ML13176A417

G20120875 - Indian Point, Riverkeeper 2.206 Petition/Closeout Letter

ML13176A417
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	07/16/2013
From:	John Lubinski Division of License Renewal
To:	Brancato D Riverkeeper
Pickett D
Shared Package
ML13176A398	List: ML13176A417 ML13176A429
References
G20120875, NRC-4235
Download: ML13176A417 (31)

Text

UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555"()001 July 16, 2013 Ms. Deborah Brancato, Riverkeeper, 20 Secor Ossining, NY Dear Ms.

In an email dated November 14, 2012, addressed to Mr. R. William Borchardt, Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), you submitted a

pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, "Requests action under this subpart," asking that the NRC take enforcement action by ordering permanent shutdown of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (Indian Point). petition has been referred to a Petition Review Board (PRB) within the Office of Nuclear Regulation for action. The NRC has made your petition publicly available in the Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML In your petition, you state that there is no assurance that Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., licensee for Indian Point, could control the total quantity of hydrogen generated following severe reactor accident.

You also state that following such an accident, it is highly likely there would be hydrogen combustion in the containment either in the form of a deflagration or detonation.

You note that NRC's resolution of combustible gas control issues for large, containments, similar to Indian Point, is predicated on static loading and does not consider potential effects of hydrogen fast deflagrations, detonations, or deflagration to transition (DDT). You assert that using these assumptions would result in dynamic which, in turn, would result in more severe results than static loads. You request that the revoke the operating licenses of the Indian Point reactors because hydrogen fast detonations, or DDT could breach the Indian Point containments following a severe accident and expose the public to a large radiological In your petition, you state that an unintended ignition following a severe reactor accident cause a hydrogen detonation.

You also state that the passive autocatalytic recombiners at Indian Point Unit No.2 can be overwhelmed by the generation of hydrogen following a reactor accident and can act as igniters in environments containing elevated concentrations hydrogen.

You quote a 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency report stating that powered thermal recombiners, similar to those used at Indian Point Unit No.3, can act igniters in environments containing hydrogen concentrations greater than 4 In your petition, you reference NRC documents that estimated the peak calculated pressures following postulated severe reactor accidents at the Oconee, Three Mile Island, Turkey Point nuclear facilities.

These calculations, which assumed 75 and 100 zirconium metal-water reactions along the active fuel length, predicted pressures approached the estimated containment ultimate failure pressures.

You state that the calculations are non-conservative because they assume static loads and do not consider effects of dynamic loads that would occur if fast deflagrations, detonations, or DDT assumed. Furthermore, you assert that the estimated ultimate containment failure may be non-conservative due to the lack of D.

-In your petition, you state that the NRC's design basis analyses do not consider internally generated missiles that may be the result of hydrogen deflagrations or detonations.

Such missiles may damage safety-related mitigation systems inside containment.

You state that the Indian Point severe accident management guidelines do not address internally generated missiles resulting from hydrogen combustion.

Finally, you stated that the Riverkeeper petition is plant-specific for Indian Point due to the following considerations: The Indian Point site is located within one or two miles of the Ramapo seismic zone. The petition asserts that the site is susceptible to a 7.0 magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale and Indian Point is only designed for a 6.1 magnitude earthquake.

An earthquake, in addition to human error, can lead to a severe reactor accident. The population within a 50-mile radius of the site is approximately 17 million which is significantly greater than any other plant in the country. A large radiological release over the New York City area would have a financial impact on the On December 20, 2012, a telephone conference call was held between you and the PRB in which you provided further explanation and support for your petition.

A transcript of that conference call, which supplements your petition, is publicly available at ADAMS Accession No. ML13030A486.

On January 17 and February 5, 2013, the PRB met internally to discuss your petition and make its initial recommendation in accordance with Management Directive 8.11 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041770328).

The PRB noted that the 2003 revisions to 10 CFR 50.44, "Combustible gas control for nuclear power reactors," removed combustible gas control requirements for large, dry pressurized-water reactor (PWR) containments.

The NRC staff concluded that even with a 75 percent zirconium metal-water reaction, large, dry PWR containments would be expected to withstand a deflagration resulting from hydrogen combustion.

