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| As a result of installing the modification for reinforcing one of the doors which also serves as a rated fire assembly, the fire rating of that door would no longer be verified and a one hour roving fire watch was established. (The door has been considered inoperable as a fire rated assembly.) Because that fire door has been inoperable for a period of greater than seven days, this report also serves as a Special Report as required by section 3/4.7.10 of the plant Technical Specifications, gC, m. | | As a result of installing the modification for reinforcing one of the doors which also serves as a rated fire assembly, the fire rating of that door would no longer be verified and a one hour roving fire watch was established. (The door has been considered inoperable as a fire rated assembly.) Because that fire door has been inoperable for a period of greater than seven days, this report also serves as a Special Report as required by section 3/4.7.10 of the plant Technical Specifications, gC, m. |
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| i PLANT IDENTIFICATION: | | i PLANT IDENTIFICATION: |
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| Y , Power' Level - 0% Mode 3 1 The plant was in hot standby completing work necessary to repair condenser tube | | Y , Power' Level - 0% Mode 3 1 The plant was in hot standby completing work necessary to repair condenser tube |
| . leaks which had caused a forced outage. , | | . leaks which had caused a forced outage. , |
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| When this was not possible (i.e., the room contained safety-related equipment which could not withstand the harsh environment), the condition was documented by a nonconformance notice (NLN) and interim or permanent repairs were initiated. The results of the unanalyzed steam propagation path evaluation determined that the areas described below posed a potential safety concern. Some additional repairs were made to other areas to retain the mild environment status of the areas (even though equipment in these other areas could function in the steam environment or was not required to function). | | When this was not possible (i.e., the room contained safety-related equipment which could not withstand the harsh environment), the condition was documented by a nonconformance notice (NLN) and interim or permanent repairs were initiated. The results of the unanalyzed steam propagation path evaluation determined that the areas described below posed a potential safety concern. Some additional repairs were made to other areas to retain the mild environment status of the areas (even though equipment in these other areas could function in the steam environment or was not required to function). |
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| UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Arenovro cus No siso-oro4 tXPtRtl- 6,31185 F ACl4tTV hAML til DOCKli NUMBER (21 ggg gygggg ggi pagg 43; l ' | | UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Arenovro cus No siso-oro4 tXPtRtl- 6,31185 F ACl4tTV hAML til DOCKli NUMBER (21 ggg gygggg ggi pagg 43; l ' |
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| This condition could create an unacceptable environment in the Control Building. '! | | This condition could create an unacceptable environment in the Control Building. '! |
| As documented in NCN 2995, door AB 303A was repaired by using perimeter door seals t | | As documented in NCN 2995, door AB 303A was repaired by using perimeter door seals t on the frame and installing an automatic door bottom, pnsealed Flexible Conduit An evaluation was performed.to assess the acceptability of using flexible conduit as a pressure boundary. It was determined that for pressure boundaries subject to significant pressures (several inches of water) which separate environmental zones |
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| on the frame and installing an automatic door bottom, pnsealed Flexible Conduit An evaluation was performed.to assess the acceptability of using flexible conduit as a pressure boundary. It was determined that for pressure boundaries subject to significant pressures (several inches of water) which separate environmental zones | |
| .that were assumed to be pressure tight, unsealed flexible conduit could provide a significant leakage path for steam. Five zone paths were identified as having ! | | .that were assumed to be pressure tight, unsealed flexible conduit could provide a significant leakage path for steam. Five zone paths were identified as having ! |
| unacceptable flexible conduit penetration:. This conduit provided a path whereby steam from a high energy line break in one zone could enter mild zone (s) containing safety-related equipment. The environmental zone pairs involved were IB-01/02 to ' | | unacceptable flexible conduit penetration:. This conduit provided a path whereby steam from a high energy line break in one zone could enter mild zone (s) containing safety-related equipment. The environmental zone pairs involved were IB-01/02 to ' |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20046B4041993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-004-00:on 930629,identified Noncompliance W/Srs of TS 4.3.2.1,Table 3.3-3.8.b.Caused by Personnel Error.Retest Sucessfully Performed & Personnel Involved Have Taken Part in Discussion of Importance of Review process.W/930728 Ltr ML20046B1601993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-003-00:on 930628,TS Violation Occurred Due to Personnel Error Re non-licensed Operator Performing Evolution W/O Consulting Governing Procedure.Reactor Bldg Purge Supply Valves closed.W/930728 Ltr ML20028H4411990-12-27027 December 1990 LER 90-001-01:on 900209,Part 21 Rept Received from Gilbert Commonwealth Re Possible Loss of One Train of Chilled Water Sys in Event of High Energy Line Break.Conceptual Design Developed to Reduce Heat Load on coils.W/901231 Ltr ML20043F3941990-06-0404 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900505,energizing of Sequencer Initiated Undervoltage Sequence Causing ESF Bus a to Deenergize. Caused by Incorrectly Installed Undervoltage Circuit Agastat Relay.Relay rewired.W/900604 Ltr ML20043B6031990-05-23023 May 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 900423,during Offsite Relay Testing,Oil Circuit Breaker Supplying Bus 3 Tripped Open,Resulting in Loss of Power to ESF Train B & Diesel Generator B Start. Caused by Deficient Procedure.Testing stopped.W/900523 Ltr ML20043A4231990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900412,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred When Train B Emergency Diesel Generator Automatically Started.Caused by Personnel Error.Feeder Breaker from Battery reopened.W/900510 Ltr ML20042G7691990-05-0808 May 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900410,steam Generator Tube Eddy Current Exam Yielded Insp Category C-3 Results.Caused by Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking in Hot Leg Tubesheet Area. Defective Tubes Plugged or repaired.W/900508 Ltr ML20042G1761990-05-0707 May 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900406,computer Software Error Caused Nonconservative Radiation Monitor Setpoints.Caused by Software Developer Personnel Error.Setpoints Readjusted & Procedures/Software evaluated.W/900507 Ltr ML20042G1791990-05-0707 May 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 881114,investigation Determined That Two Leads for Cabinet XPN-6002 Had Been Previously Disconnected in 881114 Refueling Outage,Rendering Transmitter LT-1976 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel error.W/900507 Ltr ML20042E1601990-04-11011 April 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900318,inadvertent ESF Actuation Occurred When Emergency Start Signal Reset.