ML20046B160

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LER 93-003-00:on 930628,TS Violation Occurred Due to Personnel Error Re non-licensed Operator Performing Evolution W/O Consulting Governing Procedure.Reactor Bldg Purge Supply Valves closed.W/930728 Ltr
ML20046B160
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1993
From: Proper J, Skolds J
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-003, LER-93-3, RC-93-0207, RC-93-207, NUDOCS 9308030199
Download: ML20046B160 (4)


Text

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 .            .       ..                   enkin vlie SC 29065                                       Nuclear Operations SCE&G                                                                                                         i July 28, 1993 Refer to: RC-93-0207 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 i OPEPATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

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LER 93-003  ; I Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 93-003 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear  ! Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of l 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1).  ! Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience. I Very truly yours, '

                                                                                                / l John L. Skolds                                l DCH:smd                                                                                                              l Attachment c:     0. W. Dixon (w/o attachment)                                    L. J. Montondo                                j R. R. Mahan (w/o attachment)                                    NRC Resident Inspector R. J. White                                                     J. B. Knotts Jr.

S. D. Ebneter INPO Records Center S. R. Hunt Marsh & McLennan L. D. Shealy NSRC

8. C. Williams RTS (ON0930046)

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                                                                                                                                                              ;     9[g On June 28, 1993, at 0400 hours, approval was granted by the control room to remove                                                                                         i Atmospheric Radiation Monitor RMA-2 from service to allow the performance of preventive                                                                                     i maintenance. A Removal and Restoration Checklist (R&R) was entered and logged in the                                                                                        i control room documenting that RMA-2 was out of service. The status of RMA-2 was                                                                                              !

discussed and included as part of turnover to the oncoming shift which was completed at  ! approximately 0730 hours.  ! Soon after turnover was completed, the Reactor Building pressure alarm annunciated indicating the pressure was approaching the low pressure limit allowed by Technical Specifications. At 0745, the control building operator opened purge supply valves PVG-6056 and 6057 and started purge supply fan XFN-95 to increase reactor building pressure without consulting System Operating Procedure (50P) 114 Reactor Building Ventilation S_ystem. Shortly after the valves were opened, another control room operator noticed , the valves were open and pointed out that the valves should be closed due to RMA-2 being out of service. The fan was stopped and the valves were closed at 0748. Action 17 of Table 3.3-3 states that plant operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed. Opening the valves with RMA-2 out of service constitutes operation outside the provisions of Technical Specifications. Radiation levels inside containment were normal and remained steady during the three minutes the valves were opened. Therefore, this event resulted in no safety consequences. i Operations management has communicated to all operations personnel the importance of  ! proper procedural usage and stressed the usage level requirements defined in Station i Administrative a.e e ~ Procedure (SAP) 123. Procedural Use and Adherence (Revision - 1).  !

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Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION: Containment Isolation Valve EIIS - JM IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT: A personnel error in performing a plant evolution without proper procedural adherence led to operations outside the provision Technical Specifications (T.S.).  ; EVENT TIME AND DATE: June 28, 1993, at 0745 hours.  ! l REPORT DATE: July 28, 1993 This report was initiated by Off-Normal Occurrence report 93-046. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT: Mode 1, 100% power DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: On June 28, 1993, at 0400 hours approval was granted by the control room to remove Atmospheric Radiation Monitor RMA-2 from service to allow the performance of preventive maintenance. A Removal and Restoration Checklist (R&R) was entered and logged in the control room documenting that RMA-2 was out of service. (The R&R logs are part of the configuration control process used to aid operations personnel in tracking the status. of out-of-service equipment and any associated alternate actions.) The status of PJ4A-2 was discussed and included as part of turnover to the oncoming shift which was completed at approximately 0730 hours. Soon after turnover was completed, the Reactor Building pressure alarm annunciated indicating the pressure was approaching the low pressure limit allowed by Technical Specifications. At 0745, the control building operator opened purge supply valves PVG-6056 and 6057 and started purge supply fan XFN-95 to increase reactor building pressure without consulting System Operating Procedure (S0P) 114, Reactor Building Ventilation System. Shortly after the valves were opened, another control room operator noticed

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                                                                                                     - 010      013    '     0h Text , - . -                 __ c -.n m the valves were open and pointed out that the valves should be closed due to RMA-2                                 i being out of service. The fan was stopped and the valves were closed at 0748. Action 17 of Table 3.3-3 states that plant operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed. SOP-114, Section-N, Reactor Building Normal Pressure Control, lists the following statement; "RMA-2 Atmosphere Gaseous Iodine - RB sample line is in service," as an initial condition to procedure performance. Opening the valves with RMA-2 out of service constitutes operation                                    i outside the provisions of Technical Specifications.

['ISE OF EVENT: i A non-licensed, control building operator made a personnel error by performing an evolution without consulting the governing procedure which contained the control to , prevent the opening of the purge supply valves if RMA-2 is out of service. ANALYSIS OF EVENT: Radiation levels inside containment were normal and remained steady during the three minutes the valves were open. Also, due to this event involving only the Reactor Building supply portion of the system, no release of Reactor Building Atmosphere l occurred. Therefore, this event resulted in no safety consequences. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION: The Reactor Building purge supply valves were closed at required by Technical Specification 3.3.2. ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: (1) Operations management has communicated to all 'sperations personnel the importance of proper procedural usage and stressed the usage level requirements defined in i Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 123, Procedural Use and Adherence (Rev-1). (2) This event was included in a meeting of the Management Review Board on July 13, 1993, and again on July 20, 1993, to insure adequate management attention was i given to this matter. PRIOR EVENTS: None. 4 l

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