ML20205C690
| ML20205C690 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1999 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205C682 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904010329 | |
| Download: ML20205C690 (70) | |
Text
I i
l ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED REVISIONS (MARKUPS) TO THE CATAWBA i
NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL '
SPECIFICATIONS
~~
3384188!K31888 1a P PDR
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)
MASTER RELAY TEST A MASTER RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each master relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each relay.
The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.
MODE A MODE shall corres@nd to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor f//fg7 l coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor j 7 vessel. :
OPERABLE-OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing hs specified safety function (s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normai or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).
PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. These tests are:
- a. Described in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR;
- b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.69; or
- c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
QUADRANT POWER TILT OPTR shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore RATIO (OPTR) detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater.
RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the (RTP) reactor coolant of 3411 MWt.
(continued) l Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-4 Amendment Nos.
L
NOMINAL' TRIP SETPOINT The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT shall be the design value of I
a setpoint. The trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be less or more conservative than the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by a calibration tolerance. ll plant conditions l- warrant, the trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative l with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT.
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INSERT FOR PAGE 1.1-4 l I
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RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 7) ;
Reactor Trip System Instrumentatio, j APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE NOMIV4L l TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS COND(TIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOtNT 4
I l 1. Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 2 B SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA
)
3(a),4(a)5(a), 2 C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA
- 2. Power Range .
Neutron Flux
- a. High 1,2 4 0 SR 3.3.1.1 5 110.9 % @iO9%
SR 3.3.1.2 RTP RTP SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 -
SR 3.3.1.16
- b. Low, 1(b) 2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27.1% RTP . @S% RTP SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 I
- 3. Power Range l
Neutron Flux High Positive Rate 1.2 4 D SR 3.3.1.7 s 6.3% RTP SR 3.3.1.11 with time
@S% RTP with time l
constant constant 2 2 sec 2 2 sec !
- 4. Intermediate Range j(b),2(c) 2 F.G SR 3.3.1.1 Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8
$ 31% RTP @S% RTP l SR 3.3.1.11 2(d) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 5 31% RTP @S% RTP l SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11
- 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 1.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.4 E5 cps $1.0E5 Neutron Flux
' l l SR 3.3.1.8 -cps SR 3.3.1.11 3(a),4(a)$(a) 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.4 E5 $1.0 E5 l'
SR 3.3.1.7 cps cps l SR 3.3.1.11 1
- 6. Overtemperature AT 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 (Page Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 3.3.1 18) (Page SR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1-18)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 i SR 3.3.1.17 l (continued)
.(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTDs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(c) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(d) Below the P-G (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment Nos. 73/ 5 i
RTS Instrumentation-3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 2 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER MOMINAL
' SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDfTIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT l
- 7. Owrpower AT 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to
. SR 3.3.1.3 Note 2 (Page Note 2 SR 3.3.1.C 3.3.1-19) (Page SR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1-10)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17
- 8. PressurizerPressure
- a. Low .1(8) 4 L SR 3.3.1.1 21938(0 psig ([1945(0 SR 3.3.1.7 psig l SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
- b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 5 2399 psig $5 psig SR 3.3.1.7 l SR 3.3.1.10 ,
SR 3.3.1.16 4 l
- 9. PressurizerWater g(e) 3 L SR 3.3.1.1 s 93.8 %
Level- High SR 3.3.1.7
$92%
SR 3.3.1.10
- 10. ReactorCoolant Flow Low
- a. Single Loop g(g) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 2 89.7 % $91% l SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.31.16
- b. Two Loops g(h) 3 per loop L SR 3.3.1.1 2 89.7% ()91%
,f SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 (continued)
(e) Above the P-7 (l.ow Power Reactor Trips Block) intertoi (f) Time constants utilized in the lead. lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure - Low are 2 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
(g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux)interiock.
(h) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. I l
a Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment NoS.
RTS instrumentation -
3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 3 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation I
i APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER pg l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TR'P FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 11. Undervoltage RCPs 1 per bus g(e) L SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10 2 5016 V 'tt M 2V SR 3.3.1.16 res sec e ti _i;e y ec0 rs e ti e J
- 12. Underfrequency j(e) 1 per bus L SR 3.3.1.9 RCPs 2 55.9 H M.4 Hz I SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 res s
e mje y aosec s se ti e
- 13. Stearn Generator 1.2 4 per SG E SR 3.3.1.1 I 2 9% (Unit 1) MO.7%
(SG) Wator Level. SR 3.3.1.7 2 35.1 %
Low Low - Unit 1) )
SR 3.3.1.10 (Unit 2) of 6.8% l SR 3.3.1.16 narrow r e (Unit 2) of 1 spa narrow I range spank I
- 14. Turbine Trip
- 15. Safetyinjection(SI) 1.2 2 trains P SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Input from SR 3.3.1.14 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
(continued)
(e) Above the P 7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
(i) Not used.
- 0) Above the P 9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
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Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment NoS.
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7)
Reactor Trip System instrumentation APPLICABLE )
MODES OR I OTHER MOAMM4L SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE l
TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHAN'4ELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
- a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 R SR 3.3.1.11 2 6E 11 amp @ E-10 amp l
Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 l
Flux, P4
- b. Low Power 1 1 per train S SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips l
Birck, P-7
- c. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 Neutron Flux, s 50.2% RTP $48% RTP SR 3.3.1.13 P-8 l d. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 5 70% RTP $69% RTP l
Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.13 l P-3
P 10 RTP
- f. Turbine 1 2 S SR 3.3.1.12 Impulse SR 3.3.1.13 512.2% RTP @0% RTP l turbine turbine Pressure, P-13 impulse impulse pressure pressure equivalent equiv4- lent
- 17. ReactorTrip 1,2 2 trains O.U SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA
'#8 3(a) 4(a),3(a)
, 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA
- 18. Reactor Trip Breaker 1,2 1 each per T SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Undervoltage and 'RTB Shunt Trip Mechanisms 3(a),4(a),5(a) 1 each per C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA RTB
- 19. AutomaticTripLogic 1,2 2 trains P,U SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA
( 3(a) 4(a) 5(a)
, , 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA (continued) l (a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(d) Below the P-6 (latermediate Range Neutron Flux) intertocks.
(k) including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTD.
< Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-17 Amendment Nos
i 1 l
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 i Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemperature AT NOAhNol-The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the followin T[Se int by more than 4.5% of RTP. l l AT('**'#} o
- '}
T - T' (1 + r, s , 1 + r3 s , s 6T [ K, - Ke (1 + r, s) _ (1 + r. s) ,
+ K, (P - P') - 1, (AI) J Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, 'F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, 'F. l s is the Laplace transform operator, sec i T,is the measured RCS average temperature 'F.
.T is the nominal T.vg at RTP (allowed by Safety Analysis), s 585.1*F (Unit 1) s 590.8'F (Unit 2).
P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig l P is the nominal RCS operating pressure. = 2235 omg ;
Ki = Overtemperature AT reactorigsetpdInt, as presented in the COLR, K2 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as i presented in the COLR, K3 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, t i, t, = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in l the COLR, 13 = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, t., ts = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T.yg, as presented j in the COLR, l T. = Time con-lant utilized in the measured T.,g lag compensator, as presented in the CC' 1, and f i (AI) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
(i) for qi- go between the " positive" and " negative" fi (AI) breakpoints as presented in the COLR; f i(AI) = 0, where qi and go are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the l core respectively, and qi + go is total THERM AL POWER in percent l of RATED THERMAL POWER; (ii) for each percent Al that the magnitude of qi- go is more negative than the fi(AI)
- negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the f i(AI)
- negative" slope presented in the COLR; and (continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-18 Amendment Nos.
E i
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
- Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation !
(iii) for each percent Al that the magnitude of gi- go is more positive ,
l than the f i(AI)
- positive" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT {
Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the fi(al) ' positive" j slope presented in the COLR. j I
Note 2: Overpower AT ony/L The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the followin [Setp$nt by l 1 more than 3% (Unit 1) 3.3% (Unit 2) of RTP.
