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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20203F4511999-02-12012 February 1999 SER Finding Licensee Adequately Addressed GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML20198F4241998-12-18018 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request for Approval to Repair ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping Flaws in Accordance with GL 90-05 for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20155G4551998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-416-1 with Licensee Proposed Addl Exams ML20154Q9571998-10-21021 October 1998 SER Accepting Request Seeking Approval to Use Alternative Rules of ASME Code Case N-498-1 for Class 1,2 or 3 Sys ML20237A7181998-08-13013 August 1998 SER Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20248J0191998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Inservice Testing Program Interim Pump Relief Request Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) (II) ML20212C0381997-10-19019 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting License Request for Deviation from Commitment to Meet Section III.G.2.c of App R to 10CFR50 Re Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability for Plant ML20217E3491997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Proposed Alternative for Current Interval Insp Program Plan ML20133J5551997-01-15015 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request Proposing Not to Perform Increased Frequency Testing on a Charging Pump at Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML20128G2931996-10-0202 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 135 to License NPF-12 ML20128F4221993-02-0909 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Nuclear Physics Methodology for Reload Design.Request to Perform Reload Analyses Approved ML20056A7931990-08-0606 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Capability of Plant to Meet Requirements of Branch Technical Position Rsb 5-1, Design Requirements of RHR Sys. Design Satisfies License Condition 4 ML20245F5061989-06-22022 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Request for Relief from Section XI Re Hydrostatic Test Requirement ML20244D7361989-06-12012 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability for All Domestic Operating Reactors ML20195B4421988-10-28028 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 74 to License NPF-12 ML20151K0901988-07-28028 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Proposed Implementation of ATWS Rule Pending Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20151K7771988-07-27027 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request to Deviate from Recommendations of Reg Guide 1.97 Re Instrumentation to Monitor Containment Temp ML20151R8561988-04-19019 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Related Inservice Testing Program & Request for Relief of Utils ML20236R4111987-11-13013 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97, Rev 3 ML20236K7701987-11-0505 November 1987 SER Accepting Util 831104 & 870401 Responses to Item 2.2.1 of Genreic Ltr 83-28 Re Equipment Classification Programs ML20237H3661987-07-22022 July 1987 Corrected Page to Safety Evaluation Issued W/Amend 67, Changing Second Paragraph & Deleting Third Paragraph on Page Three ML20214S8881987-06-0303 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Rept Granting Relief from Hydrostatic Testing After Repair to ASME Code Section Xi,Class 1,reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Line ML20209H3331987-01-30030 January 1987 SER Supporting Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing of Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20213A5611987-01-30030 January 1987 SER Accepting Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Re Vendor Interface Program for Reactor Trip Sys Components ML20212F2841986-12-22022 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 57 to License NPF-12 ML20211M4161986-12-0909 December 1986 Safety Evalution Supporting Licensee 860123 Submittals Re Fast Neutron Fluence for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events (10CFR50.61) ML20203N0151986-09-15015 September 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3, Post-Maint Testing (RTS Components,All Other Safety-Related Components). Response Acceptable ML20199D4211986-06-0909 June 1986 SER on Util 831104 & 860423 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 1.2 Re post-trip Review Data & Info Capabilities.Data & Info Capabilities Acceptable ML20211A2571986-05-22022 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Mods to App R,Clarified by Generic Ltrs 81-12 & 83-33,to Prevent Spurious Equipment Operation Caused by fire-induced Conductor or Cable Faults, Facilitate Operator Actions & Resolve Addl Circuit Concerns ML20154A0621986-02-24024 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting 850930 & 1204 Responses to 850802 & 1104 Requests,Respectively,For Addl Info Re Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events ML20154D1921986-02-14014 February 1986 Sser 1 Re Licensee 851204 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 3.2.2 Concerning Procedures & Programs to Review Info on safety-related Equipment.Response Acceptable & Meets Intent of Generic Ltr 83-28 ML20136B2291985-11-0707 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 46 to License NPF-12 ML20209H8411985-11-0404 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2,4.1 & 4.5.1.Response to Item 3.2.2 Incomplete & Addl Info Required ML20137S5781985-09-24024 September 1985 SER Approving Licensee 831104 & 0715 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review.Program & Procedures for Restart from Unscheduled Reactor Trip Acceptable ML20133H7321985-08-0202 August 1985 SER Re Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Concerning Reactor Trip Sys Reliability. Licensee Should Add Undervoltage Trip Attachment to Trending Program ML20128A2181985-06-21021 June 1985 SER of Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review.Listed Addl Info Required Before Review Can Be Completed 1999-02-12
