IR 05000280/2016002

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2016002 and 05000281/2016002

ML16201A007
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	07/19/2016
From:	Steven Rose NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2016002
Download: ML16201A007 (26)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 19, 2016

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2016002 AND 05000281/2016002

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On June 30, 2016, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On July 13, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. R. Simmons and other members of your staff.

Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Enclosure:

IR 05000280/2016002, 05000281/2016002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No: 05000280/2016002, 05000281/2016002 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016 Inspectors: P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector C. Jones, Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP5, 4OA1)

C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP5, 4OA1)

J. Hickman, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (trainee)

Approved by: Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000280/2016002, 05000281/2016002; 04/01/2016-06/30/2016; Surry Power Station,

Units 1 and 2: Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and region-based inspectors. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near RTP throughout the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Review of Offsite Power and Alternate AC Power Readiness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that plant features, and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and alternate alternating current (AAC) power systems were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures affecting those areas, and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the nuclear power plant to verify that the appropriate information was exchanged when issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the offsite and AAC power systems by reviewing the licensees procedures that address measures to monitor and maintain the availability and reliability of the offsite and AAC power systems. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by interviewing the responsible system manager, reviewing condition reports, and walking down portions of the offsite and alternating current (AC)power systems including the 500 kilovolt (KV) and 230 KV switchyards.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Seasonal Readiness Reviews for Hot Weather

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for seasonal hot weather. The inspection focused on verification of design features and implementation of the licensees procedure for hot weather conditions, 0-OSP-ZZ-003, Hot Weather Preparation, Revision 6. The inspectors walked down key structures including the turbine and auxiliary buildings, safeguards buildings, emergency diesel generator (EDG)rooms, emergency switchgear rooms (ESGR), and emergency battery rooms; and verified heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems were operating properly and that area temperatures remained within design requirements specified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The mitigating systems reviewed during this inspection include: the auxiliary feedwater systems, the refueling water storage tanks, EDGs, and emergency switchgear.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted four equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems listed below with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, USFAR, system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

• Unit 2 A Outside Recirculation Spray System (OSRS), after system valve stroking surveillance test.

• AAC Diesel during #3 EDG planned maintenance package.

• Unit 1 "A" Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) system during "B" LHSI pump planned maintenance.

• A, B, and C Main Control Room (MCR) Chillers while D and E MCR Chillers were out of service for planned maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Fire Protection Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the five areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Revision 11; CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 8; and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Revision 7.

The reviews were performed to evaluate the fire protection program operational status and material condition and the adequacy of:

(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;

(2) fire detection and suppression capability;

(3) passive fire protection features;

(4) compensatory measures established for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features; and

(5) procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems so that post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant is ensured. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify fire protection deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved.

• Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump House

• #2 EDG Room

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tray Rooms

• Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Rooms

• Unit 2 Normal Switchgear Rooms

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator exercise given on June 21, 2016. The scenario involved high reactor coolant system (RCS) radioactivity due to a fuel failure; loss of both main feed pumps and failure of the reactor to automatically trip; a steam generator (SG) tube rupture; and a SG main steam line break which causes a radioactive release to the environment leading to a general emergency declaration. The inspectors observed the crews performance to determine whether the crew met the scenario objectives; accomplished the critical tasks; demonstrated the ability to take timely action in a safe direction and to prioritize, interpret, and verify alarms; demonstrated proper use of alarm response, abnormal and emergency operating procedures; demonstrated proper command and control; communicated effectively; and appropriately classified events per the emergency plan. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Observation of Control Room Operations

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of licensed reactor operator activities to ensure consistency with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. For the following activities, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance: 1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications; 2) control board component manipulations; 3) use and interpretation of plant instrumentation and alarms; 4) documentation of activities; 5)management and supervision of activities; and 6) control room communications.