The staff believes that hydrogen deflagrations are the most likely mode of combustion in degraded core accidents.

Multiple ignition sources would be present inside containment to initiate combustion at lower flammability limits which would generally be expected to keep hydrogen concentrations below detonable levels. Detonations of sufficient magnitude to fail containment are considered to have an extremely low probability of occurrence.

The PRB also noted that both Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 currently meet the NRC's licensing design basis with respect to hydrogen control. The PRB further noted that your petition takes issue with the existing regulations in 10 CFR 50.44 regarding NRC's assumptions and methodology for handling combustible gases. Specifically, you state in your petition that (1) one or two recombiners are insufficient for a severe reactor accident and recommended that PWR containments include 30-60 recombiners distributed throughout containment, (2) NRC assumptions for hydrogen production are non-conservative because the total quantity of hydrogen produced in a severe reactor accident could exceed the total quantity of hydrogen produced from the oxidation of 100 percent of the active fuel length, and (3) NRC calculations of peak containment pressures are conservative because the NRC assumes static loads whereas the petitioner believes that dynamic loads associated with fast deflagrations, detonations and DDT are more appropriate modeling techniques.

Brancato -3 As a result, the PRB concluded that the petition implicitly implies that deficiencies exist within the Commission's regulations at 10 CFR 50.44. Therefore, the initial recommendation of the PRB was to reject the Riverkeeper petition for review as it met the criterion for rejection pursuant to Management Directive 8.11. On March 29, 2013, you were informed of the PRB's initial recommendation and provided with a detailed discussion that included the basis of our findings (ADAMS Accession No. ML13088A224).

On May 29, 2013, a second telephone conference call was held with you and the PRB in which you provided further explanation and support for your petition.

The transcript of that conference call, which supplements your petition, is enclosed and is publicly available at ADAMS Accession No. ML13176A429.

On June 17, 2013, the PRB met internally to discuss the second telephone conference call and determine whether any changes to the initial recommendation were necessary.

The PRB concluded that the additional information was not sufficiently persuasive to change its initial recommendation.

In summary, the PRB concludes that the NRC staff has extensively studied the issue of post-accident combustible gas control at operating facilities and that the PRB's final recommendation is to reject this petition for review under 10 CFR 2.206 because you have asserted deficiencies within the Commission's regulations.

The PRB notes that the October 14, 2011, petition for rulemaking (PRM) submitted under 10 CFR 2.802 by the Natural Resources Defense Council, proposes extensive revisions to 10 CFR 50.44 on hydrogen control (ADAMS Accession No. ML11301A094).

This petition is being tracked by the NRC staff as PRM-50-103.

The PRB is placing the information from your petition on the PRM-50-103 docket so that your concerns can be further evaluated in conjunction with that petition for rulemaking.

You can monitor the docket for PRM-50-103 on the Federal rulemaking Web site, http://www.regulations.gov, by searching on Docket ID NRC-2011-0189.

Thank you for your interest in these matters. Sincerely, Joh inski, Director Division of cense Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-247 and Transcript of May 29, 2013, Conference cc w/encl: Distribution via Official Transcript of NUCLEAR REGULATORY Title: Docket Numbers: Location: Edited Work Order ML 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board Riverkeeper Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (50-247,50-286)

Rockville, MD Wednesday, May 29,2013 Douglas Pickett NRC-4235 Pages 1-26 NEAL R GROSS AND CO., Court Reporters and 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D.C. (202) 234-4433 5 10 15 20 25 1 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION + + + + +

10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) CONFERENCE CALL RE INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER + + + + +

1JIJEDNESDAY MAY 29, 2012 + + + + +

conference call was held, John Lubinski, of the Petition Board, presiding.

