ML19340E083

Control Room Habitability Study for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station. Responses to NUREG-0737 & NUREG-0578 Status Info Encl

ML19340E083
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/30/1980
From:	BECHTEL GROUP, INC., BECHTEL POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19340E081	List: ML19340E080 ML19340E083
References
RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-578, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8101060339
Download: ML19340E083 (47)

Text

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CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STUDY FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR PO'w'ER STATION Prepared for:

Baltimore Gas & Electric Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland November 1980 O

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CONTROL ROO!! HABITABIL2TY STUDY TOR CALVERT CLITTS NUCLEAR P0k'ER STATION 1.0 INTkODUCTION Thi Calvert Cliffs 1:oclear Power Station is located in southern Calvert County, Maryland. The county is bordered on the east by the Chesapeake Bay, on the south and west by the Patuxent River, and on the north by Anne Arundel County.

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The economy of the area is primarily agricultural. The site is accessible by State Highway 2 & 4 which passes along the west side of the site.

This report provides information regarding the potential effects on the safe operation of the nuclear facility of all industrial, transportation, mining, and military installations in the site area. A survey was carried out to determine the amount of hazardous material being trans-ported, manufactured, or stored within 5 miles of the site and signi-ficant quantities at greater distances. Potential accidents involving these hazardous materials were evaluated as to their effect on the con-trol room personnel.

2.0 LOCATIONS A?.*D ROUTES 2.1 Mining There are no mining operations within 5 miles of the Calvert Cliffs site. -

2.2 Mil'itary Installations There are no milliary installations in Calvert County or within 5 miles

. . i of the site, but thare cre ssveral in th2 surrounding counties.

Firure 1.1 shows the locations of the military installations in the area (Ref. 1).

2.3 Airports Thcre are no airports within 5 miles of the Calvert Cliffs site, but there are 3 airports within 11 miles of the site.

The Chesapeake Ranch Airport is a small private airstrip located 5.6 miles south-southeast of the site. The airstrip has 1 runway (2640')

but has no regular air traf fic (about 1 plane every 2 weeks) (Ref. 2).

- St. Mary's County Airport, located 10.5 miles south-southwest of the site, has I runway (3250') with operations of 5 to 10 planes per day.

The planes that use the airport are mostly light twin engine planes used by private corporations (Ref. 3).

Patuxent Naval Air Station is a miliary airport, located 10.5 miles south-southeast of the site. The type of aircraft that use the station are:

Tanker - KA-3 Skywarrior; Trainer - A-4 Skyhawk, T-2 Buckeye, T-38 Talon, Light Bomber - A-7 Corsair, AV-8 Harrier; Medium Bomber - A-6 Intruder; Tighter - F-4 Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-18 Hornet. Early Warning - E-2

- Hawkeye; Anti-submarine - S-3 Viking; Patrol - P-3 Orion; Cargo - C-130 Hercules; Utility - U-1 Beaver, U-6 Otter, ,

UC-123 King Air, T-39 Saberliner; Helicoptor - AH-1 Cobra, 1

l H-2 Sea Sprite, H-3 Sea King, H-46 Sea Knight, H-58 Jet l

l ,, Ranger.

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Patuxent has had 8,811 radar approach 2s in 1979 end a slight increase is expected in the future. The air traffic at Patuxent NAS is much less than the 50,000 per year (500 d where d is distance from the site in miles) needed to be considered for a hazard analysis (Ref. 4). The

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flight patterns which lie within 5 miles of the Calvert Cliffs site are shown in Figure 1.2. The two Ground Control Apporach (GCA) patterns represent approximately 40 percent of the total GCA traffic at Patuxent NAS. There are 4 runways at the station. The two primary runways are Runway 13/31 (9,700') and Runway 6/24 (11,800'). Runway 2/20 (6,400') gets much less usage than the previous ones and Runway 9/27 (3,400') is a very low use utility runway. Presently, Patuxent foresees no plans for future expansion of airspace or patterns except for those of a temporary nature to meet specific real-time testing requirements (Ref. 5).

Commercial airport facilities are available at Washington National Air-port, located 43 miles northwest of the site; the Baltimore Washington International Airport, located 53 miles north-northwest of the site; and Dulles International Airport, located 65 miles northwest of the site.

An air route map for the area within 50 miles of the site is provided in Figure 1.3 (Ref. 6).

Statistics on aircraft accidents have not been provided since the airports do not meet.the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70 criteria such that the effect of aircraft accidents due to the station safety operation need to be analyzed: " airports with projected operations greater than 2

500 d movements per year within 10 miles and airports with projected operations greater than 1000 d movements per year outside 10 miles, where d is the distance from the site in miles" (Ref. 4).

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2.4 Columbia LNG Corporation at Cova Point The only major industrial facility in the area is the Columbia LNG Corporation at Cove Point, located approximately 3.5 miles south-southeast of the Calvert Cliffs site. The Columbia facilities consist

'of an onshore processing plant and storage tanks, an unloading dock about one mile offshore, and a connecting tunnel fro = the dock to the onshore facilities.

DurinE normal operations, Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) tankers with a planned capacity of 125,000 cubic meters will moor at the unloading dock and transfer their LNG cargo through the connecting tunnel to the onshore tanks. The LNG is then stored in the onshore tanks until it is sold to consumers (Ref. 7).

There are 4 onshore LNG storage tanks at the Columbia LNG Corporation facility with a nominal total capacity of 1.5 million barrels. The facility also has a helicopter landing area, but it is seldom used (only 2 landings since its installation in November, 1979) (Ref. 8).

2.5 Pipeline Columbia LNG Corporation owns and operates a 36 inch high-pressure LNG pipeline within its right-of-way in Calvert County. The line, buried 3 feet deep and operating at a pressure of 1250 psig, was placed in operation in 1977. Ball type (36 inch) isolation ve"ues

. are used

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throughout the line. The distance from the valve in the plant, at the beginning of the line, to the first valve in the line is approx 1=ately 35,900 feet. The distance between the valves after that varies.