AT (' * *' 'I ' ' '
D* - T' - f, (AI)
(1 + r, s) s; ATa Ka - K,1 + r, S 1 + r s , T-K. T 1+r,s, 1+r.s f
Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, *F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, *F.
s is the Laplace transform operator, sec.
T,is the measured RCS average temperature, 'F. ,
T is the nominal T., at RTP (calibration temperature for AT instrumentation),
s 585.1*F (Unit 1) s 590.8'F (Unit 2 .
K4 = Overpower AT reactor setp8Ent as presented in the COLR, Ks = 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average l '
temperature, Ke = Overpower AT reactor, trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient as presented in the COLR for T > T and Ke = 0 for T s T ,
t i, t, = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, ta = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, t, = Time constant utilized in the measured T y lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, ;
t, = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for T.y, as presented in the COLR, and f2(Al) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
(i) for qi - go between the " positive" and " negative" f2(AI) breakpoints as presented in the COLR; f 2(AI) = 0, where qi and go are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qi + go is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-19 Amendment Nos.
r ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2
[ Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 5) l Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrurnentation i
APPUCABLE MODES Ott l OTHER N6MLNN l l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP 1
FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDmONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 4. Safety Iriection
)
- a. Manualinitiation 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.32.8 NA NA
- b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32.4 and Actuation SR 3.32.6 Relays
- c. Contaiernent 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.32.1 s 1.4 psig @2 psig Pressure High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3210
- d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 21839 psig @1845 psig l Pressure Low SR 3.32.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.32.10
- 2. Containtnent Spray
- a. MarnalIrntiation 1,2,3,4 1 per train, 8 SR 3.32.8 NA NA 2 trains
- b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.22 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32.4 and Actuation SR 3.32.6 Reisys j
- c. Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 5 3.2 psig $3.0 psig l Pressure - SR 3.32.5 i t High High SR 3.32.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- 3. Containment Isolation
- a. Phase A lsolation i
(1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 0 SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.32.6 Actuation Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Irie%on (continued) i (a) Above the P.11 (Pressurizer P essure)intertock.
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-11 Amendment Nos.
e ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.32-1 (page 2 of 5)
Engeneered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER l SPECIFIED REQUIRED y etNAL FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP l CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 3. Containment Isolation (continued)
- b. Phase B isolatiac (1) Manual initiation 1,2,3,4 1 per train, 8 SR 3.32.8 NA NA 2 trains (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.32A Logic and S23.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 Pressure -
532 psig p.0 psig SR 3.32.5 l High High SR 3.32.9 SR 3.32.10
- 4. Steam line isolation i
i
- a. Manual initiation (1) System 1,2(D),3(b) 2 trains F SR 3.32.8 NA NA i
(2) individua! 1,2(D),3(b) 1 perline O SR 3.32.8 NA NA
- b. Automatic gy(b),3(b) 2 trains H SR 3.322 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32.4 and Actuation SR 3.32.6 Relays
- c. Containment 4 E SR 3.32.1 3g(b) 3(b) s32 @.0 psig Pressure High '
SR 3,3.2.5 l psig High SR 3.32.9 SR 3.32.10
- d. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2(b) 3(a)(b) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 2 744 psig @S psig line SR 3.3.2.5 l SR 3.32.9 SR 3.32.10 (continued)
{
(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
(b)Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-12 Amendment NoS.
0 ESFAS Instrumentation !
3.3.2 I Table 3.3.21 (page 3 of 5)
Engeneered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
]
l i
APPUCABLE l MODES OR OTHER AfDsAIA/N SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVLILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP l
FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT 4
- 4. Steam Line Isolation (continued)
(2) Negative 3(b)(c) 3 per steam D SR 3 ' 2.1 s 122.8(d) psi Rate High line SR 3.32.5
$100(d) l psi i SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.32.10
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwaterisolation
- a. Automatic 1,2(e) 2 trains 1 SR 3.32.2 'NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32. 4 and Actuation SR $.32.6 Relays
- b. SG Water Level 1,2(e) 4 per SG J SR 3.3.2.1 s 85.6%
- High High $83.9% l SR 3.3.22 (Unit 1) (Unit 1)
(P 14) - SR 3.32.4 s 78.9 % 77.1 %
SR 3.32.5 l (Unit 2) Unit 2)
SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- c. Safety Irjection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. l 1
- d. T.yLow 1,2(e) 4 : SR 3.3.2.1 2 561*F $5'64*F l SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 coincident with Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip, P-4) for all initiation functions and Reactor Trip, 0-4 requirements.
- e. Doghouse Water 1,2(e) 2 per L SR 3.3.2.8 512 inches @11 inches l Level High High doghouse above 577 ft above 577 1 floor level it floor level
- f. Tripof allmain 1,2(a) 3 per MFW K SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA feedwater pump pumps (continued)
(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure)interiock.
(b) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
(c) Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and may be blocked below P-11 when Steam Line Isolation Steam Line Pressure Low is not blocked.
(d) Time constant utilized in the rate / lag controller is t 50 seconds.
(e) Except when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a clostd manual valve.
i Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-13 Amendment NoS.
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 )
Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 5) l Engineered Safety Feature Actuatior , s !m instrumentation
~
APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVElu.ANCE ALLOWABLE
- 0Mid4L.
TRIP l i I
FUNCTION - CONDmONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTJ - VALUE SETPOINT 1
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater !
q
- a. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains H SR 3.32.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.32.6 1 Relays
-Low Low SR 3.32.5 (Unit 1) (Unit 1)
SR 3.3.2.9 2 35.1 % ($36.8%
SR 3.3210 (Unit 2) l (Unit 2)
- c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety trVection) for all initiation functes and requirements.
- d. Loss of Offsite 1,2,3 3 per bus D SR 3.32.3 2 3242 V Power
@500 V l SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.32.10
- e. Trip of all Main 1,2(a) 3 per pump K SR 3.32.8 NA NA Feedwater SR 3.32.10 Pumps
- f. Auxiliary 1,2,3 3 por train M SR 3.3.2.8 A) 2 9.5 psig Feedwater Pump SR 3.3.2.10 A)@10.5 psig l l Train A and Train B Suction B) 2 52 psig D)@62 l Transfer on (Unit 1) psig Suction Pressure 2 5.0 psig (Unit 1)
Low (Unit 2) $6.0 psig l (Unit 2)
- 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump
- a. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.32.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32.4 i and Actuation SR 3.32.6 Relays
- b. Refueling Water 1,2,3,4 4 N SR 3.32.1 2 162.4 @ 177.15 Storage Tank SR 'J.32.7 inches 5:hes l (RWST) Level- SR 3.32.9 Low '
SR 3.3.2.10 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Iriection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Safety friection (continued)
(a) Above the P-11 (Pressunzer Pressure)intertock.
Catawba UnilS 1 and 2 3.3.2-14 Amendment NoS. j
q l
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E l LOP DG Star 2 Instrumentation l 3.3.5 )
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 ------ -
NOTE- f Testing shall consist of voltage sensor relay testing j excluding actuation of load shedding diesel start. and I time delay times.
Perform TADOT. 31 days SR 3.3.5.2 Perform CHANNEL CAllBRATION with p Setpdint 18 months and Allowable Value as follows:
l
- a. Loss of voltage Allowable Value 2 3242 V. !
/IDMiNAL Loss of voltage j TM Setp$nt 0 V.
g
- b. Degraded voltage Allowable Value 2 3738 V.
Degraded voltage f T[Se in 66 V.
l 1
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.5-2 Amendment Nos.