PETITIONER; RIVERKEEPER PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS JOHN LUBINSKI, Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation, ion of License DOUGLAS PICKETT, PRB Petition , Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactor censing ANDREA RUSSELL, PRB Coordinator, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, c Communications Branch NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 5 10 15 20 25 2 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF RAJENDAR AULUCK, Japan Lessons rectorate RICHARD DUDLEY, Office of Reactor ion, Rulemaking Branch FARHAD FARZAM, Office of Nuclear Reactor Mechanical and Civil Branch CHRISTOPHER HAIR, Office of Counsel ASIMIOS MALLIAKOS, Office and State s and Environmental ALLEN NOTAFRANCESCO, Office AHSAN SALLMAN, Office Reactor ation, Containment and Ventilat NRC REGIONAL STAFF BRICE BICKETT, Region 1 sion of Reactor ects PAUL KROHN, Region 1 ion of Reactor Safety REPRESENTATIVES OF PETITIONER DEBRA BRANCATO MARK LEYSE ALSO PRESENT STEVEN PRUSSMAN, ENTERGY NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W (202) 234*4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005*3701 www nealrgross.com 3 T-A-B-L-E O-F Welcome and Introductions, Doug Pickett ............ Opening Statement, John Lubinski ............. Debra Brancato and Mark Leyse, Representatives Petitioner

.................. , , , , .................. Q&A, ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C 20005-3701 4 I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 P-R-O C E-E-D-I-N-G-S 10:04 a.m. MR. PICKETT: Welcome and good morning. would like to thank everybody for attending this My name is Douglas ckett and I am the Indian project manager the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

We are today to allow the peti Riverkeeper, assis by Mr. Mark Leyse, to Petition Review known as the PRE, Riverkeeper's 2.206 dated November 14, 2012 concerning Indian Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3. I am the petition manager for the petition.

Petition Review Chairman is Mr. John Lubinski.

As part the PRE's review of this on has requested this opportunity to the PRE. Today' s meeting scheduled for one hour 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center and 11 be transcribed by a court reporter.

The transcript will become a supplement to petition.

The will also be made publ ly available.

I would 1 to open this meeting wi th introductions.

As we go around the room, please sure to clearly state your name, your position, and fice NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 5 10 15 20 25 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 5 that you work for within the NRC I'll start with myself. I'm Douglas ckett. MR. SA.L.LMAN:

My name Iman. I work in the Containment and Ventilation of NRR. MR. AULUCK: I'm Rajendar 1'm in Japan Lessons Learned Directorate wi Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

MR. FARZAM: Farhad Farzam, Mechanical Engineering Branch, Office ear Reactor Regulations.

MR. DUDLEY: Richard Rulemaking ect Manager in the Rulemaking Branch Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

MR. NOTAFRANCESCO:

Notafrancesco, fice of Research involved in a hydrogen related issues. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

John Lubinski.

I'm the Director of the Division of e Renewal in NRR and I'm the Petition Review Board rman. MR. PICKETT: \fJe have completed introductions at NRC At this time are there any NRC participants headquarters on the phone? MS. RUSSELL: Yes. This is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE. NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D,C 20005*3701 www,nealrgross,com 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Russ 1, the PRB Coordinator in the fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

MR. PICKETT: Are any NRC participants from the regional office on ? Are there any representat the licensee on the phone? MR. PRUSSMAN:

Steven Prussman, MR. PICKET7: Ms. Brancato, you please introduce yourself for the record. MS . BRAl.""JCA70

Yes. s Brancato.

I'm a staff attorney with MR. PICKETT: And Mr. Mark you please introduce yourself for the record? MR. M. LEYSE: Sure. Mark e. MR. PICKETT: Mr. Robert Leyse, would you introduce yourself for the record? MR. R. LEYSE: No. MR. PICKETT: It is not required for members of the public to introduce themselves for this call. However, if there are any members of the publ on the phone that wish to do so at this timel please state your name for the record. I would like to emphasize that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court can accurately transcribe this meeting. If you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N.W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 www.neairgross.com 5 10 15 20 25 7 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 that you would 1 to say, please first state your name for the record. For those dialing meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimi ze any background noise or tractions.

If you do not have a mute button, this can done by pressing keys

• 6. To unmute press the

• 6 key again. At this time I'll turn it over to the PRB chairman John Lubinski.

CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Good morning. Welcome to this do have regarding the 2.206 tion submitted by Riverkeeper.

