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| ML23293A193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/2023 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| EA-23-114 IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23293A193 (34) | |
Text
October 26, 2023
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2023003, 07200079/2023001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Cleve Reasoner:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On October 2, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with M. Boyce, Engineering Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The licensee identified a violation of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6), associated with tornado hazard protection. Because this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken or plans to take the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation handling operations.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Gregory E. Werner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000482, 07200079 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000482 and 07200079
License Number:
Report Number:
05000482/2023003 and 07200075/2023001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-003-0002 and I-2023-001-0016
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS
Inspection Dates:
July 1 to September 30, 2023
Inspectors:
B. Baca, Health Physicist
L. Brookhart, Senior Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
J. Freeman, Spent Fuel Storage Inspector
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer
J. Vera, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71124.0
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Properly Pre-Plan and Perform Maintenance for Safety-Related 4160 Volt Siemens Vacuum Breakers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2023003-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of technical specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain Procedure MPE E009Q-03, Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers, revision 11, to perform maintenance on safety-related 4160 volt Siemens breaker closing spring charging motor electrical motor terminal set screws to verify they were snug tight. This resulted in the failure to charge the closing spring of safety injection pump B breaker NB0202 following surveillance testing, rendering safety injection pump B inoperable for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Inadvertent Entry into an Overhead High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green non-cited violation of technical specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees inadvertent entry into an overhead high radiation area (HRA). A non-licensed operator (operator) went outside the briefed work scope and work path to walkdown/review access to a valve in the overhead (an HRA) leading to a dose rate alarm.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status EDG EA-23-114 Enforcement Action 23-EA-114: Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)60855 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period at full power. On July 14, 2023, the licensee reduced power to 62 percent at the request of the transmission system operator to facilitate unplanned outage of the 345 kV Rose Hill Line and the unit was returned to full power on July 19, 2023. On August 13, 2023, the licensee reduced power to 62 percent at the request of the transmission system operator to facilitate unplanned outage of the 345 kV Benton Line and the unit was returned to full power on August 14, 2023. The unit remained at full power for the reminder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)train A(B) boron injection tank to charging pumps on July 20, 2023 (2)train B safety injection system on July 28, 2023 (3)train B component cooling water pump room cooler on September 12, 2023 (4)train A residual heat removal minimum flow line on September 13, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)south electrical chase, fire area C-8, on July 10, 2023 (2)auxiliary shutdown panel room, fire area A-28, on July 12, 2023 (3)south electrical chase, fire area C-11, on July 28, 2023 (4)rod drive and motor generator set room failed fire detection detector, fire area A-27, on September 15, 2023 (5)electrical penetration room A degraded door, fire area A-18, on September 15, 2023 (6)emergency diesel generator B room during silencer welding activities and extended technical specification equipment outage, fire area D-2, on September 27, 2023
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered on May 8 - June 30, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during train B centrifugal charging pump inservice testing and shutdown and control rod operability testing on July 14, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensed operator evaluation scenarios on August 28, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)station blackout diesel generator maintenance effectiveness on September 5, 2023 (2)auxiliary building safety-related HVAC systems degraded airflow maintenance effectiveness review on September 19, 2023
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)train B safety injection pump breaker failure on September 13, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)train B containment spray pump room cooler failure to automatically start emergency work and extension of technical equipment outage July 3, 2023 (2)loss of nonvital bus breaker PA0206 on July 19, 2023 (3)train A component cooling water technical specification equipment outage on August 10, 2023 (4)emergency diesel generator A, 7-day technical specification equipment outage on August 17, 2023 (5)turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump technical specification equipment outage on August 29, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)train B load shedder and emergency load sequencers failure past operability evaluation on August 31, 2023 (2)train B component cooling water room cooler below design airflow operability evaluation on August 31, 2023 (3)train B containment spray pump room cooler degraded airflow on August 31, 2023 (4)emergency diesel generator B jacket water keep warm pump abnormal noise and safety classification operability determination on September 26, 2023 (5)train B containment spray pump room cooler failure to start past operability determination on September 26, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
(1)train B containment spray pump room cooler failure to start repair post-maintenance testing on July 6, 2023 (2)train A safety injection technical specification equipment outage on July 13, 2023 (3)train B motor driven auxiliary feedwater technical specification equipment outage on August 1, 2023 (4)train A component cooling water technical specification equipment outage on August 8, 2023 (5)train B component cooling water room cooler motor replacement post-maintenance testing on September 6, 2023 (6)train B component cooling water pump D discharge check valve, EGV0016, post-maintenance testing on September 6, 2023 (7)battery charger, NK022, card replacement post-maintenance testing on September 26, 2023 (8)emergency diesel generator B output breaker extent of condition corrective maintenance post-maintenance testing on September 26, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)component cooling water pump A, B, C, and D discharger check valve surveillance testing on September 8, 2023 (2)train A residual heat removal pump discharge flow transmitter on September 12, 2023 (3)station blackout diesel generator and non-safety-related auxiliary feedwater pump quarterly run on September 13, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)emergency preparedness drill involving an anticipated transient without a scram, loss of a main feed pump, and an extended loss of all AC power on August 30, 2023
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)emergency preparedness drill involving an anticipated transient without a scram, loss of a main feed pump, and an extended loss of all AC power on August 9,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards. The NRC credits a partial baseline sample from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards. The NRC credits a partial baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)contamination control during a system breach and resulting radwaste from gaseous relief tank HA-709 relief valve replacement (2)workers processing out of the radiologically controlled area with personal items monitored in the small article monitors and workers crossing the boundary of a clean area in the fuel handling building truck bay
- (3) NRC credits a baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) equipment shipments (shipments 23R21, 23R22, 23R23) from the fuel handling building into the public domain.