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D6401999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 2 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0202, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20216J4191999-09-24024 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re 990806 Abb K-Line Breaker Defect After Repair.Vendor Notified of Shunt Trip Wiring Problem & Agreed to Modify Procedure for Refurbishment of Breakers RC-99-0180, Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression1999-09-0808 September 1999 Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression RC-99-0183, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20211K6161999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, Dtd Aug 1999 RC-99-0168, Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed1999-08-19019 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed ML20210M7071999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12 ML20211C2201999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0163, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0137, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206H2971999-05-0505 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Common Mode Failure for magne-blast Breakers.Vc Summer Nuclear Station Utilizes These Breakers in Many Applications,Including 7.2-kV EDG Electrical Buses RC-99-0103, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206K2421999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 0 to COLR for Cycle 12 for Summer Nuclear Station RC-99-0087, Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory1999-04-15015 April 1999 Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory RC-99-0083, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0063, Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced1999-03-26026 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced ML20196K5421999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Books 1 & 2. Page 2 of 2 Section 2.4.4 (Rev 2) of Incoming Submittal Were Not Included RC-99-0055, Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 9903121999-03-16016 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 990312 RC-99-0050, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML20203F4511999-02-12012 February 1999 SER Finding Licensee Adequately Addressed GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML20206R5241998-12-31031 December 1998 Santee Cooper 1998 Annual Rept RC-99-0052, Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with RC-99-0004, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206R5191998-12-31031 December 1998 Scana Corp 1998 Annual Rept ML20198F4241998-12-18018 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request for Approval to Repair ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping Flaws in Accordance with GL 90-05 for VC Summer Nuclear Station RC-98-0223, Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method1998-12-16016 December 1998 Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method RC-98-0222, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4551998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-416-1 with Licensee Proposed Addl Exams RC-98-0208, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20207J5701998-10-31031 October 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to WCAP-14955, Probabilistic & Economic Evaluation of Rv Closure Head Penetration Integrity for VC Summer Nuclear Plant ML20154Q9571998-10-21021 October 1998 SER Accepting Request Seeking Approval to Use Alternative Rules of ASME Code Case N-498-1 for Class 1,2 or 3 Sys ML20154K7901998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15101, Analysis of Capsule W from Sceg VC Summer Unit 1 Rv Radiation Surveillance Program RC-98-0184, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20154K8041998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15103, Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock for VC Summer Unit 1 RC-98-0166, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20237A7181998-08-13013 August 1998 SER Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves RC-98-0153, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0131, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station1998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20248J0191998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Inservice Testing Program Interim Pump Relief Request Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) (II) RC-98-0113, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0100, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20217G7411998-04-22022 April 1998 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 11 RC-98-0076, Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure1998-04-17017 April 1998 Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure RC-98-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20212H1421998-03-0202 March 1998 Interim Part 21 Rept SSH 98-002 Re EG-B Unit That Was Sent to Power Control Svcs for Determination of Instability & Refurbishment of a Dg.Cause of Speed Oscillations Unknown. Completed Hot Bore Checks on Power Case 1999-09-08
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM INTERIM PUMP REllEF REQUEST SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCI EAR STATION DOCKET NUMBER 50-395
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Code of Federal Regulations,10 CFR 50.55a, requires that inservice testing (IST) of certain ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 pumps and valves be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda, except where relief has been requested and granted or proposed attematives have bee authorized by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a (f)(6)(i), (a)(3)(i), or (a)(3)(ii). In order to obtain authorization or relief, the licensee must demonstrate that: (1) conformance is impractical for its facility; (2) the proposed attemative provides an acceptable level of quality and safety; or (3) compliance would result in a hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. Section 50.55a (f)(4)(iv) provides that inservice tests of pumps and valves may meet the requirements set forth in subsequent editions and addenda that are incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b), subject to the limitations and modifications listed, and subject to Commission approval. NRC guidance contained in Generic Letter (GL) 89-04," Guidance on Deve!oping Acceptable Inservice Testing Programe," provided attematives to the Code requirements determined to be acceptable to the staff. The GL guidance also authorized the use of the attematives in Positions 1,2,6,7,9, and 10, provided the licensee follows the guidance delineated in the applicable position. When an attemative is proposed which is in accordance with GL 89-04 guidanca and is documented in the IST program, no further evaluation is required; however, implementation of the altemative is subject to NRC inspection.