I would like to first share some background on our process. Section 2.206 of tle 10 of the Code Federal ations describes tion process, primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement type action to NRC 1 or licensed ac es. Depending on results of evaluation, NRC could modi suspend, or an NRC-license or any other appropriate actions to res a problem. The NRC s 's guidance for disposition of 2.206 petition request is in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, NW. (202) 234*4433 WASHINGTON, DC 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 5 10 15 20 25 8 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 Directive 8.11 which is publicly available.

The purpose of today' s meeting is to provide the petitioner an opportuni ty to comment on the initial recommendation of the PRB to reject the Riverkeeper petition because it asserts deficiencies within the Commission's regulations on combustible gas control. The PRB also recommends referring Riverkeeper petition for rulemaking with regarq to the October 14, 2011 petition for rulemaking submitted by NRDC. This meeting is not a hearing. Nor is it an opportuni ty for the peti tioner to question or examine the PRB on the meri ts or the issues presented in the peti tion request. No decision regarding the meri ts of the petition will be made at this meeting. Following this meeting the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.

outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the petitioner.

The Peti tion Review Board typically consists of the Chairman, usually a manager at the senior executive level at the NRC. It has a petition manager and a PRB coordinator.

Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of the information in the petition request. At this time I would like to introduce the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, N.W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTm" D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 9 1 Board. I am John Lubinski, the Petition ew Board 2 chairman.

Doug Pickett is peti tion manager for the 3 petition under discuss today. Andrea Rus 1 is the 4 off 's PRB coordinator.

5 Our techni staff Ahsan 6 Sal of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 7 Containment and venti Branch; Farhad Farzam from B the fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Mechanical and :r Civil Engineering Branch; Asimios Malliakos, Office of l(D and State Materials and Environmental Management 11 Programs; Brice Bickett NRC's Region I ion of 12 Reactor Projects; and Krohn from NRC's Region 1 13 Division of Reactor Safety. 14 We o obtain advice from our Office of Counsel 15 represented by Chris Hair. 16 As described our process. the NRC may ask 17 cl questions to better tand the 18 pe tioner' s presentation and to a reasoned 19 decision whether to modify the PRB's initial 20 recommendation.

21 I would 1 to suml'Tlarize scope of the 22 tion under cons and the NRC activities to 23 date. On November 14, 2012 Riverkeepe::::-

submitted to the 24 NRC a 2.206 petition regarding Indian Units 2 and 25 3. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgro55.com 5 10 15 20 25 10 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 The peti tion was prepared by Mr. Mark Leyse. The petitioner requested the permanent shutdown of Indian Point units 2 and 3 because fast hydrogen deflagrations or detonations could breech the containment following a severe accident exposing the public to a large radiological release. The petitioner states that there is no assurance that Entergy, the licensee, could control the total quanti ty of hydrogen that would be generated in the event of a severe reactor accident at Indian Point. It is highly likely that there would be hydrogen combustion in the containment either in the form of a deflagration or detonation.

As the basis for this request, the peti tion states the following:

The Indian Point site is located within one or two miles of the Ramapo seismic zone. Research suggests the site is susceptible to an earthquake of 7.0 magni tude on the Richter scale and the petitioner indicates the si te was only designed for a 6.0 magni tude earthquake.

As a result, the sites are susceptible to a severe reactor accident.

A population of nearly 17 million people reside within a 50-mile radius of the site and they would be adversely impacted by a large radiological release. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 11 1 NRC's resolution of combustible gas control sues 2 large dry containment such as Indian Point did not 3 assume hydrogen deflagrations or detonations.

4 Indian Point 2 has passive 5 , or PARS, which could be overwhelmed by 6 ion of hydrogen during a severe reactor acc 7 PARs been observed to have unintended tions 8 experiments with high initial concentrat of 9 These ignitions could lead to a fl ion 10 or 11 Indian Point 3 has electri 12 hydrogen recombiners that, according to 13 it could also have unintended 14 lowing a severe reactor accident.

Whi 15 containment design pressure is 47 psi, 16 acknowledges that the ultimate 17 is estimated to be approximately 126 18 The peti tioner notes that due to an 1 19 of data, estimated containment fai pressures 20 are questionable.

