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| | issue date = 09/18/1997 | | | issue date = 09/18/1997 |
| | title = Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, to Support NRC Review | | | title = Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, to Support NRC Review |
| | author name = HOVEY R J | | | author name = Hovey R |
| | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. | | | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY j.REGULBT(Q INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION/(STEM (RIDE)DOCKET g 05000250 05000251 NOTES: ACCESSION NBR:9709240154 DOC.DATE: 97/09/18 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY j. |
| NO FACIE-SCi-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C~40-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HOVEY,R.J. | | REGULBT(Q INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION/(STEM (RIDE) |
| Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) | | ACCESSION NBR:9709240154 DOC.DATE: 97/09/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIE -SCi-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 |
| | ~40-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HOVEY,R.J. Florida Power & Light Co. |
| | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| Forwards supplemental response to GL 95-07,"Pressure Locking&Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to support NRC review.DISTRIBUTION CODE: A056D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: Generic Ltr 95-07-Pressure Locking&Thermal Binding of Safety Rela A T E INTERNA RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DRPE/EATON CROTEAU,R ILE CENTER 01 EXTERNAL: NOAC NUDOCS ABSTRACT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 PD NRR/DE/EMEB/B NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 D U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | Forwards supplemental response to GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to support NRC review. |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGAN1ZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 8 ENCL 8 SEP 18'l997 L-97-232 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos.50-250 and 50-251 Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of By letter dated August 17, 1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL)95-07,"Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," requesting licensees to perform, or confirm that they performed, (1)evaluations of operational configurations of safety related, power operated gate valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding, and (2)further analyses, and any needed corrective actions, to ensure these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. | | A DISTRIBUTION CODE: A056D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: |
| By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL)provided its response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.As a result of NRC's review of FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, the NRC Staff requested additional information in order to complete the review.In accordance with the NRC request, attached is the supplemental information.
| | TITLE: Generic Ltr 95-07 Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety Rela T NOTES: E RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/DRPE/EATON 1 1 PD2-3 PD 1 1 CROTEAU,R 1 1 INTERNA ILE CENTER 01 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB/B 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS ABSTRACT 1 1 D |
| Should there be any questions concerning this response, please contact us.Very truly yours, R.J.Hovey Vice President Turkey Point Plant Attachment OIH cc: L'.A.Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC T.P.Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant 9709240i54
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| 'P709i8 PDR ADQCK 05000250 p PDR llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll an FPL Group company
| | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| ~~~ll p f I Attachment to L-97-232 Page 1 of 6 TURKEY POINTS UNITS 3 AND 4 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO GENERIC.LETTER 95-07,"PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY RELATED POWER OPERATED GATE VALVES"
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGAN1ZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 8 ENCL 8 |
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| ==1.0 Purpose and Scope==
| | SEP 18 'l997 L-97-232 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of By letter dated August 17, 1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," requesting licensees to perform, or confirm that they performed, (1) evaluations of operational configurations of safety related, power operated gate valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding, and (2) further analyses, and any needed corrective actions, to ensure these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. |
| By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL)provided its response to'Generic Letter (GL)95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.This document provides supplemental information to FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.Pursuant to discussions with the NRC, supplemental information is provided for MOV-3/4-~535 and-536, MOV-3/4-744A and-744B, MOV-3/4-862A and-862B, and MOV-3/4-863A and-863B.2.0 Response This response addresses specific pressure locking and thermal binding analyses for each set of valves identified above, as applicable.
| | By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) provided its response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. As a result of NRC's review of FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, the NRC Staff requested additional information in order to complete the review. In accordance with the NRC request, attached is the supplemental information. |
| 2.1 Pressure Locking MOV-3/4-535 and-536, Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV)Block Valves This supplement provides the results of calculations demonstrating the capability of MOV-3/4-535 and-536 to overcome potential pressure locking forces.I As discussed in FPL letter L-96-024, the PORV block valves have a safety function to be open to provide overpressure protection to the reactor coolant system (RCS)during low temperature operation, in conjunction with the PORVs, but are not required to change position to perform this function.The valves are pre-staged open.Therefore, pressure locking is not a concern in providing overpressure protection to the RCS during low temperature operation.
| | Should there be any questions concerning this response, please contact us. |
| However, the capability to support the emergency operating procedures for steam generator tube rupture and to establish RCS feed and bleed conditions was evaluated.
| | Very truly yours, R. J. Hovey Vice President Turkey Point Plant Attachment OIH cc: L'. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant 9709240i54 'P709i8 PDR ADQCK 05000250 llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll p PDR an FPL Group company |
| A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owners Group.A safety factor of 1.2 was utilized with these results to ensure conservatism in the design.The calculation shows the Attachment to L-97-232'Page 2 of 6 PORV block valves are capable of overcoming pressure locking forces including a safety factor of 1.2.Therefore, no further actions are required to address pressure locking for these valves.As requested by the NRC, the inputs used for the calculation are summarized in Table 1.Pressure inputs are provided for the steam generator tube rupture scenario which results in the highest potential pressure locking forces.TABLE 1 Parameter Value Bonnet Pressure, SGTR Pbonnet=2235 psig Upstream Pressure, SGTR PUp 1 3 60 psig Downstream Pressure, SGTR down 8 ps ig Disk Thickness Seat Radius Hub Radius Seat An le Poisson's Ratio Modulus of Elasticity Static Pullout Force t=0.813 in a=1.28 in b=0.625 in 6=5 deg v=0.3 E=2.53 x 10 psi Fpo=10780 lbf Coefficient of Friction between disk and seat (500oF to 600oF).Stem Diameter p=0.45 D,,=1.123 in Hub Length Hub length=0.536 in Actuator limit Valve limit Motor torque rating (derated for temperature)
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| Actuator overall ratio Pullout efficiency Application factor Undervolta e factor Stem factor=0.20 19/600 lbf 19,735 lbf 7.9 ft-lbs 82.0 0.40 1.0 0.7398 0.0116
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| ,Attachment to L-97-232 Page 3 of 6'.MOV-3/4-744A and-744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves 3.This supplement provides additional information regarding the near-term capability of MOV-3/4-744A and-744B to overcome potential pressure locking forces, and confirms long-term plans to modify the valves to preclude pressure locking.These valves are analyzed for pressure locking for the.conditions when they are required to open in response to a safety injection signal to establish low head safety injection to the RCS.A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owner's Group.The calculation showed that the valves have the capability to overcome pressure locking forces to open.The available margin does not provide for a safety factor of 1.2 desired to ensure conservatism in the design.Therefore, a modification to the valves will.be performed to vent the bonnet back to the RCS (high pressure)side of the.valves.This precludes the possibility of pressure locking the valves.These modifications will be performed in the Unit 4 Cycle 17 (Fall 1997)outage and the Unit 3 Cycle 17 (Fall 1998)outage.MOV-3/4-862A and-862B, Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Pump Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Suction Isolation Valves As stated in FPL letter L-96-024, these valves have no active function to open within the design basis.This supplement provides additional information regarding the requirement for these valves to be open as part of the flow path from the RWST to the RHR pump suction.MOV 3/4-862 A/B are double disc gate valves which are considered potentially susceptible to pressure locking.These valves have no active design basis function to open, and are normally open during Modes 1, 2, and 3.Per the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications, the valves are required to be capable of being opened to provide a flowpath from the RWST to the RHR pump suction during Mode 4.This is a manual realignment.
