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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20203K321 | |||
| issue date = 08/01/1986 | |||
| title = Insp Repts 50-317/86-10 & 50-318/86-10 on 860616-20. Violations Noted:Maint on Steam Generator Level Transmitter 1 Lt 1124C Unclassified & Nonconformance Repts Per QA Procedure 17 Not Issued | |||
| author name = Eapen P, Harris D, Hunter J, Meils E, Napuda G | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000317, 05000318 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-317-86-10, 50-318-86-10, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8608200197 | |||
| package number = ML20203K315 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 20 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000317/1986010]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:' | |||
. | |||
. | |||
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION I | |||
Report Nos. 50-317/86-10 | |||
50-318/86-10 | |||
Docket Nos. 50-317 | |||
50-318 | |||
License Nos. DPR-53 | |||
DPR-69 | |||
Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company | |||
P. O. Box 1475 | |||
Baltimore, Maryland 21203 | |||
' | |||
Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 | |||
Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland | |||
Inspection Conducted: June 16-20, 1986 | |||
Inspectors: M 8//k | |||
g Na IFda, ead Reador Engineer ' /date | |||
@huh~ r III, Reactor Engineer | |||
M | |||
eM% | |||
' | |||
ate | |||
g/ ! /f6/ | |||
D. la bri ,J RC Consultant date | |||
FD K & #lfn.s /5 | |||
E. Meils, Consultant ' /date | |||
Approved by: . | |||
- | |||
I b | |||
Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chief ' date | |||
QA Section, OB, DRS | |||
I_nspection | |||
n Summary: Special announced inspection on June 16-20, 1986 (Combined | |||
Reoort No. 50-317/86-10 and 50-318/86-10) | |||
Areas Inspected: Licensee's actions to address the concerns identified in NRC | |||
Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of Equipment Classification, Vendor Inter- | |||
face, Post Maintenance Testing, Plant Surveillance and QA/QC overview. ! | |||
4 | |||
Results: One violation (failure to follow procedures) and one unresolved item I | |||
was identified. ' | |||
8608200197 860912- | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000317 | |||
O PDR l | |||
l | |||
. | |||
2 | |||
1.0 Persons Contacted | |||
Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) | |||
*E. R. Bauer, Engineer Analyst | |||
*M. E. Bowman, Technical Services Engineering | |||
J. Carroll, Quality Assurance General Supervisor (GS) | |||
*S. R. Cowne, Licensing Engineer | |||
G. Dare, Senior Quality Control Inspector | |||
R. DeAtley, Quality Assurance Engineer | |||
R. Douglas, Manager, Quality Assurance and Staff Services | |||
A. Edwards, Administrative Services Assistant General Supervisor (AGS) | |||
J. Lemons, Manager, Nuclear Operations | |||
*R. M. Lloyd, AGS Material & Equipment Support | |||
*D. S. Marinari, Senior Engineer | |||
*A. Marion, Senior Engineer | |||
P. McGrane, Technical Librarian | |||
M. Michalski, Quality Assurance Auditor | |||
B. Montgomery, Maintenance Supervisor | |||
*J. Moreira, GS-Engineering and Construction , | |||
J. Parran, Quality Assurance Receiving Inspector | |||
*W. E. Putman, Senior Quality Assurance Auditor | |||
M. Roberson, Quality Control and Support Services General Supervisor | |||
L. Russell, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance | |||
*L. E. Salyards, Principle Engineer Licensing | |||
*L. A. Sundquist, GS-QC & Support | |||
R. Sydnor, Senior Systems Engineer | |||
*A. R. Thornton, Plant & Project Engineer | |||
*K. Umphrey, Supervisor | |||
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) | |||
: *T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector | |||
*D. Trimble, Resident Inspector | |||
*L. E. Tripp, Section Chief, Project Section 3A | |||
The inspectors also contacted other administrative and technical licensee | |||
personnel during the course of the inspection. | |||
* denotes those present at the June 20, 1986 exit meeting | |||
2.0 Inspection Summary | |||
2.1 Background | |||
The reactor trip system, as part of the reactor protection system, | |||
is fundamental to reactor safety for all nuclear power reactor | |||
, | |||
designs. Transient and accident analyses are predicated on the | |||
assumption that the reactor trip system will automatically initiate | |||
reactivity control systems on demand to assure that fuel design | |||
1 | |||
i | |||
e-, - - - -= ,- | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
. | |||
3 | |||
limits are not exceeded. The design and regulatory philosophies | |||
for attaining the high reliability required of the reactor trip | |||
system have been primarily on the use of redundancy, periodic | |||
testing, and quality assurance. In February 1983 the Salem Nuclear | |||
Power Station experienced two failures of the reactor trip system | |||
on demand. Regulatory and industry task forces were formed to | |||
determine the safety significance and generic implications of the. | |||
events. Based on these findings, certain actions were required of | |||
all licensees. These actions, transmitted in Generic Letter 83-28, | |||
fell into 4 areas: | |||
(1) post-trip review, | |||
(2) equipment classification and vendor interface, | |||
(3) post-maintenance testing, and | |||
(4) reactor trip system reliability improvements. | |||
BG&E submitted their response to Generic Letter 83-28 in letters | |||
listed in Attachment A. This inspection included the areas of | |||
equipment classification and vendor interface, post-maintenance | |||
testing, and QA/QC interface. | |||
2.2 Inspection Results | |||
One violation with multiple examples and one unresolved item were | |||
identified as detailed in paragraphs 3.2d, 3.2e, 5.2a, and 5.2c. | |||
Except for the violation and uniesolved item, the licensee's actions | |||
were found to adequately address the concerns of the Generic Letter | |||
83-28 and were consistent with their commitment in the letters listed | |||
in Attachment A. | |||
3.0 Equipment Classification | |||
3.1 Program Review | |||
The inspectors reviewed the applicable documents, listed in Attach- | |||
ment A, and determined that the Equipment Classification Program | |||
addressed the following: | |||
-- | |||
Safety-related components are identified as such in written | |||
procedures for procurement, maintenance, and modification. | |||
-- | |||
Management oversight of source documentation for the desig- | |||
nation of safety-related systems and components. | |||
-- | |||
Corporate level procedures for safety-related component | |||
procurement, maintenance, and modification. | |||
._. | |||
. | |||
4 | |||
-- | |||
Periodic Quality Assurance audits of activities impacting | |||
safety-related equipment. | |||
-- | |||
Corrective action program for safety-related equipment. | |||
3.2 Program Implementation | |||
The system used by the licensee to identify safety-related items is | |||
the Q-List and its attachments including " red-lined" P&ID drawings, | |||
the list of class IE equipment and the Q-List interpretations. The | |||
Instrument Index provides a list of components such as transmitters, | |||
control devices, recorders, control valves, power supplies, indicators | |||
and sensing elements and identifies which components are classified | |||
as safety-related. The Instrument Index is referenced by and used in | |||
conjunction with the Q-List to determine component classification. | |||
Items are treated as safety-related when there is a doubt about their | |||
classification. The licensee is currently updating and revising the | |||
Q-List and its attachments to assure that safety-related components / | |||
systems are properly classified. This update is scheduled to be | |||
complete by the end of 1986. | |||
A field comparison of system mechanical drawings and electrical | |||
elementary diagrams versus installed equipment was performed. From | |||
this comparison, components were selected to verify the effectiveness | |||
of the licensee's Equipment Classification Program implementation. | |||
For each component selected, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of | |||
safety classification, procurement, receipt, storage, and handling | |||
activities as discussed in the following sections of this report. | |||
a. Reactor Trip System (RTS) | |||
; | |||
The Chairman of the Q-List committee provided the Q-List for | |||
review. The RTS is specified as safety-related, Class IE. | |||
During the walkdown of the system, components were compared | |||
with the applicable plant drawings. All components were | |||
labeled, cables entering switchgear were tagged and cable | |||
separation was maintained. The inspector reviewed 16 | |||
Maintenance Orders (M0s) listed in Attachment A. The Safety | |||
classification of the systems and components of these M0s | |||
were consistent with the Q-List. | |||
No violations were identified. | |||
b. Class IE Electrical | |||
Undervoltage and degraded voltage relays were reviewed for | |||
proper safety classification. The selected components were | |||
< | |||
identified during a walkdown with the Unit 2 electrical mainte- | |||
nance supervisor. The supervisor provided information on cable | |||
routing to verify separation criteria. Facility Change Request | |||
(FCR) #86-15 was reviewed for proper classification of up graded | |||
___ | |||
.. .. . .. - _ - . - . . . - . - -. - .-- . . . . . - - , .. - | |||
i | |||
' | |||
t, , | |||
f | |||
, | |||
5 | |||
. | |||
4 | |||
components. This FCR is issued to change out the degraded | |||
, | |||
voltage relays and correct relay drift. This work will be | |||
4 | |||
completed in the third quarter of 1986. | |||
No violations were identified. , | |||
c. Safety Injection System | |||
The inspector selected the following components during the walk- | |||
downs of the Unit 1 High Pressure Safety Injection and Unit 2 | |||
Low Pressure Safety Injection systems: | |||
! | |||
i | |||
l Unit 1 Unit 2 | |||
j HPSI 12 - HPSI Pump LPSI 22 - LPSI Pump | |||
; 1-MOV-655 - Motor operator 2-CV-306 - Control valve | |||
j operator | |||
j 1-MOV-656 - Motor operator 2-FE-306 - Flow element | |||
- | |||
1-MOV-626 - Motor operator 2-MOV-635 - Motor operator | |||
1-MOV-627 - Motor operator 2-SI-434 - Valve | |||
: 1-FE-321 - Flow element 2-SI-435 - Valve | |||