[:.
l Containment Purgo and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation i
3.3.6
\
Table 3.3.61 (page 1 of 1)
Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation Instrumentation
- 6MINAL i FUNCTION REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP SETPOINT CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS l
l 1. ManualInitiation 2 SR 3.3.6.4 NA l-
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic and 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 NA l Actuation Relays SR 3.3.6.2 3 SR 3.3.6.3 J
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- 3. Safety fr$x: tion Refer to LCO 3.3.2 *ESFAS Instrumentation,' Table 3.3.2-1, Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.
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Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.G-3 Amendment Nos.
t L
p LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) i 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LCO 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump or one safety injection pump capab!e of injecting into the RCS, the l accumulators isolated, reactor coolant pump operation limited as specified in Table 3.4.121 and either a or b below: ,;g
- a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with\ift setting 00 psig (as left calibrated), allowable value s 425 psig (as found), with RCS cold leg temperature 265*F; or
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is s 285'F, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.
i --
NOTE----- -.
Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS <
cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in Specification 3.4.3.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
. B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation l
2 BASES
~ BACKGROUND . The RTS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of selected unit l
parameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits and
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary during anticipated l: operational occurrences (AOOs) and to assist the Engineered Safety Featoes (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents.
The protection and monitoring systems have been de'signed to assure I' l safe operation of the reactor.. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored .
by the RTS, as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system l
parameters and equipment performance. //,4/,. %I@
l' The LSSS, defined in this specification as the Mekfoin) in conjunction with the LCOs, establish the threshold for protecti re system action to prevent exceeding acceptable limits during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). ,
During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are:
- 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBF ) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to pr ) vent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);
- 2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur; and j 3. The RCS pressure SL of 2735 psig shall not be exceeded.
l l Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0,
- Safety Limits (SLs)," also l maintains the above values and assures that offeite dose will be within the 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.
I Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a
'different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence.
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-1 Revision No.p I
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected categories as illustrated in UFSAR, Chapter 7 (Ref.1),
and as identified below-
- 1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured;
- 2. Process monitoring systems, including the Process Control System, the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS), and various field contacts and sensors: monitors various plant parameters, provides any required signal processing, and provides digital outputs when parameters exceed predetermined limits. They may also provide outputs for control, indication, alarm, computer input, and recording;
- 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and output bays: c >mbines the input signals from the process monitoring sy tems per predetermined logic and initiates a reactor trip and ESF actuation when warranted by the process monitoring systems inputs; and
- 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or " rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.
Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as four, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations.
statistical allowances are provided in thefftiifSejdoint(ar/AM (756e~d The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be #
evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria.
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-2 Revision No.h I
i RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASLd l l
BACKGROUND (continued)
Trio Setpoints and Allowable Values T[ Set nts are the nominal values at which the bistables are tet. l Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the 'as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CAllBRATION tolerance.
hM1bih TM Set [ints used in the bistable are based og the analytical limits (Ref.1,2, and 3). The selection of thes f f7Setpgints i is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays, calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5) are taken into eccount. The actuaR[iominaf Trio Setooint enttred int e g bistable easures that the actual trip occurs in time to prevent an analvtical I fir".it inom being exceeded. Q Jeff nyg,h The Allowable Value accounts for changes in random measurement errors between COTS. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the COT demonstrates that the loop trips within the Allowable Value, the loop is OPERABLE. A trip within the Allowable Value ensures that the predictions of equipment performance used to_ develop thef T p6 Setp8nt are still valid, and that the equipment will initiate a trip in response to an AOO in time to gevent an l analyticallimit from being exceeded (and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment functions as designed).
Note that in the accompanying LCO 3.3.1, the Allowable Values of Table 3.3.1 1 are the l .SSS.
Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channelis taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channelin test is then tested, verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section. deh>e.1/h5~d-itD Th [Sep[s and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 incorporat@dil of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel.
The magnitydes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each Tpp Setp$nt. All field sensors and signal processing equipment l
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-4 Revision No. k
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 19. Automatic Trio Loaic ,
The LCO requirement for the RTBs (Functions 17 and 18) and Automatic Trip Logic (Fumtion 19) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rsds to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each train RTB has a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while I the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
The LCO requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip.
These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3,4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions !
must be OPERABLE when the RTDs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal.
The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 6).
ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be i entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1-1. When )
the Required Channels in Table 3.3.1-1 are specified (e.g., on a per 1 steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.
/Nara >
(Tn~the event a c nnel's Trip Setpoint is f und nonconse tive with !
respect to the owable Value, or the tr' smitter, instru ent loop, signal processing el tronics, or bistable is fo nd inoperable, 1en all affected Functions pr ided by that channel m t be declared ' operable and the LCO Condi ' n(s) entered for the pro ction Function o) affected.
l Catawba units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-30 Revision No.h
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A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel
. trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the ,
l event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the !
Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all p
affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with )
respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is I found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration -
tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
INSERT FOR PAGE B.3.3.1-30 l
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I ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) M*AL provided in th [ Set [ntk/)dowabih The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated wnen its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria.
l Sional Processino Eauipment Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with setpoints established by safety analyses. These setpoints are defined in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.1), Chapter 7 (Ref. 2), and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3). If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision logic processing Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing. Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.
Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic, if one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of- two logic.
Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function nctuation. Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation.
]
These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in the UFSAR. j l
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-2 Revision No. h I
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,, l ESFAS Instrumenta' ion B 3.3.2 BASES.
BACKGROUND (continued) l l Trio Setooints and Allowable Values ThebT Set nts are the nominal values at which the bistables are set.
- Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" l i value is within the band for CHANNEL CAllBRATION tolerance.
fleMitJAl- 9 Th )Tpp Se is used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits
- (Ref.1,2, an 3). The selection of thesef T gSetp[ts is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays, calibration tolerances, instrumenta, tion uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those ESFAS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5 are taken into account. The actual 6 ming 1 Trio Sek5oint entesed into)the -i bistable assures that the actual trip occurs before the Allowable Value is l reached. The Allowable Value accounts for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the point at which the loop trips does not exceed the Allowable Value, the loop is considered OPERABLE. Q4fufge;gt of A trip within the Allowable Value ensures that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is i operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the !
equipment _ functions as designed.
Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing i equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section. Md.46n ofOe)-
Th r/Spojds and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 incorporatetell of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel.
The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination f each#T Setp6Ent. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these[ channels are assumed to operate within the al uncertainty magnitudes.
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-3 Revision No.O I
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ESFAS instrumentation B 3.3.2
! BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) i valves, and start the NSWS pumps. This function is initiated on a two-out-of-three logic from either NSWS pump pit. l This function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to ensure cooling water remains available to essential components l during a DBA. In MODES 5 and 6, the sufficient time exists for manual operator action to realign the NSWS pump suction, if required.
- i The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref 6). ,
I ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.2-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified (e.g., on a per I steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.
' )4/J6 R T el - ? '
(Tn the event a c annel's Trip Setpoint is found neonservative with respect to the flowable Value, or the transmi >r, instrument Loop, signal processing el ctronics, or bistable is found in perable, then all affected Functions pr vided by that channel must be eclared inoperable and the l gO Condi on(s) entered for the protectior unction (s) affected.
When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 should be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.
A:1 Condition A applies to all ESFAS protection functions.
Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.
I Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-31 Revision No.@
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'A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the
! event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than tho l Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is -
found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
INSERT FOR PAGE B.3.3.2-31 1
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I LOP DG Start instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Trio Setpoints and Allowable Values The [ Set ints used in the relays are based on the analyticallimits l
presented in FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into acco . l seff 'od h l The actualhmirud Trip Set /oint erdred into)the relays is normally still more conservative than that required by the Allowable Value. If the j measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is '
considered OPERABLE.
i Setpoints adjusted in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that I the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed.
