ML18113A759: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17-7:J) | ||
' elCENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL t:!LOCK: LI _..____,_~-'--'---''--....JI 0 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) | ' elCENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL t:!LOCK: LI 1 | ||
* 25 26 LICENSE TYPE ;JO 57 CAT 58 CON'T 7 8 L!JG) I | _..____,_~-'--'---''--....JI 0 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) | ||
* 2 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 8 101 o I 1 I a I 2 I 1 I 9 | ~ I v I A I s IP Is I 1 101 o I ol -Io Io I oI o I oI - Io Io 101 41 1I 1I 1I 1101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER | ||
I During normal operation_, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing circuit 25A (panel 2h Unit #1 boron injection tank recirc. return to boric acid tank. I This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable as l]]:IJ I per T.S. 6.6.2.B. (2). The health and safety of the public were not affected. | * 25 26 LICENSE TYPE ;JO 57 CAT 58 CON'T 7 | ||
IT]]] 7 8 9 | ~8 :~t~~~ L!JG) I oI s I o I o I o I 2 I 8 I o 1011 I*2 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 8 101 o I 1 I a I 2 I 1 I 9 IG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@ | ||
I During normal operation_, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing circuit 25A (panel 2h Unit #1 boron injection tank recirc. return to boric acid tank. | |||
~ I This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable as l]]:IJ I per T.S. 6.6.2.B. (2). The health and safety of the public were not affected. | |||
IT]]] | |||
7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE ITII] | |||
7 8 I SI HI@ | |||
r..: | 9 | ||
o..:..n=..:....---------' | ~@ ~@ I HI EI AI TI EI R 1@ ~@ LU@ | ||
45 46 . _LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 80 | 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION | ||
@ LE R/RO CV ENT YEAR . REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO * | |||
EliJ I O J O IO l@. | . REPORT NUMBER I I 81 . | ||
7 8 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '43' TYPE DESCRIPTION | 7 l.==.I I Oj 4/6 I j/j I28O I 329I ~ l.=J ~ | ||
\!.;:J W@ . NA | 21 22 23 24 26 27 30 31 32 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT I Oj@I TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER l.U@LU@ | ||
'( 9 0 1 0 9 O ~3D NRC USE ONLY "' ITli] NA | 33 34 | ||
No low temperature alarms were indicated. | ~@ | ||
Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated. | 35 | ||
Faults were found on circuit 25A (panel 2) Unit 1 boron injection tank recirculation turn to boric acid tank, and were identified as being the result of boric acid attack on the tape. The tape was replaced and circuit current verified to be within specs of the surveillance document. | ~ | ||
36 37 OJO 40 L':J@ | |||
41 | |||
~ | |||
42 | |||
~@ | |||
43 1c1 44 216 JB !@) | |||
47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @ | |||
l.._A_r_e_v_i_ew__o_f_t_h_e_h_e_a_t_t_x_-a_c_i_n~g_c_i_r_c_u_i_t_s_h_o_w_e_d_t_h_a_t_f_a_i_l_u_r_e_w_a_s_c_a_u_s_e_d_b.c....y_b_o_r_i_c_a_c_i_*a____.! | |||
attack on the heat tracing circuit. The corrective action implemented was to replace | |||
£III] .I the heat tracing tape. | |||
ITTIJ 7 8 ... 9 80 FACILITY METHOD OF A STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (:v till] W@ I 1 IO IO !@)._I__NA_ _ ____. L!J@i..1_E_*l_e..c. . .;;..c_t..:. r.:.ci..:.c. :. i. :. a. :. n--=o-=b..:. s. :. e:..:r.*.:. v:. :a:. :. t. :. *1=*o..:..n=..:....---------' | |||
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 | |||
. ACTIVITY CONTENT ~ | |||
ITEJ 7 8 w @) W@._I_ | |||
RELEASED OF RELEASE 9 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | |||
_..::.;N=A_ _ _ _ ___. | |||
44 45 NA | |||
. _LOCATION OF RELEASE@ | |||
80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES . r:;;;,. | |||
NUMBER ~ TYPE DESCRIPTION 8!J 7 8 j O l O IO 11lLJ@),___=NA=----~--------------------~ | |||
9 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES ~ | |||
NUMBER DESCRIPTION~ | |||
EliJ I O J O IO l@._____- = N = A = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ | |||
7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '43' TYPE DESCRIPTION \!.;:J | |||
~ W@ . NA 7 8 9 10 so PUBLICITY r:-;;,,. | |||
ISSUED~ DESCRIPTION~ ' ( 9 0 1 0 9 O ~3D NRC USE ONLY "' | |||