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy When Emergency Start Signal Still Present on Train B.Sys Operating Procedure revised.W/900411 Ltr ML20012C4231990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900209,Gilbert/Commonwealth,Inc Informed Util of Vendor Requirement to Rept Design Deficiency Re Failure of Safety Function,Per Part 21.Util Evaluating What Design Mods Can Be Made to Correct deficiency.W/900312 Ltr ML20006B1231990-01-26026 January 1990 LER 89-022-00:on 890913,discovered That Chilled Water Pump B Returned to Svc W/O Performing Adequate Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Required post-maint Operability Test.Caused by Personnel error.W/900126 Ltr ML19354E1641990-01-17017 January 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891218,when Operator Directed to Stop Svc Water Pump C by Positioning Handswitch to auto-after Stop Position,Pump Started,Causing ESF Actuation.Caused by Failed Circuit Board.Board replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML20005G1511990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 88-008-01:on 880607,AE (Gilbert Assoc) Notified Util of Design Defect Yielding Potential for Steam Propagation Path Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown Equipment.Caused by Design Error.Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900108 Ltr ML20005E6941990-01-0202 January 1990 LER 89-019-00:on 891203,as Result of Plant Trip on 891202, Results of Reactor Coolant Sample Not Reviewed & Recognized as Being Out of Tolerance.Caused by Personnel Error.Another Sample of RCS Taken & Analyzed,Per Tech Spec.W/900102 Ltr ML20005E6611990-01-0202 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 891202,turbine Controls Failed to Respond to Attempt to Counter Loss of Load & Turbine Manually Tripped.Caused by Relay Contact Failure in Turbine Electrohydraulic Control circuitry.W/900102 Ltr ML20011D4691989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-015-02:on 890825,presssurizer Safety Valve Body Inlet Temp Increased to Greater than 450 F & Acoustic Leak Monitor Alarmed,Causing RCS to Depressurize & Reactor Trip. Caused by Loss of Loop Seal.Valve replaced.W/891220 Ltr ML19332F0131989-11-30030 November 1989 LER 89-018-00:on 891027,shift Engineer Observed That Control Room Alarm Did Not Occur When Sample Pumps Stopped.On 891031,radiation Monitors RM-A3 & RM-A4 Declared Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate procedures.W/891130 Ltr ML19327B4921989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-017-00:on 890918,responsible Engineer Reviewed Plant Parameters & Concluded That Initial Conditions Required by Surveillance Test Procedure 209.001 Not Satisfied.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedural inadequacy.W/891024 Ltr ML19327B3451989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-015-01:on 890825,pressurizer Safety Valve Body Inlet a Temp Increased to Greater than 450 F & Plant Shutdown Initiated.Cause Being Evaluated.Plant Parameters Monitored & Stabilized in Mode 3.W/891024 Ltr ML19325C6501989-10-0707 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890908,shutdown Occurred Due to Inoperable Msiv.Caused by Crushed Conduit That Resulted in Short Circuit of Test Circuit Wiring.Conduit/Test Circuit Wiring repaired.W/891006 Ltr ML20006B2751989-06-27027 June 1989 LER 89-011-01:on 890528,manual Reactor Trip Initiated Following Failure of Pressurizer Safety Valve When Valve Became Unseated,Causing Rapid Depressurization of Rcs.Temp Detectors Installed on Safety valve.W/900123 Ltr ML20024F5131983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-091/03L-0:on 830802,while in Mode 1,borated Water Vol of Accumulator a Decreased to 7,354 Gallons.Caused by Valve Leakage in ECCS Check Valve Leakage Detection Sys.Valves Verified in Locked Position.Flange installed.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F4551983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-090/03L-0:on 830818,while Increasing Reactor/Turbine Power from 14 to 20%,rod Insertion Limit Violated.Caused by Operating Personnel Failure to Establish Plant Parameters. Emergency Boration initiated.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F2221983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-093/03L-0:on 830802,refueling Water Storage Tank Level Transmitter LT-991 Failed High.Caused by Internal Component Failure.Transmitter replaced.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F5901983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-092/03L-0:on 830817,east Wall Fire Barrier in Control Bldg Room CB-36-02 Declared Degraded When Unsealed Conduit Found in Newly Installed Juction Box.Caused by Personnel error.W/830831 Ltr ML20024D9111983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-075/03L-0:on 830703,emergency Feedwater Valve IFV-3536 to Steam Generator a Tripped Shut on High Flow & Failed to Reset.Caused by Signal Comparator Card Failure. Card replaced.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D8301983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-078/03L-0:on 830709,Th Inputs to Subcooling Monitor Channel a Declared Inoperable Due to Low Indications.Caused by Intermittent Opening on Input Connections.Connectors tightened.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D7981983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-076/03L-0:on 830707,during Mode 1,pressurizer Power Relief Valve PCV-444B-RC Failed to Stroke Fully.Caused by Low Pressure Nitrogen Reservoir Failing to Charge Up to Pressure.Valves Will Be Inspected & readjusted.