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| {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ORMATIONDISTRIBUTION SYSi(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR!8107280254 DOCDDATE:" | | {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS i (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR!8107280254 DOCDDATE:" 81/07/20 NOTARIZED:: |
| 81/07/20NOTARIZED:: | | NO FACILi:50 335 Sts Lucie Plant~Unit 1<.Florida Power 8 Light Co~AUTH'AME'UTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGP R 0 E~Florida Power 8 Light Co~REC IP~NAMEl REC'IP IENT AFF ILIA'TION CI ARKipR~AD Operating, Reactors Branch 3 DOC KEiT¹05000335 SUBJECT Forwards responses to NRC 810521 request for.addi info reI auxiliary feedwateri sys automatic-initiation L flow indication;Four oversize drawings encl~Aperture cards'ill~ |
| NOFACILi:50 335StsLuciePlant~Unit1<.FloridaPower8LightCo~AUTH'AME'UTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGPR0E~FloridaPower8LightCo~RECIP~NAMElREC'IPIENTAFFILIA'TION CIARKipR~ADOperating, ReactorsBranch3DOCKEiT¹05000335SUBJECTForwardsresponses toNRC810521requestfor.addiinforeIauxiliary feedwateri sysautomatic-initiation Lflowindication;Four oversizedrawingsencl~Aperturecards'ill~
| | be ava.ilable in PDR, DISTRIBUTION CODE1 ADO IS COPIES RECEIVED;LTR |
| beava.ilable inPDR,DISTRIBUTION CODE1ADOISCOPIESRECEIVED;LTR
| | 'NCLA'IZE::gJ TITLE': General Distr ibution for af ter Issuance of Oper atingLicense NOTES:-RECIPIENT ID'ODE/NAMEI ACTION!ORB¹3 BC'4 INTERNAL'/DIREHUM FAC08 I LEi 06'ELD 11T RAD'ASMT BR COPIES" LTTR ENCLL'3 13 1 1 2 2 1 01~1 RECIPIENT ID CODE'/NAME<< |
| 'NCLA'IZE::gJTITLE':GeneralDistributionforafterIssuanceofOperatingLicense NOTES:-RECIPIENT ID'ODE/NAMEI ACTION!ORB¹3BC'4INTERNAL'/DIREHUM FAC08ILEi06'ELD11TRAD'ASMTBRCOPIES"LTTRENCLL'3131122101~1RECIPIENT IDCODE'/NAME<< | | DIRg DIV OF.LIC.NRC-PDR 02 BR 10 G*FILE 01 COPIES LTTR'NCL<1 1 1=-.1 0, 1 1 EXTERNALt:= |
| DIRgDIVOF.LIC.NRC-PDR02BR10G*FILE01COPIESLTTR'NCL<
| | ACRS NSIC 09 05 ie 16 1 1 LPDR NTIS 03 1 1 1 1-TOTAL" NUMBER'F COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 41 ENCL" 39 N'1 a~1 c a 1't$I P E t f P.O.BOX 529100 MIAMI, FL 33152 Qilljj~FLORIDA POWER&LIGHT COMPANY July 20, 1981 L-81-302 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: |
| 111=-.10,11EXTERNALt:=
| | Mr.Robert A.Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch IIl3 Division of Licensing U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 |
| ACRSNSIC0905ie1611LPDRNTIS031111-TOTAL"NUMBER'FCOPIESREQUIRED:
| |
| LTTR41ENCL"39 N'1a~1ca1't$IPEtf P.O.BOX529100MIAMI,FL33152Qilljj~FLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYJuly20,1981L-81-302OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:
| |
| Mr.RobertA.Clark,ChiefOperating ReactorsBranchIIl3DivisionofLicensing U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 | |
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| ==DearMr.Clark:== | | ==Dear Mr.Clark:== |
| Re:St.LucieUnitglDocketNo.50-335Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAutomatic Initiation andFlowIndication FloridaPower8LighthasreviewedtheNRCletterdatedMay21,1981concerning theabovesubjectandourresponseisattached. | | Re: St.Lucie Unit gl Docket No.50-335 Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication Florida Power 8 Light has reviewed the NRC letter dated May 21, 1981 concerning the above subject and our response is attached.Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/PLP/ras cc: Mr.J.P.O'Reilly, Region II Harold F.Reis, Esquire yg,(gQ g c, K~giA (8107280254 810720 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P PDR PEOPI.E.~.SERVING PEOPLE 0>, y'P r.~a~J*4~s'P''',p Il 1, J'Fa j t tl RE UEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFOIQfATION uestion 1 ST.LUCIE 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW AUTOMATIC INITIATION AND'FLOW INDICATION Please provide the following drawings: a)Detailed P&XD (Piping and Instrumentation Diagram)of the St.Lucie 1 auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS).b)Electrical schematics,, and logic diagrams for the AFWS initiation and annunciation circuits, and AFW pump and valve control circuits.c)Electrical schematics for the valves in the steam supply line to the turbine driven AFW pump.Res onse 1 The drawings requested by the staff that are attached to this letter are preliminary. |
| Verytrulyyours,RobertE.UhrigVicePresident AdvancedSystems8Technology REU/PLP/ras cc:Mr.J.P.O'Reilly, RegionIIHaroldF.Reis,Esquireyg,(gQgc,K~giA(8107280254 810720PDRADOCK05000335PPDRPEOPI.E.~.SERVINGPEOPLE 0>,y'Pr.~a~J*4~s'P''',pIl1,J'Fajttl REUESTFORADDITIONAL INFOIQfATION uestion1ST.LUCIE1AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFWAUTOMATIC INITIATION AND'FLOWINDICATION Pleaseprovidethefollowing drawings:
| | The finalized dxawings along with the information that is not yet available will be sent to you when the design is finalized. |
| a)DetailedP&XD(PipingandInstrumentation Diagram)oftheSt.Lucie1auxiliary feedwater system(AFWS).b)Electrical schematics,, | | Drawings Numbers are as follows: a)Ebasco Dwg No.8770-G-080 b)Combustion Engineering Dwg No.E-00000-41l-801 Rev 01, AFAS Simplified Functional Diagram E-00000-411-803 Rev Ol, AFAS Testing System Diagram E-00000-411-'04 Rev 01, AFAS Miscellaneous Diagram Schematics> |
| andlogicdiagramsfortheAFWSinitiation andannunciation
| | for actuated components with changes for Aux Feedwatex Automatic Initiation System (CE)not available as of yet.c)Not available as of yet.uestion 2 Assuming a loss of power to the AB-DC tie bus ("A" battery failure), describe the manual actions required to transfer this bus to the"B" battery-including the time required to make this transfer.Res onse 2 Since the"AB" bus is normally aligned to the"B" battery at St.Luice Unit 1, the procedure to transfer the"AB" bus from the"B" battery to the"A" battery will be descxibed. |
| : circuits, andAFWpumpandvalvecontrolcircuits.
| | The only difference to transfer the"AB" bus from the"A" battery to the"B" battery would be a change in the breaker numbers.1.Check the 1A charger on the 1A 125V DC bus, the lB charger on the lB 125V DC bus, and the AB charger i.s in Hot Standby. |
| c)Electrical schematics forthevalvesinthesteamsupplylinetotheturbinedrivenAFWpump.Resonse1Thedrawingsrequested bythestaffthatareattachedtothisletterarepreliminary. | | 2.Close Breaker 60317 ("AB" Battery Charger Output).3.Open Breaker 60316, tie to 125V DC bus 1B on 125V DC bus 1AB from the control room.Open Breaker 60230, tie to 125V DC bus 1AB on 125V DC bus 1B from the control room.5.Close Breaker 60130, tie to 125V DC bus lAB on 125V DC bus 1A from the'control room.6.Close Breaker 60315, tie to 125V DC bus 1A on 125V DC bus 1AB from the contxol room.The time required to carry out this procedure is approximately two'to giye minutes.uestion 3 By Florida Power and Light (FP&L)letter dated January 2, 198l (L-81-4),, Enclosure 2, it is stated that"The ASS will automatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a faulted steam generator and automatically provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generator." Provide a detailed description of this feature (i.e., automatic termination of AFW to the faulted steam generator) including logic and schematic electrical diagrams.Res onse 3 The auxiliary feedwater actuation system automatically initiates auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generator upon demand and terminates or prevents auxiliary feedwater to the steam generator identified as being ruptured.The APAS is a four channel IE system that provides separate feedwater initiation signals for each steam generator (identified as AFAS-1 and APAS-2).Both signals are provided in each channel to interface with the individual components (pumps, valves).The logic which is used within each channel to define feedwater initiation or termination is shown in figure 1.AFAS is initiated within each channel upon receipt of a low S.G.water level signal provided the steam generator or associated feedwater header is not identified as being ruptured.A rupture signal is generated upon the following condi.tions: |
| Thefinalized dxawingsalongwiththeinformation thatisnotyetavailable willbesenttoyouwhenthedesignisfinalized.
| | S.G.pressure is approximately 100 psi below the other S.G.;or Feedwater supply header pressure is approximately 100 psi below the other feedwater supply header pressure;and Its associated S.G.is identified as having a low water level, and The other S.G.or feedwater header is not identified as being ruptured.The logic discussed above produces a digital (on/off)signa1 within each channel for APAS 1 and 2.These signals are combined across the four channels to form a two-out-of four logic.This logic produces an AFAS 1 or 2 actuation signal within each channel to control the pumps or valves associated with that.signal.Therefore, initiation of APAS 1 or 2 will cause the final AFAS actuation relays to deenergize thereby energizing lt I'rV;II'igurc 1 hl'AS LO(~IC I FIYII2 I'SG 1 P1 (P2 PSG 2 , I,)f P2 (P1 P1~iP2 LSG 1 LSG 2 P2<P1+f+]OR LOV(EVEI.LO'LY LEVEI OR)()I<07 NOT nfl D II~ti 2/4~Off'JC MnfiUAL~OB f~l,$2/il COlf JC MANUAL Oll ABBREVIATIONS P.PRESSURE L LEVEL SG STEAI"I GENERATOR F'tYII FEED'VIATER HEAQFR AFAS AUXILIARY~FEEDS'IATER ACTUATION SYSTI:ii AFAS1 AFAS 2',~~'l~\~~~t'I the associated pumps and valves to provide feedwater to-thh appropriate S.G.Should the S.G.be identified as being ruptured, the AFAS actuation relays would reenergize (except pump actuation relays)and close the associated valves.For further detail of the above pxoject, see CE drawing E-00000-411-801 (attached). |
| DrawingsNumbersareasfollows:a)EbascoDwgNo.8770-G-080 b)Combustion Engineering DwgNo.E-00000-41l-801 Rev01,AFASSimplified Functional DiagramE-00000-411-803 RevOl,AFASTestingSystemDiagramE-00000-411-'04 Rev01,AFASMiscellaneous DiagramSchematics>
| | uestion 4 Are there any operating bypasses associated with the AFW automatic initiation logic/circuitry during start-up or operation of the reactor?If so, how are these bypasses removed (automatically, procedurally, etc)?~Res ense 4 The AFAS contains two types of bypasses, 1)txip channel bypass and 2)battery failure bypass.The trip channel bypass is provided for periodic testing of the system and to remove a channel from sezvice due to a component failure.This bypass is manually initiated and manually removed.2)The battery failure bypass is an automatic bypass initiated upon loss of battery power.The bypass effects only channels A and B.Loss of battery A will automatically bypass channel A only and similarly loss of battery B will automaticaliy bypass channel B only.Individual manual bypass swi.tches will be provided on a functiona1 level (AFAS 1 and AFAS 2)which will prevent the individual automatic actuation outputs from operating APW system components (i.e.APAS 1A bypass (S.G.1A, channel A), AFAS 2B (bypass (S.G.1B, channel B)etc.).A control room annunciator will be actuated when any of the available bypass switches is put in the bypass position.These bypasses will be removed manually under the dizection of written procedures. |
| foractuatedcomponents withchangesforAuxFeedwatex Automatic Initiation System(CE)notavailable asofyet.c)Notavailable asofyet.uestion2AssumingalossofpowertotheAB-DCtiebus("A"batteryfailure),
| | uestion 5 Discuss the capability for testing and calibration of the APW automatic initiation channels including intervals between tests.Res onse 5 Testing of the auxiliary feedwatez actuation system is accomplished in five segments: 1)Sensor Test 2)Bistable Test 3)Logic Matrix Test 4)Initiation Circuit Test 5)Actuation Test Each test is discussed below: 1)Sensor Test During xeactor operation, the measurement channels providing an input to the AFAS aze checked by comparing the outputs of similar channels and cross-checking with related measurements. |
| describethemanualactionsrequiredtotransferthisbustothe"B"battery-including thetimerequiredtomakethistransfer.