i 1-PT-301 X,Y - Pressure 2-I/P-306 - Controller | |||
l Transmitter | |||
! | |||
! | |||
The Q-List and its attachments and the Instrument Index were | |||
! reviewed to verify the safety classification of the selected | |||
i components. The inspector also verified that the above com- | |||
' | |||
ponents were correctly classified in the Maintenance Orders and | |||
I | |||
Maintenance Procedures listed in Attachment A. The component | |||
: identification numbers were compared with those on the drawings | |||
! and no discrepancies were found. | |||
; | |||
i | |||
During the system walkdowns, the inspector noted a Maintenance | |||
! Request tag (4642) on valve 1-MOV-626 to identify a packing | |||
i leak. However, this MR was not on the computer listing and the - | |||
licensee could not locate the documentation for this Maintenance | |||
; Request. -A new Maintenance Order was generated to ensure com- | |||
pletion and tracking of required work. The licensee informed | |||
the inspector that they had previously identified similar | |||
, problems. For example, the Nuclear operations department l | |||
1 | |||
monthly report for February 1986 reported that the status of 60 | |||
{ Maintenance Requests (MRs) were compared with the corresponding | |||
l Maintenance Order and discrepancies were found in approximately | |||
l 25% of the MRs. QC inspection reports 0-86-067 and 0-86-444 | |||
, also identified discrepancies in the closeout of MRs. The | |||
; licensee updates the status of MR tags through inspections and | |||
i | |||
i | |||
walkdowns, on a routine basis, | |||
: | |||
! | |||
I | |||
i | |||
! | |||
' _ _ _ _ _ _ __ , _ _ _ _ , . _ . _ _ __ __ _ _. _ _ - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ | |||
_ | |||
- | |||
. | |||
. | |||
6 | |||
The inspectors also noted, during a walkdown, that the packing | |||
on valves 2-CV-306 and 2-SI-536 were leaking. There was boric | |||
acid buildup on these valves. Valve 2-FE-306 had a catch basket | |||
installed below it to collect leakage. However, there were no | |||
MR tags on these components. The inspector informed the licen- | |||
see of these deficiencies and they initiated corrective action | |||
by generating MRs. | |||
While reviewing the Q-List and its attachments and the Instru- | |||
ment Index, the inspector verified that the above components | |||
were properly classified except that 1-PT-301 X and Y were not | |||
classified as safety-related. However, 1-PT-301-Z was classi- | |||
fied as safety-related. Valve controller 2-I/P-306, a safety- | |||
related component, was identified as nonsafety in the Instrument | |||
Index. The above discrepancies were brought to the licensee's | |||
attention. The licensee informed the inspector that these | |||
discrepancies were previously identified by the Q-List upgrading | |||
project and will be resolved in the next revision of the Q-List. | |||
The inspector had no further questions. | |||
The inspector reviewed selected MOs (listed in Attachment A) for | |||
proper safety classification, QC coverage, post-maintenance test | |||
requirements, maintenance and test equipment used, spare parts | |||
used and appropriate reviews and approvals. It was noted that | |||
although the 2-I/P-306 controller was classified as nonsafety- | |||
related on M0 205-170-868A and the Instrument Index listed.the | |||
component as nonsafety-related, the spare components utilized | |||
were purchased as safety-related equipment and received appro- | |||
priate considerations. The balance of the M0s adequately | |||
addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector had no | |||
l further questions. | |||
! | |||
The inspected components of LPSI 22 and HPSI 12 were installed | |||
in accordance with plant drawings. Control circuit routings | |||
were in compliance with separation criteria. All components | |||
were labeled and cables tagged. | |||
i. | |||
d. Instruments and Controls | |||
' | |||
The following components of 'A' reactor protection channel for | |||
pressurizer pressure were examined in the field. | |||
. | |||
_- ---. _ _ _ , . - _ | |||
... | |||
-- - .. _ - | |||
- | |||
l | |||
. | |||
J | |||
7 | |||
Component Description | |||
1-X 102A Pressurizer pressure transmitter 1-PT | |||
102A power supply | |||
1-E/E 102A RPS/ESFAS signal isolator | |||
XA 9 Bistable switch | |||
XA 10 Bistable switch | |||
1-PI 201A Pressure indicator | |||
ATU 7 Thermal margin / low pressure trip unit | |||
ATU 6 High pressurizer pressure trip unit | |||
K1,K2,K3,K4 Reactor trip relays | |||
The field walkdown verified that all components identified were | |||
properly and clearly marked in the field, and corresponded to | |||
the current revision of system loop diagrams. | |||
The licensee's Q-List properly designated the Reactor Protection | |||
System (RPS) and the Emergency Safety Features Actuation System | |||
(ESFAS), of which the above components are a subset, as safety- | |||
related (i.e., quality class "Q"). | |||
The following components of tne Unit 1 High Pressure Safety | |||
Injection (HPSI) system and Unit 2 Lov Pressure Safety Injection | |||
(LPSI) system were examined during a field walkdown. | |||
Component Description | |||
HPSI | |||
1-HS 301Y HPSI pump 22 hand switch | |||
1-HS 3655 Valve 1-MOV 655 hand switch | |||
1-HS 3656 Valve 1-MOV 656 hand switch | |||
1-HS 3626 Valve 1-MOV 626 hand switch. | |||
1-FI 321 Flow indicator | |||
1-FT 321 Flow transmitter | |||
LPSI | |||
2-HS 302Y LPSI pump 22 hand switch | |||
2-FT 306 Flow transmitter | |||
2-FY 306 Flow integrator | |||
2-FIC 306 Valve 2-C 306 flow indicating controller | |||
2-HS 306 Valve 2-CV 306 hand switch | |||
2-HS 3635 Valve 2-MOV 635 hand switch | |||
i | |||
. . _ . - - | |||
.- - - ._ ._ _ | |||
- | |||
. | |||
8 | |||
The field walkdown verified that all components listed above | |||
corresponded to the current revision of the piping and instru- | |||
ment diagrams of the systems. The licensee's Q-List properly | |||
designated these components as safety-related (i.e., quality | |||
class "Q"). | |||
Maintenance Orders (M0s) were examined for selected components | |||
of the RPS, HPSI, and LPSI to verify proper safety classifica- | |||
tion of repairs and spare parts. The M0s reviewed are listed | |||
in Attachment A. In all cases, safety classification of work | |||
and spare parts used were correct and in agreement with the | |||
licensee's Q-List and supplementary Instrument Index. | |||
The examination of the above M0s identified the following | |||
examples of a violation: | |||
Functional Test Procedure (FTI) 104 instructs the technician to | |||
refer to the Class 1E equipment list (Appendix C of the Q-List). | |||
If the instrument is on the list, the technician is then directed | |||
to Calvert Cliffs Instruction (CCI) 208, Qualification Mainten- | |||
a..ce Program. CCI-208 contains special maintenance requirements | |||
for an instrument to maintain its environmental qualification. | |||
The technician is also required to record the component quali- | |||
fication number on the FTI-104 data sheet. This was not done | |||
in any of the cases reviewed (M0 Nos. 205-347-209A, 205-141-984A, | |||
and 106-070-337A) for 1E components. The failure to comply with | |||
FTI-104 is the first example of a violation (50-317/86-10-01 and | |||
50-318/86-10-01). | |||
The licensee attributed this problem to the lack of clarity | |||
in FTI-104 and nine other FTIs. The licensee recently revised | |||
two additional FTIs to clarify the interface with CCI-208 and | |||
more clearly state the need to incorporate the qualification | |||
maintenance requirements of the CCI for the work performed. The | |||
licensee further stated that personnel involved in the perform- | |||
ance of qualification maintenance would be instructed in the | |||
requirements of CCI-208 by June 27, 1986, and that an interim | |||
change to FTI-104, clarifying the interface with CCI-208, would | |||
be made by August 27, 1986. The schedule for making permanent | |||
changes to FTI-104 and the other nine FTIs was pending. | |||
The Steam Generator (SG) wide range level transmitters are | |||
required to operate in the post-accident environment for both | |||
Auxiliary Feedwater initiation and control room indication. | |||
However, these transmitters are not on the IE equipment list | |||
(Q-List, Appendix C) and maintenance on SG 11 level transmitter | |||
ILT 1124C, under M0 206-112-327A, was performed as non-EQ. This | |||
is the second example of c violation (50-317/86-10-01 and | |||
50-318/86-10-01). | |||
__ | |||
- | |||
. | |||
9 | |||
i | |||
i | |||
e. Purchasing and Storage | |||
Purchase Orders (P0s) associated with replacement parts identi- | |||
fied on Maintenance Oiders (M0s) (see Attachment A for'a list of | |||
both) were reviewed to verify the following: | |||
-- | |||
Proper safety classification | |||
-- | |||
Environmental requirements | |||
! -- | |||
Seismic category | |||
-- | |||
National codes'(e.g., IEEE, ASME) criteria | |||
-- | |||
Applicability of 10 CFR 21 | |||
-- | |||
Shelf life provisions | |||
-- | |||
Documentation (e.g., Certificate of Conformance, test | |||
reports) | |||
-- | |||
Vendor technical information (e.g., manuals, storage | |||
requirements) | |||
The main warehouse was toured to determine the adequacy of clean- | |||
ness, storage environment, item identification and traceability, | |||
access restrictions, shelf life control and other aspects of | |||
stcrage conditions for items similar to those associated with | |||
the reviewed P0s. | |||
It was noted that shelf life expiration was annotated on.the | |||
"QA Accept" tags attached to items. Items subject to shelf life | |||
control were stored in a temperature and humidity controlled | |||
s ' dark' room. | |||
No violations were identified, however, an unresolved item is | |||
discussed below. | |||
The shelf. life control program has not yet included those com- | |||
ponents that contain nonmetallic internal parts subject to aging | |||
deterioration. The adeo;acy and timeliness of identification of | |||
such stored items and toe?.c inclusion into the shelf life control | |||
program constitute Ad urn.;olved item (50-317/86-10-02 and | |||
50-318/86-10-02) | |||
i | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
1 | |||
- . | |||
. ____. | |||
l | |||
- | |||
. | |||
10 | |||
4.0 Vendor Interface | |||
4.1 Program Review | |||
The licensee has identi.fied approximately'1000 vendor technical manuals | |||