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D6981983-07-29029 July 1983 LER 83-074/03L-0:on 830603,during Emergency Diesel Generator a Operability Surveillance Test,Normal 115 Kv Power Supply to Vital Bus Lost & Diesel Generator Output Breaker Tripped Open.Caused by Electrical surge.W/830729 Ltr ML20024D8571983-07-28028 July 1983 LER 83-072/03L-0:on 830701,smoke Detector SMK-CB-3,Zone W-W, Would Not Reset at Integrated Fire & Security Panel.Caused by Failure to Teletype Printed Control Board in Cathode Ray Tube Circuitry.Component replaced.W/830728 Ltr ML20024B6801983-07-0606 July 1983 LER 83-055/03L-0:on 830609 & 10,smoke Detectors in Control Bldg Zone a Failed.Caused by Welding in Area.Fire Watch Patrol Initiated & Affected Detectors & Deluge Resettled. W/830706 Ltr ML20024B7091983-07-0606 July 1983 Updated LER 83-054/03L-1:on 830601,power Failure Occurred, Defeating One Gpm Leakage Alarm for Reactor Bldg Sump.Caused by Loose Power Supply Module Fuse Holder Grounding Power Supply.Module replaced.W/830706 Ltr ML20024B7761983-07-0606 July 1983 LER 83-058/03L-0:on 830607,smoke Detector IXA-4993G Failed to Respond to Simulated Alarm.Caused by Broken Base Assembly in Detector Due to Open Circuit Preventing Alarm Condition. Component replaced.W/830706 Ltr ML20024B9821983-07-0101 July 1983 LER 83-056/03L-0:on 830606,feedwater Flow Transmitter (FT-468) Steam Generator B Failed Low.Caused by Failure of Power Supply Card.Card replaced.W/830701 Ltr ML20024C0371983-07-0101 July 1983 LER 83-057/03L-0:on 830606,nitrogen Low Pressure Alarm on Low Pressure Accumulator for PORV Received in Control Room. Caused by Valve Position Indicator Lights Not Showing Full Actual Position.Limit Switches adjusted.W/830701 Ltr ML20024C2601983-06-30030 June 1983 LER 83-54/03L-0:on 830601 Plant Auxiliary Relay Rack XPN-6034 Balance Declared Inoperable Due to Power Failure. Caused by Loose Fuse Holder on Power Supply Module Grounding Supply.Module replaced.W/830630 Ltr ML20024C1031983-06-22022 June 1983 LER 83-051/03L-0:on 830524,control Room Evacuation Panel Pressurizer Relief Tank Level Indicator ILI-470A Removed from Svc Due to Low Readings.Caused by Instrument Drift. Upgraded Electronic Cards installed.W/830622 Ltr ML20023D4561983-05-13013 May 1983 LER 83-036/03L-0:on 830414,during Performance of Channel Calibr,Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indication on Valves Failed to Function Properly.Caused by Excessive Current Flow During Contact Closure.Switch Assembly Changed ML20023B6481983-04-29029 April 1983 LER 83-032/03L-0:on 830331,detection Zone Nnn in Control Bldg Failed to Respond to Simulated Smoke Condition During Investigation of Alarm.Alarm Previously Received on 830329. Caused by Short in Smoke Detector.Detector Reinstalled ML20023B4391983-04-29029 April 1983 LER 83-033/03L-0:on 830331,while in Mode 5,source Range Detectors N-31 & N-32 Lost for Approx 5 Minutes.Caused by Maint Personnel Error in Placing Trains of Solid State Protection Sys in Wrong Position.Personnel Cautioned ML20028G0861983-02-0101 February 1983 LER 83-001/01T-0:on 830119,w/plant in Mode 1,three Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Transmitters Failed High. Caused by Frozen Instrument Lines.Transmitters Thawed. Insulated Encls Will Be Installed ML20028F4721983-01-21021 January 1983 LER 82-065/03L-0:on 821222,electrical Power Lost to Train a Radiation Monitoring Sys.During Investigation of Loss of Power,Maint Personnel Accidently Short Circuited Train B. Caused by Blown Power Fuses Due to Personnel Error ML20028E0091983-01-14014 January 1983 LER 82-060/03L-0:on 821215,Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.6 Discovered Unperformed in Modes 1,2 & 3.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised ML20028E1831983-01-13013 January 1983 LER 82-059/03L-0:on 821215,w/plant in Mode 1,several Fire Doors Not Verified Closed.Caused by Doors Not Being Included in Auxiliary Operator Logs Rev & Therefore Not Checked.Log Being Revised to Ensure That Doors Checked ML20028E1301983-01-13013 January 1983 Revised LER 82-016/03L-2:on 821216,main Control Board Indicator PI-951 for Reactor Bldg Pressure Failed Low.Caused by Failure of Loop Power Supply Circuit Board When Exposed to Ambient Conditions.Circuit Board Replaced ML20028E0771983-01-13013 January 1983 LER 82-058/03L-0:on 821214,urgent Failure Alarm Due to Loss of Power Occurred During Restoration of Rod Control Sys Upon Completion of Power Operational Testing.Caused by Oxidation Between Fuse & Fuse Block Mating Surfaces ML20028E1241983-01-11011 January 1983 LER 82-057/03L-0:on 821213,turbine Bldg Sump Normal Discharge to Site Settling Ponds Temporarily Bypassed Via Auxiliary Pump & Fire Hose.Caused by Sump Pumps Becoming Clogged W/Debris from Const Repair Work Being Done ML20028D3231983-01-0707 January 1983 LER 82-056/03L-0:on 821209,surveillance Test Procedure, Nis Power Range Heat Balance, Not Performed in Specified Intervals.Caused by Personnel Oversight.Administrative Procedures for Control of Surveillances Revised ML20028D1161983-01-0505 January 1983 LER 82-053/03L-0:on 821206,during Mode 1,spurious High & Low Meter Indications Observed on Main Control Board Indicator FI-494 for Steam Generator C Flow.Caused by Failure of Circuit Board FY-494.Board Replaced 1993-07-28
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20046B4041993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-004-00:on 930629,identified Noncompliance W/Srs of TS 4.3.2.1,Table 3.3-3.8.b.Caused by Personnel Error.Retest Sucessfully Performed & Personnel Involved Have Taken Part in Discussion of Importance of Review process.W/930728 Ltr ML20046B1601993-07-28028 July 1993 LER 93-003-00:on 930628,TS Violation Occurred Due to Personnel Error Re non-licensed Operator Performing Evolution W/O Consulting Governing Procedure.Reactor Bldg Purge Supply Valves closed.W/930728 Ltr ML20028H4411990-12-27027 December 1990 LER 90-001-01:on 900209,Part 21 Rept Received from Gilbert Commonwealth Re Possible Loss of One Train of Chilled Water Sys in Event of High Energy Line Break.Conceptual Design Developed to Reduce Heat Load on coils.W/901231 Ltr ML20043F3941990-06-0404 June 1990 LER 90-008-00:on 900505,energizing of Sequencer Initiated Undervoltage Sequence Causing ESF Bus a to Deenergize. Caused by Incorrectly Installed Undervoltage Circuit Agastat Relay.Relay rewired.W/900604 Ltr ML20043B6031990-05-23023 May 1990 LER 90-007-00:on 900423,during Offsite Relay Testing,Oil Circuit Breaker Supplying Bus 3 Tripped Open,Resulting in Loss of Power to ESF Train B & Diesel Generator B Start. Caused by Deficient Procedure.Testing stopped.W/900523 Ltr ML20043A4231990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-006-00:on 900412,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred When Train B Emergency Diesel Generator Automatically Started.Caused by Personnel Error.Feeder Breaker from Battery reopened.W/900510 Ltr ML20042G7691990-05-0808 May 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900410,steam Generator Tube Eddy Current Exam Yielded Insp Category C-3 Results.Caused by Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking in Hot Leg Tubesheet Area. Defective Tubes Plugged or repaired.W/900508 Ltr ML20042G1761990-05-0707 May 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900406,computer Software Error Caused Nonconservative Radiation Monitor Setpoints.Caused by Software Developer Personnel Error.Setpoints Readjusted & Procedures/Software evaluated.W/900507 Ltr ML20042G1791990-05-0707 May 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 881114,investigation Determined That Two Leads for Cabinet XPN-6002 Had Been Previously Disconnected in 881114 Refueling Outage,Rendering Transmitter LT-1976 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel error.W/900507 Ltr ML20042E1601990-04-11011 April 1990 LER 90-002-00:on 900318,inadvertent ESF Actuation Occurred When Emergency Start Signal Reset.