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The pipeline runs south and west of the Calvert Cliffs sige and is approxi=ately 1.76 miles southwest of the site at the closest point -

(Ref. 8).

2.6 Land Transportation Routes State Highway 2 & 4 is the major land transportation route within 5 miles of the site. The highway runs alcag the west side of the site and is approximately 1.2 miles west southwest of the site at the closest point. In 1979, State Highway 2 & 4 averaged 6400 movements per day (Ref. 9). The hazardous c.aterials transported on State Highway 2 & 4 are primarily local gasoline, fuel oil, and propane deliveries.

. Table 1.1 provides the size and frequency of the transports of these materials (Ref. 10, 11, 12, 13, & 14).

2.7 k'ater Transportation Reutes The Chesapeake Bay adjoins the Calvert Cliffs site to the east and is a major shipping route. The navigable channel is about 4 miles wide and is approximately 0.68 miles east of the site at the closest point.

In 1978, there was 42,419,046 tons of material transported on the Bay, of which 12,037,414 tons was hazardous material (Ref. 15). Table 1.2 l

. provides information on the hazardous material transported on the Chesapeake Bay in 1978.

Table 1.3 summarizes the information on the transportation of materials within 5 miles of the Calvert Cliffs site and Figures 1.ha and 1.kb show.the transportation routes.

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2.0 Onsite Chemical St., race There is a wide range of chemicals stored at the Calvert Cliffs site.

Tab 1e 1.4 provides a ce=plete list of the typ.es and quantities of chemicals stored at the site along with the chenical storage locations

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'(Ref. 16).

The chemicals identified as having the potential to affect the control room personnel are:

ammonia nitrogen acetone hydrogen carbon dioxide #2 fuel oil sulfuric acid transformer oil Liquid a==onia, NH3 at 28% concentration, is stored in 55 gallen drums in a warehouse 550 feet from the control roe- intake. Nc rnal storage quantities consist of 15 - 55 gallon drums.

Liquid acetone, CH 5 COCH 3

,is stored in 4 liter bottles and 55 gallon drums in the warehouse 550 feet from the control room intake. Normal storage quantities consist of 8 - 4 liter bottles and 6 - 55 gallon drums.

Liquid carbon dioxide, CO at 100% concentration, is stored in 20 pound 2

and 4 ton containers at a level of 12 feet in the Turbine Building, 360 feet from the control room intake. Normal storage quantities con-sist of 225 - 20 pound containers and 1 - 4 ton container.

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Nitrogen gas, Ny at 100% concentration, is stored in 15 ft3 cylinders in the East Service Building and in T.oca A223 on level 5 of the Auxiliary Building. Normal storage quantities consist cf 3 - 15ft

, cylinders. Also, a maxi =um of 45,000 ft3 (34 cylinders).is stored on a truck parked at the Bayfront, a distance of 650 feet from the control room intake.

Liquid sulfuric acid, H SO 2 4at 9B% concentration,is stored in a 10,800 gallon capacity tank in the Tank Farm, 630 feet from the control room intake.

Hydrogen gas, H y at 100% concertration,is stored it. 6.889 SCF con-tainers in the Tank Farm, 425 feet from the controi room intake.

Normal storage quantities consist of 9 - 6,899 SCF containers.

No. 2 fuel oil is stored in 125,000 gallen tanks outside the diesel rooms at a distance of 200 feet from the control toom intake. Normal storage quantities consist of 2 - 125,000 gallen capacity tanks with nor=al tank volumes of 90,000 gallons.

There are several transformers onsite which contain transformer oil. . Two of the transfor=er sites are located 600 feet north and 600 feet south of the e i

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tr'o1 room air intake. At each of these transformer sites, there are 6 trans formers: 3 with 202,500 lbs of transformer oil each and 3 with 19,500 lbs o

, transformer oil each. Two other transformers with 196,800 lbs of transforme:

l j oil each are located 300 feet west of the control room air intake.

The onsite hazardous chemical storage locations are shown in Figure 1-5.

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2.9 off-Site Chemical Storr.ge Two co=panies. True=an Cas Co=pany and Columbia 1.NG Corporation store large quantities of chemicals within 5 miles of the site. ~

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The LNG storage facility was discussed in Section 2.4.

Trueman Gas Co=pany is located in St. Leonard, Maryland, approximately 4.2 miles northwest of the site. There are two 10,000 gallon gasoline tanks at the Trueman gas facility, but only one tank is in service.

Table 1.5 provides the information on the chemical storage at these two locations (Ref. 8,17) . Figure 1.6 shews the location of the chemical storage facilities within 5 miles of the Calvert Cliffs site.

3. 0 EVALUATION OF POTENTIA 1. ACCIDENTS On the basis of the infor=ation provided in Section 2.0, the potential affects on the plant from accidental release of the hazardous caterials were considered in ter=s of design parameters (e.g., overpressure and missile energies) or physical phenomena (e.g., concentration of fla==able or toxic cloud outside the control room intake).

3.1 Explosions As described in Section 2.6 , the closest land transportation route to the Calvert Cliffs site that would be used by trucks carrying explosive materials through the area would be State Highway 2 6 4 As indicated on Table 1.1, the largest explosive transport on State Highway 2 & 4 would be an 8,000 gallon gasoline tanker truck. In the

, event of a tanker truck crash, assuming all the gasoline explodes instantaneously, the equivalent weight of TNT would be 4.78 x 10' lb which would cause a peak overpressure of 1 psi to occur at a distance of 1,700 feet from the accident site (Ref. 18). Since the closest point of" State Highway 2 & 4 to the Calvert Cliffs site is 6,336 feet 1

(1.20 milcs), no hazerd to th2 plcnt du2 to o gesolina tcnkar cxplosion in cxpected.