in their possession. A review of these manuals was instituted and | |||
approximately 85% of the manuals have been updated. The review was | |||
prioritized as follows: | |||
l' | |||
1) safety-related needed as soon as possible, | |||
2) nonsafety related needed as soon as possible, | |||
3) other safety-related, and | |||
4) other nonsafety-related; and user classified as a) manuals in | |||
possession that were needed, b) manuals not possessed that are | |||
needed, and c) manuals cut needed. | |||
A centralized library has been established which contains a master | |||
(not circulated) and two copies (can be borrowed) of those manuals | |||
determined to be needed. Other controlled copies are issued to users | |||
having a need and who must return pages/ sections for which they have | |||
received updated information. Manuals are indexed by vendor name, | |||
assigned number and component nomenclature. | |||
Procedure CCI-1220 requires that snyone receiving vendor technical | |||
information (VTI) forward same to the Technical Library. The library | |||
logs the VTI and distributes it to engineering groups for review and | |||
disposition. The results of engireering review are returned to the | |||
Technical Library for implementing the disposition (e.g., updating | |||
a manual). i | |||
The program has recently been revised to assure vendor notification | |||
when the licensee identifies any discrepancies and/or inaccuracies | |||
in the vendor information. Also, the Technical Library had issued a | |||
memorandum to engineering and plant project supervisors requesting | |||
that an effort be initiated to establish contact with those vendors | |||
who have not and normally do not provide updated VTI. | |||
From the above, the inspector concluded that the licensee's control | |||
of VTI closely parallels the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee | |||
(NUTAC) recommendations. The NUTAC proposals are currently under NRC | |||
review. | |||
l | |||
No violations were identified. j | |||
4.2 Program Implementation | |||
a. Reactor Trip Switchgear | |||
The inspector reviewed the General Electric vendor technical j | |||
manual (Revision 0) for vendor bulletin interface. The system | |||
' | |||
engineer has the. responsibility for reviewing the service | |||
. | |||
_ . ._ ~. _ _ _ _ __ _ __ | |||
, | |||
- | |||
.. | |||
; | |||
11 | |||
; | |||
advisories letters and incorporating applicable information in | |||
; the appropriate procedures. . The inspector noted that the system | |||
for implementation was satisfactory. ' | |||
' | |||
b. Safety Injection Systems | |||
The inspector reviewed applicable Preventive Maintenance cards | |||
. | |||
and _ Facility Change Requests (FCRs) listed in Attachment- A for | |||
i | |||
references and incorporation of vendor technical information- | |||
(e.g., reports, manuals and instructions). The inspector deter- | |||
mined that the documents reviewed' referenced vendor information | |||
where applicable. | |||
t | |||
The FCRs were reviewed for proper safety classification, perform- | |||
ance of safety analysis, Technical Specification applicability, | |||
purchase order component classification, QA/QC coverage, spare | |||
parts classification, drawing change requests and required review | |||
and approvals. For example; FCR #84-1032 was a vendor recom- | |||
mended change initiated by Velan Valve Corporation to change the | |||
disc material of certain safety injection valves. The reviewed | |||
: FCRs were determined to be adequate. The inspector had no | |||
further questions. . | |||
c. Instrumentation and Controls | |||
; | |||
)! Instrument functional test and calibration procedures listed in | |||
Attachment A were reviewed to determine adequate incorporation | |||
of vendor supplied information. All appropriate vendor infor- | |||
j mation was found to be properly incorporated into the applicable | |||
i | |||
procedures. Vendor manuals were administratively controlled and | |||
were verified to pertain to the model number of the installed | |||
component. | |||
No violations were identified. | |||
5.0 Post Maintenance and Surveillance Testing | |||
5.1 program Review ' | |||
Procedures in Attachment A were reviewed and the-inspectors deter- | |||
mined that the following were addressed during the performance.of | |||
, | |||
maintenance: | |||
- | |||
Written procedures provide for initiating requests for post- | |||
, | |||
maintenance testing. | |||
-- | |||
Criteria and responsibilities for review and' approval of l | |||
maintenance. | |||
1 | |||
' | |||
- | |||
Criteria and responsibilities for the basis of safety-related/ l | |||
nonsafety-related activity designation. | |||
.- , ,-m , , - r,_ , , - . i 4.- , , , -.- .-. _ _ , . . - . . . . ,,,..,r , -- . - #em-e | |||
- | |||
. | |||
12 | |||
l | |||
l | |||
- | |||
Criteria and responsibilities for inspection of post-maintenance | |||
testing. | |||
- | |||
Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance. | |||
- | |||
Administrative controls for documentation of maintenance | |||
activities. | |||
5.2 Program Implementation | |||
Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)-14, " Plant Maintenance," defines | |||
the responsibilities associated with preventive and corrective main- | |||
tenance, and modifications performed on safety related components. | |||
CCI-200, " Maintenance Requests," establishes the responsibilities | |||
and requirements for preparation and processing MRs required by | |||
QAP-14. The MRs require the specification of post-maintenance test | |||
requirements. CCI-201, " Maintenance Procedures," provides responsi- | |||
bility for writing procedures whenever maintenance on safety-related | |||
components is outside the scope of routine maintenance. The mainte- | |||
nance procedures include sections addressing post-maintenance testing | |||
prior to return to service, and ensuring lunctional acceptability of | |||
the components. Surveillance tests are also often utilized to satisfy | |||
post-maintenance operability testing pricr to returning the component | |||
to service, | |||
a. Reactor Trip System (RTS) | |||
The inspector reviewed those MOs for the RTS listed in Attach- | |||
ment A. Post-Maintenance Testing had met the requirements for | |||
operation of the RTS. Calibration sheecs for selected measuring | |||
ard test equipment (M&TE) used were reviewed and the results are | |||
discussed below: | |||
Item #8731 Digital Volt Meter (DVM), calibration sheet 1/8/86, | |||
(last calibration 10/21/85). The 'as found' column was blank, | |||
indicating that the calibration could not be verified from the | |||
last calibration date. The usage log identified that this DVM | |||
was used in the safety-related tests listed below: | |||
Date Test | |||
10/22/85 STP-M-150-2 | |||
10/23/85 STP-M-514-2 | |||
10/28/85 2-52-I-R-28 | |||
10/31/85 562-2 | |||
10/31/85 535-2 | |||
11/02/85 STP-M-510-2 | |||
11/04/85 STP-M-525-2 | |||
- , - | |||
. | |||
. | |||
l | |||
13 i | |||
- | |||
Item #10278 DVM, calibration sheet 4/14/86, (last calibra- | |||
tion 3/11/86). It was noted on the calibration sheet 'DC | |||
amps out of cal.' The usage log sheet indicated that the | |||
DC amp scale was used for STP-M-672-1 on 3/17/86. | |||
- | |||
Item #10273 DVM, calibration sheet 6/5/85, the 'as found' | |||
column was blank. Comments listed on the calibration sheet | |||
noted ' meter not zeroing and reading way out.' The usage | |||
log sheets showed that this DVM was used in the following | |||
safety-related tests. | |||
Date Test | |||
5/16/85 M0 205-105-024A | |||
5/16/85 STP-M-210B-2 | |||
5/16/85 STP-M-510 | |||
Procedure QAP 17, part 12.1, requires the issuance of a Noncon- | |||
formance Report (NCR) when calibration problems are identified | |||
for M&TE. The inspector requested the NCRs issued for the above | |||
DVMs. | |||
The licensee had no documented evidence indicating that the | |||
required NCRs were issued for these three DVMs. These failures | |||
to initiate NCRs constitute the third example of the violation | |||
(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01). | |||
The inspector reviewed STP-M-511-1, which is a channel response | |||
time test for the RTS. It was noted that the results were | |||
within the limits of the Technical Specifications. However, | |||
the original test had 15 places where data had been revised by | |||
' whiting out' the original information with no indication of who | |||
had changed the data or when it was changed. This is not in | |||
conformance with QAP-7 that requires that the person making | |||
changes and the date be documented. This is another example of | |||
the violation (50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01). | |||
The performance of STP-M-200-1, Revision 5, was observed by an | |||
inspector on 6/18/86. The test director failed to follow the | |||
procedure step II.B.2 in that after tripping the first set of | |||
breakers, the test director notified the control room to close | |||
the breakers before he had checked the undervoltage (UV) device | |||
armature, to assure the breaker would not ' trip free.' This | |||
is the fourth example of violation (50-317/86-10-01 and | |||
50-318/86-10-01). | |||
, __ | |||
. | |||
14 , | |||
b. Class IE Electrical System | |||
The inspector-reviewed STP-M-522-1, Revision 4, performed 5/1/86. | |||
One relay was found to be out of Technical Specification limits | |||
< | |||
and was recalibrated. The system as a whole was within the | |||
limits of the technical specifications and satisfactory. | |||
, | |||
c. Safety Injection Systems | |||
The inspector reviewed M0s listed in Attachment A for_ adequate | |||
post-maintenance testing. Surveillance test procedures (STP) | |||
and completed surveillance tests performed as post-maintenance | |||
tests, listed in Attachment A, were also reviewed for technical | |||
adequacy, completeness, acceptance criteria, maintenance and | |||
test equipment tracking, corrective action and appropriate | |||
supervisory review and approval. Except for STP-0-65-2 per- | |||
formed 12/16/85, the M0s and STPs reviewed were complete and , | |||
adequately addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector | |||
noted that STP-0-65-2 performed 12/16/85 was missing information | |||
on the cover sheet regarding test results and that all supple- | |||
mental data did not properly identify the person providing the | |||
data or the date. This is an additional example of violation | |||