| | ll p |
| On plant start up, procedures for shifting RHR from an RCS cooldown line-up to an injection line-up in Mode 4 require the RHR system to be isolated from the RCS, cooled down, and then realigned for injection.
| | f I |
| The potenti'al for pressure locking during this evolution was evaluated, since the valves would be closed with pressure in the bonnet when I 0 4 Attachment to L-97-232 Page 4 of 6 the RHR system was cooled down and depressurized, creating the potential for pressure locking.Pressure locking is not expected since the cooldown cools the valve bonnet, which would also cause a bonnet pressure reduction. | | |
| This reduces the potential for pressure locking.This alignment occurs on plant start up, or at least once per fuel cycle.No failure of the valves to perform this function has previously occurred.Local manual operation of the valve is provided for and possible to perform during this scenario.This demonstrates the capability of these valves to meet the Technical Specification requirement. | | Attachment to L-97-232 Page 1 of 6 TURKEY POINTS UNITS 3 AND 4 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO GENERIC. LETTER 95-07, "PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY RELATED POWER OPERATED GATE VALVES" |
| 4.MOV-3/4-863A and-863B, SI/CS Recirculation Phase Suction Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude pressure locking of these valves in lieu of solely crediting bonnet pressure decay time on start up, and to address potential pressure locking following surveillance testing.During plant startup, the valve bonnets could potentially be pressurized while the unit is heating up using the Reactor Coolant Pumps with the RHR system in service.When the RHR system is isolated from the RCS on plant start up, pressure may be trapped in the bonnet of the valves.To preclude potentially pressure locking the valves, the MOV-3/4-863A and-863B valves are cycled prior to realigning the RHR System for low head safety injection.
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| This valve cycling is completed by procedure after the RHR system has been cooled down to less than 200'F and the RHR pumps have been secured.This ensures that the valves will support low head safety injection operability.
| | ==1.0 Purpose and Scope== |
| These valves are routinely exposed to RHR Pump discharge pressure during quarterly inservice testing which could pressurize the valve bonnet cavity.In the event that the valves were required to open for recirculation mode, an RHR pump would already be running on a safety injection signal applying pressure to one side of the valve disc.Any minor differential pressure due to the remaining pressure in the valve bonnets would not cause a potential pressure locking condition.
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| Therefore, these valves remain operable during and after an RHR pump inservice test.
| | By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) provided its response to 'Generic Letter (GL) 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. This document provides supplemental information to FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. Pursuant to discussions with the NRC, supplemental information is provided for MOV-3/4- ~ |
| Attachment to L-97-232 Page 5 of 6 2.2 Thermal Binding MOV-3/4-535 and-536, PORV Block Valves 2.This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude thermal binding of MOV-3/4-535 and-536 when the valves are closed to isolate PORV leakage.~If the PORV block valves are closed to address PORV leakage;and subsequently, the plant is cooled from normal operating'temperature to an RCS temperature of 275'F to 285'F, the potential, exists for thermal binding.In order to align for cold over pressure protection per Technical Specification 3/4.9.3, the PORV block valves must be opened.Plant operating history has shown that the block valves have not previously thermally bound.However, to eliminate the possibility of thermal binding, procedure controls are in place.The block valves will be opened prior to the RCS being cooled to below hot standby conditions unless the PORVs or Block valves have been declared inoperable, or PORV leakage exceeds that allowed by Technical Specifications. | | 535 and -536, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, MOV-3/4-862A and |
| This procedural control provides assurance that the PORVs that will be relied upon for OMS will be available during controlled plant cooldowns.
| | -862B, and MOV-3/4-863A and -863B. |
| MOV-3/4-744A and-744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural contr'ols that are in place to preclude the potential for thermal binding of MOV-3/4-744A and-744B: The low head safety injection isolation valves, MOV-3/4-744A and-744B valves could be closed at a temperature up to 350'F when securing from RHR system operation during plant start up.For scenarios where these valves are required to open, the temperature may be near normal containment ambient temperature creating the potential for thermal binding.Procedure controls are in place to require stroking the valve after the valve has cooled to eliminate any potential thermal binding.This is accomplished by opening and closing the valves during back leakage testing of downstream check valves.The MOV-3/4-744A and-744B valve cycling occurs prior to.performing the low head safety injection flowpath alignment after RHR,system cooldown to less than 200'F, and prior to plant heatup above 0 II I I ,~
| | 2.0 Response This response addresses specific pressure locking and thermal binding analyses for each set of valves identified above, as applicable. |
| Attachment to L-97-232 Page 6 of 6 350'F when low head safety injection capability is required.Operating experience indicates that lines containing the valves are relatively cool.Additionally, several hours of delay due to time constraints in performing RHR system cooldown and testing activities allows additional ambient cooling prior to the final cycling of the valves.3.0 Conclusions This supplement provides the necessary information to establish the acceptability of specific Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 motor operated valves for pressure locking and thermal binding concerns.The potential for pressure locking is adequately addressed by the analyses, modifications, and procedural" controls described herein for MOV-3/4-535 and-536, MOV-3/4-744A and-744B, and MOV-3/4-863A and-863B.Information regarding the operating conditions with respect to the potential for pressure locking of MOV-3/4-862A and-862B is also provided.Thermal binding for MOV-3/4-535 and-536, and MOV-3/4-744A and-744B are addressed by procedural controls.Long term upgrades for MOV-3/4-744A and-744B are also addressed.