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy When Emergency Start Signal Still Present on Train B.Sys Operating Procedure revised.W/900411 Ltr ML20012C4231990-03-12012 March 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900209,Gilbert/Commonwealth,Inc Informed Util of Vendor Requirement to Rept Design Deficiency Re Failure of Safety Function,Per Part 21.Util Evaluating What Design Mods Can Be Made to Correct deficiency.W/900312 Ltr ML20006B1231990-01-26026 January 1990 LER 89-022-00:on 890913,discovered That Chilled Water Pump B Returned to Svc W/O Performing Adequate Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Required post-maint Operability Test.Caused by Personnel error.W/900126 Ltr ML19354E1641990-01-17017 January 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891218,when Operator Directed to Stop Svc Water Pump C by Positioning Handswitch to auto-after Stop Position,Pump Started,Causing ESF Actuation.Caused by Failed Circuit Board.Board replaced.W/900117 Ltr ML20005G1511990-01-0808 January 1990 LER 88-008-01:on 880607,AE (Gilbert Assoc) Notified Util of Design Defect Yielding Potential for Steam Propagation Path Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown Equipment.Caused by Design Error.Also Reportable Per Part 21.W/900108 Ltr ML20005E6941990-01-0202 January 1990 LER 89-019-00:on 891203,as Result of Plant Trip on 891202, Results of Reactor Coolant Sample Not Reviewed & Recognized as Being Out of Tolerance.Caused by Personnel Error.Another Sample of RCS Taken & Analyzed,Per Tech Spec.W/900102 Ltr ML20005E6611990-01-0202 January 1990 LER 89-020-00:on 891202,turbine Controls Failed to Respond to Attempt to Counter Loss of Load & Turbine Manually Tripped.Caused by Relay Contact Failure in Turbine Electrohydraulic Control circuitry.W/900102 Ltr ML20011D4691989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-015-02:on 890825,presssurizer Safety Valve Body Inlet Temp Increased to Greater than 450 F & Acoustic Leak Monitor Alarmed,Causing RCS to Depressurize & Reactor Trip. Caused by Loss of Loop Seal.Valve replaced.W/891220 Ltr ML19332F0131989-11-30030 November 1989 LER 89-018-00:on 891027,shift Engineer Observed That Control Room Alarm Did Not Occur When Sample Pumps Stopped.On 891031,radiation Monitors RM-A3 & RM-A4 Declared Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate procedures.W/891130 Ltr ML19327B4921989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-017-00:on 890918,responsible Engineer Reviewed Plant Parameters & Concluded That Initial Conditions Required by Surveillance Test Procedure 209.001 Not Satisfied.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedural inadequacy.W/891024 Ltr ML19327B3451989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-015-01:on 890825,pressurizer Safety Valve Body Inlet a Temp Increased to Greater than 450 F & Plant Shutdown Initiated.Cause Being Evaluated.Plant Parameters Monitored & Stabilized in Mode 3.W/891024 Ltr ML19325C6501989-10-0707 October 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890908,shutdown Occurred Due to Inoperable Msiv.Caused by Crushed Conduit That Resulted in Short Circuit of Test Circuit Wiring.Conduit/Test Circuit Wiring repaired.W/891006 Ltr ML20006B2751989-06-27027 June 1989 LER 89-011-01:on 890528,manual Reactor Trip Initiated Following Failure of Pressurizer Safety Valve When Valve Became Unseated,Causing Rapid Depressurization of Rcs.Temp Detectors Installed on Safety valve.W/900123 Ltr ML20024F5131983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-091/03L-0:on 830802,while in Mode 1,borated Water Vol of Accumulator a Decreased to 7,354 Gallons.Caused by Valve Leakage in ECCS Check Valve Leakage Detection Sys.Valves Verified in Locked Position.Flange installed.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F4551983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-090/03L-0:on 830818,while Increasing Reactor/Turbine Power from 14 to 20%,rod Insertion Limit Violated.Caused by Operating Personnel Failure to Establish Plant Parameters. Emergency Boration initiated.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F2221983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-093/03L-0:on 830802,refueling Water Storage Tank Level Transmitter LT-991 Failed High.Caused by Internal Component Failure.Transmitter replaced.W/830831 Ltr ML20024F5901983-08-31031 August 1983 LER 83-092/03L-0:on 830817,east Wall Fire Barrier in Control Bldg Room CB-36-02 Declared Degraded When Unsealed Conduit Found in Newly Installed Juction Box.Caused by Personnel error.W/830831 Ltr ML20024D9111983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-075/03L-0:on 830703,emergency Feedwater Valve IFV-3536 to Steam Generator a Tripped Shut on High Flow & Failed to Reset.Caused by Signal Comparator Card Failure. Card replaced.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D8301983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-078/03L-0:on 830709,Th Inputs to Subcooling Monitor Channel a Declared Inoperable Due to Low Indications.Caused by Intermittent Opening on Input Connections.Connectors tightened.