The 36 inch,1,250 psi, LNG pipeline that passes 1.76 miles southwest of the site was analyzed for potential explosion. Although the pipe-line is buried 36 inches deep, a rupture in an exposed portion of the line due'to accidental excavation was assumed. The 1.NG in the pipeline is composed primarily of gaseous methane (Ref. 19). It was found that

, methane, though fla=able, will not explode in an unconfined area (Ref. 20). Also, the products of combustion from a fire caused by pipe-line rupture will have negligible concentrations at the control room air intake due to the distance separation of 1.76 miles. Therefore, the 1.NG pipeline poses no hazard to the control rec = personnel.

3.2 Flam able Vapor Clouds (Delayed Ignition)

Fla=able gases in the liquid or gaseous state can form a vapor cloud which can drift toward the plant before ingition occurs. The possibility of the cloud then exploding depends upon its concentration being within the fla= ability limits for the particular gas released.

The most hazardous chemical transported near the site in terms of a delayed ignition is propane gas. As indicated in Table 1.1, the largest expected propane transport in State Highway 2 & 4 would be a 2,400 gallon truck. In the event of a propane truck crash and con-servatively assuming 45% of the propane instantaneously flashes to vapor, the propane vapor cloud can drif t 1,200 meters away from the ace.ident site and still be within the flammable limits. The effective distance that* the cloud could travel and still be within fla=able limit was estibated to be 1,254 meters. This radius, 1,254 meters, is less than the distance between the plant site and the closest point of State 9

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Highway 2 & 4, 1,900 osters (1.2 nile). Th2 propent vapor cloud explosion at that distance would produce an overpressure less than 1 psi at the Calvert Cliffs site (Ref. 18). Therefore, a propane truck crash poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

3.3 Toxic Chemicals - Onsite Section 2.8 discussed the hazardous chemicals stored onsite. As indicated in Table 1.4, there is no chlorine stored onsite and the existing propane tank is being drained. The toxic chemicals identified as potentially hazardous to the safety of the control room personnel are:

a==onia nitrogen acetone sulfuric acid carbon dioxide Liquid ammonia, NH 3 at 28 concentration, is stored onsite in 55 gallon drums in a warehouse 550 feet fro = the control room intake. In the event of storage drum failure, assuming an ambient te=perature of 30 C and a continuous ground level release, the NH3 concentration would be 30.0 ppm at the control room air intake. This is much less than the NH3 toxicity limit of 50 ppm (Ref. 21), therefore, the ammonia storage drum

failure poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

Liquid acetone, CH5 COCH 3

, is stored onsite in 55 gallon drums an a vare-house 550 feet from the control room air intake. In the event of an acetone spill and assuming an initial spill radius of 0.5 meters, the acetone gas 9

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concentra2 ion a2 the control room air intake would be 1.21 x 10 pp:.

This is much less than the acetone toxicity limit of 2,000 ppm (Ref. 22),

therefore, an acetone spill poses no hazard to the control room per-sonnel.

Liquid carbon dioxide, C07 , is stored onsite in a 4 ton tank (O F, or 314.7 psi), 360 feet from the control room air intake. In the event of tank failure, the CO2 puff concentration reaching the control room intake 3

would be 1.64 mg/m . This is much less than the 2CO t xicity limit of 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), therefore, the C0 storage tank failure poses 7

no hazard to the control room personnel.

Liquid nitrogen, Ny at 2,000 psi and ambient temperature,is stored in 3

1,323.5 ft capacity cylinders, 650 feet from the control room air intake.

In the event of storage cylinder failure, the Ny puff concentration reaching the control room air intake would be 4.4 g/m . The maximum 3

N 2 concentration in the control room would be 0.57 g/m . This N y concentration (0.05%) would not displace a significant fraction of the control room air, hence, would not axphyxiste (Ref. 22) . Therefore, nitrogen storage cylinder failure poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

Liquid sulfuric acid. H SO at 98% concentration,is stored onsite in a l 2 4 10,800 gallon capacity tank 630 feet from the control room. In the event of tank failure, assuming an ambient temperature of 35 C a spill t

l radius of 3.8 meters and a continuous ground level release, the concen-I tra' tion of H2SO4 reaching the control room air intake vould be O 1'x 10~0 mg/m 3

. " This is much less than theyH4 SO toxicity limit of l

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2 rg/m (Raf. 22), tharofore, failure of tha culfyric ccid storage tanks poses no hazard to the control roo= personnel.

It was concluded that the toxic chemicals stored onsite pose no hazard to the control room personnel. In each case, worse case meteorological conditions were identified and used. Results of the analysis of the toxic che=icals stored onsite is summarized in Table 1.6.

3.4 Toxic Chemicals - Offsite As shown in Table 1.2 and discussed in Section 2.7, large quantities of chemicals are transported on the Chesapeake Bay. The chemicals identified as potentially hazardous to the control room persennel are:

benzene sulfur toluene #6 fuel oil Liquid benzene, C6 6,is transported on the Chesapeake Bay. In the event of a ship accident 0.68 miles offshore causing a benzene spill, assuming a vessel load of 11,000 tons (Ref. 23), a spill radius of 50 meters, and a continuous ground level release, the C66 H concentration reaching the

( control room air intake would be 29.3 pp=. This is less than the C M g6 l

toxicity limit of 50 ppm (Ref. 22), therefore, a benzene spill in the Chesapeake Bay poses no hazard to the control roem personnel.

Liquid toluene, C 6"5CH3 is transported on the Chesapeake Bay. .in the event of a ship accident causing a toluene spill, assuming a vessel loid of 11,000 tons (Ref. 23), a spill radius of 50 meters, and a con-tin'uous ground level release, the C 65 CH 3 concentration reaching the 12 l

centrol room inteko would b2 12.2 ppm. This is cuch loss than the toluene toxicity limit of 200 ppm (Ref. 21), therefore, a toluene spill in the Chesapeake Bay poses no hazard to the personnel in the control room.

