Text

Proposed Tech Specs Modifying SR 4.4.3.3 for Pressurizer Heaters to Be Consistent W/Plant Design & W/Ts Requirement as Delineated in Improved Tech Specs
	ML20248B574
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	05/22/1998
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20248B565	List: ML20248B560; ML20248B574;
References
	NUDOCS 9806010338
	Download: ML20248B574 (18)
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l' ATTACHIGNT la REVISED CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES FOR CATAWBA UNIT 1 9006010338'980522 PDR ADOCK 05000413' P

PDR

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to 1656 cubic feet and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 150 kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one group of pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least i

two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT S.UTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUT-DOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.

J 4.4.3.3/ihe emergen y power supply for the pressuriz' r heaters sh 11 be emons rated OPERAB at least onc per 18 months by anually tra ferring

>ower from the no 1 to the emer ncy power supply nd energizi the lea rs.

reg,re$ p re ttv r t tcr ledetr ere Ak least once fer IS' m9nf{s, Ve'tify 0

c m bh & Le 'c3 rowed &a u c y cy rea celi.

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h CATAWBA - UNIT 1 3/4 4-9 Amendment No.

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t ATTACHMENT lb REVISED CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES FOR CATAWBA UNIT 2 i

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1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

1 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to 1656 cubic feet and et least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 150 kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one group of pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in H0T SHUTDOWN within the l

following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in H0T SHUT-DOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.

The emergency ower supply f the pressuri er heaters sha 1 be emonst ated OPERABLE t least once p r 18 months by manually tran ferring i

power rom the normal o the emergen y power supply and energizin the i

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A Y ltttt o n e f u 12 m s d ls, wirfr rep l,re$

prestvrou bekst a re cara of Lee'<Spo,eet (an emp row.r6.

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CATAWBA - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 Amendment No.

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l ATTACHBGDIT 2a REPRINTED CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES FOR CATAWBA UNIT 1 j

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REACTOR CCOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to-1656 cubic feet and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 150 kW.

APPLICABILI11: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one group of pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be. in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in H0T SHUT-DOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer

(

heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.3 At least once per 18 months, verify required pressurizer heaters are l

capable of being powered from an emergency power supply-l l

CATAWBA.- UNIT 1 3/44-9 Anendment No.

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i ATTACHMENT 2b REPRINTED CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES FOR CATAWBA UNIT 2 4

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to 1656 cubic feet and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a-capacity of at least 150 kW.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With :;ne group of pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in-at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUT-D0WN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.3 At least once per 18 months, verify required pressurizer heaters are l

capable of being powered from an emergency power supply.

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CATAWBA - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 Amendment No.

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ATTACIDfENT 3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION J

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Description of Proposed Changes TS SR 4.4.3.3 states, "The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters.shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by manually transferring power from the normal to the emergency power supply and energizing the heaters."

ITS SR 3.4.9.3 states, " Verify required pressurizer heaters are capable of being powered from an emergency power supply."

This SR is required to be performed at least once every 18 months.

Catawba is requesting a change to SR 4.4.3.3 in order to make its requirement consistent with existing plant design and equivalent to the requirement of ITS SR 3.4.9.3.

Consequently, the proposed new TG SR 4.4.3.3 states, "At least'once per 18 months, verify required pressurizer heaters are capable of being powered from an emergency power supply."

Technical Justification For each Catawba unit, two groups of pressurizer heaters (designated 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B for Units 1 and 2, Trains A and B, respectively) are supplied from the 600 VAC Blackout Auxiliary Power System, one heater group per power train.

Power is available to each heater group from the offsite power system or from the onsite emergency power system.

For each unit, heater group A and B is fed from 600 VAC blackout load centers LXI-and LXH, respectively.

LXI and LXH are fed from the 4160 VAC blackout switchgear FTA and FTB, respectively.

During normal operations (i.e.,

with offsite power available), the blackout switchgear is fed from the offsite power source via the 6900 VAC power system.

During a blackout (i.e.,

loss of offsite power), the 4160 VAC blackout switchgear bus is automatically transferred via load sequencer logic to the emergency 4160 VAC essential switchgear, which is fed from the emergency diesel generators.

Refer to the enclosed diagram for a schematic

-representation of the pressurizer heater power supply arrangement.

In" order to perform TS SR 4.4.3.3, Catawba utilizes two overlapping procedures (PT/1(2)/A/4200/09, " Engineered Safety. Features Actuation Periodic Test", and PT/l(2)/A/4600/16, " Surveillance Requirements for Unit

.Startup").

PT/l(2)/A/4200/09 is performed every refueling outage..

