ML14324A424

Version 19 to Emergency Plan. ML051580245

ML14324A424
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/01/2005
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14324A378	List: ML14324A424 ML14324A425
References
FOIA/PA-2015-0004
Download: ML14324A424 (215)

Text

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Plan

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EMERGENCY PLAN Version 19 05/05

HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EMERGENCY PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page Preface .................................................................................................................................... 1 A. Assignment Of Responsibilities .......................................................................................A-1 B. Onsite Emergency Organization ......................................................................................B-1 C. Emergency Response Support And Resources.............................................................. C-1 D. Emergency Classification System .................................................................................. D-1 E. Notification Methods and Procedures ..............................................................................E-1 F. Emergency Communications ...........................................................................................F-1 G. Public Education and Information................................................................................... G-1 H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment.............................................................................. H-1 I. Accident Assessment......................................................................................................... I-1 J. Protective Response ........................................................................................................ J-1 K. Radiological Exposure Control.........................................................................................K-1 L. Medical and Public Health Support .................................................................................. L-1 M. Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations..................................... M-1 N. Exercises and Drills ........................................................................................................ N-1 O. Radiological Emergency Response Training .................................................................. O-1 P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort ...............................................................................P-1 i Version 19 05/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Appendix No. Title Page Appendix 1 - Glossary.....................................................................................................A1-1 Appendix 2 - Letters of Agreement .................................................................................A2-1 Appendix 3 - Means for Providing Prompt Alerting and Notification of the Public Prompt Notification System........................................................................A3-1 Appendix 4 - Typical Emergency Equipment Lists ..........................................................A4-1 Appendix 5 - Evacuation Time Estimates........................................................................A5-1 Appendix 6 - Typical Emergency Implementing Procedures ...........................................A6-1 Appendix 7 - Emergency Operations Facility...................................................................A7-1 ii Version 19 05/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Page Table i - Toombs County Geographical Boundaries of Plume Exposure Pathway Evacuation Zones...................................................................................... 2 Table ii - Appling County Geographical Boundaries of Plume Exposure Pathway Evacuation Zones...................................................................................... 3 Table iii - Jeff Davis County Geographical Boundaries of Plume Exposure Pathway Evacuation Zones .................................................................................... 4 Table iv - Tattnall County Geographical Boundaries of Plume Exposure Pathway Evacuation Zones .................................................................................... 5 Table A Responsible Individuals of Primary Response Organizations .........................A-10 Table B Minimum Staffing Capacity for Emergencies ....................................................B-7 Table B Emergency Organization Assignments.............................................................B-9 Table D Notification of Unusual Event .......................................................................... D-5 Table D Alert .............................................................................................................. D-19 Table D Site Area Emergency .................................................................................... D-30 Table D General Emergency ...................................................................................... D-41 Table E Initial Notification System Normal Working Hours and Backshift Hours............E-3 Table J Protective Action Recommendations Based on Dose Projections of Field Measurements ..................................................................................... J-4 Table J Protective Action Recommendations Based on Plant Conditions ...................... J-5 Table J Sheltering Guidance Reduction in External Gamma Dose From Passing Cloud........................................................................................ J-6 Table J Evacuation Time Estimate Summary ................................................................ J-7 Table K Emergency Exposure Limits .............................................................................K-3 Table A4 Control Room Emergency Equipment (Typical)............................................A4-1 Table A4 Technical Support Center Emergency Equipment (Typical) .........................A4-2 Table A4 Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Equipment (Typical) .................A4-3 iii Version 19 05/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Page Table A4 Operations Support Center Emergency Equipment (Typical) .......................A4-5 Table A5 Population and Vehicle Distribution Within Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Planning Zone...........................................................................A5-4 Table A5 Roadway Characteristics ..............................................................................A5-5 Table A5 Evacuation Time Analysis.............................................................................A5-6 Table A5 Location of Persons With Special Needs Within the 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone...........................................................................A5-7 Table A7 Typical Corporate Emergency Organization Assignments..........................A7-14 Table A7 Corporate Emergency Organization Training Matrix ...................................A7-15 Table A7 Description of Training Subject Areas ........................................................A7-16 Table A7 Typical EOF Communication Capability......................................................A7-17 iv Version 19 05/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Title Page Figure i - General Vicinity Map ............................................................................................... 6 Figure ii - Location And Vicinity Map ...................................................................................... 7 Figure iii Mile Emergency Planning Zone........................................................................ 8 Figure iv Mile Emergency Planning Zone........................................................................ 9 Figure A Formal Interfaces Among Emergency Organizations ....................................A-11 Figure A State Government Operations in a Declared Radiological Emergency..........A-12 Figure A Operational Relationships Among County Response Organizations .............A-13 Figure B Typical Hatch Nuclear Plant Organization Chart ...........................................B-11 Figure B Typical Alert, Site Area or General Emergency Response Organization .......B-12 Figure E Typical Example of Emergency Notification Form ...........................................E-4 Figure E Typical Example of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Notification Form .....................................................E-6 Figure H Technical Support Center Typical Layout Plan............................................... H-8 Figure H Operations Support Center Typical Layout Plan ............................................ H-9 Figure H Emergency Operations Facility Typical Layout Plan..................................... H-10 Figure M Typical Recovery Organization ...................................................................... M-5 Figure P Typical Emergency Planning Organization ......................................................P-2 Figure A5 Sampling Locations for Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program....................................................................................A5-8 Figure A5 Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Area Map Indicating Facilities and Public Areas...........................................A5-9 Figure A5 Principal Evacuation Routes Within Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone .......................................................................A5-10 v Version 19 05/05

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Title Page Figure A5 State of Georgia Defined Zone Layout Within the 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone.........................................................................A5-11 Figure A7-1 .......................................................................................................................A7-18 Figure A7-2 .......................................................................................................................A7-19 vi Version 19 05/05

PREFACE The Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) is a two-unit boiling water reactor operated by Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) (hereafter referred to as the licensee). The plant is on a 2100-acre site located in Appling County, Georgia, approximately 11 miles north of Baxley, Georgia, on U.S. Highway 1 (Figure i). Figure ii shows the site and locations of the buildings onsite. The locations of the HNP emergency facilities and rally points are shown on Figure ii.

This Emergency Plan is applicable to HNP, Units 1 and 2, and to its environs as specified by the emergency planning zones (EPZs): a plume exposure pathway EPZs, which nominally consists of the area within approximately 10 miles of the plant, and an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, which extends to approximately 50 miles. These distances are taken from the plant stack. The two EPZs are shown in Figures iii and iv.

The geographical boundaries of the plume exposure pathway EPZ are shown on Figure iii.

These evacuation zones are further detailed in the State Base Plan, Annex A, Table D-1, of each county section (Toombs, Appling, Jeff Davis, and Tattnall). These zones are presented in Tables i through iv.

The EPZ for ingestion exposure includes an area within 50 miles of the plant stack, except for portions of Brantley and McIntosh Counties which were excluded to prevent crossing any additional jurisdictional boundaries. Planning for the ingestion exposure pathway is a responsibility of the State of Georgia. More information about the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ can be obtained from the State's Radiological Emergency Plan.

The order of the presentation provided herein follows that of the 16 standards delineated in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Section 50.47(b). Appropriate criteria from NUREG-0654, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," are addressed approximately in the sequence presented in that document.

Although this Plan is designed to stand on its own, additional plans expand on matters mentioned here, as identified in Section C. It is to be recognized that this is only a plan and not a prescriptive document. Each incident is a unique event; therefore, this Plan is designed to incorporate the flexibility to tailor the response and meet the emergency.

This Plan is supported by a set of implementing procedures. A typical list of these procedures is included as Appendix 6.

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TABLE i TOOMBS COUNTY GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EVACUATION ZONES Zone Geographical Boundaries A South - Altamaha River North, East, and West mile boundary D-5 North - Georgia Highway No. 56 West - Grays Landing Road (County Rd 59) and Hitchcock Road (County Rd 57)

South - Altamaha River East - U.S. Highway No. 1 E-5 North - C. V. Alexander Road (County Rd 39), Roderick Clifton Rd (County Rd 44), and Knight Rd (County Rd 46)

West - U.S. Highway No. 1 South mile boundary and Altamaha River East - David Bell Road (County Rd 332), Old River Rd (County Rd 5), and 5-mile boundary H-10 North - Georgia Highway No. 56 West - Toombs/Montgomery County Line South - Altamaha River East - Grays Landing Road (County Rd 39) and Hitchcock Road (County Rd 37)

I-10 North mile boundary West - Georgia Highway No. 56 and Toombs/Montgomery County Line South - Georgia Highway No. 56 East - U.S. Highway No. 1 J-10 North mile boundary West - U.S. Highway No. 1 South - C. V. Alexander Road (County Rd 39), Roderick Clifton Rd (County Rd 44),

and Knight Rd (County Rd 46)

East - Georgia Highway Nos. 147 and 178 K-10 North - Georgia Highway No. 147 Northwest - Georgia Highway No. 147 West mile boundary and Old River Road (County Rd 5)

South - Altamaha River East - Toombs/Tattnall County Line 2 Version 19 05/05

TABLE ii APPLING COUNTY GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EVACUATION ZONES Zone Geographical Boundaries A North - Altamaha River South, East, and West mile boundary B-5 North mile boundary and Altamaha River West - U.S. Highway No. 1 South - Lenox Road (County Rd 538)

East - Davis Landing Road (County Rd 370) and East River Rd (County Rd 375)

B-10 North - Altamaha River West - Davis Landing Road (County Rd 370) and East River Rd (County Rd 375)

South - Fire Tower Road (County Rd 338) and Ten-Mile Road (County Rd 537)

East - Oscar Tippins Road (County Rd 339) and 10-mile boundary C-5 North - Altamaha River and 2-mile boundary West - Appling/Jeff Davis County Line South - Altamaha School Road (County Rd 538)

East - U.S. Highway No. 1 C-10 North - Ten-Mile Road (County Rd 537) and Fire Tower Road (County Rd 338)

West/Northwest - Ten-Mile Road (County Rd 537)

South/Southeast - Old Field Cemetery Road (County Rd 341), Manning Williams Rd (County Rd 342), and 10-mile boundary East - Oscar Tippins Road (County Rd 339)

D-10 North - Lenox Road (County Rd 538)

West - U.S. Highway No. 1 South - Georgia Power Company (GPC) transmission line and 10-mile boundary East/Northeast - Ten-Mile Road (County Rd 537)

E-10 North - Altamaha School Road (County Rd 538)

West - Appling/Jeff Davis County Line and Oil Well Rd (County Rd 37)

South - GPC transmission line East - U.S. Highway No. 1 3 Version 19 05/05

TABLE iii JEFF DAVIS COUNTY GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EVACUATION ZONES Zone Geographical Boundaries F-10 North - Altamaha Road (County Rd 203) and Bullard Creek Road by Carters Cemetery (County Rds 226 and 221)

West - Graham Rd (County Rd 185)

South and East - Jeff Davis/Appling County Line G-10 North - Altamaha River West - Graham Road (County Rd 185) and 10-mile boundary South - Altamaha Road (County Rd 203) and Bullard Creek Road by Carters Cemetery (County Rds 226 and 221)

East - Jeff Davis/Appling County Line 4 Version 19 05/05

TABLE iv TATTNALL COUNTY GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EVACUATION ZONES Zone Geographical Boundaries L-10 North - Georgia Highway No. 147 West - Tattnall/Toombs County Line South - Altamaha River East mile boundary 5 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE i -

GENERAL VICINITY MAP 6 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE ii -

LOCATION AND VICINITY MAP 7 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE iii -

10-MILE EPZ 8 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE iv -

50-MILE EPZ 9 Version 19 05/05

A. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES In the event of a situation at the HNP which requires activation of the emergency response organizations, various Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations may be required to contribute to the emergency response. This section describes the responsibilities of these organizations. Table A-1 lists primary response organizations and the emergency title of the individual in charge.

The Licensee The licensee accepts the responsibility of developing and maintaining an effective emergency plan and of maintaining proper preparedness through the development of formal procedures for implementing the Plan as identified in Appendix 6, the training of personnel in accordance with Section O, the procurement of necessary equipment, and the development of relationships with various governmental agencies and private organizations as identified in this section and in Appendix 2. The following tasks are part of the licensee's responsibility:

1. Recognize and declare the existence of an emergency condition.

2. Take corrective actions to mitigate the severity of the accident.

3. Classify the event in accordance with the methodology described in Section D of this Plan.

4. Notify appropriate plant and corporate personnel and offsite authorities.

5. Request additional support, as deemed necessary.

6. Establish and maintain effective communications within HNP and with offsite response groups, as described in Section F.

7. Continuously assess the status of the accident and periodically communicate the status information to the appropriate response groups. This includes the collection and evaluation of onsite and offsite radiological monitoring data.

8. Take protective measures onsite and recommend protective measures to offsite authorities.

9. Monitor and control radiation exposures of all personnel responding to the emergency, under the direction of the licensee.

10. Provide timely and accurate emergency information to the public through press briefings in conjunction with State and local officials.

The licensee emergency response is carried out under the control of the Emergency Director (ED). The onsite organization to support these activities is described in Section B of this Plan.

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State of Georgia Georgia has developed a RERP on a statewide basis as an integral part of the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan. The Georgia Emergency Operations Plan is an emergency operations plan for all natural disasters, accidents, and incidents, including radiological emergencies at fixed nuclear facilities. It is a plan of action developed for use by State and local government officials in preparing for, responding to, and dealing with situations throughout the State.

In accordance with Annex No. 12 of the Governor's Executive Order dated June 3, 1983, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has the lead agency responsibility for responding to all peacetime radiological emergency situations throughout Georgia. Under the procedure established by the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, which was developed pursuant to the Governor's Executive Order, the DNR radiological emergency response team assesses the radiological conditions of an incident at the site and confirms or determines whether a state of emergency exists.

Upon being advised that a radiological emergency exists, the Governor declares an emergency condition, which then activates the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) authorities to deal with the situation. Under the statutory authority granted to the GEMA, the pre-established plans and procedures of all State agencies and applicable local government organizations are automatically activated and coordinated by the GEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Atlanta. In the event of a radiological emergency, GEMA has broad legal authority to take whatever actions are deemed necessary to protect the health and safety of Georgia citizens. This authority includes, but is not limited to, evacuation of people from private property, control of public and private transportation corridors, and utilization of all public facilities in support of efforts to protect life and property.

The fundamental legislation providing the basis for emergency response by civil authorities is the Georgia Emergency Management Act of 1981, as amended. This Act in part creates a State Emergency Management Agency (EMA); authorizes the creation of local organizations for emergency management; confers upon the Governor and the executive heads of governing bodies of the State certain emergency powers; and provides the rendering of mutual aid among the political subdivisions of the State, and with other states, and with the Federal Government.

Other documents providing bases for emergency response are:

1. Governor's Executive Order, August 25, 1981: Recognizes the Georgia Emergency Management Act of 1981, which redesignates the State Civil Defense Agency as the GEMA.

2. Georgia Emergency Disaster Operations Plan: Contains the rules and regulations for operations, should an emergency or disaster occur in the State. The Plan is binding on all local governments authorized or directed to conduct emergency management operations and on all State departments or agencies.

3. Radiation Control Act, Georgia Code Annex 88-1301 et seq.: Delegates emergency powers during radiation emergencies to the DNR, Division of Environmental Protection.

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4. Georgia Water Quality Control Act of 1974, as amended, Act No. 870.

5. Georgia Air Quality Control Act of 1978, as amended, Act No. 794.

6. Georgia Transportation of Hazardous Materials Act of 1979, Act No. 487.

The duties and responsibilities of the principal and support agencies of the State of Georgia are summarized below. A detailed discussion of the State's response is contained in the Georgia RERP.

Principal Agencies of the State of Georgia The following State agencies are assigned lead responsibility for radiological emergencies and for overall State preparedness, respectively:

1. GEMA

a. GEMA is responsible for general State emergency planning and exercises, and overall direction and control of emergency or disaster operations as assigned by Executive Order.

b. The Director of Emergency Management as the State Disaster Coordinator coordinates DNR emergency activities with overall State response efforts.

c. On behalf of the Governor, activate all or portions of the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan to provide the necessary overall coordinated response.

d. Provide communications for the State EOC, as required, through the 24-hour radio net, commercial telephone, National Warning System (NAWAS), teletype, or other communications systems. Communication links will be established, in accordance with existing procedures, with the State EOC, as well as with additional State and local emergency response personnel within the plume exposure pathway and 50-mile radius EPZs. These functions will initially be handled from the State EOC in Atlanta and once activated will be transferred to the Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) in Vidalia.

e. Maintain liaison with the DNR Radiation Emergency Coordinator (REC).

f. Activate public emergency warning and/or evacuation procedures, as needed, pursuant to the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan.

g. Assist in performing radiological monitoring and provide radiological monitoring instrumentation.

h. Provide radiological monitoring training assistance.

i. In accordance with the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, coordinate public information releases in cooperation with State and local agencies.

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j. Contact the Governor for National Guard assistance.

2. DNR

a. DNR is assigned primary responsibility by Executive Order for implementation and administration of the State radiological emergency response function.

b. An REC in the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) interacts with appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies and private organizations to direct all necessary radiation control actions. The REC is on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and will be notified by the GEMA Duty Officer.

c. In situations beyond local government control, DNR provides program assistance in the application of available personnel, equipment, and technical expertise, as required.

d. DNR requests State support agency(s) and Federal assistance pursuant to the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, as required.

e. DNR will escort media personnel within the plume exposure pathway EPZ as conditions allow, if access controls have been established.

f. Dispatch radiation emergency teams, as needed.

g. Perform radiation survey and monitoring, and provide protective equipment, as necessary.

h. Provide technical advice and assist in substance identification.

State Support Agencies The following State agencies are prepared to provide related support of this function as indicated pursuant to the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan:

1. Department of Human Resources Coordinate emergency health and social assistance pursuant to the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan.

2. Department of Public Safety

a. As applicable, assume control over the situation until the arrival of radiation safety personnel.

b. Maintain liaison with the DNR REC.

c. Provide communication linkage, as required.

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d. Provide land or air transportation, or escort, as available, for radiation safety personnel, other necessary personnel, or equipment.

e. Assist in radiological monitoring, as required.

f. Provide law enforcement assistance for area security or recovery of lost or stolen radioactive material.

g. Coordinate with DNR law enforcement and local police.

h. Assist in public warning or evacuation, as required, including ground and airborne means as available.

i. Assist in area security and control.

j. Provide land or air transportation, as requested, for radiation safety personnel, other necessary personnel, or equipment.

3. Department of Agriculture

a. Collect samples of food products, livestock, produce, and dairy products, as necessary.

b. Restrict the sale, production, distribution, and warehousing of livestock, produce, dairy, and processed food products contaminated beyond safe consumption.

c. Assist in disposal of contaminated products.

d. Coordinate these activities with United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) personnel.

e. Maintain liaison with the DNR REC for assessing degree of contamination.

4. Department of Transportation

a. Assist in traffic control and routing, accident assessment, and recovery operations in transportation incidents.

b. As requested, provide land, air, or water transportation for radiation safety personnel, other necessary personnel, or equipment.

c. Provide communications linkage, as required.

d. Assist State Patrol and DNR law enforcement in security and radioactive material escort, as requested.

e. Provide heavy equipment and personnel, as required.

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5. Forestry Commission

a. Provide land or air transportation, as requested, for radiation safety personnel, other necessary personnel, or equipment.

b. Provide personnel and heavy equipment, as required, to assist in recovery operations.

c. Provide communication linkage, as necessary.

d. Assist with public warning or evacuation, as required, including ground and air operations.

6. Department of Administrative Services

a. Provide for expedient approval and purchase of equipment and supplies essential to emergency operations.

b. Provide land transportation vehicles for emergency personnel.

c. Provide emergency communications equipment and repair.

County Emergency Response The area within the plume exposure pathway in the State of Georgia falls within Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties. The responsibility for radiological emergency response planning rests with each Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners or the Mayor of his respective jurisdiction. It is this individual's responsibility to initiate actions and provide direction and control at a level consistent with the specific incident. Agencies within each county which have a primary role in radiological emergency planning and response include the EMA, and local law enforcement agencies.

Local Emergency Management Agencies (LEMAs)

Principal activities include the following:

1. Receive notification from HNP and GEMA.

2. Activate county resources, as necessary, to respond to the emergency.

3. Maintain communications with HNP on emergency situation status.

4. Provide information to other county response elements, the media, and the public.

5. Activate the public notification system, if required.

6. Activate the county EOC.

7. Coordinate the county emergency response activities.

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8. Activate and direct operations at the designated reception and care facility.

Local Law Enforcement Agencies Principal activities include the following:

1. Provide backup public notification.

2. Control access to the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

3. Provide traffic control and law enforcement measures in the event of an evacuation.

4. Act as receiver of notification from HNP and GEMA.

Others Other county resources, including the Fire Department, Health Department, and Public Works Department, may be mobilized as described in Annex A to the Georgia RERP.

Medical Support The licensee has established agreements with the Appling Ambulance Service and the Meadows Regional Medical Center for the transportation of injured personnel, including people who may be radioactively contaminated, to hospital facilities for treatment. Agreements with the Appling General Hospital in Baxley, the Meadows Regional Medical Center in Vidalia, and a contract with a medical consulting group have also been established for treatment of injured and contaminated/irradiated individuals. Copies of these agreements are included in Appendix 2.

Fire Support The licensee has established an agreement with the Appling County EMA to provide, upon request, offsite fire support to the HNP Fire Brigade. A copy of this agreement is included in Appendix 2.

Private Sector Organizations

1. Bechtel Power Corporation The licensee has established an agreement with Bechtel Power Corporation to obtain engineering and construction services which may be required following an accident.

Bechtel's assistance will not be required during the early stages of the emergency response but is more likely to be requested during recovery activities.

2. General Electric Company (GE)

The licensee has established an agreement with GE to obtain general services related to nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) operations during and following an accident situation. GE provides a capability to respond on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

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3. Voluntary Assistance Group The licensee is a signatory to two comprehensive agreements among electric utility companies: the Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Voluntary Assistance Agreement and the Voluntary Assistance Agreement By and Among Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials.

Federal Government Support The resources of the Federal agencies appropriate to the emergency condition will be made available in accordance with the Federal RERP. The ED is specifically authorized to request Federal assistance on behalf of the licensee under the provisions of this Plan. In addition to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), other agencies which may become involved are the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Agriculture.

Concept of Operations The emergency preparedness (EP) program for HNP requires the coordinated response of several organizations. The emergency organization for HNP is described in detail in Section B of this Plan. The ED is the key individual in the HNP emergency organization; one of his nondelegatable responsibilities is the decision to notify the NRC and those authorities responsible for offsite emergency measures. The interfaces among the emergency organizations are shown on Figure A-1.

Continuous Communication Capability The ED initiates the activation of various emergency response organizations by contacting the State of Georgia, county EMAs, and the NRC. All of these organizations can be contacted 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The State of Georgia and counties surrounding HNP have a continuously manned communication link, the Emergency Notification Network (ENN), for the purpose of receiving notification of a radiological emergency. The preferred contact for the county is the EMA Director. In the event of inability to contact the EMA Director, the designated 24-hour point of contact for each county will be contacted so the county officials can be notified. The Federal agencies which may be requested by HNP to provide assistance can be notified by contacting the NRC on a dedicated communication link, the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The capability for 24-hour-per-day alerting and notification of offsite response organizations and plant emergency personnel is further described in Section E.

State and County Operations The State and County responses are conducted in accordance with the following framework, as presented in the Georgia RERP:

1. As the lead radiation emergency response agency, the DNR is involved in virtually all peacetime radiation emergencies, regardless of severity, due to its assigned responsibility and the probable requirements for special techniques, equipment, and expert personnel.

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2. As the designated agency to administer NRC Agreement State Programs, the Department of Natural Resources is the principal radiation emergency response support agency due to the probable requirements for special techniques, equipment, and expert personnel.

3. As the overall State coordinating agency, GEMA coordinates the DNR emergency response activities with State, County, and municipal agencies and departments, as stated in the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan.

4. To the extent available, local resources, personnel authority, and emergency plans are employed in response to radiation emergencies.

5. When requested to assist in response and recovery efforts to radiation emergencies, personnel from local and other State agencies are normally expected to perform functions and activities in which they have expertise but may perform limited radiation safety functions under the guidance of the DNR REC.

6. In the case of occurrences of limited severity and complexity, direction and control of response and recovery operations will be assumed by the DNR REC; GEMA will be kept informed of conditions in order to facilitate GEMA response and Georgia Emergency Operations Plan activation, as deemed necessary.

7. When necessitated by the magnitude and severity of an occurrence, GEMA will activate the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan and coordinate overall response and recovery operations, with the DNR REC coordinating radiation protection activities through the State Disaster Coordinator.