Sullur is also transported on the Chesapeake Day. Salfur is shipped as a liquid, at temperatures between 235 F and 300 F. When an accident occurs, the leaking sulfur will solidify as the temperature falls below the melting point. The solid sulfur will stay on the vessel and confine the spillage to a limited area. Any solid sulfur that does spill into the water will sink. Except when in the presence of lamp black, carbon black, charcoal, and a few less common substances, spon-taneous ignition of sulfur is practically non-existent (Ref. 24).

As indicated in Table 1-2, several types of fuels are transported on the Chesapeake Bay. No. 6 fuel oil was analyzed since it represents the largest volume of fuels transported. Assuming a vessel load of 11,000 tons (Ref. 23) and a No. 6 fuel oil burning rate of 8 inches /hcur (Ref. 25),

two accident cases were considered: (1) fire is confined to the vessel and (2) oil from the damaged vessel drif ts to the Bayfront and catches fire. For both cases, due to vigorous buoyancy generated by the oil-fire, wind speeds greater than 63 meters /sec are required to bend the extremely hot plume toward the control room air intake to affect the control room personnel. The frequency of such a high wind from the east is zero (Ref. 2C?, therefore, no hazard is expected to tbt ;ontrol room personnel.

It was concluded that materials transported on the Chesapeake Bay will pose no hazard to.the control room personnel. Results of the offsite toxic cI'mcials e analysis ;is also summarized in Table 1.6.

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3.5 Fire The chemicals stored onsite that were identified as potentially ha..ardous due to fire were:

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No. 2 fuel oil hydrogen transformer oil There are 2 - 125,000 gallon capacity (24 feet in height and 40 feet in diameter) No. 2 fuel oil storage tanks located onsite near the diesel room. Tank nu=ber 11, enclosed by a tank dike, is located 220 feet northwest of the control room. The other tank is located 220 feet southwest of the control room in Building No. 21 (refer to Tigure 1-5 for the building locations).

Assuming an accident occurs when a high wind (Stability D and a wind speed of 16.0 m/s) is blowing from the storage site toward the control room, three cases will be considered:

Case 1 - "

The oil fire is restricted to the oil tank, hence a continuous elevated release (24 feet) is assumed. The concentration of CO2 reaching the 3

control room intake would bc 2,020 mg/m . This is much less than the CO 2 t xicity limit f 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), hence there vill be no hazard to the control room personnel.

Case 2 The oil fire spills into the dike area arcwri stcrage tank number 11, hence

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a continuous ground level release is assumed. The CO concentration 2

3 reaching the contro: room intake would be 5,590 x 10~3 mg/m . This is -

mucp less than the toxicity limit of 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), hence there will be no hazard,to the control room personnel.

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case 3 The oil fire spills frcm the tank ento the ficor of Buil: ling No. 21 (flocr area 1,764 f t ) hence, a continuous ground level release is assumed.

The CO2 concentration reaching the control room intake would be 3,400 mg/m . This is much less than the toxicity limit of 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), hence there will be no hazard to the control room personnel.

Hydrogen gas is also stored onsite in 6889 SCF containers in the Tank Farm, 425 feet from the control room intake. Studies (Ref. 27) show that hydrogen-air nixtures do not go through a transition from ordinary flame to detonation wave if they exist in the open air (without any accumulation), ualess the ignition source impacts with considerable extra energy in the form of a shock wave. Hence, an unconfined hydrogen-air mixture will burn rather than explode. If the hydrogen gas is not ignited upon impact, but a vapor cloud drifts from the ruptured tank toward the control room, the hydrogen concentration inside the control room is estimated at 0.55 g/m3 which would be 0.67% by volume in the air mixture. As the fla=mable limits of hydrogen range from 4.0% to 74.2% by volume, the air inside the control room is not fla=mcble.

Therefore, a hydrogen tank rupture poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

Transformer oil quantities and locations were discussed in Section 2.8.

Assuming a high wind (Stability D and a wind speed of 15.0 m/s) blowing from the transformer toward the control room, a continuous release from the aggregate rock bed under the transformer, and only'one transforner fails, two cases were considered.

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Case 1 I i

There is a transformer oil fire in the aggregate rock bed 600 feet from the control room air intake involving 202,500 lbs of trans-former oil. The C0 -3concentration reaching the control room air intake would be 8.87 x 10-28 mgf,3 . s hss h &

CO 2 toxicity limit of 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), therefore no hazard to the control room personnel is expected.

Case 2 There is a transformer oil fire in the aggregate rock bed 300 feet from the control room intake 196,800 lbs of transformer oil. The 1

CO 2 concentration reaching the control room air intake would be 3

37 mg/m . This is much less than the CO 2 t xicity limit of 18,400 mg/m3 (Ref. 22), therefore, no hazard to the control room personnel is expected.

i Results of onsite storage of No. 2 fuel oil, hydrogen and transforrer oil analysis is also summarized in Table 1.6.

Danger to the Calvert Cliffs control room personnel due to forest fires i

was also investigated. The closest forest to Calvert Clif fs Nuclear Power Station is Calvert Clif fs State Park which adjoins the power station 1

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site to the scuth. Calvert Cliffs State Park is a 1,300 acre state park with a predccinant vegetatien of mixed hardwoods and pinen. The park is very fire ccnscious and there has been no fire at the park for at least the last 7 years (Ref. 28)

On a county wide basis, Calvert County averages 20 forest or brush fires per year. County fire prctecticn is censidered very good with a shcrt travel time to all areas frem fire stations and most fires are limited to less t.han 1/4 acre burned (Ref. 29). Therefore, a calculation was done that censidered the ecmbustion of 1/2 acre of forest nearest the plant.

Using data accumulated from the Maryland Forest Service (Refs. 35 & 36) the calculation ehewed that a forest fire poses no threat to control roem habitability.