(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01). | |||
* | |||
. | |||
The inspector reviewed Preventive Maintenance (PM) data cards, | |||
(listed in Attachment A) for QC coverage requirements, refer- | |||
4 | |||
ences to vendor information, approval requirements, technical | |||
i | |||
' | |||
specifications restrictions and references, and plant condition | |||
requirements. The PM data cards addressed the above attributes, | |||
where applicable. | |||
d. Instrumentation and Control | |||
Maintenance Orders (MOs) for RPS and Safety Injection systems | |||
were reviewed to verify adequacy of post-maintenance testing. | |||
In all cases reviewed, post-maintenance testing was found to | |||
be adequate and complete. The M0s reviewed are listed in | |||
Attachment A. | |||
e. Trending | |||
The system engineer provided records for trending breaker | |||
response times. The information included any work performed | |||
on the breaker (s) relating to maintenance and new component | |||
installation. | |||
The performance test group has programs to monitor system | |||
trending such as oil sampling, vibration monitoring, and pump | |||
performance. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
1 | |||
_.- | |||
,,,m,-, _ _ , . _ _ _ _ . _ , _ .- . - _ - | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
15 | |||
6.0 QA/QC Interface | |||
A recent reorganization has transferred the QC function from the QA group | |||
to the operations or maintenance groups as appropriate. Two QC supervisors | |||
and twenty-one inspectors report to a Quality Control and Support Services | |||
General Supervisor who in turn reports to the Nuclear Maintenance Manager. | |||
One QC Supervisor and five inspectors report to a Quality Control and | |||
Support General Supervisor who reports to the Manager, Nuclear Operations. | |||
Confidential organization charts, position descriptions and department | |||
Purpose and Functions Authority and Responsibility Assignments were | |||
reviewed and discussed with the General Supervisors and Managers. | |||
Maintenance QC has developed written criteria that establish priorities | |||
for the overview of work. Priority I requires 100% overview and includes | |||
Emergency Diesel Generator, Main Steam Isolation Valve, Main Feed Pump | |||
Controls and Turbine Rotor Inspection work. Priority II requires 50-100% | |||
overview and includes Snubber, Machine and Weld Shop, other Valve Overhauls | |||
and Pump Overhauls and Repacking work. Priority III requires 0-50% over- | |||
view of Valve Repacking, Packing Adjustments, Grouting and Painting work. | |||
l The QC Supervisors stated that notification was received on work for 2162 | |||
. | |||
i | |||
Maintenance Orders (M0s) between January I and June 18,19Eo. The 294 M0s | |||
for which QC overview was waived represented approxiraately 13% of the total | |||
work (i.e., 87% of work was monitored by QC). | |||
1 | |||
I | |||
Operations QC' reviews the monthly schedules for various activities and | |||
then choose those they wish to observe, review or independently verify. | |||
This includes log checks, plant evolutions, plant surveillance tests and | |||
independent verification of valve lineups. | |||
Based on an analysis and evaluation of the above, it was determined that | |||
no apparent conflict existed between QC independence and the budget / cost / | |||
schedule function. | |||
Two QA Supervisors and twenty-five technical persons report to a Quality | |||
knurance General Supervisor who reports to the Quality Assurance and Staff | |||
Services Manager. The latter individual reports directly to the Nuclear | |||
Energy Vice President. The duties of the QA Department include review of | |||
Purchase Orders, vnndor evaluation and surveillance, and internal auditing. | |||
Two audit packages and the 1986 audit schedule were reviewed to determine | |||
the following: | |||
-- | |||
Checklists were developed and used | |||
-- | |||
Identified discrepancies were followed up ' | |||
-- | |||
Appropriate attributes and characteristics addressed the functional | |||
, | |||
' | |||
areas audited | |||
-- | |||
Conduct of audits generally adhered to the schedule | |||
1 | |||
No violations were identified. | |||
l | |||
L | |||
' | |||
4 | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
16 | |||
7.0 Unresolved Items | |||
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in | |||
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violations. | |||
An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 3.2.e. | |||
8.0 Management Meetings | |||
Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection | |||
at an entrance meeting conducted June 16, 1986. The findings of the in- | |||
spection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course | |||
of the inspection. An exit meeting was conducted June 20, 1986 at the | |||
conclusion of the inspection (see Paragraph I for attendees) at which time | |||
the findings were presented to licensee management. At no time during | |||
this inspection was written material provided to the licensee. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
.- - .- - - - . _ _ . _ _ . - . - - . - - -. | |||
. , | |||
ATTACHMENT A | |||
1.0 References / Requirements | |||
NRC Generic Letter 83-28, " Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events" | |||
10 CFR 50, Appendix B | |||
Technical Specifications | |||
FSAR | |||
Quality Assurance Program | |||
ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the | |||
Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants | |||
ANSI N45.2.2-1972, Packing, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of | |||
Items for Nuclear Power Plants | |||
ANSI N45.2.12-1977, Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance | |||
Programs for Nuclear Power Plants | |||
NRC Safety Evaluation Regarding Generic Letter 83-28 Items, 11/21/85 | |||
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI,1974 edition with addenda | |||
BG&E letter of 11/5/83, Subject: Required Actions based on Generic | |||
Letter 83-28 | |||
BG&E transmittal of 2/29/84, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic | |||
Letter 83-28 | |||
BG&E letter of 1/18/85, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic Letter | |||
83-28 | |||
2.0 Documents Reviewed | |||
2.1 Procedures / Tests | |||
CCI-200I Nuclear Maintenance System, Change 2, 4/1/85 | |||
CCI-208B Qualification Maintenance Program, 2/3/86 | |||
CCI-2110 Preventive Maintenance Program, Change 6, 6/6/86 | |||
FTI-104 Transmitter Calibration / Calibration Check, Revision 4, 5/8/85 | |||
STP No. M2108-1 RPS Functional Test, Revision 26, 4/23/86, performed | |||
on 5/15/86 | |||
STP No, M220-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System | |||
Functional Test, Revision 7, performed on 6/4/85 | |||
STP No. M510-1 RPS Channel Calibration Check, Revision 12, | |||
performed on 5/3/85 | |||
STP No, M520-1 ESFAS Calibration, Revision 7, 4/10/85, performed on | |||
5/13/85 | |||
STP No. M200-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time | |||
STP No. M511-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time ' | |||
STP No. M522 4kV relay calibration | |||
FTE-57 Reactor Trip Switchgear Preventive Maintenance | |||
CCI-104A Surveillance Test Program, Change 1, 6/1/86 | |||
CCI-309A Locked Valves, Change 2, 9/27/85 | |||
CCI-122C Control of Technical Manuals, Change 1, 8/24/84 | |||
CCI-1220 Control of Technical Manuals, Proposed Revision | |||
QAP-7 Records Management, Revision- 19, 6/4/86 | |||
QAP-14 Plant Maintenance, Revision 29, 1/10/86 | |||
. - | |||
Attachment A 2 | |||
QAP-15 Changes, Tests & Experiments, Revision 45, 6/4/86 | |||
QAP-16 Surveillance Testing, Revision 16, 1/1/86 | |||
QAP-28 Control of Items Covered by QA Program, Revision 23, 1/1/86 | |||
1-52-M-2M-1 #11 LPSI Pumps, Revision 1, 6/6/85 | |||
1-52-M-A-4 #12 HPSI Pump, Revision 6, 3/27/85 | |||
1-52-M-R-5 1-MOV-4144, Revi sion 0, 8/30/85 | |||
1-52-M-R-31 1-MOV-652, Revision 0, 9/4/85 | |||
STP-0-67-2 Check Valve Operability Verification, Revision 14, | |||
11/28/84 results of 4/27/85, 5/2/85 and 5/5/85 | |||
STP-0-65-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations, | |||
Revision 26, 3/6/35 results of 5/28/85 | |||
STP-0-65-2 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations, | |||
Revision 28, 10/2/85 results of 12/16/85 | |||
STP-0-93-1 Locked Valve Verification, Revision 20, 2/28/85 | |||
STP-0-73-1 ESF Equipment Performance Test, Revision 23, 11/5/85 | |||
STP-0-66-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Shutdown, | |||
Revision 18, 12/4/85 | |||
STP-0-62-1 Monthly Valve Position Verification, Revision 25, 2/5/86 | |||
2.2 Vendor Manuals | |||
ITT Barton Installation & Operation Manual, Model 764, Differential | |||
Pressure Electronic Transmitter, 9/83 | |||
GEI-50299A, Revision 0, GE Technical Manual for Reactor Trip. | |||
Switchgear | |||
Ingersoll. Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 1 Installation, Operations and | |||
' | |||
Maintenance, 4/8/85 | |||
Ingersoll Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 2 Installation, Operations and | |||
Maintenance, 2/24/86 | |||
Limitorque SMB Installation and Maintenance Manual | |||
GE HK-2-25 Breaker Manual GEI-50 299A | |||
- | |||
2.3 Procedures | |||
& | |||
DESP-3, Establishment and Control of the List of Safety-Related | |||
Items, Reviston 0 | |||
DESP-8, Equipment Qualification, Revision 1 | |||
DESP-10, Control of Calvert Cliffs Equipment Data Base, Revision 0 | |||
2.4 Prints / Drawings | |||
60-933-B, Sh. IA 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 ' | |||
60-933-B, Sh. 18 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 | |||
60-933-B, Sh. 1C 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 | |||
60-933-B, Sh. 10 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 | |||
12125-16, Sh. 8 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3 | |||
12125-16, Sh. 10 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3 | |||
63-005-E Meter & Relay Diagram 4kV System, Revision 11 | |||
6750-M590-17-2 RTS One-Line Diagram, Sh. 3 | |||
IE76, Sh. 2 LPSI 22 Control Diagram, Revision 9 | |||
IE76, Sh. 4 HPSI 12 Control Diagram, Revision 9 | |||
. . . - . | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
Attachment A 3 | |||
IE7, Sh. 1 UV Relay Control Diagram, Revision 10 | |||
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems | |||
M-462, Sh. 1 of.3, P&ID | |||