Section 50.55a authorizes the Commission to grant relief from ASME Code requirements or to approve proposed alternatives upon making the necessary findings. The NRC staff's findings with respect to granting or not granting the relief requested, or authorizing the proposed
, attemative as part of the licensee's IST program, are contained in this Safety Evaluation (SE).
The second 10-year interval for the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) began on January 1,1994, and ends on December 31,2003. The licensee's IST program is based on the 1989 edition of ASME Section XI, which references Operations and Maintenance (OM)
Standard, Part 6, for pumps (OM-6) and Part 10 for valves (OM-10). The licensee's February 11,1998, letter transmitted their interim relief request to the staff.
9906090350 980604 PDR ADOCK 05000395 P PDR Enclosure
2.0 DISCUSSION l
l Intenm Relief Request
( ,
The licensee has requested relief from the OM-6 acceptance criteria requirements of Paragraph 1-6.1 for charging / safety injection pump *C." The pump is currently tested at full-flow conditions during refueling outages, and at minimum-flow conditions quarterly in accordance with GL 89-04, Position 9 guidance. Because of bearing vibration values in the alert range during refueling outage testing, the licensee has prop 7 sed to test the "C" pump every 6 weeks.
Bearing vibration will be monitored using spectral analysis until refueling outage (RF) 11, when the pump rotating element will be replaced. At the conclusion of RF-11, the licensee will revert back to the original testing schedule.
Licensee's Basis for Reauestina Relief The licensee states:
The Charging /SI Pumps are tested in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 89-04, Position 9. This position allows the use of a non-instrumented minimum flow path for quarterly testing with a test performed at substantial flow conditions during cold shutdowns or refueling outages. As the C Charging /SI Pump had also exceeded the code allowable for the alert range during minimum flow testing after the maintenance activity discussed below, the required quarterly frequency has been doubled resulting in a required test every six weeks. Periodic testing on minimum flow in conjunction with testing at substantial flow conditions during refueling outages provides adequate assurance that these pumps are capable of performing their design safety function upon demand.
This position is incorporated into the VCSNS Inservice Testing (IST) Program.
Through the IST Program, the acceptance criteria applied to pump performance parameters [are) established through ASME/ ANSI Oma-1988, Part 6. Part 6 is structured to address actions to be taken when performing quarterly tests for components within systems capable of demonstrating their design function performance during power operation.
The actioris prescribed for components with parameters in the Alert range do not accommodate components that require testing during cold shutdown plant mode to demonstrate design performance parameters. During the Fall 1997 refueling outage, Charging Pump C indicated one vibration point out of 5 (pump horizontal, outboard) to be in the Alert range for both full flow and minimum flow conditions, it was noted that the test frequency was impacted but that the pump was still recognized as opueble to the Code acceptance criteria. VCSNS initiated an evaluation ts determine the cause of the deviation and establish corrective actions, i
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The evaluation included a review of Charging Pump C data collected to determine a viable cause and established corrective actions that could be pursued to improve the vibration condition.