| | During extended shutdown periods or refueling, these measurement channels are checked and where possible calibrated against known standards. |
| Resonse2Sincethe"AB"busisnormallyalignedtothe"B"batteryatSt.LuiceUnit1,theprocedure totransferthe"AB"busfromthe"B"batterytothe"A"batterywillbedescxibed.
| | 2)Bistable Test Testing of the bistable is accomplished by manually varying the input signal up to or down to the trip setpoint level on one bistable at a time and observing the trip action.Varying the input signal is accomplished by means of a trip test circuit consistipg of a digita1 voltmeter and a test circuit used to vary the magnitude of the signal supplied by the measurement channel to the trip input.The trip test circuit is interlocked electrically so that it can be used in only one channel at a time.A switch is provided to select the.measurement channel, and a push-button is provided to apply the test signal.The digital voltmeter indicates the value of the test signal.Trip action (deenergizing) of each of the bistable relays is indicated by individual 1ights on the front of the cabinet, indicating that these relays operate as required for a bistable trip condition. |
| Theonlydifference totransferthe"AB"busfromthe"A"batterytothe"B"batterywouldbeachangeinthebreakernumbers.1.Checkthe1Achargeronthe1A125VDCbus,thelBchargeronthelB125VDCbus,andtheABchargeri.sinHotStandby.
| | When one of the bistables of the AFAS is in the tripped condition, a channel trip exists and is annunciated. |
| 2.CloseBreaker60317("AB"BatteryChargerOutput).3.OpenBreaker60316,tieto125VDCbus1Bon125VDCbus1ABfromthecontrolroom.OpenBreaker60230,tieto125VDCbus1ABon125VDCbus1Bfromthecontrolroom.5.CloseBreaker60130,tieto125VDCbuslABon125VDCbus1Afromthe'controlroom.6.CloseBreaker60315,tieto125VDCbus1Aon125VDCbus1ABfromthecontxolroom.Thetimerequiredtocarryoutthisprocedure isapproximately two'togiyeminutes.uestion3ByFloridaPowerandLight(FP&L)letterdatedJanuary2,198l(L-81-4),, | | In this condition, auxiliary feed would take place only upon receipt of a AFAS 1 or AFAS 2 trip signa1 in one of the other like trip channels.The AFAS 1 or AFAS 2 trip channel under test is therefore bypassed for this test.Fu11 protection is maintained. |
| Enclosure 2,itisstatedthat"TheASSwillautomatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flowtoafaultedsteamgenerator andautomatically provideauxiliary feedwater flowtotheintactsteamgenerator." | | 3)Lo ic Matrix Test The test is carried out to verify proper operation of the six 1ogic matrices, any of which can initiate a system actuation. |
| Provideadetaileddescription ofthisfeature(i.e.,automatic termination ofAFWtothefaultedsteamgenerator) including logicandschematic electrical diagrams.
| | Only the matrix relays in one of the six logic matrices can be held in the energized position during tests.If, for example, the AB 1ogic matrix hold pushbutton is depressed, actuation of the other matrix hold push-buttons can have no effect upon their respective logic matrices.Actuation of the pushbutton, applies a test voltage to the test system hold coils of the selected double coil matrix relays.This voltage provides the power necessary to hold the relays in their energized position when deactuation of the bistable relay contacts in the matrix ladder being tested causes deenergization of the primary matrix relay coils.The logic matrix to be.tested is selected using the System Select switch.While holding the matrix Hold pushbutton in its actuated position, rotation of the System Select switch releases only those bistable relays that have operating contacts in the logic matrix under test.The System Select switch applies a test voltage of opposite polarity to the bistable relay test coils, so that the magnetic flux generated by these coils opposes that of the primary coil of the relay.The resulting flux will be zero, and the relays will release.A simplified diagram of this testing system is shown on C-E drawing E-00000-411-803, (attached). |
| Resonse3Theauxiliary feedwater actuation systemautomatically initiates auxiliary feedwater totheintactsteamgenerator upondemandandterminates orpreventsauxiliary feedwater tothesteamgenerator identified asbeingruptured.
| | Trip action can be observed by illumination of the bistable relay indicators located on the front panel of the AFAS cabinet and by loss of voltage to the four matrix relays, which is indicated by extinguishing indicator lights connected across each matrix relay coil.During this test, the matrix relay"hold" lights remain on, indicating that a test voltage has been applied to the holding coils of the matrix relays of the logic matrix module under test.The test is repeated for all six matrices.This test verifies that the'bistable relay contacts operate correctly and that the logic matrix relays will deenergize if the matrix continuity is violated.The opening of the matrix relay contact is tested in the initiation circuit test.4)Initiation Circuit Test Each initiation circuit is tested individually by depressing a matrix Hold pushbutton (holding matrix relays), selecting either system position on the System Select switch (opening the matrix), and selecting a matrix relay on the Matrix Relay Select Switch (deenergizing one of the matrix relays).This causes one, and only one, of the initiation circuits to deenergize, causing one current leg of the selective two-out,-of-four in each channel to open.Loss of current through this leg is indicated on the AFAS cabinet.The Matrix Relay Select Switch is turned to the next position, reenergizing the tested matrix relay, allowing the initiation circuit to xeenergize. |
| TheAPASisafourchannelIEsystemthatprovidesseparatefeedwater initiation signalsforeachsteamgenerator (identified asAFAS-1andAPAS-2).Bothsignalsareprovidedineachchanneltointerface withtheindividual components (pumps,valves).Thelogicwhichisusedwithineachchanneltodefinefeedwater initiation ortermination isshowninfigure1.AFASisinitiated withineachchanneluponreceiptofalowS.G.waterlevelsignalprovidedthesteamgenerator orassociated feedwater headerisnotidentified asbeingruptured.
| | This sequence is repeated for the remaining three initiation circuits from the selected matrix.Following this, the entire sequence is repeated for the remaining five matrices.5)Actuation Test Proper operation of the AFAS relays in the AFAS Cabinet, is verified by deenergizing the relays one at a time via a test relay contact and noting the proper operation of all actuated components in that trip function (ASAS-1 or AFAS-2).The relay will automatically reenergize and return its components to the pretest condition when the test pushbutton is released.The design of the test system is at a time.The test switch must (AFAS 1 or AFAS 2)to be tested, impossible. |
| Arupturesignalisgenerated uponthefollowing condi.tions:
| | The test circuit is of a particular AFAS function.such that only one relay may be deenergized be positioned to the function relays selection of more than one function is electrically locked out upon actuation Testing of segments 2 thru 5 of the AFAS should be accomplished at intervals similar to the RPS.uestion 6 Address the physical separation provided between the redundant AFW automatic initiation instrument channels. |
| S.G.pressureisapproximately 100psibelowtheotherS.G.;orFeedwater supplyheaderpressureisapproximately 100psibelowtheotherfeedwater supplyheaderpressure; andItsassociated S.G.isidentified ashavingalowwaterlevel,andTheotherS.G.orfeedwater headerisnotidentified asbeingruptured. | | Res onse 6 The AFAS cabinet is divided into front and back compartments separated by a mechanical barrier at the 30" depth point.Additional thermal and mechanical barriers in the horizontal and vertica1 planes at the cabinet centerline divide the cabinet into eight separate compartments. |
| Thelogicdiscussed aboveproducesadigital(on/off)signa1withineachchannelforAPAS1and2.Thesesignalsarecombinedacrossthefourchannelstoformatwo-out-of fourlogic.ThislogicproducesanAFAS1or2actuation signalwithineachchanneltocontrolthepumpsorvalvesassociated withthat.signal.Therefore, initiation ofAPAS1or2willcausethefinalAFASactuation relaystodeenergize therebyenergizing lt I'rV;II'igurc 1hl'ASLO(~ICIFIYII2I'SG1P1(P2PSG2,I,)fP2(P1P1~iP2LSG1LSG2P2<P1+f+]ORLOV(EVEI.LO'LYLEVEIOR)()I<07NOTnflDII~ti2/4~Off'JCMnfiUAL~OBf~l,$2/ilCOlfJCMANUALOllABBREVIATIONS P.PRESSURELLEVELSGSTEAI"IGENERATOR F'tYIIFEED'VIATER HEAQFRAFASAUXILIARY
| | The front four compartments contain the initiation circuitry (bistables, logic, and test circuitry) for channels A, B, C and D respectively as we11 as the interchannel isolation devices to another.Access to each front compartment is controlled by a separate transparent door with a key switch.M>ere cables of one compartment must pass through to another an enclosed cable duct (qualified as a fire barrier)is utilized.'The four rear compartments contain the actuation circuitry and devices that are requiied for control of the AFAS System.Hach compartment has a separate door for access.Mhere existing plant instrumentation signals (e.g., Steam Generator'level and pressure)are to be used by the AFAS initiation system, the extension of these 1oops to the AFAS cabinet will be installed with appropriate separation consistent with the existing 1oop installations. |
| ~FEEDS'IATER ACTUATION SYSTI:iiAFAS1AFAS2',~~'l~\~~~t'I theassociated pumpsandvalvestoprovidefeedwater to-thhappropriate S.G.ShouldtheS.G.beidentified asbeingruptured, theAFASactuation relayswouldreenergize (exceptpumpactuation relays)andclosetheassociated valves.Forfurtherdetailoftheabovepxoject,seeCEdrawingE-00000-411-801 (attached). | | New dedicated instrumentation signals (e.g., Feedwater header pressure)will be installed with separation consistent with existing plant separation criteria.System outputs and operator interface devices (switches) will also be installed in accordance with existing plant separation criteria.uestion 7 Describe the auxiliary feedwater flow indication instrumentation at the St.Lucie plant.This description should include: a.Type and number of flow channels.b.The specific source (vital bus)from which these channels are powered.c.Capability for testing and calibration including the interval between tests.d.The type of indication available in the control room for each channel (indicator, recorder, etc.)e.Safety grade qualification of the flow channels.f.Accuracy of the flow channels.a.St.Lucie 1 has three auxiliary feedwater pumps.Each pump with its associated flow path controls and instrumentation represents separate channel.Header discharge flow for each channel is indicated on Reactor-Turbine-Generator Board (RTGB)and recorded on Post Accident Panels A and B (PAP).The channels are designated as XA, XB, XAB (important A, B or AB).Each channel runs in separate tray system. |
| uestion4Arethereanyoperating bypassesassociated withtheAFWautomatic initiation logic/circuitry duringstart-uporoperation ofthereactor?Ifso,howarethesebypassesremoved(automatically, procedurally, etc)?~Resense4TheAFAScontainstwotypesofbypasses, 1)txipchannelbypassand2)batteryfailurebypass.Thetripchannelbypassisprovidedforperiodictestingofthesystemandtoremoveachannelfromsezviceduetoacomponent failure.Thisbypassismanuallyinitiated andmanuallyremoved.2)Thebatteryfailurebypassisanautomatic bypassinitiated uponlossofbatterypower.ThebypasseffectsonlychannelsAandB.LossofbatteryAwillautomatically bypasschannelAonlyandsimilarly lossofbatteryBwillautomaticaliy bypasschannelBonly.Individual manualbypassswi.tches willbeprovidedonafunctiona1 level(AFAS1andAFAS2)whichwillpreventtheindividual automatic actuation outputsfromoperating APWsystemcomponents (i.e.APAS1Abypass(S.G.1A,channelA),AFAS2B(bypass(S.G.1B,channelB)etc.).Acontrolroomannunciator willbeactuatedwhenanyoftheavailable bypassswitchesisputinthebypassposition.