- (2) The movement, survey, and weighing of a spent resin liner (PO 711397-8) from the shielded filling station to its storage location in the high-level radioactive waste storage area.
- (3) Radiation work permit 2023-0050, "Contaminated system breaches including, valves, pumps, piping, and strainers for maintenance activities. Includes cutting, welding, grinding of components, technical specification equipment outage activities, and air operated valve & motor operated valve teams," revision 0, task 1 covering the gaseous relief tank HA-709 relief valve replacement.
- (4) The NRC credits a baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):
(1)auxiliary building locked high radiation area (LHRA) rooms 1302 (2000' demineralizer alley filter pits and filter high integrity container) and 1507A (2047' containment personnel hatch)
- (2) ISFSI pad LHRA (3)radwaste building LHRA rooms 7218 (2000' round process shield), 7220 (primary spent resin valve room), and 7225 (low level storage)
- (4) NRC credits a baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023 Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP
Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization. The NRC credits a partial baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry. The NRC credits a partial baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) Three internal dose assessments involving work under the following radiation work permits (RWPs): RWP 222001, "Welding Activities," revision 2; RWP 222220, "Insulation Removal and Replacement," revision 1; and RWP 224001, "Letdown Heat Exchanger Eddy Current including Block Wall Replacement, Insulation Removal and Re-Installation, Endbell Removal and Re-Installation," revision 1.
- (2) The NRC credits a baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23, 2023.
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) A declared pregnant worker package.
- (2) Effective dose equivalent external assessments for RWP 221102,"Incore Tunnel Inspections, Maintenance & Decontamination," revision 1, task 1 and task 8; RWP
===223049, "Under Reactor Vessel Head - Full Body Entry and Outside Support,"
revision 1, task 1; and RWP 225048, "Reactor Head Cleaning - Whole Body Entry Inside Windows," revision 0, task 2.
- (3) The NRC credits a baseline sample from the IAEA OSART review conducted March 6 through March 23,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023.
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023.
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)train B residual heat removal minimum flow valve degraded nonconforming condition associated with motor operator on September 14, 2023 (2)emergency plan classification error trend on September 20,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60855 - Operation of an ISFSI The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities to verify compliance with requirements of the Transnuclear (TN)
Nutec Horizontal Modular Extended Optimized Storage (NUHOMS EOS) system's Certificate of Compliance 72-1042, Amendment 1, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Revision 3. The inspectors observed licensee operations and reviewed selected procedures, corrective action reports, and records to verify ISFSI operations were compliant with the Certificate's technical specifications, requirements in the FSAR, and NRC regulations.
Operation of an ISFSI===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees dry cask storage operations, from August 28 through September 1, 2023, during an onsite inspection. The Wolf Creek ISFSI is located within the Part 50 protected area. The EOS Matrix ISFSI pad was designed to hold 64 dry shielded canisters (DSCs), each with 37 spent fuel assemblies.
The EOS Matrix design contains two levels of HSM-MXs (horizontal storage module-matrix). Currently the licensee had constructed 11 HSM-MXs, each capable of receiving one DSC, on the southeast portion of the ISFSI pad. During the licensee's loading campaign Wolf Creek planned on loading 3 DSCs into the upper level of the EOS Matrix. Inspectors observed loading activities associated with the second DSC loaded into the upper level of the EOS Matrix. At the end of the loading campaign, the licensee had loaded a total of 8 DSCs into the EOS Matrix.