| | 2.1 Pressure Locking MOV-3/4-535 and -536, Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) Block Valves This supplement provides the results of calculations demonstrating the capability of MOV-3/4-535 and -536 to overcome potential pressure locking forces. |
| 0~'O'~A r.~k'~}}
| | I As discussed in FPL letter L-96-024, the PORV block valves have a safety function to be open to provide overpressure protection to the reactor coolant system (RCS) during low temperature operation, in conjunction with the PORVs, but are not required to change position to perform this function. The valves are pre-staged open. Therefore, pressure locking is not a concern in providing overpressure protection to the RCS during low temperature operation. However, the capability to support the emergency operating procedures for steam generator tube rupture and to establish RCS feed and bleed conditions was evaluated. |
| | A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owners Group. A safety factor of 1.2 was utilized with these results to ensure conservatism in the design. The calculation shows the |
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| | Attachment to L-97-232 |
| | 'Page 2 of 6 PORV block valves are capable of overcoming pressure locking forces including a safety factor of 1.2. |
| | Therefore, no further actions are required to address pressure locking for these valves. As requested by the NRC, the inputs used for the calculation are summarized in Table 1. Pressure inputs are provided for the steam generator tube rupture scenario which results in the highest potential pressure locking forces. |
| | TABLE 1 Parameter Value Bonnet Pressure, SGTR Pbonnet = 2235 psig Upstream Pressure, SGTR PUp 1 3 60 psig Downstream Pressure, SGTR down 8 ps ig Disk Thickness t= 0.813 in Seat Radius a = 1.28 in Hub Radius b = 0.625 in Seat An le 6 = 5 deg Poisson's Ratio v = 0.3 Modulus of Elasticity E = 2.53 x 10 psi Static Pullout Force Fpo = 10780 lbf Coefficient of Friction between p = 0.45 disk and seat (500oF to 600oF). |
| | Stem Diameter D,, = 1.123 in Hub Length Hub length = 0.536 in Actuator limit 19/600 lbf Valve limit 19,735 lbf Motor torque rating (derated 7.9 ft- lbs for temperature) |
| | Actuator overall ratio 82.0 Pullout efficiency 0.40 Application factor 1.0 Undervolta e factor 0.7398 Stem factor = 0.20 0.0116 |
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| | ,Attachment to L-97-232 Page 3 of 6'. |
| | MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves This supplement provides additional information regarding the near-term capability of MOV-3/4-744A and |
| | -744B to overcome potential pressure locking forces, and confirms long-term plans to modify the valves to preclude pressure locking. |
| | These valves are analyzed for pressure locking for the |
| | .conditions when they are required to open in response to a safety injection signal to establish low head safety injection to the RCS. A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owner's Group. The calculation showed that the valves have the capability to overcome pressure locking forces to open. The available margin does not provide for a safety factor of 1.2 desired to ensure conservatism in the design. Therefore, a modification to the valves will. be performed to vent the bonnet back to the RCS (high pressure) side of the .valves. This precludes the possibility of pressure locking the valves. These modifications will be performed in the Unit 4 Cycle 17 (Fall 1997) outage and the Unit 3 Cycle 17 (Fall 1998) outage. |
| | : 3. MOV-3/4-862A and -862B, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) |
| | Pump Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Suction Isolation Valves As stated in FPL letter L-96-024, these valves have no active function to open within the design basis. This supplement provides additional information regarding the requirement for these valves to be open as part of the flow path from the RWST to the RHR pump suction. |
| | MOV 3/4-862 A/B are double disc gate valves which are considered potentially susceptible to pressure locking. |
| | These valves have no active design basis function to open, and are normally open during Modes 1, 2, and 3. |
| | Per the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications, the valves are required to be capable of being opened to provide a flowpath from the RWST to the RHR pump suction during Mode 4. This is a manual realignment. On plant start up, procedures for shifting RHR from an RCS cooldown line-up to an injection line-up in Mode 4 require the RHR system to be isolated from the RCS, cooled down, and then realigned for injection. The potenti'al for pressure locking during this evolution was evaluated, since the valves would be closed with pressure in the bonnet when |
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| | Attachment to L-97-232 Page 4 of 6 the RHR system was cooled down and depressurized, creating the potential for pressure locking. Pressure locking is not expected since the cooldown cools the valve bonnet, which would also cause a bonnet pressure reduction. This reduces the potential for pressure locking. This alignment occurs on plant start up, or at least once per fuel cycle. No failure of the valves to perform this function has previously occurred. |
| | Local manual operation of the valve is provided for and possible to perform during this scenario. This demonstrates the capability of these valves to meet the Technical Specification requirement. |
| | : 4. MOV-3/4-863A and -863B, SI/CS Recirculation Phase Suction Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude pressure locking of these valves in lieu of solely crediting bonnet pressure decay time on start up, and to address potential pressure locking following surveillance testing. |
| | During plant startup, the valve bonnets could potentially be pressurized while the unit is heating up using the Reactor Coolant Pumps with the RHR system in service. When the RHR system is isolated from the RCS on plant start up, pressure may be trapped in the bonnet of the valves. To preclude potentially pressure locking the valves, the MOV-3/4-863A and -863B valves are cycled prior to realigning the RHR System for low head safety injection. This valve cycling is completed by procedure after the RHR system has been cooled down to less than 200'F and the RHR pumps have been secured. |
| | This ensures that the valves will support low head safety injection operability. |
| | These valves are routinely exposed to RHR Pump discharge pressure during quarterly inservice testing which could pressurize the valve bonnet cavity. In the event that the valves were required to open for recirculation mode, an RHR pump would already be running on a safety injection signal applying pressure to one side of the valve disc. Any minor differential pressure due to the remaining pressure in the valve bonnets would not cause a potential pressure locking condition. Therefore, these valves remain operable during and after an RHR pump inservice test. |
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| | Attachment to L-97-232 Page 5 of 6 2.2 Thermal Binding MOV-3/4-535 and -536, PORV Block Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude thermal binding of MOV-3/4-535 and -536 when the valves are closed to isolate PORV leakage. |
| | If the PORV block valves are closed to address leakage; and subsequently, the plant is cooled |
| | ~ |
| | PORV from normal operating'temperature to an RCS temperature of 275'F to 285'F, the potential, exists for thermal binding. |
