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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 (7-77) e U. S-LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:~'
{{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 (7-77) e   LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U. S-LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL BLOCK:~'~~~~~~~~___,l(D                                                            (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1                                      6  .
1 6 . (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
[U2] IVIAjs IP 1s II IG)jO 10 I- lo 10 10 10 10 I- 10 10 1014 11 11 11 11 101 I 10 7         8     9       LICENSEE CODE               14     15                           LICENSE NUMBER                       25       26       LICENSE TYPE 30         57 CAT 58 CON'T
[U2] IVIAjs IP 1s II IG)jO 10 I-lo 10 10 10 10 I-10 10 1014 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 101 I 10 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T 7 B LJG)I o I s Io Io Io 12 ! 8 I o 101 11 1 1 2 I 11 11 9 101 1 1 2 1 2 I 1 I 1 I 9 10 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
  ~B 7
I During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing I circuit 2B *(Panel* 8), Unit #1 suction piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump, l-,CH-.P-2A.
:~:~~~      LJG)I 60              61 o I s   Io Io         Io 12 ! 8 DOCKET NUMBER I   o101 11 11 2 11 11 68    69 I
[Q]::I) [This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5., and is r~portable as CQ:m I per T. S. 6. 6. 2. b. {2). Since the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as [§]]] I required, the redundant circuit was operable and two flow paths for boric acid to the I reactor were available, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
EVENT DATE 9 101 1 12 12 I 1 I 1 I 9 74       75       REPORT DATE 10 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
[ill] 7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE [I0 Is IHI@ IE I@ ~@ IHIEIAITIEIRI@  
I During       normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing
~ ~.J@ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT @ LER/RO CV ENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE REPORT I 7 ! 9 j L=.I l O I 3 I 5 I I/I 10 j3 I L=J NUMBER 21 22 23 '.'4 26 27 28 29 30 31 ACTION FUTUR!: EFFECT SHUTDOWN {:u) ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
  ~              I circuit         2B *(Panel* 8), Unit #1 suction piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump, l-,CH-.P-2A.
+* 80 r~El@l~0 fo~ 0 1 ~LAI@ ~7~H1 0 I H 0 r 0 I sur+Tr@ 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 ~@ ~@) IC 1 2 1 6 1 8 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIV~ .A.CTJONS@
                                                                                                                                                                                              +*
42 43 44 47 IA review of the he~t tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water damage to ITJJ] l the heat tracing circuit. The corrective action implemented was to replace the heat [I]]] I tape and initiate a i!i2:intenance request to repair the water leak. ITEJ 7 8 9 FACILITY '3a' STATUS of POW::R OTHER STATUS METHOD OF A BO DI) LJ@ Oj O ! 0 J@ .... l _N_A ______ _. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
[Q]::I) [This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5., and is r~portable as CQ:m I per T. S. 6. 6. 2. b. {2).                                 Since the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as
'23, ~@ ... I __ Op_e_r_a_t_o_r_o_b_s_e_rv
[§]]] I required,                     the redundant circuit was operable and two flow paths for boric acid to the
__ a_t_i_o_n
  ~              I reactor         were available, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
_________
[ill]
_. 7 8 9 10 12 13 ACTIVITY CONTENT Q\ RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY L!J@) ~§ ..... I __ NA ______ .....J 7 8 9 10 1i 45 46 44 80 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,. [iDJ I O N(oroJ@1TYIE1@
7         8   9                                                                                                                                                                           80 SYSTEM               CAUSE             CAUSE                                                           COMP.           VALVE CODE               CODE           SUBCODE                       COMPONENT CODE                   SUBCODE         SUBCODE
DESCRIPTIONA~
[I0 7          8 Is IHI@ IE 9          10 I@           ~@                     IHIEIAITIEIRI@
7 8 9 11 12 1-3--------------------------------------80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 GJI1 I O I O I O I@ N. 7 8 9 11 ... 12------------------------------------------e'BO LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY @*3 TYPE DESCRIPTION CiliJ l:J@I NA 19/2. '&l/0$f?,, 1 a g ,~o:-----.~---~-----~---~-~-~--.::......L..1L.:e!~=-.3f_-=--=:--=-~-----~---
                                                                                                                                                  ~ ~.J@
9~0 PUBLICITY Q ISSUED,,;;\
11               12                   13                           18           19             20 SEQUENTIAL                           OCCURRENCE             REPORT                     REVISION
DESCRIPTION~
                @     LER/RO CV ENT YEAR                                             REPORT NO.                               CODE                 TYPE                       NO.
NRC USE ONLY "' l.BJ~~-N_A
REPORT NUMBER I 7!9 j               L=.I               l O I 3 I 526I                I/I         10   j3   I           ~              L=J         ~
___________________
21         22         23                 '.'4                         27           28       29           30             31         32 r~El@l~ 0fo~ 01~LAI@
__. I I I I I I I I I I I I I~ &:Q .::.a __ Ro,;;: 
ACTION     FUTUR!:               EFFECT         SHUTDOWN                                     {:u)   ATTACHMENT         NPRD-4         PRIME COMP.           COMPONENT 33        34                    35
" .. e ATTACHMENT, PAGE 1 of 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 79-035/031-0 EVENT DATE: 11/27/79 TITLE OF REPORT: Low Current on Heat Tracing 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: e With the unit in normal operation at rated power, operator surveillance found that Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8) was operating at less than the current specified in the surveillance document.
                                                                  ~7~H1 36                  37 0   IH    r 0 0~ I 40 sur+Tr@
Low temperature alarms were indicated.
41 FORM SUB.
Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated on the affected circuit. Faults were found on Circuit 2B (Panel 8) "2A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump suction and were identified as being the result of water penetration of the tape. The tape was replaced.
                                                                                                                                          ~@
The circuit current was then verified to be within specs. of the surveillance document.
42 SUPPLIER
and a maintenance request ~ubmitted .to repair the leak. This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).
                                                                                                                                                            ~@)
: 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES  
43            44 MANUFACTURER IC 12 16 18 I 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIV~ .A.CTJONS@
* .\ND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS: At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as required.
IA review of the he~t tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water damage to ITJJ] l the heat tracing circuit.                                           The corrective action implemented was to replace the heat
TI-le redundant circuit was operable.
[I]]] I tape and initiate a i!i2:intenance request to repair the water leak.
ITEJ8 7             9                                                                                                                                                                           BO FACILITY STATUS             of POW::R                       OTHER STATUS
                                                                                            '3a'
                                                                                            ~
METHOD OF DISCOVERY                            DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION A
                                                                                                                                                                            '23, DI) LJ@                           Oj       O! 0     J@ l...._N_A_ _ _ _ _ __.                             ~@ I...__Op_e_r_a_t_o_r_o_b_s_e_rv          __ a_t_i_o_n__________.
7       8     9             10                 12     13                                       44      45        46                                                                    80 ACTIVITY       CONTENT                                                       Q\
RELEASED OF RELEASE                           AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY                                                               LOCATION OF RELEASE@
~              L!J@) ~§ I.....__NA_ _ _ _ _ _                                                    .....J                     NA 7       8     9             10               1i                                                 44             45                                                                         80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES                               r:;;:;,.
[iDJ I ON(oroJ@1TYIE1@ DESCRIPTIONA~
7         8   9               11         12         1-3--------------------------------------80 PERSONNEL INJURIES                   ~
NUMBER                 DESCRIPTION 41 GJI1               OOO 7        8 9I I I 11I@ 12------------------------------------------e'BO
                                          ...            N.
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY @*3 TYPE       DESCRIPTION CiliJa l:J@I,~o:-----.~---~-----~---~-~-~--.::......L..1L.:e!~=-.3f_-=--=:--=-~-----~---
1              g NA                                                                                        19/2. '&l/0$f?,,                                            ~
90 PUBLICITY                 Q ISSUED,,;;\ DESCRIPTION~                                                                                                                                 NRC USE ONLY           "'
~              l.BJ~~-N_A_____________________.                                                                                                                 I I   I I I I I I I I I I   I~
 