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems | |||
- | |||
M-462, Sh. 2 of 3, P&ID | |||
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems | |||
M-74, Sh.1 of 3, P&ID | |||
2.5 Maintenance Orders | |||
205-347-209A ILIC 1123D, Steam Generator (S/G) 12 Level | |||
203-001-256A AJ2, RPS Channel B Variable Output Power Transformer | |||
205-141-984A ILT 1113A, S/G 11 Level | |||
205-267-695A BBE, RPS Channel B Thermal Margin Calculator | |||
* | |||
205-274-941A IJIO11, XC933 Average RPS Internal ASI | |||
206-133-256A AAG3, RPS Channel C Trip Unit 3 (TV-3) Low Flow | |||
* | |||
206-134-860A CCG4, RPS Channel C TU-4 | |||
206-112-327A ILT 1124C S/G 11 Level | |||
206-134-876A AAF, Channel A S/G 11 ASGT | |||
; 205-064-545A 2-PIA 102A, Pressure Indication / Annunciation | |||
* | |||
205-064-550A 2-PIA 102C, Pressure Indicator / Annunciation | |||
, 206-070-337A 2-PT 102A,B,C,D, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters | |||
205-358-494A RTS breaker will not close from control room | |||
. | |||
205-131-751A RTS replace lug on pushbutton | |||
i 205-204-655A RTS replace defective UV coil | |||
205-087-472A RTS breaker wouldn't-trip on UV signal | |||
206-023-245A RTS breaker would not close | |||
.: 205-036-499A RTS test UV in place for response times | |||
205-147-186A RTS repair or replace trip unit | |||
205-067-681A RTS ensure breaker trips on demand | |||
206-066-274A RTS remove and install springs | |||
203-001-025A RTS replace overcurrent trip device | |||
205-085-344A RTS install NC pushbutton | |||
205-149-237A RTS breaker will not close | |||
, 205-087-439A RTS replace HFA relay | |||
i 205-199-573A RTS UV coil did not pick up trouble shoot | |||
206-056-977A RTS breaker failed to close | |||
203-001-035A RTS breaker will not close properly | |||
205-294-721A RTS perform GE SAL | |||
203-003-330A,B,C 1-SI-450 | |||
203-003-388A 1-PT-3014 | |||
205-162-640A HPSI Pump #12 coupling bolts | |||
205-229-677A 1-SI-627 MOV | |||
) 206-085-735A 2-CV-306 Shutdown cooling flow' control | |||
j 203-001-424A Repair CV-306 | |||
203-001-524A Troubleshoot & Repair SI-306-FT | |||
2-SI-635 repack | |||
' | |||
203-003-009B | |||
205-029-189A 2-SI-440 packing | |||
205-035-450A 2-SI-440 repack on back seat | |||
205-035-455A Breakers 20417 & 20416 for MOV-635 | |||
. | |||
- | |||
. | |||
Attachment A 4 | |||
205-119-412A HPSI MOVs 2-616,626,617,627 | |||
205-141-001A 2 M0V-615,625,635,645 | |||
205-145-168A MOV 626 set limits | |||
205-150-287A 2-HS-3626 | |||
205-155-437A 1-HS-3626 | |||
205-170-868A LPSI 2-I/P-306 Recalibrate | |||
205-247-197A HPSI Pump #12 loose screw | |||
205-304-036A 1-MOV-626 repack | |||
205-304-037A 1-MOV-627 repack | |||
205-347-212A FY-306 eratic output | |||
206-064-240A 2-SI-306 packing | |||
206-078-530A Calibrate FIC-306 | |||
2.6 Miscellaneous | |||
Relay setting sheets for under voltage and degraded voltage relays | |||
FCR #86-15 Facility Change Request for up grading degraded voltage | |||
relays | |||
FCR #84-1032, Safety Injection System Valves, 12/14/84 | |||
FCR #83-102, HPSI Pump #22, 1/25/84 | |||
2.7 Purchase Orders | |||
44784-EX, Power Supply | |||
62346-GX, Barton Transmitters | |||
59558-EX and 59560-EX, Linear Amplifier Module Board | |||
72466-GX, Barton Transmitter 0-Rings | |||
67817-GX, Packing | |||
38849-GX, Electro pneumatic Transducers | |||
75187-GX, Valve Packing | |||
49551-EX, Relays | |||
54284-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Terminals | |||
61254-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Cutoff Switch | |||
70492-EX, 125 Vdc Closing Coil | |||
2.8 Audits | |||
2-31-85, Procurement and Storage | |||
86-14, Plant Maintenance Activities | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 08:26, 20 December 2021
ML20203K321 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Calvert Cliffs |
Issue date: | 08/01/1986 |
From: | Eapen P, Harris D, Hunter J, Meils E, Napuda G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20203K315 | List: |
References | |
50-317-86-10, 50-318-86-10, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8608200197 | |
Download: ML20203K321 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000317/1986010
Text
'
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos. 50-317/86-10
50-318/86-10
Docket Nos. 50-317
50-318
License Nos. DPR-53
Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
'
Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2
Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland
Inspection Conducted: June 16-20, 1986
Inspectors: M 8//k
g Na IFda, ead Reador Engineer ' /date
@huh~ r III, Reactor Engineer
M
eM%
'
ate
g/ ! /f6/
D. la bri ,J RC Consultant date
FD K & #lfn.s /5
E. Meils, Consultant ' /date
Approved by: .
-
I b
Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chief ' date
I_nspection
n Summary: Special announced inspection on June 16-20, 1986 (Combined
Reoort No. 50-317/86-10 and 50-318/86-10)
Areas Inspected: Licensee's actions to address the concerns identified in NRC
Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of Equipment Classification, Vendor Inter-
face, Post Maintenance Testing, Plant Surveillance and QA/QC overview. !
4
Results: One violation (failure to follow procedures) and one unresolved item I
was identified. '
8608200197 860912-
PDR ADOCK 05000317
O PDR l
l
.
2
1.0 Persons Contacted
Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E)
- E. R. Bauer, Engineer Analyst
- M. E. Bowman, Technical Services Engineering
J. Carroll, Quality Assurance General Supervisor (GS)
- S. R. Cowne, Licensing Engineer
G. Dare, Senior Quality Control Inspector
R. DeAtley, Quality Assurance Engineer
R. Douglas, Manager, Quality Assurance and Staff Services
A. Edwards, Administrative Services Assistant General Supervisor (AGS)
J. Lemons, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- R. M. Lloyd, AGS Material & Equipment Support
- D. S. Marinari, Senior Engineer
- A. Marion, Senior Engineer
P. McGrane, Technical Librarian
M. Michalski, Quality Assurance Auditor
B. Montgomery, Maintenance Supervisor
- J. Moreira, GS-Engineering and Construction ,
J. Parran, Quality Assurance Receiving Inspector
- W. E. Putman, Senior Quality Assurance Auditor
M. Roberson, Quality Control and Support Services General Supervisor
L. Russell, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- L. E. Salyards, Principle Engineer Licensing
- L. A. Sundquist, GS-QC & Support
R. Sydnor, Senior Systems Engineer
- A. R. Thornton, Plant & Project Engineer
- K. Umphrey, Supervisor
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
- *T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Trimble, Resident Inspector
- L. E. Tripp, Section Chief, Project Section 3A
The inspectors also contacted other administrative and technical licensee
personnel during the course of the inspection.
- denotes those present at the June 20, 1986 exit meeting
2.0 Inspection Summary
2.1 Background
The reactor trip system, as part of the reactor protection system,
is fundamental to reactor safety for all nuclear power reactor
,
designs. Transient and accident analyses are predicated on the
assumption that the reactor trip system will automatically initiate
reactivity control systems on demand to assure that fuel design
1
i
e-, - - - -= ,-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
3
limits are not exceeded. The design and regulatory philosophies
for attaining the high reliability required of the reactor trip
system have been primarily on the use of redundancy, periodic
testing, and quality assurance. In February 1983 the Salem Nuclear
Power Station experienced two failures of the reactor trip system
on demand. Regulatory and industry task forces were formed to
determine the safety significance and generic implications of the.
events. Based on these findings, certain actions were required of
all licensees. These actions, transmitted in Generic Letter 83-28,
fell into 4 areas:
(1) post-trip review,
(2) equipment classification and vendor interface,
(3) post-maintenance testing, and
(4) reactor trip system reliability improvements.
BG&E submitted their response to Generic Letter 83-28 in letters
listed in Attachment A. This inspection included the areas of
equipment classification and vendor interface, post-maintenance
testing, and QA/QC interface.
2.2 Inspection Results
One violation with multiple examples and one unresolved item were
identified as detailed in paragraphs 3.2d, 3.2e, 5.2a, and 5.2c.
Except for the violation and uniesolved item, the licensee's actions
were found to adequately address the concerns of the Generic Letter 83-28 and were consistent with their commitment in the letters listed
in Attachment A.
3.0 Equipment Classification
3.1 Program Review
The inspectors reviewed the applicable documents, listed in Attach-
ment A, and determined that the Equipment Classification Program
addressed the following:
--
Safety-related components are identified as such in written
procedures for procurement, maintenance, and modification.
--
Management oversight of source documentation for the desig-
nation of safety-related systems and components.
--
Corporate level procedures for safety-related component
procurement, maintenance, and modification.
._.
.
4
--
Periodic Quality Assurance audits of activities impacting
safety-related equipment.
--
Corrective action program for safety-related equipment.
3.2 Program Implementation
The system used by the licensee to identify safety-related items is
the Q-List and its attachments including " red-lined" P&ID drawings,
the list of class IE equipment and the Q-List interpretations. The
Instrument Index provides a list of components such as transmitters,
control devices, recorders, control valves, power supplies, indicators
and sensing elements and identifies which components are classified
as safety-related. The Instrument Index is referenced by and used in
conjunction with the Q-List to determine component classification.
Items are treated as safety-related when there is a doubt about their
classification. The licensee is currently updating and revising the
Q-List and its attachments to assure that safety-related components /
systems are properly classified. This update is scheduled to be
complete by the end of 1986.
A field comparison of system mechanical drawings and electrical
elementary diagrams versus installed equipment was performed. From
this comparison, components were selected to verify the effectiveness
of the licensee's Equipment Classification Program implementation.
