatedfromthenon-safetyrelatedcomponentsthatitprovidesoutputto,includingtheCEAdriveMGsetcontrolcircuits,theSequenceofEventsRecorder,andtheControlRoomannunciatorpanels.Iftheconcernappliesonlytonon-safetyrelatedDSScircuitry,thenFPL'sConceptual,DesignforasafetyrelatedDSSissufficienttosatisfyit.ConcernwithisolationoftheRPSfromthesafetyrelatedDSShasbeenaddressedwithexistingandproposedsafetyrelatedisolationdevicesinthepressurizerpressureinstrumentloopsforbothunits.ThespecificarrangementoftheloopcircuitrywillputanadditionaldevicebetweenthecircuitryandtheESFAS/DSScircuitrytoinsurethatfaultsintheDSSdonotpropagatetotheRPS.DevicesusedtoisolatetheESFAS/DSScircuitryfromthesafetyrelatedRPSarenotyetinstalledinStLucie-Unit1.AscanbeseeninFigure7,asingleI/I(currenttocurrent)converterprovidespressurizerpressuresignalstotheSequenceofEventscabinet,ESFAScabinetMC,apressureindicatorinRTGB-103,andtheRPScircuitryinRPScabinetC.AsecondsimilarI/IconverterwillbeinstalledinRTGB-106whichwillsupplypressurizerpressuresignalstoESFASandtheDSScircuitry.Thisissimilarfortheotherthreepressureloops.DevicesusedtoisolatetheESFAS/DSScircuitryfrom.thesafetyrelatedRPSispartoftheoriginalplantdesignforStLucie-Unit2.ItcanbeseeninFigure8thattherearetwoE/I(voltage-to-current)convertersforthepressuretransmittersignalloopinstalledinInstrumentCabinetMC.OneE/IconverterprovidespressurizerpressuresignalstoRPScircuitryinRPScabinetC.TheotherE/IconverterprovidessimilarsignalstotheSequenceofEventscabinet,ESFAScabinetMC,andapressureindicatorinRTGB-203.ItisfromthesecondE/IconverterthattheDSSwillreceivesignalsrepresentativeofpressurizerpressure,isolatedfromtheRPSthroughtwoE/Iconverters.Thisissimilarfortheotherthreepressureloops.IfthereisachangeintheConceptualDesign,thesafetyclassificationoftheDSS,ortheproposedDSSvendor(ConsolidatedControls)whichaffectstheproposedisolationbetweentheRPSandandthesafetyrelatedDSS,thenisolationdeviceswillbeprocuredwhichwillmeettherequirementsofAttachmnent1totheMay18,1988NRCletter.

Page5of9b)TheControlRoomannunciatorpanelcircuitrywillbeisolatedfromtheDSSlogiccircuitryasitisfromallsafetyrelatedcomponents.TheblockdiagramshownasFigure6oftheConceptualDesigndoesnotindicatethisalthoughtheparagraphsinSectionIVDSSLogicdoesspecifyisolationfromtheannunciatorpanelcircuits.4.BreakerDiversitQuestion:Usingcircuitbreakersfromdifferentmanufacturersisgenerallynotconsideredsufficienttoprovidetherequireddiversityforinterruptionofcontrolrodpower.Ingeneral,circuitbreakersfromdifferentmanufacturersareconsideredsusceptibletocommonmodefailure(CMF)becauseofcommondesignfeaturessuchasmechanicallinkage(consistingofsprings,pivots,latches,pins,cams,etc.)thataresubjecttobinding/malfunctionfromanumberofcauses(e.g.,dirt,corrosion,improperlubrication,etc.)ashasbeendemonstratedthroughoperatingexperience.PleaseprovideinformationthatdemonstratesphysicalhardwarediversityoftheCEAdriveMGsetoutputbreakersfromthereactortripbreakersactuatedbytheRPS.Response:DuetotheNRC'sconcernfordiversitybetweenthereactortripbreakersandtheCEAdriveMGsetoutputbreakers,FPLwillinvestigatetheuseofalternatemethodsforATWSactuation,includingtheuseofexistingHGsetcontactorsandexcitationcontrol.AletterwillbeforwardedtotheNRCwithin150daystodocumenttheresultsofthatinvestigation.5.DSSModificationsandDiversityQuestion:Duringthelifeofacommerciallight~ater-coolednuclearpowerplantmanycomponentsreachtheirendoflifeandmustbereplaced,includ1ngcomponentsinstalledintheRPS,AFWS,DSS,andDTTsystem.Provideadescriptionofthemeasures/programsimplementedatStLucietoassurethattheequipmentd1versityprovidedinaccordancewiththeATWSrulewillbemainta1neddur1ngcomponentrepair,replacement,modificationsand/ordesignchangesetc.throughoutthelifeoftheplant.