| | In order to align for cold over pressure protection per Technical Specification 3/4.9.3, the PORV block valves must be opened. Plant operating history has shown that the block valves have not previously thermally bound. |
| | However, to eliminate the possibility of thermal binding, procedure controls are in place. The block valves will be opened prior to the RCS being cooled to below hot standby conditions unless the PORVs or Block valves have been declared inoperable, or PORV leakage exceeds that allowed by Technical Specifications. This procedural control provides assurance that the PORVs that will be relied upon for OMS will be available during controlled plant cooldowns. |
| | : 2. MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural contr'ols that are in place to preclude the potential for thermal binding of MOV-3/4-744A and -744B: |
| | The low head safety injection isolation valves, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B valves could be closed at a temperature up to 350'F when securing from RHR system operation during plant start up. For scenarios where these valves are required to open, the temperature may be near normal containment ambient temperature creating the potential for thermal binding. Procedure controls are in place to require stroking the valve after the valve has cooled to eliminate any potential thermal binding. This is accomplished by opening and closing the valves during back leakage testing of downstream check valves. The MOV-3/4-744A and -744B valve cycling occurs prior to .performing the low head safety injection flowpath alignment after RHR,system cooldown to less than 200'F, and prior to plant heatup above |
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| | Attachment to L-97-232 Page 6 of 6 350'F when low head safety injection capability is required. Operating experience indicates that lines containing the valves are relatively cool. |
| | Additionally, several hours of delay due to time constraints in performing RHR system cooldown and testing activities allows additional ambient cooling prior to the final cycling of the valves. |
| | 3.0 Conclusions This supplement provides the necessary information to establish the acceptability of specific Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 motor operated valves for pressure locking and thermal binding concerns. The potential for pressure locking is adequately addressed by the analyses, modifications, and procedural" controls described herein for MOV-3/4-535 and 536, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, and MOV-3/4-863A and -863B. |
| | Information regarding the operating conditions with respect to the potential for pressure locking of MOV-3/4-862A and |
| | -862B is also provided. Thermal binding for MOV-3/4-535 and |
| | -536, and MOV-3/4-744A and -744B are addressed by procedural controls. Long term upgrades for MOV-3/4-744A and -744B are also addressed. |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML17355A4601999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Revs to 0-EPIP-1102, 0-EPIP-1212,0-EPIP-20110,0-EPIP-20111,0-EPIP-20132, 0-EPIP-20133 & 0-EPIP-20201,per 10CFR50.54(q) & 10CFR50, App E.Epip 0-EPIP-20107,has Been Deleted ML17355A4301999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 16 of Updated Fsar.Info Accurately Reflects Plant Changes Made Since Previous Submittal.Rev Incorporates Changes Completed Between 971015 & 990408.Summary of Accuracy Review Changes & Instructions,Included ML17355A4461999-10-0404 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Commitment to Perform Periodic Testing of Critical Welds & Parts on Special Lifting Devices IAW NUREG-0612.Use of Ae Technology Will Provide Same Level of Testing Quality as Did NDE Methods Noted in ANSI Std L-99-208, Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included ML17355A4291999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Telcon Questions Re License Amend Request Dtd 990727,proposing Amend on one-time Basis to Modify TS 3.8.1.1 & TS 3.4.3 & 3.5.2 to Extend Allowed Outage Time for EDG from 72 H to 7 Days ML20212M1601999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to 990908 Engineering Meeting Conducted at NRC Region II to Discuss Engineering Issues at Lucie & Turkey Point Facilities.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML17355A4251999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams, Issued 990820 ML17355A4111999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Thermo-Lag Upgrades for Fire Zones 47,54,113, 114,115,116,118,119,120 & 143 Completed on 990726,per GL 92-08 ML17355A4131999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 20 Re Requirement to Perform Exams as Required by IWL-2524 & IWL-2525,Table IWL-2500-1 for Exempt Tendon Insp,Per Recent Discussions with NRC ML17355A4141999-09-0202 September 1999 Documents That Util Has No Concerns or Challenges Related to site-specific Written Exam Administered at Plant on 990830 ML17355A4041999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Info to Support Assessment of Potential Risks Associated with Proposed Civil Aircraft Operations at Former Homestead Air Force Base to FP&L Turkey Point Nuclear Facility Units 3 & 4 ML17355A4071999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Completed Review of Info Listed in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 & Found Listed Discrepancies,Re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. ML17355A4061999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual FFD Performance Rept for Period of Jan- June 1999,for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.List of Events Reported & Summary of Mgt Actions Taken,Included ML17355A4001999-08-20020 August 1999 Informs That on 990722,util Determined Blind Specimen Submitted to Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs on 990721,was Reported Back with Unsatisfactory Results.Attachment 1 Is Summary of Investigation of Unsatisfactory Performance ML17355A3941999-07-27027 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for FY00 & FY01 ML17355A3871999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides Supplement to FP&L Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17355A3851999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs That Pages Missing from 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, Contain Info Unrelated to ODCM- Specified Sampling & Were Not Included as Part of Rept ML17355A3711999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs 0-EPIP-20201, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training & 0-EPIP-20126, Off-Site Dose Calculations. with Summary of Changes ML17355A3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Turkey Point,Unit 4 ISI Rept. Listed Repts Are Encl.No Eddy Current Exams Scheduled for Unit 4 Steam Generators ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17355A3571999-06-28028 June 1999 Informs That Util Voluntarily Reporting Facility Readiness as Outlined in Suppl 1 to GL 98-01.Encl Is Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 3 & 4,reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness ML17355A3521999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. ML17355A3491999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions Implemented by FPL Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. ML17355A3441999-05-27027 May 1999 Modifies FPLs Consent to Confirmatory Order to Reflect Resolution of Four Issues Identified as Pending in L-99-031 ML17355A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests Waiver of 520 Hours (13 Wks) Required Parallel Watchstanding in Control Room Prior to License Application Submittal for W Conley ML17355A2921999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards Rev 35 to Turkey Point EP & Revised EPIP 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of EC, Per Requirements of 10CFR50, App E & 10CFR50.54(q).Summary of Changes,Encl.Implementation Date for Both Documents Was 990330 ML20205M0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Eighth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Records.App Q & R Records Encl & Being Made Available in PDR ML17355A2891999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Relief Request 20, Exempt Tendon Insp, Requesting Relief from ASME Section XI Code,1992 Edition,Paragraph IWL-2521.1(c) Which Requires That Each Exempted Tendon Be Examined IAW IWL-2524 & IWL-2525.Approval Needed by 991001 ML17355A2861999-04-0505 April 1999 Forwards COLR for Turkey Point Unit 4,Cycle 18,IAW TS 6.9.1.7 ML17336A0681999-04-0101 April 1999 Expresses Support for FP&L Request for Waiver of Applicable Review Fees Upon FP&L Submittal of an Application for License Renewal for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2751999-03-25025 March 1999 Informs NRC & Staff of Fp&Ls Plans to Submit License Renewal Application for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 by End of Dec 2000 ML17355A2641999-03-19019 March 1999 Requests Changes to FPL Official Service List for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Add s Franzone & Remove G Hollinger from All Correspondence ML17355A2651999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-Dec 1998 & Rev 7 to ODCM for Gaseous & Liquid Effluents from Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4. ML17355A2621999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards Special Rept as Result of Turkey Point Unit 3 End-of-Cycle 16 ISI of SG Tubes.Rept Summarizes Results of SG Tube ISI ML17355A2631999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards FPL Decommissioning Fund Status Repts for St Lucie, Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Rept for St Lucie, Unit 2 Provides Status of Decommissioning Funds for All Three Owners of That Unit ML20204C6991999-03-10010 March 1999 Requests Amend to Turkey Point PSP to Modify Requirement to Post Security Officers to Provide Continuous Observation of Entire PA Perimeter in Event of Security Computer Failure. Change to Security Force Staffing Level Also Requested ML17355A2451999-03-0909 March 1999 Submits Info on FPL Current Levels of Nuclear Property Insurance,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17355A2501999-03-0808 March 1999 Informs That Licensee Reviewed NRC 990228 Ltr Issuing Exemption Requested Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg.Tabulated Summary of Util Comments & Marked Copy of NRC Ltr & SER Encl ML17355A2441999-03-0101 March 1999 Provides Update to Util Written Notices,Dtd 961120 & 970627 of Claim Involving Alleged Bodily Injury Arising Out of or in Connection with Use of Radioactive Matl at Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2431999-02-25025 February 1999 Informs That FPL Does Not Have Any Candidates from Turkey Point Scheduled to Participate in 990407,Generic Fundamentals Examination (GFE) ML17355A2301999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Semiannual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Period of 980701-981231 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2361999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Tabulation of 1998 Occupational Exposure Data for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4,per TS 6.9.1.2.a.Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Limits of 100/E-bar Mci Per Gram of Gross Radioactivity Were Not Exceeded During 1998 L-99-042, Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17355A2341999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Response to RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Crdm/ CEDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. ML17355A2231999-02-0808 February 1999 Informs That Util Will Comply with Commitment with Respect to Units 3 & 4,in Response to Ja Zwolinski 990129 Ltr.Util Also Agrees to Incorporate Commitment Into Confirmatory Order Modifying License Effective Immediately Upon Issuance ML17355A2031999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Recovery Plan. Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML17355A2171999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards Listed ISI Repts for Turkey Point Unit 3,in Accordance with Provisions of ASME Code,Section XI ML17354B2241999-01-0606 January 1999 Forwards Annual 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Changes To,Or Errors Discovered in ECCS Evaluation Models,Or in Application of Such Models That Effect Peak Clad Temp Calculation ML17354B2081998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That Fpl,In Cooperation with State of Fl & County Emergency Response Agencies,Will Conduct Exercise of Turkey Point Radiological Emergency Plan on 990210.Scenario Package Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness Section Chief,Region II ML17354B2091998-12-15015 December 1998 Forwards Price Anderson Guarantees Annual Financial Rept,Per 10CFR140.21.Exhibit 1 Submitted to Satisfy Annual Financial Reporting Requirement of 10CFR50.71(b) 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17355A4601999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Revs to 0-EPIP-1102, 0-EPIP-1212,0-EPIP-20110,0-EPIP-20111,0-EPIP-20132, 0-EPIP-20133 & 0-EPIP-20201,per 10CFR50.54(q) & 10CFR50, App E.Epip 0-EPIP-20107,has Been Deleted ML17355A4301999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 16 of Updated Fsar.Info Accurately Reflects Plant Changes Made Since Previous Submittal.Rev Incorporates Changes Completed Between 971015 & 990408.Summary of Accuracy Review Changes & Instructions,Included ML17355A4461999-10-0404 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Commitment to Perform Periodic Testing of Critical Welds & Parts on Special Lifting Devices IAW NUREG-0612.Use of Ae Technology Will Provide Same Level of Testing Quality as Did NDE Methods Noted in ANSI Std L-99-208, Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included ML17355A4291999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Telcon Questions Re License Amend Request Dtd 990727,proposing Amend on one-time Basis to Modify TS 3.8.1.1 & TS 3.4.3 & 3.5.2 to Extend Allowed Outage Time for EDG from 72 H to 7 Days ML17355A4251999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams, Issued 990820 ML17355A4111999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Thermo-Lag Upgrades for Fire Zones 47,54,113, 114,115,116,118,119,120 & 143 Completed on 990726,per GL 92-08 ML17355A4131999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 20 Re Requirement to Perform Exams as Required by IWL-2524 & IWL-2525,Table IWL-2500-1 for Exempt Tendon Insp,Per Recent Discussions with NRC ML17355A4141999-09-0202 September 1999 Documents That Util Has No Concerns or Challenges Related to site-specific Written Exam Administered at Plant on 990830 ML17355A4041999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Info to Support Assessment of Potential Risks Associated with Proposed Civil Aircraft Operations at Former Homestead Air Force Base to FP&L Turkey Point Nuclear Facility Units 3 & 4 ML17355A4071999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Completed Review of Info Listed in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 & Found Listed Discrepancies,Re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. ML17355A4061999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual FFD Performance Rept for Period of Jan- June 1999,for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.List