3.6 The issue of the potential hazards to Calvert Cliffs from operaticns at Cove Point LNG Ter=inal hss been ' analyzed and discussed at length in numercus investigation reports and meetings between BGLE and the NRC. The resolution of the issue was at folicws: the NRC concluded that Cove Point operaticns would present no unacceptable hazard to Calvert Cliffs provided that BG&E prepare a centingency plan for the possibility of a methane cloud engulfing plant structures.

The NRC's technical conclusion is contained in referene 37 and is reaffirmed in paragraph 3 0 of their Safety Evaluation acccmpanying License ammendment Nos. h2 and 25 fcr Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Unit 2 respectively dated March lo, 1980. BG&E's contingency plan, fulfilling NRC requirements, is contained in the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Response Plan which has been reviewed in draft form by NRC and which will be submitted in final form en December 31, 1980. These documents, the Safety Evaluation and the Emergency

-Response Plan, show that there is adequate assurance that the Calvert Cliffs Control rocm will be protected in the extreme 3y unlikely event of methane cloud intrusion.

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37 Collisien with Intake Structure The intake structure is s ituated to the east of the main plant and is pri=arily a reinforced concrete structure. It houses 12 circulating water pgs which supply water from the Chesapeake Bay to the condensers and to 6 salt water pumps. The intake structure is protected by a baffle wall. 'Ihe bafflewall would exclude pleasure craft, while ships of a size which eculd penetrate the baffle was wculd run aground far offshcre.

Therefore, collisien with the intake structure will not affect plant cperaticns.

plant service water is supplied by ground water wells, therefcre, collisien with the intake structure presents no hazard to the control roem perscnnel.

(F.ef. 30) 3.8 Licuid spills

'Ihe accidental release petroleum products or corrosive liquids upstress of the intake structure vill not affect operatien of the plant. Homal cperaticns of the water intake structure pumps require submergence; i

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the suctions extend from elevation -12.0 feet to -9.6 feet. Liquids with a specific gravity less than one will float on the surface of the water and consequently are not likely to be drawn into the water intake.

Plani service water is supplied by ground water wells. Therefore, liquid spills present no hazard to the control room personnel (Ref. 30).

3.9 Equations Used in the Analysis

1. The dif fusion equation for an instantaneous (puff) ground level release is:

• >  ;'

k . i.sv tj',53. ,;4 (, . 'f j>,

' =, 4/ "' + "' + Y (ae. 22)

,[3 + c} #8+ej 3 a'+aj/,

where:

= unit concentration at coordinates x, y, z from the center of the puff, m~

x y .e, = standard deviations of the gas concentration in e ,e the horizontal alongwind, horizontal crosswind, and vertical crosswind directions, respectively (assume e = e ), m y

7.67 = (2)1/2 (Tr)3/2 .

e7 = initial standard deviation of the puff, m

- 1/3 91

=

where 7Q is the puff release quantity, 7.87x o "

g and X, is the density of the gas at standard conditions, g/m .

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x.y,z = distenco from th2 puff cantor in the horizontal alongwind, horizontal crossvind, and vertical cross-wind directions, respectively, m.

2. Tor liquified gases and low boiling point liquids, the' heat balance in the instantaneous puff formation assuming an adiabatic change is given by:

My

= f- Mg C p (T,-Tb) (Ref. 33) where:

M g = total initial mass of the liquid (g)

C = heat capacity of the liquid (cal /g C)

T, = ambient temperature ( C)

Tb = n r=al boiling point of the liquid (#C) <T, My = mass,of the instantaneously vaporized liquid (g)

Hy = leat of vaporization of the liquid (cal /g)

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3. The equation for the TNT energy equivalent, Q, of a fuel tank explosion is:

(AEIU Q = "2000 (Ref. 31) where:

Q = TNT equivalent yield (1b)

AH = heat of combustion (Btu /lb)

W = weight of fuel oil to be evaluated (1b) a = empirical factor The U.S. Bureau of Mines advises using a=0.1 as a safe upper limit for An explosion whenever the characteristics are not known.

-2 .

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i 4 The equation for the buoyancy flux, T, of a hot source is:

t .

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i 4 T= gQ" s 3.7 x 10-5 g m /see 3 sC cT -

H cal /sec (Ref. 32 )

where:

QH =

eat mission (cal /sec)

I Cp = specified heat of air at constant pressure c = ambient density T = source temperature e 5. The equation for estimating the surface area A(t), of a spill is:

- 1/2'j 2 8\ ,o (# 1- #) I

, A(t) = w r, +2t , (Ref. 33) l

{ ,

,I where:

, r, = initial radius of spill (m) 3 V, = volume of the spill (cm ) = w(r,)3 c3 = density of the liquid or gas (g/cm )

c = density of air (g/cm )

t = time (sec) e en e

0 0 8' . e 21

, ..,.e, v., -- ,-, ,-, -- , _ - - - - - - -

t *

6. The cquation for the rote of vcpor diffusion, de/dt, in still air is:

- 4 A 1/2

f " (t)p c"x10 p

( ')

(f) (Ref. 33 )

- where:

A(t) = surface area of the spill @ time, t (m )

p = vapor pressure of the liquid (mm Hg) cy = vapor density of the liquid (g/c= )

s D = diffusion coefficient of the liquid into air (cm'/s)

7. The equation for the dilution factor, F, of air taken into the control room air intake is:

F = 1-exp f,# (Ref. 33)

. T.

where k' = air flow rate into control room V = control volu=e r

r = time duration l 8. The equation for the height of the plume centerline, Ah, of a buoyant plume is:

Sh = 1.6F x! /u (Ref. 32) where:

F = buoyancy flux

, x = distance *

." u = wind speed i

l 22 1

L

9. The diffusion equation for the concentration, x, of a continuous ground level release is:

~

2' xp -

( ) (Ref. 34 )

X = seyz ou z ,

. where:

Q = release rate (g/s) y .e, e = standard deviations in horizontal and vertical directions (m) u = wind speed (c/s)

H = effective height (m)

