ML18136A361: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:-------~ . NRC FORM-366 ----------U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,. .CENSEE EVENT REPORT * .. CONTROL BLOCK: I 1 I IG) 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1 101 ° I O I -I o I o I o I o I o I -Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T [ITIJ 7 8  
{{#Wiki_filter:-------~ . NRC FORM-366 ----------U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,. .CENSEE EVENT REPORT * .. CONTROL BLOCK: I 1 I IG) 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1 101 ° I O I -I o I o I o I o I o I -Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T [ITIJ 7 8  
~©I 0 1 5 1 °I O I O 1 2 1 8 I 0 101 11 21 t*1 41 71 9IG)I 01 11 01 41 sl olG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
~©I 0 1 5 1 °I O I O 1 2 1 8 I 0 101 11 21 t*1 41 71 9IG)I 01 11 01 41 sl olG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed. [[:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability  
I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed. [[:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability
[[TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general [[II] I public were not affected.
[[TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general [[II] I public were not affected.
The event is reportable in accordance with Technical  
The event is reportable in accordance with Technical
[[[TI I Specification  
[[[TI I Specification
: 6. 6.~-~ b. 3. I I~ [§]]] 7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE [ill] I sl 8 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT @ LER/RO CVENT YEAR REPORT NO: CODE TYPE REPORT I 7 J 9 J l.=.l l O I 3 1
: 6. 6.~-~ b. 3. I I~ [§]]] 7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE [ill] I sl 8 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT @ LER/RO CVENT YEAR REPORT NO: CODE TYPE REPORT I 7 J 9 J l.=.l l O I 3 1
* 8 1 J/1 I O I 3 I l£J. l=J NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r'22) ATTACHMENT NPAD-4 FOAM SUB. PRIME C.OMP. SUPPLI EA 80 REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TAK.ff: ACTl2N ON PLANT METHOD . HOURS SUBMITTED  
* 8 1 J/1 I O I 3 I l£J. l=J NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r'22) ATTACHMENT NPAD-4 FOAM SUB. PRIME C.OMP. SUPPLI EA 80 REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TAK.ff: ACTl2N ON PLANT METHOD . HOURS SUBMITTED  
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@ METHOD OF A 80 ITE] LI@ I 11 o, 01@11-N-JA
@ METHOD OF A 80 ITE] LI@ I 11 o, 01@11-N-JA
____ ___. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~@L..I _s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n
____ ___. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~@L..I _s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n
_ _. 8 9 10 12 11 ACTIVITY CONTENT REL~SED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~  
_ _. 8 9 10 12 11 ACTIVITY CONTENT REL~SED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~
[QI] L:J@) ~@ .... I _NA ______ * ........ 7 8 9 10 11 44 7 45 46 80 44 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,. NUl;l.BEA. TYPE DESCRIPTION~  
[QI] L:J@) ~@ .... I _NA ______ * ........ 7 8 9 10 11 44 7 45 46 80 44 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,. NUl;l.BEA. TYPE DESCRIPTION~  
@TI I o I u I o Jl:J@L----~---------------------,-----'
@TI I o I u I o Jl:J@L----~---------------------,-----'
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* Title of Event: MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43 1. Description of Event: With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator.
* Title of Event: MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43 1. Description of Event: With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator.
The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification
The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification
* 6.6.2.b.3.  
* 6.6.2.b.3.
: 2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems: With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~ tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were* not affected.
: 2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems: With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~ tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were* not affected.
* 3. Cause: The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test. 4. Immediate Corrective Action: Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated.
* 3. Cause: The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test. 4. Immediate Corrective Action: Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated.
In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.  
In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.  
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.  
To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.
: 7. Generic Implications:
: 7. Generic Implications:
Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.}}
Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.}}

Revision as of 11:27, 25 April 2019

LER 79-038/03L-0:on 791214,two Manual Isolation Valves for Refueling Water Storage Tank Chemical Addition Tank Outlet Valve MOV-CS-102B Found Closed.Caused by Operator Procedural Error.Operators Instructed
ML18136A361
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/04/1980
From: STEWART W L
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18136A360 List:
References
LER-79-038-03L-01, LER-79-38-3L-1, NUDOCS 8001070450
Download: ML18136A361 (2)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-------~ . NRC FORM-366 ----------U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7a7.J. __ , ,. .CENSEE EVENT REPORT * .. CONTROL BLOCK: I 1 I IG) 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v1 Al s1 Pl s1 1 101 ° I O I -I o I o I o I o I o I -Io I o 1014 11 11 11 I 1 101 I 10 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 CON'T [ITIJ 7 8 ~©I 0 1 5 1 °I O I O 1 2 1 8 I 0 101 11 21 t*1 41 71 9IG)I 01 11 01 41 sl olG) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@ I With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two nnnual isolation valves for the RWST I Chanical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve IVX)~-102B were fourrl to be closed. [[:ill Subsequent to the discovery of this con::lition, a test established the operability [[TI] I of the redurrlant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health am safety of the general [[II] I public were not affected. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical [[[TI I Specification