Efforts to determine the cause included-
- Analysis of the vibration data spectrum I
- Review of past maintenance history 1
- Review of trend data (in particular, vibration)
Corrective actions performed to alleviate vibration and confirm cause included-(this includes' activities prior to the start of the outage through the completion of the testing performed after all maintenance conducted during the outage)
- Performed alignment check; discovered that there was no apparent alignment problem, additionally, checks for a ' soft foot' condition were performed on the gearbox and pump casing hold down bolts. ' Soft foot' corrections were made on the gearbox.
- Inspected barrel key block, determined that the key was contacting but was not binding. No corrections were performed for this condition.
- Verified that all the bolts in the outboard bearing area were torqued as required.
- Disassembled pump coupling to insure correct assembly and presence of correct amount of grease.
- The pump outboard bearing housing was tom down, the radial bearing fits were checked. The bearing to housing fit was found to be out of tolerance, this was corrected by installing a gasket with the correct tolerances. The allowed axial float of the shaft was also out of tolerance, this condition was corrected by machining the end cover to correct the outboard thrust shoe position.
Full flow (substantial flow) testing was performed after [the conclusion of] each
' phase of major maintenance on the charging pump when the appropriate test conditions existed (e.g. refill or draindown of the reactor vessel). This test was performed a total of three times during RF-10 while attempting to find and correct the cause of the alert range vibration. The final test results indicate the outboard bearing horizontal vibration amplitude is 0.43 inches per second (ips). This value is above the Oma-6 limit for alert *ange (0.325 ips) but is still below the action range. The pump manufacturer, ingersoll Dresser Pump has provided a letter to
. SCE&G stating that the current levels of pump vibration are acceptable for continued operation and that for this pump,0.54 ips shoula be the alarm limit.
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Minimum flow testing was performed on this pump after all maintenance had been completed and the full flow test results were analyzed. The final results for
. this test were 0.38 ips at the same test point, with all other parameters satisfactory.
The increased frequency testing of every six weeks will provide periodic reinforcement that there is not a continuous degradation mechanism involved with this pump. Quarterly vibration measurements for this pump at this test point have shown a consistently high (but below alert) vibration level. These t measurements are recorded back through 1994 and range from 0.187 to greater than 0.305 ips. No additional significant degradation is expected to develop for this pump based on this history. Additionally, the full-flow vibration measurement for this point has been consistently close to the alert limit of 0.325 ips.
During maintenance on the pump, the vendor was onsite to provide additional guidance. EPRI was also consulted for possible additional actions after final testing was completed. SCE&G has determined, based on evaluation of the data and all available inputs, that the appropriate corrective action is to replace the rotating assembly. Other utilities were contacted to attempt to obtain a spare rotating assembly but none were available. VCSNS has one spare rotating
- assembly, however this assembly must be rebuilttalanced by the manufacturer (currently in progress) and this could not be completed prior to restart from the Fall 1997 outage.
A planned shutdown to Mode 6 in order to test this pump to comply with the increased frequency testing requirement will create unnecessary challenges to the plant and operating personnel without a corresponding increase in safety.
The C Charging /SI pump is the installed spare and is usually aligned to the operating pump but electrically racked out during all modes of operation.
Full flow (substantial flow) testing of 'ne charging pump would only be feasible during an extended planned shutdoun with the Reactor Vessel head removed.
VCSNS will conduct this testing pr'or to the 1999 Refueling outage if system alignment and reactor vessel cc.-ditions will support performance of the test.
However, should this condition not be corrected prior to the increased test frequency due date, the pump will be declared inoperable and removed from service if relief from increased frequency testing is not received from the NRC (requested by June 18,1998).
Altemative Testing The licensee proposes to: .