• On April 18, 2-OPT-SI-005, Low Head Safety Injection Pump Test on Unit 2

• On April 26, Operator response to electrical grid instability and loss of N16 radiation detectors

• On May 9, 1-OSP-EP-002, Generator Reactive Power Capability Testing on Unit 1 and infrequently conducted or complex evolution (ICCE) brief

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

For the one equipment issue listed below and the periodic evaluation (two samples total), the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and associated circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews, as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem(s). Inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), station procedures ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 10, and ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Revision 10.

• CRs 1029109 and 1030874, Relay failures on Unit 1 consequence limiting system (CLS) HI logic and Unit 1 "J" emergency bus degraded voltage (DV) protection

• Maintenance Rule Periodic a(3) Review 01/01/2014 to 07/01/2015

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the seven activities listed below for the following:

(1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;

(2) the management of risk;

(3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and,

(4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)

(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.

• On April 7, Unit 2 risk while the 1-VS-S-1A SW strainer was out of service for maintenance and there was adverse impending weather (thunderstorms/high winds)in the area.

• On April 14, Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during troubleshooting and repair of the 2A2 vital bus uninterruptible power supply (UPS) after it had shifted to its alternate power supply with the Unit 2 "B" charging (CH) pump and the Unit 1 B CH/SW pump out of service for planned maintenance.

• On April 25, Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during #3 EDG maintenance package.

• On May 9 and 10, Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk while conducting main generator reactive power capability testing.

• On June 13 and 14, Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during AAC DG planned maintenance and unplanned maintenance on channel 1 intake canal instrumentation, "C" MCR chiller SW pipe leak, and Unit 2 turbine building sump pump.

• On June 22, Unit 1 and 2 risk during #3 EDG unplanned voltage regulator maintenance.

• On June 30, Unit 1 and 2 risk during unplanned maintenance on #3 EDG starting air system.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the six operability evaluations listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess as appropriate:

(1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;

(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;

(3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered;

(4) if compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and

(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance.

The inspectors review included verification that operability determinations were made as specified in OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 14. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to verify deficiencies in operability determinations were being identified and corrected. One sample included a review regarding the licensees assessments and corrective actions for operator workarounds (OWAs). The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the licensees OWAs and licensee procedure OP-AA-1700, Operations Aggregate Impact, Revision 6, and evaluated OWAs against the requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revisions 30, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and OP-AA-100, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 30.

• CR1033107, 1-SW-3, B ESW pump engine coolant outlet valve had a cracked flange downstream of the valve

• CR1037888, General corrosion on 1-SW-RTD-105B, RSHX SW supply header resistance temperature detector (RTD) fasteners

• CR1038630, Low pressure start of diesel driven fire pump

• CR1039764, Intake canal low level spurious alarms

• CR 1040499, #3 EDG voltage regulator not fully qualified

• CR1040626, 1-RC-TE-1432A, "C" loop T-hot RTD degradation

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Temporary Modification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification, TM-S1-16253, on Unit 1 feedwater temperature sensor 1-FW-RTD-111A, which provided the feedwater temperature input to the plant computer for use in computing the plant calorimetric. This temporary modification removed the temperature indication, 1-FW-TI-154A, and installed an equivalent RTD to 1-FW-RTD-111A in its place. It also removed the cable attached to 1-FW-RTD-111A and relocated it to the new RTD. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification to verify that it did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS and UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the temporary modification was in accordance with CM-AA-TCC-204, Temporary Configuration Changes, Revision 2, and for the related work package, that adequate controls were in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified the operability of the affected systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems listed below, to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;

(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;

(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;

(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and

(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Revision 14.

• 2-IPT-CC-NI-N-41, Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range N-41 Channel Calibration, Revision 4, after the replacement of an isolation amplifier on N-41.

• 1-PT-18.8, Charging Pump Service Water Performance Test, Revision 38, after SW strainer replacement for the Unit 1 B CH/SW pump.

• 0-OPT-EG-009, #3 Emergency Diesel Generator Major Maintenance Operability Test, Revision 57 (OTO-4), after #3 EDG major maintenance package.

• 0-MOP-AAC-002, Return to Service of the AAC Diesel Generator, Revision 24, after AAC DG governor replacement.