//oMiNAL i Allowable Values an1T ' Setp[nts are specified for each Function in I l
the LCO. TheM set ints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable i
Value if the relav is performing as requiredf lf e measured etpoint does n t exceed the Allow ble Value, the rel is considere g OPE BLE. Operation ith a Trip Setpoint ess conserva ve than the MI E nom' al Trip Setpoint, t within the Allow le Value, is ceptable M pro ided that operatio and testing is con stent with th assumptions of (gggg unit soecific seto nt calculation./Each Allowable Value andfff Sejp3 Int specified is more conservauvo man tne analyticai umit assumed in the transient and accident analyses in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These uncertainties are ;
defined in setpoint calculations. !
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APPLICABLE The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the Engineered SAFETY ANALYSES Safety Features (ESF) Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS).
Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the loss of offsite power during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The actual DG start has historically been associated with the ESFAS actuation. The Catawba UrGis 1 and 2 0 3.3.5-2 Rev 5 No.h
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j A relay shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the relay trips is i
found more conservative than the Allowable Valac, in the event a -
relay's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowabic Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that relay must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. It plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band ]
L
'j as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the I r NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of !
the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calioration tolerance band and I non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, I the setpoint shall be re-adjusted. '
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LOP DG Start instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2,3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the
, required DG must be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LOP or degraded power to the vital bus.
ACTIONS 6the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nobconservative with respect to th ' Allowable Value, or the channel I found inoperable, then
',y* ~
the function hat channel provides must be d clared inoperable and the d LCO Con ion entered for the particular pr ection function affected.
Yitflill' ~ L Because the required channels are specified on a per bus basis, the Condition may be entered separately for each bus as appropriate.
A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
A.,J.
Condition A applies to the LOP DG start Function with one loss of voltage or degraded voltage channel per bus inoperable.
If one channelis inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires that channel to l be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With a channelin trip, the LOP DG start i instrumentation channels are configured to provide a one-out-of-two logic to initiate a trip of the incoming offsite power.
The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the Function remains fully OPERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an cvent occurring during these intervals.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.5-4 Revision No )
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A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, !
or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processir.g electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, if the trip setpoint is found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPCINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
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ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED REVISIONS (REPRINTED PAGES) TO THE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
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p Definitions 1.1 I
[ - 1.1 Definitions (continued) l l MASTER RELAY TEST A MASTER RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each i l master relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each relay.
The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check l of each associated slave relay.
l MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuelin the reactor vessel.
NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT shall be the design value of a setpoint. The trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be less or more conservative than the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by a calibration tole 'ance. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint implemented in plant hardware may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT.
OPERABLE-OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be l OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function (s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooiing and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function (s) are also capable of performing their related suppod function (s).
PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation. These tests are:
- a. Described in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR;
- b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or
- c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Jommission.
QUADRANT POWER TILT OPTR shall be the ratio of the maximurn upper excore RATIO (OPTR) detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower l excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater.
(continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-4 Amendment Nos.
I Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (ccotinued)
RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the
. (RTP) reactor coolant of 3411 MWt.
I REACTOR TRIP The RTS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from SYSTEM (RTS) RESPONSE when the monitored parameter exceeds its RTS trip setpoint TIME at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coit voltage. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) SDM shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is suberitical or would be subcritical from its
_ present condition assuming. 3 I
- a. All rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) are fully j inserted except for the single RCCA of highest reactivity l worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With any - l
- RCCA not capable of being fully inser:ed, the reactivity worth of the RCCA must be accounted for in the determination of SDM; and ;
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- b. In MODES 1 and 2, the fuel and moderator temperatures are changed to the nominal z.ero power design level. ,
SLAVE RELAY TEST A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall consist of energizing each slave relay and verifying the OPERABILITY of each slave relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shallinclude, as a minimum, a continuity check of associated testable actuation devices.
STAGGERED TEST BASIS A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of the testing of one of the systems, subsysterns, channels, or other designated components during the interval specified by the -
Surveillance Frequency, so that all systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components are tested during n Surveillance Frequency intervals, where n is the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components in the associated function.
THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-5 Amendment Nos.
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If D2finitions
- l. 1.1 1
1.1 Definitions (continued) l TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE A TADOT shall consist of operating the trip actuating device OPERATIONAL TEST and verifying the OPERABILITY of required alarm, interlock, (TADOT) and trip functions. The TADOT shallinclude adjustment, as necessary, of the trip actuating device so that it actuates at -
the required setpoint within the required accuracy.
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j Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-6 Amendment Nos.
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l Definitions :
l 1.1 l l ,
Table 1.1-1 (page 1 of 1) l_ MODES
! AVERAGE REACTIVITY % RATED REACTOR COOLANT CONDITION THERMAL TEMPERATURE MODE TITLE (k.n) POWER (a) (*F) 1 Power Operation 2 099 >5 NA 2 Startup 2 099 s5 NA 3 Hot Standby < 0.99 NA 2 350 4 Hot Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA 350 > T.y > 200 ;
5 Cold Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA s200 6 Refueling (c) NA NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.
'(b)- All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. .;
(c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.
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Catawba Units 1 and 2 1.1-7 Amendment Nos.
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RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 i Table 3.3.1 1 (page 1 of 7)
Reactor Trip System instrumentation ;
1 APPLICABLE MODES OR l OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP l FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUC SETPOINT
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip 1,2 2 B SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA 3(a)4(a)$(a).
, , 2 C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA 1 l
- 2. Power Range
' Neutron Flux
- a. H.gh 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 s 110.9 % ~ 100% RTP l SR 3.3.1.2 RTP SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
- b. Low 1(b),2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27.1% RTP 25% RTP l SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
- 3. Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate 1.2 4 D SR 3.3.1.7 s 6.3% RTP 5% RTP l SR 3.3.1.11 with time with time constant constant 2 2 sec 2 2 sec
- 4. Intermediate Range g(b) 2(c) 2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 s 31% RTP 25% RTP l Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 i
2(d) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 s 31% RTP 25% RTP l SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11
- 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 f.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.4 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps l Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 2 J.K SR 3.3.1.1 - s 1.4 E5 1.0 E5 cps l SR 3.3.1.7 cps SR 3.3.1.11
- 6. Overtemperature AT 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 (Page Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 3.3.1 18) (Page SR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1 18)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17 (continued)
(a) With Reactor Tnp Breakers (RTDs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(b) Below the P 10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(c) Abovo the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment NoS.
l l
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 7)
Reactor Trip System instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR -
OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP l FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 7. Overpower AT 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 2 (Page Note 2 SR 3.3.1.6 3.3.1 19) (Page SR 3.3.1.7 3.3.1 19)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 SR 3.3.1.17 -
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure
- a. Low 1(e) 4 L SR 3.3.1.1 21938(0 psig 1945(0 l SR 3.3.1.7 psig SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
- b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 2399 psig 2385 psig l SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
- 9. Pressurizer Water j(e) 3 L SR 3.3.1.1 5 93.8 % 92% l Level .High SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10
- 10. ReactorCoolant Flow Low
- a. Single Loop 3(g) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 2 89.7 % 91 % l SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 ,
SR 3.3.1.16 '
- b. Two Loops j(h) . 3 per loop L SR 3.3.1.1 2 89.7 % 91 % l SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16 (continued)
(e) Above the P 7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
(f) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure Low are 2 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
(g) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(h) Above the P 7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) Interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 '3.3.1-15 Amendment NoS.
1 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 >
Table 3.3.1 1 (page 3 of 7) l
! Reactor Trip Systern instrumentation l
l APPLICABLE f/,Ot4S OR OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP j FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 11. Undervoltage RCPs 3(e) 1 per bus L SR 3.3.1.9 2 5016 V 5082 V l SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
- 12. Underfrequency 3(e) 1 per bus L SR 3.3.1.9 2 55.9 Hz 56.4 Hz l RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
- 13. Steam Generator 1.2 4 per SG E SR 3.3.1.1 2 9% (Unit 1) 10.7 % l (SG) Water Lowl . SR 3.3.1.7 2 35.1 % (Unit 1) l Low Low SR 3.3.1.10 (Unit 2) of 36.8 % I SR 3.3.1.16 narrow range (Unit 2) of span narrow range span
- 14. Turbine Trip
- 15. Safetyinjection(SI) 1,2 2 trains P SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Input from SR 3.3.1.14 ;
Engineered Safety l Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
(continued)
(e) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Otock) interlock.