The organizational structures for State and County operations are illustrated on Figures A-2 and A-3, respectively. The Georgia RERP and Annex A to the Plan provide the bases for a 24-hour-a-day radiological emergency response capability for extended periods.

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TABLE A-1 RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIMARY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS Individual in Charge of Organization Emergency Response SNC ED State of Georgia Governor GEMA State Disaster Coordinator Georgia DNR REC Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Chairman, County Board of Counties Commissioners LEMAs EMA Directors Local Law Enforcement Agencies Sheriff/Chief of Police Georgia Department of Human Resources Environmental Radiation Specialist of the Radiological Health Section A-10 Version 19 05/05

NRC EMERGENCY GEMA DIRECTOR DNR/EPD COUNTY EMA DHR OTHER STATE LOCAL AGENCIES ORGANIZATIONS EOF DIRECTION OR COORDINATION PATH INFORMATION PATH AID OR ASSISTANCE PATH FIGURE A-1 FORMAL INTERFACES AMONG EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS A-11 Version 19 05/05

GOVERNOR STATE DISASTER DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL COORDINATOR RESOURCES ENVIRONMENTAL GEMA PROTECTION DIVISION RADIOLOGICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN OF ADMINISTRATIVE OTHER AGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY TRANSPORATION RESOURCES AGRICULTURE SERVICES RESOURCES POLICE SERVICES ENGINEERING HEALTH AND CONTAMINATED FIRE CONTROL SERVICES SOCIAL FOOD AND SEARCH RESCUE SERVICES MILK CONTROL TRANSPORATION TRANSPORATION SERVICES EVACUATION SERVICES COORDINATION WITH USDA HEAVY STATE MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMMUNICATIONS LEGEND:

COORDINATION LINK OPERATIONAL LINK FIGURE A-2 STATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN A DECLARED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY A-12 Version 19 05/05

HNP GEMA COUNTY EMA FIRE SHERIFFS BOARD OF MUNICIPAL VOLUNTEER DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT EDUCATION POLICE ORGANIZATIONS COUNTY MUNICIPAL COUNTY DEFACS HOSPITAL HEALTH PUBLIC PUBLIC DEPARTMENT WORKS WORKS LEGEND:

COORDINATION LINK OPERATIONAL LINK FIGURE A OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COUNTY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS A-13 Version 19 05/05

B. ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Initial staffing of the onsite HNP emergency organization is provided from personnel normally stationed at the site. For reference throughout this section, the organizational chart for the HNP staff is presented in Figure B-1. If the need arises, this staff is augmented substantially by the addition of other licensee personnel and by personnel from other organizations. This section includes a description of the emergency duties of the normal shift complement, a discussion of the manner in which emergency assignments are to be made, a listing of additional support personnel upon whom the licensee can rely, and a description of the relationships between onsite and offsite response activities.

Normal Plant Organization The organizational structure shown on Figure B-1 represents the pool of personnel normally available, approximately 900 people.

The operating crew for each unit includes one Shift Supervisor (SS), two Nuclear Plant Operators (NPOs), and two System Operators (SOs). A Superintendent of Shift (SOS) and a Shift Technical Advisor (STA) are also on shift during operation. In addition, personnel from the Health Physics (HP) and Chemistry, Maintenance, and Security Departments are continuously onsite.

Emergency Organization Once an emergency condition is determined and initial mitigating actions are underway, the ED has the responsibility to classify the event in accordance with the emergency classification system (described in Section D). Classification of an event into one of the four emergency categories [Notification of Unusual Event (NUE), Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency] activates the HNP emergency organization. The extent to which the onsite HNP emergency organization is activated depends upon the severity of the situation. Table B-1 provides a summary of personnel available on shift and those who would be available within approximately 60 min. of notification.

For an NUE, the ED assigns responsibility for making the appropriate notifications and directing the proper response; but no further activation of the emergency organization is required.

If the event is classified as an Alert, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC) are activated. Figure 2 shows the emergency organization when fully activated. Corporate personnel who may report to the plant site are provided the necessary training and are integrated into the HNP emergency organization, as necessary.

Relationships among the HNP emergency organization and other elements of emergency response are shown on Figure A-1.

Emergency Organization Responsibilities Following an Alert or higher emergency declaration, the positions shown on Figure B-2 will be filled by emergency response personnel as discussed below.

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1. ED The ED has the authority, management ability, and knowledge to assume the overall responsibility for directing HNP staff in an emergency situation. Initially this position is filled by the SOS, the SS, or if the event involves both units, the Unit 1 SS. Any of these persons will assume the ED position until the Nuclear Plant General Manager, the Plant Operations Assistant General Manager, the Plant Support Assistant General Manager, the Vice President-Project (Hatch) or other qualified EDs can arrive onsite and receive an adequate turnover.

The ED manages the following activities for the duration of the emergency:

• Notification and communication: directs the notification of HNP and licensee personnel and communications with offsite authorities regarding all aspects of emergency response.

• Emergency response facilities (ERF): oversees the activation and staffing and requests additional assistance, as needed.

• Emergency operations: has authority over those actions taken to mitigate the emergency condition or reduce the threat to the safety of plant personnel or the public, including the recommendation of protective actions to offsite authorities.

• Emergency services: provides overall direction for management of procurement of site-needed materials, equipment, and supplies; documentation; accountability; and security functions.

• Emergency operations planning: provides overall direction for the management of planning for procedure, equipment, and system development to support emergency operations.

• Discretionary authority: may tailor the emergency organization to fit the specific staffing needs on a case-by-case basis.

The ED may not delegate the following responsibilities:

• The decision to notify offsite emergency response agencies.

• The decision to recommend protective actions to offsite authorities.

• Declaration of emergency classifications.

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• Authorization for plant personnel to exceed 10 CFR 20 radiation exposure limits.

• The decision to downgrade the emergency classification or terminate the emergency.

• The decision to request Federal assistance.

• The decision to dismiss nonessential personnel from the site at an Alert classification level or higher.

• Authorization of the use of potassium iodide.

• The ED may operate from the Control Room, the TSC, or the EOF at his discretion.

He may act as the TSC Manager during the early phases of emergency response, as needed. It is the intent of SNC that the ED will be transferred from the Control Room as soon as practicable.

2. TSC Staff

a. TSC Manager The TSC Manager performs the following activities:

• Coordinates inputs and recommendations from technical and corrective action advisors.

• Directs onsite HNP emergency personnel involved in restoration of the plant to a safe condition.

• Provides technical assistance and operations guidance to Control Room personnel.

• Directs TSC staff in analysis of problems, design and planning for temporary modifications, and development of temporary emergency operating procedures (EOP).

• Recommends protective actions to the ED based on plant conditions.

• Provides the ED recommendations on emergency classifications.

b. Support Coordinator (TSC)

The Support Coordinator in the TSC directs the clerical and logistic activities in the TSC. He ensures support staff, including Clerks and Communicators/Recorders, are available in sufficient numbers and that office supplies, drawings, and other documents are available to TSC personnel. He ensures transportation and communication needs are satisfied. When the EOF is activated, the Support Coordinator in the TSC interfaces with the Support Coordinator in the EOF.

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c. Engineering Supervisor The Engineering Supervisor directs a staff of engineers with expertise in reactor engineering, thermal and hydraulic analysis, instrumentation and control, and mechanical and electrical systems. He directs the analysis of plant problems and provides recommendations for plant modifications to mitigate the effects of the accident.

d. Maintenance Supervisor The Maintenance Supervisor manages the planning and coordination of repair, damage control, and plant modification activities. He works closely with the Engineering Supervisor in planning for plant modifications and repairs.

e. Operations Supervisor The Operations Supervisor analyzes problems associated with systems operations and provides recommendations for procedures for mitigating the emergency situation.

f. Security Supervisor The Security Supervisor has the following responsibilities:

• Processing of personnel who require authorization to enter the site.

• Requesting assistance through the ED from civic law enforcement authorities, if required.

• Ensuring site accountability and access control are maintained.

3. OSC Staff

a. OSC Manager The OSC Manager receives direction from the TSC to dispatch emergency teams (e.g., fire fighting, rescue, first aid, repair, etc.) to prescribed areas of the plant or site. The OSC Manager directs composition of the teams to ensure appropriately qualified personnel are assigned. In particular, he ensures proper HP coverage is provided. The OSC Manager ensures specific instructions are provided to the team leaders and maintains communications with the teams to monitor the status of their activities.

b. OSC Personnel Selected personnel report to the OSC, as directed. Emergency personnel from the Maintenance, the Operations, and the HP/Chemistry Departments are directed to report to the OSC. The following emergency teams are formed, as necessary:

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• Fire brigade.

• Search and rescue.

• Repair.

• Post-accident sampling.

• Internal survey.

• Field monitoring.

• Rally point.

Each OSC team is headed by a designated team leader, who maintains communication with the OSC. The field monitoring teams are dispatched to the Simulator Building to prepare for field monitoring activities. These teams are under the control of the on-shift HP/Chem Foreman until relieved by the HP/Chem Supervisor in the TSC or the Dose Assessment Supervisor in the EOF.

4. EOF Staff The description of the EOF staff positions is contained in Appendix 7.

Emergency Organization Assignments Table B-2 identifies by title the individuals who will fill the key emergency positions. No individual listed in Table B-2 is identified as the primary candidate for more than one emergency position. Some primary candidates are identified as alternates for other emergency positions.

It is expected that one person may occupy up to two emergency positions within the same emergency. During the first 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of an emergency, the emergency response positions will be manned by qualified available personnel. A sufficient number of people are identified to ensure that all emergency positions listed on Table B-2 will be filled on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

Other Support Services

1. Contractor Support Arrangements have been made to obtain support services from Bechtel Power Corporation, and GE, if required. Support capability has been available through the joint efforts of the SNC nuclear support (Hatch) general office staff and Southern Company Services (SCS) architect-engineering and service company. As a result of the consolidation of SCS and SNC nuclear expertise, and in addition to being the licensee, SNC also serves as its own architect/engineer and performs the functions previously performed by SCS. The EOF Support Coordinator initially contacts these organizations to arrange for the required assistance.

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2. Medical Assistance Agreements are in place with the Appling General Hospital, the Meadows Regional Medical Center, and the Appling Ambulance Service (Appendix 2) and a contract with a medical consulting group to provide assistance for injured personnel, including cases involving radioactive contamination. This assistance is requested whenever necessary in accordance with plant procedures.

3. Offsite Fire Assistance Agreements are in place with the Appling County EMA to provide onsite HNP Fire Brigade in the unlikely event of a fire requiring offsite assistance. This assistance is requested according to plant procedures.

4. Agency Support Assistance may be requested from the State of Georgia or the Federal agencies. Section A of this Plan describes the assistance that may be requested. Any requests for aid are made by the ED.

Interfaces Among Response Groups Section A, Figure A-1, illustrates the integrated organization for response to an emergency at HNP.

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TABLE B-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

MINIMUM STAFFING CAPACITY FOR EMERGENCIES Expertise or Typical On Augmentation (a)

Major Functional Area Major Tasks Position Title Shift in 60 min Plant operations and SOS 1 _

assessment of SS 1 _

operational aspects. NPO 2 _

SO 2 _

(c)

Emergency direction and Overall management of SOS, SS , Nuclear Plant Gen. Mgr., 1 _

control (ED). emergency organization. Plant Operations Asst. Gen. Mgr.,

Plant Support Asst. Gen. Mgr.,

Vice President-Project (Hatch),

Other designated qualified persons Notification/ Notification of Licensee, Nuclear Plant Operator or other trained 1 2 communication. Federal, State, and personnel (ENN Communicator).

local personnel.

Radiological accident EOF direction EOF Manager. _ 1 assessment and support Offsite dose assessment. HP/Chemistry supervision. _ 1 of operational accident assessment.

Offsite surveys. HP/Chemistry Technicians and 2 2 Onsite (out of plant) survey. other trained personnel. 1 1 In-plant survey. 2 1 Chemistry/radiochemistry. HP/Chemistry Technicians or 1 1 other trained personnel.

Plant system engineering, Technical support STA. 1 -

repair, and corrective (including core/ Reactor Engineer (Core/Thermal - 1 actions. thermal hydraulics). Hydraulics).

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TABLE B-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

MINIMUM STAFFING CAPACITY FOR EMERGENCIES Expertise or Typical On Augmentation (a)

Major Functional Area Major Tasks Position Title Shift in 60 min Repair and corrective Mechanical maintenance. 1 1 actions. System Operator. 1 -

Electrical maintenance. 2 1 Instrumentation and Control Technician. 1 1 (b)

Protective actions Radiation protection: HP/Chemistry Technicians 4 2 (in-plant).

• Access control. or other trained personnel.

• HP coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue, first aid, and fire fighting.

• Personnel monitoring.

• Dosimetry.

Fire fighting. - - Fire brigade. Per Local Fire support Plan.

(b)

Rescue operations and - - 2 Local first aid. support Site access control and Security, Security personnel. Per personnel accountability communications, and Security personnel Plan.

accountability.

TOTALS 26 17 NOTES:

a. The 60 min referenced here represent an approximate after hours staff augmentation time.

During normal working hours, on-shift personnel include those individuals denoted in the 60-min column.

b. May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions.

c. If the event involves both units, the Unit 1 SS will initially assume the position.

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TABLE B-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS (a)

Typical Normal Position by Title Emergency Position Primary Alternate(s)

ED(b) Nuclear Plant General Manager Plant Operations Asst. Gen. Mgr., Plant Support Asst. Gen. Mgr., Vice President-Project (Hatch).(c)

TSC Manager Plant Operations Asst. Gen. Mgr. Engineering Support Manager, Maintenance Manager, Operations Manager, Plant Operations Asst. Gen. Mgr.,

Plant Support, Nuclear Plant General Manager.

Support Coordinator (EOF) Refer to Appendix 7. Refer to Appendix 7.

Engineering Supervisor Engineering Support Manager Engineering Supervisor(s), Engineer, Principal, Engineer-Sr.

Maintenance Supervisor Maintenance Manager Maintenance Superintendent, Maintenance Team Leader(s), Maintenance Engineer.

Operations Supervisor Operations Manager Superintendent Unit, SOS, Operations Support Superintendent.

HP and Chemistry Supervisor HP/Chem Manager HP Superintendent, Chemistry Superintendent, HP Supervisor, Chem Supervisor, Health Physicist.

OSC Manager Maintenance Team Leader(s) Maintenance Team Leader(s), Assistant Team Leader.

EOF Manager Refer to Appendix 7. Refer to Appendix 7.

Support Coordinator (TSC) Document Control Supervisor Plant Administration Manager, Human Resources Administrative Supervisor, Administrative Assistant(s).

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TABLE B-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS (a)

Typical Normal Position By Title Emergency Position Primary Alternate(s)

Dose Assessment Refer to Appendix 7. Refer to Appendix 7.

Supervisor Security Supervisor Security (Site) Manager-Nuclear Security Supervisor, Nuclear Security Captain, Security Supervisor Lieutenant-Nuclear.

NOTES:

a. These positions are typical to the emergency response position. Changes in assignment may be made as long as the individual qualifies for the new assignment. The annual review/revision (as necessary) to the Plan will reflect any changes in emergency response assignment.

b. This position may be filled initially by an on-shift individual. The most senior member of plant or SNC management who is qualified may assume this position upon arrival at HNP.

c. Individual whose normal work location is the SNC in Birmingham.

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EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT-PROJECT (HATCH)

NUCLEAR QUALITY NUCLEAR PLANT SUPPORT ASSURANCE GENERAL GENERAL MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER QUALITY ASSURANCE SUPERVISOR PLANT QUALITY PLANT SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONCERNS ASST. GEN. MGR.

ASST. GEN. MNG PROGRAM NUCLEAR SAFETY HP OUTAGES & ENGINEERING PLANT PLANT TRAINING OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE & CHEMISTRY MODIFICATIONS SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION & EMERGENCY

& COMPLIANCE MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER PREP. MANAGER OPERATIONS ENG/ GROUP SECURITY ENG. GROUP MAINTENANCE HP ENG. GROUP TRAINING SUPPORT SUPERVISOR MANAGER SUPERVISOR SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERINTENDENT (BOP) NUCLEAR ENG. GROUP HR NUCLEAR OPS.

ENG. GROUP UNIT CHEMISTRY CONTRACTS TRAINING TEAM LEADER SUPERVISOR ADMINISTRATIVE PLANT NURSE SUPERVISOR SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR (RX SYS) SUPERVISOR SCHEDULING ENG. GROUP EMERGENCY SHIFT FACILITIES SUPERVISOR MATERIALS INFORMATION PREP SUPERVISOR SUPERINTENDENT SUPERVISOR SUPERINTENDENT RESOURCES COORDINATOR (DAILY) (RX ENG.)

HP SCHEDULING ENG. GROUP DOCUMENT & CHEMICAL SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR CONTROL TRNG (OUTAGE) (REGULATORY) SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR

`

ENG. GROUP PROGRAM SUPERVISOR DEVELOPMENT (SUPPORT) SUPERVISOR FIGURE B-1 TYPICAL HNP ORGANIZATION CHART B-11 Version 19 05/05

FEDERAL, STATE EMERGENCY

& OTHER OFFSITE DIRECTOR AGENCIES EOF TSC MANAGER MANAGER REFER TO APPENDIX 7 ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR HP/CHEMISTRY SUPERVISOR OSC SUPPORT COORDINATOR (TSC)

CLERK COMMUNICATORS SECURITY SUPERVISOR MANAGER SUPERINTENDENT OF-SHIFT OPERATIONS SUPPORT FIRE BRIGADE (AS NEEDED)

INTERNAL SURVEY HP/CHEMISTRY SEARCH/RESCUE MAINTENANCE SHIFT SHIFT TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR ADVISOR SHIFT SUPPORT SUPERVISOR PLANT OPERATORS

• SYSTEM COMMUNICATORS OPERATORS

• MAY BE DISPATCHED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM lOR OSC.

FIGURE B-2 TYPICAL ALERT, SITE AREA OR GENERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION B-12 Version 19 05/05

C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES State and Local Governmental Support The State of Georgia through the GEMA has the lead agency responsibility for responding to emergency situations throughout Georgia. Under the procedure established by the Natural Disaster Operation Plan, which was developed pursuant to the Governor's Executive Order, the DNR radiological emergency response team, under the direction of GEMA, assesses the radiological conditions at the site of an incident and determines whether a state of emergency exists. Upon GEMA's advising the Governor of the State of Georgia that a radiological emergency exists, the Governor declares an emergency condition which activates the GEMA.

The LEMAs may activate independently or prior to the Governor's declaration of a state of emergency. However, the LEMA must be activated in conjunction with the GEMA activation.

[(Reference the State of Georgia RERP).]

The concept of operations for which the State of Georgia discharges this responsibility, together with a discussion of action responsibilities assigned to various State/County governmental agencies is contained in the State of Georgia REP, and Annex A to the REP, HNP. For a complete discussion of authority, assigned responsibilities, capabilities, and activation and communication arrangements, refer to these plans.

It is expected that a few State representatives, including one skilled in making dose calculations and radiological assessments, will be dispatched to the EOF. The licensee will send a technical representative to the offsite governmental centers, as needed or as requested.

Federal Governmental Support In addition to coordination with State/County governmental entities in an emergency situation, the licensee may require assistance from certain Federal agencies in the areas of communications, radiological monitoring and laboratory analysis, transportation, and disaster relief.

Requests for Federal assistance are directed, as needed, by the ED, and usually these requests are channeled through GEMA. The exceptions to this procedure are direct contacts between the licensee Emergency Organization and the NRC.

In the event of an incident in which Federal assistance is needed to supplement State/County emergency response capabilities, principal points of contact for State government are as follows:

• The FEMA, Region Headquarters in Atlanta.

• The DOE, Region Operations Office in Aiken, South Carolina.

• The EPA, Region Headquarters in Atlanta.

The FEMA is assigned lead responsibility for Federal offsite nuclear emergency planning and response (per Title 44 CFR 351). FEMA is also delegated responsibility for development and promulgation of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) which assumes C-1 Version 19 05/05

states will be responsible for overall management of offsite emergency response. The Federal government's role consists of providing technical and/or logistical resource support at the request of State emergency management.

Federal emergency response consists of technical and nontechnical components. The NRC and FEMA jointly coordinate federal emergency response actions. The NRC coordinates technical aspects, and FEMA coordinates nontechnical aspects of Federal response.

The NRC and FEMA have stated that they each expect to have a representative at HNP within approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after receiving notification. DOE can give assistance within approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Airfields within the plant vicinity that may be used to support the Federal response, as well as that of other response groups, include a commercial airport with scheduled service and nearby municipal airports that can accommodate small aircraft. The approximate distance and direction to these airfields are as follows:

Distance (miles)/

Location Straight Line Direction Augusta 107 NNE Savannah 70 ENE Waycross 48 S Macon 94 NW Wright Army Airfield 50 E Warner Robbins AFB 90 NW Vidalia 19 NNW Reidsville 20 NE Baxley 15 S Alma 30 SSW Hazlehurst 19 WSW Licensee Support The licensee provides space, telephone communications, and administrative services for up to five NRC personnel at the TSC. Accommodations for the NRC, State of Georgia, and FEMA representatives in the EOF are described in Appendix 7.

Other Support The licensee expects services to be available from qualified organizations to provide radiochemical laboratory analysis, environmental monitoring assistance, and medical support services should a serious emergency occur.

Other private organizations that supply engineering, HP, and general emergency support are as follows:

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• GE, San Jose, California.

• Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Atlanta, Georgia.

The NSSSs for the plant were purchased from GE, who continues to provide operations support to the company in plant modifications, licensing, and engineering.

As a member of INPO, the licensee is provided with INPO's Emergency Response Manual.

This manual identifies the various organizations (utilities, service companies, and reactor vendor) that could be expected to provide resources in response to a request for emergency support.

As referenced throughout this Plan, a number of offsite licensee departments and the Southern Company companies may be involved in the emergency response effort. These departments have, where appropriate, developed separate nuclear emergency response plans and procedures governing their emergency functions. Coordination of these plans to ensure a consistent integrated response is the responsibility of the SNC. These specific plans include:

• HNP Emergency Communication Plan, controlled by the GPC Corporate Communications Department.

• HNP Security Plan, controlled by the Security Department.

• HNP Fire Hazards Analysis and Fire Protection Plan, controlled by Engineering Support.

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D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM Summary of Emergency Classification Logic The classification system for the Emergency Plan for the HNP is based on four emergency classes. The classes determine initial steps to be taken by the licensee onsite, by corporate emergency response elements, and those actions which are taken by the offsite support organizations. An emergency class is indicative of the status of the plant. Inputs to the emergency classification system include the status of various plant systems, radiation levels in and around plant areas, and the rate of release of radioactivity from the plant.

The emergency classes are used by offsite authorities to determine which of the preplanned actions are to be taken by their emergency organizations. Protective actions taken on behalf of members of the public are the responsibility of local and State governments. Subsequent actions by these authorities are based on projected or potential radiation exposures to individuals in the population. The actions recommended by these authorities have been identified as part of their emergency planning efforts. The projected or potential exposures are based on predictions made by the licensee from parameters such as status of reactor core and core cooling systems, effluent release rates, effluent radioactivity levels, containment radiation level, containment pressure, actual meteorological conditions, or measurements of offsite levels of radioactivity made by the licensee and/or State radiological response teams.

Emergency Class Description and Response The emergency classes are as follows:

• NUE

• Alert

• Site Area Emergency

• General Emergency The NUE and Alert classes give early notification of minor events that could lead to more serious consequences or that might indicate more serious conditions which have not yet fully developed. A Site Area Emergency reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where core melt is not likely to occur. In this situation, onsite and offsite licensee emergency personnel and monitoring teams are fully mobilized. A General Emergency involves actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment. The immediate action for this class is to recommend sheltering until an assessment can be made that an evacuation is advisable and can be completed prior to any significant release and transport of radioactive material to the affected areas. Emergency class descriptions are provided below. Also included are the actions to be carried out by the licensee.

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NUE

1. Class Description Unusual events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

2. Licensee Actions

a. Inform State and local offsite authorities of the nature of the unusual event within approximately 15 min. of classifying the emergency. Notify the NRC as soon as possible (ASAP) but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following the classification emergency.

b. Augment on-shift resources, as needed.

c. Assess and respond.

d. Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate, or close out with a verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by a written summary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Alert

1. Class Description Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels.

2. Licensee Actions

a. Within approximately 15 min. of classification, inform State and local authorities of Alert status and reason for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following classification of the emergency.

b. Augment resources and activate TSC, OSC, and EOF.

c. Assess and respond.

d. Mobilize, and dispatch, if necessary, internal survey teams.

e. Provide periodic plant status updates to offsite authorities.

f. Provide periodic meteorological assessments to offsite authorities and, if any releases are occurring, dose estimates for actual releases.

g. Escalate to a more severe emergency class, if appropriate, or close out or reduce emergency class by verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of close-out or reduction in emergency class.