It states that the an 21 could fail from the maximum poss e 22 tion load. 23 Finally, the petitioner states 24i I integrity and essent system d compromised by internally generated missiles by NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, DC 20005-3701

'Mvw.nealrgross.com 12 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 flame acceleration or DDT. The peti notes that the licensee's severe accident mi tigation ternatives, known as SAMA, do not address internal generated missiles from hydrogen combust me to discuss the NRC ties to date. On November 16, 2012, the peti manager contacted the ioner to discuss the NRC 2.206 process and to offer oner an opportuni to address the PRB by phone or person. On December 20, 2012 the peti tion ass by Mr. Mark Leyse address PRB in advance of PRB's initial deliberations on the petition.

On COURT REPORTER:

This court reporter.

Can non-speakers please mute phones at this time. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Thank you. On January 17 and February 20, 2013, the PRB met internal to discuss the petition and to make its initial recornrnendat The PRB concluded the peti tioner asserted encies in the Cornrniss

's regulations regarding post-accident generat hydrogen and the subsequent ing of combustion.

In accordance wi th NRC Directive supports rejecting petition from review 8.11 this 10 CFR 2.206. The PRB so noted that Mr. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, DC.

5 10 15 20 25 13 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 Mark Leyse, who prepared the Ri verkeeper tion, also prepared the October 2011 NRDC 2.8 peti tion for rulemaking proposing rulemaking to revise the Commission's regulations on t e gas control. The PRB also recommended that ition be referred to the NRDC On March 27, 2013 recommendation was submitted to for approval.

This approval was Riverkeeper 2.206 rulemaking petition.

PRB's initial s NRR management provided on March 29, 2013. On March 29, 2013 the it was informed that the PRB's initial recommendation was to reject the petition because the petitioner asserted deficiencies within existing NRC rules. =n addition, the PRB recommended referring the Riverkeeper 2.206 peti to emaking under the NRDC peti tion noted previously.

was offered an opportunity to its initial recommendation.

Riverkeeper and NRC agreed upon At the time Riverkeeper the PRB regarding ly, on April 23, 2013 May 29th, for their second petition before the PRB. As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks as s will help us in the preparation of the meeting that will be made publicly available.

Thank you. Also, as a reminder, when you're not talking e mute your phone so that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 5 10 15 20 25 14 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 other people can hear the conversations.

Ms. Brancato, I will turn over to you to allow you to provide any information you believe the PRB should cons as part of this ition. MS. BR.AI:JCATO:

Thank you. This is Debra Brancato.

I'm a staff at with Riverkeeper.

First, I just wanted to thank you the opportuni ty to address PRB in this follow-up conference call. Riverkeeper disagrees wi PRB's ini recommendation to reject 's 2.206 petition.

As Mr. Leyse will scuss in further detail, the peti does present site-specific concerns which c consideration another form rulemaking proceeding is not appropriate and warrants PRB ' s acceptance peti tion for further review consideration.

To the extent the PRB timately decides to uphold s initial recommendation to ect 's petition, the alternative only does Riverkeeper support any recommendation the issues concerns raised our 2.206 petition cons in the context of petition for emaking PRM-50 103. With that very introductory I'll turn it over to Mr. to discuss in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, N.W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C 20005-3701 www.nealrgrosS.CQm 5 10 15 20 25 15 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 detail why we disagree with the PRB's init recommendation.

Thank you. MR. M. LEYSE: Mark Leyse speaking.

Thank you. First, I would like to thank Petition Review Board, PRB, this second meeting. In this second PRB meeting I will respond to the PRB's initial decision to not consider Riverkeeper's 2.206 petition.

In an email dated March 29, 2013/ that Doug ckett, the PRB manager sent to Debra Brancato of Ri verkeeper, there is an explanation of the PRB' s t decision.

The email states that, "The PRB's initial recommendation is to reject the petition because the peti tioner asserts deficiencies wi thin existing NRC rules. In addition, the PRB recommends referring the Riverkeeper peti tion to emaking under PRM-50 103. I guess PRM-50 103 was just covered. That's the NRDC rulemaking peti tion is requesting revisions to the NRC's regulations on combustible gas control. First, I would like to say that I think that Riverkeeper's 2.206 petition does se a number of issues are plant specific.