• 0-OSP-VS-011, "Backwashing SW Strainers to Flush Piping in MER-3 and MER-4,"

Revision 8 (OTO-1), after SW piping repairs.

• 0-MCM-0607-01, Manual Duplex Strainer Inspection, Lubrication, and Overhaul, Revision 3, after mechanical equipment room (MER)-5 SW strainer cleaning and inspection.

• 0-EPM-0701-01, EDG Service and Inspection, Revision 20 (OTO-1), following replacement of the rheostat on the #3 EDG motor operated rheostat.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the three surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Testing:

• 1-OPT-CS-006, Containment Spray System MOV Stroke Test, Revision 13 Surveillance Testing:

• 0-NSP-CW-006, Canal Level Probe Removal, Inspection, and Cleaning, Revision 2 (OTO-1)

• 0-MPM-19601-01, Annual Test of BDB FLEX Equipment, Revision 4

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing and maintaining the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5), and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, were also used as a reference.

The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the attachment, interviewed personnel responsible for system performance, and observed aspects of periodic siren maintenance and testing. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.

The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, two changes were made to the Radiological Emergency Plan, along with changes to several implementing procedures.

The licensee determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors reviewed these changes to evaluate for potential reductions in the effectiveness of the plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes.

Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees post-event after action reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. Inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training, and selected screenings and evaluations to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in maintaining them. The inspectors evaluated the capabilities of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation to adequately support EAL declarations.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standards, related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (t)were used as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency preparedness on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

.1 May 10, 2016 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill

a. Inspection Scope

On May 10, 2016, the inspectors reviewed and observed a licensee EP drill involving a dropped control rod which causes a fuel failure and high RCS radioactivity; a loss of coolant accident with a failed inside recirculation pump; and a flange leak on the inlet isolation valve of a low head safety inject pump which causes a radioactive release to the environment leading to a general emergency declaration. The inspectors assessed the licensee emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective actions recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and post-drill critique performance. The inspectors verified that the drill critique identified drill performance weaknesses and entered these items into the licensees CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 June 21, 2016, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill

a. Inspection Scope

On June 21, 2016, the inspectors reviewed and observed a licensee EP drill involving high RCS radioactivity due to a fuel failure; loss of both main feed pumps and failure of the reactor to automatically trip; a SG tube rupture; and a SG main steam line break which causes a radioactive release to the environment leading to a general emergency declaration. The inspectors assessed the licensee emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective actions recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and post-drill critique performance. The inspectors verified that the drill critique identified drill performance weaknesses and entered these items into the licensees CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, and Occupational Radiation Safety

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures performance indicators for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (two samples) for the period of April 1, 2015, through March 31, 2016, to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. The inspectors reviewed the applicable NRC inspection reports and the licensees event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity and RCS Leak Rate

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees submittals for the RCS specific activity and RCS leak rate performance indicators for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period of April 1, 2015 through March 31, 2016 (four samples) to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. The inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze an RCS sample. The inspectors also reviewed RCS sample analysis and control room logs of daily RCS leakage, and compared that information to the data reported by the performance indicator.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

.3 Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals relative to the PIs listed below for the period January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, was used to confirm the reporting basis for each data element.

• Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)

• ERO Readiness

• Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability For the specified review period, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records.

The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied three inspection samples for PI verification on an annual basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Daily Reviews of items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:

a. Inspection Scope

As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR review team meetings.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 13, 2016, the inspection results were presented to Mr. R. Simmons and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

L. Baker, Training Manager

L. Black, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

D. Cobb, Manager, Nuclear Oversight

J. Eggart, Manager, Radiation Protection & Chemistry

B. Garber, Supervisor, Station Licensing

M. Haduck, Manager, Outage and Planning

R. Hanson, Manager, Protection Services

R. Johnson, Manager, Operations

L. Lane, Site Vice President

D. Lawrence, Director, Station Safety and Licensing

J. Rosenberger, Director, Station Engineering

R. Scanlan, Manager, Maintenance

R. Simmons, Plant Manager

M. Smith, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness

N. Turner, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None