ML20024D250

Updated LER 83-019/03L-1:on 830406,breaker in Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Ctr 3B1 Shorted Out,Causing Various Pieces of Equipment on Train B to Be Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Breaker Removed & cleaned.W/830726 Ltr

ML20024D250
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/26/1983
From:	Hughes P, Westafer G FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
3F-0783-24, 3F-783-24, LER-83-019-03L, LER-83-19-3L, NUDOCS 8308030387
Download: ML20024D250 (4)

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• s' m SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION j REPORT NO: 50-302/83-019/03L-1 FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3 REPORT DATE: July 26, 1983 OCCURRENCE DATE: April 6,1983 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Center (3B1), which had been damaged during routine maintenance, short circuited.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

MODE 6 (REFUELING) .

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 6,1983, an Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Center breaker (8BR on ES MCC 3B1) short circuited causing various pieces of required equipment on ES Train B to be inoperable.

At the time that this event occurred, Emergency Diesel Generator A (EDG-A) had been removed from service to perform maintenance. Thus, the redundant systems (ES Train A) powered by Emergency Bus A were unable to be powered fron; an operable Emergency diesel generator.

Attached is a list of the equipment affected, applicable Technical Specifications, apparent causes, corrective actions and the significance of the loss of this equipment.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

This event was caused by personnel error. The breaker connectors were not properly aligned, causing the breaker to short circuit.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

See the attached list.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

i The immediate corrective actions are described on the attached list. The faulty breaker was removed, cleaned, and reinstalled. The breaker was returned to operability at 2100 on April 6, 1983.

Technical Specification Applicable Tech. Apparent Corrective Analysis Equipment Affected Specification Cause Action of Occurrence One of two 120 Volt 3.8.2. 2 A large power Containment integrity was Although ES Train A was A.C. Vital Busses spike, following ES MCC 3B1 established and the fuse unable to be powered from failure, caused a fuse to blow was replaced. its emergency power source in the Vital Bus inverter / it was capable of performing transformer. Its normal functions due to the availability of its normal power source. Thus, redundant .

systems were available.

Boron injection flow 3.1.2.1 DHV-6, DHV-35 and DHV-111, Verified that no opera- Same as above.

path on decay heat train B, are tions involving CORE powered by ES MCC 3Bl. ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes were performed.

Boric Acid Storage 3.1.2.8 Heat tracing on the Boric Verified that no opera- The temperature of the System Acid Storage system is tions involving CORE Boric Acid solution remained powered by ES MCC 3B1. ALTERATIONS or positive at no less than reactivity changes were 1050F.

performed.

Smoke detectors in: 3.3.3.7 The distribution panel that A Fire Watch Patrol The Fire Watch Patrol was

1) Plant Battery Room 3B supplies power for these was established to available to detect and

2) Control Rod Drive detectors is powered by inspect the affected mitigate any fires that Equipment Room ES MCC 3Bl. areas. may have started in the

3) 4160 Volt Switchgear affected areas.

Bus Rooms 3A & 3B

4) Inverter Rooms 3A & 3B

5) Cable Spreading Room 3A and 3B

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July 26,1983 3F-0783-24 Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No.83-019

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No.83-019 and the attached supplementary information sheet, which are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. This report supplies supplementary information to our initial report dated May 6,1983.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

/

of G. R. Westafer /

Manager Nuclear Licensing and Fuel Management AEF:mm Enclosure cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL COPY

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General Office 3201 Thirtyeurth street soutn . P O. Box 14042. St. Petersburg. Fbrida 33733 813-866-5151