ML20205D217

Revised Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Reflecting Statements for Actions 2b & 6b Per NRC 850724 Ltr & Page B 3/4 3-1 Re Bases to Reflect NRC 850221 Approval of WCAP-10271

ML20205D217
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000
Issue date:	09/11/1985
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205D215	List: ML20205D211 ML20205D217
References
TAC-59320, TAC-59321, TAC-59322, TAC-60930, NUDOCS 8509230520
Download: ML20205D217 (9)

Text

. .

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION A

With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

Values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation.

• • • Comply with the provisions of Specification 3.3.2, for any portion of the channel required to be OPERABLE by Specification 3.3.2.-

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, l

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> l for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at~least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Specification 4.2.4.2.

8509230520 850911 yDR ADOCM 05000369 PDR MCGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2- - 3/4 3-6 .. Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

L-

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and I

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> I for surveillance testing of other channels per Specifica-tion 4.3.1.1 and Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 7 - Delete.  !

ACTION 8 - With'less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permi sive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

MCGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensure that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with main-taining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation and, 3) sufficient system functions capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System", and supplements to that report. Surveillance inter-vals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an approp-riate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation. (Implementation of quarterly testing of RTS is being postponed until after approval of a similar testing interval for ESFAS). The NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10271 was provided in a letter dated February 21, 1985 from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-CP&L).

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Feature actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate MCGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 8 3/4 3-1 l

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51 x

5 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) e c: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

"" MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

10. Pressurizer Pressure-High 4 2 3 1, 2 6# ** f

11. Pressurizer Water Level-High 3 2 #

2 1 6 l

12. Reactor Cooland Flow - Low 3/ loop 2/ loop in 2/ loop in 1 6#

a. Single Loop (Above P-8) any oper- each oper- (

ating loop ating loop

b. Two Loops (Above P-7 3/ loop 2/ loop in 2/ loop 1 6# (

and below P-8) two oper- each oper-ating loops ating loop M

13. . Steam Generator Water 4/stm 2/stm gen 3/stm' gen 1, 2

? Level-Low-Low gen in any each 6#**{

operating operating stm gen stm gen

14. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant 4-1/ bus 2 3 1 6#

Pumps (Above P-7)

15. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant 4-1/ bus 2 3 1 6#

Pumps (Above P-7)

16. Turbine Trip

a. Low Control Valve EH Pressure 4 2 3 1#### 6# '

b. Turbine Stop Valve Closed 4 4 4 1#### 6#

j 17. Safety Injection Input j from ESF 2 1 2 1, 2 9 l

l

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

• 0nly if the Reactor Trip System breakers happen to be in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

• • Comply with the provisoins of Specification 3.3.2, for any portion of the j channel required to be OPERABLE by Specification 3.3.2.

1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

1. 1. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. 1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoi.it Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. 1. 1. Above the P-9 (Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip Interlock) Setpoint.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. I

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however,

, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> l for surveillance testing of other channels per Specifica-4 tion 4.3.1.1.

I

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12' hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint; or CATAWBA - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5

)

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) );

TABLE NOTATION

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and verify Valves NV-231, NV-237, NV-241, and NV-244 are clcsed and secured in position within the next hour.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and I

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> I for surveillance testing of other channels per Specifica-tion 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - Delete. l ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive status light (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

CATAWBA - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6

1 1

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION i BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SfSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features i

! Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensure that: (1) the l associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the 4

specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is traintained to permit

-a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features instrumenation and, 3) sufficient system function capability is available from diverse parameters. 1 The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall i

reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the ,

assumptions used in the accident analyses. The Surveillance Requirements j specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional 1 capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection l Instrumentation System", and supplements to that report. Surveillance inter-vals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an approp-riate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered i Safety Features instrumentation. (Implementation of quarterly testing of RTS 1

is being postponed until after approval of a similar testing interval for ESFAS). The NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10271 was provided in a letter dated February 21, 1985 from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-CP&L).

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip

, Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bis-tables are set for each functional unit. -A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is j within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

. To accommondate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational i tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and e.alibrated,

Allowable Values for the Setpoir.ts have been specified in Table 3.3-4. Oper-ation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An' optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and

,1

- sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other i uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainities in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 3.3-1, CATAWBA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 a

INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Z + R + S < TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, an'd the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, R or RACK Error is the "as measured" deviation, in the percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 3.3-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainities. Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drfit is expected. Rack or sensor drif t, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either:

(1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replace-ment sensors with certified response time.

The Engineereu Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident: (1) Safety Injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position, (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, CATAWBA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2

i INSTRUMENTATION 4

BASES i-REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM  ;

~

INSTRUMENTATION (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) nuclear service water pumps start and automatic valves position, and (11) component cooling pumps start and automatic valves position.

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i CATAWBA UNIT 1 8 3/4 3-2a L- - - - - _ . _ _ . _ . . - . . . _ . _ _