(i) Not used.
- 0) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interiock.
I 1
I l
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment NoS.
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7)
Reactor Trip System instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
' FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDfTIONS REQUIREMENTS -VALUE SETPOINT
- 16. Reactor Trip System interlocks
- b. t.ow Power 1 1 per train S SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips Block. P 7
P 10 RTP
- f. Turbine 1 2 S SR 2 3.1.12 10% RTP l 512.2% RTP Impulse SR 3.3.1.13 turbine Pressure, P-13 turbine impulse impulse pressure pressure equivalent equivalent i
! 17. ReactorTrip 1.2 2 trains O.U SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA 3(8i,4(a)5(a)
, 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA l-I 18. Reactor Trip Breaker 1,2 1 each per T SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Undervoltage and RTB l Shunt Trip Mechanisms 3(a),4(a)5(a)
, i each per C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA RTB
- 19. Automatic Trip i ogic 1,2 2 trains P,U SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA 3(a) 4(a) 5(a)
, , 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA (continued)
(a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(k) including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-17 Amendment Nos.
I i
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overternperature AT The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by more than 4.5% of RTP.
AT('**'"I ' ' '
K, - K, I' * ') T
' - T' + K, (P - P') - f, (AI) s ATo (1 + r, s 1 + r, s , (1 + r, s) _ (1 + r. s)
Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, *F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, *F.
s is the Laplace transfona operator, sec.
T,is the measured RCS average temperature, *F.
T is the nominal T.y at RTP (allowed by Safety Analysis), s 585.1F (Unit 1) s 590.8*F (Unit 2).
P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig P is the nominal RCS operating pressure, = 2235 psig K, = Overtemperature AT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, as presented in l the COLR, K2 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, K3 = Overtemperature AT reactor trip depressurization setpoint penalty coefficient, as presented in the COLR, t i, t, = Time constants util; zed in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, t3 =. Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, t 4, is = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T y, as presented in the COLR,
- t. = Time constant utilized in the measured T y lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, and fi(AI) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response du' ring plant startup tests such that:
(i) for q, - go between the " positive" and "negativt (AI) breakpoints as presented in the COLR; fi(AI) = 0, where qi and go are percent i RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the !
core respective ly, and gi + go is total THERMAL POWER in percent j ef RATED THERMAL POWER; i (ii) for each percent Al that the magnitude of qi- go is more negative than the f i(AI) " negative" breakpoint presented in the COLR, the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the fi(AI) " negative" slope presented in the COLR; and (continued)
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-18 Arnendment Nos. ;
i l
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 6 of 7)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation i
(iii) for each percent Al that the magnitude of qt - go is more positive than the fi (Al)" positive" breakpoint presented in the COLK the AT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by the fi(AI) " positive" slope presented in the COLR.
I l
Note 2: Overpower AT l
The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT by more than 3% (Unit 1) 3.3% (Unit 2) of RTP.
- j e
AT S * *' #) < SATa K, - Ks U# T-K. T - T' - f, (AI) j (1 + r, s) ,1 + r3 s , 1+r,S 1+r,s, 1+r,s l Where: AT is the measured RCS AT by loop narrow range RTDs, *F.
ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, "F.
s is the Laplace transform operator, sec" l T,is the measured RCS average temperature, *F. l T is the nominal T,vg at RTP (calibration temperature for AT instrumentation),
s 585.1*F (Unit 1) s 590.8*F (Unit 2).
K4 = Overpower AT reactor NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT as presented in the l COLR, Ks = 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, Ke = Overpower AT reactor, trip heatup setpoint penalty coefficient as presented in the COLR for T > T and Ke = 0 for T s T ,
t i, t, = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR, 13 = Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, as presented in the COLR,
- t. = Time constant utilized in the measured T. g lag compensator, as presented in the COLR, t, = Time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for T,yg, as presented in the COLR, and f 2(AI) = a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measur6d instrument response during plant startup tests such that:
(i) for q,- go between the " positive" and " negative" f2 (AI) breakpoints as presented in the COLR; f 2(Al) = 0, where qi and go are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qi + go is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER; (continued)
Catawba Units 1 ar d 2 3.3.1 19 Amendment Nos.
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.E Table 3.32-1 (page 1 of 5)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION . CONDITIONS . CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT j l
- 1. Safety injection
- a. - Manualinitiation 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA
- b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.32.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays
- c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.32.1 s 1.4 psig 1.2 psig l Pressure High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 21839 psig 1845 psig l Pressure Low SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
-- 2. Containment Spray
- a. ManualInitiation 1,2,3,4 1 per train, 8 SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA 2 trains
- b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays -
- c. Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 3.2 psig 3.0 psig l Pressure. SR 3.3.2.5 High High SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- 3. ' Containment isolation
- a. Phase A isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Injection (continued)
(a) Above the P 11 (Pressuriter Pressure) interlock.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-11 Amendment NoS.
1 ESFAS instrumentation )
3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 5) -
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation l
APPLICABLE -
MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL l j SPECIFIED REQUIRED - SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP I FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REOUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT )
- 3. Containment Isolation (continued) . .
1 1
Phase B lsolation '
g1) Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 1 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA . NA 2 trains (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 - 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuatior, Relays (3) Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3_3.2.1 5 3.2 psig 3.0 psig ~l Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 High High SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 l
- 4. Stearr, Line Isolation j
- a. Manual Initiation (1) System 1,2(b) 3(b)
, 2 trains F SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA .
(2) Individual 1,2(b);(b) 1 per line G SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA
- b. Automatic 1,2(b) 3(b) 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA l Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 '
Relays !
- c. Containment 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 3.2 3.0 psig l 3 g(b)g(b)
Pressure .High SR 3.3.2.5 psig ,
High SR 3.3.2.9 l SR 3.3.2.10
- d. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2(b),3(a)(b) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 2 744 psig 775 psig -l line SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
(a)Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
(b)Except when all MStVs are closed and de-activated.
I
- Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-12 Amendment NoS, l-m . _ m
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.21 (page 3 of 5)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation 4,PPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER . NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUlHED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 4. Steam Line isolatKm (continued)
(2) Negative 3(b)(c) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 s 122.8(d) psi 100(d) psi Rate High line l
SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- 5. Turbine Tr5 and Feedwater isolation
- a. Automatic 1,2(e) 2 trains ( SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays b.' SG Water Level 1,2(e) 4 per SG J SR 3.3.2.1 5 85.6 % 83.9 % l High High SR 3.3.2.2 (Unit 1) (Unit 1)
(P-14) SR 3.3.2.4 578.9 % 77.1% l SR 3.3.2.5 (Unit 2) (Unit 2)
SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for allinitiation functions and requirements.
- d. T.5-Low 1,2(8) 4 J SR 3.3.2.1 2 561*F 564*F l SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 coincident with Refer to Function 8.a (Reactor Trip, P-4) for sll initiation functions and Reactor Trip, P-4 requirements.
- e. Doghouse Wator 1,2(e) 2 per L SR 3.3.2.8 s 12 inches 11 inches l Level High High doghouse above 577 ft above 577 floor level it floor level
- f. Trip of all main 1,2(a) 3 por MFW K SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA feedwater pump pumps (continued) l I
- (a) Above the P 11 (Prossurizer Pressure) interlock.
(b) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated-l (c) Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and may be blocked below P-11 when Steam Line Isolation Steam Line Pressure - Low is not blocked.
(d) Time constant utilized in the rate / lag controller is 2 50 seconds.
(e) Except when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve. !
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-13 Amendment NoS.