For each component selected, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of
safety classification, procurement, receipt, storage, and handling
activities as discussed in the following sections of this report.
a. Reactor Trip System (RTS)
The Chairman of the Q-List committee provided the Q-List for
review. The RTS is specified as safety-related, Class IE.
During the walkdown of the system, components were compared
with the applicable plant drawings. All components were
labeled, cables entering switchgear were tagged and cable
separation was maintained. The inspector reviewed 16
Maintenance Orders (M0s) listed in Attachment A. The Safety
classification of the systems and components of these M0s
were consistent with the Q-List.
No violations were identified.
b. Class IE Electrical
Undervoltage and degraded voltage relays were reviewed for
proper safety classification. The selected components were
<
identified during a walkdown with the Unit 2 electrical mainte-
nance supervisor. The supervisor provided information on cable
routing to verify separation criteria. Facility Change Request
(FCR) #86-15 was reviewed for proper classification of up graded
___
.. .. . .. - _ - . - . . . - . - -. - .-- . . . . . - - , .. -
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f
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5
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4
components. This FCR is issued to change out the degraded
,
voltage relays and correct relay drift. This work will be
4
completed in the third quarter of 1986.
No violations were identified. ,
c. Safety Injection System
The inspector selected the following components during the walk-
downs of the Unit 1 High Pressure Safety Injection and Unit 2
Low Pressure Safety Injection systems:
!
i
l Unit 1 Unit 2
j HPSI 12 - HPSI Pump LPSI 22 - LPSI Pump
- 1-MOV-655 - Motor operator 2-CV-306 - Control valve
j operator
j 1-MOV-656 - Motor operator 2-FE-306 - Flow element
-
1-MOV-626 - Motor operator 2-MOV-635 - Motor operator
1-MOV-627 - Motor operator 2-SI-434 - Valve
- 1-FE-321 - Flow element 2-SI-435 - Valve
i 1-PT-301 X,Y - Pressure 2-I/P-306 - Controller
l Transmitter
!
!
The Q-List and its attachments and the Instrument Index were
! reviewed to verify the safety classification of the selected
i components. The inspector also verified that the above com-
'
ponents were correctly classified in the Maintenance Orders and
I
Maintenance Procedures listed in Attachment A. The component
- identification numbers were compared with those on the drawings
! and no discrepancies were found.
i
During the system walkdowns, the inspector noted a Maintenance
! Request tag (4642) on valve 1-MOV-626 to identify a packing
i leak. However, this MR was not on the computer listing and the -
licensee could not locate the documentation for this Maintenance
- Request. -A new Maintenance Order was generated to ensure com-
pletion and tracking of required work. The licensee informed
the inspector that they had previously identified similar
, problems. For example, the Nuclear operations department l
1
monthly report for February 1986 reported that the status of 60
{ Maintenance Requests (MRs) were compared with the corresponding
l Maintenance Order and discrepancies were found in approximately
l 25% of the MRs. QC inspection reports 0-86-067 and 0-86-444
, also identified discrepancies in the closeout of MRs. The
- licensee updates the status of MR tags through inspections and
i
i
walkdowns, on a routine basis,
!
I
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!
' _ _ _ _ _ _ __ , _ _ _ _ , . _ . _ _ __ __ _ _. _ _ - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _
_
-
.
.
6
The inspectors also noted, during a walkdown, that the packing
on valves 2-CV-306 and 2-SI-536 were leaking. There was boric
acid buildup on these valves. Valve 2-FE-306 had a catch basket
installed below it to collect leakage. However, there were no
MR tags on these components. The inspector informed the licen-
see of these deficiencies and they initiated corrective action
by generating MRs.
While reviewing the Q-List and its attachments and the Instru-
ment Index, the inspector verified that the above components
were properly classified except that 1-PT-301 X and Y were not
classified as safety-related. However, 1-PT-301-Z was classi-
fied as safety-related. Valve controller 2-I/P-306, a safety-
related component, was identified as nonsafety in the Instrument
Index. The above discrepancies were brought to the licensee's
attention. The licensee informed the inspector that these
discrepancies were previously identified by the Q-List upgrading
project and will be resolved in the next revision of the Q-List.
The inspector had no further questions.
The inspector reviewed selected MOs (listed in Attachment A) for
proper safety classification, QC coverage, post-maintenance test
requirements, maintenance and test equipment used, spare parts
used and appropriate reviews and approvals. It was noted that
although the 2-I/P-306 controller was classified as nonsafety-
related on M0 205-170-868A and the Instrument Index listed.the
component as nonsafety-related, the spare components utilized
were purchased as safety-related equipment and received appro-
priate considerations. The balance of the M0s adequately
addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector had no
l further questions.
!
The inspected components of LPSI 22 and HPSI 12 were installed
in accordance with plant drawings. Control circuit routings
were in compliance with separation criteria. All components
were labeled and cables tagged.
i.
d. Instruments and Controls
'
The following components of 'A' reactor protection channel for
pressurizer pressure were examined in the field.
.
_- ---. _ _ _ , . - _
...
-- - .. _ -
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Component Description
1-X 102A Pressurizer pressure transmitter 1-PT
102A power supply
1-E/E 102A RPS/ESFAS signal isolator
XA 9 Bistable switch
XA 10 Bistable switch
1-PI 201A Pressure indicator
ATU 7 Thermal margin / low pressure trip unit
ATU 6 High pressurizer pressure trip unit
K1,K2,K3,K4 Reactor trip relays
The field walkdown verified that all components identified were
properly and clearly marked in the field, and corresponded to
the current revision of system loop diagrams.
The licensee's Q-List properly designated the Reactor Protection
System (RPS) and the Emergency Safety Features Actuation System
(ESFAS), of which the above components are a subset, as safety-
related (i.e., quality class "Q").
The following components of tne Unit 1 High Pressure Safety
Injection (HPSI) system and Unit 2 Lov Pressure Safety Injection
(LPSI) system were examined during a field walkdown.
Component Description
1-HS 301Y HPSI pump 22 hand switch
1-HS 3655 Valve 1-MOV 655 hand switch
1-HS 3656 Valve 1-MOV 656 hand switch
1-HS 3626 Valve 1-MOV 626 hand switch.
1-FI 321 Flow indicator
1-FT 321 Flow transmitter
2-HS 302Y LPSI pump 22 hand switch
2-FT 306 Flow transmitter
2-FY 306 Flow integrator
2-FIC 306 Valve 2-C 306 flow indicating controller
2-HS 306 Valve 2-CV 306 hand switch
2-HS 3635 Valve 2-MOV 635 hand switch
i
. . _ . - -
.- - - ._ ._ _
-
.
8
The field walkdown verified that all components listed above
corresponded to the current revision of the piping and instru-
ment diagrams of the systems. The licensee's Q-List properly
designated these components as safety-related (i.e., quality
class "Q").
Maintenance Orders (M0s) were examined for selected components
of the RPS, HPSI, and LPSI to verify proper safety classifica-
tion of repairs and spare parts. The M0s reviewed are listed
in Attachment A. In all cases, safety classification of work
and spare parts used were correct and in agreement with the
licensee's Q-List and supplementary Instrument Index.
The examination of the above M0s identified the following
examples of a violation:
Functional Test Procedure (FTI) 104 instructs the technician to
refer to the Class 1E equipment list (Appendix C of the Q-List).
If the instrument is on the list, the technician is then directed
to Calvert Cliffs Instruction (CCI) 208, Qualification Mainten-
a..ce Program. CCI-208 contains special maintenance requirements
for an instrument to maintain its environmental qualification.
The technician is also required to record the component quali-
fication number on the FTI-104 data sheet. This was not done
in any of the cases reviewed (M0 Nos. 205-347-209A, 205-141-984A,
and 106-070-337A) for 1E components. The failure to comply with
FTI-104 is the first example of a violation (50-317/86-10-01 and
50-318/86-10-01).
The licensee attributed this problem to the lack of clarity
in FTI-104 and nine other FTIs. The licensee recently revised
two additional FTIs to clarify the interface with CCI-208 and
more clearly state the need to incorporate the qualification
maintenance requirements of the CCI for the work performed. The
licensee further stated that personnel involved in the perform-
ance of qualification maintenance would be instructed in the
requirements of CCI-208 by June 27, 1986, and that an interim
change to FTI-104, clarifying the interface with CCI-208, would
be made by August 27, 1986. The schedule for making permanent
changes to FTI-104 and the other nine FTIs was pending.
The Steam Generator (SG) wide range level transmitters are
required to operate in the post-accident environment for both
Auxiliary Feedwater initiation and control room indication.
However, these transmitters are not on the IE equipment list
(Q-List, Appendix C) and maintenance on SG 11 level transmitter
ILT 1124C, under M0 206-112-327A, was performed as non-EQ. This
is the second example of c violation (50-317/86-10-01 and
50-318/86-10-01).
__
-
.
9
i
i
e. Purchasing and Storage
Purchase Orders (P0s) associated with replacement parts identi-
fied on Maintenance Oiders (M0s) (see Attachment A for'a list of
both) were reviewed to verify the following:
--
Proper safety classification
--
Environmental requirements
! --
Seismic category
--
National codes'(e.g., IEEE, ASME) criteria
--
Applicability of 10 CFR 21
--
Shelf life provisions
--
Documentation (e.g., Certificate of Conformance, test
reports)
--
Vendor technical information (e.g., manuals, storage
requirements)
The main warehouse was toured to determine the adequacy of clean-
ness, storage environment, item identification and traceability,
access restrictions, shelf life control and other aspects of
stcrage conditions for items similar to those associated with
the reviewed P0s.
It was noted that shelf life expiration was annotated on.the
"QA Accept" tags attached to items. Items subject to shelf life
control were stored in a temperature and humidity controlled
s ' dark' room.
No violations were identified, however, an unresolved item is
discussed below.