ITli] | |||
7 | |||
~~I NA 8 9 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 6 8 69 I I I !. I I I I I I I I I ~ | |||
80 0: | |||
T. L. Baucom ;1(804) 357-3]84 0 NAME OF PREPARER PHONE: 0. | |||
t, | |||
(Attachment, page 1 of 1) e e Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Docket No: 50-280 Report No: 78-046/03L-0 Event Date: 12-11-78 Title of Report: Low Current on Heat Tracing | |||
: 1. Description of Event: | |||
With the unit in normal operation at rated power, routine surveillance found that heat tracing circuit 2:SA (panel 2) was operating at less than the current* specified in the surveillance document. No low temperature alarms were indicated. | |||
Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated. Faults were found on circuit 25A (panel 2) Unit 1 boron injection tank recirculation re-turn to boric acid tank, and were identified as being the result of boric acid attack on the tape. | |||
The tape was replaced and circuit current verified to be within specs of the surveillance document. | |||
This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 *and is r~portable in accordance with Technical Specif1cation 6.6.2.b.(2). | This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 *and is r~portable in accordance with Technical Specif1cation 6.6.2.b.(2). | ||
: 2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems: At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected line was maintained as required. | : 2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems: | ||
The redundant circuit was operable. | At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected line was maintained as required. The redundant circuit was operable. There was at all times two operable flow paths for boric'acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected. | ||
There was at all times two operable flow paths for boric'acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected. | : 3. Cause: | ||
: 3. Cause: The reduced currents were due to boric acid damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit. 4. Immediate Corrective Action: The heat tracing tape was replaced. | The reduced currents were due to boric acid damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit. | ||
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required. | : 4. Immediate Corrective Action: | ||
The heat tracing tape was replaced. | |||
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: | |||
The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required. | |||
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: | : 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: | ||
Continuous surveillance is maintained on _the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary. | Continuous surveillance is maintained on _the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary. | ||
: 7. Generic Implicaticns: | : 7. Generic Implicaticns: | ||
This failure~ as with .others in the system, is considered random since no specified circuit has exhibited repeated failure.}} | This failure~ as with .others in the system, is considered random since no specified circuit has exhibited repeated failure.}} |
Revision as of 08:08, 21 October 2019
ML18113A759 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Surry ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/02/1979 |
From: | Baucom T VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
Shared Package | |
ML18113A757 | List: |
References | |
LER-78-046-03L, LER-78-46-3L, NUDOCS 7901090230 | |
Download: ML18113A759 (2) | |
Text
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17-7:J)
' elCENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL t:!LOCK: LI 1
_..____,_~-'--'-----....JI 0 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
~ I v I A I s IP Is I 1 101 o I ol -Io Io I oI o I oI - Io Io 101 41 1I 1I 1I 1101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER
- 25 26 LICENSE TYPE ;JO 57 CAT 58 CON'T 7
~8 :~t~~~ L!JG) I oI s I o I o I o I 2 I 8 I o 1011 I*2 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 8 101 o I 1 I a I 2 I 1 I 9 IG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
I During normal operation_, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing circuit 25A (panel 2h Unit #1 boron injection tank recirc. return to boric acid tank.