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D7981983-08-0101 August 1983 LER 83-076/03L-0:on 830707,during Mode 1,pressurizer Power Relief Valve PCV-444B-RC Failed to Stroke Fully.Caused by Low Pressure Nitrogen Reservoir Failing to Charge Up to Pressure.Valves Will Be Inspected & readjusted.W/830801 Ltr ML20024D6981983-07-29029 July 1983 LER 83-074/03L-0:on 830603,during Emergency Diesel Generator a Operability Surveillance Test,Normal 115 Kv Power Supply to Vital Bus Lost & Diesel Generator Output Breaker Tripped Open.Caused by Electrical surge.W/830729 Ltr ML20024D8571983-07-28028 July 1983 LER 83-072/03L-0:on 830701,smoke Detector SMK-CB-3,Zone W-W, Would Not Reset at Integrated Fire & Security Panel.Caused by Failure to Teletype Printed Control Board in Cathode Ray Tube Circuitry.Component replaced.W/830728 Ltr ML20024B6801983-07-0606 July 1983 LER 83-055/03L-0:on 830609 & 10,smoke Detectors in Control Bldg Zone a Failed.Caused by Welding in Area.Fire Watch Patrol Initiated & Affected Detectors & Deluge Resettled. W/830706 Ltr ML20024B7091983-07-0606 July 1983 Updated LER 83-054/03L-1:on 830601,power Failure Occurred, Defeating One Gpm Leakage Alarm for Reactor Bldg Sump.Caused by Loose Power Supply Module Fuse Holder Grounding Power Supply.Module replaced.W/830706 Ltr ML20024B7761983-07-0606 July 1983 LER 83-058/03L-0:on 830607,smoke Detector IXA-4993G Failed to Respond to Simulated Alarm.Caused by Broken Base Assembly in Detector Due to Open Circuit Preventing Alarm Condition. Component replaced.W/830706 Ltr ML20024B9821983-07-0101 July 1983 LER 83-056/03L-0:on 830606,feedwater Flow Transmitter (FT-468) Steam Generator B Failed Low.Caused by Failure of Power Supply Card.Card replaced.W/830701 Ltr ML20024C0371983-07-0101 July 1983 LER 83-057/03L-0:on 830606,nitrogen Low Pressure Alarm on Low Pressure Accumulator for PORV Received in Control Room. Caused by Valve Position Indicator Lights Not Showing Full Actual Position.Limit Switches adjusted.W/830701 Ltr ML20024C2601983-06-30030 June 1983 LER 83-54/03L-0:on 830601 Plant Auxiliary Relay Rack XPN-6034 Balance Declared Inoperable Due to Power Failure. Caused by Loose Fuse Holder on Power Supply Module Grounding Supply.Module replaced.W/830630 Ltr ML20024C1031983-06-22022 June 1983 LER 83-051/03L-0:on 830524,control Room Evacuation Panel Pressurizer Relief Tank Level Indicator ILI-470A Removed from Svc Due to Low Readings.Caused by Instrument Drift. Upgraded Electronic Cards installed.W/830622 Ltr ML20023D4561983-05-13013 May 1983 LER 83-036/03L-0:on 830414,during Performance of Channel Calibr,Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indication on Valves Failed to Function Properly.Caused by Excessive Current Flow During Contact Closure.Switch Assembly Changed ML20023B6481983-04-29029 April 1983 LER 83-032/03L-0:on 830331,detection Zone Nnn in Control Bldg Failed to Respond to Simulated Smoke Condition During Investigation of Alarm.Alarm Previously Received on 830329. Caused by Short in Smoke Detector.Detector Reinstalled ML20023B4391983-04-29029 April 1983 LER 83-033/03L-0:on 830331,while in Mode 5,source Range Detectors N-31 & N-32 Lost for Approx 5 Minutes.Caused by Maint Personnel Error in Placing Trains of Solid State Protection Sys in Wrong Position.Personnel Cautioned ML20028G0861983-02-0101 February 1983 LER 83-001/01T-0:on 830119,w/plant in Mode 1,three Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Transmitters Failed High. Caused by Frozen Instrument Lines.Transmitters Thawed. Insulated Encls Will Be Installed ML20028F4721983-01-21021 January 1983 LER 82-065/03L-0:on 821222,electrical Power Lost to Train a Radiation Monitoring Sys.During Investigation of Loss of Power,Maint Personnel Accidently Short Circuited Train B. Caused by Blown Power Fuses Due to Personnel Error ML20028E0091983-01-14014 January 1983 LER 82-060/03L-0:on 821215,Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.6 Discovered Unperformed in Modes 1,2 & 3.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised ML20028E1831983-01-13013 January 1983 LER 82-059/03L-0:on 821215,w/plant in Mode 1,several Fire Doors Not Verified Closed.Caused by Doors Not Being Included in Auxiliary Operator Logs Rev & Therefore Not Checked.Log Being Revised to Ensure That Doors Checked ML20028E1301983-01-13013 January 1983 Revised LER 82-016/03L-2:on 821216,main Control Board Indicator PI-951 for Reactor Bldg Pressure Failed Low.Caused by Failure of Loop Power Supply Circuit Board When Exposed to Ambient Conditions.Circuit Board Replaced ML20028E0771983-01-13013 January 1983 LER 82-058/03L-0:on 821214,urgent Failure Alarm Due to Loss of Power Occurred During Restoration of Rod Control Sys Upon Completion of Power Operational Testing.Caused by Oxidation Between Fuse & Fuse Block Mating Surfaces ML20028E1241983-01-11011 January 1983 LER 82-057/03L-0:on 821213,turbine Bldg Sump Normal Discharge to Site Settling Ponds Temporarily Bypassed Via Auxiliary Pump & Fire Hose.Caused by Sump Pumps Becoming Clogged W/Debris from Const Repair Work Being Done ML20028D3231983-01-0707 January 1983 LER 82-056/03L-0:on 821209,surveillance Test Procedure, Nis Power Range Heat Balance, Not Performed in Specified Intervals.Caused by Personnel Oversight.Administrative Procedures for Control of Surveillances Revised ML20028D1161983-01-0505 January 1983 LER 82-053/03L-0:on 821206,during Mode 1,spurious High & Low Meter Indications Observed on Main Control Board Indicator FI-494 for Steam Generator C Flow.Caused by Failure of Circuit Board FY-494.Board Replaced 1993-07-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D6401999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 2 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0202, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20216J4191999-09-24024 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re 990806 Abb K-Line Breaker Defect After Repair.Vendor Notified of Shunt Trip Wiring Problem & Agreed to Modify Procedure for Refurbishment of Breakers RC-99-0180, Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression1999-09-0808 September 1999 Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression RC-99-0183, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20211K6161999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, Dtd Aug 1999 RC-99-0168, Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed1999-08-19019 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed ML20210M7071999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12 ML20211C2201999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0163, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0137, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206H2971999-05-0505 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Common Mode Failure for magne-blast Breakers.Vc Summer Nuclear Station Utilizes These Breakers in Many Applications,Including 7.2-kV EDG Electrical Buses RC-99-0103, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206K2421999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 0 to COLR for Cycle 12 for Summer Nuclear Station RC-99-0087, Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory1999-04-15015 April 1999 Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory RC-99-0083, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0063, Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced1999-03-26026 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced ML20196K5421999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Books 1 & 2. Page 2 of 2 Section 2.4.4 (Rev 2) of Incoming Submittal Were Not Included RC-99-0055, Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 9903121999-03-16016 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 990312 