Perform on-line vibration monitoring and analysis at minimum flow conditions at a frequency of every six weeks to verify pump pe.1ormance and identify any pump degradation. The attemate test flow is the minimum charging pump flow of i approximately 60 gallons per minute (gpm). This relief is requested until i
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completion of the 11th Refueling Outage (scheduled for Spring,1999) when additional pump' repairs and full flow testing can be performed. Full flow testing during the next refueling outage will confirm acceptable operation after maintenance or will identify that further action is necessary. The test interval established by Generic Letter 89-04, Position 9 will be resumed when the cause is corrected.
3.0 EVALUATION There are three single speed, horizontal, centrifugal, charging pumps manufactured by Pacific Pumps (now ingersoll-Dresser Pumps) in the VCSNS chemical volume and control system.
The charging pumps are also the high-head safety injection pumps in the emergency coia cooling system (ECCS). Two pumps are required to fulfill their safety function. During plant operation, one pump is normally running, one pump is a non-running pump, and the third is a spare with its associated breakers normally racked out.
Each charging pump at VCSNS is being tested in accordance with the guidance provided in GL 89-04. Position 9 of GL 89-04 states that the increased interval is an acceptable attemative to the Code requirements provided that pump differential pressure, flow rate, and bearing vibration measurements are taken during this testing, and:
- flow can only be established through a non-instrumented minimum-flow path during quarterly pump testing, and a path exists at cold shutdowns or refueling outages to perform a test of the pump under full or substantial flow conditions.
Position 9 further specifies that quarterly testing also measuring at least pump differenti91 pressure and vibration is to be continued. Current considerations for Position 9, which are included in NUREG-1482, state that if a pump parameter is measured in the alert range during refueling outage testing, it is recommended that efforts be made to take corrective actions during the o'utage and perform testing after the maintenance is complete.
l l . During RF-10, the charging pump "C" outboard bearing, horizontal direction, was measured to l ,have overall vibration values during full- and minimum-flow testing above the alert range of l- 0.325 ips; The licensee stated in their basis for requesting relief that numerous maintenance activities have been performed on the pumps to reduce the vibration. After all maintenance
- - was completed, the vibration values for the outboard bearing, horizontal direction, were L 0.43 ips and 0.38 ips for full flow and minimum flow respectwely. The pump manufacturer has stated that the current vibration levels are acceptable for operation.
The licensee concluded that the appropriate action was to replace the rotating assembly. An assembly was available onsite but could not be refurbished before the end of RF-10. The licensee plans to replace the rotating assembly on charging pump "C" during RF-11, scheduled to begin in the spring of 1999.
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{ The Code requires that, if a measured pump test parameter falls within the alert range, the testing frequency shall be doubled until the cause of the deviation is determined and the condition corr 6cted. Since the "C" charging pump was in the alert rcnge during RF-10, it would be required to be tested again during the middle of the cycle.' Because the "C" charging pump cannot be tested at full flow while the plant is at power, the licensee is requesting relief for an interim period from June 18,1998, until completion of RF-11. In the interim period, the licensee has proposed to test the pump every 6 weeks. This is the same interval as currently required by the Code because the pump is in the alert Iange on minimum flow. In addition to the Code overall vibration values, spectral data of the pump will be taken during each 6-week test.
It would be a burden on the licensee to shut the plant down to perform the Code-required testing if there were other means to monitor the pump for degradation during the interim period.
The proposed testing provides a reasonable assurance of oprational readiness because the pump will be monitored every 6 weeks, and spectral vibration data will be collected to assess whether the pump has experienced further degradation. In addition, during the next refueling outage, the relating assembly will be replaced.
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the proposed attemative to the Code acceptance criteria requirements of OMa-1988, Part 6, Section 6.1, for the "C" charging pump may be authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii) based on the determination that compliance with the specified requirements results in a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. The attemative is authorized for an interim period from the date of this SE until completion cf the 11th refueling outage.
Principal Contributor: J. Colaccino Date: June 4, 1998