  .
"
e                            e ATTACHMENT, PAGE 1 of 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 79-035/031-0 EVENT DATE: 11/27/79 TITLE OF REPORT: Low Current on Heat Tracing
: 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
With the unit in normal operation at rated power, operator surveillance found that Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8) was operating at less than the current specified in the surveillance document. Low temperature alarms were indicated.
Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated on the affected circuit. Faults were found on Circuit 2B (Panel 8) "2A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump suction and were identified as being the result of water penetration of the tape. The tape was replaced. The circuit current was then verified to be within specs. of the surveillance document.
and a maintenance request ~ubmitted .to repair the leak.
This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).
: 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES *.\ND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:
At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as required. TI-le redundant circuit was operable.
Tnere were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.
Tnere were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.
: 3. CAITSE: The reduced currents were due to water penetration damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit. 4. Iffi-LEDIATR CORRECTIVE ACTION: The heat tracing tape was replaced.
: 3. CAITSE:
A maintenance request has been initiated to repair the leak. 5. SCF...EDDLED COR...~CTIVE ACTION: Tne uroblem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.
The reduced currents were due to water penetration damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit.
: 4. Iffi-LEDIATR CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The heat tracing tape was replaced. A maintenance request has been initiated to repair the leak.
: 5. SCF...EDDLED COR...~CTIVE ACTION:
Tne uroblem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary.
Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary. A task force has been assembled to investigate the replacement of existing tape with water resistant tape.
A task force has been assembled to investigate the replacement of existing tape with water resistant tape. This investigation is in progress.
This investigation is in progress.
: 7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:
: 7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:
This failure, as with others in the system, is c.onsidered randcfo( since no specific circuit has exhibited repeated failure.}}
This failure, as with others in the system, is c.onsidered randcfo( since no specific circuit has exhibited repeated failure.}}

Revision as of 04:05, 21 October 2019

LER 79-035/03L:on 791127,during Normal Operation,Routing Surveillance Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8),Unit 1 Suction Piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-CH-P-2A.Caused by Water Damage.Heat Tape Replaced
ML18136A321
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1979
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18136A319 List:
References
LER-79-035-03L, LER-79-35-3L, NUDOCS 7912270592
Download: ML18136A321 (2)
v • d • e


Text

NRC FORM 366 (7-77) e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U. S-LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL BLOCK:~'~~~~~~~~___,l(D (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6 .