10. The rate of total heat transfer, in cal /sec of the spilling liquid is:

d0 1/2 g = A(t) gr+hc (T,-Tb )+197(TE -T b )/t (Ref. 33 )

where: -

g = s lar and atmospheric radiation fluxes r

h = heat transfer coefficient (cal /m -see- C)

T, = ambient temperature ( C)

Tb = boiling point ( C)

TE " I# "" *#~E*#**"#* (

l t = time (sec)

(

11. The evaporation rate, in g/sec of the spilling liquid is:

dM

=f(V

) (Ref. 33 )'

where: ,

,; M y= mass of the , vapor 23

[

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is concluded that the industrial, transportation, and military installations in the site area vill not adversely effect safe operation j

of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Chemicals stoted on the pove'r p1' ant site pose no hazard to the control room personnel. Chemicals stored and transported in the site vicinity (within 5 miles of the power plant) also pose no hazard to the control room personnel. To further insure control room personnel safety, Table 1.7 lists additional safety equipment in the control room.

}

l S

l r

I e 8 I e l

l

. 1 Refere7ees

1. Maryland State Highway Map, Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway Administration, 1979.

2. Perri, Joyce (GFD), personal communication to Chesapeake Ranch, Calvert

~

County, Maryland, 326-3166, August 1980.

3. Perri, Joyce (GFD), personal co==unication to St. Mary's County Airport, Maryland, 373-2101, August 1980.

4 Regulatory Guide 1.70, Section 2.2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission, November 1976.

5. Poe, B. L., Co==ander, U. S. Navy, Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, 44aryland, correspondence, September 1980.

6. Washington Sectional Aeronautical Chart, 28 Edition, U. S. Department of Co==erce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, DC, September 1980.

7. "Rcport on Investigation and Literature Survey to Establish the Hazard I=p11 cations of LNG Spills at the Columbia LNG Corporation," submitted by Baltimore Gas and Electric to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission, March 15, 1976.

8. Colu=bia LNG Corporation, Lusby Maryland, correspondence, Septe=ber 19S0.

9. Schreiber, Willia =, Chief Traffic Inventory Section, Bureau of Traffic Engineering, Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway Administration, correspondence, August 1980.

1 l 10. Perri, Joyce (GFD), personal co==unication to Pargar, Inc., Prince Frederick, Maryland, 535-1340, September 1980. -

11. Bowen, William, Truemas Gas Company, St. Leonard, Maryland, correspondence, l September 1980.

l .

I I

References (Contd.)

12. Perri,-Joyce (GFD), personal communication to R. S. Leitch Co. , Solomons, Maryland , 326-4257, September 1980.

13. Perri,- Joyce (GFD), personal communication to Reliable Oil Co., Prince Frederick, Maryland, 535-1717, September 1980.

14. Perri, Joyce (GFD), personal co=munication to Southern Maryland Oil Co.,

Owings, Maryland , 257-7575, Septe=ber 1980.

15. Computer Printout, Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Baltimore, Maryland District, Years 1975-1978, Army Corps of Engineers.

16. W111ats, S. J. , Engineer, Baltimore cas and Electric, correspondence, September 1980,

17. Perri, Joyce (GFD) personal co=munication to Trueman Gas Co=pany, St.

Leonard, Maryland, 645-7301, October 1980.

18. Regulatory Guide 1.91, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1978.

19. Carr, Peter'C.(GFD),personalco=municationwithMaxLevy, Columbia Natural Gas, Wilmington, Delaware, (302) 429-5000, November 1980.

20. Carr, Peter C. (GFD), personal communication with Wally Clifton, Columbia LNG Corporation, Cove Point, Maryland, (301) 326-3152, November 1980.

21. OSHA, Concentration For Cases-1979.

22. Regulatory Guide 1.78, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1974

23. " Chlorine Manual," The Chlorine Institute, Inc. , N.Y.1969.

l 24 Fire Protection Handbook, Thirteenth Edition, National Fire Protection l

Association, 1969.

25~. Desai, Mukesh (GFD), personal communication to National Fire Protection -

Associ;stion, Boston, MA., (617) 482-8755, November 1980.

l References (Contd.)

26. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, hable8b,BaltimoreGas&ElectireCoepany, January 1971.

27. 'Sandli5g Ha:ardous Materials," Technology Survey, Technology-Utilization Division, NASA, Washington, DC.

28. Perri, Joyce (GPD), personal co==unication with Ranger Frair, Calvert Cliffs State Park, Calvert County, Maryland, (301) 326-4728, November 1980.

29. Perri, Joyce (GFD), personal co==unication with John Markovich, Maryland Forest Service, (301) 535-1303, November 1980.

30. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, January 1971.

31. Brosie, W. C., D. W. Si=pson, " Guidelines for Estimating Damage Explosion,"

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Chemical Engineering Process 1968.

32. Briggs, G. A., Plume Rise, U.S. Atmoic Energy Co==ission 1969.

33. Wing, J. " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Fcilowing a Postulated Accidental Release," U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission, NUREG-0570, 1979.

34. Stade, D. H., Meteorology and Atomic Energy, U.S. Atomic Energy Co==ission, July 1968.

35. Perri, Joyce, (GFD), Personal communication with John MarRovich, Maryland Forest Service, (301) 535-1303, December 1980.

36. Lin, Y. J. , (GFD), Personal communication with Dave Summers, Maryland Forest Service, (301) 888-1638, December 1980.

37. Letter frca R. W. Eeid (IIRC) to A. E. Lundvall, Jr. (BG&E) dated June 13',

1980.

Subject:

Cove Point I2?G Facility Safety Evaluation.