6. 6.~-~ b. 3. I I~ [§]]] 7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE [ill] I sl 8 1@ ~@ L!J@ I z I z I z I z I z I z 18 L?J l!J@ 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT @ LER/RO CVENT YEAR REPORT NO: CODE TYPE REPORT I 7 J 9 J l.=.l l O I 3 1
  • 8 1 J/1 I O I 3 I l£J. l=J NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r'22) ATTACHMENT NPAD-4 FOAM SUB. PRIME C.OMP. SUPPLI EA 80 REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TAK.ff: ACTl2N ON PLANT METHOD . HOURS SUBMITTED

~@L_j@ L.:J@ L:J I O I O I O I I ~@ 33 34 35 36 3 7 40 41 ~@ LI@ I z 19 19 19 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 42 43 44 47 [I12] I The discrepancy in valve al igrment was caused by an operator failirg to follow a ITTIJ I procedure that required the reopeni.rg of manual isolation valves for IDV-CS-102B OJI] I followi~ canpletion of a test. Operators have been explicitly reinstructed on um I the importance of perfonni.rg a periodic test in canplete conformance with the [I]3J I test document. 7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHERSTATUS @ METHOD OF A 80 ITE] LI@ I 11 o, 01@11-N-JA ____ ___. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ~@L..I _s_e_n_i_o_r_Re_a_c_t_o_r_Ope-=-_r_a_t_o_r_Ob_se_rv_a_t_i_o_n _ _. 8 9 10 12 11 ACTIVITY CONTENT REL~SED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY~ [QI] L:J@) ~@ .... I _NA ______ * ........ 7 8 9 10 11 44 7 45 46 80 44 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE@ 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r:;;:;,. NUl;l.BEA. TYPE DESCRIPTION~ @TI I o I u I o Jl:J@L----~---------------------,-----' 7 8 9 11 12 13 BO PERSONNEL INJURIES ONU~BEA . DESCRIPTION 41 Ci:fil I I I O 1@1,._._ ________________________ 7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4J'I TZE DESCAIP~ON 7 8 9 10 80 PUBLICITY Q <Jr-, NRC USE ONLY IS~EDQ DESC:&\_TION 8 0 Q l O 7 0 7 ..J O "' [ill] ~ei ..... l ---------------------:' II I I I II I II II I 7 8 9 10 68 69 80*0: NAME OF PREPARER __..w._. * ..__.T .... , .__.S.LJt_,,ew"""-"i:i'-'r .... t.__ ________ ___ PHONE =---+(~s~o"*-4)"3"'3~7== 3~1i,,:gj,,l,l4,-- __ 0 Q. "

  • ~~~ATTaCHMENT:

--,--""'J St1rry Power ... Docket No.: Report No.: Event Date: Page 1 Station

  • 50-280 79-038/03L-0

-12/14/79

  • Title of Event: MOV-CS-l02B INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED MANUAL VALVES l-C.S-39 / 43 1. Description of Event: With Unit 1 at steady state operation, two manual isolation valves l-CS-39/43 for the RWST Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet valve MOV-CS-102B were found to be closed during a plant walk-down by a Senior Reactor Operator.

The manual isolation valves had been closed for 38 hours. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification

  • 6.6.2.b.3.
2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems: With MOV-CS-102B isolated, if the redundant parallel CAT outlet valve had failed to open upon the initiation of a CLS Hi Hi signal, sodium hydroxide could not have been added to the containment spray water in the correct proportion as water was pumped out of the *RWST by the con~ tainment spray pumps. Subsequent to the discovery of the closed manual valves l-CS-39/43, a test established the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve, therefore the health and safety of the public were* not affected.
  • 3. Cause: The discrepancy in valve alignment was caused by an operator failing to follow a procedure that required the reopening of manual isolation valves for MOV-CS-102B following the completion of a test. 4. Immediate Corrective Action: Upon the discove~y of the discrepancy in the manual isolation valves alignment, a performance test was conducted to prove the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve had a CLS Hi Hi signal been initiated while MOV-CS-102B was isolated.

In conformance with the performance test, MOV-CS-102B was then unisolated.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action: Corrective action was taken upon the discovery of the event by conducting the performance test. This test proved the operability of the redundant CAT outlet valve and unisolated MOV-CS-102B, therefore no scheduled corrective action is required.
6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

To prevent recurrence of the event, operators have been explicitly instructed on the importance of performing periodic tests in complete conformance with the test document.

7. Generic Implications:

Since this event was caused by a single case of operator error in the performance of a test, there are no generic implications associated with this event.}}