The shelf. life control program has not yet included those com-
ponents that contain nonmetallic internal parts subject to aging
deterioration. The adeo;acy and timeliness of identification of
such stored items and toe?.c inclusion into the shelf life control
program constitute Ad urn.;olved item (50-317/86-10-02 and
50-318/86-10-02)
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4.0 Vendor Interface
4.1 Program Review
The licensee has identi.fied approximately'1000 vendor technical manuals
in their possession. A review of these manuals was instituted and
approximately 85% of the manuals have been updated. The review was
prioritized as follows:
l'
1) safety-related needed as soon as possible,
2) nonsafety related needed as soon as possible,
3) other safety-related, and
4) other nonsafety-related; and user classified as a) manuals in
possession that were needed, b) manuals not possessed that are
needed, and c) manuals cut needed.
A centralized library has been established which contains a master
(not circulated) and two copies (can be borrowed) of those manuals
determined to be needed. Other controlled copies are issued to users
having a need and who must return pages/ sections for which they have
received updated information. Manuals are indexed by vendor name,
assigned number and component nomenclature.
Procedure CCI-1220 requires that snyone receiving vendor technical
information (VTI) forward same to the Technical Library. The library
logs the VTI and distributes it to engineering groups for review and
disposition. The results of engireering review are returned to the
Technical Library for implementing the disposition (e.g., updating
a manual). i
The program has recently been revised to assure vendor notification
when the licensee identifies any discrepancies and/or inaccuracies
in the vendor information. Also, the Technical Library had issued a
memorandum to engineering and plant project supervisors requesting
that an effort be initiated to establish contact with those vendors
who have not and normally do not provide updated VTI.
From the above, the inspector concluded that the licensee's control
of VTI closely parallels the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee
(NUTAC) recommendations. The NUTAC proposals are currently under NRC
review.
l
No violations were identified. j
4.2 Program Implementation
a. Reactor Trip Switchgear
The inspector reviewed the General Electric vendor technical j
manual (Revision 0) for vendor bulletin interface. The system
'
engineer has the. responsibility for reviewing the service
.
_ . ._ ~. _ _ _ _ __ _ __
,
-
..
11
advisories letters and incorporating applicable information in
- the appropriate procedures. . The inspector noted that the system
for implementation was satisfactory. '
'
b. Safety Injection Systems
The inspector reviewed applicable Preventive Maintenance cards
.
and _ Facility Change Requests (FCRs) listed in Attachment- A for
i
references and incorporation of vendor technical information-
(e.g., reports, manuals and instructions). The inspector deter-
mined that the documents reviewed' referenced vendor information
where applicable.
t
The FCRs were reviewed for proper safety classification, perform-
ance of safety analysis, Technical Specification applicability,
purchase order component classification, QA/QC coverage, spare
parts classification, drawing change requests and required review
and approvals. For example; FCR #84-1032 was a vendor recom-
mended change initiated by Velan Valve Corporation to change the
disc material of certain safety injection valves. The reviewed
- FCRs were determined to be adequate. The inspector had no
further questions. .
c. Instrumentation and Controls
)! Instrument functional test and calibration procedures listed in
Attachment A were reviewed to determine adequate incorporation
of vendor supplied information. All appropriate vendor infor-
j mation was found to be properly incorporated into the applicable
i
procedures. Vendor manuals were administratively controlled and
were verified to pertain to the model number of the installed
component.
No violations were identified.
5.0 Post Maintenance and Surveillance Testing
5.1 program Review '
Procedures in Attachment A were reviewed and the-inspectors deter-
mined that the following were addressed during the performance.of
,
maintenance:
-
Written procedures provide for initiating requests for post-
,
maintenance testing.
--
Criteria and responsibilities for review and' approval of l
maintenance.
1
'
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Criteria and responsibilities for the basis of safety-related/ l
nonsafety-related activity designation.
.- , ,-m , , - r,_ , , - . i 4.- , , , -.- .-. _ _ , . . - . . . . ,,,..,r , -- . - #em-e
-
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12
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Criteria and responsibilities for inspection of post-maintenance
testing.
-
Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance.
-
Administrative controls for documentation of maintenance
activities.
5.2 Program Implementation
Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)-14, " Plant Maintenance," defines
the responsibilities associated with preventive and corrective main-
tenance, and modifications performed on safety related components.
CCI-200, " Maintenance Requests," establishes the responsibilities
and requirements for preparation and processing MRs required by
QAP-14. The MRs require the specification of post-maintenance test
requirements. CCI-201, " Maintenance Procedures," provides responsi-
bility for writing procedures whenever maintenance on safety-related
components is outside the scope of routine maintenance. The mainte-
nance procedures include sections addressing post-maintenance testing
prior to return to service, and ensuring lunctional acceptability of
the components. Surveillance tests are also often utilized to satisfy
post-maintenance operability testing pricr to returning the component
to service,
a. Reactor Trip System (RTS)
The inspector reviewed those MOs for the RTS listed in Attach-
ment A. Post-Maintenance Testing had met the requirements for
operation of the RTS. Calibration sheecs for selected measuring
ard test equipment (M&TE) used were reviewed and the results are
discussed below:
Item #8731 Digital Volt Meter (DVM), calibration sheet 1/8/86,
(last calibration 10/21/85). The 'as found' column was blank,
indicating that the calibration could not be verified from the
last calibration date. The usage log identified that this DVM
was used in the safety-related tests listed below:
Date Test
10/22/85 STP-M-150-2
10/23/85 STP-M-514-2
10/28/85 2-52-I-R-28
10/31/85 562-2
10/31/85 535-2
11/02/85 STP-M-510-2
11/04/85 STP-M-525-2
- , -
.
.
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Item #10278 DVM, calibration sheet 4/14/86, (last calibra-
tion 3/11/86). It was noted on the calibration sheet 'DC
amps out of cal.' The usage log sheet indicated that the
DC amp scale was used for STP-M-672-1 on 3/17/86.
-
Item #10273 DVM, calibration sheet 6/5/85, the 'as found'
column was blank. Comments listed on the calibration sheet
noted ' meter not zeroing and reading way out.' The usage
log sheets showed that this DVM was used in the following
safety-related tests.
Date Test
5/16/85 M0 205-105-024A
5/16/85 STP-M-210B-2
5/16/85 STP-M-510
Procedure QAP 17, part 12.1, requires the issuance of a Noncon-
formance Report (NCR) when calibration problems are identified
for M&TE. The inspector requested the NCRs issued for the above
DVMs.
The licensee had no documented evidence indicating that the
required NCRs were issued for these three DVMs. These failures
to initiate NCRs constitute the third example of the violation
(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).
The inspector reviewed STP-M-511-1, which is a channel response
time test for the RTS. It was noted that the results were
within the limits of the Technical Specifications. However,
the original test had 15 places where data had been revised by
' whiting out' the original information with no indication of who
had changed the data or when it was changed. This is not in
conformance with QAP-7 that requires that the person making
changes and the date be documented. This is another example of
the violation (50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).
The performance of STP-M-200-1, Revision 5, was observed by an
inspector on 6/18/86. The test director failed to follow the
procedure step II.B.2 in that after tripping the first set of
breakers, the test director notified the control room to close
the breakers before he had checked the undervoltage (UV) device
armature, to assure the breaker would not ' trip free.' This
is the fourth example of violation (50-317/86-10-01 and
50-318/86-10-01).
, __
.
14 ,
b. Class IE Electrical System
The inspector-reviewed STP-M-522-1, Revision 4, performed 5/1/86.
One relay was found to be out of Technical Specification limits
<
and was recalibrated. The system as a whole was within the
limits of the technical specifications and satisfactory.
,
c. Safety Injection Systems
The inspector reviewed M0s listed in Attachment A for_ adequate
post-maintenance testing. Surveillance test procedures (STP)
and completed surveillance tests performed as post-maintenance
tests, listed in Attachment A, were also reviewed for technical
adequacy, completeness, acceptance criteria, maintenance and
test equipment tracking, corrective action and appropriate
supervisory review and approval. Except for STP-0-65-2 per-
formed 12/16/85, the M0s and STPs reviewed were complete and ,
adequately addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector
noted that STP-0-65-2 performed 12/16/85 was missing information
on the cover sheet regarding test results and that all supple-
mental data did not properly identify the person providing the
data or the date. This is an additional example of violation
(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).
.
The inspector reviewed Preventive Maintenance (PM) data cards,
(listed in Attachment A) for QC coverage requirements, refer-
4
ences to vendor information, approval requirements, technical
i
'
specifications restrictions and references, and plant condition
requirements. The PM data cards addressed the above attributes,
where applicable.
d. Instrumentation and Control
Maintenance Orders (MOs) for RPS and Safety Injection systems
were reviewed to verify adequacy of post-maintenance testing.
In all cases reviewed, post-maintenance testing was found to
be adequate and complete. The M0s reviewed are listed in
Attachment A.
e. Trending
The system engineer provided records for trending breaker
response times. The information included any work performed
on the breaker (s) relating to maintenance and new component
installation.
The performance test group has programs to monitor system
trending such as oil sampling, vibration monitoring, and pump
performance.
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15
6.0 QA/QC Interface
A recent reorganization has transferred the QC function from the QA group
to the operations or maintenance groups as appropriate. Two QC supervisors
and twenty-one inspectors report to a Quality Control and Support Services
General Supervisor who in turn reports to the Nuclear Maintenance Manager.
One QC Supervisor and five inspectors report to a Quality Control and
Support General Supervisor who reports to the Manager, Nuclear Operations.
Confidential organization charts, position descriptions and department
Purpose and Functions Authority and Responsibility Assignments were
reviewed and discussed with the General Supervisors and Managers.
Maintenance QC has developed written criteria that establish priorities
for the overview of work. Priority I requires 100% overview and includes
Emergency Diesel Generator, Main Steam Isolation Valve, Main Feed Pump
Controls and Turbine Rotor Inspection work. Priority II requires 50-100%
overview and includes Snubber, Machine and Weld Shop, other Valve Overhauls
and Pump Overhauls and Repacking work. Priority III requires 0-50% over-
view of Valve Repacking, Packing Adjustments, Grouting and Painting work.
l The QC Supervisors stated that notification was received on work for 2162
.
i
Maintenance Orders (M0s) between January I and June 18,19Eo. The 294 M0s
for which QC overview was waived represented approxiraately 13% of the total
work (i.e., 87% of work was monitored by QC).