| | b.Each flow instrumentation channel is powered from safety related source.Channel IA is powered from vital bus SA, channel IB from SB and channel XA3 from SAB.Vital bus SA, SB takes power from offsite source and is backed-up by Emergency Diesel Generator. |
| Thesebypasseswillberemovedmanuallyunderthedizection ofwrittenprocedures.
| | Vital bus SAB takes power either fxom vital bus SA or SB.c.One point pressure check is conducted once a month and response of the instruments is observed.Instruments are calibrated during each scheduled refueling outage.Scheduled.outages occur at intervals of twelve to eighteen months.All instruments in the loop;,are also xecalibrated every time there is a malfunction or a problem in the loop.d.One flow indicator per each channel is mounted on RTGB.Also each channel has flow recorder mounted of PAP.Channel IA and XAB are mounted on PAP"A" and Channel M is mounted on PAP".B";e.Flow instrumentation channels are seismically qualified. |
| uestion5Discussthecapability fortestingandcalibration oftheAPWautomatic initiation channelsincluding intervals betweentests.Resonse5Testingoftheauxiliary feedwatez actuation systemisaccomplished infivesegments:
| | This includes transmitters as well as equipment mounted on RTGB and PAP.Flow instrumentation equipment mounted on RTGB or PAP is located on non-safety portion of the board.There is no tracability of materials fox auxiliary feedwater flow instrumentation. |
| 1)SensorTest2)BistableTest3)LogicMatrixTest4)Initiation CircuitTest5)Actuation TestEachtestisdiscussed below:1)SensorTestDuringxeactoroperation, themeasurement channelsproviding aninputtotheAFASazecheckedbycomparing theoutputsofsimilarchannelsandcross-checking withrelatedmeasurements. | | f~Flow transmitters accuracy is.5%at ambient temperatures. |
| Duringextendedshutdownperiodsorrefueling, thesemeasurement channelsarecheckedandwherepossiblecalibrated againstknownstandards.
| | Accuracy of each component in the loop except precision resistors is.5%.Accuracy of precision resistor is 0.01%.The component of the loop which has accuracy higher than 0.5%is rejected.Overall accuracy of each flow loop is typically 0.7%.uestion 8 Describe the steam generator level instrumentation at the St.Lucie plant.This description should include: a.Type and number of level channels pex steam generator including the range fox each channel.b.The specific source (vital bus)from which each of these channels is powered.c.Capability for testing and calibration including the interval between tests.d.The specific indication available in the control room for each channel (indicator, recorder, etc.).Res onse 8 Steam Genexator Level Instrumentation is used to effect reactor trip, automatically initiate Auxiliary Feedwatex System to the intact steam generator and to monitor steam generator level during the course of an accident.Steam generator level instrumentation is classified into safety related and non-safety instrumentation. |
| 2)BistableTestTestingofthebistableisaccomplished bymanuallyvaryingtheinputsignaluptoordowntothetripsetpointlevelononebistableatatimeandobserving thetripaction.Varyingtheinputsignalisaccomplished bymeansofatriptestcircuitconsistipg ofadigita1voltmeter andatestcircuitusedtovarythemagnitude ofthesignalsuppliedbythemeasurement channeltothetripinput.Thetriptestcircuitisinterlocked electrically sothatitcanbeusedinonlyonechannelatatime.Aswitchisprovidedtoselectthe.measurement channel,andapush-button isprovidedtoapplythetestsignal.Thedigitalvoltmeter indicates thevalueofthetestsignal.Tripaction(deenergizing) ofeachofthebistablerelaysisindicated byindividual 1ightsonthefrontofthecabinet,indicating thattheserelaysoperateasrequiredforabistabletripcondition. | | a.The safety related instrumentation is divided into four safety related protective channels.The channels are designated |
| Whenoneofthebistables oftheAFASisinthetrippedcondition, achanneltripexistsandisannunciated.
| | >fA, MB, MC and MD.Each steam generator has four level transmitters representing four protective channels.Protective channels are narrow range type and are primarily used to initiate reactor trip and initiate auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generator. |
| Inthiscondition, auxiliary feedwouldtakeplaceonlyuponreceiptofaAFAS1orAFAS2tripsigna1inoneoftheotherliketripchannels.
| | Low steam generator level signal will txip the xeactor when measured steam generator level falls to a low preset va1iie.The logic is such that the coincidence of two out of four low level signals in either steam generator will effect reactor trip.The same level transmitters which txip the reactor provide an input to Auxiliary Feedwater Initiation System.The logic is such that the coincidence of two out of four low level signals in either steam generator will initiate auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generator. |
| TheAFAS1orAFAS2tripchannelundertestistherefore bypassedforthistest.Fu11protection ismaintained.
| | All components of protective channels are Class lE.Each protective channel is independent and separate from each other.Cables of the same measured parameter xun in separate conduit or tray system.Instrumentation of the same protective channel mounted on RTGB or PAP is isolated from other channels and non-safety equipment by fireproof barrier.Transmitter ranges for protective channels are as follows: SG~Ta No.Transm Ran e 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 LT-9013A LT-9013B LT-9013C LT-9013D LT-9023A LT-9023B LT-9023C LT-9023D 0-131.8" MC 0-132.1" MC 0-131 8" MC 0-131.7" MC 0-131.7" MC 0-131.8" MC 0-131.8" MC 0-131.8" MC In addition to four protective channels each steam generator is equipped with one wide range non-safety channel for indication and recording. |
| 3)LoicMatrixTestThetestiscarriedouttoverifyproperoperation ofthesix1ogicmatrices, anyofwhichcaninitiateasystemactuation. | | These transmitters are Seismic Class l.Transmitter ranges fox wide range transmitters are as follows:~Ta No.~Raa e LT-9012 LT-9022 483.8" QC-21.2" MC 482.6" MC-20.1" MC Third group of SG level transmitters are part of Feedwater Regulating System.Two non-safety Seismic Class 1 transmitters axe provided for each SG.These narrow range transmitters provide input to the feedwater regulating systems and drive indicating controllers and recorders mounted on RTGB. |
| Onlythematrixrelaysinoneofthesixlogicmatricescanbeheldintheenergized positionduringtests.If,forexample,theAB1ogicmatrixholdpushbutton isdepressed, actuation oftheothermatrixholdpush-buttonscanhavenoeffectupontheirrespective logicmatrices.
| | These transmitter ranges are as follows: SG~Ta No.~Ran e 2 1 2 LT-9005 LT-9006 LT-9011 LT-9021 61.2" WC 63.7" WC 193 4" WC 198.7" WC-192.9" WC-195.5" WC 61.6" WC 61.7" WC b.Each protective channel is powered from 120VAC class 1E uninterxuptib16 |
| Actuation ofthepushbutton, appliesatestvoltagetothetestsystemholdcoilsoftheselecteddoublecoilmatrixrelays.Thisvoltageprovidesthepowernecessary toholdtherelaysintheirenergized positionwhendeactuation ofthebistablerelaycontactsinthematrixladderbeingtestedcausesdeenergization oftheprimarymatrixrelaycoils.Thelogicmatrixtobe.testedisselectedusingtheSystemSelectswitch.WhileholdingthematrixHoldpushbutton initsactuatedposition, rotationoftheSystemSelectswitchreleasesonlythosebistablerelaysthathaveoperating contactsinthelogicmatrixundertest.TheSystemSelectswitchappliesatestvoltageofoppositepolaritytothebistablerelaytestcoils,sothatthemagneticfluxgenerated bythesecoilsopposesthatoftheprimarycoiloftherelay.Theresulting fluxwillbezero,andtherelayswillrelease.Asimplified diagramofthistestingsystemisshownonC-EdrawingE-00000-411-803, (attached). | | ,''=power supply of the same channel.Power supplies of channels MA and HC are powered from Battery A while channel HB and MD axe powered from Battery B.Each channel is powered through an inverter.Power supply of the same channel is isolated fxom non-safety and safety related equipment of another channel.c.Safety xelated instrumentation is calibrated during: 1-Sh'utd6wn 2-Scheduled refueling outage 3-When malfunction or a pxoblem occurs in the loop.Each scheduled outage occurs at time intervals of twelve to eighteen months.As mentioned earlier accuracy of each component in the loop except precision resistor is 0.5%.Precision resistor accuracy is.01%.Component is rejected if its accuracy exceeds.5%during calibration. |
| Tripactioncanbeobservedbyillumination ofthebistablerelayindicators locatedonthefrontpaneloftheAFAScabinetandbylossofvoltageto thefourmatrixrelays,whichisindicated byextinguishing indicator lightsconnected acrosseachmatrixrelaycoil.Duringthistest,thematrixrelay"hold"lightsremainon,indicating thatatestvoltagehasbeenappliedtotheholdingcoilsofthematrixrelaysofthelogicmatrixmoduleundertest.Thetestisrepeatedforallsixmatrices.
| | Overall accuracy of each SG safety related instrumentation loop is typically...7%., Similarily calibration and accuracy requirements will also apply to non-safety instrumentation. |
| Thistestverifiesthatthe'bistable relaycontactsoperatecorrectly andthatthelogicmatrixrelayswilldeenergize ifthematrixcontinuity isviolated.
| | Overall accuracy will vary slightly depending how many components axe in the loop.Typically there axe between four ox five components in the 1oop.Overall accuracy is computed using Square Root of the Sum of the Squaxes (SRSS)method.d.For narrow range safety related instrumentation four channels of indicating controllers per SG axe mounted on RTGB (total of 8).Also channel IfA, fox SG 1 and SG 2 is recorded on PAP A.Fox non-safety wide range level instrumentation one indicator per a"".-SG is located on RTGB and HSCP.One two-pen recorder mounted on PA'P, records channel HA of SGl and SG2 level.For non-safety narrow range SG level instrumentation used for Feedwater Regulating Systems one level indicating controller per SG is provided on RTGB.Also one two-pen xecorder for recording SG1 and SG2 level is located on PAP)at t}} |
| Theopeningofthematrixrelaycontactistestedintheinitiation circuittest.4)Initiation CircuitTestEachinitiation circuitistestedindividually bydepressing amatrixHoldpushbutton (holdingmatrixrelays),selecting eithersystempositionontheSystemSelectswitch(openingthematrix),andselecting amatrixrelayontheMatrixRelaySelectSwitch(deenergizing oneofthematrixrelays).Thiscausesone,andonlyone,oftheinitiation circuitstodeenergize, causingonecurrentlegoftheselective two-out,-of-four ineachchanneltoopen.Lossofcurrentthroughthislegisindicated ontheAFAScabinet.TheMatrixRelaySelectSwitchisturnedtothenextposition, reenergizing thetestedmatrixrelay,allowingtheinitiation circuittoxeenergize.
| |
| Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremaining threeinitiation circuitsfromtheselectedmatrix.Following this,theentiresequenceisrepeatedfortheremaining fivematrices.
| |
| 5)Actuation TestProperoperation oftheAFASrelaysintheAFASCabinet,isverifiedbydeenergizing therelaysoneatatimeviaatestrelaycontactandnotingtheproperoperation ofallactuatedcomponents inthattripfunction(ASAS-1orAFAS-2).Therelaywillautomatically reenergize andreturnitscomponents tothepretestcondition whenthetestpushbutton isreleased. | |
| Thedesignofthetestsystemisatatime.Thetestswitchmust(AFAS1orAFAS2)tobetested,impossible.
| |
| Thetestcircuitisofaparticular AFASfunction.
| |
| suchthatonlyonerelaymaybedeenergized bepositioned tothefunctionrelaysselection ofmorethanonefunctioniselectrically lockedoutuponactuation Testingofsegments2thru5oftheAFASshouldbeaccomplished atintervals similartotheRPS.uestion6Addressthephysicalseparation providedbetweentheredundant AFWautomatic initiation instrument channels.
| |
| Resonse6TheAFAScabinetisdividedintofrontandbackcompartments separated byamechanical barrieratthe30"depthpoint.Additional thermalandmechanical barriersinthehorizontal andvertica1planesatthecabinetcenterline dividethecabinetintoeightseparatecompartments.
| |
| Thefrontfourcompartments containtheinitiation circuitry (bistables, logic,andtestcircuitry) forchannelsA,B,CandDrespectively aswe11astheinterchannel isolation devicestoanother.Accesstoeachfrontcompartment iscontrolled byaseparatetransparent doorwithakeyswitch.M>erecablesofonecompartment mustpassthroughtoanotheranenclosedcableduct(qualified asafirebarrier)isutilized.
| |
| 'Thefourrearcompartments containtheactuation circuitry anddevicesthatarerequiiedforcontroloftheAFASSystem.Hachcompartment hasaseparatedoorforaccess.Mhereexistingplantinstrumentation signals(e.g.,SteamGenerator | |
| 'levelandpressure) aretobeusedbytheAFASinitiation system,theextension ofthese1oopstotheAFAScabinetwillbeinstalled withappropriate separation consistent withtheexisting1oopinstallations. | |
| Newdedicated instrumentation signals(e.g.,Feedwater headerpressure) willbeinstalled withseparation consistent withexistingplantseparation criteria.
| |
| Systemoutputsandoperatorinterface devices(switches) willalsobeinstalled inaccordance withexistingplantseparation criteria.
| |
| uestion7Describetheauxiliary feedwater flowindication instrumentation attheSt.Lucieplant.Thisdescription shouldinclude:a.Typeandnumberofflowchannels.
| |
| b.Thespecificsource(vitalbus)fromwhichthesechannelsarepowered.c.Capability fortestingandcalibration including theintervalbetweentests.d.Thetypeofindication available inthecontrolroomforeachchannel(indicator, | |
| : recorder, etc.)e.Safetygradequalification oftheflowchannels.
| |
| f.Accuracyoftheflowchannels. | |
| a.St.Lucie1hasthreeauxiliary feedwater pumps.Eachpumpwithitsassociated flowpathcontrolsandinstrumentation represents separatechannel.Headerdischarge flowforeachchannelisindicated onReactor-Turbine-Generator Board(RTGB)andrecordedonPostAccidentPanelsAandB(PAP).Thechannelsaredesignated asXA,XB,XAB(important A,BorAB).Eachchannelrunsinseparatetraysystem. | |
| b.Eachflowinstrumentation channelispoweredfromsafetyrelatedsource.ChannelIAispoweredfromvitalbusSA,channelIBfromSBandchannelXA3fromSAB.VitalbusSA,SBtakespowerfromoffsitesourceandisbacked-up byEmergency DieselGenerator. | |
| VitalbusSABtakespowereitherfxomvitalbusSAorSB.c.Onepointpressurecheckisconducted onceamonthandresponseoftheinstruments isobserved.
| |
| Instruments arecalibrated duringeachscheduled refueling outage.Scheduled | |
| .outagesoccuratintervals oftwelvetoeighteenmonths.Allinstruments intheloop;,are alsoxecalibrated everytimethereisamalfunction oraproblemintheloop.d.Oneflowindicator pereachchannelismountedonRTGB.AlsoeachchannelhasflowrecordermountedofPAP.ChannelIAandXABaremountedonPAP"A"andChannelMismountedonPAP".B";e.Flowinstrumentation channelsareseismically qualified. | |
| Thisincludestransmitters aswellasequipment mountedonRTGBandPAP.Flowinstrumentation equipment mountedonRTGBorPAPislocatedonnon-safetyportionoftheboard.Thereisnotracability ofmaterials foxauxiliary feedwater flowinstrumentation.
| |
| f~Flowtransmitters accuracyis.5%atambienttemperatures. | |
| Accuracyofeachcomponent intheloopexceptprecision resistors is.5%.Accuracyofprecision resistoris0.01%.Thecomponent oftheloopwhichhasaccuracyhigherthan0.5%isrejected.
| |
| Overallaccuracyofeachflowloopistypically 0.7%.uestion8Describethesteamgenerator levelinstrumentation attheSt.Lucieplant.Thisdescription shouldinclude:a.Typeandnumberoflevelchannelspexsteamgenerator including therangefoxeachchannel.b.Thespecificsource(vitalbus)fromwhicheachofthesechannelsispowered.c.Capability fortestingandcalibration including theintervalbetweentests.d.Thespecificindication available inthecontrolroomforeachchannel(indicator,
| |
| : recorder, etc.).Resonse8SteamGenexator LevelInstrumentation isusedtoeffectreactortrip,automatically initiateAuxiliary Feedwatex Systemtotheintactsteamgenerator andtomonitorsteamgenerator levelduringthecourseofanaccident.
| |
| Steamgenerator levelinstrumentation isclassified intosafety relatedandnon-safety instrumentation.
| |
| a.Thesafetyrelatedinstrumentation isdividedintofoursafetyrelatedprotective channels. | |
| Thechannelsaredesignated
| |
| >fA,MB,MCandMD.Eachsteamgenerator hasfourleveltransmitters representing fourprotective channels. | |
| Protective channelsarenarrowrangetypeandareprimarily usedtoinitiatereactortripandinitiateauxiliary feedwater totheintactsteamgenerator. | |
| Lowsteamgenerator levelsignalwilltxipthexeactorwhenmeasuredsteamgenerator levelfallstoalowpresetva1iie.Thelogicissuchthatthecoincidence oftwooutoffourlowlevelsignalsineithersteamgenerator willeffectreactortrip.Thesameleveltransmitters whichtxipthereactorprovideaninputtoAuxiliary Feedwater Initiation System.Thelogicissuchthatthecoincidence oftwooutoffourlowlevelsignalsineithersteamgenerator willinitiateauxiliary feedwater flowtotheintactsteamgenerator.
| |
| Allcomponents ofprotective channelsareClasslE.Eachprotective channelisindependent andseparatefromeachother.Cablesofthesamemeasuredparameter xuninseparateconduitortraysystem.Instrumentation ofthesameprotective channelmountedonRTGBorPAPisisolatedfromotherchannelsandnon-safety equipment byfireproof barrier.Transmitter rangesforprotective channelsareasfollows:SG~TaNo.TransmRane1112222LT-9013ALT-9013BLT-9013CLT-9013DLT-9023ALT-9023BLT-9023CLT-9023D0-131.8"MC0-132.1"MC0-1318"MC0-131.7"MC0-131.7"MC0-131.8"MC0-131.8"MC0-131.8"MCInadditiontofourprotective channelseachsteamgenerator isequippedwithonewiderangenon-safety channelforindication andrecording.
| |
| Thesetransmitters areSeismicClassl.Transmitter rangesfoxwiderangetransmitters areasfollows:~TaNo.~RaaeLT-9012LT-9022483.8"QC-21.2"MC482.6"MC-20.1"MCThirdgroupofSGleveltransmitters arepartofFeedwater Regulating System.Twonon-safety SeismicClass1transmitters axeprovidedforeachSG.Thesenarrowrangetransmitters provideinputtothefeedwater regulating systemsanddriveindicating controllers andrecorders mountedonRTGB.
| |
| Thesetransmitter rangesareasfollows:SG~TaNo.~Rane212LT-9005LT-9006LT-9011LT-902161.2"WC63.7"WC1934"WC198.7"WC-192.9"WC-195.5"WC61.6"WC61.7"WCb.Eachprotective channelispoweredfrom120VACclass1Euninterxuptib16
| |
| ,''=powersupplyofthesamechannel.PowersuppliesofchannelsMAandHCarepoweredfromBatteryAwhilechannelHBandMDaxepoweredfromBatteryB.Eachchannelispoweredthroughaninverter. | |
| Powersupplyofthesamechannelisisolatedfxomnon-safety andsafetyrelatedequipment ofanotherchannel.c.Safetyxelatedinstrumentation iscalibrated during:1-Sh'utd6wn 2-Scheduled refueling outage3-Whenmalfunction orapxoblemoccursintheloop.Eachscheduled outageoccursattimeintervals oftwelvetoeighteenmonths.Asmentioned earlieraccuracyofeachcomponent intheloopexceptprecision resistoris0.5%.Precision resistoraccuracyis.01%.Component isrejectedifitsaccuracyexceeds.5%duringcalibration.
| |
| OverallaccuracyofeachSGsafetyrelatedinstrumentation loopistypically
| |
| ...7%.,Similarily calibration andaccuracyrequirements willalsoapplytonon-safety instrumentation. | |
| Overallaccuracywillvaryslightlydepending howmanycomponents axeintheloop.Typically thereaxebetweenfouroxfivecomponents inthe1oop.OverallaccuracyiscomputedusingSquareRootoftheSumoftheSquaxes(SRSS)method.d.Fornarrowrangesafetyrelatedinstrumentation fourchannelsofindicating controllers perSGaxemountedonRTGB(totalof8).AlsochannelIfA,foxSG1andSG2isrecordedonPAPA.Foxnon-safety widerangelevelinstrumentation oneindicator pera"".-SGislocatedonRTGBandHSCP.Onetwo-penrecordermountedonPA'P,recordschannelHAofSGlandSG2level.Fornon-safety narrowrangeSGlevelinstrumentation usedforFeedwater Regulating Systemsonelevelindicating controller perSGisprovidedonRTGB.Alsoonetwo-penxecorderforrecording SG1andSG2levelislocatedonPAP)att}}
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|
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML17241A5001999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Emergency Response Data Sys (ERDS) Data Point Library for St Lucie Unit 1.Rev Provides Replacement Pages & Follows Format Recommended by NUREG 1394, ERDS Implementation, Rev 1,App C ML17309A9981999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 3 to EPIP-10 & Rev 25 to HP-202.EPIP-10 Added Onsite Monitoring Points,Made Administrative Changes & Incorporated New Attachments & HP-202 Added Red Team Survey Points ML20217F6171999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-335/99-11 & 50-389/99-11 on 990827 & 990907-09.No Violations Identified.Matl Encl Contained Safeguards Info as Defined by 10CFR73.21 & Disclosed to Unauthorized Individuals Prohibited by Section 147 of AEA ML17241A4811999-10-0101 October 1999 Reports Number of Tubes Plugged During Unit 1 Refueling Outage SL1-16,per TS 4.4.5.5.a ML20212M1601999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to 990908 Engineering Meeting Conducted at NRC Region II to Discuss Engineering Issues at Lucie & Turkey Point Facilities.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML17241A4701999-09-25025 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested by NRC Staff During 990916 Telcon to Complete Staff Review of Request for risk-informed Extension of Action Completion/Aot Specified for Inoperable Train of LPSI Sys at Plant ML17241A4721999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Plant Change/Mod (PCM) 99016 to St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.11.d.Refueling Overhaul Activities Are Currently in Progress & Reactor Operations for Cycle 16 Are Scheduled to Commence in Oct 1999 ML17241A4681999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Restriction Be Added to Senior Operator License SOP-21093 for TE Bolander.Nrc Forms 369,encl.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML17241A4671999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Completed NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for St Lucie Units 1 & 2,as Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams. ML17241A4581999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested by NRC Staff During 990630 & 0816 Telcons,To Complete Review of Proposed License Amend for Fuel Reload Process Improvement Program ML17241A4531999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That No Candidates from St Lucie Plant Will Be Participating in PWR Gfes Being Administered on 991006 ML17241A4521999-08-31031 August 1999 Withdraws Relief Request 16 & Suppl Relief Request 15 with Info Requested During 990526 Telephone Conference Re ISI Insp Plan,Third 10-yr Interval ML17241A4501999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Reviewed Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Called RVID2,re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1. Requested Corrections & Marked Up Pages from Rvid 2 Database Summary Repts That Correspond to Comments,Attached ML17241A4371999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for six- Month Period Ending 990630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17241A4461999-08-11011 August 1999 Requests That W Rept Entitled, Evaluation of Turbine Missile Ejection Probability Resulting from Extending Test Interval of Interceptor & Reheat Stop Valves at St Lucie Units 1 & 2, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure L-99-171, Forwards Rev 56 to Physical Security Plan.Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages Also Encl.Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Rev 56 to Physical Security Plan.Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages Also Encl.Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17309A9911999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs & Revised Procedures That Implement Emergency Plan as Listed.Procedures Provides Instruction for Operational Support Ctr (OSC) Chemistry Supervisor to Establish Remote Labs at Locations Specified ML17241A4471999-07-22022 July 1999 Requests That Rev 1 to WCAP-14732 & Rev 1,Add 1 to WCAP-14732 Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML17241A4221999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards List of Proposed Licensing Actions for St Lucie Units 1 & 2,planned During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates. ML17241A4151999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 25 for Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Unit 2 ML17241A4101999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards FP&L Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17309A9881999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 5 to EPIP-03, Emergency Response Organization Notification/Staff Augmentation. Rev 5 to EPIP-03 Was Revised to Transfer EP Responsibilities from Training Manager to Protection Svcs Manager ML20209F1541999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That NRC in Process of Conducting Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations at Nuclear Power Reactors. Plant Chosen for Such Review Scheduled for Wk of 990823-26 ML17241A4011999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Info Copy of Florida Wastewater Permit (FL0002208) (Formerly NPDES Permit) Mod,Which Was Issued by Florida Dept of Environ Protection on 990604 ML17241A3971999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Suppl Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, as Requested in 990317 Ltr ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17241A3951999-06-29029 June 1999 Provides Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants.Gl 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Requested Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness by 990701.Disclosure Encl ML17241A3731999-06-17017 June 1999 Supplements Relief Requests 4,11 & 13 for Third ten-year ISI Interval with Info Requested During 990526 Telcon.Expedited Review Is Requested by 990730 to Avoid Negatively Impacting Upcoming St Lucie Unit 1 Refueling Outage (SL1-16) ML17241A3641999-06-14014 June 1999 Submits Supplement to Relief Request 24 with Info Requested by Nrc.In Addition Relief Request 24 Is Identical to St Lucie Unit 1 Relief Request 4 for Third ISI Interval Being Supplemented by FPL Ltr L-99-139 ML20195F3871999-06-11011 June 1999 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.App a Records Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5) IA-99-247, Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.App a Records Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5)1999-06-11011 June 1999 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.App a Records Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5) L-99-129, Forwards Rev 55 to Physical Security Plan,Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages.With Directions for Incorporating Rev Into Plan & Copies of Replacement Pages.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Rev 55 to Physical Security Plan,Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages.With Directions for Incorporating Rev Into Plan & Copies of Replacement Pages.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17241A3561999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Rept Containing Brief Description & Summary of SEs for Changes,Tests & Experiments Which Were Approved for Unit 3 During Period of 970526-981209 ML17241A3601999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Correction to Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept for CY98.Util Has Identified Transcription Error on Last Page of Attachment C of Rept,Results from Interlaboratory Comparison Program 1998 ML20195F3941999-05-27027 May 1999 FOIA Request That Memo from J Calvo to Fl Lebdon Re TIA - St Lucie,Unit 1 Environ Qualification of Woodward Governor Controls Be Placed in PDR ML17241A3461999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 22 to Clarify Several Areas of Relief.Nrc Action Is Requested to Be Complete by Aug 1999 to Support Planning for Spring 2000 Unit 2 Refueling Outage ML17241A3391999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Notification of Change to Small Break LOCA ECCS Evaluation Model Used for St Lucie Unit 1.Anomaly Was Discovered & Corrected That Resulted in Reducing Calculated PCT for Limiting SBLOCA by More than 50 F ML17241A3371999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Util Suppl to GL 95-07 Response Re pressure-locking & Thermal Binding of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves,In Response to NRC Second RAI Dtd 990225 ML20207C7531999-05-17017 May 1999 Discusses Issue Identified by FPL in Feb 1998 Involving Potential for Fire to Cause Breach of Rc Sys High/Low Pressure Interface Boundary & NRC Decision for Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML17241A3301999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits,Which Occurred on 990415.Root Cause Determination Not Yet Complete.Suppl to Include Root Cause & Corrective Actions Will Be Submitted ML17309A9821999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rev 36 to St Lucie Emergency Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(q).Executive Summary & Summary of Changes Incorporated by Rev,Encl IR 05000335/19980141999-04-29029 April 1999 Provides Confirmation of NRC Staff Conclusions Re Cited & non-cited Violations in Insp Rept 50-335/98-14 & 50-389/98-14.Utils Position Re Consideration of Multiple Spurious Actuations in Event of Fire,Reiterated ML17241A3221999-04-29029 April 1999 Provides Confirmation of NRC Staff Conclusions Re Cited & non-cited Violations in Insp Rept 50-335/98-14 & 50-389/98-14.Utils Position Re Consideration of Multiple Spurious Actuations in Event of Fire,Reiterated ML17229B1071999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Environ Operating Rept for St Lucie Unit 2. Rept Includes Discussions of 5-inch Barrier Net Maint & Taprogge Condenser Tube Cleaning Sys Ball Loss,As Agreed at First Biennial Sea Turtle Meeting Held on 980120 ML17229B1051999-04-22022 April 1999 Requests That Listed Individuals Be Placed on Official Serve List for Nuclear Matl Safety & Safeguards Info Notices ML17229B1061999-04-21021 April 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Medical Status of Licensed Operator Pf Farnsworth (Docket 55-21285,license SOP-21094). NRC Form 3996, Medical Exam Certification, Encl.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML17309A9851999-04-15015 April 1999 Requests That NRC Review Denial of Appeal from Assessment of Fees Assessed in 981101 Invoice RS0062-99 & Assessment of Fees in Invoice RS0182-99 Which Was Also Denied in 990305 Ltr.Both Invoices Are for Fees Re Inspector GG Warnick ML20205M0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Eighth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Records.App Q & R Records Encl & Being Made Available in PDR ML17229B0951999-04-0808 April 1999 Requests Approval of Encl Revised Relief Request 6,in Response to 990322 Telcon with NRC & 10CFR55.55a(a)(3). Request States That Visual VT-3 Exams Will Be Conducted IAW IWA-2213 & Repairs Will Be IAW Util ASME Section IX Program ML17229B0821999-04-0707 April 1999 Requests Approval of Interim Relief Request 26 Re Repair Requirements for Class 2 ECCS Piping,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & 50.55a(g)(iii).Alternative Actions Apply Guidance of GLs 91-18 & 90-05 & ASME Code Case N-513.Evaluation,encl 1999-09-28
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17241A5001999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Emergency Response Data Sys (ERDS) Data Point Library for St Lucie Unit 1.Rev Provides Replacement Pages & Follows Format Recommended by NUREG 1394, ERDS Implementation, Rev 1,App C ML17309A9981999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 3 to EPIP-10 & Rev 25 to HP-202.EPIP-10 Added Onsite Monitoring Points,Made Administrative Changes & Incorporated New Attachments & HP-202 Added Red Team Survey Points ML17241A4811999-10-0101 October 1999 Reports Number of Tubes Plugged During Unit 1 Refueling Outage SL1-16,per TS 4.4.5.5.a ML17241A4701999-09-25025 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested by NRC Staff During 990916 Telcon to Complete Staff Review of Request for risk-informed Extension of Action Completion/Aot Specified for Inoperable Train of LPSI Sys at Plant ML17241A4721999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Plant Change/Mod (PCM) 99016 to St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.11.d.Refueling Overhaul Activities Are Currently in Progress & Reactor Operations for Cycle 16 Are Scheduled to Commence in Oct 1999 ML17241A4681999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Restriction Be Added to Senior Operator License SOP-21093 for TE Bolander.Nrc Forms 369,encl.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML17241A4671999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Completed NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, for St Lucie Units 1 & 2,as Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams. ML17241A4581999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested by NRC Staff During 990630 & 0816 Telcons,To Complete Review of Proposed License Amend for Fuel Reload Process Improvement Program ML17241A4531999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That No Candidates from St Lucie Plant Will Be Participating in PWR Gfes Being Administered on 991006 ML17241A4521999-08-31031 August 1999 Withdraws Relief Request 16 & Suppl Relief Request 15 with Info Requested During 990526 Telephone Conference Re ISI Insp Plan,Third 10-yr Interval ML17241A4501999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Reviewed Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Called RVID2,re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1. Requested Corrections & Marked Up Pages from Rvid 2 Database Summary Repts That Correspond to Comments,Attached ML17241A4371999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for six- Month Period Ending 990630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17241A4461999-08-11011 August 1999 Requests That W Rept Entitled, Evaluation of Turbine Missile Ejection Probability Resulting from Extending Test Interval of Interceptor & Reheat Stop Valves at St Lucie Units 1 & 2, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure L-99-171, Forwards Rev 56 to Physical Security Plan.Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages Also Encl.Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Rev 56 to Physical Security Plan.Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages Also Encl.Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17309A9911999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs & Revised Procedures That Implement Emergency Plan as Listed.Procedures Provides Instruction for Operational Support Ctr (OSC) Chemistry Supervisor to Establish Remote Labs at Locations Specified ML17241A4221999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards List of Proposed Licensing Actions for St Lucie Units 1 & 2,planned During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates. ML17241A4471999-07-22022 July 1999 Requests That Rev 1 to WCAP-14732 & Rev 1,Add 1 to WCAP-14732 Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML17241A4151999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 25 for Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Unit 2 ML17241A4101999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards FP&L Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17309A9881999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 5 to EPIP-03, Emergency Response Organization Notification/Staff Augmentation. Rev 5 to EPIP-03 Was Revised to Transfer EP Responsibilities from Training Manager to Protection Svcs Manager ML17241A4011999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Info Copy of Florida Wastewater Permit (FL0002208) (Formerly NPDES Permit) Mod,Which Was Issued by Florida Dept of Environ Protection on 990604 ML17241A3971999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Suppl Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, as Requested in 990317 Ltr ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17241A3951999-06-29029 June 1999 Provides Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants.Gl 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Requested Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness by 990701.Disclosure Encl ML17241A3731999-06-17017 June 1999 Supplements Relief Requests 4,11 & 13 for Third ten-year ISI Interval with Info Requested During 990526 Telcon.Expedited Review Is Requested by 990730 to Avoid Negatively Impacting Upcoming St Lucie Unit 1 Refueling Outage (SL1-16) ML17241A3641999-06-14014 June 1999 Submits Supplement to Relief Request 24 with Info Requested by Nrc.In Addition Relief Request 24 Is Identical to St Lucie Unit 1 Relief Request 4 for Third ISI Interval Being Supplemented by FPL Ltr L-99-139 L-99-129, Forwards Rev 55 to Physical Security Plan,Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages.With Directions for Incorporating Rev Into Plan & Copies of Replacement Pages.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Rev 55 to Physical Security Plan,Summary of Changes & Marked Up Copy of Revised Pages.With Directions for Incorporating Rev Into Plan & Copies of Replacement Pages.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17241A3601999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Correction to Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept for CY98.Util Has Identified Transcription Error on Last Page of Attachment C of Rept,Results from Interlaboratory Comparison Program 1998 ML17241A3561999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Rept Containing Brief Description & Summary of SEs for Changes,Tests & Experiments Which Were Approved for Unit 3 During Period of 970526-981209 ML20195F3941999-05-27027 May 1999 FOIA Request That Memo from J Calvo to Fl Lebdon Re TIA - St Lucie,Unit 1 Environ Qualification of Woodward Governor Controls Be Placed in PDR ML17241A3461999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 22 to Clarify Several Areas of Relief.Nrc Action Is Requested to Be Complete by Aug 1999 to Support Planning for Spring 2000 Unit 2 Refueling Outage ML17241A3371999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Util Suppl to GL 95-07 Response Re pressure-locking & Thermal Binding of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves,In Response to NRC Second RAI Dtd 990225 ML17241A3391999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Notification of Change to Small Break LOCA ECCS Evaluation Model Used for St Lucie Unit 1.Anomaly Was Discovered & Corrected That Resulted in Reducing Calculated PCT for Limiting SBLOCA by More than 50 F ML17241A3301999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits,Which Occurred on 990415.Root Cause Determination Not Yet Complete.Suppl to Include Root Cause & Corrective Actions Will Be Submitted ML17309A9821999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rev 36 to St Lucie Emergency Plan, Per 10CFR50.54(q).Executive Summary & Summary of Changes Incorporated by Rev,Encl ML17241A3221999-04-29029 April 1999 Provides Confirmation of NRC Staff Conclusions Re Cited & non-cited Violations in Insp Rept 50-335/98-14 & 50-389/98-14.Utils Position Re Consideration of Multiple Spurious Actuations in Event of Fire,Reiterated IR 05000335/19980141999-04-29029 April 1999 Provides Confirmation of NRC Staff Conclusions Re Cited & non-cited Violations in Insp Rept 50-335/98-14 & 50-389/98-14.Utils Position Re Consideration of Multiple Spurious Actuations in Event of Fire,Reiterated ML17229B1071999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Environ Operating Rept for St Lucie Unit 2. Rept Includes Discussions of 5-inch Barrier Net Maint & Taprogge Condenser Tube Cleaning Sys Ball Loss,As Agreed at First Biennial Sea Turtle Meeting Held on 980120 ML17229B1051999-04-22022 April 1999 Requests That Listed Individuals Be Placed on Official Serve List for Nuclear Matl Safety & Safeguards Info Notices ML17229B1061999-04-21021 April 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Medical Status of Licensed Operator Pf Farnsworth (Docket 55-21285,license SOP-21094). NRC Form 3996, Medical Exam Certification, Encl.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML17309A9851999-04-15015 April 1999 Requests That NRC Review Denial of Appeal from Assessment of Fees Assessed in 981101 Invoice RS0062-99 & Assessment of Fees in Invoice RS0182-99 Which Was Also Denied in 990305 Ltr.Both Invoices Are for Fees Re Inspector GG Warnick ML17229B0951999-04-0808 April 1999 Requests Approval of Encl Revised Relief Request 6,in Response to 990322 Telcon with NRC & 10CFR55.55a(a)(3). Request States That Visual VT-3 Exams Will Be Conducted IAW IWA-2213 & Repairs Will Be IAW Util ASME Section IX Program ML17229B0821999-04-0707 April 1999 Requests Approval of Interim Relief Request 26 Re Repair Requirements for Class 2 ECCS Piping,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & 50.55a(g)(iii).Alternative Actions Apply Guidance of GLs 91-18 & 90-05 & ASME Code Case N-513.Evaluation,encl ML17229B0851999-04-0505 April 1999 Requests Approval of Encl Relief Request 25 Which Proposes to Use Alternative Requirements of ASME Code Case N-613 in Lieu of Requirements of ASME Section XI Figures IWB-2500-7(a) & IWB-2500-7(b).Action Requested by Aug 1999 ML17309A9791999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs Including Rev 2 to EPIP-00,rev 2 to EPIP-09,rev 2 to EPIP-10 & Rev 10 to HP-207.Summary of Revs Listed ML17309A9761999-03-23023 March 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 4 to EPIP-03, Er Organization Notification/Staff Augmentation, Rev 3 to EPIP-05, Activation & Operation of OSC & Rev 14 to HP-200, HP Emergency Organization. Changes to Epips,Discussed ML17229B0691999-03-19019 March 1999 Transmits TS Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity,Per Soluble Boron Credit ML17229B0721999-03-16016 March 1999 Requests Approval of Enclosed Relief Requests 23 & 24 Re ISI Plan for Second ten-year Interval.Nrc Action Is Requested to Be Complete by Aug 1999 to Support Planning for Spring 2000 Unit 2 Refueling Outage ML17355A2631999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards FPL Decommissioning Fund Status Repts for St Lucie, Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Rept for St Lucie, Unit 2 Provides Status of Decommissioning Funds for All Three Owners of That Unit ML17229B0481999-03-10010 March 1999 Informs That Util Delivered Matls Requested in Encl 1 of NRC Ltr by Hand on 990308,as Requested by NRC Ltr Dtd 990218 1999-09-25
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML17223A9401990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Evaluation of Potential Safety Impact of Failed Control Element Assemblies on Limiting Transients for Facility ML17223A9341990-09-10010 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Generic Implications & Resolution of Control Element Assembly (CEA) Failure at Facility,Per NRC Request.Description of Testing Program for Old Style CEAs in Unit 1 Core Encl L-90-315, Advises That Util Has Completed Evaluation of NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1,SER Item 81990-08-30030 August 1990 Advises That Util Has Completed Evaluation of NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1,SER Item 8 ML17223A9201990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Forms NIS-1 & NIS-2, Owners Rept for Inservice Insps as Required by Provisions of ASME Code Rules, Per 900725 Ltr ML17223A8911990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1990 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2 & Summary of Operating Experience ML17348A5041990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 L-90-301, Discusses Generic Implications & Resolution of Control Element Assemblies Failure at Plant1990-08-16016 August 1990 Discusses Generic Implications & Resolution of Control Element Assemblies Failure at Plant ML17223A8751990-08-0909 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-335/90-14. Corrective Actions:Rcs Flow Determination by Calorimetric Procedure Repeated W/Supervisor of Individual Observing & Individual Counseled by Supervisor IR 05000335/19900141990-08-0909 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-335/90-14. Corrective Actions:Rcs Flow Determination by Calorimetric Procedure Repeated W/Supervisor of Individual Observing & Individual Counseled by Supervisor ML17348A4701990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Rept Detailing Investigative Analysis of Unsatisfactory Blind Specimen Results,Identification of Causes & Corrective Actions Taken by Lab to Prevent Recurrence,Per Unsatisfactory Performance Testing ML17223A8621990-07-25025 July 1990 Advises That NIS-1 & NIS-2 Forms,As Part of Inservice Insp Rept,Will Be Submitted by 900831 ML17348A4281990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards Decommissioning Financial Assurance Repts for Plants,Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b) ML17223A8631990-07-25025 July 1990 Submits Addl Info Re Implementation of Programmed Enhancements Per Generic Ltr 88-17, Loss of Dhr. All Mods for Unit 1 Completed & Operational.Mods for Unit 2 Schedule for Upcoming Refueling Outage L-90-271, Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/90-09 & 50-389/90-09.Corrective Actions:Procedural Expectation Re Hanging & Removal of Deficiency Tags Will Be Reemphasized to Personnel Generating Work Orders1990-07-20020 July 1990 Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/90-09 & 50-389/90-09.Corrective Actions:Procedural Expectation Re Hanging & Removal of Deficiency Tags Will Be Reemphasized to Personnel Generating Work Orders ML17223A8581990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards Implementation Status of 10CFR50.62 Mod at Facility Re Requirements for Reduction of Risk from ATWS Events for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants ML17223A8491990-07-18018 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. No Rosemount Transmitters Models 1153 Series B,1153 Series D & 1154 Mfg Prior to 890711 Supplied by Different Vendor ML17223A8521990-07-17017 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Requested Re Generic Implications & Resolution of Control Element Assembly Failure at Plant.Encl Confirms Util Intent to Follow C-E Regulatory Response Group Action Program IR 05000335/19900131990-07-0909 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/90-13 & 50-389/90-13.Corrective Actions:Maint Personnel Counseled & Aware of Importance of Verifying Design Configuration Requirements ML17223A8421990-07-0909 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/90-13 & 50-389/90-13.Corrective Actions:Maint Personnel Counseled & Aware of Importance of Verifying Design Configuration Requirements ML17348A3881990-07-0505 July 1990 Requests Audit of NRC Records to Independently Verify Reasonableness of Charges Assessed Against Util,Per 10CFR170 Svcs ML17223A8391990-07-0303 July 1990 Forwards Results of Beach Survey Procedure & Reduction of Field Survey Data,Per Tech Spec 4.7.6.1.1.Unit 1 Updated Fsar,Section 2.4.2.2,concluded That Dune Condition Acceptable Per Tech Spec 5.1.3 ML17223A8381990-07-0202 July 1990 Requests Termination of Operator License for s Lavelle.Util Also Requests That Ltr Be Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) L-90-239, Forwards