- p ,, , , -- a -

- - - - . e... - --

e

TABI.E 1.1 IIAZARDOUS MATERIAI.S TRANSPORTED ON STATE IITCIIWAY 2 & 4 WITIIIN 5 MILES OF Tile CAINERT CIIFFS SITE t

e llazardous Material Transporting Company Truck Capacity (gal) Frequency of Transports casoline Trueman cas Co. 1900 5 trips / week Southern Maryland 011 Co. 3000 1 trip / week Reliable 011 Co. 8000 1 trip / week 3000 1 trip / day R.S. I.eitch Co. 8000 4 trips / week 3600 2 trips / day Fuel 011 Southern Maryland Oil Co. 3000 2 trips / week Reliable 011 Co. 3000 3 trips / day R. S. I.citch Co. 2200 2 trips / day 8000 4 trips / week Propane Pargas, Inc. 2400 2 trips / month 3-100th cylinders 2 trips / day e

9

TARI.E 1.2 -

IIA 7.ARD0llS MATERIAL TRANSPORTED ON TIIE CilESAPEAKE BAY IN 1978 Amount (short tons) llazardous Cargo Foreign Coastwise Internal Total

) .

t Crude petroleum 421,661 30,598 193,301 645,560 Sulphur, liquid -

40,189 -

40,189 Sodium hydroxide -

50,718 -

50,718

. Crude tar, oil, gas products 46 56,507 606 57,159 Alcohols 327 7,289 -

7,616

', Benzene and toluene -

1,494 23,854 25,348 Sulphuric acid -

37,050 230,178 267,228 Basic chemicals and products, NEC 238,245 7,514 6,600 252,359 Gum and wood chemicals 360 184 -

544 Nitrogenous chemical fertilizers 184,813 13,855 61,570 260,238 Potassic chemical fertilizers -

52 -

52 Phosphatic chemical fertilizers 40,125 4,000 1,250 45,375 Fertilizer and materials, NEC 7,571 24,588 6,300 38,459 Miscellaneous chemical products 44,410 1,682 50 46',142 Casolin,e 1,558 .398,129 565,520 965,207 Jet fuel -

3,733 2,852 6,585 Kerosene 68 3,802 15,482 19,352

(

TABLE 1.2 (Contd.) -

1 IIAZARD0tJS MATERTAI. TRANSPORTED ON Tile CllESAPEAKE IIAY IN 1978 3 .

llazardous Cargo Amount (short tons) -

Foreign Coastwise Internal Total d

Distillate fuel oil 24,438 580,013 480,254 l',084,705 Residual fuel oil 2,077,765 1,825,009 1,283,012 5,185,786

, Lubricating oils and greases 29,614 12,187 34,410 76,211 Naphtha, petroleum solvents -

30,774 9,096 39,870 a

Asphalt, tar and pitches 18,533 770,587 210,616 999,736 Coke, petroleum coke 713,418 3 -

713,421 Liquefied gases 1,112,166 340 -

1,112,506 4

Petroleum and coal products, NEC 14,115 77,332 5,601 97,048 Total hazardous cargo 4,929,233 3,977,629 3,130,552 12,037,414

Total cargo 31,846,630 5,227,937 5,344,479 42,419,046 Ilazardous percentage of total cargo 15.48% 76.08% 58.58% 28.38%

i 9

TABLE 1.3 8

, , S14t!ARY OF MATERTALS TRANSPORTED WITIIIN 5 MILES OF Tile SITE ,

i Mode of Transportation Distance from Site (Miles) Year Traffic Volume State Highway 2 & 4 1.20 WSW 1978 Total movements: 6400/ day hazardous transports: 13/ day C esapeake Bay 0.68 E 1978 Total cargo: 42,419,046 tons /yr hazardous cargo: 12,037,414 tons /yr Colimbia LNG Pipeline 1.76 SW 1979 36" pipeline at 1250 psig O

e

TABLE '1 .4 a C1IEMICALS STORED ONSITE Chemical Quantity Containers 1

location Concentration 14 bottles 250 ft /hottle East Serv. Bldg. 100%

Acetylene 1 bottle 250 ft3/hottle Room A223 100%

17 bottles '

250 ft3/hottle Warehouse 100%

Ammonia 15 drums 55 gal. drums Warehouse 28%

CO 225 containers 20 lb containers various/12' level 100%

4 tons one container Turbine Bldg. 100%

Dry Resins 3

' Cation 370 ft 5 ft d3 rums Wa rehouse -

Anton 230 f t 3 5 ft3 d rums Warehouse -

Freon R-12 150# 3 bottles 0 50# e . Warehouse 4

1004 i

Freon R-22 1800# 36 bottles 0 50# ea. Warehouse 100%

400# 8 hottles @ 50# ea. East Serv. Bldg. 100%

a liydrogen 62000 SCF Max. 9 Tank Farm 100%

i llypochlorite Solution 16 drums 55 gal. drums Warehouse 16%

4000 gals. Storage tank Waterfront 16%

Lube 011 23,400 gals. 13 Tank reir- -

Nitrogen 30 ft 2 cylinders East Serv., Bldg. 100%

15 f t3 1 cylinder Room 4221 100%

45000 ft3 max. 34 cylinders on 4 5 ' L ?v= 1 7ayf ront' 100%

truck No. 2 Fuel Oil /. Diesel 180,000 gal, norm / West of Aux Bldg.

6 250,000 gal. max. 100%

Outside Diesel Rooms Chlorine None

TABLE 1.4a (Contd.) .

CIIDlICALS STORED ONSITE Chemical Quantity Containers I,ocation

• Concentration

.' Oxygen 12 bottles 224 ft / bottle East Serv. Bldg. -

1 bottle 224 ft / bottle Room A223 -

37 bottles 3 224 ft / bottle Warehouse -

Paints and Solvents Table 1.5b Polymers (vinyl chlorides) Table 1.5b Propane

• 38 ft total 2 tanks Tank Farm 100%

Sodium 11ydroxide 6100 gal, norm /

25,000 gal. max.

4 12' East Serv. Bldg. 50%

Sodium ifypochlorite See hypochlorite solution Sulfuric Acid 4300 gal. norm /

12000 gal, max.