Page6of9Response:FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasdevelopedprocedurestocontrolchangestothenuclearunits.TheseproceduresensurethatappropriateregulatoryrequirementsaremetinthatthedesignbasesestablishedintheFSARaremaintained.AfterimplementationoftheATWSmodificationstheFSARwillbeupdatedinaccordancewith10CFR50.71toreflectthenewdiversityrequirements.Thisupdate,incon)unctionwithestablishedprocedures,providesassurancethatfuturechangeswillmaintainthediversityrequirements6.HumanFactorsEnineeringuestion:Discusshowgoodhumanfactorsengineeringpracticesareincorporated1ntothedesignofATWSprevention/mitigationsystemcomponentslocatedinthecontrolroom.SpecificallyaddresscoordinationofdisplaysusedtoprovidethestatusofATWSsystems/equipmenttotheoperatorwithexistingdisplays.Response:Onlyasingleannunciatorwindoww111beusedforconstantind1cationineachoftheControlRoomswhichwillprovidealarmstatuswheneitherchanneloftheDSSisplacedinthebypassconditionfortestingorwheneitherchannelactuates.AttheESFAScabinets,eachchannelwillhaveanACTUATEstatusindicatinglightandaBYPASSstatusindicatinglightAslongastheESFASisoperat1ng,theDSSwillalsobeoperating.AppropriatelabelswillbeusedtoidentifytheindicatinglightsfollowingtheexistingStLuciestandardsforletteringsize,color,andlayout.Theannunciatorwindowwillbelabelledinamannersimilartotheotherexistingannunciatorwindows.Sincetherewillbenoactiveormimicdisplaysavailabletotheoperators,coordinationwithexistingdisplayswillnotberequired.Thef1naldesignofthesystemwilltakeintoaccounttheFPLHumanFactorsEngineeringprogramandwillmeettheguidelinesoftheappropriatesectionsofNUREG0700"GuidelinesforHumanFactorsEngineering Page7of97.TurbineTriCircuitsQuestion:FPL'sJuly15,1987letterstatesthatinherenttotheDSSdesignisaturbinetripindependentanddiversefromtheRPS,whichis'inititatedbyundervoltageconditionssensedintheCEAdrivecontrolsystem.ExplainindetailhowthisarrangementsatisfiestheATWSrulerequirementsforadiverseturbinetrip.Pleaseprovideelectricalschematic/elementarydiagramsoftheDTTcircuits.Response:TheexistingturbinetripisdiversefromtheRPSinthattheactuationoftheturbinetripisbasedonanundervoltageconditioninthereactortripswitchgearandisnotbasedontheRPSlogic.ThisassumesthatthereisanoperationalDSSwhichcausestheundervoltageconditionregardlessofthestatusofthereactortripbreakers.Ascanbeseenintheone-linediagramsinFigures9and10,therearefourvoltagesensingdevices(differentdevicesforeachUnit)thatarefedintotwo2/4logiccircuits,whichinturnactuatetotheautotripsolenoidandemergencytripsolenoidvalvetoreleaseautostophydraulic,oilandemergencytriphydraulicoil,respectively.Lossofhydraulicoilpressurefromeithersourcewillcauseaturbinetrip.8.TestiteTQuestion:Theequipmentrequiredby10CFR50.62toreducetheriskassociatedwithanATWSeventmustbedesignedtoperformitsfunctionsinareliablemanner.TheDSS,diverseAFWSactuationcircuitry,anddiverseturbinetripcircuitsmustbedesignedtoallowperiodictestingtoverifyoperabilitywhileatpower.Allbypassconditionsshouldbeautomaticallyandcontinuouslyindicatedinthemaincontrolroom.')Describethescopeandintentofthevarioussurveillancetests(e.g.sensor/channelchecks,instrumentchannelfunctionaltests,logicchanne1andactuationdevicetests,channel/systemcalibrations,overallsystemfunctionaltests,etc.)thatFPLintendstousetoperiodicallyverifyoperabilityoftheDSSandDTTequipment/circuitryinstalledatStLucieUnits162.Indicatethefrequencyforwhich.eachsurveillancetestisconducted.Alsodiscussthecontrols/programs(e.g.,technicalspecifications)tobeusedtoensurethattheequipment/circuitryinstalledinaccordancewiththeATWSrulewillbeproperlytestedandmaintainedinoperablecondition.Thecontrols/programswouldprovidereasonableassurancethattheATWSequipment/circuitrywillperformitsdesignfunctionswhenrequired,andtherefore,satisfythereliabilityrequirementsoftheATWSrule.