For one thing, Indian Point Unit 2 is the only unit licensed by the NRC that has passive autocatalytic recombiners, In the event of a severe accident, there is the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE" N,W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C, 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com II 5 10 15 20 25 16 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 241 possibility that a PAR will malfunc by having an ignition.

Such an ignition could cause a detonation that could potentially jeopardize Unit 2 containment.

That would most likely be in form of a deflagration that would transition to a detonation.

Then on page 6 through 8 the petition we cover plant specific characteristics regarding the location of Indian Point. On pages 8 and 9 of the tion we cover plant specific charac tics regarding the particular volume of Indian Point's containments as well as the particular distribution steel and concrete masses in containments.

finally, the NRC l f in its resolution of Generic Saf Issue 121 stated, "It was ieved plant specific vulnerabilities may st mainly due to the effects of local hydrogen detonation activi es for estimating the likelihood local hydrogen detonation and access the consequences would require plant specific information." The second problem with PRB's tial recommendation to reject the petition and referring it to the emaking branch that the rulemaking process years, decades some cases. It could more than 10 years or the NRC to correct '[he def encies in its current regulations on cowbustible gas control. (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 17 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1.;1, 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 Unfortunately the NRC has decided to relegate combustible gas control s issues to the lowest priori ty of its response to the Fukushima Dai ichi accident.

There is a very important reason the PRB should accept Ri verkeeper I s peti tion . I think are enty of plant specific issues to justify the PRB accepting the petition.

As discussed in the petition, Indian ant was built within a couple miles of the Ramapo seismic zone. Research suggests that Indian Point is susceptible to an earthquake of 7.0 in magnitude on the chter scale. Hence, if there were a large earthquake, there could be a severe accident at Indian Point. Severe accidents can o occur wi thout being caused by natural disasters.

Three Mile Is unit 2 accident was not caused by a natural ter. Or there could be perhaps a fire at Indian Point that could cause a severe accident.

Incidentally, NRC has allowed Indian Point to have lower protection standards than are permitted at other commerc buildings in New York. Now I will discuss information that indicates that Point I S large dry PWR containments could be vulnerable to hydrogen combustion.

The NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 5 10 15 20 25 18 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 Fukushima Dai i accident demonstrated that NRC's hydrogen experiments, many of which were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories, SNL, just did not icate what d occur in a severe accident.

In September 8, 2011 ACRS meeting Dana Powers of SNL s that, "It's extraordinarily hard to " detonations experiments because of tion problems.

He pointed out that were detonations in Fukushima -ichi accident.

It seems to me that the experiments have been conducted just were not realistic enough so conclusions from such experiments could be non-conservative.

I want to point out that NRC's SECY-00-0198 states that, "A detonation would impose a dynamic pressure on the containment structure that could more severe than the static load from an equivalent flagration." The point that a dynamic pressure load on the containment be more severe than the static load. In a July 2011 IAEA report, tigation of Hydrogen in Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power ants states, "Hydrogen ion can pose various sks to the containment and other plant systems. combustion can give large pressure varying rom rela ti ve low pressure loads bound by AICC loads, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 21 22 23 24 2 adiabatic isochoric complete combustion loads, up to large loads :rom accelerated flames and detonations.

Such acceleration can already occur above 8 percent hydrogen volume so that above that value the AICC load may not always be the bounding value." The NRC may have determined that Generic Safety Issue 121, hydrogen control for large dry PWR containments, has been resolved.

However, there are culations that indicate that hydrogen combustion could cause a large dry H"ffi containment to fail. Such culations were done in 1982 in Indian Point probabilistic safety study by the power authori ty of State New York and Con Edison. This is covered in the petition on pages 23 and 24. Some of the calculations found that the peak pressure could reach 160, 169, about 157, and 180 pounds per square inch. Absolutes were greater. Such results indicate that hydrogen combustion could, in fact, cause Indian Point's containments to fail because the estimated lure pressure of Indian Point's containments is about 141 pounds per square inch absolute.