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Site Area Emergency

1. Class Description Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels, except onsite or near the site boundary.

2. Licensee Actions

a. Within approximately 15 min. of classification, inform State and local offsite authorities of Site Area Emergency and reasons for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following classification of the emergency.

b. If necessary, provide protective action recommendations to State and local authorities.

c. Augment resources by activating the TSC, OSC, and EOF.

d. Assess and respond.

e. Dispatch internal and external survey teams.

f. Dedicate individuals for plant status updates to offsite authorities and periodic press briefings.

g. On a periodic basis, make onsite senior technicians and management staff available for consultation with NRC and State officials.

h. Provide meteorological data and dose estimates to offsite authorities.

i. Provide release and dose projections based upon available plant condition information and foreseeable contingencies.

j. Escalate to General Emergency, if appropriate, or close out or reduce emergency class by briefing offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of close-out or reduction in emergency class.

General Emergency

1. Class Description Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Release can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

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2. Licensee Actions

a. Within approximately 15 min. of classification, inform State and local offsite authorities of General Emergency and reason for emergency. Notify the NRC ASAP but no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following classification of the emergency.

b. Provide protective action recommendations to State and local authorities based upon plant conditions and/or actual or projected releases of radioactive material.

c. Augment resources by activating the TSC, OSC, and EOF.

d. Assess and respond.

e. Dispatch internal and external survey teams.

f. Dedicate an individual for plant status updates to offsite authorities and periodic press briefings.

g. On a periodic basis, make senior technical and management staff onsite available for consultation with the NRC and State officials.

h. Provide meteorological data and dose estimates to offsite authorities for actual releases.

i. Provide release and dose projections based on plant condition and foreseeable contingencies.

j. Close out or reduce emergency class by briefing of offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of close-out or reduction in emergency class.

Classification Process The various emergency classes are grouped as follows: NUEs are listed in Table D-1, Alerts in Table D-2, Site Area Emergencies in Table D-3, and General Emergencies in Table D-4.

These tables include the emergency conditions used in determining the appropriate emergency class. For each emergency condition, specific equipment status and parameter values are listed.

Changes to the equipment status and the associated parameters for an initiating condition may be changed in procedure without revision to the Plan. Any change made shall be incorporated in the next revision to the Emergency Plan.

Logical connectors are utilized in the emergency classification scheme in a manner consistent with that utilized in the HNP Technical Specifications (TS). The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings. In the event an abnormal condition meets the definition of any emergency class but is not covered in the Emergency Classification tables, or the initiating condition is met but equipment status parameter values are not, then the SOS/ED will use his judgment to declare the appropriate level of emergency.

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TABLE D-1 NUE (SHEET 1 OF 14) 1.0 AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCSs)

A NUE exists when:

Automatic initiation or demand for ECCS to recover water level is indicated by:

High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) automatic initiation and discharging to vessel with reactor water level < -113 in.

OR HPCI automatic initiation has occurred and discharging to vessel with drywell pressure > 1.92 psig (TS)

OR Core spray (CS) automatic initiation has occurred and discharging to vessel with reactor water level < -113 in. (TS)

OR CS automatic initiation has occurred and discharging to vessel with drywell pressure > 1.92 psig (TS)

OR Residual heat removal (RHR) [low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode]

automatic initiation has occurred and discharging to vessel with reactor water level < -113 in. (TS)

OR RHR (LPCI mode) automatic initiation has occurred and discharging to vessel with drywell pressure > 1.92 psig (TS).

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TABLE D-1 (SHEET 2 OF 14) 2.0 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS A NUE exists when:

Limits for gaseous effluent releases beyond the site boundary have exceeded TS as indicated by either actual field measurements or effluent monitor readings corresponding to:

0.057 mR total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) in an hour OR 500 mR (TEDE) in a year (TS).

A NUE exists when:

Limits for liquid effluents, as given in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) have been exceeded, as indicated by Chemistry analysis, as follows:

1.5 mR to the total body in a quarter OR 3.0 mR to the total body in a year.

This number is derived from the TS yearly limit divided by the number of hours in a year.

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TABLE D-1 (SHEET 3 OF 14) 3.0 CORE DAMAGE A NUE exists when:

Core damage is indicated by high off-gas with Pretreat Monitor (D11-K601) at hi alarm, plus Pretreat Monitor reading exceeding either of the following, as indicated on the pretreat graph found in the Unit 1 or 2 Off-Gas Release Curve book.

500,000 µCi/s OR 100,000 µCi/s increase within a 30-min. period.

A NUE exists when:

Core damage is indicated by a high coolant activity lab sample with I-131 dose equivalent coolant activity > 100 µCi/gm.

4.0 SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) FAILURE A NUE exists when:

A main steam line (MSL) relief valve fails to close when system pressure is reduced below setpoint of SRV and fuses pulled as indicated by:

SRV tailpipe temperature remaining > 230°F AND SRV tailpipe pressure switch remaining > 80 psig AND Temperature continuing to increase on any suppression pool local water temperature indicator.

D-7 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 4 OF 14) 5.0 LOSS OF AC POWER A NUE exists when:

A loss-of-offsite power (LOSP) or loss of onsite AC power capability has occurred and indicated as follows:

LOSP as indicated by:

Zero voltage on all 500-kV incoming lines AND Zero voltage on all 230-kV incoming lines OR LOSP as indicated by:

Loss of startup transformers (SUTs) 1C and 1D OR LOSP as indicated by:

Loss of SUTs 2C and 2D OR Loss of onsite ac power capability as indicated by:

Loss of all emergency diesel generators (DGs) on Unit 1 or Unit 2 for any reason.

6.0 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT A NUE exists when:

A loss of primary or secondary containment integrity is indicated by the inability to meet any one of the requirements within the time limit established by the applicable unit's TS. The NUE is declared upon commencing load reduction.

D-8 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 5 OF 14) 7.0 FIRE IN PLANT A NUE exists when:

A fire continuing > 10 min. (after discovery) exists within the protected area including 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards as indicated by either of the following:

Fire alarm with visual confirmation OR SOS/ED judgment.

8.0 SECURITY EVENT A NUE exists when:

A Security Alert occurs as indicated by the following:

Nuclear Security SS advises SOS/ED of Security Alert conditions AND SOS/ED judgment.

D-9 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 6 OF 14) 9.0 NATURAL PHENOMENON 9.1 Earthquake A NUE exists when:

Any earthquake is detected within the plant as indicated by the following:

Felt by personnel OR Confirmed "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 1) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration > 0.005 g.

9.2 High Winds A NUE exists when:

High winds are indicated by the following:

Any tornado observed onsite OR Any hurricane force winds projected onsite with windspeeds > 75 mph.

9.3 High River Water Level A NUE exists when:

High river water level is indicated by the following:

Plant service water (PSW) intake pump well level indication 88.6 ft mean sea level (msl).

9.4 Low River Water Level A NUE exists when:

Low river water level is indicated by the following:

PSW intake pump well level indication < 60.7 ft msl.

D-10 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 7 OF 14) 10.0 HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION 10.1 Aircraft Activity A NUE exists when:

Aircraft activity is indicated by the following:

Unusual aircraft activity observed over operating facility OR Aircraft crash within the owner-controlled area AND SOS/ED judgment.

10.2 Explosions A NUE exists when:

An explosion is indicated by the following:

Any explosion observed (within the protected area) including 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards.

10.3 Toxic Gas A NUE exists when:

A toxic gas release is indicated by the following:

Observation of significant toxic gas release (within the protected area) including 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards AND SOS/ED judgment.

Operating facility is defined to be areas within the protected area, and the 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards.

D-11 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 8 OF 14) 10.4 Flammable Gas A NUE exists when:

A flammable gas release is indicated by the following:

Observation of significant flammable gas release (within the protected area) including 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards OR Piping rupture in any flammable gas (i.e., hydrogen, propane) system OR SOS/ED judgment.

10.5 Turbine Failure A NUE exists when:

A turbine failure is indicated by the following:

Main turbine trip AND Confirmation of rotating component failure OR SOS/ED judgment.

D-12 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 9 OF 14) 11.0 (Deleted) 12.0 FAILURE OF REACTOR PRESSURE SYSTEM (RPS)

A NUE exists when:

A failure of the RPS to initiate a scram as indicated by the following:

Valid automatic scram signal AND Reactor not subcritical or subcriticality cannot be maintained.

D-13 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 10 OF 14) 13.0 LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION/ALARMS/ANNUNCIATORS A NUE exists when:

Any significant loss of main Control Room indication or alarms that reduces assessment capability to the extent requiring plant shutdown by TS.

A significant loss consists of a loss of any one of the following:

• Plant process computer

• Safety parameter display system (SPDS)

• Radioactive effluent instrumentation AND The plant not shut down within the time limit specified by TS.

14.0 LOSS OF COOLANT A NUE exists when:

Any confirmed reactor coolant system (RCS) operational leakage, as defined in the TS, is indicated by the following:

Any RCS pressure boundary leakage.

NUE to be declared upon commencing load reduction.

D-14 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 11 OF 14) 15.0 LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE A NUE exists when:

The loss of any engineered safety feature (ESF) with continued operation of either unit beyond the time frame specified in the applicable TS Action statement.

The following are ESFs:

• Containment Heat Removal System

• Post loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) Hydrogen Recombiner System

• Containment Isolation System

• HPCI System

• Automatic Depressurization System

• Core Spray

• LPCI System

• MSL Isolation Valves

• Control Rod Velocity Limiters

• Standby Gas Treatment System

• Low-Low Set Relief Logic System

• RPS

• Main Control Room Environmental Control System

• MSL Flow Restrictor

• CRD Housing Supports

• Emergency DGs D-15 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 12 OF 14) 16.0 MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS A NUE exists when:

Plant conditions that exceed any safety limit, as required in the TS (Sections 2.0) are indicated by the following categories:

Thermal power OR Minimum critical power ratio (MCPR)

OR Low reactor water level with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel

< -139 in. in Unit 1 OR < -158 in. in Unit 2 OR Reactor vessel steam dome pressure > 1325 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel OR Other condition that in the SOS/ED judgment warrant increased awareness of the plant operating staff or State and/or local authorities.

D-16 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 13 OF 14) 17.0 ISFSI OPERATIONS 17.1 Loss of cask confinement boundary for any loaded spent fuel cask A NUE exists when:

Direct Radiation levels outside the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) protected area boundary exceed:

2 mRem in an hour AND Contamination levels outside the Independent ISFSI protected area boundary exceed the technical specification limits for spent fuel storage cask surface contamination OR Direct Radiation Readings for a loaded spent fuel cask exceed the technical specification limit for overpack average surface dose rates.

D-17 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-1 (SHEET 14 OF 14) 17.2 Degradation of any Spent Fuel Cask due to an operational event A NUE exists when:

Direct observation of a loaded spent fuel cask indicates cask confinement boundary or shielding damage due to an operational event

• Cask handling

• Cask drop

• Cask tip-over AND SOS/ED judgment.

17.3 Degradation of any Spent Fuel Cask due to environmental phenomena or external events A NUE exists when:

Direct observation of a loaded spent fuel cask indicates cask confinement boundary or shielding damage due to environmental phenomena or external events

• Tornado

• Explosion

• Lightning

• Flooding

• Earthquake

• Extreme environmental temperatures

• Burial under debris

• Fire

• Explosion

• Aircraft crash

• Missile or projectile impact

• Security Event AND SOS/ED judgment.

D-18 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 1 OF 11)

ALERT 1.0 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS An ALERT exists when:

A gaseous effluent release is underway with offsite dose rates beyond the site boundary, as indicated by either field measurements or effluent monitor readings corresponding to:

0.57 mR (TEDE) in an hour OR 5000 mR (TEDE) in a year (10 x TS).

2.0 CORE DAMAGE An ALERT exists when:

Core damage is indicated by a high off-gas with pretreat monitor (D11-K601) at Hi Hi alarm, plus 5 Ci/s, as indicated on the pretreat graph found in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 Off-Gas Release Curve book.

An ALERT exists when:

Core damage is indicated by a high coolant activity lab sample with dose equivalent I-131 coolant activity > 300 µCi/gm.

This number is derived from 10 times the TS yearly limit divided by the number of hours in a year.

D-19 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 2 OF 11) 3.0 STEAM LINE BREAK An ALERT exists when:

A primary system [as defined by the EOP] MSL break occurs outside containment with significant isolation valve leakage as indicated by:

Either of the following:

Any valid reactor building or turbine building leak detection indication OR Hi MSL tunnel temperature 194°F (TS)

AND Either of the following indications:

Any reactor building area radiation monitor (ARM) above maximum normal operating values and increasing OR Any turbine building ARM above alarm setpoint and increasing.

4.0 LOSS OF AC POWER An ALERT exists when:

A LOSP with loss of all onsite AC power occurs for 15 min. as indicated by:

All 4.16-kV buses reading zero volts AC AND The inability to energize at least one 4.16-kV bus on both units with DGs.

D-20 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 3 OF 11) 5.0 LOSS OF ONSITE DC POWER An ALERT exists when:

A loss of all vital onsite DC power occurs for 15 min. as indicated by:

Low voltage and/or fuse trouble on all the affected units' 125-V/250-V station batteries AND Low voltage and/or fuse trouble on the affected units' 125-V diesel DG batteries (including the swing DG).

6.0 FIRE IN PLANT An ALERT exists when:

A fire continuing > 10 min. (after discovery) exists, potentially affecting safety systems as defined by the System Evaluation Document required for the present mode of operation as indicated by the following:

Fire alarm AND Location, observation, and judgment of SOS/ED.

7.0 SECURITY EVENT An ALERT exists when:

A security emergency occurs as indicated by the following:

Nuclear Security SS advises the SOS/ED of a Security Emergency condition.

AND SOS/ED judgment.

D-21 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 4 OF 11) 8.0 NATURAL PHENOMENON 8.1 Earthquake An ALERT exists when:

An earthquake is detected within the plant, as indicated by the following:

"Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 2) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration 0.08 g [operating basis earthquake (OBE) level]

OR Any horizontal (N-S, E-W) peak shock annunciator 12.7 Hz amber light illuminated indicating 100% OBE actuated on panel 1H11-P701 AND Any one of the following:

"Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 1) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration > 0.005 g OR Unit 1 and/or Unit 2 seismic peak shock recorder high "G" alarm OR Unit 1 and Unit 2 time-history recorders start.

D-22 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 5 OF 11) 8.2 High Winds An ALERT exists when:

High winds are indicated by the following:

Any tornado observed striking the operating facility OR Any hurricane observed onsite with sustained windspeeds at design level

( 94.5 mph)

OR SOS/ED judgment.

8.3 High River Water Level An ALERT exists when:

High river water level is indicated by the following:

PSW intake pump well level indication 100 ft msl.

8.4 Low River Water Level An ALERT exists when:

Low river water level is indicated by the following:

PSW intake pump well level indication < 59.9 ft msl.

Operating facility is defined to be areas within the protected area, and the 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards.

D-23 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 6 OF 11) 9.0 HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION 9.1 Aircraft Activity An ALERT exists when:

Aircraft activity is indicated by the following:

Aircraft crash within the protected area including the 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards.

9.2 Explosions An ALERT exists when:

An explosion is indicated by the following:

Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation.

9.3 Toxic Gas An ALERT exists when:

A toxic gas release is indicated by the following:

Uncontrolled toxic gas entry into protected area facility environs.

9.4 Flammable Gas An ALERT exists when:

A flammable gas release is indicated by the following:

Uncontrolled flammable gas entry into protected area facility environs.

D-24 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 7 OF 11) 9.5 Turbine Failure/Missile Impact An ALERT exists when:

A turbine failure generating projectiles is indicated by the following:

Main turbine trip AND Turbine casing penetration by internal components OR Projectile from any source affects plant operation OR SOS/ED judgment.

10.0 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION An ALERT exists when:

An evacuation of the main Control Room is imminent, as indicated by the following:

Entry into remote shutdown procedures used to shut down the plant from outside the Control Room.

D-25 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 8 OF 11) 11.0 CONTROL ROD DROP An ALERT exists when:

Control rod drop accident is indicated by any combination of the following:

Local power range monitors (LPRMs) indicating abnormal neutron flux in the vicinity of the suspected dropped rod.

AND MSL high-rad monitors > 3 x normal background OR Average power range monitor (APRM) upscale trip of RPS channels "A" and/or "B":

Unit 1: > 120% full power Unit 2: > 120% full power OR Intermediate range monitor (IRM) upscale trip of RPS channels "A" and/or "B":

Either unit 120/125 divisions of full scale.

12.0 FAILURE OF RPS An ALERT exists when:

A failure of the RPS to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical, is indicated by the following Valid automatic and manual scram signal AND Reactor not subcritical or subcriticality cannot be maintained.

D-26 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 9 OF 11) 13.0 LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION/ALARMS/ANNUNCIATORS An ALERT exists when:

Most or all main Control Room alarms (annunciators) are lost, as indicated by the following:

Observation or failure in alarm check OR SOS/ED judgment.

14.0 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS An ALERT exists when:

A complete loss of any function needed for plant cold shutdown is indicated by the following:

RHR shutdown cooling mode unavailable for any reason AND Loss of alternate shutdown cooling modes AND Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature < 212°F, when required.

15.0 FUEL DAMAGE BY FUEL-HANDLING ACCIDENT An ALERT exists when:

A fuel-handling accident with release of radioactivity to reactor building is indicated by the following:

Valid refueling floor ARM hi alarm > 50 mR/hour OR Valid refueling floor exhaust high radiation alarm > 20 mR/hour OR Valid refueling floor vent filter hi-hi radiation alarm > 20 mR/hour.

D-27 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 10 OF 11) 16.0 HIGH RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION An ALERT exists when:

High radiation levels or high airborne contamination indicating a severe degradation in control of radioactive material is indicated by the following:

ARMs off-scale high (readings confirmed)

OR An increase by a factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings.

17.0 LOSS OF COOLANT An ALERT exists when:

Any confirmed RCS leak or unisolable system leak causing the direct loss of vessel inventory > 50 gpm as indicated by:

Calculation of RCS leak rate > 50 gpm using drywell equipment and/or floor drain sump level integrators on panel H11-P613 OR SOS/ED judgment OR SOS/ED judgment that an unisolable RCS leak > 50 gpm into the reactor building has occurred and may be indicated by one or more of the following indications:

Reactor building equipment and/or floor drain sump level hi alarms OR Valid leak detection alarms OR Any confirmed ARM in the reactor building above maximum normal operating values.

D-28 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-2 (SHEET 11 OF 11) 18.0 MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS An ALERT exists when:

Plant conditions warrant precautionary activation of the TSC and placing the EOF and other key emergency responders on standby as indicated by the following:

Observation AND SOS/ED judgment.

D-29 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 1 OF 11)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.0 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A gaseous effluent release is underway with offsite dose at the site boundary, as indicated by either field measurements or effluent monitor readings (using adverse meteorological conditions) corresponding to:

50 mR (TEDE) in an hour for > 1/2 hour but

< 1000 mR (TEDE) in an hour OR 500 mR (TEDE) in an hour for 2 min. but

< 1000 mR (TEDE) in an hour OR 250 mR committed dose equivalent (CDE thyroid) in an hour for 1/2 hour but

< 5 Rem (CDE thyroid) in an hour OR 2500 mR (CDE thyroid) in an hour for 2 min. but

< 5 Rem (CDE thyroid) in an hour.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Dose beyond the site boundary is projected to be greater than EPA PAGs based on dose projections from plant parameters as follows:

1 Rem (TEDE)

OR 5 Rem (CDE thyroid).

Stability class F and 1 m/s (2 mph) windspeed or inclement weather.

D-30 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 2 OF 11) 2.0 CORE DAMAGE SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Degraded core with possible loss of core geometry is indicated by the following:

Containment post-LOCA hi rad alarm > 138 Rem/hour (TS)

AND Noble gas fission product monitor (D11-K630) (variable setpoint) hi-hi radiation alarm OR 5

Noble gas fission product monitor (D11-K630) upscale (7.0 x 10 cpm)

OR Reactor low-low-low level alarm < -113 in.

D-31 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 3 OF 11) 3.0 STEAM LINE BREAK SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An unisolable primary system (as defined by the EOPs) break outside containment, as indicated by:

Entry conditions into Secondary Containment Control EOP AND A primary containment isolation failure (cannot be isolated automatically or manually) has occurred on the affected primary system OR Any indications of significant leakage into the turbine building from the main steam system with turbine building ARMs above alarm setpoints and increasing AND A primary containment isolation failure (cannot be isolated automatically or manually) has occurred on the affected primary system.

OR SOS/ED judgment.

4.0 LOSS OF AC POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An LOSP with loss of all onsite AC power occurs for > 15 min. as indicated by:

All 4.16-kV buses reading zero volts AC AND The inability to energize at least one 4.16-kV bus on both units with DGs.

D-32 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 4 OF 11) 5.0 LOSS OF ONSITE DC POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A loss of all vital onsite DC power occurs for > 15 min. as indicated by:

Low voltage and/or fuse trouble on all the affected unit's 125-V/250-V station batteries AND Low voltage and/or fuse trouble on the affected unit's 125-V DG batteries.

(including the swing DG).

6.0 FIRE IN PLANT SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A fire continuing > 10 min. (after discovery) compromising the functions of safe shutdown systems as indicated by the following:

Fire defeating redundant safety system trains required for the current mode of operation OR Loss of safety system due to fire that affects shutdown capability by the inability to perform one of the following:

• Prevent excessive reactor pressurization

• Provide adequate makeup inventory

• Depressurize the reactor

• Remove decay heat from the reactor OR Location, observation, and judgment of SOS/ED.

D-33 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 5 OF 11) 7.0 SECURITY EVENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An imminent loss of physical control of the plant is indicated by the following:

Loss of physical barrier capability or control of protected area OR Attempted unauthorized entry into the protected area by force or covert action AND SOS/ED judgment based on Nuclear Security SS's advice.

8.0 NATURAL PHENOMENON 8.1 Earthquake SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An earthquake is detected within the plant, as indicated by the following:

Same as Alert parameters, plus the maximum g level measured by time-history recorders is 0.15 g design basis earthquake (DBE) as indicated by any horizontal (N-S, E-W) peak shock annunciator, 12.7 Hz red light, illuminated on panel 1H11-P701 AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

D-34 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 6 OF 11) 8.2 High Winds SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

High winds are indicated by the following:

Observation of damage from an onsite tornado with windspeeds in excess of meteorological instruments' range (> 100 mph)

AND Either unit not in cold shutdown OR Sustained windspeeds in excess of meteorological instruments' range

(> 100 mph)

AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

8.3 High River Water Level SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

High river water level is indicated by the following:

PSW intake pump well level indication 120 ft msl OR Actual or projected hurricane surge or flood level 120 ft msl AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

D-35 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 7 OF 11) 8.4 Low River Water Level SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Low river water level is indicated by the following:

PSW intake pump well level indication < 57.2 ft msl AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

9.0 HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION 9.1 Aircraft Activity SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Aircraft activity is indicated by the following:

Aircraft crash affecting vital operating plant structures by impact or fire including:

• Intake structure

• Main Control Room

• DG building

• Central alarm station (CAS)/Secondary alarm station (SAS)

• Power block AND Either unit not in cold shutdown OR SOS/ED judgment.

D-36 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 8 OF 11) 9.2 Explosions SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An explosion is indicated by the following:

Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion that affects shutdown capability by the inability to perform one of the following:

• Prevent excessive reactor pressurization

• Provide adequate makeup inventory

• Depressurize the reactor

• Remove decay heat from the reactor AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

9.3 Toxic Gas SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A toxic gas release is indicated by the following:

Uncontrolled toxic gas entry into a vital area restricting access and constituting a safety problem:

• Intake structure

• Main Control Room

• DG building

• CAS/SAS

• Power block AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

D-37 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 9 OF 11) 9.4 Flammable Gas SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A flammable gas release is indicated by the following:

Uncontrolled flammable gas entry into a vital area:

• Intake structure

• Main Control Room

• DG building

• CAS/SAS

• Power block AND Either unit not in cold shutdown.

10.0 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

An evacuation of main Control Room is ordered AND Control of shutdown systems from local stations not established within 15 min.

after main Control Room evacuation.

11.0 FAILURE OF RPS SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

A transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram (continued power generation but no core damage immediately evident) is indicated by the following:

Valid automatic and manual scram signal AND

< 3% power generation cannot be achieved/maintained AND Standby liquid control initiation required.