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 5)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEfLLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater -
- a. Automatic 1,2,3 - 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays
- b. SG Water Level 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 29% 10.7% l
. Low Low SR 3.3.2.5 (Unit 1) (Unit 1)
SR 3.3.2.9 2 35.1 % 36.8 % l SR 3.3.2.10 (Unit 2) (Unit 2)
- c. Safety Ir(ection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
- d. Loss of Offsite 1,2,3 - 3 per bus D SR 3.3.2.3 2 3242 V 3500 V l Power SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
- e. Trip of all Main 1,2(a) 3 per pump K SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Feedwater SR 3.3.2.10 Pumps
- f. Auxiliary 1,2,3 3 per train M SR 3.3.2.8 A) 2 9.5 psig A) 10.5 l
[
Feedwater Pump SR 3.3.2.10 psig Train A and Train B Suction B) 2 5.2 psig B) 6.2 psig l Transfer on ' (Unit 1)
(Unit 1)
Suction Pressure 2 5.0 psig 6.0 psig l Low (Unit 2)
(Unit 2)
- 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump
- a. Automatic 1,2,3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays
- b. Refueling Water 1,2,3,4 4 N SR 3.3.2.1 2 162.4 177.15 l Storage Tank SR 3.3.2.7 inches inches (RWST) Level- SR 3.3.2.9 Low SR 3.3.2.10 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
Safety injection (continued)
(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-14 Amendment Nos.
.m_.
v:
l ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 l
Table 3 3.2-1 (page 5 of 5)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation APPLICABLE I- MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION. CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 8. ESFAS Interkx:ks
- a. . ReactorTrip P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, F SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA 2 trains
- b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 O SR 3.3.2.5 21944 and 1955 psig Pressure, P-11 SR 3.3.2.9 51966 psig
- c. T., . Low Low. 1,2,3 1 per loop O SR 3.3.2.5 2 550*F 553*F P-12 SR 3.3.2.9 l'
- 9. Containment Pressure Control System
- a. Start Permissive 1,2,3,4 4 per train P. SR 3.3.2.1 5 0.45 psid 0.4 psid l SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9
- b. Termination 1,2,3,4 4 per train P SR 3.3.2.1 2 0.25 psid 0.3 psid l SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9 '
- 10. Nuclear Service 1,2,3,4 3 por pit O,R SR 3.3.2.1 2 El. 555.4 ft EL 557.5 ft l Water Suction SR 3.3.2.9 Transfer LowPit SR 3.3.2.11 Level I
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-15 Amendment NoS. j I
i l
l_: I
LOP DG Start instrumentation 3.3.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- )
i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 --------
--------- N O T E------------- ----.-.
Testing shat consist of voltage sensor relay testing excluding actuation of load shedding diesel start, and time delay times..
Perform TADOT. 31 days SR 3.3.5.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with NOMINAL TRIP 18 months l SETPOINT and Allowable Value as follows:
- a. Loss of voltage Allowable Value 2 3242 V.
Loss of voltage NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT =
3500 V.
- b. Degraded voltage Allowable Value a 3738 V.
Degraded voltage NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT =
3766 V.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.3.5-2 Amendment Nos.
Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)
Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation Instrumentation j i
FUNCTION REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS TRIP SE7 POINT I
- 1. ManualInitiation 2 SR 3.3.6.4 NA
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic and 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 NA Actuation Relays SR 3.3.6.2 SR 3.3.6.3
- 3. Safetyinjection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, 'ESFAS instrumentation," Table 3.3.2-1, Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.
I i
l l
j k
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Catawba Units I and 2 3.3.6-3 Amendment Nos.
l LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System
- LCO 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one cf,arging pump or one safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS, the accumulators isolated, reactor coolant pump operation limited as specified in Table 3.4.12-1 and either a or b below:
- a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with nominal lift setting = l 400 psig (as left calibrated), allowable value s 425 psig (as found),
with RCS cold leg temperature 2 65'F; or l
- b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 45 square inches. I APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is s 285'F, l MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.
_..N OT E----------------------------- -
Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in Specification 3.4.3.
l 1
l Catawba Units 1 and 2 3.4.12-1 Amendment Nos.
re RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation .
IBASES BACKGROUND . The RTS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and to assist the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents.
T he protection and monitoring systems have been designed to assure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RTS, as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
The LSSS, defined in this specification as the Allowable Value, in l conjunction with the LCOs, establish the threshold for protective syt, tem action to prevent exceeding acceptable limits during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
During AOOs, which are those events expected to occur one or more times during the unit life, the acceptable limits are:
- 1. The Depar1ure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent departure from nucleate boiling (DNB);
- 2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur; and
Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0, " Safety Limits (SLs)," also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during AOOs.
Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they are not expected to occur during the unit life. The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a
' different fraction of these limits, based on probability of occurrence. !
Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.-
Catawba Units 1 and 2 83.3.1-1 Revision No.1
i RTS Instrummtation I B 3.3.1
- BASES BACKGROUND (continued) .
The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected categories as illustrated in UFSAR, Chapter 7 (Ref.1), 4 and as identified below:
- 1. Field transmitters or process sensors: provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the {
parameter being measured; I l
- 2. Process monitonng systems, including the Process Control System, the Nuclear instrumentation System (NIS), and various field contacts an'. sensors: monitors various plant parameters, ,
provides any required signal processing, and provides digital outputs when parameters exceed predetermined limits. They may a also provide o';tputs for control, indication, alarm, computer input, j and recording; {
l
- 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and J output bays: combines the input signals from the process monitoring systems per predetermined logic and initiates a reactor trip and ESF actuation when warranted by the process monitoring j systems inputs; and '
- 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including reactor trip breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or " rods," to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.
Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one, and often as many as four, field transmitters or sensors are ust.d to measure unit parameters. To account for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. l The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated wnen
< its "as found" calibration data are compared against its dc,cumcated acceptance criteria.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1 2 Revision No.1
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 B'SES' A
BACKGROUND (continued)
Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS are the nominal values at which the l bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CAllBRATION tolerance.
The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits (Ref.1,2, and 3). The selection cf these NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays, calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that me 1 function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5) are taken into account. The actual as-left setpoint of the bistable assures that the actual trip occurs in time to prevent an analytical limit from being exceeded.
The Allowable Value accounts for changes in random measurement l errors between COTS. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the COT demonstrates that the loop trips within the Allowable Value, the loop is OPERABLE. A trip within the Allowable Value ensures that the predictions of equipment performance used to develop the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT are still l valid, and that the equipment will initiate a trip in response to an AOO in ,
time to prevent an analytical limit from being exceeded (and that the j i consequences of DBAs will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated i l from within the LCOs at the onset of the AOO or DBA and the equipment
- functions as designed). Note that in the accompanying LCO 3.3.1, the Allowable Values of Table 3.3.1-1 are the LSSS.
Each channel of the process control equipment can be tested on line to verify that the signal or setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channelis taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SRs section.
The determination of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. All l field sensors and signal processing equipment Catawba Units 1 anri 2 B 3.3.1-4 Revision No.1
U RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES l ..
L APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 19. Automatic Trio Loaic The LCO requirement for the RTBs (Functions 17 and 18) and
. Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each train RTB has a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
The LCO requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not pr2 vent reactor trip.
These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3,4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs and associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD System is capable of rod withdrawal. j The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 6).
AC'llONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of I Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.1-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.
A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value, in the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP Catawba Units 1 and 2 ' B 3.3.1-30 Revision No.1
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
-When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.
[
6J.
Condition A applies to all RTS protection Functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required channels for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the '
protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the reference'd Conditions and Required Actions.
B.1 and B.2 Condition E' # es to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addrewos the train orientation of the SSPS for this Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function.
The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that there I
are two automatic actuation trains and another manualinitiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time). The 6 additional hours are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an ordedy manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, the MODE 1 and 2 requirements for this trip Function are no longer required and Condition C is entered.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.1-31 Revision No.1
e ,
i ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND { continued) provided in the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. The OPERABILITY of each l transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria.