Since these calculations were done back in 1982, it I S very doubtful that these ca::"culations mode::" NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 Ilv'ASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 erat Hence, they would have for s c loads and not dynamic loads so they could be actual non-conservative some ways. Riverkeeper's tion discuss the fact that in a severe accident more hydrogen could produced than not produced from a reaction, a me water reaction of 100 percent of the active fuel cladding length. Despite that t, the NRC does not seem to too worried about large concentrations of hydrogen building up and exploding in a severe accident if it occurs if it were to occur at a PWR with a large dry loads from flame In a recent proposed decision the NRC made regarding 2.206 petition that NRDC, Natural Resources Defense Council, submitted regarding Indian Point Unit 2, the NRC stated, "Hydrogen deflagrations are the most likely mode combus on in degraded core accidents.

The 1 ihood in nature of lagrations insi are influenced gas mixture composition and availability of tion sources. Due to the small amounts of energy needed to ignite combus e mixtures I there are numerous potential tion sources such as sparks from elec equipment I elec'Crostatic discharges I hot NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234*4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005*3701 5 10 15 20 25 21 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 jets, gases, hot surfaces including PARs, core-melt icles, etc." In that same decision the NRC concluded that, "Mult e ignition sources would be present in the containment to initiate combustion at lower flammability limi ts which would be expected to maintain hydrogen concentrations below detonable levels." It clear that the NRC has overlooked the fact that a hydrogen deflagration could transi tion into a detonation a severe accident at a PWR wi th a large dry containment.

Of course, NRC is correct that in a severe accident hydrogen could randomly deflagrate when its concentrations were low because only a small quantity energy is required for igniting hydrogen.

However, other scenarios could also occur. In a severe accident average hydrogen concentration in containment could reach 16 volume percent or higher. Loc concentrations could much higher. Hermi t Karwat, K-J..-R-W-A-T, a safety expert, in a paper he wrote entitled, "Igniters to Mitigate the Risk of Hydrogen Explosion:

A Critical Review" concluded, "wi thin the large geometries of PWR containments, a slow laminar deflagration would be very unlikely. most cases highly ficient combustion modes must be expected. " NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C,' 20005-3701 22 1 2 3 . 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Scenarios in which large quanti ties of steam were present in containment, the hydrogen gas could reach high concentrations because of the inerting effect of steam. That would prevent the hydrogen from igniting at lower concentrations.

After steam condensed, which is inevitable at some point, a deflagration could transition into a detonation.

A detonation could cause the containment to fail. cause the containment penetrations.

P'VVRs typi penetrations.

To conclude, It could also in particular to fail at containment ly have about 90 containment I think this is a very s ous ety sue regarding Indian Point. As discussed, Riverkeeper's 2.206 petition raises issues that are plant specific.

I would happy to answer any questions that you may have regarding what I discovered.

Thank you. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Thank you, Mr. Leyse and Ms. Brancato.

We apprec additional information.

At this time does the staff here at headquarters any ques tions for ei ther ltIr. Leyse or Ms. Brancato?

We have no ques ons here at headquarters.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 WW'N.nealrgross.com 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 Did anyone from our Region I office join us? MR. KROHN: Yes. Paul Krohn. I joined about five minutes ago. I have no other questions.

CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Thank you, Paul. Appreciate it. Does the licensee have any ques ons at this time? MR. PRUSSMAN:

No, we do not. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Okay. Before I conclude the meeting, members of the public may provide comments regarding the petition and ask questions about the 2.206 petition process. However, as stated at the beginning of the meeting, the purpose of this meeting is not to provide an opportunity for the petitioner or the public to question or examine the PRB regarding the merits of the peti tion request. Are there any members of the public at this time who have any comments or questions?

Okay. Hearing none, Ms. Brancato and Mr. Leyse, thank you for taking the time to provide NRC staff with clarifying information on the petition you've submi Before we close, does court ::::-eporter need any additional information for the meeting transc::::-ipt?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS ANO TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE .. N,W (202) 234-4433 Wf\SHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 Wv'l/w.nealrgross.com 5 10 15 20 25 24 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 COURT REPORTER:

I'm all right. Thank you, sir. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Okay. Wi th that this meeting is concluded and MR. M. LEYSE: Actually, I'm sorry. This is Mark Leyse speaking.