D-38 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 10 OF 11) 12.0 LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION/ALARMS/ANNUNCIATORS SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Most or all main Control Room alarms (annunciators) are lost with plant transient initiated or in progress as indicated by the following:

Observation of plant transient (i.e., reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of feedwater)

OR SOS/ED judgment.

13.0 FUEL DAMAGE BY FUEL-HANDLING ACCIDENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Major damage to spent fuel in reactor building as indicated by the following:

Spent-fuel storage pool low level alarm AND Refuel floor area ARMs exceed maximum safe operating values in more than one area OR Large object damages spent fuel in pool AND SOS/ED judgment (based on refueling floor radiation levels).

D-39 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-3 (SHEET 11 OF 11) 14.0 LOSS OF COOLANT SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Any confirmed RCS leak is indicated by the following:

RCS leak > all available ECCS pumps capacities AND Reactor low-low-low level alarm < -113 in. and level decreasing with available makeup pumps running and discharging to vessel AND Drywell high temp alarms and drywell temperature increasing OR Drywell high pressure initiation alarm > 1.92 psig and increasing.

15.0 MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS SITE AREA EMERGENCY exists when:

Plant conditions warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams, or a precautionary notification to the public near the site as indicated by the following:

Observation AND SOS/ED judgment.

D-40 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 1 OF 10)

GENERAL EMERGENCY 1.0 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A gaseous effluent release is underway with offsite dose beyond the site boundary, as indicated by either field measurements or effluent monitor readings (using actual meteorological conditions) corresponding to:

1 Rem (TEDE) in an hour OR 5 Rem (CDE thyroid) in an hour.

A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

Dose beyond the site boundary is projected to be > EPA PAGs based on dose projections from plant parameters as follows:

A gaseous release is ongoing or imminent AND 1 Rem (TEDE)

OR A gaseous release is ongoing or imminent AND 5 Rem (CDE thyroid).

D-41 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 2 OF 10) 2.0 FIRE IN PLANT A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A fire in the plant that could cause massive damage to any plant system which could lead to core degradation or core melt as indicated by the following:

Loss of systems due to fire needed to maintain integrity of all three fission product barriers:

• Fuel integrity

• RCS integrity

• Containment integrity OR Location, observation and judgment of SOS/ED (based on Fire Brigade Leader's report).

3.0 SECURITY EVENT A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A loss of physical control of the plant is imminent as indicated by the following:

Loss of physical barrier capabilities of any vital building OR Loss of control of any vital area to include:

• Intake structure

• Main Control Room

• DG building

• CAS/SAS

• Power block AND SOS/ED judgment based on advice of Nuclear Security SS.

D-42 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 3 OF 10) 4.0 NATURAL PHENOMENON 4.1 Earthquake A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

An earthquake that could cause massive damage to any plant system which would lead to core degradation or core melt is indicated by the following:

Loss of systems needed to maintain integrity of all three fission product barriers:

• Fuel integrity

• RCS integrity

• Containment integrity OR Observation and judgment of SOS/ED.

5.0 MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS 5.1 Failure of Cladding and Containment with Potential Loss of Primary Coolant Boundary A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A failure of cladding and containment with the potential loss of primary coolant boundary is indicated by any one condition being met from each of the following three subsections:

A. Cladding Failure of cladding exists if sufficient fuel rod noble gas gap activity is found in the coolant, as indicated by:

I-131 dose equivalent coolant activity > 100 µCi/gm OR Drywell wide range radiation monitor (DWRRM) reading > 500 R/hour AND D-43 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 4 OF 10)

B. Containment Failure of primary containment exists if any of the following exists:

Primary containment integrity breached OR Drywell or torus hydrogen concentration > 6% with drywell or torus oxygen concentration > 5%

OR SOS/ED judgment that containment is lost or loss is imminent AND C. Primary Coolant Boundary A potential loss of primary coolant boundary exists if any one of the following exists:

Failure of SRVs to open with reactor pressure off-scale high OR All 4160/600V buses undervoltage OR Failure of ECCS to maintain reactor water level.

If a parameter is approaching emergency action level criteria and mitigation systems are unavailable, assume the barrier will be lost.

D-44 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 5 OF 10) 5.2 Failure of Cladding and Primary Coolant Boundary with Potential Loss of Containment A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A failure of cladding and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of containment is indicated by any one condition being met from each of the following three subsections:

A. Cladding Failure of cladding exists if sufficient fuel rod noble gas gap activity is found in the coolant as indicated by:

I-131 dose equivalent coolant activity > 100 µCi/gm OR DWRRM reading > 500 R/hour AND B. Primary Coolant Boundary Failure of primary coolant boundary exists if any one of the following exists:

An unisolable primary system (as defined by the EOPs) break outside containment as indicated by entry conditions into secondary containment control EOP OR Any indications of significant leakage into the turbine building from the main steam system with turbine building ARMs above alarm setpoint and increasing OR High drywell pressure 25 psig OR High drywell temperature 300°F OR Gap activity in drywell AND D-45 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 6 OF 10)

C. Containment A potential loss of containment exists if any of the following exist:

Loss of primary containment cooling capability with Primary Containment temperature and/or pressure increasing and approaching 56 psig OR Drywell or torus hydrogen concentration 6% with drywell or torus oxygen concentration 5%

OR SOS/ED judgment that the loss of containment is imminent.

If a parameter is approaching emergency action level criteria and mitigation systems are unavailable, assume the barrier will be lost.

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TABLE D-4 (SHEET 7 OF 10) 5.3 Failure of Primary Coolant Boundary and Containment with Potential Loss of Cladding A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

A failure of primary coolant boundary and containment with potential loss of cladding is indicated by any one condition being met from each of the following three subsections:

A. Primary Coolant Boundary Failure of primary coolant boundary exists if one of the following exists:

An unisolable primary system (as defined by the EOPs) break outside containment as indicated by entry conditions into secondary containment control EOP OR Any indications of significant leakage into the turbine building from the main steam system with turbine building ARMs above alarm setpoint and increasing OR High drywell pressure 25 psig OR High drywell temperature 300°F AND D-47 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 8 OF 10)

B. Containment Failure of primary containment exists if any of the following exists:

Primary containment integrity breached OR Drywell or torus hydrogen concentration 6% with drywell or torus oxygen concentration 5%

OR SOS/ED judgment that containment is lost or loss is imminent AND C. Cladding A potential loss of cladding exists if one of the following exists:

Failure of ECCS to maintain reactor water level OR Reactor water level -158 in. and core uncovered for > both 3.5 min. and the maximum core uncovery time limit OR All 4160/600V buses undervoltage.

If a parameter is approaching emergency action level criteria and mitigation systems are unavailable, assume the barrier will be lost.

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TABLE D-4 (SHEET 9 OF 10) 5.4 Potential Large Releases of Radioactivity A GENERAL EMERGENCY exists when:

Plant conditions exist where the potential release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period are possible (e.g., any core melt situation), as indicated by the following conditions:

Transient (e.g., scram, LOSP)

AND Failure of required core shutdown system that could lead to core melt in several hours AND Containment failure likely OR Small or large LOCA AND Failure of ECCS to perform (leading to core degradation or melt in minutes to hours)

AND Loss of containment is imminent OR D-49 Version 19 05/05

TABLE D-4 (SHEET 10 OF 10) 5.4 Potential Large Releases of Radioactivity (continued)

Small or large LOCA AND Containment performance is unsuccessful (affecting long-term success of ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in hours)

OR Shutdown occurs AND Requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) are rendered unavailable or nonsafety systems heat removal capabilities are rendered unavailable AND Core degradation or melt could occur in about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with subsequent containment failure OR Any major internal or external event that could cause massive damage to plant systems resulting in any of the conditions listed in multiple symptoms of potential large releases of radioactivity OR SOS/ED judgment.

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E. NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES This section describes the plan for notification of onsite and offsite licensee emergency response personnel for HNP, State, local, and NRC emergency response centers. Actual methods and sequencing of notifications are covered in appropriate implementing procedures. Table E-1 presents the initial notification concept for normal working hours and backshift hours.

Notification of HNP Personnel The ED is responsible for classifying an event (Section D) into the appropriate emergency class and ensuring onsite personnel are notified accordingly. This notification involves sounding the appropriate plant emergency alarm signal, making appropriate announcements over the plant public address (PA) system, and using the plant telephone system.

The primary means for notification of personnel within the controlled area is the PA system. Upon declaration of an Emergency, personnel will be notified by a page announcement. For declaration of an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency, this notification will be preceded by a warning tone. Likewise, page announcements for a Fire will be preceded by a specific tone.

Notification of persons who are in the public access areas, on or passing through the site, or within the controlled area will be performed by the Security Department. All such notifications would be accomplished in accordance with the Emergency Plan implementing procedures.

Visitors within the protected area are escorted by a permanently badged individual who is responsible for informing the visitors of emergencies when they occur and for taking action to evacuate the visitors from the site, as necessary.

The ED is responsible for notifying the Hatch Duty Manager (who is on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day). This Duty Manager contacts the Project Duty Manager. These notifications may be made utilizing available communications systems. Selected plant management can also be reached utilizing available communications systems. During normal working hours, emergency response personnel report to their assigned locations at the TSC and the OSC, as required by the specific emergency classification. Notification of EOF personnel will be accomplished utilizing available communications systems in accordance with Appendix 7. During backshift hours, the Operations SOS is responsible for initiating the notification process to required emergency response personnel, directing them to report to their designated ERF. These notifications may be made utilizing available communications systems.

Notification of State and Local Response Personnel The ED is responsible for ensuring that the State and local counties surrounding HNP are notified in a timely and accurate manner of an emergency condition. This notification consists of the information on the Emergency Notification Form (Figure E-1) being given within approximately 15 min of declaring an emergency to the following agencies:

• Georgia EMA.

• The 24-hour warning points of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties.

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These agencies are responsible for notifying appropriate response personnel in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures. The ENN is a dedicated communications system that is normally used to accomplish these notifications. Commercial telephone, microwave, or land lines provide backup for the ENN.

Figure E-1 presents the sample Emergency Notification Form for making notifications to these response centers. This form has been developed in conjunction with appropriate agencies. The Emergency Notification Form may be revised upon receipt of State and utility approval. Any revisions to the Notification Form are incorporated into the applicable implementing procedure are included in the next revision to the Emergency Plan.

Verification of Notification Messages All ENN notification messages must be verified as being received by the State of Georgia and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties. Verification is normally accomplished by roll call.

Notification of Federal Agencies The ED is responsible for ensuring notification calls are made to the NRC Operations Center by the ENS or commercial telephone as backup within the prescribed time constraints from the declaration of an emergency. A sample of the form used to provide the notification to the NRC Operations Center is shown in Figure E-2.

Notification of the Public Administrative and physical means have been established for providing early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. (See Appendix 3.) The prompt notification system has a capability to complete the initial notification within 15 min.

The initial notification, when appropriate, of the affected population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ is to be completed by the State and/or local authorities in a manner consistent with assuring the public health and safety.

The primary means for alerting and providing instructions to the public is by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Alert System. The emergency message would be broadcast on the NOAA weather radio immediately after completion of the acoustic alerting signal. The initial message will likely be brief, but will include all necessary information. NOAA would periodically broadcast short updated messages as warranted. The National Weather Service has agreed to activate the NOAA Alert System in the plant vicinity, when requested by GEMA or other appropriate government officials. Selected radio/TV stations with coverage within the plume exposure pathway EPZ have agreed to broadcast emergency instructions and information in cooperation with offsite officials. The prompt notification system (PNS) is described in Appendix 3.

The licensee will provide offsite authorities with supporting information for their messages to the public. Such messages, consistent with the emergency classification scheme, will provide the public with instructions in regard to specific protective actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas.

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TABLE E-1 INITIAL NOTIFICATION SYSTEM NORMAL WORKING HOURS AND BACKSHIFT HOURS Primary Notification Communicator System Party Notified ED (or designated PA system Protected area personnel communicator) (normal and backshift hours)

ED (or designated Plant telephone system Security Department personnel communicator) or PA system (normal and backshift hours)

Security Department Plant telephone system Visitors Center personnel (normal working hours)

Visitors Center Director (backshift hours)

Security Department Direct contact Recreation area occupants (normal and backshift hours)

ED (or designated Plant telephone system Off-shift personnel necessary for communicator) emergency response (backshift hours)

ED (or designated ENN GEMA Communicator communicator) Appling County Communicator Jeff Davis County Communicator Tattnall County Communicator Toombs County Communicator (normal and backshift hours)

ED (or designated ENS NRC Operations Center communicator) (normal and backshift hours)

ED (or designated Plant telephone system Plant management communicator) (or commercial Hatch Duty Manager telephone) (normal and backshift hours)

Hatch Duty Manager Plant telephone system Project Duty Manager (or commercial (normal and backshift hours) telephone)

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FIGURE E-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM E-4 Version 19 05/05

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Record the time(s) of contact with offsite authorities as indicated below:

Record the time acknowledgement is Record the time acknowledgement is received prior to verbally transmitting received after completing verbal ENN ENN information notification GEMA (time) (time)

Appling Co.

(time) (time)

Jeff Davis Co.

(time) (time)

Tattnall Co.

(time) (time)

Toombs Co.

(time) (time)

FIGURE E-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

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TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF NRC OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION FORM E-6 Version 19 05/05

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F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS This section describes the provisions for communications among the principal response organizations and among the licensee ERF.

Communications with the State of Georgia The primary means of communication between the HNP and the State of Georgia is the ENN, which is a dedicated communications system from the plant to the EOC at GEMA headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia and the FEOC in Vidalia, Georgia. Extensions for this system are located in the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF. The ENN system is available and manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. The ENN provides the licensee the capability to notify State and local authorities of an emergency within 15 min. of declaration. Commercial telephones, microwave, or land lines provide backup for the ENN.

Communication with contiguous local governments in the Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ) will be coordinated through the State of Georgia.

Communications with Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ Counties The primary means of communication between HNP and each EPZ county is the ENN, which is a dedicated communications system from the plant to each county EOC and 24-hour point of contact. Commercial telephones, microwave or land lines discussed above provide backups for the ENN. Radio contact between the plant and the Appling County Sheriff's Office can also be established, if necessary.

The ENN is available and manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. At the plant, the ED is responsible for ensuring contact with each of the plume exposure pathway EPZ counties.

Communications with NRC and Other Federal Agencies The primary means of communication between HNP and the NRC is the ENS, a dedicated communications system from the plant to the NRC Operations Center. The NRC Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia, may also be connected to the ENS through the NRC Operations Center. Additional dedicated telephone circuits [known as the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)] are installed in the TSC and the EOF. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which provides specific plant parameters to the NRC via computer modem, is installed in the Computer Room and the TSC.

Commercial telephone lines and the microwave system serve as backups to the ENS.

Communications with other Federal emergency response organizations would be by telephone; such communications would normally be completed by GEMA from the State EOC.

Communications Among HNP ERF Communications among the Control Room, the TSC, the OSC, and the EOF can be completed using various communications systems including dedicated telephone circuits, normal plant telephones, and radios. A radio system is also used for communications with the radiological monitoring teams. Communications available at each ERF are as follows:

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1. Control Room

• Dedicated ringdown telephone circuit to the TSC, the OSC, and the EOF.

• One extension to the ENN.

• One extension to the NRC ENS.

• ERDS to the NRC.

• Normal plant phones (network or commercial).

• Base station radio console (multiple frequencies).

• Sound-powered phones (internal to Control Room only).

• Plant PA system.

• One facsimile line.

2. TSC

• Dedicated ringdown telephone circuit to the Control Room, the OSC, and the EOF.

• One extension to the ENN.

• One extension to the NRC ENS.

• ERDS to the NRC.

• One facsimile line.

• Normal plant phones (network or commercial).

• Base station radio console (multiple frequencies).

• Plant PA system.

3. OSC

• Dedicated ringdown telephone circuit to the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF.

• Normal plant phones (network or commercial).

• Base station radio console.

• Plant PA system.

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4. EOF

• Dedicated ringdown telephone circuit to the Control Room, the TSC, and the OSC.

• One extension to the ENN.

• An extension to the NRC ENS.

• Multiple facsimile lines.

• Normal plant phones (network or commercial).

• Southern LINC radio equipment.

Medical Support Facility Communications Communication between HNP and the Appling General Hospital or the Meadows Regional Medical Center is by commercial telephone. The Appling Ambulance Service and the Meadows Regional Medical Center Ambulance Service are equipped with radio for communications with the hospitals. Normally, ambulance services and hospitals within the State are interconnected in a statewide hospital radio network.

Alerting Emergency Response Personnel As described in Section E, notification of onsite personnel at HNP is completed utilizing available communications systems. HNP personnel not onsite at the time of the emergency are also notified utilizing available communications systems.

Communications System Tests Communication channels with the State of Georgia, the plume exposure pathway EPZ counties, and the NRC (with the exception of ERDS) are tested each calendar month, using the extensions in the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF. ERDS is tested each calendar quarter.

All communications procedures and systems are also tested each calendar year during a communications drill. This drill is normally conducted in an exercise each calendar year.

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G. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION The detailed planning for public information actions during an emergency, including rumor control, is contained in the GPC HNP Emergency Communication Plan. A general description of the public education and information program follows.

Each calendar year, information is provided to the public regarding how they will be notified and what their actions should be in an emergency. The means for disseminating this information includes, but is not limited to, information in local telephone books, posting in public areas, and/or publications distributed by mail.

Each calendar year, information is distributed to residents in the plume exposure pathway EPZ through various publications. Information includes the following:

• Instructions in use of the NOAA weather radio notification system.

• How the emergency notification will take place.

• Discussions of protective measures such as sheltering and evacuation and actions to take in either case.

• Radio stations where additional information will be broadcast.

• Evacuation routes and reception centers including a map and instructions.

• Educational information on radiation.

• Special needs and considerations for the handicapped.

• Contacts to obtain additional information.

A Visitors Center is operated onsite. The center is staffed with public information personnel who provide public education programs to the community and any other visitors. These programs typically focus on plant operational concepts, plant safety considerations, and radiation.

Information for Transients Posted "Emergency Information" signs and a notice published in the local telephone books are used to provide the transient population with appropriate emergency information and instructions. The information/instructions advise the public on how they will be notified in the event of an emergency; indicate the actions to take if notified; and refer the public to designated broadcast stations for information in the event of a serious emergency.

Emergency News Center (ENC) Operations The ENC is the point of contact with the news media during an emergency. The ENC facilities used to coordinate the dissemination of information to the media will be established to accommodate public information representatives from the licensee, Federal, State, and local G-1 Version 19 05/05

response agencies. News releases and media briefings are coordinated to the maximum extent possible.

The licensee utilizes the GPC Corporate Headquarters Building located in Atlanta, Georgia, to serve as a temporary information center until the ENC located next to the GPC Operating Headquarters in Vidalia can be activated. The ENC is located approximately 22 miles from the plant and is large enough to accommodate a large number of reporters. Once activated, the ENC becomes the principal location for the dissemination of information relative to the emergency. News media who may arrive at the plant site during a declared emergency will be directed to the Emergency News Center to obtain approved news release information.

The principal licensee contacts for the media are the Public Information Director and the designated Company Spokesperson. The Company Spokesperson has access to the ED through the EOF Manager. The Company Spokesperson briefs the media on plant status and company emergency activities. In addition, technical briefers who can provide general and background information, as appropriate, to reporters at the ENC have been designated.

Further information relative to the public information organization and information flow to the public during an emergency is available in the HNP Emergency Communications Plan.

Offsite Agency Coordination Timely and accurate information is provided to Federal, State, and local agencies. The licensee seeks reciprocal information from these agencies. Efforts are made to coordinate periodic press briefings and to issue public statements in conjunction with these government agencies.

A joint public information center operation at the ENC provides ample opportunity for all parties represented to review all information prior to public release.

Rumor Control Providing timely, accurate, and consistent information to the public is considered the most effective method of dispelling rumors. Rumors are controlled by having a single source of information. In an emergency, a rumor control network is activated. News media are monitored to detect and respond to misinformation. Offsite information is the responsibility of offsite agencies; however, rumor control is coordinated between the State and licensee.

Media Education A program is conducted each calendar year to acquaint the news media with the methodology for obtaining information during an emergency and background about overall EP at HNP.

Included is information about the plant, radiation and the role of the ENC.

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H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Following the declaration of an emergency, response activities will be coordinated at a number of facilities. These facilities and the equipment which will be used for assessment and monitoring functions are described in this section.

Emergency Facilities

1. TSC The TSC, which is shared by both units, is located adjacent to the service building annex.

The layout of the TSC is shown in Figure H-1. Walking time from the TSC to the Control 2

Room is approximately 2 min. The TSC covers approximately 2620 ft .

The TSC provides plant management and technical support personnel [including five NRC personnel] with adequate space to assist plant operating personnel located in the Control Room during an emergency. The TSC is equipped with technical data displays and has ready access to plant records to allow TSC personnel to perform detailed analysis and diagnosis of abnormal plant conditions, including assessment of any release of radioactivity to the environment.

The TSC structure and ventilation system are designed to ensure that TSC personnel are protected from radiological hazards similar to that of the Control Room. An ARM which alarms on abnormal radiation levels is provided in the TSC. In addition, portable radiation monitors are available for personnel in transit from the TSC to other areas. Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are provided in the TSC. Anticontamination clothing is available at the nearby OSC.

The TSC normal lighting is supplied from normal site power through a motor control center backed up by the security DG.

Power for the TSC vital equipment is provided from either the motor control center backed up by the security DG or from a battery-backed uninterruptible power supply system. Power to the dc system is provided via battery chargers, one of which is powered from this same motor control center.

The TSC records area maintains copies of the following documents:

• TS.

• Plant Operating Procedures.

• EOP.

• Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs).

• System piping and instrumentation diagrams and heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) flow diagrams.

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• Piping area drawings.

• Electrical one-line, elementary, and wiring diagrams.

• Control logic and loop diagrams.

• Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.

The above records are available in current form and are updated, as necessary, to ensure the content is accurate and complete.

In the event the TSC becomes uninhabitable during an emergency, the Control Room will serve as an alternate location for TSC management.

Operations at the TSC are directed by the TSC Manager.

2. OSC The OSC consists of the service building breakroom and other areas, as necessary, to stage support personnel. This includes groups such as Instrument Technicians, Mechanics, Electricians, Nuclear Chemistry and HP Technicians, System Operators, and oncoming shift personnel who assemble to aid in the response to an emergency. In addition, the OSC is the initial assembly point for all radiological emergency team (RET) members. Briefings will be held with each team prior to being dispatched. Work to be performed, cautions, plant conditions, and radiological information will be included in the briefings. Status boards containing plant conditions and emergency classification will be available in the OSC. The layout of the OSC is shown in Figure H-2.

Emergency kits containing radiation monitoring equipment, first-aid supplies, decontamination supplies, breathing apparatus, portable lighting, and hand-held radios are available to the OSC. Typical emergency kit contents are listed in Appendix 4. In the event the OSC becomes uninhabitable during an emergency, OSC functions will be conducted from the alternate OSC located in the EOF.

Operations at the OSC are directed by the OSC Manager.

3. EOF Description of EOF operations and staffing is contained in Appendix 7.

4. Simulator Building This location consists of several rooms, as shown in Figure H-3. These rooms are normally used as classrooms and training labs. Designated rooms are utilized for equipment storage. Available classrooms and conference rooms will be utilized for field monitoring team assembly and dispatch activities and for the alternate OSC.

This area of the Simulator Building has a ventilation system that is functionally similar to the system used in the TSC without charcoal filtration. During normal mode of operation, a slight positive pressure is maintained. During emergency operation, no outside air is H-2 Version 19 05/05

allowed and positive pressure is not maintained. The ventilation system has recirculation through high-efficiency particulate air filters during emergency mode only. This location is designed to provide a radiation protection shielding factor of 5. Dedicated portable radiation monitors are available for surveillance.

Normal power to the simulator building is from offsite power. Emergency lighting is provided by 3-hour wall packs.

Kits containing equipment for conducting offsite radiological monitoring are located in the Simulator Building on plant site. Typical contents of these kits are listed in Appendix 4.

Emergency News Center ENC Description of the ENC resides in the HNP Emergency Communications Plan.

Activation and Staffing of Emergency Facilities During the initial stages of an emergency, activities at HNP are directed from the Control Room.

For a NUE, no other facilities are activated.

Upon declaration of an Alert or higher level classification, the TSC is activated and becomes fully operational ASAP, but not later than approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following the initial notification.

Overall direction and control are exercised from the TSC for an Alert or Higher situation. The ED may establish himself either at the Control Room or TSC, generally from the TSC.

Activation of the OSC is initiated at an Alert or higher level classification. Support personnel are directed to report to that facility, as appropriate, for the specific situation. The OSC becomes operational ASAP, but not later than approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following initial notification.

Activation and staffing of the EOF is contained in Appendix 7.