of Events Reported & Summary of Mgt Actions Taken,Included ML17355A4001999-08-20020 August 1999 Informs That on 990722,util Determined Blind Specimen Submitted to Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs on 990721,was Reported Back with Unsatisfactory Results.Attachment 1 Is Summary of Investigation of Unsatisfactory Performance ML17355A3941999-07-27027 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for FY00 & FY01 ML17355A3871999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides Supplement to FP&L Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17355A3851999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs That Pages Missing from 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, Contain Info Unrelated to ODCM- Specified Sampling & Were Not Included as Part of Rept ML17355A3711999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs 0-EPIP-20201, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training & 0-EPIP-20126, Off-Site Dose Calculations. with Summary of Changes ML17355A3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Turkey Point,Unit 4 ISI Rept. Listed Repts Are Encl.No Eddy Current Exams Scheduled for Unit 4 Steam Generators ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17355A3571999-06-28028 June 1999 Informs That Util Voluntarily Reporting Facility Readiness as Outlined in Suppl 1 to GL 98-01.Encl Is Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 3 & 4,reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness ML17355A3521999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. ML17355A3491999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions Implemented by FPL Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. ML17355A3441999-05-27027 May 1999 Modifies FPLs Consent to Confirmatory Order to Reflect Resolution of Four Issues Identified as Pending in L-99-031 ML17355A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests Waiver of 520 Hours (13 Wks) Required Parallel Watchstanding in Control Room Prior to License Application Submittal for W Conley ML17355A2921999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards Rev 35 to Turkey Point EP & Revised EPIP 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of EC, Per Requirements of 10CFR50, App E & 10CFR50.54(q).Summary of Changes,Encl.Implementation Date for Both Documents Was 990330 ML17355A2891999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Relief Request 20, Exempt Tendon Insp, Requesting Relief from ASME Section XI Code,1992 Edition,Paragraph IWL-2521.1(c) Which Requires That Each Exempted Tendon Be Examined IAW IWL-2524 & IWL-2525.Approval Needed by 991001 ML17355A2861999-04-0505 April 1999 Forwards COLR for Turkey Point Unit 4,Cycle 18,IAW TS 6.9.1.7 ML17336A0681999-04-0101 April 1999 Expresses Support for FP&L Request for Waiver of Applicable Review Fees Upon FP&L Submittal of an Application for License Renewal for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2751999-03-25025 March 1999 Informs NRC & Staff of Fp&Ls Plans to Submit License Renewal Application for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 by End of Dec 2000 ML17355A2641999-03-19019 March 1999 Requests Changes to FPL Official Service List for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Add s Franzone & Remove G Hollinger from All Correspondence ML17355A2651999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-Dec 1998 & Rev 7 to ODCM for Gaseous & Liquid Effluents from Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4. ML17355A2621999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards Special Rept as Result of Turkey Point Unit 3 End-of-Cycle 16 ISI of SG Tubes.Rept Summarizes Results of SG Tube ISI ML17355A2631999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards FPL Decommissioning Fund Status Repts for St Lucie, Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Rept for St Lucie, Unit 2 Provides Status of Decommissioning Funds for All Three Owners of That Unit ML20204C6991999-03-10010 March 1999 Requests Amend to Turkey Point PSP to Modify Requirement to Post Security Officers to Provide Continuous Observation of Entire PA Perimeter in Event of Security Computer Failure. Change to Security Force Staffing Level Also Requested ML17355A2451999-03-0909 March 1999 Submits Info on FPL Current Levels of Nuclear Property Insurance,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17355A2501999-03-0808 March 1999 Informs That Licensee Reviewed NRC 990228 Ltr Issuing Exemption Requested Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg.Tabulated Summary of Util Comments & Marked Copy of NRC Ltr & SER Encl ML17355A2441999-03-0101 March 1999 Provides Update to Util Written Notices,Dtd 961120 & 970627 of Claim Involving Alleged Bodily Injury Arising Out of or in Connection with Use of Radioactive Matl at Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2431999-02-25025 February 1999 Informs That FPL Does Not Have Any Candidates from Turkey Point Scheduled to Participate in 990407,Generic Fundamentals Examination (GFE) ML17355A2341999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Response to RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Crdm/ CEDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. L-99-042, Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17355A2361999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Tabulation of 1998 Occupational Exposure Data for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4,per TS 6.9.1.2.a.Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Limits of 100/E-bar Mci Per Gram of Gross Radioactivity Were Not Exceeded During 1998 ML17355A2301999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Semiannual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Period of 980701-981231 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2231999-02-0808 February 1999 Informs That Util Will Comply with Commitment with Respect to Units 3 & 4,in Response to Ja Zwolinski 990129 Ltr.Util Also Agrees to Incorporate Commitment Into Confirmatory Order Modifying License Effective Immediately Upon Issuance ML17355A2031999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Recovery Plan. Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML17355A2171999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards Listed ISI Repts for Turkey Point Unit 3,in Accordance with Provisions of ASME Code,Section XI ML17354B2241999-01-0606 January 1999 Forwards Annual 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Changes To,Or Errors Discovered in ECCS Evaluation Models,Or in Application of Such Models That Effect Peak Clad Temp Calculation ML17354B2081998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That Fpl,In Cooperation with State of Fl & County Emergency Response Agencies,Will Conduct Exercise of Turkey Point Radiological Emergency Plan on 990210.Scenario Package Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness Section Chief,Region II ML17354B2091998-12-15015 December 1998 Forwards Price Anderson Guarantees Annual Financial Rept,Per 10CFR140.21.Exhibit 1 Submitted to Satisfy Annual Financial Reporting Requirement of 10CFR50.71(b) ML17354B2061998-12-0909 December 1998 Informs That Request for Exemption Specified in Section II.B.3 Will Not Be Needed Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg ML17354B1981998-11-25025 November 1998 Forwards Scope & Objective for 1999 Plant Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise.Objectives Developed in Conjunction with State & Local Govts.Exercise Scheduled for 990210 1999-09-09
[Table view] |
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CATEGORY j.