[U2] IVIAjs IP 1s II IG)jO 10 I- lo 10 10 10 10 I- 10 10 1014 11 11 11 11 101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T

~B 7

~:~~~ LJG)I 60 61 o I s Io Io Io 12 ! 8 DOCKET NUMBER I o101 11 11 2 11 11 68 69 I

EVENT DATE 9 101 1 12 12 I 1 I 1 I 9 74 75 REPORT DATE 10 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

I During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing

~ I circuit 2B *(Panel* 8), Unit #1 suction piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump, l-,CH-.P-2A.

+*

[Q]::I) [This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5., and is r~portable as CQ:m I per T. S. 6. 6. 2. b. {2). Since the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as

[§]]] I required, the redundant circuit was operable and two flow paths for boric acid to the

~ I reactor were available, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

[ill]

7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

[I0 7 8 Is IHI@ IE 9 10 I@ ~@ IHIEIAITIEIRI@

~ ~.J@

11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION

@ LER/RO CV ENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

REPORT NUMBER I 7!9 j L=.I l O I 3 I 526I I/I 10 j3 I ~ L=J ~

21 22 23 '.'4 27 28 29 30 31 32 r~El@l~ 0fo~ 01~LAI@

ACTION FUTUR!: EFFECT SHUTDOWN {:u) ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT 33 34 35

~7~H1 36 37 0 IH r 0 0~ I 40 sur+Tr@

41 FORM SUB.

~@

42 SUPPLIER

~@)

43 44 MANUFACTURER IC 12 16 18 I 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIV~ .A.CTJONS@

IA review of the he~t tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water damage to ITJJ] l the heat tracing circuit. The corrective action implemented was to replace the heat

[I]]] I tape and initiate a i!i2:intenance request to repair the water leak.

ITEJ8 7 9 BO FACILITY STATUS of POW::R OTHER STATUS

'3a'

~

METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION A

'23, DI) LJ@ Oj O! 0 J@ l...._N_A_ _ _ _ _ __. ~@ I...__Op_e_r_a_t_o_r_o_b_s_e_rv __ a_t_i_o_n__________.

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT Q\

RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE@

~ L!J@) ~§ I.....__NA_ _ _ _ _ _ .....J NA 7 8 9 10 1i 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,.

[iDJ I ON(oroJ@1TYIE1@ DESCRIPTIONA~

7 8 9 11 12 1-3--------------------------------------80 PERSONNEL INJURIES ~

NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 GJI1 OOO 7 8 9I I I 11I@ 12------------------------------------------e'BO

... N.

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY @*3 TYPE DESCRIPTION CiliJa l:J@I,~o:-----.~---~-----~---~-~-~--.::......L..1L.:e!~=-.3f_-=--=:--=-~-----~---

1 g NA 19/2. '&l/0$f?,, ~

90 PUBLICITY Q ISSUED,,;;\ DESCRIPTION~ NRC USE ONLY "'

~ l.BJ~~-N_A_____________________. I I I I I I I I I I I I I~

.

"

e e ATTACHMENT, PAGE 1 of 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 79-035/031-0 EVENT DATE: 11/27/79 TITLE OF REPORT: Low Current on Heat Tracing

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With the unit in normal operation at rated power, operator surveillance found that Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8) was operating at less than the current specified in the surveillance document. Low temperature alarms were indicated.

Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated on the affected circuit. Faults were found on Circuit 2B (Panel 8) "2A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump suction and were identified as being the result of water penetration of the tape. The tape was replaced. The circuit current was then verified to be within specs. of the surveillance document.

and a maintenance request ~ubmitted .to repair the leak.

This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES *.\ND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as required. TI-le redundant circuit was operable.

Tnere were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. CAITSE:

The reduced currents were due to water penetration damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit.

4. Iffi-LEDIATR CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The heat tracing tape was replaced. A maintenance request has been initiated to repair the leak.

5. SCF...EDDLED COR...~CTIVE ACTION:

Tne uroblem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary. A task force has been assembled to investigate the replacement of existing tape with water resistant tape.

This investigation is in progress.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

This failure, as with others in the system, is c.onsidered randcfo( since no specific circuit has exhibited repeated failure.

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