RC-99-0050, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML20203F4511999-02-12012 February 1999 SER Finding Licensee Adequately Addressed GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML20206R5241998-12-31031 December 1998 Santee Cooper 1998 Annual Rept RC-99-0052, Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with RC-99-0004, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206R5191998-12-31031 December 1998 Scana Corp 1998 Annual Rept ML20198F4241998-12-18018 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request for Approval to Repair ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping Flaws in Accordance with GL 90-05 for VC Summer Nuclear Station RC-98-0223, Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method1998-12-16016 December 1998 Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method RC-98-0222, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4551998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-416-1 with Licensee Proposed Addl Exams RC-98-0208, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20207J5701998-10-31031 October 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to WCAP-14955, Probabilistic & Economic Evaluation of Rv Closure Head Penetration Integrity for VC Summer Nuclear Plant ML20154Q9571998-10-21021 October 1998 SER Accepting Request Seeking Approval to Use Alternative Rules of ASME Code Case N-498-1 for Class 1,2 or 3 Sys ML20154K7901998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15101, Analysis of Capsule W from Sceg VC Summer Unit 1 Rv Radiation Surveillance Program RC-98-0184, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20154K8041998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15103, Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock for VC Summer Unit 1 RC-98-0166, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20237A7181998-08-13013 August 1998 SER Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves RC-98-0153, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0131, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station1998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20248J0191998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Inservice Testing Program Interim Pump Relief Request Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) (II) RC-98-0113, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0100, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20217G7411998-04-22022 April 1998 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 11 RC-98-0076, Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure1998-04-17017 April 1998 Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure RC-98-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20212H1421998-03-0202 March 1998 Interim Part 21 Rept SSH 98-002 Re EG-B Unit That Was Sent to Power Control Svcs for Determination of Instability & Refurbishment of a Dg.Cause of Speed Oscillations Unknown. Completed Hot Bore Checks on Power Case 1999-09-08
[Table view] |
Text
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.10CFR50.73
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- l: . , ~; ; South Car: lina Electric e das Company Olne S Bradham -
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.U.7S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Washington,-OC 20555
SUBJECT:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station >
Docket No. 50/395 .
Operating License No.-NPF-12 LER 88-008. Revision 1
~ Gentlemen:-
. Attached.is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-008.for the Virgil TC. Summer Nuclear Station. This LER was originally submitted on' July 7,.1988
- pursuant.to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) and (a)(2)(vii). This revision documents the ,
l results of the completed steam propagation path evaluation. ,
Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience..
Very truly yours, [
- 0. S. Bradham k
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-c Attachment T c: D. A. Nauman/0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.
E.:C. Roberts
.- J. C. Snelson DS. D. Ebneter R. L. Prevatte J. J. Hayes, Jr. J. B. Knotts, Jr. <
General Managers INP0 Records Center C. A. Price ANI Library '
G. J. Taylor Marsh & McLennan J. R. Proper NSRC ,
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#AcaLITY esaast nl 00Cettf IsWASSR m raur su Virail C. Summer Nuclear' Station o is I o lo I o B 1915 1loFl017 TITLE les Steam Path Yieldina Potential for Affectina Unaualified Eauinment IVONT Daf t (Se LER asunGG A IG) RSPORT Daft 176 OTM4R S ACILIT188 INVOLVED m MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR -
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l' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLOMeerTAL A480mf EMPGCTIO 041 MONTH DAY YtAR Ytt II9 ye, temeneer LX9tCTRO SUOnetSSION CA Til NO l l l A88 TRACT ILs=t to 8400 asecas (e., asenewaess<y Missa papeemste tysewnessa snes; noi On June 7, 1988, with the plant at Mode 3, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) was notified by Gilbert Associates, the architect engineer for the Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station, of a design defect yielding the potential for a steam propagation path which could affect safe shutdown equipment. Both a direct steam path through floor penetrations and a more tortuous propagational path were identified. The tortuous steam path is the result of a steam break releasing steam which travels through several fire doors, up one elevation in a stairwell, and through several floor penetrations leading back down to the original elevation before arriving at the safe shutdown equipment.
Upon verification of the potential problem by SCE&G personnel. Operations personnel initiated taking the plant from Mode 3 to Mode 4. Various interior plant doors were '
opened to allow for the relief of pressure build-ups and another door was sealed to prevent moisture intrusion in the event of the postulated steam break. Ultimately several doors were structurally reinforced, several doors had sealing materials added l to prevent steam flow or moisture intrusion and evaluations were performed to verify that the in-place fire barrier penetration seals would also serve as pressure retaining barriers. 0ther actions included modification to drain lines, ductwork, conduit and wall spaces to prevent steam intrusion.
As a result of installing the modification for reinforcing one of the doors which also serves as a rated fire assembly, the fire rating of that door would no longer be verified and a one hour roving fire watch was established. (The door has been considered inoperable as a fire rated assembly.) Because that fire door has been inoperable for a period of greater than seven days, this report also serves as a Special Report as required by section 3/4.7.10 of the plant Technical Specifications, gC, m.