REGULBT(Q INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION/(STEM (RIDE)
ACCESSION NBR:9709240154 DOC.DATE: 97/09/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIE -SCi-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
~40-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HOVEY,R.J. Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards supplemental response to GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to support NRC review.
A DISTRIBUTION CODE: A056D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Generic Ltr 95-07 Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety Rela T NOTES: E RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/DRPE/EATON 1 1 PD2-3 PD 1 1 CROTEAU,R 1 1 INTERNA ILE CENTER 01 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB/B 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS ABSTRACT 1 1 D
U N
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGAN1ZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 8 ENCL 8
SEP 18 'l997 L-97-232 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of By letter dated August 17, 1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," requesting licensees to perform, or confirm that they performed, (1) evaluations of operational configurations of safety related, power operated gate valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding, and (2) further analyses, and any needed corrective actions, to ensure these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions.
By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) provided its response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. As a result of NRC's review of FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, the NRC Staff requested additional information in order to complete the review. In accordance with the NRC request, attached is the supplemental information.
Should there be any questions concerning this response, please contact us.
Very truly yours, R. J. Hovey Vice President Turkey Point Plant Attachment OIH cc: L'. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant 9709240i54 'P709i8 PDR ADQCK 05000250 llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll p PDR an FPL Group company
~~ ~
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Attachment to L-97-232 Page 1 of 6 TURKEY POINTS UNITS 3 AND 4 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO GENERIC. LETTER 95-07, "PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY RELATED POWER OPERATED GATE VALVES"
1.0 Purpose and Scope
By letters L-96-024 dated February 9, 1996, and L-96-194 dated July 30, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) provided its response to 'Generic Letter (GL) 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. This document provides supplemental information to FPL's response to GL 95-07 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. Pursuant to discussions with the NRC, supplemental information is provided for MOV-3/4- ~
535 and -536, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, MOV-3/4-862A and
-862B, and MOV-3/4-863A and -863B.
2.0 Response This response addresses specific pressure locking and thermal binding analyses for each set of valves identified above, as applicable.
2.1 Pressure Locking MOV-3/4-535 and -536, Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) Block Valves This supplement provides the results of calculations demonstrating the capability of MOV-3/4-535 and -536 to overcome potential pressure locking forces.
I As discussed in FPL letter L-96-024, the PORV block valves have a safety function to be open to provide overpressure protection to the reactor coolant system (RCS) during low temperature operation, in conjunction with the PORVs, but are not required to change position to perform this function. The valves are pre-staged open. Therefore, pressure locking is not a concern in providing overpressure protection to the RCS during low temperature operation. However, the capability to support the emergency operating procedures for steam generator tube rupture and to establish RCS feed and bleed conditions was evaluated.
A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owners Group. A safety factor of 1.2 was utilized with these results to ensure conservatism in the design. The calculation shows the
Attachment to L-97-232
'Page 2 of 6 PORV block valves are capable of overcoming pressure locking forces including a safety factor of 1.2.
Therefore, no further actions are required to address pressure locking for these valves. As requested by the NRC, the inputs used for the calculation are summarized in Table 1. Pressure inputs are provided for the steam generator tube rupture scenario which results in the highest potential pressure locking forces.
TABLE 1 Parameter Value Bonnet Pressure, SGTR Pbonnet = 2235 psig Upstream Pressure, SGTR PUp 1 3 60 psig Downstream Pressure, SGTR down 8 ps ig Disk Thickness t= 0.813 in Seat Radius a = 1.28 in Hub Radius b = 0.625 in Seat An le 6 = 5 deg Poisson's Ratio v = 0.3 Modulus of Elasticity E = 2.53 x 10 psi Static Pullout Force Fpo = 10780 lbf Coefficient of Friction between p = 0.45 disk and seat (500oF to 600oF).
Stem Diameter D,, = 1.123 in Hub Length Hub length = 0.536 in Actuator limit 19/600 lbf Valve limit 19,735 lbf Motor torque rating (derated 7.9 ft- lbs for temperature)
Actuator overall ratio 82.0 Pullout efficiency 0.40 Application factor 1.0 Undervolta e factor 0.7398 Stem factor = 0.20 0.0116
,Attachment to L-97-232 Page 3 of 6'.
MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves This supplement provides additional information regarding the near-term capability of MOV-3/4-744A and
-744B to overcome potential pressure locking forces, and confirms long-term plans to modify the valves to preclude pressure locking.