May I just ask one question and if the PRB does not want to answer it, would you please consider question?

CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Yes. MR. M. LEYSE: Sorry. It's just something I thought of ter I concluded.

Sena tor Edward J. Markey's office asked the NRC some questions regarding statements that were made by the NRC on this petition.

The NRC responded on March 7, 2013. In the attachment it said that the NRC said that a severe accident management in the SAMGs, severe accident management guidelines, they provide advice, and I quote, "Indian Point operators with multiple options to control hydrogen including controlled burns in containment by starting motors and initiating sparks. " Now, do you really think of turning motors on in the containment?

Do you really consider that a controlled burn? It seems a very random thing. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Leyse, thank you for that. addi tional ece information.

If you requested NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 5 10 15 20 25 25 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 it, we weren't going to respond to that today. We would consider that in our deliberation and we will consider that question as well as the information that is in response to Congressman Markey. MR. M. LEYSE: Sure, sure. I just want to add there is an IAEA report which I know I've referred to it in Riverkeeper 2.206 petition.

It was published in 2011 and the title is Mitigation of Hydrogen Hazards and Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power plants. They talked about that. Also about switching components on and off. They qualify it. They say, "The operator may try to generate sparks by switching components on an off." You know, they -just like I say -I appreciate the fact that you will consider this. It just really doesn't seem to me to really be a controlled burn. If that's what we have up at Indian Point to save the day the event of a mel tdown accident, I think that is not going to really save the day. I think that is a real problem. Then there is also the option of containment venting but that would not really solve the problem because there would be no way you could vent a large P'iAJR dry containment in a timely fashion such that you would be able to prevent hydrogen combus on. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D,C 20005-3701

....'W\.'V. nealrgross.com 5 10 15 20 25 26 Anyway, that is the last comment I have. Thank you. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Thank you, Mr. Leyse . We will consider that information in making our final deliberation.

MR. M. LEYSE: Okay. Thank you. CHAIR LUBINSKI:

Okay. Thank you for that additional information.

At this point we will conclude the meeting and terminate the phone connection.

Thank you, everyone. (Whereupon, at 10:41 a.m. the conference call was adjourned.)

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 20005-3701 DISTRIBUTION:

G20130875 PUBLIC LPL1-1 R/F RidsNrrDorl RidsNrrPMlndianPoint RidsNrrLAKGoldstein RidsNrrOd RidsNrrAdes RidsNrrDlr RidsOGCRp Resource RidsOeMailCenter RidsOiMailCenter RidsRgn1 MailCenter RidsOcaMailCenter ARussell, PGCB SRutenkroger,RI SSa"man, SCVB FFarzam,EMCB WReckley, JLD ANotafrancesco, JLD RidsNrrDprPrmb AMalliakos, FSME CHair,OGC RidsNrrDprPrmb RidsNrrDorlLpl1-1 RidsNrrMailCenter RidsNrrAdro RidsEDOMailCenter RidsOpaMail PKrohn, R1 RidsNrrDssScvb RidsNrrDeEmcb RDudley, PRMB RAuluck, JLD ADAMS Package: ML13176A398 Response to Petitioner:

ML13176A417 Transcript of May 29,2013 ML13176A429 Incoming Petition:

ML12321A317 Transcript of Dec 20, 2013: ML13030A486

• Concurrence via email QFFICE LPL1-lIPM LPL 1-1/LA PGCB/PM SCVB/BC NAME DPickett KGoldstein ARusse"* RDennig 'DATE 06/27/13 06/26/13 06 128 113 06/27/13 OFFICE LPL 1-1/BC(A)

EMCB/BC PRNB/BC JLD NAME RBea" SHelton Y\lReckley DATE 06/28/13 07 I 08/13 07/01/13 07/03/13 iOFFICE OGC Region 1/DRS DORUD DLRlD NAME CHair PKrohn* MEvans JLubinski DATE 07/11 113 07/01/13 07/15/13 07116113 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy