ML15083A083

McGuire TS Bases Updates

ML15083A083
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	03/10/2015
From:	Beaver B C Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
DUK150690031
Download: ML15083A083 (11)

Text

PRIORITY Normal DISPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE TO THE TRANSMITTAL SIGNATURE UNLESS RECIPIENT IS OTHERWISE IDENTIFIED BELOW Date: 03/10115 Document Transmittal

1. DUK150690031

1) 01820 J R ELKINS- EC081 2) 02361 QATS-MG01MM

3) 02388 BOB SCHOMAKER LYNCHBG, VA 4) 02532 RESIDENT NRC INSPECT MG01 NRC 5) 03044 MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN MG05DM 6) 03614 MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MG01OP 7) 03744 OPS TRNG MGR. MG030T 8) 03759 U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC 9) 03796 SCIENTECH CLEARWTR, FL 10) 04809 MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR. MG05SE 11) 05262 J L FREEZE MG01IE 12) 05606 J C MORTON MG01EP 13) 08103 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO LLC 14) 09665 JON H THOMPSON, USNRC Duke Energy DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM REFERENCE MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES (TSB)RECORD RETENTION

1. 421734 Page 2 of 2 QA CONDITION

[] Yes 0 No OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED 0 Yes IF QA OR OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED, PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY RETURNING THIS FORM TO: Duke Energy McGuire DCRM MGO2DM 13225 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, N.C. 28078 Rec'd By Date DOCUMENT NO QACOND REV #/ DATE DISTR CODE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 TOTAL MNS TSB 3.7.7 N/A 135 03/10/15 MADM-04B V1 V1 V1 x V3 V1 V1 V1 V1 vi V1 29 REMARKS: PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LOES REVISION 122 DATED 02/25/15 S D CAPPS VICE PRESIDENT MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION BY: B C BEAVER MG01RC BCB/BRG-~

February 25, 2015 MEMORANDUM

Subject:

McGuire TS Bases Updates REMOVE INSERT TSB List of Effected Sections Rev 121 TSB List of Effected Sections Rev 122 TSB 3.7.7 Rev. 115 TSB 3.7.7 Rev 135 Due to the revision process used for TS and Bases, revision numbers may be skipped.Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver Regulatory Compliance 875-4180 McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification Bases LOES TS Bases are revised by section Page Number Revision Revision Date O BASES (Revised per section)i Revision 87 8/15/07 ii Revision 87 8/15/07 iii Revision 87 8/15/07 B 2.1.1 Revision 51 01/14/04 B 2.1.2 Revision 109 9/20/10 B 3.0 Revision 81 3/29/07 B 3.1.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.1.2 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.1.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.1.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.1.6 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04 B 3.1.8 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.2.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.2.2 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.2.3 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.2.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.3.1 Revision 124 10/1/12 B 3.3.2 Revision 132 8/27/14 B 3.3.3 Revision 122 10/25/12 B 3.3.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.3.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.3.6 Not Used -Revision 87 6129/06 B 3.4.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.3 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page I Revision 122 Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.4.6 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.7 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.8 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.9 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.10 Revision 102 8/17/09 B 3.4.11 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.12 Revision 134 1/8/15 B 3.4.13 Revision 126 5/1/13 B 3.4.14 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.15 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.16 Revision 121 8/5/09 B 3.4.17 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.4.18 Revision 86 6/25/07 B 3.5.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.5.2 Revision 116 8/18/11 B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.5.4 Revision 122 10/25/12 B 3.5.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.6.2 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.3 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.6 Revision 122 10/25/12 B 3.6.7 Not Used -Revision 63 4/4/05 B 3.6.8 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.9 Revision 131 4/14/14 B 3.6.10 Revision 120 4/26/12 B 3.6.11 Revision 122 10/25/12 B 3.6.12 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.13 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.14 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.6.15 Revision 125 10/19/12 B 3.6.16 Revision 130 4/7/14 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 2 Revision 122 Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.7.1 Revision 129 10/24/13 B 3.7.2 Revision 105 2/22/10 B 3.7.3 Revision 102 8/17/09 B 3.7.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.6 Revision 127 8/2/13 B 3.7.7 Revision 135 2/11/15 B 3.7.8 Revision 128 10/2/13 B 3.7.9 Revision 120 4/26/12 B 3.7.10 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.11 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.12 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.13 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.14 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.7.15 Revision 66 6/30/05 B 3.7.16 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.2 Revision 92 1/28/08 B 3.8.3 Revision 123 9/29/12 B 3.8.4 Revision 133 9/10/14 B 3.8.5 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.8.6 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.7 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.8 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.9 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.8.10 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.1 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.2 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.3 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.4 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.5 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.6 Revision 115 3/29/11 B 3.9.7 Revision 115 3/29/11 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 3 Revision 122 NSWS B 3.7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)BASES BACKGROUND The NSWS provides a transfer mechanism for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.