Plant Monitoring and Data Handling Systems

1. Geophysical Phenomena Monitors

a. Meteorological Meteorological monitoring is in place at HNP. The instruments are mounted on a 100-meter primary tower located to the south of the power block and on a 45-meter backup tower located to the southeast of the power block. Parameters measured and transmitted to the Control Room include:

• Windspeed.

• Wind direction.

• Vertical temperature difference.

• Ambient temperature.

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A building that houses meteorological equipment is located near the base of each tower. The system is powered by an uninterruptible power supply for high availability. Additionally, meteorological information can be obtained from the National Weather Service to supplement onsite data and provide a backup to the plant meteorological monitoring program on an as-needed basis.

The important parameters for characterizing the transport of airborne radioactivity are windspeed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability (e.g., derived from the standard deviation of the horizontal wind direction or vertical temperature difference). These meteorological parameters are used in a calculational methodology to assess the offsite radiological consequences of accidental releases of airborne radioactivity. The methodology is described in Section I, Accident Assessment.

b. Hydrologic The normal and emergency source of plant cooling water is the Altamaha River, which provides makeup to the cooling towers. The probable maximum flood level is approximately 105 ft msl.

c. Seismic Seismic monitoring instrumentation for HNP consists of time-history accelerographs, peak recording accelerographs (PRAs), a response-spectrum recorder, and seismic switches.

One triaxial seismic switch, with a horizontal setpoint of 0.08 g, is installed on the drywell pedestal on the 87 ft level of the Unit 2 reactor building. A second seismic switch is located outside the biological shield on the 185 ft level of the Unit 2 reactor building and has a vertical setpoint of 0.063 g. They are backup devices which actuate visual and audible annunciators in the Control Room.

Activation of the seismic switches causes an audible and visual annunciation in the Control Room to alert the plant operator (PO) that an earthquake has occurred.

These initial setpoints are based upon experience in existing plants and may be changed once significant plant operating data, which indicate that a different setpoint will provide better strong-motion accelerometer (SMA) system operation, are obtained.

d. Fire Detection The fire detection system at HNP includes smoke and thermal detectors and manual fire alarms. Fire detection systems are provided in all areas with safe shutdown equipment, as well as other locations throughout the plant. In addition to initiating fire suppression systems, indications from the fire detection system are transmitted to the Control Room.

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2. Radiation Monitoring System (RMS)

The RMS receives and processes radiological input readings during normal and abnormal operating and accident conditions; measures, evaluates, and reports radioactivity in designated areas; and monitors releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents. Data from the RMS are available in the Control Room. A more detailed description of the RMS is provided in the HNP-2-FSAR, Section 11.4.

There are three types of radiation monitors in the RMS: airborne and air particulate radiation monitors, liquid radiation monitors, and post-accident radiation monitors. The post-accident radiation monitors provide radiation monitoring after an accident. The monitors are comprised of area, airborne, and air particulate monitors. Area monitors respond to gamma radiation photons within any energy range from 60 KeV to 3 MeV.

Airborne monitors are capable of detecting and measuring radioactive gaseous effluent concentrations with compositions ranging from fresh equilibrium noble gas fission product mixtures to 10-day-old mixtures. Backup power to the post-accident monitors is supplied by a DG to ensure against interruption of monitor operation and loss of data.

3. SPDS The SPDS provides a display of plant parameters from which the status of operation can be assessed, in the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF. The SPDS performs the following functions:

• Aids Control Room operators in the rapid detection and identification of abnormal operating conditions.

• Provides additional specific information used to analyze and diagnose the cause of abnormal operating conditions.

• Monitors plant response to corrective actions.

• Provides grouping of parameters to enhance the operators' capability to quickly assess plant status without surveying concurrently all Control Room displays.

• Directs the operators' attention to other specific confirmatory non-SPDS Control Room displays.

• Provides human factors engineered display formats in simple and consistent display patterns and codings.

• Provides display information on a real-time basis, along with validation of data.

• Provides generated selectable trend displays on a real-time basis for monitoring reactivity control, reactor core cooling and heat removal from the primary system, RCS integrity, radioactivity control, containment integrity, and other selected parameters.

The SPDS in the Control Room consists of displays of sets of concentrated parameters from which plant safety status can be rapidly assessed. SPDS can also be displayed in H-5 Version 19 05/05

the TSC and the EOF to maximize the exchange of information between these facilities and the Control Room. The SPDS is in operation during normal and abnormal operating conditions.

The selection of parameters to be displayed on the SPDS is based on the parameters required to monitor the critical safety functions identified by the General Electric Owners Group (GEOG). These parameters will aid Control Room operators in determining the safety status of the plant. The justification for selecting these parameters is contained in the analyses and background information generated by the GEOG to support the critical safety function restoration guidelines. The emergency response guidelines, which contain the critical safety function restoration guidelines and identify the parameters used to monitor the critical safety functions, have been submitted to the NRC by the GEOG.

4. Post-accident sampling system (PASS)

The PASS allows for obtaining grab samples of the RCS and containment atmosphere.

Various chemical analyses and radiological measurements on these samples can be performed, including the determination of radionuclide concentrations. The results from these analyses are used to assess the extent of core damage and the potential source term.

5. Laboratory Facilities HNP has a laboratory facility for analysis of radioactive samples. The major pieces of equipment include a solid-state gamma spectrometer and a beta/gamma gas proportional counter.

The training section of the simulator building includes a laboratory which can be used for analysis of environmental media. A solid-state gamma spectrometer is available at that location.

Backup laboratory facilities are available at Plant Vogtle. This backup capability would be used if facilities at HNP were not available.

6. Other Process Parameters Several other process parameters, including RCS pressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels and other system indications, are useful both for the initiation phase and continued assessment. Several of these are used in the classification process as discussed in Section D, Emergency Classification System.

7. Offsite Radiological Monitoring HNP has sufficient portable equipment and trained personnel to field a minimum of three field monitoring teams. These teams are dispatched to offsite locations and are also utilized for site boundary and owner-controlled area surveys. Each team obtains emergency monitoring materials and equipment including dosimetry, two-way radio equipment, meters for measuring gamma and beta/gamma dose rates, and air samplers for collecting particulates and iodines.

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8. Emergency Supplies and Equipment Emergency supplies and equipment are located in the Control Room, the TSC, the OSC, and the Simulator Building. Procedures require an inspection and operational check of equipment in these kits on a quarterly basis and after each use. Equipment in these locations is calibrated in accordance with existing plant procedures. Spare equipment is also maintained to replace inoperative or out-of-calibration equipment.

Typical listings of the emergency supplies and equipment are included in Appendix 4.

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K I

T RESTROOMS N DOCUMENT C H

ROOM E (Janitors Closet)

N AIR LOCK WORK AREA NRC STORAGE ROOM ROOM CONFERENCE ROOM FIGURE H TSC TYPICAL LAYOUT PLAN H-8 Version 19 05/05

N OSC Supervision OSC Teams Assembly Area FIGURE H OSC TYPICAL LAYOUT PLAN H-9 Version 19 05/05

Conference Room Field Monitoring Teams Emergency Kit Storage Room Chemistry HP Training Training Lab Lab N

FIGURE H SIMULATOR BUILDING TYPICAL LAYOUT PLAN H-10 Version 19 05/05

I. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT This section describes the methods, systems, and equipment available for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency. Initial assessment actions are the responsibility of the Operations SOS and/or the SS, using available shift personnel. Subsequent assessment actions are directed by the ED with assistance from the Control Room, TSC, the EOF, and the emergency teams, as necessary.

Plant Parameters Plant system and effluent parameter values characteristic of the spectrum of off-normal conditions and accidents and the manner in which these values are used to classify an emergency are provided in Section D. Some of the parameters monitored include: RCS pressure, reactor water level, drywell pressure, drywell radiation level, effluent monitor readings, and ARM readings. Emergency response procedures include methods for quickly assessing plant system and effluent parameter values and classifying the emergency condition. Additional information relative to plant instrumentation is provided in Section H.

Radiological Monitors In-plant radiological measurements provide information helpful in assessing emergency conditions. Systems are installed to permit reactor coolant and drywell atmosphere sampling under emergency conditions. The PASS and the RMS are described in Section H of this Plan.

The drywell wide-range radiation monitor and the drywell hydrogen monitor are used to provide an early indication of the quantity of radioactivity available for release from the containment.

Plant procedures include a correlation between the monitor reading and the extent of core damage. Estimates derived from these monitor readings are used until a sample using PASS has been obtained and analyzed.

Determination of Release Rate Section H of this Plan describes RMS and PASS. These systems, in combination with procedures located in the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF can provide the information needed to determine the radiological source term. Emergency response procedures provide methods for determining relationships between monitor readings and releases and/or material available for release.

Dose Projection System The Meteorological Information Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) is the dose calculation computer model used at HNP. Dispersion is computed using either a straight line or the variable trajectory dispersion model. Both models are time-dependent and provide integrated doses, as well as dose rates, using EPA 400 dose factors.

The dose calculation model will be provided in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF for use in projecting potential offsite doses. The TSC will assume responsibility for this function from the Control Room after the TSC is activated. This function will be transferred to the EOF as soon as practicable from the TSC, to relieve the TSC of unnecessary burden; however, the TSC will I-1 Version 19 05/05

maintain the capability of dose projections should the EOF not be available. Backup calculations will be performed in the TSC, as needed.

Meteorological data are obtained and evaluated, as described in Section H. The meteorological data collection system can be accessed directly from the Control Room, the TSC, and the EOF.

The EOF will be able to provide this information upon request to any offsite organization.

Field Monitoring Up to three teams will be deployed for field monitoring. These teams are available for offsite field monitoring within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, as described in Section H. Initially at least two persons can be dispatched from on-shift personnel for offsite surveys. The on-shift HP/Chem department foreman will provide for field monitoring coordination until the TSC is activated. Once the emergency facilities are activated, the HP/Chem Supervisor in the TSC or the Dose Assessment Supervisor in the EOF can request monitoring teams from support personnel located at the OSC.

Field Monitoring Teams consist of at least two people. These teams are formed at the OSC and dispatched as described in Section B. Materials and equipment for conducting offsite radiological monitoring are located in the Simulator Building. Typical equipment available for field monitoring is listed in Appendix 4.

Offsite field monitoring teams normally use company vehicles and have a two-way radio for communications. It is estimated that teams can be in the field and performing monitoring tasks within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the determination of the need for field monitoring. Preselected radiological sampling and monitoring locations are designated on the HNP 10-mile EPZ field monitoring map. Offsite field monitoring teams perform sampling at these locations and others as directed by the HP/Chem Supervisor in the TSC or the Dose Assessment Supervisor in the EOF. A communicator maintains periodic communications contact with all field monitoring teams. To facilitate direction of the teams and reporting of results, both the field monitoring teams and the communicator use identical maps showing the sampling locations.

The emergency monitoring kits contain a portable air sampler and appropriate cartridges (silver zeolite) and counters to provide the capability to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations

-7 in air as low as 10 µCi/cc. The cartridges can be counted in the field without interference from noble gas (background count rate below 300 cpm on an HP-210 probe or equivalent). The cartridge and air particulate filter are returned to the laboratory at the plant site for isotopic analysis if the field analysis reading is 100 cpm above background on an HP-210 probe or equivalent.

In addition to direct monitoring and air sampling, the assessment program may utilize the environmental sampling program in which environmental samples (water, air, soil, and vegetation) are collected and analyzed in the laboratory for detailed radionuclide data. This program is implemented at the direction of the Dose Assessment Manager or designee.

Data obtained from the field monitoring program (including data from offsite agencies) can be utilized to perform or refine dose projections. Any adjustments to dose projections will be considered in the evaluation of protective action recommendations as described in Section J.

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J. PROTECTIVE RESPONSE This section describes the protective actions that were developed to limit radiation exposure of plant personnel and the public following an accident at the plant. This section addresses conditions relative to the Alert, the Site Area Emergency, or the General Emergency classifications. Any protective response taken at the NUE level is done so at the discretion of the ED.

Protective Response for Onsite Personnel Protective response for onsite personnel (including visitors and contractor personnel) depends upon alerting, assembly and accountability, evacuation, monitoring, and decontamination.

1. Alerting Section E of this Plan, Notification Methods and Procedures, describes the methods to be used to alert onsite personnel of emergency conditions.

2. Assembly and Accountability Upon activation of the plant emergency alarm, plant personnel assigned specific emergency responsibilities proceed to their designated respective emergency response locations, where they are logged in and accounted for. Accountability reports for the Control Room, the OSC, and the TSC) are provided by the Security Department ASAP.

Thereafter, personnel emergency assignment tracking will be in place at each of the ERF to account for all onsite individuals throughout the emergency. This accountability may include use of the security computer system, assignment logs, and required periodic communications between emergency teams and the Control Room and the TSC.

Nonessential plant personnel report to their normal reporting area during an Alert for the purpose of assembly and initial accountability. Visitors, contractors, and escorted personnel will leave the protected area during an Alert or higher declaration.

Nonessential plant personnel located within the protected area leave upon hearing the Site Area or the General Emergency alarm. The Security Department accounts for each person inside the protected area by using the security computer system, which is provided Emergency Diesel backup power as well as an emergency backup fail-over computer. This system is supplemented by the availability of telephone and radio communications capability between the Control Room, the OSC and the TSC. This methodology provides for accountability of all individuals inside the protected area within approximately 30 minutes of the emergency declaration. Accountability reports are made periodically to the ED by the Security Department. Nonessential plant personnel, visitors, and contractors located within the protected area proceed to a rally point location outside the protected area [normally, the Plant Entry Security Building (PESB); however, if radiological conditions prohibit its use, Gate 17 or any ED designated gate exiting the protected area may be used as a rally point]. A security patrol periodically inspects all offices and work locations outside the protected area to ensure that all personnel have received instructions regarding onsite protective measures.

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3. Search and Rescue If protected area accountability reveals a missing person, the ED or designee assembles a search and rescue team per the emergency response procedures. The search and rescue team can obtain information on last known location from the security computer system or reports from other personnel. A search of likely areas will be conducted until the missing individual is located.

4. Evacuation Evacuation of all nonessential personnel (if feasible) is ordered by the ED whenever:

a. It is determined that a threat to the safety of onsite personnel exists.

b. A Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency is declared.

The ED or designee provides evacuation route directions to personnel directed to leave the plant site using the PA system and other communications means. This information, including the evacuation routes (North and/or South on U.S. Highway 1) are included in applicable implementing procedures. Nonessential plant personnel, visitors, and contractors will be directed to the designated county relocation centers if a radiological release is in progress during the emergency. The appropriate relocation centers are Toombs County High School for northern evacuations and Appling County High School for southern evacuations. Evacuation is generally by individually owned vehicles.

Directions provided to evacuees are based on radiological necessities and specific protective action requirements.

5. Monitoring and Decontamination When an Alert is declared but no site evacuation is anticipated, personnel who have left the protected area are monitored by portal monitors. If necessary, decontamination is completed using the plant decontamination facilities located in the Control building or other onsite locations.

For a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency, or when site evacuation is expected and a release of radioactivity has occurred, monitoring is performed by portal monitors at the PESB or by portable monitoring equipment at the rally point areas. The Rally Point Team establishes a control point at the rally point area and monitors evacuees before releasing them. The monitoring teams maintain the appropriate records.

Should decontamination become necessary, the Rally Point Team will conduct decontamination onsite, preferably at the predesignated locations in the Environmental Building or Building 10. Decontamination and waste disposal are completed in accordance with plant procedures.

6. Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies Plant emergency kits and other supplies are used to provide dosimetry, monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory protection gear for individuals arriving or J-2 Version 19 05/05

remaining onsite during the emergency. A supply of potassium iodide is stored in the primary ERF and will be distributed as directed by the ED when thyroid exposures are projected to be above 25 Rem CDE. Plant radiation protection procedures dictate the requirements for use of dosimetry, respiratory protection, and protective clothing. A list of the emergency supplies available at ERF and other onsite areas is detailed in the plant procedures.

Protective Response for the Public The licensee is responsible for ensuring that timely recommendations for protective actions reach appropriate State and local officials. These officials (as described in Section A) are responsible for alerting the public and ordering shelter and/or evacuation, if necessary.

1. Alerting The means used by HNP to alert local and State agencies and the means used by State and local agencies to alert the public are described in Section E and Appendix 3 of this Plan.

2. Protective Action Recommendations The ED is responsible for providing protective action recommendations to State and local officials as part of initial notifications and follow-up communications. These recommendations are based upon assessment actions described in Section I of this Plan.

Using available information regarding plant conditions, projected dose estimates, and any available monitoring data, the ED recommends whether the public should be advised to seek shelter or evacuate. The mechanism for making these recommendations is described in Section E of this Plan. These recommendations are based upon EPA-400, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" (Table 2-1, PAGs for the Early Phase of a Nuclear Incident). Table J-3 provides guidance on the expected protection afforded by residential units.

Plant conditions, plume dose projection calculations, and offsite monitoring results should be evaluated when making protective action recommendations. If significant discrepancies exist between field monitoring results and plume dose rate projection calculations, an evaluation should be made. The most conservative valid dose projections based on evaluation results should be used in the determination of protective action recommendations.

3. Evacuation Determining the benefit of evacuation must take into account the time needed to complete the evacuation. Table J-4 presents a summary of evacuation time estimates.

Appendix 5 includes further detail regarding how these estimates were developed and presents information on evacuation routes, evacuation areas, relocation centers, shelter areas, and the population distribution by evacuation areas and zones.

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TABLE J-1 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON DOSE PROJECTIONS OF FIELD MEASUREMENTS Has offsite dose Continue Assessment been measured OR No projected?

(NOTE)

Yes Is population dose >1.0 Evacuation may be recommended E+3 mrem TEDE or IF in the Emergency Directors

>5.0 E+3 mrem CDE No judgment plant conditions warrant.

Thyroid?

Yes Is dose at 5-10 miles Is dose at 2-5 miles

>1.0 E+3 mrem TEDE >1.0 E+3 mrem or >5.0 E+3 mrem No TEDE or >5.0 E+3 No CDE Thyroid? REM mrem CDE Thyroid?

CDE Thyroid?

Yes Yes Recommend evacuation Recommend evacuation Recommend 0-5 miles complete radius and 0-2 miles complete radius and evacuation 0-2 miles downwind 5-10 miles. Shelter downwind 2-5 miles. Shelter complete radius.

the remainder of the EPZ the remainder of 2-5 miles Shelter downwind and downwind 5-10 miles. 2-5 miles.

Evaluate the need for PARs beyond the 10 mile Continue Assessment EPZ and recommend, as appropriate.

NOTE Field measurements (if utilized) must be corrected to TEDE and CDE Thyroid values in accordance with 73EP-EIP-015-0, Offsite Dose Assessment, prior to evaluating for PARs.

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TABLE J-2 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON PLANT CONDITIONS Has a General Determine PARs Emergency been offsite dose projections No using the PARs based declared?

on Dose Projections flowchart.

Yes Large fission product inventory Recommend in the drywell or evacuation 0-2 miles loss of physical No and shelter downwind control of a vital 2-5 miles.

area to an intruder (NOTE) .

Yes Release in Recommend Evaluate the need to progress or evacuation 0-2 miles modify PARs from offsite containment No and downwind 2-5 dose projections using the failure imminent miles. Shelter the PARs based on Dose or projected? remainder of 2-5 miles Projections flowchart.

and downwind 5-10 miles.

Yes Recommend evacuation Evaluate the need for 0-5 miles complete radius, PARs beyond the and downwind 5-10 miles. 10 mile EPZ and Shelter the remainder of recommend as the EPZ. appropriate.

NOTE Large fission product inventories may be indicated by DWWRM readings >4.8 E 5 R/Hr. IF DWWRM readings are unavailable, perform 73EP-EIP-023-0, Core Damage Assessment to determine equivalent DWWRM readings from the Post LOCA monitors.

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TABLE J-3 SHELTERING GUIDANCE REDUCTION IN EXTERNAL GAMMA DOSE FROM PASSING CLOUD Shielding Factor(a)

Structure or Location Average Range Outside 1.0 -

Vehicles 1.0 -

(b)

Wood frame house (no basement) 0.9 -

(c)

Basement of wood house 0.6 0.1 to 0.7 (c)

Masonry house (no basement) 0.6 0.4 to 0.7 (c)

Basement of masonry house 0.4 0.1 to 0.5 (c)(d)

Large office or industrial building 0.2 0.1 to 0.3

a. The ratio of the interior dose to the exterior dose.

b. For shielding purposes, a wood frame house with brick or stone veneer is approximately equivalent to a masonry house.

c. This range is mainly due to different wall materials and different geometry.

d. The reduction factor depends upon where personnel are located within the building (e.g., the basement or an inside room).

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TABLE J-4 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE

SUMMARY

(a)

Total Evacuation Time (min.)

Analysis Area Day - Fair Night - Adverse Weather(b)

Weather 0-2 miles (Appling County) 95 101 0-2 miles (Toombs County) 70 71 2-5 miles (Appling County) 147 156 2-5 miles (Toombs County) 122 131 5-10 miles (Appling County) 275 305 5-10 miles (Jeff Davis County) 152 160 5-10 miles (Tattnall County) 97 100 5-10 miles (Toombs County) 285 310 Full EPZ - 290

a. The entire resident and transient population within the evacuation analysis area would be evacuated. Time estimates include times associated with notification, preparation, mobilization, and confirmation events.

b. Adverse conditions were assumed to occur at night during a major rainstorm.

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K. RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL Emergency Exposure Guidelines During an emergency, it may be necessary to authorize radiation exposures above 10 CFR 20 limits. These higher exposures may be necessary to complete protective, corrective, or lifesaving actions. Table K-1 presents the emergency exposure limits for the licensee emergency workers involved in sampling or other assessment actions, protective actions (e.g.,

first aid, ambulance, or medical treatment), corrective actions (e.g., emergency repair), or lifesaving actions. These limits are based upon EPA-400, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Action for Nuclear Incidents," Table 2-2, Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performing Emergency Services. Under all such situations, every reasonable effort will be made to minimize exposures. Decisions as to appropriate exposures, considering the action required and relative risks, will be made by the ED in consultation with HP personnel.

Onsite Radiation Protection Program When necessary, the ED can authorize emergency exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits but within the limits given in Table K-1. Where possible, the normal radiation work permit procedure will be used to control exposures. This procedure requires signature approval, prior knowledge of worker past exposures, and guidance on protective actions to be used in the course of the emergency work. If time and urgency do not allow this procedure to be followed, HP supervision may approve emergency radiological work permit controls. In all cases, a briefing is given to the emergency team by a qualified HP member. Each team is accompanied by a HP technician as directed by HP supervision. This briefing includes a discussion of the hazards involved in the planned action, as well as protective actions to be taken.

A record of collective exposures incurred during the emergency will be kept by HP supervision.

This record of exposure will be used to determine OSC team assignments.

In situations where exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits are authorized, the following considerations will be made prior to emergency team selection:

1. Individuals undertaking emergency actions in which the anticipated exposure will exceed 25 Rem TEDE must be volunteers with full awareness of the risks involved.

2. Declared pregnant individuals exposure will be controlled in accordance with normal plant procedures.

3. Personnel should have a known radiation exposure history.

All emergency exposures are to be included in personnel radiation exposure records.

Emergency dosimetry in the form of a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badge and a self-reading dosimeter is provided to each member of the emergency response organization as he or she reports to the response facilities on an as-needed basis. Offsite authorities responding to HNP facilities are provided with emergency dosimetry, as required. Plant procedures present information on the types and quantities of dosimetry available in each ERF and other locations.

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There is a capability to read TLDs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. HP supervision ensures that this is done and maintains exposure records for all emergency response personnel.

Decontamination Plant procedures contain the action levels for determining the need for decontamination of personnel, clothing, and areas. Personnel decontamination facilities are located in the control building and other onsite locations. These locations have all necessary monitoring equipment and decontamination supplies. Waste generated through the use of the decontamination facilities is collected and processed by the plant liquid radwaste system.

If decontamination activities are required at State/local relocation centers for relocated personnel, a controlled access area will be established in such a way that liquid and solid waste can be collected and returned to the plant for processing as radwaste following normal plant radwaste procedures. Supplies of clean clothing will be transported to the offsite State/local relocation centers to replace any contaminated clothing. Personnel decontamination will be accomplished using water washes or other methods for extreme cases, as described in the plant HP procedures. Decontamination of serious wounds will be accomplished at the Appling General Hospital or the Meadows Regional Medical Center, as described in Section L of this Plan.

Equipment and area decontamination will be accomplished using methods described in the plant HP procedures.

Onsite Radiological Contamination Control During emergency conditions, the Security Department provides access control. Emergency response personnel are allowed to enter the protected area and report to the appropriate ERF for accountability prior to completing any emergency assignments. Additional personnel may be allowed onsite with the approval of the ED or the Recovery Manager.

Access to in-plant areas that are contaminated is controlled by barriers, signs, locked doors, or personnel stationed for that purpose. Emergency monitoring teams are responsible for determining the need for onsite radiological access control and establishing the proper method through discussions with TSC personnel. Plant procedures used for determining contaminated areas will be used for determining the need for access control.

Food and water in radiation-controlled areas will be considered contaminated. The ED or designee will make arrangements for supplies to be brought in.

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TABLE K-1 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE LIMITS Dose Limit (Rem) Activity Condition 5 All NA 10 Protecting valuable property Lower dose is not practicable 25 Life saving or protection of Lower dose is not practicable large population

> 25 Life saving or protection of Only on a voluntary basis to large population persons who are fully aware of risks involved This limit is expressed as the sum of the EDE and the CEDE.

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L. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT Onsite Capability Provisions have been made to assist personnel who are injured, who may have received high-radiation doses, or who have been contaminated. Portable first-aid kits, available at strategic locations throughout the plant, and decontamination materials are brought to the scene by responding First Responders and HP technicians as needed. There are selected personnel on shift and in the onsite and offsite emergency organizations trained in first-aid and decontamination procedures. In addition to the onsite first-aid response, arrangements have been made with local hospitals for onsite treatment and evaluation of serious injuries or sicknesses.

The first-aid and decontamination area, located in the control building, is equipped with decontamination supplies and other equipment. Personnel found to be contaminated but not requiring immediate medical attention will undergo decontamination in accordance with plant procedures. Where contamination of large, open wounds is involved, personnel may be immediately transported to the Appling General Hospital or the Meadows Regional Medical Center, where they receive prompt medical attention. Waste fluids and waste from decontamination of personnel or material will be collected and handled as radioactive waste in accordance with the HNP HP Procedures.

Medical Transportation Injured/externally contaminated personnel who require medical attention will normally be transported by ambulance to the cooperating hospitals. Ambulance crews are trained to handle external contamination cases, and an HP technician accompanies any contaminated patients to the hospital. Support and backup ambulance service are provided by the Appling Ambulance Service and Meadows Regional Medical Center Ambulance Service, respectively. These crews also receive sufficient training in handling contamination cases.

Arrangements for the use of the local ambulance service are described in Appendix 2, Letters of Agreement.

Offsite Services Arrangements for treating radiologically contaminated and/or irradiated patients have been made with the Appling General Hospital, located approximately 11 miles south of the site and Meadows Regional Medical Center, located approximately 22 miles north of the site. Each hospital has a radiation emergency area which is separate from the rest of the complex. Each area contain facilities and equipment for emergency surgery, personnel dosimetry, decontamination, radioactive waste recovery, and portable shields for attendant exposure control. These facilities enable the emergency treatment and the handling of contaminated individuals. Noncontamination injuries will be handled by the hospital with its routine facilities.

The medical staff of each hospital is trained to treat externally contaminated patients or individuals who have received high exposures. Trained plant radiation protection personnel assist hospital staff when plant personnel are being evaluated. Following decontamination, personnel suspected to have ingested radionuclides will undergo bioassay analysis for determination of internal contamination.

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A medical consulting group will provide medical support services to coordinate the total radiological management of radiation accident victims. An emergency medical assistance program has been established to use available personnel, facilities, and material in an effective manner.

Training of Medical Support Personnel At least once per calendar year, training will be offered for both onsite and offsite personnel having medical support responsibilities. Retraining typically consists of a repetition of the initial training, with the inclusion of lessons learned from the previous year's drills. In addition, drills and exercises are an integral part of the training program and are conducted as specified in Section N, Exercises and Drills.

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M. RECOVERY AND REENTRY PLANNING AND POST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS The objectives of the licensee following any emergency declaration are to mitigate the consequences of the event and to take those steps described in this Emergency Plan which will minimize any effects upon the health and safety of the public and emergency workers. Once the emergency situation is terminated, the goal is to restore the HNP to normal operating status. For some situations, such as a NUE involving a natural phenomenon that has no effect upon HNP, the emergency situation may not require any change to normal operations; therefore, no formal transition is required. In other circumstances which may involve suspected or actual damage to the plant, a transition is appropriate. This is defined as the recovery phase.

Commencement of Recovery Phase The ED determines when the recovery phase begins. The following guidelines, as applicable to the specific situation, are observed prior to terminating the emergency:

1. The affected reactor is in a stable condition and can be maintained in that condition indefinitely.

2. Plant radiation levels are stable or are decreasing with time.

3. Releases of radioactive material to the environment have ceased or are being controlled within permissible limits.

4. Fire or similar emergency conditions no longer constitute a hazard to safety-related systems or equipment or personnel.

5. Discussions with the licensee's applicable members of the HNP emergency organization, offsite authorities (NRC; Georgia State EMA; and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs County EMA Directors) do not result in identification of any valid reason for not terminating the emergency.

Once the above conditions are satisfied, the ED will announce that the emergency is terminated and the plant is in a recovery mode. He will direct that all elements of the emergency response organization be advised of the change in status via the Emergency Notifications Network, the ENS, and other pertinent communications systems. At this time, the ED, with the approval of Corporate Management, will designate a Recovery Manager to constitute the recovery organization.

Recovery Organization Initially, the Recovery Manager will direct operations from the EOF. He will structure the recovery organization to accomplish the following general objectives:

1. Maintain comprehensive radiation surveillance of the site until levels return to normal.

2. Control access to the affected area of the plant and exposures to workers.

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3. Decontaminate affected areas and equipment.

4. Conduct activities in radiation areas in accordance with the plant's radiation work practices.

5. Isolate and repair damaged systems.

6. Document proceedings of the accident and review the effectiveness of the emergency response organization in mitigating plant damage and reducing radiation exposures to the public.

7. Provide offsite authorities with plant status reports and information concerning the plant recovery organization.

8. Provide assistance with recovery activities undertaken by State and County authorities, if requested.

9. Provide public information on the status of recovery operations via releases to the media.

The Recovery Manager will assign individuals to specific positions depending upon the nature and the extent of damage to the plant. Figure M-1 shows a representative organization for recovery operations. The responsibilities and functions of the managers shown on Figure M-1 are summarized as follows:

• Recovery Manager: has overall responsibility for restoring the plant to a normal operating configuration.

• Plant Operations Manager: manages day-to-day in-plant operations and, during recovery, is responsible for ensuring that repairs and modifications will optimize post-recovery plant operational effectiveness and safety.

• Design and Construction Support Manager: focuses necessary engineering, design, and construction resources on those aspects of plant recovery requiring redesign, modifications, or new construction; directs and coordinates NSSS and balance-of-plant engineering and construction/repair work.

• Radcon/Radwaste Manager: develops plans and procedures to process and control liquid, gaseous, and solid waste to minimize adverse effects on the health and safety of the public and plant recovery personnel. In addition, the Radcon/Radwaste Manager coordinates the activities of staff radiological engineers and radiation protection personnel engaged in waste treatment operations.

• HP and Chemistry Manager: responsible for as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning, execution, and monitoring; plans and manages decontamination of affected areas and equipment; supervises and directs all special radiological controls, radiochemistry, and chemistry activities required to support the recovery operation.

• Technical Support Manager: provides analyses, plans, schedules, and procedures in direct support of plant operations.

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• Advisory Support (Recovery Review Board): reviews and approves general recovery plans and procedures, as well as reviewing the consequences of specific recovery operations.

• Scheduling/Planning Manager: prepares plans and schedules and tracks/expedites recovery operations.

• Administrative/Logistics Manager: supplies administrative, logistic, communications, and personnel support for the recovery operation.

• Public Information Director: coordinates the flow of media information concerning recovery operations.

Once the organization is established and specific responsibilities are assigned, the Recovery Manager may relocate some or all of the recovery organization staff from the EOF to the plant site.

The Recovery Manager will designate, in consultation with management, a Recovery Review Board, which will review and approve recovery plans and procedures. This review will address the impact and consequences, both anticipated and potential, of any given recovery operation.

The Recovery Review Board will establish administrative and procedural controls, lines of communication, and functional responsibilities of each segment of the organization. In general, any recovery operation will require Recovery Review Board review and approval.

Reentry Planning If the accident situation involved a release of radioactivity, appropriate areas of the plant and site will be monitored to determine contamination and radiation levels. Those areas where 2

surface contamination is > 1000 dpm/100 cm will be appropriately identified as radiation or contamination areas, and access will be controlled in accordance with normal plant procedures.

When reentry to a radiation area is required for inspection or work, the activity will be preplanned, and plant radiation work practices and ALARA program principles will be followed.

Exposure Monitoring All personnel who require access to the plant or to radiation areas onsite during the recovery phase will be issued TLDs and other dosimetry, as appropriate. These TLDs will be read at least monthly (or more frequently if work in high-radiation areas is undertaken). The results of the dosimeter readings, including integrated exposures (i.e., man-Rems) will be reported to the Recovery Manager, the Radcon/Radwaste Manager, and others in the plant organization who normally receive such reports.

The State of Georgia has the responsibility for determining population exposure of the public via plume exposure and ingestion pathways. HNP will provide information including: the release rate of radioactivity, the quantity of radioactivity released, the isotopic composition of released material, and meteorological data to assist the State in its determinations.

By determining the affected population and performing dose assessment calculations, including determining the quantity of radioactivity and release rate, HNP personnel can estimate the M-3 Version 19 05/05

population exposure rate, if necessary. Use of data from fixed monitoring stations (TLDs and air samplers) can be used to confirm the exposure estimates.

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CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS PUBLIC RECOVERY ADMINISTRATIVE/

INFORMATION MANAGER LOGISTICS DIRECTOR MANAGER ADVISORY SHEDULING/

SUPPORT PLANNING (RECOVERY MANAGER REVIEW BOARD)

TECHNICAL PLANT DESIGN & HP RADCON/RADWASTE CONSTRUCTION AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER SUPPORT CHEMISTRY MANAGER MANAGER FIGURE M TYPICAL RECOVERY ORGANIZATION M-5 Version 19 05/05

N. EXERCISES AND DRILLS Emergency exercises and drills are conducted to test and evaluate the adequacy of emergency facilities, equipment, procedures, communication links, actions of emergency response personnel, and coordination between the HNP and the offsite emergency response organizations. Some exercises and/or drills are unannounced.

Exercises EP exercises that test integrated response capabilities are conducted in accordance with NRC and FEMA guidance. Exercises are conducted every calendar year and are designed to include the demonstration of a major portion of the basic elements of the EP plans of the participating organizations. The planning and execution of each exercise is coordinated with Federal, State, and local agencies, as appropriate.

For those exercises during which offsite response groups play a significant part, mobilization of State and local personnel, and resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident situation is included. The exercise program for HNP incorporates the following features:

1. Scenarios are varied from year to year so that all major elements of the HNP EP program are tested within a 5-year period.

2. Once every 6 years, an exercise may be scheduled to start after hours. After hours shall be defined as after 6:00 p.m. and prior to 4:00 a.m., or during the weekend.

Deviation from the HNP exercise program (after hours, testing all sections of the program) to support State and local objectives and evaluations is acceptable. Every reasonable effort will be made to return to the program schedule during the following year.

Drills A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation. Drills may be incorporated into an exercise that is supervised and evaluated by a controller organization.

1. Communication Drills To ensure emergency communication channels between HNP and offsite authorities are operable, periodic drills are conducted. For drills, the communication is initiated at HNP using the actual message format in accordance with the applicable plan and procedure.

By using the standard message format, the drill tests understanding of message content, as well as the communication systems hardware. The following test and drills are conducted:

a. Communication drills among the Control Room personnel, the TSC, the OSC, the EOF, and the ENC are conducted at least once per calendar year. These drills may be conducted in conjunction during an exercise.

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b. Communication drills with the State of Georgia EOC; the Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties EOCs; and the licensee field monitoring teams are conducted annually. These drills may be conducted in conjunction with an exercise.

2. Fire Drills Fire drills are conducted in accordance with HNP plant procedures. Quarterly drills are scheduled so that every member of the shift fire brigade participates in at least two drills per year. In addition, an annual practice that requires extinguishing a fire is conducted.

3. Medical Emergency Drills A medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated person is conducted one per calendar year. The drill script identifies the simulated injuries and contamination levels of the individual. The simulated injured individual is given initial treatment, as appropriate, by the HNP personnel transported by ambulance to the hospital, and given subsequent treatment by the hospital staff. Throughout the medical drill, the simulated injured person is treated as though he or she were contaminated until decontamination is demonstrated. A medical drill of this scope is conducted at least once each calendar year and may be included as part of an exercise.

The medical drill should be rotated between the agreement hospitals.

4. Radiological Monitoring Drills Plant environs and radiological monitoring drills (onsite and offsite) are conducted at least once each calendar year. For these drills, a team is dispatched to obtain the required measurement or sample. Demonstration of the proper use of monitoring equipment and sampling of environmental media (water, vegetation, soil, and air) are included. Data are recorded in accordance with the applicable procedure, and communications with the appropriate emergency facility are established. The communication portion of the drill includes direction of the monitoring team and reporting of results. This drill may be conducted in conjunction with an exercise.

5. HP Drills Semi-annual HP drills involve response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne or liquid samples and direct radiation in or about the plant environment. Use of protective clothing and respirators will be demonstrated, as appropriate, during the drills but may not be used throughout the drill (e.g., field monitoring teams do not wear protective clothing or respirators for drill purposes). Exposure control considerations are also used during the drills. Semi-annual drills may be conducted, in whole or in part, jointly with an exercise.

6. PASS Drills The use of the PASS under simulated accident conditions is demonstrated at least once each calendar year. A sample is taken and an analysis performed. Controlled data are used to simulate the potential high-radiation levels that may be encountered during accident conditions. This drill may be conducted in conjunction with an exercise.

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Scenarios Each drill and exercise is conducted in accordance with a scenario. The drill scenarios are considerably less extensive than exercise scenarios. The preparation of drill and exercise scenarios is directed by the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (EPC) or designee, who enlists the assistance of personnel from other departments, as required, to assist in this task.

The scenario for the biennial exercise is prepared under the direction of the EPC or designee and coordinated with offsite authorities. Biennial exercise scenarios are submitted to the NRC and FEMA in accordance with available guidance.

Scenarios include the following information:

• Basic objectives and appropriate evaluation criteria.

• Date, time period, place, and participating organizations.

• Simulated events.

• Time schedules of real and simulated initiating events.

• Narrative summary describing the conduct of the drill or exercise, including such items as simulated casualties, offsite fire fighting assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities.

• Description of arrangements for and advance materials to be provided to official observers.

The exercise program is structured with sufficient flexibility to allow free play for decision-making processes. The exercise scenario package identifies a specific accident sequence, a set of messages, and a set of procedural response actions that parallel the accident sequence. The exercise control organization receives general instructions concerning the deviation of plant personnel from procedural response. The exercise control organization may restrict player action if the response will interfere with the time sequence, restrict player action if the response would prevent demonstration of an exercise objective, and introduce free-play items to the scenario to maintain player interest.

Specific elements that allow free-play in the decision-making process during the exercise include:

• Damage control.

• Accident mitigation.

• Manpower augmentation actions.

• Exposure control actions.

• Communication with offsite authorities.

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• Recommendation of protective actions.

Evaluations and Corrective Actions All drills and exercises, with the exception of fire drills, are evaluated via the following steps:

1. The exercise or drill controllers/evaluators assemble the players at the conclusion of activities for a critique. Players are encouraged to identify areas where improvements are required. The exercise or drill controllers/evaluators also present their observations to the players. Each controller/evaluator submits his/her comments regarding the drill/exercise to the Exercise Manager. Following the exercise, an overall critique is presented to key players and the controller organization.

2. A report, summarizing the drill/exercise and identifying items for improvement and/or corrective actions, is provided to plant management by the EPC. These items will be tracked in accordance with the plants corrective action program.

In addition to the internal critique and evaluation, Federal observers observe, evaluate, and critique the biennial exercise. Corrective actions resulting from this critique will be tracked in accordance with the plants corrective action program.

Fire drills are evaluated in accordance with the plant Fire Protection Program.

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O. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING All badged HNP workers receive general training in EP. Topics include emergency classes, response to emergency conditions, methods of personnel notification, and plant accountability and evacuation procedures. Selected individuals onsite and offsite receive specialized training at least once each calendar year to respond to an emergency situation.

The extent of general training for all badged personnel is documented in HNP procedures. The specialized radiological emergency response training is outlined herein; however, full details are provided in the HNP procedures and appropriate training lesson plans.

Training for EOF emergency responders is outlined in Appendix 7.

Initial Emergency Response Training Various personnel receive initial emergency response training in the subject areas identified in HNP procedures according to the respective emergency response position to which they will be assigned. It should be noted that these subject areas do not necessarily represent specific course titles, since several individual courses may be used to implement the training in each area. Also, both the content and the depth of training may be varied slightly, depending upon the particular audience, to tailor the presentation to the specific needs of the group. Initial emergency response training is offered on an as-needed basis to fill various emergency response positions.

The training is conducted in accordance with lesson plans. Classroom lectures, demonstration and use of equipment, and walk-through of facilities are incorporated into the lesson plans, as appropriate. A written examination will be administered at the conclusion of a lesson, as appropriate. Records of the attendance and the examination scores are retained in accordance with plant procedures.

In addition, drills and exercises are an integral part of the training program and are conducted as specified in Section N of this Plan. During practical drills, on-the-spot corrections are made if the situation and time allow; however, if not, the corrections are pointed out in the critique.

Upon completion of each training session or drill, the participants are asked to critique the training to ensure continued improvement.

Continuing Emergency Response Training Continuing training for emergency responders is offered throughout the year for persons currently holding an emergency response position. Continuing training will consist of information regarding any EP equipment and procedure changes which could affect job performance in an emergency. Practical and theoretical EP concepts, industry standards, industry events and lessons learned are reviewed to reinforce previous training and to provide a broader scope and increased depth of knowledge. Applicable critique items resulting from previous training and exercises are reviewed. Selected objectives from the initial training program may be presented and evaluated if determined to be necessary based on task difficulty, drill critique items and participant feedback.

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Qualification Initial emergency response personnel qualification is obtained by successful completion of the applicable EP Initial Training course(s) as identified in HNP procedures. Each emergency responder is required each calendar year to complete the applicable EP Continuing Training course(s) for each of his/her emergency response positions as identified in HNP procedures.

Also, some positions have additional prerequisites for qualification based on their normally assigned duties. These are as follows:

1. All personnel expected to work in areas that potentially could have excessive airborne radioactivity in emergency conditions should be qualified to wear respiratory protection.

This includes the radiological monitoring teams, the operations personnel, the onsite fire fighting team, the repair teams, and search and rescue personnel.

2. Any personnel expected to serve on the search and rescue team should have completed the equivalent of the Red Cross Multimedia First-Aid Course.

Offsite Emergency Response Training Offsite emergency response training consists of training provided to medical support personnel, as described in Section L of this Plan, and upon the request of State and LEMAs for any pertinent training necessary for emergency response. Additionally, other Southern Company personnel will be trained on an as-needed basis if responding to the plant site.

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P. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING EFFORT The Vice President-Project (Hatch) has overall responsibility and authority for all nuclear activities, including the EP program. The SNC-Hatch Project Emergency Planning Coordinator is responsible for overseeing EP activities offsite and coordinating those activities with Licensee, Federal, State and local response organizations. The EPC stationed at the plant site is responsible for onsite EP activities and supports offsite activities in the plant vicinity. The EPC reports to the Nuclear Training and EP Manager and coordinates site input and involvement in EP programs. The EPC also coordinates the implementation of procedure development and maintenance. Figure P-1 shows the EP organization. The SNC-Hatch Project Emergency Planning Coordinator, the EPC, and other individuals with delegated EP responsibilities are trained by self-study and attending industry seminars, short courses, and workshops.

The Emergency Plan and the approved changes are forwarded to key organizations and appropriate individuals who are responsible for implementing the Plan. The Emergency Plan and agreements, and the Emergency Implementing Procedures are reviewed once each calendar year and updated, as needed. These updates take into account changes identified by drills and exercises, and the independent review described below. Revised pages are dated, and revision bars are used to indicate the changes have been made. In addition, telephone numbers referenced in the Emergency Call List are reviewed quarterly and updated as needed.

All proposed changes to the Emergency Plan are reviewed by the Plant Review Board and evaluated prior to implementation to ensure the continued effectiveness of the program.

Without prior NRC approval, no changes to the Plan are implemented if deemed to decrease the program's effectiveness.

An independent review of the EP program is conducted, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(t). The review includes the Emergency Plan, its implementing procedures and practices, training, readiness testing, equipment, and interfaces with offsite agencies. The results of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, are documented and reported to plant management and to appropriate offsite agencies. Management controls are implemented for evaluation and correction of the review findings. Records of these audits and recommendations are maintained for at least 5 years.

In addition to this Plan, several other formal emergency plans were developed to support the overall emergency response effort. These supporting plans and their sources are as follows:

HNP Emergency Communication Plan GPC- Corporate Communications Department.

Georgia RERP

• Base Plan

• Annex A, Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties

• Annex F, Ingestion Pathway P-1 Version 19 05/05

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT PROJECT (HATCH)

NUCLEAR SUPPORT NUCLEAR PLANT GENERAL MANAGER GENERAL MANAGER PLANT SUPPORT ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER PLANT TRAINING AND EMERGENCY PLANNING EMERGENCY COORDINATOR PREPAREDNESS HATCH PROJECT MANAGER EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COORDINATOR HNP FIGURE P-1 TYPICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ORGANIZATION P-2 Version 19 05/05

APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY

APPENDIX 1 - GLOSSARY ALARA as low as reasonably achievable APRM average power range monitor ARM Area radiation monitor ASAP as soon as possible CAS central alarm station CD civil defense CDE committed dose equivalent CFR Code of Federal Regulations CS core spray DBE design basis earthquake DG diesel generator DNR Department of Natural Resources DOE Department of Energy DWRRM Drywell wide range radiation monitor ECCS emergency core cooling system ED Emergency Director EMA Emergency Management Agency ENC Emergency News Center ENN Emergency Notification Network ENS Emergency Notification System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedures EP emergency preparedness A1-1 Version 19 05/05

GLOSSARY (Continued)

Term Definition EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPC Emergency Preparedness Coordinator EPD Environmental Protection Division EPZ emergency planning zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FTS Federal Telecommunications System GE General Electric Company GEMA Georgia Emergency Management Agency GEOG General Electric Owners Group GPC Georgia Power Company HNP Hatch Nuclear Plant HP health physics HPCI High pressure coolant injection HVAC heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPZ Ingestion Planning Zone IRM intermediate range monitor LEMAs Local Emergency Management Agencies LOCA loss-of-coolant accident LPCI low pressure coolant injection LOSP loss-of-offsite power A1-2 Version 19 05/05

GLOSSARY (Continued)

Term Definition LPRM local power range monitor MCPR Minimum critical power ratio MIDAS Meteorological Information Dose Assessment System MSL main steam line msl mean sea level NAWAS National Warning System NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NPO Nuclear Plant Operator NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS nuclear steam supply system NUE Notification of Unusual Event OBE operating basis earthquake OSC Operations Support Center PA public address PAG Protective Action Guideline PASS post-accident sampling system PNS prompt notification system PO Plant Operator PRA peak recording accelerograph PSW plant service water RCS reactor coolant system REC radiation emergency coordinator RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RET radiological emergency team A1-3 Version 19 05/05

GLOSSARY (Continued)

Term Definition RHR residual heat removal RMS radiation monitoring system RPS reactor protection system SAS secondary alarm station SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus SCS Southern Company Services, Inc.

SMA strong-motion accelerometer SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company SO System Operator SOS Superintendent of Shift (Operations)

SPDS safety parameter display system SRV safety relief valve SS Shift Supervisor STA Shift Technical Advisor SUTs Startup transformers TEDE total effective dose equivalent TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter TS Technical Specifications TSC Technical Support Center USDA United States Department of Agriculture vph vehicles per hour A1-4 Version 19 05/05

APPENDIX 2 LETTERS OF AGREEMENT

APPENDIX 2 - LETTERS OF AGREEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page Appling County Emergency Management Agency ..................................................................... 2 Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Agency ................................................................. 3 Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency (Civil Defense) ............................................. 4 Toombs County Emergency Management Agency .................................................................... 5 Appling County Sheriffs Department ......................................................................................... 6 Jeff Davis County Sheriffs Department ..................................................................................... 7 Tattnall County Sheriffs Department ......................................................................................... 8 Toombs County Sheriffs Department ........................................................................................ 9 Appling General Hospital System..............................................................................................10 Meadows Regional Medical Center...........................................................................................11 U.S. Department of Energy.......................................................................................................12 U.S. Department Of Commerce ................................................................................................13 Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services ..............................................................14 A2-1 Version 19 05/05

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TATTNALL COUNTY EMA (CIVIL DEFENSE)

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TELEDYNE BROWN ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (SHEET 1 OF 3)

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TELEDYNE BROWN ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (SHEET 2 OF 3)

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APPENDIX 3 MEANS FOR PROVIDING PROMPT ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC (PNS)

APPENDIX 3 - MEANS FOR PROVIDING PROMPT ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM A. INTRODUCTION Prompt alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ are the obligation of State and local government or other responsible authority. The responsibility that means exist for this purpose rests with the licensee. An overview of these means is given in this Appendix.