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i PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
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, E0VIPMENT' IDENTIFICATION: :
fl: lCompot5 tiCooling[ Water; Pumps (EIIS:CC)
L Control Room Evacuation' Panels-(EIIS:JL):-
F Switchgear-(EIIS:EB) H
- : Main Steam System (EIIS:SB) J 6,
- Chilled. Water System.(EIIS:KM) ' j!
High Pressure Safety? Injection = Pumps (EIIS:BQ)
Central Control Complex (EIIS:NA).
Miscellaneous Buildings and Structures
~ Environmental Control System (EIIS:UK) ,; .
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' IDENTIFICATION'0F EVENT: q
' Unsealed steam propagation path yielding potential for affecting unqualified it equipment.'
DISCOVERY DATE:-
4 I June:7. 1988 at:1630 hours 4
h ' REPORT ~DATE: January,8, 1990 ,
b L -This report was initiated by Off-Normal Occurrence Report 88-033 and is a p supplement.to the original report dated July 7, 1988.
7 This report also serves as a Special Report, required by-Technical Specification o (3/4.7.10 " Fire Rated Assemblies,".to notify the NRC, Region II, of a fire door .
L (IB 407) which remained inoperable for greater than 7 days as a result of l . implementing _the corrective actions required by the identification of the steam path.-
L .
; CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:
Y , Power' Level - 0% Mode 3 1 The plant was in hot standby completing work necessary to repair condenser tube
. leaks which had caused a forced outage. ,
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' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERITEXT CONTINUATION AreRovio oue No. siso-oio4 t g . somEs. amm F ACILITY NAME (16 OOCKET NV69ER (2) LER NUWeER 18) PAGE (36 naa "W,,P,P le : SJJ: ,
Virgil' C. Summer Nuclear Station; o ls lo j o lo I 319 I 5 818 -
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
I .On June 7,'1988, at 1630 hours, SCE&G personnel were notified by Gilbert .
, Associates, the architect engineer for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, of an ,
unsealed steam propagation path which could potentially affect safety related equipment in the event of a postulated steam break outside containment. The applicable scenario for modes 3 thru 5 involved a main steamline break which occurs on the.43G' elevation (room IB 36-02) of the Intermediate Building-(IB) upstream of.
the main steam. isolation valves. The steam from this-break was postulated to go directly to room IB 63-01 via non pressure rated floor penetrations. The steam 'l flow was also postulated to go through a non-safety fire door leading into a stairwell. Steam fills this stairwell and proceeds through another fire door (IB '
407) at the 463' elevation of the IB leading to a corridor (room IB 63-03). From here steam can leak into the "A" Train Switchgear room (IB 63-01) through heavy,
-bullet resistant, but not pressure tight, double doors (IB 408). IB 36-01, which is below IB 63-01, also contains electrical equipment equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown ("B" Train Switchgear) and communicates with IB 63-01 4 through floor penetrations. From' corridor IB 63-03 steam can also enter, through- .,
double doors similar to IB 408, room IB 63-02. Though IB 63-02 does not contain equipment required to shutdown the plant and maintain it shutdown, it is in direct communication,.again through floor penetrations, with rooms IB 36-03, A, B, IB 36-04 IB 36-05, and IB 36-06 which do contain safe shutdown equipment. (Control room evacuation panels and electrical equipment for all three component cooling water
, pumps.) Therefore, rooms IB 36-01, IB 36-03, A, B, IB 36-04, IB 36-05, IB 36-06 and IB 63-01 arq all subject to steam intrusion.
In addition a steam break (reheat steam jet) in.the Turbine Building (TB) (modes 5 thru 2 with main steam isolation valves open) could enter IB 63-03 through door IB 409 and subsequently enter rooms IB 63-02 and IB 63-01 with the same results as ;
. described above.
L Upon verification that this problem existed, the control room personnel proceeded to Mode 4 since all the component cooling water speed switches were in rooms affected by this potential scenario.
As a temporary measure to limit potential pressure buildups in the event of a steam l break the following doors were blocked open: IB 405 from corridor 63-03 to the IB i roof, IB 409 from corridor 63-03 to the TB, IB 403 from room 63-02 to the TB, and
.IB 313 from the stairwell to the TB. Applicable roving fire watches were also established. To limit moisture intrusion through IB 408 from corridor 63-03 to room 63-01 (switchgear room), all edges of the door were sealed with " Tuck" tape.
-In addition the main steam isolation valves were required to be closed in mode 3 as long as the doors between the Turbine and Intermediate Buildings were blocked open.
l Door IB 407 (from the stairwell into corridor IB 63-03) was reinforced to ensure it
! would remain closed in the event of the postulated breaks and was also sealed with a neoprene seal to ensure it remained leak tight.
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-To allow for operation with the above stated doors closed, the silicone foam fire seals in the-floors of IB 63-01 and IB 63-02 were verified to be capable of withstanding a peak pressure of 3 psig which is in excess of the peak pressures to be experienced during the postulated steam breaks. As added conservatism, seals in direct contact with IB 36-02 (where the steam break is postulated to occur) and one additional seal in the stairway at elevation 463' were caulked to further guard against steam leakage.
-To enable operation above mode 3 with the main steam isolation valves open, door IB 409 between the Intermediate Building and the Turbine Building was braced to ensure it could withstand the force of a steam jet from within the TB. The latch was removed from door IB 405 leading from the IB to the roof of another portion of the IB to limit any unacceptable pressure buildup from steam flowing under door IB 409.
CAUSE OF EVENT:
The cause of this event is a design error. Discussions with the original design engineer revealed that these concerns had not been reviewed at the time of the
' initial design and appear to have been a design oversight.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
A harsh environment created by the above discussed postulated steam breaks could potentially disable the "A" and "B" train Class 1E switchgear, the "A", "B", and "C" Component Cooling Water pump speed switches and "C" transfer switch, and both Control Room Evacuation Panels.
As' required by 10CFR21, Gilbert Associates notified the NRC of this event by a letter dated July 15, 1988. Subsequent to the issuance of the 10CFR21 report and the original LER, a thorough evaluation was performed to identify all possible pipe break steam paths into or out of mild environment areas. The approach taken was consistent with the original design approach where steam paths into mild environment areas were identified and designed to be steam tight. The steam intrusion paths assessed included doors, floor drains, penetrations, openings, and ductwork.
An attempt was made to qualify the existing paths and environmental conditions.
When this was not possible (i.e., the room contained safety-related equipment which could not withstand the harsh environment), the condition was documented by a nonconformance notice (NLN) and interim or permanent repairs were initiated. The results of the unanalyzed steam propagation path evaluation determined that the areas described below posed a potential safety concern. Some additional repairs were made to other areas to retain the mild environment status of the areas (even though equipment in these other areas could function in the steam environment or was not required to function).
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0l1 0 l 8i U' n 17 AB 63-01. AB 12-28 AB 63-01'contains Train B ESF switchgear and controls. AB 12-28 contains Train A ESF switchgear and controls.- The original plant design for pipe rupture required that room AB 63-01 be steam tight but not AB 12-28, in accordance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1 (November 25,1975). Review of the as-built configuration of AB 63-01 revealed several unacceptable steam paths. As documented in NCH 2995, the paths into AB 63-01 were sealed by 1) providing perimeter seals on door AB 501A, 2) caulking around ductwork, 3) providing a loop seal in a one inch condensate drain pipe and sealing gaps betvieen the pipe and drain with caulk, and
- 4) sealing the opening to room AB 63-02.
IB 63-01. IB 36-01
-IB 63-01 contains Train A ESF switchgear. IB 36-01 contains Train B ESF switchgear. A steam line break could adversely affect electrical equipment in these rooms which is requireo for safe shutdown. Corrective actions for these -
rooms were as described in the original LER and are documented in NCNs 2976 and 2995. In addition, the path from the rattlespace to IB 63-01 was sealed with silicone foam.
IB 51-01. IB 51-02 IB 51-01'contains the Train A ESF switchgear cooling unit. IB 51-02 contains the Train B ESF switchgear cooling unit. These rooms directly communicate with ESF
, switchgear rooms IB 63-01 and IB 36-01. Steam may enter these rooms through floor-I drains. The short term resolution (documented in NCN 2995) for this item was to plug the floor drains.
l-IB 12-12. IB 12-13A. IB 12-138. IB 12-13C. IB 12-14 and IB 12-15 l These rooms contain HVAC chilled water system pumps and chillers which maintain L proper ambient conditions for safety-related equipment. These chiller rooms
! contain two floor drains that provide a potential path for steam intrusion. During a plant walkdown related to the steam intrusion issue, it was identified that the clapper valve on one of the common floor drains was missing and the clapper valve for the other drain was in an open position. This condition could allow steam ingress in the rooms causing unacceptable environmental conditions and potential chiller failure. The main impact of the chiller failure was determined to be excessive lube oil temperatures for the charging pumps which could threaten the functions of the pumps. The immediate corrective actions (documented in NCN 3348) performed were:
L 1) installation of a blank flange with a 1/4 inch drain hole for the drain missing l a valve.
- 2) installation of a brace to ensure the clapper valve remained closed for the other drain.
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steam tight and that steam could enter the' Control Building from the southwest Auxiliary Building stairway (room 12-01). l
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This condition could create an unacceptable environment in the Control Building. '!
As documented in NCN 2995, door AB 303A was repaired by using perimeter door seals t on the frame and installing an automatic door bottom, pnsealed Flexible Conduit An evaluation was performed.to assess the acceptability of using flexible conduit as a pressure boundary. It was determined that for pressure boundaries subject to significant pressures (several inches of water) which separate environmental zones
.that were assumed to be pressure tight, unsealed flexible conduit could provide a significant leakage path for steam. Five zone paths were identified as having !
unacceptable flexible conduit penetration:. This conduit provided a path whereby steam from a high energy line break in one zone could enter mild zone (s) containing safety-related equipment. The environmental zone pairs involved were IB-01/02 to '
1B-05, PAA-01 to AB-35. IB-08 to AB-39, PAA-03 to AB-38 and AB-39, and 1B-01 to IB-
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The affected conduit was sealed using silicone tape, caulk and/or foam as documented in NCN-3000.
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Upon identification of the steam propagation path scenario,-operations personnel initiated a plant shutdown from Mode 3 to Mode 4. 'The plant was maintained in Mode 4 subsequent to the initiation of the immediate corrective actions of opening doors to IB 63-03 to limit pressure buildups and sealing IB 408 to prevent moisture intrusion to IB 63-01.
During the course of the detailed evlauation when an additional area of concern was identified, an NCN was generated to document the condition and immediate repairs were made as described above.
ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION:
To mitigate the consequences of the postulated steam breaks the following actions were completed:
- 1) Door IB 407 was reinforced and sealed to ensure it remained closed and prevented steam leakage in the event of a steam break.
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This temporary modification impacted the fire. rating capability of the door and therefore a 1 hour roving fire watch was established for the door.
2)- Door IB 408 was sealed to prevent moisture intrusion into IB 63-01.
-3) Applicable silicone foam fire seals between the rooms in question were verified to be capable of withstanding pressures which would be experienced-in the event of.a postulated steam break.
- 4) Door IB 409 was reinforced to enable it to withstand a steam jet originating in the Turbine Building. l
- 5) The latch on door IB 405 was removed to allow the door to open and relieve any pressure buildup in corridor IB 63-03'in the event of a Turbine Building steam ;
break and the resulting. leakage under door IB 409.
LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION: ,
The following permanent actions are planned for completion of this item. Since the interim corrective actions identified previously provide adequate protection against steam intrusion, the actions listed below have been prioritized and ranked ;
with other plant modifications and are scheduled for implementation at a later date.
- 1. Replace doors 18-403, 407 and 409 with pressure and fire rated safety-related doors.
- 2. Add a new pressure rated wall and door to room AB 63-02.
- 3. Add a new supply duct to room AB-63-02 through room AB 63-01. Permanently seal the duct opening in the wall of AB 63-01.
- 4. Install an orifice in the floor-drain from elevation 451 of the IB (IB 51-01 and 02)-to restrict steam flow.
- 5. Install blind flanges with drainage holes in the floor drains (2) to the IB 412 elevation sump (IB 12-12, 13A, 13B, 13C, 14 and 15).
-PRIOR OCCURRENCES:
None.
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