This' test' simulates a blackout and causes'the 4160 VAC blackout switchgear bus to be automatically loaded onto

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the 4160 VAC essential switchgear bus via load sequencer logic..

Once this occurs, the 600 VAC blackout load center busses are verified to be energized.

The pressurizer heater breaker control logic is'also verified to be energized without actually energizing the heaters.

During the

. performance of this test,.the heaters are not energized,

- since this test is performed during a plant mode when.there is insufficient water in the reactor coolant system and pressurizer to allcw the heaters to be energized without

- damage.

It is verified that the heaters can be energized duringLunit startup per PT/l(2)/A/4600/16 prior to entry Einto Mode.3 following a refueling outage.

Since none of the pressurizer heater control. interlocks are dependent on-the source of power, the performance of these two overlapping procedures demonstrates the capability of energizing the heaters from the' emergency power supply.

The' design of the 4160 VAC blackout power system does not l

. allow the pressurizer heaters to be manually transferred from the normal to the~ emergency power source without

- physically manipulating individual supply breakers to allow a dead-bus transfer.

A hot-bus transfer could only be accomplished by defeating electrical interlocks (by placing jumpers) and by manipulating individual supply breakers.

Testing at power utilizing either of these methods would subject the plant to an undesirable transient.

The 6ead-bus transfer-would result in the loss of a 600 VAC blackout load center and several motor control centers and low voltage power panelboards.

Some of the loads fed from these busses that could cause a plant transient during a dead-bus transfer include:

1.

Feedwater system recirculation valves will fail open which would cause a secondary system transient, 2.

Component cooling water system heat exchanger outlet throttle valves will fail open on loss of power which would cause an adverse temperature swing on the reactor coolant pump seals and/or a reactivity transient due to a temperature change on letdown, 3.

Loss of an instrument air compressor which will result in'a' reduction in instrument air capacity, 4.

Loss of the'125 VDC auxiliary control power battery chargers,'and 5.

Loss'of~the 250 VDC auxiliary power battery chargers.

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A hot-bus transfer is not part of the Catawba design and would. result.in voltage transients of unknown magnitude on both the essential and blackout busses.

Protective relaying on these busses would be adversely affected and could result in the loss of a 4160 VAC essential switchgear bus.

1 Manual alignment of these busses does not test the design features of the Catawba blackout and essential power systems, since a transfer is designed to occur automatical"y.

Catawba has concluded that the proposed TS amendment will correct the wording deficiency in SR 4.4.3.3.

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ATTACID8ENT 4 l'

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l

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No Significant. Hazards Consideration Determination The[ollowingdiscussionisasummaryoftheevaluationof the cha2.ges contained in this proposed amendment against the 110 CFR 50.92(c) requirements to demonstrate that all three standards are satisfied.

A no significant hazards consideration is indicated if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1.

Invclve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or l

l 2.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of l

accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

First Standard Implementation of this amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of zul accident previously evaluated.

Changing the requirements of SR 4.4.3.3 as previously described will not have any impact on accident probabilities.

It merely makes the TS requirement consistent with the design of the pressurizer heaters and the normal and emergency power supply arrangement.

In addition, no impact on accident consequences will occur, since the design function of the pressurizer heaters will be maintained and the heaters will

-be tested according to the manner in which they were designed.

Second Standard Implementation of this amendment would not create the

. possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Changing the requirements of SR 4.4.3.3 will make the SR consistent with the actual design of-the equipment it governs.

No design changes are being_made to the plant and no changes are being made to the manner in which the plant is operated or tested.

Therefore, no'new. accident causal mechanisms are created.

LThird Standard Implementation of'this amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following an accident situation.

These barriers

include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and

.the containment system.

The performance of the fission product barriers will not be impacted by implementation of this proposed amendment.

The design function of the affected pressurizer heaters and power supplies will not be affected.

Therefore, no safety margin will be adversely impacted.

Based upon the preceding analysis, Duke has concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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ATTACHMENT 5 ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

Environmental Analysis Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an evaluation of this license amendment request has been performed to determine whether or not it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) of the regulations.

This amendment to the Catawba Unit 1 and 1 TS modifies SR 4.4.3.3 concerning testing of the pressurizer heaters to make its requirement consistent with that of the ITS.

Implementation of this amendment will have no adverse impact upon the Catawba units; neither will it contribute to any additional quantity or type of effluent being available for adverse environmental impact or personnel exposure.

It has been determined there is:

1.

No significant hazards consideration, 2.

No significant change in the types, or significant increase in the amounts, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and 3.

No significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures involved.

Therefore, this amendment to the Catawba TS meets the criteria of 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) for categorical exclusion from an environmental impact statement.

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ML20248B574

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