~ I This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable as l]]:IJ I per T.S. 6.6.2.B. (2). The health and safety of the public were not affected.
IT]]]
7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE ITII]
7 8 I SI HI@
9
~@ ~@ I HI EI AI TI EI R 1@ ~@ LU@
10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
@ LE R/RO CV ENT YEAR . REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO *
. REPORT NUMBER I I 81 .
7 l.==.I I Oj 4/6 I j/j I28O I 329I ~ l.=J ~
21 22 23 24 26 27 30 31 32 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT I Oj@I TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER l.U@LU@
33 34
~@
35
~
36 37 OJO 40 L':J@
41
~
42
~@
43 1c1 44 216 JB !@)
47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @
l.._A_r_e_v_i_ew__o_f_t_h_e_h_e_a_t_t_x_-a_c_i_n~g_c_i_r_c_u_i_t_s_h_o_w_e_d_t_h_a_t_f_a_i_l_u_r_e_w_a_s_c_a_u_s_e_d_b.c....y_b_o_r_i_c_a_c_i_*a____.!
attack on the heat tracing circuit. The corrective action implemented was to replace
£III] .I the heat tracing tape.
ITTIJ 7 8 ... 9 80 FACILITY METHOD OF A STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (:v till] W@ I 1 IO IO !@)._I__NA_ _ ____. L!J@i..1_E_*l_e..c. . .;;..c_t..:. r.:.ci..:.c. :. i. :. a. :. n--=o-=b..:. s. :. e:..:r.*.:. v:. :a:. :. t. :. *1=*o..:..n=..:....---------'
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
. ACTIVITY CONTENT ~
ITEJ 7 8 w @) W@._I_
RELEASED OF RELEASE 9 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
_..::.;N=A_ _ _ _ ___.
44 45 NA
. _LOCATION OF RELEASE@
80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES . r:;;;,.
NUMBER ~ TYPE DESCRIPTION 8!J 7 8 j O l O IO 11lLJ@),___=NA=----~--------------------~
9 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES ~
NUMBER DESCRIPTION~
EliJ I O J O IO l@._____- = N = A = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '43' TYPE DESCRIPTION \!.;:J
~ W@ . NA 7 8 9 10 so PUBLICITY r:-;;,,.
ISSUED~ DESCRIPTION~ ' ( 9 0 1 0 9 O ~3D NRC USE ONLY "'
ITli]
7
~~I NA 8 9 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 6 8 69 I I I !. I I I I I I I I I ~
80 0:
T. L. Baucom ;1(804) 357-3]84 0 NAME OF PREPARER PHONE: 0.
t,
(Attachment, page 1 of 1) e e Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Docket No: 50-280 Report No: 78-046/03L-0 Event Date: 12-11-78 Title of Report: Low Current on Heat Tracing
- 1. Description of Event:
With the unit in normal operation at rated power, routine surveillance found that heat tracing circuit 2:SA (panel 2) was operating at less than the current* specified in the surveillance document. No low temperature alarms were indicated.
Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated. Faults were found on circuit 25A (panel 2) Unit 1 boron injection tank recirculation re-turn to boric acid tank, and were identified as being the result of boric acid attack on the tape.
The tape was replaced and circuit current verified to be within specs of the surveillance document.
This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 *and is r~portable in accordance with Technical Specif1cation 6.6.2.b.(2).
- 2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:
At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected line was maintained as required. The redundant circuit was operable. There was at all times two operable flow paths for boric'acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
- 3. Cause:
The reduced currents were due to boric acid damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit.
- 4. Immediate Corrective Action:
The heat tracing tape was replaced.
- 5. Scheduled Corrective Action:
The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.
- 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
Continuous surveillance is maintained on _the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary.
- 7. Generic Implicaticns:
This failure~ as with .others in the system, is considered random since no specified circuit has exhibited repeated failure.