Page8of9b)c)Pleaseindicatewhetherthetestproceduresinvolveundesirablepracticessuchasinstallingjumpers,liftingleads,pullingfusesptrippingbreakers,blockingrelays,orothercircuitalterations.Describethespecificindicationprovidedinthecontrolroomofthebypassconditionwhenequipment/circuitsrequiredbytheATWSrulearebypassed/renderedinoperableduringtesting(includinguseofthebistablebypassswitches).Response:a)AsdescribedintheDSSConceptualDesign,theDSSwillincludethecapabilitytotesttheDSSfunctionfromsensoroutputtoandincludingtheMGsetcontrolcircuitswiththeplantinashutdowncondition."TwobypassswitchesonESFAScabinetsSAandSBwillallowtestingoftheDSSfunctionfromsensoroutputto,butnotincluding,"thefinalactuationdevicesatpower.SensoroutputisdefinedasthepointatwhichtheanalogsignalenterstheESFAScabinets.TotesttheDSS,atestsignalwillbesubstitutedforthesensoroutputatthebistablecardswithoutaffectingtheESFAScircuitry.Inaddition,theexistingESFAScabinetautomatictestinstrument,whichusescountsontheauto-testgenerator,willbeemployedtocheckinternalDSSlogicfunctionsfromthebistabledevicesthroughthelogicmoduleswhenevertheESFAScabinetsareenergized.However,thespecificsoftestingandmaintenance,includingschedules,arenotconsideredtobepartoftheDSSConceptualDesign,anditisanticipatedthattheywi11bedeve1opedduringPhase2,whichisthedetaileddesign,engineering,andprocurementphase.Theturbinetripcircuitrycurrentlyexistsandisassumedtobediverse,inherenttothedesignoftheDSS(Seetheresponseto'question7).Sincethesystemisinstalledandoperating,itsdesignandfunctionsarenotinquestionandadditionalmaintenanceandtestingarenotenvisioned.b)FPLdoesnotintendtointegrate'theDSSintotheStLuciePlantTechnicalSpecificationsandwillutilizethestandardplantmaintenanceprogramsandprocedurestoensurethatheDSSisproperlytestedandmaintainedinanoperableconditionThespecificationthatwillbepreparedfortheprocurementandinstallationoftheDSSfromConsolidatedControlswillincluderequirementstopreventtheinclusionofundesirablepracticesinDSStesting.Theseundesirablepracticesareinstallingjumpers,liftingleads,pullingfuses,trippingbreaker>,,blockingrelays,andothercircuitalterationsc)Asingleannunciatorwindowwillbeusedforconstantindication"ineachoftheControlRoomstoprovidealarmstatuswheneitherchanneloftheDSSlogicisplacedinthebypassconditionfortesting.orwheneitherchannelactuates.

Page9of9QuestionfromJune22,1988PhoneConversationQuestion:,AlongwiththeeightquestionsintheNRCletterofMay18,1988,anadditionalpointwasraisedbytheNRCduringtheFPL/NRCphoneconversationofJune22,1988dealingwiththediversitybetweentheRPSandAFASmatrixrelays.Response:AsstatedintheRPS/AFASDiversityStudy,bothsystemsemployDouglasRandalldualcoil,reedtyperelays.Themainpointsofdiversityincludecoilswithdifferentvoltageandresistanceratingsanddifferentinsulations,widelyspacedmanufacturinglotnumbers,anddifferentmountingarrangements.Inadditiontothisdiversity,theseareveryhigh~ualityrelayswithexcellentreliability.Theyarelocatedinacontrolledenvironment,utilizedifferentpowersuppliesandcircuits,arelocatedindifferentcabinets,aresealedunits,andaredemnergizedtoactuate(failsafe).Itishigh1yimprobablethatacommonmodefailurecouldexistthatwoulddisablethemfunctionallyandwouldnotalsodisableothertypesoflogicdevices(e.g.fire,seismicevent.,impropermaintenancetechniques,powersurgeorpowerfailure).Theonlycommonmodefailureofconcernisthefusingofthecontactssincethematrixrelaysarenormallyenergized,failsafe.TheDouglasRandallrelaysatStLucieUnits162haveaccumulated12.2millionoperatinghourswithoutafailureandhaveanexpectedlifeofonemillionoperationsatratedload.Thecoilsarepottedinepoxy.Thereedsandcontactsarehermeticallysealedinglasscapsulesandbackfilledwithdrynitrogen.Contactsarerhodiumwitharatingof30volt-amperesmaximum,whichiswellabovetheexpectedoperationaldemands.ItisFPL'sconcernthatreplacementoftheserelaysmayincreasediversityattheexpenseofprovenreliabilityandthattheprobabi1ityforcommonmodefailuresissoremotethattheirreplacementisnot]ustified.Thereisthepotentialofreplacingtherelayswithlessreliabledevicesandofreducingcircuitfunctionalreliabilityduetothenewdesign.ItisthereforeproposedthattheexistingRPSandAFASmatrixrelaysbefoundacceptablefortheirproposedATWSfunctions.

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