1
I
Operations QC' reviews the monthly schedules for various activities and
then choose those they wish to observe, review or independently verify.
This includes log checks, plant evolutions, plant surveillance tests and
independent verification of valve lineups.
Based on an analysis and evaluation of the above, it was determined that
no apparent conflict existed between QC independence and the budget / cost /
schedule function.
Two QA Supervisors and twenty-five technical persons report to a Quality
knurance General Supervisor who reports to the Quality Assurance and Staff
Services Manager. The latter individual reports directly to the Nuclear
Energy Vice President. The duties of the QA Department include review of
Purchase Orders, vnndor evaluation and surveillance, and internal auditing.
Two audit packages and the 1986 audit schedule were reviewed to determine
the following:
--
Checklists were developed and used
--
Identified discrepancies were followed up '
--
Appropriate attributes and characteristics addressed the functional
,
'
areas audited
--
Conduct of audits generally adhered to the schedule
1
No violations were identified.
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7.0 Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violations.
An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 3.2.e.
8.0 Management Meetings
Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection
at an entrance meeting conducted June 16, 1986. The findings of the in-
spection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course
of the inspection. An exit meeting was conducted June 20, 1986 at the
conclusion of the inspection (see Paragraph I for attendees) at which time
the findings were presented to licensee management. At no time during
this inspection was written material provided to the licensee.
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. ,
ATTACHMENT A
1.0 References / Requirements
NRC Generic Letter 83-28, " Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events"
Technical Specifications
Quality Assurance Program
ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the
Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants
ANSI N45.2.2-1972, Packing, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of
Items for Nuclear Power Plants
ANSI N45.2.12-1977, Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance
Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
NRC Safety Evaluation Regarding Generic Letter 83-28 Items, 11/21/85
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI,1974 edition with addenda
BG&E letter of 11/5/83, Subject: Required Actions based on Generic
Letter 83-28
BG&E transmittal of 2/29/84, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic
Letter 83-28
BG&E letter of 1/18/85, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 83-28
2.0 Documents Reviewed
2.1 Procedures / Tests
CCI-200I Nuclear Maintenance System, Change 2, 4/1/85
CCI-208B Qualification Maintenance Program, 2/3/86
CCI-2110 Preventive Maintenance Program, Change 6, 6/6/86
FTI-104 Transmitter Calibration / Calibration Check, Revision 4, 5/8/85
STP No. M2108-1 RPS Functional Test, Revision 26, 4/23/86, performed
on 5/15/86
STP No, M220-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
Functional Test, Revision 7, performed on 6/4/85
STP No. M510-1 RPS Channel Calibration Check, Revision 12,
performed on 5/3/85
STP No, M520-1 ESFAS Calibration, Revision 7, 4/10/85, performed on
5/13/85
STP No. M200-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time
STP No. M511-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time '
STP No. M522 4kV relay calibration
FTE-57 Reactor Trip Switchgear Preventive Maintenance
CCI-104A Surveillance Test Program, Change 1, 6/1/86
CCI-309A Locked Valves, Change 2, 9/27/85
CCI-122C Control of Technical Manuals, Change 1, 8/24/84
CCI-1220 Control of Technical Manuals, Proposed Revision
QAP-7 Records Management, Revision- 19, 6/4/86
QAP-14 Plant Maintenance, Revision 29, 1/10/86
. -
Attachment A 2
QAP-15 Changes, Tests & Experiments, Revision 45, 6/4/86
QAP-16 Surveillance Testing, Revision 16, 1/1/86
QAP-28 Control of Items Covered by QA Program, Revision 23, 1/1/86
1-52-M-2M-1 #11 LPSI Pumps, Revision 1, 6/6/85
1-52-M-A-4 #12 HPSI Pump, Revision 6, 3/27/85
1-52-M-R-5 1-MOV-4144, Revi sion 0, 8/30/85
1-52-M-R-31 1-MOV-652, Revision 0, 9/4/85
STP-0-67-2 Check Valve Operability Verification, Revision 14,
11/28/84 results of 4/27/85, 5/2/85 and 5/5/85
STP-0-65-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations,
Revision 26, 3/6/35 results of 5/28/85
STP-0-65-2 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations,
Revision 28, 10/2/85 results of 12/16/85
STP-0-93-1 Locked Valve Verification, Revision 20, 2/28/85
STP-0-73-1 ESF Equipment Performance Test, Revision 23, 11/5/85
STP-0-66-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Shutdown,
Revision 18, 12/4/85
STP-0-62-1 Monthly Valve Position Verification, Revision 25, 2/5/86
2.2 Vendor Manuals
ITT Barton Installation & Operation Manual, Model 764, Differential
Pressure Electronic Transmitter, 9/83
GEI-50299A, Revision 0, GE Technical Manual for Reactor Trip.
Switchgear
Ingersoll. Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 1 Installation, Operations and
'
Maintenance, 4/8/85
Ingersoll Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 2 Installation, Operations and
Maintenance, 2/24/86
Limitorque SMB Installation and Maintenance Manual
GE HK-2-25 Breaker Manual GEI-50 299A
-
2.3 Procedures
&
DESP-3, Establishment and Control of the List of Safety-Related
Items, Reviston 0
DESP-8, Equipment Qualification, Revision 1
DESP-10, Control of Calvert Cliffs Equipment Data Base, Revision 0
2.4 Prints / Drawings
60-933-B, Sh. IA 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 '
60-933-B, Sh. 18 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0
60-933-B, Sh. 1C 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0
60-933-B, Sh. 10 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0
12125-16, Sh. 8 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3
12125-16, Sh. 10 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3
63-005-E Meter & Relay Diagram 4kV System, Revision 11
6750-M590-17-2 RTS One-Line Diagram, Sh. 3
IE76, Sh. 2 LPSI 22 Control Diagram, Revision 9
IE76, Sh. 4 HPSI 12 Control Diagram, Revision 9
. . . - .
~
.
Attachment A 3
IE7, Sh. 1 UV Relay Control Diagram, Revision 10
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems
M-462, Sh. 1 of.3, P&ID
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems
-
M-462, Sh. 2 of 3, P&ID
62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems
M-74, Sh.1 of 3, P&ID
2.5 Maintenance Orders
205-347-209A ILIC 1123D, Steam Generator (S/G) 12 Level
203-001-256A AJ2, RPS Channel B Variable Output Power Transformer
205-141-984A ILT 1113A, S/G 11 Level
205-267-695A BBE, RPS Channel B Thermal Margin Calculator
205-274-941A IJIO11, XC933 Average RPS Internal ASI
206-133-256A AAG3, RPS Channel C Trip Unit 3 (TV-3) Low Flow
206-134-860A CCG4, RPS Channel C TU-4
206-112-327A ILT 1124C S/G 11 Level
206-134-876A AAF, Channel A S/G 11 ASGT
- 205-064-545A 2-PIA 102A, Pressure Indication / Annunciation
205-064-550A 2-PIA 102C, Pressure Indicator / Annunciation
, 206-070-337A 2-PT 102A,B,C,D, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters
205-358-494A RTS breaker will not close from control room
.
205-131-751A RTS replace lug on pushbutton
i 205-204-655A RTS replace defective UV coil
205-087-472A RTS breaker wouldn't-trip on UV signal
206-023-245A RTS breaker would not close
.: 205-036-499A RTS test UV in place for response times
205-147-186A RTS repair or replace trip unit
205-067-681A RTS ensure breaker trips on demand
206-066-274A RTS remove and install springs
203-001-025A RTS replace overcurrent trip device
205-085-344A RTS install NC pushbutton
205-149-237A RTS breaker will not close
, 205-087-439A RTS replace HFA relay
i 205-199-573A RTS UV coil did not pick up trouble shoot
206-056-977A RTS breaker failed to close
203-001-035A RTS breaker will not close properly
205-294-721A RTS perform GE SAL
203-003-330A,B,C 1-SI-450
203-003-388A 1-PT-3014
205-162-640A HPSI Pump #12 coupling bolts
205-229-677A 1-SI-627 MOV
) 206-085-735A 2-CV-306 Shutdown cooling flow' control
j 203-001-424A Repair CV-306
203-001-524A Troubleshoot & Repair SI-306-FT
2-SI-635 repack
'
203-003-009B
205-029-189A 2-SI-440 packing
205-035-450A 2-SI-440 repack on back seat
205-035-455A Breakers 20417 & 20416 for MOV-635
.
-
.
Attachment A 4
205-119-412A HPSI MOVs 2-616,626,617,627
205-141-001A 2 M0V-615,625,635,645
205-145-168A MOV 626 set limits
205-150-287A 2-HS-3626
205-155-437A 1-HS-3626
205-170-868A LPSI 2-I/P-306 Recalibrate
205-247-197A HPSI Pump #12 loose screw
205-304-036A 1-MOV-626 repack
205-304-037A 1-MOV-627 repack
205-347-212A FY-306 eratic output
206-064-240A 2-SI-306 packing
206-078-530A Calibrate FIC-306
2.6 Miscellaneous
Relay setting sheets for under voltage and degraded voltage relays
FCR #86-15 Facility Change Request for up grading degraded voltage
relays
FCR #84-1032, Safety Injection System Valves, 12/14/84
FCR #83-102, HPSI Pump #22, 1/25/84
2.7 Purchase Orders
44784-EX, Power Supply
62346-GX, Barton Transmitters
59558-EX and 59560-EX, Linear Amplifier Module Board
72466-GX, Barton Transmitter 0-Rings
67817-GX, Packing
38849-GX, Electro pneumatic Transducers
75187-GX, Valve Packing
49551-EX, Relays
54284-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Terminals
61254-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Cutoff Switch
70492-EX, 125 Vdc Closing Coil
2.8 Audits
2-31-85, Procurement and Storage
86-14, Plant Maintenance Activities