Initial notification of the public will occur in a manner consistent with assuring the public health and safety. The design objective for the system is to meet the acceptance criteria provided in a subsequent section of this Appendix. The design objective does not constitute a guarantee that prompt notification can be provided for everyone with 100-percent assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will meet the design objective in all cases.

The ED at HNP is responsible for notifying appropriate State and local response organizations, as well as plant emergency personnel, in the event of an emergency. The initiating conditions for each emergency class are delineated in Section D in the main body of this Emergency Plan. The capability for 24-hour-per-day alerting and notification of offsite response organizations and plant emergency personnel is described in Section E.

The National Weather Service has agreed to activate the NOAA Alert System in the plant vicinity when requested by appropriate governmental officials. The NOAA weather radio broadcasts 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. Selected radio and TV stations, providing coverage within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, have agreed to broadcast emergency instructions and information in cooperation with offsite officials. Stations are expected to be ready for broadcasting within the terms of their agreement(s) with offsite officials.

In the event of a declared emergency at HNP, initial information to the public would likely be by way of the NOAA Alert System. The initial message would likely state that an emergency condition exists at the HNP and might also advise of any appropriate instructions for protective actions. Further instructions may be provided on selected radio and television stations. These continuing instructions are expected to provide more specific or detailed information on any protective actions advised for affected areas.

Information on the nature of the accident, any release, and the progress in mitigating or terminating the emergency might also be provided periodically, along with a prognosis for escalation or termination of the event.

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B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The primary means for alerting and providing initial instructions to the public is by the NOAA Alert System. The emergency message will be broadcast on the NOAA weather radio immediately after completion of an acoustic alerting signal. NOAA will periodically broadcast short, updated messages, as warranted. Detailed information and instructions may be broadcast on selected local radio and television stations. State and local officials will provide and coordinate the messages to be broadcast by NOAA weather radio, or selected local radio and television stations.

The primary alerting mechanism will be augmented by secondary means using State and local resources on an as-needed and/or as-available basis. These resources consist of some combination of the following:

1. Vehicles equipped with sirens and/or loudspeakers traveling the road network - These vehicles would be supplied by the County Sheriff's Department, the Georgia State Patrol, and/or the EMA. Several radio networks are available for use in this operation which would likely be directed from the county EOC. Routes to be traversed can be pre-established.

2. Boats equipped with a voice or sound device traveling the Altamaha River to notify sportsmen or recreationers - These boats would be supplied locally by the Georgia DNR, Game and Fish Division, and the EMA.

3. Door-to-door contact in acute areas - This would be accomplished as deemed necessary by offsite authorities and might be carried out after completion of portions of Item 1 above in conjunction with confirmation of evacuation.

C. CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTANCE

1. Within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, the system will provide an alerting signal and notification by NOAA radio; further notification might also be provided by selected local radio and television stations.

2. The minimum acceptable objectives for coverage by the system are:

a. Capability for both alerting signal and an information or instructional message to the population on an area-wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ, within 15 min.

b. The initial notification system will assure direct coverage of essentially 100 percent of the population within 10 miles of the site.

c. Special arrangements will be made to assure 100-percent coverage, within 45 min., of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ.

People in remote areas, such as those engaged in hunting and fishing, will be reached on a best-effort basis. Vehicles equipped with sirens or loudspeakers are a feasible means to notify such people.

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Assurance or continued notification capability will be verified on a statistical basis. Periodically, perhaps in conjunction with an exercise at HNP, the public alert and notification system will be activated; FEMA, the licensee and/or the State and local government will survey a sample of the residents in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The survey results may be used to assess the public's ability to hear the alerting signal and their awareness of the meaning of the prompt notification message, as well as the availability of information on what action to take in an emergency. In response to the findings of these surveys, appropriate corrective measures will be taken to provide reasonable assurance that coverage approaching the design objective is maintained.

3. State and local agencies have the capability to provide prompt information over selected local radio and television at the time of the activation of the alerting signal. An agreement has been made with NOAA, and arrangements have been made with selected local radio and television stations. Authority for the provision of this information is provided through agreements negotiated between selected local radio and television station providing coverage within the EPZ and State and Local officials.

D. PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION In the event of an emergency, the licensee has developed and will maintain plans, systems, procedures, and relationships that are effective in notifying appropriate governmental and other responsible authorities. These authorities will have available to them the means for alerting and notifying the general public and for advising of appropriate responses by the public.

The communications network utilized between the plant and the responsible authorities is described in section E.

Notification of the licensee's emergency response personnel is described in Section E of the main body of this Emergency Plan. Notification of State and local response organization personnel would be described in their respective emergency plans.

The licensee provides NOAA radio receivers for all establishments (residents, businesses, and schools) within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The licensee will replace any defective radios.

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APPENDIX 4 TYPICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT LISTS

TABLE A4-1 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

1. Survey instruments

2. Complete sets of protective clothing

3. SCBAs

4. Spare air cylinders

5. Spare batteries

6. Radiation Protection and Monitoring Procedures

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TABLE A4-2 TSC EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

1. Survey instruments

2. Digital alarming dosimeters

3. Air sampler

4. Radiological signs and inserts

5. SCBAs

6. Potassium iodide tablets

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TABLE A4-3 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EOF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

EOF Supplies

1. Survey instruments (and check sources)

2. Digital alarming dosimeters

3. TLDs

4. Air samplers

5. Silver zeolite cartridges for air samplers

6. Particulate filter papers for air samplers

7. Smears

8. Plastic bags

9. Radiological signs and inserts

10. Barrier ropes

11. Tape

12. Plastic sheeting

13. Paper coveralls

14. Paper shoe covers

15. First-aid kit

16. Flashlights

17. Spare batteries

18. Potassium iodide tablets

19. Emergency Implementing Procedures; checklists and data forms

20. Clipboards, writing materials, and secretarial supplies

21. Area maps

22. Portable radios

23. NOAA weather radio

24. Plant radio

25. Respirators (for field monitoring team use)

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TABLE A4-3 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

EOF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

Emergency field-monitoring materials and equipment

1. Survey instruments (and check sources)

2. Digital alarming dosimeters

3. TLDs

4. Portable air sampler

5. Silver zeolite cartridges for portable air sampler

6. Particulate filter papers for portable air sampler

7. Sample counting equipment

8. Field-monitoring log forms and log books

9. Area and road maps

10. Field-monitoring and sampling procedures

11. Clipboard and writing materials

12. Smear record folders

13. Plastic sample bags and bottles

14. Spade

15. Gloves

16. First-aid kit

17. Flashlights with spare batteries

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TABLE A4-4 OSC EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

1. Survey instruments (and check sources)

2. Digital alarming dosimeters

3. TLDs

4. Air samplers

5. Silver zeolite cartridges for air sampler

6. Particulate filter papers for air sampler

7. Survey logs

8. Smear record folders

9. Plastic bags

10. Radiological signs and inserts

11. Barrier ropes

12. Tape

13. Plastic sheeting

14. Absorbent material

15. Complete sets of protective clothing

16. Respirators

17. Respirator particulate filters

18. SCBAs

19. Spare air cylinders

20. Plant radio

21. Radiation Protection and Monitoring Procedures

22. Potassium iodide tablets

23. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures; checklists and data forms

24. Clipboards, writing materials, and secretarial supplies

25. Plastic rainsuits Decon kit

1. Decon agents

2. Paper towels

3. Soap powder

4. Pumice-base soap

5. Scrub brushes

6. Paper coveralls

7. Paper booties

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APPENDIX 5 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES FOR HNP PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EPZ

APPENDIX 5 - EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES In the event of a declared emergency at the HNP, it is envisioned that nuclear materials could possibly affect an area 10 miles in radius from the plant site. Weather and wind conditions will play a major role in the direction and distance nuclear materials may extend. The affected area has been divided into sixteen 22 1/2-degree annular sectors surrounding the nuclear facility.

These annular sectors will provide an effective method for determining affected areas, since the nuclear materials will spread laterally, as well as forward, when drifting from the plant site. The lateral pattern will tend to spread wider as distance increases. Radiation protection operations can easily determine which annular sections are affected by the incident, thus providing reliable data for evacuating affected areas or effecting restrictions upon the population living in the area.

These sectors overlay the State of Georgia defined zones, which have readily identifiable boundaries. Evacuation and/or restrictions would be directed only within the boundaries of the zones affected by the incident (Figure A5-4). A map of the plume exposure pathway EPZ showing transportation networks, political boundaries, structures, and commercial and special facilities is given in Figure A5-2.

Estimates of evacuation times were made in consultation with the Emergency Management Director of Appling, Toombs, Tattnall, and Jeff Davis Counties; County Sheriff's offices; and representatives from county maintenance departments, Altamaha and Satilla EMCs, Georgia Forestry Commission, State Emergency Management Planners, and the Georgia Department of Transportation. Since the plume exposure pathway EPZ is located in an extremely rural area, there was no need for computer models or complicated methods for analysis of evacuation times. Estimates of evacuation time were calculated as the amount of time needed to drive from the longest distance within an area to the 10-mile edge of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Estimates were made for normal and adverse conditions. For analysis purposes, normal conditions were assumed to occur in normal daylight on an average weekday. Adverse conditions were assumed to occur at night during a major rainstorm.

Information on roadway capacities was provided by the Georgia Department of Transportation.

Road capacities in vehicles per hour (vph) were determined by the following equation:

Capacity = 2000 (density and speed factor) (width adjustment factor) (directional distribution factor)

Capacities were calculated for major roads (width > 20 ft) and minor roads (width 20 ft or less).

Average speed under normal conditions was assumed to be 50 mph on major roads and 40 mph on minor roads. Average speed under adverse conditions was assumed to be 30 mph on both major and minor roads. Spacing of vehicles was assumed to be 20 ft per 10 mph under normal conditions and 30 ft per 10 mph under adverse conditions. It was further assumed direction of travel direction factor would be 90 percent in outbound lanes. Road capacity estimates are given below:

Major Roads Normal Conditions:

Capacity - 2000 (0.66) (0.87) (0.90) = 1000 vph A5-1 Version 19 05/05

Adverse Conditions:

Capacity - 2000 (0.30) (0.87) (0.90) = 470 vph Minor Roads Normal Conditions:

Capacity - 2000 (0.51) (0.77) (0.90) = 650 vph Adverse Conditions:

Capacity - 2000 (0.30) (0.77) (0.90) = 410 vph Information considered in population estimates included individual county tax maps, road maps, aerial photography, and windshield surveys. Population estimates and number of residences were obtained from the NOAA radio distribution information. It was further assumed each household would use one automobile in evacuation.

Population segments considered in the analysis included permanent residents, persons in special facilities, and persons with special needs. Transients in this rural area were considered negligible. Most transients would be passing through the area on U.S. Highway No. 1, major route for evacuation, and could be notified from aircraft or Sheriff's vehicles. The population distribution of permanent residents and estimated vehicle distribution are given in Table A5-1.

The locations of persons with special needs are given in Table A5-4.

Special facility population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ considered in this analysis includes Toombs Central School, Altamaha Elementary School, and Baxley Wilderness Institute (Figure A5-2).

Populations at campsites in the area were considered negligible for this analysis, although persons in such areas will be notified by use of aircraft-mounted speakers or Sheriff's vehicles.

The Toombs Central School, located in Zone J-10, has a normal population of approximately 400. The Altamaha Elementary School, located in Zone C-5, has a normal population of 300.

Baxley Wilderness Institute is located in Zone C-5 and has a normal population of 30.

Principal evacuation routes to reception centers are depicted in Figure A5-3. Evacuation routes are adequate to move the population from any part of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway.

The only physical barrier in the area is the Altamaha River, which bisects the plume exposure pathway EPZ along an east-west line. Evacuation of Zones A, B-5, B-10, C-10, D-10, and Appling County portions of Zones C-5 and E-10 will channel evacuees to U.S. Highway No. 1 and then south to the reception center at the Appling County Comprehensive High School.

Evacuation of portions of Jeff Davis County Zones F-10 and G-10 in the 5- to 10-mile zone would channel evacuees to the Altamaha Road and to U.S. Highway No. 341, and then to the reception center at the Jeff Davis High School in Hazlehurst, Georgia. Evacuation of Tattnall County portions of Zone L-10 would channel evacuees to Georgia Highway No. 147 and then to the reception center at the Tattnall County High School. Evacuations of Zones A, D-5, E-5, H-10, I-10, and Toombs County portions of Zones J-10 and K-10 would channel evacuees to U.S. Highway No. 1 and Georgia Highway No. 147, and then to the reception center at Toombs A5-2 Version 19 05/05

County High School. Roadway characteristics of principal evacuation routes within the plume exposure pathway EPZ are given in Table A5-3.

Movements of the evacuees along these predetermined routes could be affected by one or more of the following accident-related factors:

1. A General Emergency resulting in a major release which affects a large area could dictate rerouting the evacuation traffic.

2. A slow wind causing a radioactive plume to drift slowly over all or a portion of an evacuation route would dictate rerouting the evacuation traffic.

3. A temperature inversion; i.e., a reversal of the normal atmospheric temperature gradient, causing released radioactive material to remain near the ground surface could result in rerouting of the evacuation traffic.

If monitoring results determine the need for evacuation, wind direction will be used to determine zone(s) to recommend for evacuation to the State of Georgia.

Emergency instructions will employ State of Georgia defined zones that use landmarks, street names, and similar ground features to describe the area to be evacuated to the surrounding population.

Privately owned vehicles will be the primary mode of transportation if evacuation is directed.

County school buses, traveling their regular routes, will provide transportation to individuals lacking personal transportation. Special-needs persons registered with the County Emergency Management Units will be evacuated by an appropriate vehicle dispatched directly to their homes (Figure A5-3).

No institutional facilities are located within the 10-mile zone, with the exception of the Altamaha Elementary School, Baxley Wilderness Institute, and the Toombs Central School, which will require special consideration in an evacuation. School buses transporting students are called in an ALERT emergency classification. If it became necessary to evacuate the schools; the entire school populations could be transported to safety within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> under all conditions.

Evacuated students will be transported in groups to the reception centers. Table A5-3 presents a summary of the evacuation analysis. Areas were subdivided according to local Emergency Management plans for moving evacuees into reception areas. The prompt notification system will alert the affected populations within 15 min. Time for preparation of evacuation is assumed to be 30 min. following notification. Evacuation times presented in Table A5-3 represent travel times for populations to leave the 2-5, and 10-mile radii within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Confirmation times presented represent the times required to make visual observations of residences to confirm evacuation. Confirmation would be made from Sheriff's vehicles or Emergency Management vehicles in Toombs, Appling, Tattnall and Jeff Davis Counties. The maximum time required for evacuation and confirmation of the entire 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ under adverse conditions is assumed or estimated to be 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 50 min.

This assumption is based upon the fact that notification, preparation, evacuation, and confirmation would take place sequentially. A more reasonable assumption would include some overlap in time between notification and preparation, and between evacuation and confirmation. With such overlap, the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ could be evacuated and confirmed within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> under adverse conditions.

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TABLE A5-1 (a)(b)

POPULATION AND VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN HNP EPZ Zone Population Vehicles A 328 138 B-5 587 253 B-10 212 92 C-5 497 182 C-10 185 83 D-5 667 291 D-10 1625 627 E-5 287 101 E-10 862 342 F-10 343 137 G-10 254 94 H-10 452 175 I-10 615 215 J-10 646 252 K-10 115 50 L-10 175 69 TOTAL 7850 3101

a. This information was taken from the Hatch Tone Alert Radio Database as of December 2002.

b. There are 3101 resident/business locations within the 10-mile radius of HNP.

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TABLE A5-2 ROADWAY CHARACTERISTICS No. of Capacity Capacity Segment(s)* Lanes Type Normal Adverse Comments 1-2 2 Rural Hwy 1000 470 U.S. Hwy No. 1 3-4 4 Rural Hwy 2000 940 U.S. Hwy No. 1 5-7 2 Rural Hwy 1000 470 GA Hwy No. 56 8 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 336 9 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 78 10, 11 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 147 12, 13, 15 2 Rural Hwy 1000 470 GA Hwy No. 178 14, 15 2 Rural Hwy 1000 470 GA Hwy No. 178 16 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rds 332, 333 17 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 203 18, 19 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 538 20 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 1 21, 22 2 Rural Hwy 650 410 Co Rd 537 Legend:

Hwy = highway.

Co Rd = county road.

• Segments are shown in Figure A5-3.

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TABLE A5-3 EVACUATION TIME ANALYSIS Special Needs Special Needs Population Population Persons Persons Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation Permanent Permanent Notification Preparation Time (min.) Time (min.) Time (min.) Time (min.) Conformation Zones Population Vehicles Time (min.) Time (min.) Normal Adverse Normal Adverse Time (min.)

Within 2 miles (1)

A 309 130 15 30 5 6 15 20 30 (2)

A 19 8 15 30 5 6 0 0 20 Between 2 & 5 miles (1)

B-5, C-5 1084 435 15 30 15 20 17 21 70 (2)

D-5, E-5 954 392 15 30 12 16 25 30 40 Between 5 & 10 miles B-10, C-10 (1)

D-10, E-10 2884 1144 15 30 30 45 60 75 140 H-10, I-10, (2)

J-10, K-10 1828 692 15 30 30 40 90 105 120 (3)

F-10, G-10 597 231 15 30 12 18 15 17 80 (4)

L-10 175 69 15 30 12 15 0 0 40 Notes:

1. Portion of Appling County.

2. Portion of Toombs County.

3. Portion of Jeff Davis County.

4. Portion of Tattnall County.

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TABLE A5-4 LOCATION OF PERSONS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS WITHIN THE 10-MILE EPZ Emergency Appling Jeff Davis Tattnall Toombs Planning Zone County County County County A 0 *

• 0 B-5 0 * *

• C-5 0 * *

• D-5 * *

• 3 E-5 * *

• 0 B-10 1 * *

• C-10 2 * *

• D-10 8 * *

• E-10 1 * *

• F-10

• 0 *

• G-10

• 0 *

• H-10 * *

• 1 I-10 * *

• 0 J-10 * *

• 0 K-10 * *

• 0 L-10 *

• 1

• Note: The data were compiled from information provided by the Plume Exposure EPZ County EMA directors.

• EPZ is not applicable to this county.

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FIGURE A5 SAMPLING LOCATIONS FOR RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM A5-8 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE A5 PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY (EPZ) AREA MAP INDICATING FACILITIES AND PUBLIC AREAS A5-9 Version 19 05/05

FIGURE A5 PRINCIPAL EVACUATION ROUTES WITHIN PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY (EPZ)

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FIGURE A5 STATE OF GEORGIA DEFINED ZONE LAYOUT WITHIN THE 10-MILE EPZ A5-11 Version 19 05/05

APPENDIX 6 TYPICAL EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

APPENDIX 6 - TYPICAL EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Procedure No. Procedure Title 73EP-EIP-001-OS Emergency Classification and Initial Actions 73EP-EIP-004-OS Duties of ED 73EP-EIP-005-OS On-Shift Operations Personnel Emergency Duties 73EP-EIP-009-OS Nuclear Security Duties 73EP-EIP-011-OS Assembly, Accountability and Evacuation 73EP-EIP-012-OS Search and Rescue Team Duties 73EP-EIP-013-OS Contaminated Injury and First Aid 73EP-EIP-014-OS Internal Survey Team Duties 73EP-EIP-015-OS Offsite Dose Assessment 73EP-EIP-016-OS TSC HVAC Operation 73EP-EIP-017-OS Emergency Exposure Control 73EP-EIP-018-OS Prompt Offsite Dose Assessment 73EP-EIP-019-OS Rally Point Team Duties 73EP-EIP-020-OS Offsite Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies 73EP-EIP-021-OS Alternate OSC Activation 73EP-EIP-023-OS Core Damage Assessment 73EP-EIP-054-OS Protective Action Recommendations to State and Local Authorities 73EP-EIP-062-OS OSC Activation 73EP-EIP-063-OS TSC Activation 73EP-EIP-073-OS Offsite Emergency Notifications 73EP-RAD-001-OS Radiological Event 73EP-RAD-006-OS Repair and Corrective Action During a Radiological Emergency A6-1 Version 19 05/05

Procedure No. Procedure Title NMP-EP-101 EOF Activation NMP-EP-102 EOF Manager NMP-EP-103 Licensing Support Coordinator NMP-EP-104 Dose Assessment Supervisor NMP-EP-105 EOF Technical Supervisor NMP-EP-106 EOF Support Coordinator NMP-EP-107 EOF Security Coordinator NMP-EP-108 Offsite Response Coordinator A6-2 Version 19 05/05

APPENDIX 7 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

APPENDIX 7 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY A. INTRODUCTION A.1 Purpose The purpose of this appendix is to outline the function of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC). Additionally, this appendix delineates the actions to be taken by SNC Corporate Staff in the event of an emergency at any (SNC) site.

A.2 Scope and Applicability This appendix provides the framework for operations of the EOF for SNC. This appendix is an integral part of the site-specific emergency plan(s).

This appendix may be implemented to coordinate a SNC response to an emergency at any SNC facility or in response to a transportation accident involving radioactive material.

Additionally, this appendix provides the mechanism for obtaining and providing additional emergency response support and resources to SNC site(s) in the event of an emergency.

The SNC Corporate Staff will be responsible for offsite emergency response support and resources as requested. Overall management of the emergency will be accomplished at the specific site(s) [Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP), and Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)].

A.3 Summary The site-specific Emergency Plan is activated by the Emergency Director (ED). Upon notification of an ALERT or higher classification or as directed by the ED, the EOF will be activated as described in emergency implementing procedures. When notified, the designated corporate emergency organization management report to the EOF to be briefed on current conditions and perform their assigned tasks. Each manager's support staff will operate from that group's office area. Offsite support personnel and equipment will be dispatched to the site Operations Support Center (OSC) or Technical Support Center (TSC) upon request from the specific site ED. The corporate emergency organization will provide offsite emergency response support and resources to SNC sites 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day until the emergency has been terminated. The EOF will be activated for an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL emergency classification. This facility will be operational within about an hour of the initial notification.

SNCs goal is to begin notification of all required on-call Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel as soon as practicable, within 15 minutes, following the declaration of an Alert emergency or higher emergency classification at any SNC site.

Minimum EOF staff for facility activation will include the EOF Manager, the Dose Assessment Supervisor, the Dose Analyst, the Field Team Coordinator, the ENN Communicator, and the Licensing Support Coordinator. Access control for the EOF is established through the use of electronic card readers.

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During the emergency, the ED will normally be located in either the TSC or Control Room at his/her option. The ED is responsible for the management of the emergency response.

Specific duties and responsibilities are provided in the site-specific Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

SNC has taken precautions to ensure that the EOF can be quickly accessed and made operational within about an hour of the initial notification and is safeguarded against unauthorized personnel. The common EOF is located in a secure building. The building itself has posted security guards and video surveillance cameras. Any outside doors that do not have security guards are accessible only by SNC ID badges. Additionally, the EOF facility door is accessible only to people with ID badges that have been pre-approved for access. If an event were to occur during off-normal hours, a guard will be posted at the main entrance to Building 40 to allow access to offsite agency or other responders without predesignated ID access.

B. EOF ORGANIZATION The EOF Organization consists of selected management and staff members located in the SNC Corporate Office. This organization is responsible for providing offsite emergency response support and resources, as needed. The EOF Organization is displayed on Figure 7-1 and typical duty assignments are shown in Table 7-1. This organization may be supplemented or reduced by the EOF Manager, as required, to respond to the specific emergency situation but will not be reduced to below the minimum staff as specified in A.3 above.

SNC normally maintains ERO positions in a duty rotation. Several positions have been designated as plant specific and, as such, have personnel designated for each of the three sites. Specifically, each of the following EOF positions has site-specific personnel designated:

• EOF Manager

• EOF Technical Supervisor In order to augment additional staff that may be needed in the unlikely event of a multisite accident, SNC will reactivate its ERO notification system. When the EOF is activated, all EOF staff pagers are activated, and all EOF personnel are expected to report to the EOF. Personnel who are not needed to augment positions are briefed and dismissed with a standby status.

B.1 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Manager The EOF Manager manages the following activities:

• Overall direction and control of the offsite response for SNC.

• Communication of radiological information to State and local emergency response agencies as needed.

• After consultation with the ED, provides support for initial activities associated with planning for recovery operations.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Manager will be assumed by designated SNC corporate personnel. The designated individual will be assigned according to a predetermined rotation schedule and will typically have either previous plant-specific SRO background or long-term supervisory/management experience.

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The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Manager are as follows:

1. Manage the EOF and direct the activities of the EOF organization.

2. Ensure activation of the EOF at ALERT or higher classification, or as directed by the ED.

3. Support site efforts for the following:

• Determining the cause of the incident.

• Assessing the overall damage, including personnel, equipment, systems, facilities, and/or fuel.

• Developing recovery plans.

4. Keep corporate management informed regarding the emergency response and emergency classification upgrades.

5. Ensure that the joint owners, as applicable, are kept apprised of significant changes in the emergency status including upgrades, downgrades, and terminations.

6. Keep the GPC/APC public information director fully apprised regarding the status of the emergency.

7. Identify the available resources within and outside the company to assist in mitigation and recovery, as necessary.

8. Procure outside services and equipment, as necessary.

9. Obtain assistance from SNC Environmental Services regarding nonradiological and hazardous materials environmental considerations.

10. Request assistance from legal counsel as appropriate.

11. Coordinate NRC inquiries/activities requiring a response from the Corporate Office. Obtain licenses and/or amendments to licenses, if required, for repair of the affected unit and disposal of waste products.

12. Approve news releases issued from the Emergency Response Center (ERC) or the Emergency News Center (ENC).

13. Communicate developed PARs to the ED once offsite communication responsibility is transferred to the EOF. The EOF Manager and ED will determine which facility will communicate the PARs to offsite agencies.

Normally, initial PARs will be communicated to offsite agencies by the TSC while changes in PARs will be communicated to offsite agencies by the EOF.

14. Ensure that necessary support is provided to the SNC Newswriter, the SNC Spokesperson, and the Public Information Director to ensure timely and accurate information flow to the public. An unaffected EOF Manager will be available to assist the affected EOF Manager in Company Spokesperson interface activities.

B.2 EOF Technical Supervisor The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Technical Supervisor will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The designated individual will be assigned according to a A7-3 Version 19 05/05

predetermined rotation schedule and will typically have plant-specific long-term engineering/design experience. Reporting to the EOF Technical Supervisor are the emergency communicators and the necessary engineering, technical, and licensing personnel needed to support tasks assigned to the EOF.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Technical Supervisor are as follows:

1. Provide technical interface to vendors, utility groups, consultants, and technical investigation groups.

2. Assist in establishing a list of plant equipment/system modifications required to bring the plant to cold shutdown, recovery, and/or startup.

3. Develop an engineering support plan compatible with the plant mitigation and recovery plan. Provide engineering support developing site recovery procedures. This plan will include engineering personnel resources.

4. Coordinate the work performed by SNC engineering, Southern Company Services, the architect engineer, the nuclear steam supply system supplier, and other engineering consultants. Coordinate the transmittal of engineering modification/design documents (Design Change Packages (DCP), Request for Engineering Assistance (REA), etc) to the site staff and site and SNC procurement groups.

5. Coordinate the receipt and assessment of technical information related to plant systems and facility operations and submit recommendations to the TSC Manager through the EOF Manager.

6. Provide licensing support, as requested, through utilization of the licensing support.

7. Provide communications support for offsite notifications [(Emergency Notification Network (ENN)], as requested.

B.3 EOF Support Coordinator The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Support Coordinator will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotational schedule. Reporting to the EOF Support Coordinator are the nontechnical personnel needed to support tasks assigned to the EOF. Additionally, the News Writer is matrixed to the EOF Support Coordinator from the corporate communications organization.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Support Coordinator are as follows:

1. Provide assistance to the EOF Support Coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC) for ordering equipment and materials needed. Establish a standby list of personnel to provide additional technical support, as required.

2. Obtain materials, supplies, and equipment that are needed in the EOF.

3. Process expense accounts, distribute checks from payroll, and conduct other financial aspects of the emergency organization.

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4. Provide logistics arrangements for support personnel called in to assist in the emergency, including communications hardware, transportation, food, and lodging.

5. Obtain assistance from corporate financial staff to communicate, as necessary, with banks, financial institutions, investors, joint owners, and insurers regarding the emergency situation.

6. During the initial phase of the emergency, provide the official log of actions and the course of the emergency from the EOF.

7. Provide administrative services such as clerical, typing, and duplication for the Corporate Emergency Response Organization.

8. Provide administrative, logistic, financial, and procurement support as appropriate during the recovery phase.

B.4 Dose Assessment Supervisor The duties and responsibilities of the Dose Assessment Supervisor will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule. Reporting to the Dose Assessment Supervisor are the Dose Analyst, Field Team Coordinator, Field Team Communicator, and Radiological Status Communicator.

The TSC will initially be responsible for dose projection and field team control activities.

When the EOF is activated and ready to assume functions of dose projection/assessment activities, then the EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor will coordinate transfer of dose assessment, field team control, and protective action determination from the TSC to the EOF. Coordination will include ED/EOF Manager mutual approval of the transfer with the intention of transferring dose assessment from the TSC to the EOF as rapidly as possible while ensuring a smoothly coordinated transfer of this critical function.

The duties and responsibilities of the Dose Assessment Supervisor are as follows:

1. Support the plant dose assessment supervisor as necessary. Be prepared to assume offsite dose projection if requested. Keep the EOF Manager informed of any offsite dose assessments performed by the site or corporate staff.

2. Provide an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) exposure review of engineering modifications and tasks proposed by the emergency organization, including necessary documentation of those reviews.

3. Develop methods for treatment and/or disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the emergency and recovery operations.

4. Compare calculations and measurements with State and Federal groups performing radiological assessments.

5. Coordinate distribution of dose assessment information with offsite authorities.

6. Coordinate assistance to the State for transportation incidents involving radioactive material, as requested.

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7. Develop protective action recommendations (PARs) and communicate to the EOF Manager the need for PAR communication once control is transferred to the EOF.

B.5 Security Coordinator The duties and responsibilities of the Security Coordinator will be assumed by SNC corporate security personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule.

The duties and responsibilities of the Security Coordinator are as follows:

1. Support the plant security manager as necessary. Keep the EOF Manager informed of any security events/issues.

2. Provide assistance to the security supervisor at the site, as requested.

3. Establish and maintain access control for the EOF.

B.6 Offsite Response Coordinator The duties and responsibilities of the Offsite Response Coordinator will be assumed by SNC Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinators and designated staff. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule.

The duties and responsibilities of the Offsite Response Coordinator are as follows:

1. Coordinate activities concerning the dispatch and update of technical liaisons to State and local authorities, as appropriate.

2. Monitor EOF functional areas to facilitate coordination between the licensee and State and local agencies.

B.7 Engineering/Technical Support Staff and Administrative Support Staff

1. The Engineering/Technical Support staff and administrative support will report to the EOF, as directed. These job titles refer to a number of individuals performing a variety of designated tasks. Their numbers will depend on the type and duration of the emergency.

2. The Engineering/Technical Support staff are personnel designated by the management of the Corporate Emergency Organization. They provide management, technical, regulatory, and licensing support during an emergency.

This staff reports through the EOF Technical Supervisor to the EOF Manager.

3. The administrative support staff are the nontechnical members of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization. They perform duties designated by the EOF Support Coordinator or appropriate manager which include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Providing clerical and secretarial support to the Emergency organization.

b. Operation of word processors.

c. Operation of telecopiers.

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d. Making entries to and retrieving data from Nuclear Network.

e. Retrieval of file documents.

f. Updating status boards using information provided from the sites.

C. NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION Initial notifications of emergency response personnel will follow the guidelines specified in the site-specific Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. This appendix contains the emergency notification of Corporate Management and the appropriate offsite support groups not specified in the site-specific Emergency Plan(s).

C.1 Notification of Corporate Management The Corporate Duty Manager will be notified of all emergencies classified at any SNC site. The Corporate Duty Manager will in turn notify the EOF Manager. The EOF Manager is responsible for activation of the EOF Staff and notifying the appropriate Corporate Management.

1. The EOF Manager is responsible for assuring that the Corporate Emergency Organization is notified.

2. The EOF Manager will also be responsible for ensuring that the corporate emergency staff members report directly to the EOF.

3. Notification of personnel may be accomplished through the use of an automated or manual system.

C.2 Notification of Offsite Support Agencies Offsite support agencies will be notified by the appropriate emergency organization member(s) as requested by VEGP, FNP, and HNP.

D. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Following the declaration of an emergency, response activity will be coordinated at a number of facilities. These emergency response facilities are described in the site-specific emergency plans. The EOF is a common facility for all SNC sites and is described in this section.

D.1 EOF Description The EOF is the central location for management of the offsite emergency response, coordination of radiological assessment, and management of initial recovery operations. The EOF is located in Birmingham, Alabama, and serves as the EOF for all SNC sites (VEGP, FNP, and HNP). The EOF will be activated as prescribed in the site-specific Emergency Plan implementing procedures. From the EOF, SNC corporate management personnel assist the states and other governmental bodies by communicating protective action recommendations approved by the ED to ensure public health and safety. Plant systems information, radiological data, and meteorological data are provided via the SNC Integrated Data Display System to A7-7 Version 19 05/05

EOF personnel as needed to: assess environmental conditions, coordinate radiological monitoring activities, and recommend implementation of offsite emergency plans. Data displays provide periodic and timely conditions of the affected plant and periodic and timely assessment of radiological conditions in the plant environs. The SNC Integrated Data Display System utilizes data provided by the plant-specific data links. These station data links are described in each site-specific plan. These displays may be either manual or electronic. Data displays are located in the main caucus area of the EOF, dose assessment area, plant status area, and engineering area within the facility. Other displays may be located in the command center area. Data are also available to all State agencies responding to the EOF. Data are available both in the main caucus area and the area designated for the particular State agency.

Similarly, these data are available to State and local authorities via a secure network dedicated to data distribution among the various offsite emergency response facilities. The data display system provides the user with a master view for the monitoring of multiple site events simultaneously. Data required to support EOF operations are provided by an extensive ring bus transport network. Data may also be obtained manually via telephone from the Control Room and the TSC to the EOF.

Contained within the facility will be the manpower and equipment necessary to provide dedicated direct communication links to the plant site(s). In addition, there are commercial and company-wide phone systems to and from the site(s). A communication link will be established and maintained between the EOF and the TSC until the ED determines that the communication link is no longer needed. Other communications equipment accessible to the EOF includes Nuclear Network (an intra-industry computer-based information exchange network), telecopiers, and computer workstations designated for emergency use.

The EOF is the distribution center for all field data and sample analyses. This information will be available to county, State, and Federal representatives. The EOF is sized to accommodate 35 persons, including 25 predesignated persons, 9 persons from the NRC, and 1 person from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It is anticipated that representatives from the State(s) of Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida will be dispatched to the EOF for an event at specific SNC site(s). The EOF has been designed to accommodate these representatives. Agreements exist between the appropriate State agencies and SNC to ensure rapid response of State personnel dispatched to the EOF. Table 7-4 provides additional information concerning EOF communications capabilities.

Upon activation of the EOF, Corporate personnel will provide staffing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day until directed otherwise by the ED.

The ED, located at the affected site(s), is responsible for the management of the emergency response. Specific duties and responsibilities are provided in the site-specific Emergency Plan.

The EOF, which consists of several rooms, is shown, together with the location of key personnel, in Figure 7-2. The EOF is a dedicated facility. The designated emergency planning coordinator for each of the three sites maintains an office within the EOF to ensure readiness and daily operability.

Based on the physical location of the EOF, specialized ventilation systems are not required.

The EOF ventilation system is consistent in design with standard building codes. Similarly, EOF functions would not be interrupted by radiation releases from any SNC site.

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Normal power to the EOF is from a reliable offsite source. Emergency lighting is provided by battery operated lights. Backup power for the EOF is supplied by onsite diesel generation. All essential equipment is backed up by the diesel generation system.

The EOF is located adjacent to the document management section for SNC. The following records or information are available:

• Technical Specifications.

• Selected plant operating procedures.

• Emergency Plans.

• Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

• Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs).

• State and local emergency response plans.

• Savannah River Site Emergency Plan.

The following records or information can be transmitted to the EOF manually, electronically, or by facsimile:

• Environs radiological monitoring records.

• SNC employee radiation exposure histories.

• System piping and instrumentation diagrams and HVAC flow diagrams.

• Piping area diagrams.

• Electrical one-line, elementary, and wiring diagrams.

The above records or information are available in current form and updated as necessary to ensure currency and completeness.

Operations at this facility are directed by the EOF Manager.

D.2 Contingency Planning Optimum functionality and availability were considered in the decision to locate the EOF in Birmingham, Alabama. At this location, functionality of the EOF would be uninterrupted by radiation releases, natural phenomena, and security based events at any of the SNC sites.

Support operations and coordination with Federal, State, and local organizations would continue. If personnel were to be dispatched to the sites, then personal protection equipment would be available from the local emergency management agency or from one of the unaffected SNC plant sites. In the unlikely event that individuals should need to respond to the EOF from within the 10-mile EPZ of any SNC plant, they would be surveyed prior to release by local emergency authorities at the reception centers in accordance with State and local emergency response plans.

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In the unlikely event that individuals should need to respond to the EOF from within the 10-mile EPZ of any SNC plant, they would be surveyed prior to release by local emergency authorities at the reception centers in accordance with State and local emergency response plans.

In the unlikely event that the EOF becomes uninhabitable, resources and personnel will be transferred to the Corporate Headquarters of Alabama Power Company, located in Birmingham, Alabama. These actions will be taken as part of the normal business continuity plan.

E. COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES The site-specific Emergency Plan(s) delineate the governmental agencies to be notified and specifies the information to be initially conveyed. It is anticipated that representatives of various agencies will be dispatched to the EOF for an event at an SNC facility.

Arrangements have been made between the appropriate State agencies and SNC to ensure rapid response of State personnel dispatched to the EOF.

E.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordination with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may be underway at several locations simultaneously. For details of the NRC response, see the Region II Incident Response Plan.

Initial notification of the NRC will proceed as specified in the site-specific Emergency Plan. The resident NRC inspector(s) and plant personnel have direct communications from the site control room to the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, and to the regional headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

The resident inspector(s) may be reinforced by additional NRC personnel shortly after notification of an emergency. The ED is responsible for coordinating NRC activities to reduce duplication of effort and reduce impact on the plant staff during the emergency situation.

Provisions have been made to have direct NRC FTS lines in the TSC and the EOF during an emergency. This will allow personnel in the control room to continue responding to the emergency while personnel in the TSC or EOF respond to questions and input from the NRC.

NRC activities requiring response from the licensee will be coordinated by the EOF Technical Coordinator through the EOF Manager.

E.2 State Governmental Agencies The government notifications are outlined in the site-specific Emergency Plan(s).

Coordination of offsite responses to the emergency is the responsibility of State agencies as outlined in the State Radiological Emergency Response Plans.

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E.3 Local Governmental Agencies Notification of local government officials is outlined in the site-specific Emergency Plan(s).

Coordination with local government agencies will normally be through the responsible State agency.

E.4 Department of Energy Notification of DOE officials is outlined in the site-specific Emergency Plan.

F. OFFSITE SUPPORT Offsite resources that may be available to support an emergency response effort include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Southern Nuclear Operating Company.

2. Georgia Power Company.

3. Alabama Power Company.

4. Southern Company Services, Inc.

5. The architect engineers.

6. NSSS supplier.

7. Nuclear industry.

8. Contract laboratories.

F.1 Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)

1. SNC is divided into three projects: the Farley Project, the Hatch Project, and the Vogtle Project. Each of the projects is further divided into a plant staff and a corporate staff. These represent a pool of positions of which approximately two-thirds would be additional assets that could be made available to support an individual site emergency organization, as required.

a. Plant Staffs - The permanent plant staffs consist of personnel who possess expertise in at least one of the following areas: operations, maintenance, engineering, administration, or technical support. These personnel would be available to assist in an emergency or recovery situation at an SNC nuclear facility.

b. Corporate Staffs - These staffs consist of personnel who provide management, technical, clerical, procurement, and regulatory support to the nuclear facilities.

F.2 Georgia Power Company (GPC)

1. The GPC Fossil and Hydro Power Generation Department is responsible for the operations and maintenance of all GPC nonnuclear generating facilities, including diesel and combustion turbine facilities. This represents a large source of technical expertise which could provide support to the emergency organization, if required.

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2. The GPC Power Delivery Department manages the activities of the divisions and areas of the company which provide electrical services to customers. This organization has a large resource of people and heavy equipment which may be of assistance following a nuclear emergency.

3. Other GPC assets, including maintenance and repair facilities, training facilities, engineering staffs, and headquarters personnel represent additional resources available for emergency support.

4. The GPC Central Laboratory has personnel and facilities available to provide offsite monitoring, sample analysis, and dosimetry processing for the affected site.

F.3 Alabama Power Company (APC)

1. The APC Fossil and Hydro Power Generation Department is responsible for the operations and maintenance of all APC nonnuclear generating facilities, including diesel and combustion turbine facilities. This represents a large source of technical expertise which could provide support to the emergency organization, if required.

2. The APC Power Delivery Department manages the activities of the divisions and areas of the company which provide electrical services to customers. This organization has a large resource of people and heavy equipment which may be of assistance following a nuclear emergency.

3. Other APC assets, including maintenance and repair facilities, training facilities, engineering staffs, and headquarters personnel represent additional resources available for emergency support.

F.4 Southern Company Services, Inc. (SCS)

SNC has the primary responsibility for engineering support of VEGP, FNP, and HNP.

SCS may be utilized in response to a plant emergency or for subsequent recovery operations as deemed necessary by SNC.

F.5 Architect Engineers The architect engineers will provide support as requested through the Engineering Services Manager. The Architect/Engineers are SNC and Bechtel Power Corporation.

1. SNC serves as its own Architect/Engineer. SCS, an associate company to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, will be used to the extent appropriate in responding to nuclear emergencies.

2. Bechtel Power Corporation, headquartered in Gaithersburg, Maryland, also performs Architect/Engineer services for SNC. Bechtel's technical staffs are engaged in all phases of public utility engineering, design, construction, purchasing, inspection, and expedition of materials, as well as consultation on utility operating matters. Bechtel has available a broad range of engineering, construction, and consulting experience.

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Bechtel's nuclear experience includes engineering studies, the evaluation of reactor systems, safety evaluations, detailed engineering design, construction, and startup and testing of nuclear power facilities.

F.6 Nuclear Steam Supply System Vendor The applicable NSSS vendor will provide support through the Engineering Services Manager. Plant-specific references to the appropriate vendor are specified in the plant-specific base plans. The NSSS maintains a large staff of technically qualified people in all the engineering disciplines related to the design, construction, and operation of a nuclear power plant. These same skills would be necessary in the evaluation of, and recovery from, an emergency at any SNC site. Assistance would most likely be sought for large-scale core analysis, special tool design, and licensing.

F.7 Nuclear Industry The nuclear industry provides a large reservoir of personnel with a wide range of technical expertise and knowledge. A nuclear industry national inventory of personnel who might be called upon to supplement Company personnel has been developed through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

In addition, a number of utilities have entered into an INPO coordinated Voluntary Assistance Agreement program. This provides a mechanism to draw upon industry resources during an emergency.

Support that may be requested from neighboring utilities would include the following:

1. Manpower and equipment to assist in in-plant and emergency field monitoring.

2. Engineering, design, and technical expertise to assist in determining the cause of the accident and to support recovery.

3. Manpower and equipment to assist in maintenance and repairs to the facility.

F.8 Contract Laboratories Teledyne Isotopes, Inc., for emergency analytical services.

Framatome ANP for emergency analytical services.

G. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS G.1 Organizational Preparedness

1. Training Corporate personnel identified in the Emergency Response Organization receive training. The training consists of familiarization with the Site Emergency Plans and A7-13 Version 19 05/05

applicable emergency implementing procedures required to carry out their specific functions.

The Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinator(s) will ensure that personnel in the Corporate Emergency Response Organization are familiar with the Emergency Plans and able to respond promptly. A training matrix for corporate personnel assigned to the ERO is shown in Table 7-2, and training course summaries are presented in Table 7-3. Training will be documented in accordance with established practices.

The Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinator(s) are responsible for assuring that training is conducted for corporate emergency response personnel each calendar year.

2. Drills/Exercises Drills/exercises will be conducted each calendar year to test the performance of implementing procedures, personnel, and emergency equipment. These drills/exercises will be conducted with each SNC site.

SNCs goal is to activate the EOF in support of all site activities that involve TSC activation. EOF activation is required at least three times annually (one scenario per site per year) in accordance with the existing emergency plans. At least one activation every 5 years will require a concurrent EOF support response for more than one SNC site.

Each drill/exercise will test, as a minimum, the communication links and notification procedures to assure the prompt notification of the corporate staff.

Provisions are made for critique of all drills/exercises. Critique items will be forwarded to the site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for processing in the site-specific corrective action program.

G.2 Review and Update of Plan and Procedures Reviews of the site Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be performed in accordance with site-specific emergency plans. These reviews will be utilized to update the Plans and procedures and to improve emergency preparedness.

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TABLE A7-1 TYPICAL CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS EMERGENCY POSITION ASSIGNMENT EOF Manager

• Supervision from corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Technical Supervisor

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Support Coordinator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Dose Analyst

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Field Team Coordinator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Field Team Communicator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Radiological Status Communicator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Plant Status Loop Communicator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 ENN Communicator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 ENS Communicator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Licensing Support Coordinator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Security Coordinator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Offsite Response Coordinator

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Engineering/Technical Support Staff

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Administrative Support Staff

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Liaisons

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Public Information Director

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Company Spokesperson

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Newswriter

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Other Public Information Emergency

• Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Communications Organization Staff A7-15 Version 19 05/05

TABLE A7-2 CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MATRIX Subject Area Emergency Plan Position-Specific Offsite Dose Position Overview Items Assessment EOF Manager X X EOF Technical Supervisor X X EOF Support Coordinator X X EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor X X X Dose Analyst X X X Field Team Coordinator X X X Field Team Communicator X X Radiological Status Communicator X X Plant Status Loop Communicator X X ENN Communicator X X ENS Communicator X X Licensing Support Coordinator X X Security Coordinator X X Offsite Response Coordinator X X Engineering/Technical Support Staff X X Administrative Support Staff X X Liaisons X X Public Information Director X X Company Spokesperson X X Newswriter X X Other Public Information Emergency X X Communications Organization Staff A7-16 Version 19 05/05

TABLE A7-3 DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING SUBJECT AREAS Subject Area Description Emergency Plan Overview An overview of the Emergency Plan with special attention to emergency planning zones (EPZs);

emergency classification system; emergency response organizations; responsibilities of emergency response personnel; site accountability; and site dismissal.

Offsite Dose Assessment Dose projection methodology including manual and computerized methods; methods for obtaining meteorological and radiological data; operation of the dose assessment computer; and interpretation of offsite dose calculation results.

Position-Specific Items An overview of this appendix with an emphasis on organization, interactions with other elements of the emergency organization, and position-specific responsibilities as delineated in the emergency implementing procedures. This overview training may be conducted as part of the classroom, table-top, drill, or exercise.

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TABLE A7-4 TYPICAL EOF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY Communications VEGP HNP FNP Functions Commercial telephone lines Commercial telephone lines Commercial telephone lines EOF Management TSC/EOF/OSC Conference TSC/EOF/OSC Conference TSC/EOF/OSC Conference with TSC Bridge Bridge Bridge Radio Radio Radio Commercial telephone lines Commercial telephone lines Commercial telephone lines Resource OPX OPX OPX Management Ringdown Radiological Southern LINC Southern LINC Southern LINC Monitoring Kenwood radio system Kenwood radio system Kenwood radio system Offsite (PARs) ENN ENN ENN ENS ENS ENS HPN HPN HPN RSCL RSCL RSCL NRC Use PMCL PMCL PMCL MCL MCL MCL LAN LAN LAN Conference phones (3) Conference phones (3) Conference phones (3)

Note: The Offsite Premises Extension (OPX) lines to the three SNC plant sites will be available in the proposed common EOF. These lines bypass the local phone switch.

These lines may be referenced as company tie lines.

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FIGURE A7-1

• Positions used to meet augmentation requirements for EOF direction and nofifications/communication.

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FIGURE A7-2 TECH PROBLEM RAD STATUS STATUS Field Team Tracking Data Display Computer Digital/Analog ELMO Scanner Back Up Data Display Computer AL GA PLANT SC STATUS FL A7-20 Version 19 05/05