During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the NSWS also provides this function for various safety related and nonsafety related components.

The safety related function is covered by this LCO.The NSWS is normally supplied from Lake Norman as a non-seismic source, through a single supply line as shown in Figure B 3.7.7-1. An additional safety-related and seismic supply of water to the NSWS, in the event of a loss of Lake Norman, is the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). The supply line from Lake Norman separates into two supply headers, each header is capable of being isolated by two, independently powered, motor operated valves. The two supply headers feed into two separate supply trains. The "A" train supplies water to the"A" pump on each unit and the "B" train to the "B" pump on each unit.During normal operation, only one pump, per unit, is in operation to supply NSWS flow to the essential and non-essential headers for each unit. The "B" train supply is automatically realigned to the SNSWP and supplies the "B" header on an SI signal from either unit. The "A" train supply is automatically realigned to the low-level supply from Lake Norman and supplies the "A" header on an SI signal from either unit.Essential headers provide flow to the following safety related components and systems: 1. Component Cooling (CCW) Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers, 2. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers, 3. Control Room Area Chiller Condensers, 4. Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers, 5. Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor, Bearing Oil and Gear Oil Coolers, 6. Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor Coolers, 7. Auxiliary Feedwa-ter Pump Motor Coolers, 8. Safety Injection Pump Motor and Bearing Oil Coolers, 9. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Coolers, 10. Fuel Pool Pump Motor Coolers, 11. Assured Auxiliary Feedwater Supply, 12. Assured Component Cooling System Makeup, 13. Assured Fuel Pool Cooling System makeup, and 14. Assured Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System makeup.McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-1 Revision No. 135 NSWS B 3.7.7 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The non-essential channel supply comes from the "A" and "B" train crossover piping and isolates on an SI or Blackout signal.The Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Air Coolers are not essential for safe shutdown, but are set up to receive cooling flow until the Containment, High-High signal is received.

The pumps and valves are remote and manually aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical loops are automatically started upon receipt of a safety injection or Station Blackout signal, and all essential valves are aligned to their post accident positions.

Additional information about the design and operation of the NSWS, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the UFSAR, Section 9.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the NSWS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System.APPLICABLE The design basis of the NSWS is for one NSWS train, in conjunction with SAFETY ANALYSES the CCW System and the Containment Spray system, to remove core decay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCS pumps. The NSWS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power.The NSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also removes heat from the residual heat removal (RHR) system, as discussed in the UFSAR, Section 5.4 (Ref. 3), from RHR entry conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident operations.

The time required for this evolution is a function of the number of CCW and RHR System trains that are operating.

One NSWS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum NSWS inlet temperature of 102 0 F is not exceeded.The NSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).LCO Two NSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-2 Revision No. 135 NSWS B 3.7.7 BASES LCO (continued) heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.An NSWS train is considered OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when: a. The associated unit's pump is OPERABLE; and b. The associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.Portions of the NSWS system are shared between the two units (Figure B 3.7.7-1).

The shared portions of the system must be OPERABLE for each unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability.

Additionally, both normal and emergency power for shared components must also be OPERABLE.

If a shared NSWS component becomes inoperable, or normal or emergency power to shared components becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently for each unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the NSWS is a normally operating system that is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the NSWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.In MODES 5 and 6, the requirements of the NSWS are determined by the systems it supports.ACTIONS A._1 If one NSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE NSWS train is adequate to perform the heat removal function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE NSWS train could result in loss of NSWS function.

Required Action A. 1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," should be entered if an inoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator.

The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train.McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-3 Revision No. 135 NSWS B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.B.1 and B.2 If the NSWS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the NSWS components or systems may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the NSWS.Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the NSWS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for NSWS operation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-4 Revision No. 135 NSWS B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.7.2 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS valves on an actual or simulated actuation safety injection signal. The NSWS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.7.3 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The NSWS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing during normal operation.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3. UFSAR, Section 5.4.4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components".

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-5 Revision No. 135 NSWS B 3.7.7 BASES FIGURE B 3.7.7-1 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (, C3 w zX McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-6 Revision No. 135