Slanal Processina Eauipment Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used )
for the signal processing of unit paramaters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with setpoints established by safety analyses. These setpoints are defined in UFSAR, ,
Chapter 6 (Ref.1), Chapter 7 (Ref. 2), and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3). If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision logic processing. Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing. Some unit parameters l
provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.
Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the j required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that j would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE l with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of- two logic.
Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control I function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to j provide the required reliability and redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Again, a single i failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation. l These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in the UFSAR, a
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-2 Revision No.1
i ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 DASES BACKGROUND (continued)-
Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS are the nominal values at which the l :
bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted l when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION )
tolerance. '
The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS used in the bistables are based on me analyticallimits (Ref.1,2, and 3). The selection of these NOMINAL TRIP d SETPOINTS is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays, calibration tolerances, instrumentation ;
uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those I ESFAS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by l 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5) are taken into account. The actual as-left setpoint of the bistable assures that the actual trip occurs before the Allowable Value is reached. The Allowable Value accounts for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a COT. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the point at which the loop trips does not exceed the Allowable Value, the !
Ioop is considered OPERABLE.
A trip within the Allowable Value ensures that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.
Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channelis taken out of service for !
- testing, a sirr ulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument
]
signal. The process equipment for the channelin test is then tested, i l verified, and calibrated. SRs for the channels are specified in the SR section.
The determination of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS and Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.2-1 incorporates all of the known uncertainties j applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. All l field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channe:s are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-3 Revision No.1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICACLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) valves, and start the NSWS pumps. This function is initiated on a two-out-of-three logic from either NSWS pump pit.
This function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to ensure cooling water remains available to essential components during a DBA. In MODES 5 and 6, the sufficient time exists for manual operator action to realign the NSWS pump suction, if required.
The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref.
6).
ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.2-1 When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.
A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SEl POINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration .
tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
When the number of inoperabic channels in a trip function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 should be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.
6d Condition A applies to all ESFAS protection functions.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-31 Revision No.1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued) l Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditior.s and Required Actions. l B.1. B.2.1 and B.2.2 l
Condition B applies to manualinitiation of:
. Sl;
. Phase A lsolation; and
. Phase B Isolation.
This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for the functions ,
listed above. If a channel or train is inoperable,48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is allowed to i return it to an OPERABLE status. Note that for containment spray and )
Phase B isolation, failure of one or both channels in one train renders the train inoperable. Condition B, therefore, encompasses both situations.
The specified Complet:on Time is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation train OPERABLE for each Function, and the low probability of an event ,
occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO I does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> total time) and in MODE 5 within an l additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> total time). The allowable Completion !
Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the i required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner ano without challenging unit systems. l C.1. C.2.1 and C.2.2 Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions:
. Sl;
. Phase A Isolation; Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-32 Revision No.1
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LG DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 l BASES j BACKGROUND (continued)
Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS used in the relays are based on the l analytical limits presented in UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when ;
all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account.
The actual as-left setpoint of the relays is normally still more conservative l than that required by the Allowable Value. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. ;
Setpoints adjusted in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that I the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed.
Allowable Values and NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS are specified for each Function in the LCO. The NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINTS are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance j procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing I as required. A relay shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the relay I trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value. In the event a relay's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or l bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that -
relay must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for ;
the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions warrant, the trip !
setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to ,
the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of I the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration to;erance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint ;
shall be re-adjusted. Each Allowable Value and NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analyses in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These uncertainties are defined in setpoint calculations.
APPLICABLE The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the Engineered SAFETY ANALYSES Safety Features (ESF) Systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS).
Catawba Units 1 and 2 8 3.3.5-2 Revision No.1
.. B 3.3.5
. BASES -
APPLICABLE SAFETY' ANALYSES (continued)
I
- Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the loss of
- offsite power during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The actual DG start has historically been associated with the ESFAS actuation. The !
DG loading has been included in the delay time associated with each safety system component requiring DG supplied power following a loss of )
offsite power. The analyses assume a non- mechanistic DG loading, which does not explicitly account for each individual component of loss of
{
power detection and subsequent actions.
-l The required channels of LOP DG start instrumentation,in conjunction with the ESF systems powered from the DGs, provide unit protection in I the event of any of the analyzed accidents discussed in Reference 2, in l which a loss of offsite power is assumed.
The delay times assumed in the safety analysis for the ESF equipment !
include the 10 second DG start delay, and the appropriate sequencing I delay,if applicable. The response times for ESFAS actuated equipment in LCO 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) l Instrumentation," include the appropriate DG loading and sequencing j delay. The LOP DG start instrumentation channels satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).
LCO The LCO for LOP DG start instrumentation requires that three channels
~
per bus of both the loss of voltage and degraded voltage Functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 when the LOP DG start instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6, the three channels must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the automatic start of the DG is available when needed. Loss of the LOP DG Start i Instrumentation Function could result in the delay of safety systems l initiation when required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences l during accidents. During the loss of offsite power the DG powers the )
motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Failure of these pumps to start would leave only one turbine driven pump, as well as an increased potential for a loss of decay heat removal through the secondary system.
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.5-3 Revision No.1 m
I'
.. LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES APPLICABILITY - The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2,3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in
, these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the i required DG must be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an
! LOP or degraded power to the vital bus.
ACTIONS A channel shall be OPERABLE if the point at which the channel trips is found more conservative than the Allowable Value, in the event a channel's trip setpoint is found less conservative than the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. If plant conditions
. warrant, the trip setpoint may be set outside the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band as long as the trip setpoint is conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT. If the trip setpoint is found outside of the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT calibration tolerance band and non-conservative with respect to the NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT, the setpoint shall be re-adjusted.
Because the required channels are specified on a per bus basis, the l
Condition may be entered separately for each bus as appropriate.
l A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of I
- l. Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be i entered independently for each Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
l M
I I l Condition A applies to the LOP DG start Function with one loss of voltage i
or degraded voltage channel per bus inoperable.
If one channel is inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires that channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With a channel in trip, the LOP DG start l instrumentation channels are configured to provide a one-out-of-two logic to initiate a trip of the inc aning offsite power.
The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the Function
! remains fully OPERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an event occurring during these intervals.
l l
Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.5-4 Revision No.1
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k ATTACHMENT 3 l DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION l
l l
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Description of Proposed Changes:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.90 and 10CFR50.4, DEC proposes to revise the Catawba Nuclear Station TS's as stated below. The proposed revisions will facilitate treatment of the I applicable RTS, ESFAS, LOP, VP , and LTOP Instrumentation TS Trip l Setpoints as nominal values. In addition, proposed. changes to I the applicable TS Bases are included which further define the TS Trip Setpoints as nominal values. l The proposed changes are as follows:
- 1. Inequalities associated with the TRIP SETPOINT columns of TS Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1 would be deleted.
- 2. The column heading " TRIP SETPOINT" in TS Tables 3.3.1-1 l and 3.3.2-1 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT".
- 3. The column heading " TRIP SETPOINT" in TS Table 3.3.6-1 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT".
- 4. " Trip Setpoint" in the first sentence of Table 3.3.1-1 Note 1 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT". " Trip Setpoint" in the definition of K1 in Table 3.3.1-1 Note 1 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT".
- 5. " Trip Setpoint" in the first sentence of Table 3.3.1-1 Note 2 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT". " Trip Setpoint" in the definition of Ki in Table 3.3.1-1 Note 2 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT".
- 6. Each instance of " Trip Setpoint" in TS Surveillance 3.3.5.2 would be changed to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT".
- 7. TS Section 1.1 Definitions would be revised to add the definition of NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT.
- 8. The inequalities in TS Surveillance 3.3.5.2 associated with the Loss of Voltage Trip Setpoint (3500V) and the Degraded Voltage Trip Setpoint (3766V) would be deleted.
- 9. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.12 would ;
be revised to change " lift setting" to " nominal lift setting" and remove the inequality from the lift setting value (400 psig).