These valves are analyzed for pressure locking for the
.conditions when they are required to open in response to a safety injection signal to establish low head safety injection to the RCS. A calculation was performed using the PRESLOK methodology developed by Commonwealth Edison and validated by the Westinghouse Owner's Group. The calculation showed that the valves have the capability to overcome pressure locking forces to open. The available margin does not provide for a safety factor of 1.2 desired to ensure conservatism in the design. Therefore, a modification to the valves will. be performed to vent the bonnet back to the RCS (high pressure) side of the .valves. This precludes the possibility of pressure locking the valves. These modifications will be performed in the Unit 4 Cycle 17 (Fall 1997) outage and the Unit 3 Cycle 17 (Fall 1998) outage.
- 3. MOV-3/4-862A and -862B, Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Suction Isolation Valves As stated in FPL letter L-96-024, these valves have no active function to open within the design basis. This supplement provides additional information regarding the requirement for these valves to be open as part of the flow path from the RWST to the RHR pump suction.
MOV 3/4-862 A/B are double disc gate valves which are considered potentially susceptible to pressure locking.
These valves have no active design basis function to open, and are normally open during Modes 1, 2, and 3.
Per the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications, the valves are required to be capable of being opened to provide a flowpath from the RWST to the RHR pump suction during Mode 4. This is a manual realignment. On plant start up, procedures for shifting RHR from an RCS cooldown line-up to an injection line-up in Mode 4 require the RHR system to be isolated from the RCS, cooled down, and then realigned for injection. The potenti'al for pressure locking during this evolution was evaluated, since the valves would be closed with pressure in the bonnet when
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Attachment to L-97-232 Page 4 of 6 the RHR system was cooled down and depressurized, creating the potential for pressure locking. Pressure locking is not expected since the cooldown cools the valve bonnet, which would also cause a bonnet pressure reduction. This reduces the potential for pressure locking. This alignment occurs on plant start up, or at least once per fuel cycle. No failure of the valves to perform this function has previously occurred.
Local manual operation of the valve is provided for and possible to perform during this scenario. This demonstrates the capability of these valves to meet the Technical Specification requirement.
- 4. MOV-3/4-863A and -863B, SI/CS Recirculation Phase Suction Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude pressure locking of these valves in lieu of solely crediting bonnet pressure decay time on start up, and to address potential pressure locking following surveillance testing.
During plant startup, the valve bonnets could potentially be pressurized while the unit is heating up using the Reactor Coolant Pumps with the RHR system in service. When the RHR system is isolated from the RCS on plant start up, pressure may be trapped in the bonnet of the valves. To preclude potentially pressure locking the valves, the MOV-3/4-863A and -863B valves are cycled prior to realigning the RHR System for low head safety injection. This valve cycling is completed by procedure after the RHR system has been cooled down to less than 200'F and the RHR pumps have been secured.
This ensures that the valves will support low head safety injection operability.
These valves are routinely exposed to RHR Pump discharge pressure during quarterly inservice testing which could pressurize the valve bonnet cavity. In the event that the valves were required to open for recirculation mode, an RHR pump would already be running on a safety injection signal applying pressure to one side of the valve disc. Any minor differential pressure due to the remaining pressure in the valve bonnets would not cause a potential pressure locking condition. Therefore, these valves remain operable during and after an RHR pump inservice test.
Attachment to L-97-232 Page 5 of 6 2.2 Thermal Binding MOV-3/4-535 and -536, PORV Block Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural controls in place to preclude thermal binding of MOV-3/4-535 and -536 when the valves are closed to isolate PORV leakage.
If the PORV block valves are closed to address leakage; and subsequently, the plant is cooled
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PORV from normal operating'temperature to an RCS temperature of 275'F to 285'F, the potential, exists for thermal binding.
In order to align for cold over pressure protection per Technical Specification 3/4.9.3, the PORV block valves must be opened. Plant operating history has shown that the block valves have not previously thermally bound.
However, to eliminate the possibility of thermal binding, procedure controls are in place. The block valves will be opened prior to the RCS being cooled to below hot standby conditions unless the PORVs or Block valves have been declared inoperable, or PORV leakage exceeds that allowed by Technical Specifications. This procedural control provides assurance that the PORVs that will be relied upon for OMS will be available during controlled plant cooldowns.
- 2. MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, Low Head Safety Injection Isolation Valves This supplement provides a summary of procedural contr'ols that are in place to preclude the potential for thermal binding of MOV-3/4-744A and -744B:
The low head safety injection isolation valves, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B valves could be closed at a temperature up to 350'F when securing from RHR system operation during plant start up. For scenarios where these valves are required to open, the temperature may be near normal containment ambient temperature creating the potential for thermal binding. Procedure controls are in place to require stroking the valve after the valve has cooled to eliminate any potential thermal binding. This is accomplished by opening and closing the valves during back leakage testing of downstream check valves. The MOV-3/4-744A and -744B valve cycling occurs prior to .performing the low head safety injection flowpath alignment after RHR,system cooldown to less than 200'F, and prior to plant heatup above
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Attachment to L-97-232 Page 6 of 6 350'F when low head safety injection capability is required. Operating experience indicates that lines containing the valves are relatively cool.
Additionally, several hours of delay due to time constraints in performing RHR system cooldown and testing activities allows additional ambient cooling prior to the final cycling of the valves.
3.0 Conclusions This supplement provides the necessary information to establish the acceptability of specific Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 motor operated valves for pressure locking and thermal binding concerns. The potential for pressure locking is adequately addressed by the analyses, modifications, and procedural" controls described herein for MOV-3/4-535 and 536, MOV-3/4-744A and -744B, and MOV-3/4-863A and -863B.
Information regarding the operating conditions with respect to the potential for pressure locking of MOV-3/4-862A and
-862B is also provided. Thermal binding for MOV-3/4-535 and
-536, and MOV-3/4-744A and -744B are addressed by procedural controls. Long term upgrades for MOV-3/4-744A and -744B are also addressed.
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