ML20204E727

Chapter 16.5-2,page 1-3 to CNS Selected Licensee Commitments Manual. with List of Effective Pages

ML20204E727
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/08/1999
From:	Gilbert G DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC
References
PROC-990308, NUDOCS 9903250112
Download: ML20204E727 (5)

Text

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""* York. SC 29745 s e r (80.D 831-3000 March 11,1999 RE: Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Manual Revision Date 3/08/9.9 Attached are revisions to the Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Manual. Please remove and replace the following pages:

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REMOVE INSERT Page 1 of 8 Page 1 of 8 1

TAB 16.5 l Chapter 16.5 2, pages 1 & 2 Chapter 16.5-2, pages 1-3 I If you have any questions concerning the contents of this package update, contact Larry Rudy at (803) j 831-3084.

1 Gary D. Gilbert Regulatory Compliance Manager O _

V' 9903250112 950311  :

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS MANUAL O

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List of Effective Pages Tab 16.0 16.0 Page 1 of 4 01/16/99 16.0 Page 2 of 4 01/16/99 16.0 Page 3 of 4 01/16/99 16.0 Page 4 of 4 01/16/99 Tab 16.1 16.1 Page 1 of 1 01/16/99 1 Tab 16.2 16.2 Page 1 of 2 01/16/99 16.2 Page 2 of 2 01/16/99 Tph164 16.3 Page 1 of 4 01/16/99 16.3 Page 2 of 4 01/16/99 16.3 Page 3 of 4 01/16/99 16.3 Page 4 of 4 01/16/99 Tab 16.4 Tab 16.5 16.5-1 Page 1 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-1 Page 2 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-1 Page 3 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-1 Page 4 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-2 Page 1 of 3 03/08/99 16.5-2 Page 2 of 3 03/08/99 16.5-2 Page 3 of 3 03/08/99 16.5-3 Page 1 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-3 Page 2 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-3 Page 3 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-3 Page 4 of 4 01/16/99 16.5-4 Page 1 of 1 01/16/99 16.5-5 Page 1 of 2 01/16/99 16.5-5 Page 2 of 2 01/16/99 16.5-6 Page 1 of 2 01/16/99 16.5-6 Page 2 of 2 01/16/99 1

16.5-7 Page 1 of 1 01/16/99 Page 1 of 8 03/08/99

A 1.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16,5-2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN COMMITMENT:

A minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig + 3%,-2% OR the Reactor Coolant System shall be depressurized and a minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve shall be removed thus creating a Reactor Coolant System vent of a 4.5 square inches per ITS LCO 3.4.12b. ,

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4 when any Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperature is s 285'F, MODE 5.

E' JEDIAL ACTION:

With this COMMITMENT not met, immediately suspend all operations involving l positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE residual heat removal loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

O TESTING REQUIREMENTS; l Verify any pressurizer code safety valve being used to meet this COMMITMENT is l OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. ,

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REFERENCES:

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1) Letter from NRC to Gary R. Peterson, Duke, Iscuance of Improved Technical Specifications Amendments for Catawba, September 30,1998.

2) Catawba Safety Evaluation Report, including Supplements 1 through 6.

3) CNC-1223.03-00-0005," Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Setpoint Verification for Low Temperature Overpressure Protection."

BASES:

The pressurizer Code safety valves do not perform an adequate Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) function in the stated modes of APPLICABILITY.

ITS 3.4.12 assures that the PORVs are OPERABLE to perform this LTOP function.

A pressurizer Code safety valve that is removed from its flange meets the LTOP The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambiant conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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BASES (con't)

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option of creating a Reactor Coolant System vent of 245 square inches per ITS LCO 3.4.12b. During cold shutdown and draining of the Reactor Coolant System, there is no adverse effect of opening more than one 4.5 square inch path.

Therefore, a minimum of one pressurlzer Code safety valve that is removed provides an LTOP path that is equivalent and superior to a minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve that is OPERABLE in response to a mass input or heat input transient. The REMEDIAL ACTION to immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes is conservative to preclude any reactivity management event. The REMEDIAL ACTION to place an OPERABLE residual heat removal loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode makes the Residual Heat Removal System suction relief valve available to provide its equivalent LTOP function.

The following is excerpted from Section 5.2.2 of Reference 2: i "SRP Section 5.2.2 requires that the overpressure protection system during low temperature operation of the plant shall be designed in accordance with the requirements of BTP RSB 5 2.

The low-temperature overpressure protection is primarily provided by the pressurizer relief valves PORVs. As RCS temperature approaches a specified set point during plant cooldown, an annunciator alerts the operator that plant conditions require low-temperature overpressure protection. A key-lock switch for each train of the PORVs is placed to the low pressure position by the operator to enable the PORV low pressure set point. Should a pressure excursion occur with the low pressure mode enabled when the plant temperature is below ihe temperature set point, system pressure would be limited to acceptable values, and excess mass would be relieved to the pressurizer relief tank. An annunciator in the control room would alert the operator to system overpressure.

The PORVs and associated block valves are required to have safety-grade emergency power supplies in accordance with item ll.G.1 of NUREG-0737.

Section 8.4.12 of this SER provides a discussion of Catawba's compliance with this requirement.

As a backup to the low-temperature overpressure protection system, the residual heat removal system (RHRS) has two suction relief valves with a capacity of 900 gpm each at a set point pressure of 450 psig. The relieving capacity of each valve is adequate to relieve the combined flow of the two centrifugal charging pumps. The RHRS suction relief valves provide overpressure protection after the RHRS is put into operation and the RHRS suction isolation valves are open at an RCS pressure of less than 425 psig.

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Also, operating procedures require that the operator lock out the cold-leg accumulator isolation valves in the closed position during shutdown."

Based on the above SER discussion, as well as current LTOP design basis calculations, each inlet line to the Residual Heat Removal System is equipped with a pressure relief valve designed to relieve, at a pressure no greater than the Code maximum allowable pressure, the greater combined flow of: a) two centrifugal charging pumps, or b) one charging pump and one safety injection pump. When the Residual Heat Removal System is in operation, the suction relief valves provide additionallow temperature overpressure protection. These suction relief valves exceed the capacity of the pressurizer PORV. Therefore, it has been demonstrated that given any three of four LTOP relief devices (NC328, NC34A, ND3, ND38), and assuming single failure affecting any one of these devices, the remaining two will provide overpressure protection for either two centrifugal charging pumps, or one charging pump and one safety injection pump.

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