[ 10. The 0.7 second response time associated with Table 3.3.1-1, Function 11 (Undervoltage RCPs), and the 0.2 i second response time essociated with Table 3.3.1-1, 1 Function 12 (Underfrequency RCPs), is being deleted, f
1 L
e Technical Justification:
A) Proposed Changes #1, #2, #4, #5, and #7 Note that these proposed changes are submitted for clarification only and do not represent a change in DEC's position and methodologies which treat the subject setpoints and their associated inequalities as nominal values.
Background:
Section 7.1.2.1.7 of the Catawba UFSAR provides instrument range and setpoint design criteria for safety-related instrumentation.
This section' describes three setpoints - Safety Limit Setpoint, Limiting Value, and Nominal Setpoint. The Limiting Value is described as the Technical Specification allowable value. Duke ,
Energ7 interprets this Limiting Value to be the Limiting Safety I System Setting (LSSS). The Nominal Setpoint is the value set into the instrument. As described in the Catawba setpoint methodology outlined in the following paragraph, this as-left l setpoint value allows for normal instrument drift such that the J Technical Specification limit (limiting or LSSS value) is not exceeded.
The setpoint methodology used for calibrating some of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation at Catawba is described in a Westinghouse document titled " Westinghouse Reactor Protection ,
l System / Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Setpoint '
Methodology". The balance of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation is calibrated using a setpoint methodology described in an Engineering Directives Manual (EDM). The methodology described in the EDM is consistent with the philosophy in the above referenced Westinghouse document which indicates that no action is required by plant staff as long as the as-left Trip Setpoint error is less than or equal to that required to ensure the Allowable Value (LSSS value for Catawba) is not exceeded. This setpoint methodology information indicates that, as long as the LSSS value is not exceeded, it is acceptable for the applicable safety-related instrumentation as-left Trip Setpoints to be exceeded by the instrument calibration setting tolerances. A review of current Catawba station practices related to Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation setpoints indicates that the as-left instrument calibration setting tolerances utilized are consistent with the above methodologies and the Catawba safety analyses.
The approved Catawba Nuclear Station Standardized Technical Specifications (STS) were developed in accordance with NUREG-1431. STS sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 specify the Trip Setpoints for the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation at the Catawba Nuclear Station. The BASES associated with these STS sections
1 provida clarifying information related to as-le etpoints for the Reactor Tris System Instrumsntation and the Lagineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation. The BASES for these sections state the following:
"The Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as-left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy."
Conclusion:
The.above information and other statements in the BASES for STS sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 supports DEC's position that the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation TS Trip Setpoints are nominal values and that these setpoints can be left at the value specified in the TS's plus or minus an instrument calibration setting tolerance.
t B) Proposed Change #3
Background:
TS Table 3.3.6-1 contains requirements for the VP actuation instrumentation. In this table, no additional setpoint requirements are specified beyond those already specified in TS Table 3.3.2-1, ESFAS Instrumentation. The automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and i
operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function lb, Safety Injection and ESFAS Function 3a, Containment Isolation in )
TS Table 3.3.2-1.
Conclusion:
Changing the Tr.. ~e tpoint column heading to " NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT" will> ure consistency with ESFAS Table 3.3.2-1.
I l C) Proposed Chang,es #6 and #8
Background:
The BASES for TS 3.3.5 conta.in the following statement: l
" Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are specified for each Function in the LCO. The trip setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing as required. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable i Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Operation with a Trip '
Setpoint less conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation
and testing is consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific sotpoint calculation. Each Allowable Value and Trip Setpoint specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analyses in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These uncertainties are defined in setpoint calculations (Ref. 3)."
Conclusion:
This above background information supports DEC's position that the Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage Trip Setpoints specified in Surveillance Requirement 3.3.5.2 are nominal values and that these setpoints can be left at the value specified in the TS's plus or minus an instrument calibration setting tolerance.
D) Proposed Change #9 i
Background:
A review of the Catawba Safety Analyses associated with the pressurizer power operated relief valves in the low temperature overpressure protection mode of operation indicates that the as-left lift setting is a nominal value.
Conclusion:
Based upon the above background informatian, revising Catawba TS 3.4.12 as proposed is consistent with the applicable Safety Analyses.
E) Proposed Change #10
Background:
Tahto 3.3.1-1, Functions 11 and 12, pertain to the Undervoltage RCPs and Underfrequency RCPs, respectively. These functions include a 0.7/0.2 second response time, respectively. The use of the term " response time" is misleading, since these values are actually time delays which are incorporated in order to prevent spurious RCP trips on undervoltage and underfrequency. It is not necessary to specify values for these time delays in the TS.
NUREG-1431, Revision 1, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants, which formed the basis for the Catawba TS, did not specify inclusion of these time delays. It is not necessary to include these time delays in the TS because overall Reactor Trip System response times must be met for these functions. For the Undervoltage RCPs and Underfrequency RCPs functions, respect.ively, the appropriate response times as delineated in Table 7-3, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, of the UFSAR, are 1.5 seconds and 0.6 second. The above specified time delays are accounted for in ensuring that the overall
channel responce time is met.
Conclusion:
The above described time delays can be removed from the TS, since their effect is accounted for in the performance of the overal]
r6sponse of the affected channel in reeting the response times specified in the UFSAR.
Summary Revisions to the Catawba TS's as shown in proposed changes #1,
- 2, #4, #5, and ',7 are consistent with the setpoint methodologies described in the Westinghouse setpoint methodology document and the EDM. Proposed changes #6 and #8 are censistent with statements in the BASES for TS 3.3.5. Revising the Catawba %s as shown in proposed change #3 provides clarification to T5 % ble 3.3.6-1 and ensures consistency with ESFAS Table 3.3.2-1.
Revisions to the Catawba TS's as outlined in proposed change #9 j is acceptable since it ensures consistency between TS 3.4.12 and the applicable Catawba Safety Analyses. Revisions to the Catawba TS's as outlined in proposed change #10 is acceptable since it is
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consistent with UFSAR requirements concerning function and channel response times.
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I ATTACHMENT 4 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS
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No Significant Hazarda ConsidSrations:
l In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10CFR50.91 and 50.92, Catawba Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specification change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is 4 provided in support of this conclusion.
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
No. The proposed chanc . are consistent with the current I licensing basis for cal mL Nuclear Station, the setpoint l methodology used to develop the Trip Setpoints, the Catawba Safety Analyses, and current station calibration procedures and 1 practices. The Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System are not accident initiating systems; they are accident mitigating systems. Therefore, these proposed changes will have no impact on any accident probabilities.
Accident consequences will not be affected, as no changes are being made to the plant which will involve a reduction in reliability of these systems. Consequently, any previous evaluations associated with accidents will not be affected by these changes.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No. The proposed changes are consistent with the current licensing basis for Catawba Nuclear Station, the setpoint l methodology used to develop the Trip Setpoints, the Catawba I Safety Analyses, and current station calibration procedures and practices. No changes are being made to actual plant hardware which will result in any new accident causal mechanisms. Also, i no changes are being made to the way in which the plant is being operated. Therefore, no new accident causal mechanisms will be generated. Consequently, plant accident analyses will not be affected by these changes. l
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. The proposed changes are consistent with the current licensing basis for Catawba Nuclear Station, the setpoint methodology used to develop the Trip Setpoints, the Catawba Safety Analyses, and current station calibration procedures and practices. Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the l
ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design l functions during and following accident conditions. These f barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, l and the containment system. The performance of these barriers will not be degraded by the proposed changes. Consequently, plant safety analyses will not be affected by these changes.
ATTACHMENT 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT l
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.Environmtntal Impact Assessment:
The proposed Technical specification amendment has been reviewed against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, nor increase the types and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures.
Therefore, the propos'ed amendment meets the criteria given in 10CFR51. 22 (c) (9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirement for:an Environmental Impact Assessment.
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