Rev 6 to Guard Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1990-07-0202 July 1990 Forwards Rev 6 to Guard Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML17223A8371990-06-27027 June 1990 Provides Details of Implementation Plan Re Recommendations & Schedular Requirements in Generic Ltr 89-10,per 891228 Ltr.Design Basis Review of safety-related motor-operated Valves & Determination of Switch Settings in Progress ML17308A4981990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions ML17223A8341990-06-19019 June 1990 Forwards Corrected Proposed Tech Spec Figure 3.4-2 Per 900207 Application for Amend to License NPF-16,incorporating Revised Pressure/Temp Limits & Results of Revised Low Temp Overpressure Protection Analysis Into Tech Specs ML17223A8241990-06-18018 June 1990 Forwards Revised Combined Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1988. ML17223A8271990-06-18018 June 1990 Forwards Ma Smith 900601 Ltr to WR Cunningham of EPA Requesting Mod to Plant NPDES Permit to Permit Cleaning of Facility & to Establish Discharge Limits for Chemical Cleaning Wastes ML17348A2981990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Topical QA Rept. ML17223A6761990-05-31031 May 1990 Advises That Air Operated safety-related Components Will Perform All Design Basis Events,Per 881227 Ltr.All Actions Required by Generic Ltr 88-14 Complete for Plant ML17348A2651990-05-29029 May 1990 Submits Rept Detailing Investigative Analysis of Unsatisfactory Blind Specimen Results,Identification of Causes & Corrective Actions Taken by Lab to Prevent Recurrence,Per 10CFR26,App A.2.8(e)(4) ML17223A6741990-05-22022 May 1990 Forwards Info Re Status of 10CFR50.62 Mods to Meet ATWS Requirements as of 900515.Plant Change/Mod Package Necessary for Installing ATWS Will Be Issued by 900630.Hardware Procurement for Diverse Scram Sys Approx 90% Complete ML17223A6361990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards Final Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. One Untraceable Circuit Breaker Installed in Unit 2 Qualified SPDS & Replaced W/Traceable Breaker ML17223A6281990-04-21021 April 1990 Forwards St Lucie Unit 2 Annual Environ Operating Rept, Vol 1 1989. ML17223A6081990-04-13013 April 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/90-02 & 50-389/90-02.Corrective Actions:Nuclear Plant Supervisor Required to Remain in Control Room During Significant Changes in Power Operation & Preventive Maint Upgraded ML17223A6071990-04-0505 April 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-001, Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs. Removal & Replacement of Cold Leg Side Plugs of Heat Number 3513 for Unit 1 Completed During Refueling Outage ML17308A4911990-04-0202 April 1990 Forwards Description & Summary of Safety Evaluations of Plant Changes/Mods Reportable Per 10CFR50.59.Repair &/Or Replacement of Protective Coatings on Surfaces Inside Bldg Pose No Unreviewed Safety Question ML17223A5931990-03-30030 March 1990 Forwards Status of 10CFR50.62, Requirements for Reduction of Risk from ATWS Mods at Plant as of 900315.Diverse Scram Sys Module Prototype Fabrication in Progress ML17223A5921990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info on Proposed License Amend Re Increased Max Allowable Resistance Temp Detector Delay Time,Per 891219 Telcon & Advises That Util Request to Increase Plant Resistance Temp Detector Response Time Remain Unchanged ML17223A5831990-03-19019 March 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implications of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants,' Per 10CFR50.54(f) ML17347B6191990-03-13013 March 1990 Provides Listing of Property Insurance Programs ML17223A5531990-03-0909 March 1990 Submits Results of Investigation of Error Detected in Dose Assessment During 900124 NRC Evaluated Exercise at Plant. Operator Error Caused Keyboard Hangup Requiring Computer Restart ML17223A5451990-03-0808 March 1990 Forwards Revised Tech Specs Re Steam Generator Tube Repairs, Per 890602 Telcon & Subsequent Discussions W/Nrc ML17308A4871990-03-0707 March 1990 Forwards Response to Eight Audit Questions & Licensing Bases Criteria to Resolve Station Blackout Issue.Util Currently Has Procedures to Mitigate Effects of Hurricanes & Tornados Which Meet or Exceed NUMARC 87-00 Guidelines ML17347B5881990-03-0101 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01, Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey. Info Covers Time Spent by Key Power Plant Managers in Responding to Operational Insps & Audits ML17347B6031990-02-27027 February 1990 Requests Approval to Use Code Case N-468 at Plants ML17223A5321990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards CEN-396 (L)-NP, Verification of Acceptability of 1-Pin Burnup Limit of 60 Mwd/Kg for St Lucie Unit 2. ML20012A0011990-02-26026 February 1990 Notifies That Followup Actions Completed on Schedule & Incorporated Into Rev 25 to Plant Physical Security Plan,Per NRC 890605 Request ML17223A5411990-02-26026 February 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Proposed License Amends Re Moderator Temp Coefficient Surveillance Requirements,Per 891026 & 900109 Telcons IR 05000335/19890241990-02-22022 February 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/89-24 & 50-389/89-24.Corrective Actions:Applicable Procedures Changed to Clarify Which Spaces & Blocks Required to Be Completed on Plant Work Order & QC Supervisor Counseled 1990-09-13
[Table view] |
Text
REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS i (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR!8107280254 DOCDDATE:" 81/07/20 NOTARIZED::
NO FACILi:50 335 Sts Lucie Plant~Unit 1<.Florida Power 8 Light Co~AUTH'AME'UTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGP R 0 E~Florida Power 8 Light Co~REC IP~NAMEl REC'IP IENT AFF ILIA'TION CI ARKipR~AD Operating, Reactors Branch 3 DOC KEiT¹05000335 SUBJECT Forwards responses to NRC 810521 request for.addi info reI auxiliary feedwateri sys automatic-initiation L flow indication;Four oversize drawings encl~Aperture cards'ill~
be ava.ilable in PDR, DISTRIBUTION CODE1 ADO IS COPIES RECEIVED;LTR
'NCLA'IZE::gJ TITLE': General Distr ibution for af ter Issuance of Oper atingLicense NOTES:-RECIPIENT ID'ODE/NAMEI ACTION!ORB¹3 BC'4 INTERNAL'/DIREHUM FAC08 I LEi 06'ELD 11T RAD'ASMT BR COPIES" LTTR ENCLL'3 13 1 1 2 2 1 01~1 RECIPIENT ID CODE'/NAME<<
DIRg DIV OF.LIC.NRC-PDR 02 BR 10 G*FILE 01 COPIES LTTR'NCL<1 1 1=-.1 0, 1 1 EXTERNALt:=
ACRS NSIC 09 05 ie 16 1 1 LPDR NTIS 03 1 1 1 1-TOTAL" NUMBER'F COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 41 ENCL" 39 N'1 a~1 c a 1't$I P E t f P.O.BOX 529100 MIAMI, FL 33152 Qilljj~FLORIDA POWER&LIGHT COMPANY July 20, 1981 L-81-302 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr.Robert A.Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch IIl3 Division of Licensing U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555
Dear Mr.Clark:
Re: St.Lucie Unit gl Docket No.50-335 Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication Florida Power 8 Light has reviewed the NRC letter dated May 21, 1981 concerning the above subject and our response is attached.Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/PLP/ras cc: Mr.J.P.O'Reilly, Region II Harold F.Reis, Esquire yg,(gQ g c, K~giA (8107280254 810720 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P PDR PEOPI.E.~.SERVING PEOPLE 0>, y'P r.~a~J*4~s'P,p Il 1, J'Fa j t tl RE UEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFOIQfATION uestion 1 ST.LUCIE 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW AUTOMATIC INITIATION AND'FLOW INDICATION Please provide the following drawings: a)Detailed P&XD (Piping and Instrumentation Diagram)of the St.Lucie 1 auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS).b)Electrical schematics,, and logic diagrams for the AFWS initiation and annunciation circuits, and AFW pump and valve control circuits.c)Electrical schematics for the valves in the steam supply line to the turbine driven AFW pump.Res onse 1 The drawings requested by the staff that are attached to this letter are preliminary.
The finalized dxawings along with the information that is not yet available will be sent to you when the design is finalized.
Drawings Numbers are as follows: a)Ebasco Dwg No.8770-G-080 b)Combustion Engineering Dwg No.E-00000-41l-801 Rev 01, AFAS Simplified Functional Diagram E-00000-411-803 Rev Ol, AFAS Testing System Diagram E-00000-411-'04 Rev 01, AFAS Miscellaneous Diagram Schematics>
for actuated components with changes for Aux Feedwatex Automatic Initiation System (CE)not available as of yet.c)Not available as of yet.uestion 2 Assuming a loss of power to the AB-DC tie bus ("A" battery failure), describe the manual actions required to transfer this bus to the"B" battery-including the time required to make this transfer.Res onse 2 Since the"AB" bus is normally aligned to the"B" battery at St.Luice Unit 1, the procedure to transfer the"AB" bus from the"B" battery to the"A" battery will be descxibed.
The only difference to transfer the"AB" bus from the"A" battery to the"B" battery would be a change in the breaker numbers.1.Check the 1A charger on the 1A 125V DC bus, the lB charger on the lB 125V DC bus, and the AB charger i.s in Hot Standby.
2.Close Breaker 60317 ("AB" Battery Charger Output).3.Open Breaker 60316, tie to 125V DC bus 1B on 125V DC bus 1AB from the control room.Open Breaker 60230, tie to 125V DC bus 1AB on 125V DC bus 1B from the control room.5.Close Breaker 60130, tie to 125V DC bus lAB on 125V DC bus 1A from the'control room.6.Close Breaker 60315, tie to 125V DC bus 1A on 125V DC bus 1AB from the contxol room.The time required to carry out this procedure is approximately two'to giye minutes.uestion 3 By Florida Power and Light (FP&L)letter dated January 2, 198l (L-81-4),, Enclosure 2, it is stated that"The ASS will automatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a faulted steam generator and automatically provide auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generator." Provide a detailed description of this feature (i.e., automatic termination of AFW to the faulted steam generator) including logic and schematic electrical diagrams.Res onse 3 The auxiliary feedwater actuation system automatically initiates auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generator upon demand and terminates or prevents auxiliary feedwater to the steam generator identified as being ruptured.The APAS is a four channel IE system that provides separate feedwater initiation signals for each steam generator (identified as AFAS-1 and APAS-2).Both signals are provided in each channel to interface with the individual components (pumps, valves).The logic which is used within each channel to define feedwater initiation or termination is shown in figure 1.AFAS is initiated within each channel upon receipt of a low S.G.water level signal provided the steam generator or associated feedwater header is not identified as being ruptured.A rupture signal is generated upon the following condi.tions:
S.G.pressure is approximately 100 psi below the other S.G.;or Feedwater supply header pressure is approximately 100 psi below the other feedwater supply header pressure;and Its associated S.G.is identified as having a low water level, and The other S.G.or feedwater header is not identified as being ruptured.The logic discussed above produces a digital (on/off)signa1 within each channel for APAS 1 and 2.These signals are combined across the four channels to form a two-out-of four logic.This logic produces an AFAS 1 or 2 actuation signal within each channel to control the pumps or valves associated with that.signal.Therefore, initiation of APAS 1 or 2 will cause the final AFAS actuation relays to deenergize thereby energizing lt I'rV;II'igurc 1 hl'AS LO(~IC I FIYII2 I'SG 1 P1 (P2 PSG 2 , I,)f P2 (P1 P1~iP2 LSG 1 LSG 2 P2<P1+f+]OR LOV(EVEI.LO'LY LEVEI OR)()I<07 NOT nfl D II~ti 2/4~Off'JC MnfiUAL~OB f~l,$2/il COlf JC MANUAL Oll ABBREVIATIONS P.PRESSURE L LEVEL SG STEAI"I GENERATOR F'tYII FEED'VIATER HEAQFR AFAS AUXILIARY~FEEDS'IATER ACTUATION SYSTI:ii AFAS1 AFAS 2',~~'l~\~~~t'I the associated pumps and valves to provide feedwater to-thh appropriate S.G.Should the S.G.be identified as being ruptured, the AFAS actuation relays would reenergize (except pump actuation relays)and close the associated valves.For further detail of the above pxoject, see CE drawing E-00000-411-801 (attached).
uestion 4 Are there any operating bypasses associated with the AFW automatic initiation logic/circuitry during start-up or operation of the reactor?If so, how are these bypasses removed (automatically, procedurally, etc)?~Res ense 4 The AFAS contains two types of bypasses, 1)txip channel bypass and 2)battery failure bypass.The trip channel bypass is provided for periodic testing of the system and to remove a channel from sezvice due to a component failure.This bypass is manually initiated and manually removed.2)The battery failure bypass is an automatic bypass initiated upon loss of battery power.The bypass effects only channels A and B.Loss of battery A will automatically bypass channel A only and similarly loss of battery B will automaticaliy bypass channel B only.Individual manual bypass swi.tches will be provided on a functiona1 level (AFAS 1 and AFAS 2)which will prevent the individual automatic actuation outputs from operating APW system components (i.e.APAS 1A bypass (S.G.1A, channel A), AFAS 2B (bypass (S.G.1B, channel B)etc.).A control room annunciator will be actuated when any of the available bypass switches is put in the bypass position.These bypasses will be removed manually under the dizection of written procedures.
uestion 5 Discuss the capability for testing and calibration of the APW automatic initiation channels including intervals between tests.Res onse 5 Testing of the auxiliary feedwatez actuation system is accomplished in five segments: 1)Sensor Test 2)Bistable Test 3)Logic Matrix Test 4)Initiation Circuit Test 5)Actuation Test Each test is discussed below: 1)Sensor Test During xeactor operation, the measurement channels providing an input to the AFAS aze checked by comparing the outputs of similar channels and cross-checking with related measurements.