4 Tank Farm 98%

Italon 1301 3000 lbs/ room 19 cylinders / room Room #A302/A306 10%

3060 lbs/ room 9 cylinders / room Room #A311/A317 10%

150 lbs/ room 8 cylinders / room Room #A406/A431 10%

Transformer 011 200,000 lbs/trans. 4 transformers Transformer Pada -

Propane tank 'will be drained since it is no longer useil.

. . TABLE 1.4b CHEMICALS STORD ONSITE Paints, Solvents, Polymers:

"The materials listed below refleet normal supplies stocked in Warehouse No. 2.

~

Paint Rast-Oleum Black Spray (16 oz.) #h0-33h 2h cans Red Marking (17 oz.) Iko-993 13 cans 2::anel Z1770 Black (16 oz.) #61-026 2h cans Yellov Lae. (16 oz.) #61 k15 12 cans Acetene Pisher A-18 (k liter bottles) #92-782 8 bottles -

55 Gal. Approx. B5S # Drun #93-999 6 dr=s The material listed belev refleet present (and normal) supplies stocked in Catalytie's Paint Departnent.

Epoxy Paint 810 Gallons (5 gal. eentainers - various colors) 80 - 5 Gal. buelets of cat 89-T-1 19 - 5 Gal. buckets of Surfing Co= pound 15 Gallons - red 20-R-9 20 Gallons Zine Chomate Primer / curring Agent 13-T-2 Enamel Paint .

l l 850 Ca11ons (5 Gal. containers - vartnus colors)

! 6k Gallons (1 Gal. containers)

Solvents I k'hinners 25 Gallons T-T k5 Thinner k0 Gallons 33 n inner 10 Gallons 35 ninner 90 Gallons 38 Thinner -

Miscellaneous kO5 Gallons Vinyl Primer 80-R-8 i . 330 Galle a vinyl - White W-9 60 Gallon. Dizeeote

-30 Gallons Antifouling seven Seas Ey-Build - 1087 60 Gallons Altyd Pla's vall Pinish 20 Gallons Zine Chronate Base Component 13-B-56 l

l TABLE 1.5 CHEMICALS STORED OFFMTE Company Distance From Chemicals Name Site (mi) Stored Description Columbia LNG Corp. 3.5 SE liquified 4 tanks with total natural gas nomical capacity of 1.5 million barrels Trueman Gas Co. 4.2 W gasoline 2 tanks each with a 10,000 gallon capacity but only 1 tank is in service

, u.

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TARI.E I.6 MAXIMlDi CAS CONCENTRATION AT Tile CONTROL. ROOM AIR fidTAFE Distance From Toxicity Maximum Concentration Chemical Quantity Control Room Ictake Assumptions Limit At Control Room intake y lised in Analysis Ammonta 55 gal drum 550 feet 50 ppm 30.0 ppm c, d Nil) (28% conc. liquid) (OSHA)

Acetone 55 gal drum 550 feet 2000 ppe 0.21 x 10' ppm a, d Cit3 Ctril) (Reg Guide 1.78)

Carbon Dioxide 4 tons 360 feet 18t00 mg/m 1.64 mg/m Co y (Isquid @ 0 F. (Reg Culde 1.78) a, f 314.7 psta)

Nitrogen 1323.5 ft 3 650 feet NA 0.57 g/m

• Ny (liquid 9 2000 psi) a. I Sulfuric Acid 10,800 gal 610 feet l fl ySO (98% conc liqutJ) 2 mg/m 0.1 x 10-6 ,gj ,3 a, d 4 (Reg Culde 1.78)

Benzene 11,000 tons 0.68 miles 50 ppm 29.3 ppe

• C66 ii (liquid) a, d (Reg Cuide 1.78)

Toluene *- 11,000 tona 0.68 miles 200 ppm 12.2 ppm e, d C65H CII) (liquid) (or, IIA)

Ifydrogen 6889 SCF 425 feet NA 0.55 g/m'* a, e 11 7 (gas @ 2000 psi)

1. 2 Fuel Oil 125,000 gal 220 feet 18,400 mg/m (fire) Case 1: 2020 mg/m 3 Case la b, g CO e nc. (Rog Culde 1.78) Case 2: 5590 x 10 mg/m) 2 Case 3: 3400 x 10' mg/m 3 Case 2 & 3: b, d Transformer Oil 202,500 lbs 600 feet 18,400 mg/m mg/m (fire) 196,800 lbs 300 feet (Reg. Culde 1.78) 8.87x{0' 37 ag/m b, d Coy conc. b, d 1 e Assumptions used in analysis:

Af ter dilution in the control room air intake system a) Meteorology - Stability E l) Meteorntony - Stability D r) Meteorology - Stability F ,

it ) Continuous ground Icvel release c) instantaneous (puff) groun.1 level release

() Instantaneous (puff) clevated release g) continuous elevated release NA - Define.1 as asphyulates in Regulatory Cul.le 1.78

. .

6 ,

TABLE 1.7 C0hTROL ROOM CHARACTERISTICS Item Control Room

a. Self-cont. breathing apparatus-number location 2 i

b. Bottled air supply - hours 4 ( hr ea.)

c. Personnel capacity - normal /

emergency 5/8

d. Potassium / oxide drug supply See below

e. Chlorine / toxic gas detectors 3 (02 detectors)

Potassium iodide is stored in medical office; 4000 tablets, 35 oz. liquid.

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Attschment 2 The location of the control recm serves to minimize radiation frem all direct streeming scurces. The centrol rocm docrways and stairwells do not open into any areas where radioactive materials would be present following a design basis accident.

The recm is isolated from the remainder of the Au:::iliary Euilding by its two foot thick concrete walls and flocrs. There are no contairment penetratiens that point at the centrol rocm en the elevation of the centrol rocm. Additienally, a new shield wall is being added (following a shielding analysis per mTFIG 0578) to prevent any streaming through a pipe chase into the control rocm frcm belev.

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