During extended shutdown periods or refueling, these measurement channels are checked and where possible calibrated against known standards.
2)Bistable Test Testing of the bistable is accomplished by manually varying the input signal up to or down to the trip setpoint level on one bistable at a time and observing the trip action.Varying the input signal is accomplished by means of a trip test circuit consistipg of a digita1 voltmeter and a test circuit used to vary the magnitude of the signal supplied by the measurement channel to the trip input.The trip test circuit is interlocked electrically so that it can be used in only one channel at a time.A switch is provided to select the.measurement channel, and a push-button is provided to apply the test signal.The digital voltmeter indicates the value of the test signal.Trip action (deenergizing) of each of the bistable relays is indicated by individual 1ights on the front of the cabinet, indicating that these relays operate as required for a bistable trip condition.
When one of the bistables of the AFAS is in the tripped condition, a channel trip exists and is annunciated.
In this condition, auxiliary feed would take place only upon receipt of a AFAS 1 or AFAS 2 trip signa1 in one of the other like trip channels.The AFAS 1 or AFAS 2 trip channel under test is therefore bypassed for this test.Fu11 protection is maintained.
3)Lo ic Matrix Test The test is carried out to verify proper operation of the six 1ogic matrices, any of which can initiate a system actuation.
Only the matrix relays in one of the six logic matrices can be held in the energized position during tests.If, for example, the AB 1ogic matrix hold pushbutton is depressed, actuation of the other matrix hold push-buttons can have no effect upon their respective logic matrices.Actuation of the pushbutton, applies a test voltage to the test system hold coils of the selected double coil matrix relays.This voltage provides the power necessary to hold the relays in their energized position when deactuation of the bistable relay contacts in the matrix ladder being tested causes deenergization of the primary matrix relay coils.The logic matrix to be.tested is selected using the System Select switch.While holding the matrix Hold pushbutton in its actuated position, rotation of the System Select switch releases only those bistable relays that have operating contacts in the logic matrix under test.The System Select switch applies a test voltage of opposite polarity to the bistable relay test coils, so that the magnetic flux generated by these coils opposes that of the primary coil of the relay.The resulting flux will be zero, and the relays will release.A simplified diagram of this testing system is shown on C-E drawing E-00000-411-803, (attached).
Trip action can be observed by illumination of the bistable relay indicators located on the front panel of the AFAS cabinet and by loss of voltage to the four matrix relays, which is indicated by extinguishing indicator lights connected across each matrix relay coil.During this test, the matrix relay"hold" lights remain on, indicating that a test voltage has been applied to the holding coils of the matrix relays of the logic matrix module under test.The test is repeated for all six matrices.This test verifies that the'bistable relay contacts operate correctly and that the logic matrix relays will deenergize if the matrix continuity is violated.The opening of the matrix relay contact is tested in the initiation circuit test.4)Initiation Circuit Test Each initiation circuit is tested individually by depressing a matrix Hold pushbutton (holding matrix relays), selecting either system position on the System Select switch (opening the matrix), and selecting a matrix relay on the Matrix Relay Select Switch (deenergizing one of the matrix relays).This causes one, and only one, of the initiation circuits to deenergize, causing one current leg of the selective two-out,-of-four in each channel to open.Loss of current through this leg is indicated on the AFAS cabinet.The Matrix Relay Select Switch is turned to the next position, reenergizing the tested matrix relay, allowing the initiation circuit to xeenergize.
This sequence is repeated for the remaining three initiation circuits from the selected matrix.Following this, the entire sequence is repeated for the remaining five matrices.5)Actuation Test Proper operation of the AFAS relays in the AFAS Cabinet, is verified by deenergizing the relays one at a time via a test relay contact and noting the proper operation of all actuated components in that trip function (ASAS-1 or AFAS-2).The relay will automatically reenergize and return its components to the pretest condition when the test pushbutton is released.The design of the test system is at a time.The test switch must (AFAS 1 or AFAS 2)to be tested, impossible.
The test circuit is of a particular AFAS function.such that only one relay may be deenergized be positioned to the function relays selection of more than one function is electrically locked out upon actuation Testing of segments 2 thru 5 of the AFAS should be accomplished at intervals similar to the RPS.uestion 6 Address the physical separation provided between the redundant AFW automatic initiation instrument channels.
Res onse 6 The AFAS cabinet is divided into front and back compartments separated by a mechanical barrier at the 30" depth point.Additional thermal and mechanical barriers in the horizontal and vertica1 planes at the cabinet centerline divide the cabinet into eight separate compartments.
The front four compartments contain the initiation circuitry (bistables, logic, and test circuitry) for channels A, B, C and D respectively as we11 as the interchannel isolation devices to another.Access to each front compartment is controlled by a separate transparent door with a key switch.M>ere cables of one compartment must pass through to another an enclosed cable duct (qualified as a fire barrier)is utilized.'The four rear compartments contain the actuation circuitry and devices that are requiied for control of the AFAS System.Hach compartment has a separate door for access.Mhere existing plant instrumentation signals (e.g., Steam Generator'level and pressure)are to be used by the AFAS initiation system, the extension of these 1oops to the AFAS cabinet will be installed with appropriate separation consistent with the existing 1oop installations.
New dedicated instrumentation signals (e.g., Feedwater header pressure)will be installed with separation consistent with existing plant separation criteria.System outputs and operator interface devices (switches) will also be installed in accordance with existing plant separation criteria.uestion 7 Describe the auxiliary feedwater flow indication instrumentation at the St.Lucie plant.This description should include: a.Type and number of flow channels.b.The specific source (vital bus)from which these channels are powered.c.Capability for testing and calibration including the interval between tests.d.The type of indication available in the control room for each channel (indicator, recorder, etc.)e.Safety grade qualification of the flow channels.f.Accuracy of the flow channels.a.St.Lucie 1 has three auxiliary feedwater pumps.Each pump with its associated flow path controls and instrumentation represents separate channel.Header discharge flow for each channel is indicated on Reactor-Turbine-Generator Board (RTGB)and recorded on Post Accident Panels A and B (PAP).The channels are designated as XA, XB, XAB (important A, B or AB).Each channel runs in separate tray system.
b.Each flow instrumentation channel is powered from safety related source.Channel IA is powered from vital bus SA, channel IB from SB and channel XA3 from SAB.Vital bus SA, SB takes power from offsite source and is backed-up by Emergency Diesel Generator.
Vital bus SAB takes power either fxom vital bus SA or SB.c.One point pressure check is conducted once a month and response of the instruments is observed.Instruments are calibrated during each scheduled refueling outage.Scheduled.outages occur at intervals of twelve to eighteen months.All instruments in the loop;,are also xecalibrated every time there is a malfunction or a problem in the loop.d.One flow indicator per each channel is mounted on RTGB.Also each channel has flow recorder mounted of PAP.Channel IA and XAB are mounted on PAP"A" and Channel M is mounted on PAP".B";e.Flow instrumentation channels are seismically qualified.
This includes transmitters as well as equipment mounted on RTGB and PAP.Flow instrumentation equipment mounted on RTGB or PAP is located on non-safety portion of the board.There is no tracability of materials fox auxiliary feedwater flow instrumentation.
f~Flow transmitters accuracy is.5%at ambient temperatures.
Accuracy of each component in the loop except precision resistors is.5%.Accuracy of precision resistor is 0.01%.The component of the loop which has accuracy higher than 0.5%is rejected.Overall accuracy of each flow loop is typically 0.7%.uestion 8 Describe the steam generator level instrumentation at the St.Lucie plant.This description should include: a.Type and number of level channels pex steam generator including the range fox each channel.b.The specific source (vital bus)from which each of these channels is powered.c.Capability for testing and calibration including the interval between tests.d.The specific indication available in the control room for each channel (indicator, recorder, etc.).Res onse 8 Steam Genexator Level Instrumentation is used to effect reactor trip, automatically initiate Auxiliary Feedwatex System to the intact steam generator and to monitor steam generator level during the course of an accident.Steam generator level instrumentation is classified into safety related and non-safety instrumentation.
a.The safety related instrumentation is divided into four safety related protective channels.The channels are designated
>fA, MB, MC and MD.Each steam generator has four level transmitters representing four protective channels.Protective channels are narrow range type and are primarily used to initiate reactor trip and initiate auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generator.
Low steam generator level signal will txip the xeactor when measured steam generator level falls to a low preset va1iie.The logic is such that the coincidence of two out of four low level signals in either steam generator will effect reactor trip.The same level transmitters which txip the reactor provide an input to Auxiliary Feedwater Initiation System.The logic is such that the coincidence of two out of four low level signals in either steam generator will initiate auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generator.
All components of protective channels are Class lE.Each protective channel is independent and separate from each other.Cables of the same measured parameter xun in separate conduit or tray system.Instrumentation of the same protective channel mounted on RTGB or PAP is isolated from other channels and non-safety equipment by fireproof barrier.Transmitter ranges for protective channels are as follows: SG~Ta No.Transm Ran e 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 LT-9013A LT-9013B LT-9013C LT-9013D LT-9023A LT-9023B LT-9023C LT-9023D 0-131.8" MC 0-132.1" MC 0-131 8" MC 0-131.7" MC 0-131.7" MC 0-131.8" MC 0-131.8" MC 0-131.8" MC In addition to four protective channels each steam generator is equipped with one wide range non-safety channel for indication and recording.
These transmitters are Seismic Class l.Transmitter ranges fox wide range transmitters are as follows:~Ta No.~Raa e LT-9012 LT-9022 483.8" QC-21.2" MC 482.6" MC-20.1" MC Third group of SG level transmitters are part of Feedwater Regulating System.Two non-safety Seismic Class 1 transmitters axe provided for each SG.These narrow range transmitters provide input to the feedwater regulating systems and drive indicating controllers and recorders mounted on RTGB.
These transmitter ranges are as follows: SG~Ta No.~Ran e 2 1 2 LT-9005 LT-9006 LT-9011 LT-9021 61.2" WC 63.7" WC 193 4" WC 198.7" WC-192.9" WC-195.5" WC 61.6" WC 61.7" WC b.Each protective channel is powered from 120VAC class 1E uninterxuptib16
,=power supply of the same channel.Power supplies of channels MA and HC are powered from Battery A while channel HB and MD axe powered from Battery B.Each channel is powered through an inverter.Power supply of the same channel is isolated fxom non-safety and safety related equipment of another channel.c.Safety xelated instrumentation is calibrated during: 1-Sh'utd6wn 2-Scheduled refueling outage 3-When malfunction or a pxoblem occurs in the loop.Each scheduled outage occurs at time intervals of twelve to eighteen months.As mentioned earlier accuracy of each component in the loop except precision resistor is 0.5%.Precision resistor accuracy is.01%.Component is rejected if its accuracy exceeds.5%during calibration.
Overall accuracy of each SG safety related instrumentation loop is typically...7%., Similarily calibration and accuracy requirements will also apply to non-safety instrumentation.
Overall accuracy will vary slightly depending how many components axe in the loop.Typically there axe between four ox five components in the 1oop.Overall accuracy is computed using Square Root of the Sum of the Squaxes (SRSS)method.d.For narrow range safety related instrumentation four channels of indicating controllers per SG axe mounted on RTGB (total of 8).Also channel IfA, fox SG 1 and SG 2 is recorded on PAP A.Fox non-safety wide range level instrumentation one indicator per a"".-SG is located on RTGB and HSCP.One two-pen recorder mounted on PA'P, records channel HA of SGl and SG2 level.For non-safety narrow range SG level instrumentation used for Feedwater Regulating Systems one level indicating controller per SG is provided on RTGB.Also one two-pen xecorder for recording SG1 and SG2 level is located on PAP)at t