During the onsite inspection, the inspectors evaluated and observed the following activities:
- fuel selection and spent fuel placement into the DSC for canister #7
- removal of the loaded DSC from the spent fuel pool to the canister processing area
- canister vacuum drying and pneumatic testing of the DSC
- welding, nondestructive testing, and helium leak testing of the top plate and vent/drain port covers The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following documentation during the inspection:
- fuel selection evaluations for the canisters loaded since the last NRC ISFSI inspection (canisters 2 - 7)
- radiation surveys for radiological dose at the owner-controlled boundary to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 for 2022
- selected ISFSI-related condition reports issued since the last NRC ISFSI inspection
- quality assurance program implementation, including recent audits, surveillances, receipt inspection, and quality control activities related to ISFSI operations
- compliance to technical specifications for operational surveillance activities and FSAR required maintenance activities
- documentation of annual maintenance activities for the sites cask handling crane, EOS Matrix crane, and special lifting devices
- reviewed selected licensee design changes and program changes for the ISFSI performed under the site's 10 CFR 72.48 program
- reviewed changes made by the licensee in the site's 10 CFR Part 72.212 Evaluation report from revision 0 to revision
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement Discretion Enforcement Action EA-23-114:: Tornado Hazards Protection at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (EGM 22-001)60855
Description:
Upon issuance of U.S. NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM)22-001 (ML22087A496), dated April 15, 2022, the licensee performed an assessment of all outdoor dry cask storage activities that were not explicitly analyzed for tornado hazards in the system's FSAR. Five configurations were identified by the licensee where transport activities did not have a related tornado wind and hazard analysis consistent with the cask's design basis requirements. These situations occurred during both outside operations when the canister is being loaded into the HSM-MX and during indoor activities when the transfer cask is being lowered onto the low-profile transporter.
The TN NUHOMs EOS FSAR, Appendix A, Section A.2, which includes Section A.2.3 Design Criteria for Environmental Conditions and Natural Phenomena, describes the general design criteria for the cask system. Specifically, FSAR Section A.2.3 states, The HSM-MX SSCs described in Section A.2.1 are designed consistent with the 10 CFR Part 72 122(b)requirement for protection against environmental conditions and natural phenomena. The criterion used in the design of the NUHOMS EOS System ensures that exposure to credible site hazards does not impair their safety functions. This includes all off-normal condition loads, environmental phenomena, and accident conditions. Tornado hazards are evaluated in the FSAR Section A. 2.3.1 Tornado Wind and Tornado Missiles for HSM-MX, Section 2.3.2 Tornado Wind and Tornado Missiles for EOS-TC, Section 12.3.3 Tornado Wind and Tornado Missile Effect on EOS-HS, and Section 12.3.4 Tornado Wind and Tornado Missile Effect on EOS-TC. These sections of the FSAR do not include an analysis for tornado hazards when
- (1) the loaded canister is lifted by the Matrix Loading Crane at a height > 65",
- (2) the transfer cask outer cover is removed,
- (3) the HSM-MX door is removed,
- (4) the canister is being inserted into the HSM-MX, and
- (5) while the transfer cask is being lowered onto the low-profile transporter inside the fuel building due to the fuel building door being potentially susceptible to a tornado missile.
Corrective Actions: The licensee followed the guidance actions as described in the EGM. The issue was entered into the corrective action program and the licensee established additional measures to mitigate tornado hazards, through procedures, during periods of ISFSI handling operations. These actions included, restricting outdoor dry cask storage activities during periods of adverse weather, establishing meteorological criteria, designating staff to monitor weather during ISFSI handling operations, describing actions to take in the event of severe weather necessary to place the cask in an analyzed condition, minimizing the duration of ISFSI handling operations during which ISFSI important to safety SSCs are in an unanalyzed condition, documentation that required weather checks were completed prior to the start of ISFSI handling operations, and documenting in the CAP a request for the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder to request an amendment within six months of the date of the EGM or implement physical design modifications and/or perform evaluations that demonstrate important to safety SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including tornadoes and tornado-generated missiles prior to the expiration date of the EGM (April 15, 2024).
Corrective Action References: Condition report 10018017
Enforcement:
Significance/Severity: This violation was dispositioned in accordance with the traditional enforcement process using section 2.3 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This issue was determined by inspectors to be of more than minor safety significance, since if left uncorrected, the deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Consistent with the guidance in section 1.2.6.D of the NRC's Enforcement Manual, if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it should be assigned a severity level:
- (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
- (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The violation was evaluated to be similar to a Severity Level IV violation in Enforcement Policy section 6.5.d.2.
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.212 (b)(6), states, in part, that the general licensee must: review the Safety Analysis Report referenced in the CoC or amended CoC and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the general
license, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports.
Contrary to the above, from August 21, through September 8, 2023, the licensee failed to determine whether or not reactor site parameters including analyses of tornado missiles were enveloped by the cask design bases. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an analysis consistent with FSAR section A.2.3 to demonstrate the NUHOMs cask system ensures that exposure to credible site hazards does not impair their safety functions, such as, when
- (1) the loaded canister is lifted by the Matrix Loading Crane at a height > 65",
- (2) the transfer cask outer cover is removed,
- (3) the HSM-MX door is removed,
- (4) the canister is being inserted into the HSM-MX, and
- (5) while the transfer cask is being lowered onto the low-profile transporter inside the fuel building due to the fuel building door being potentially susceptible to a tornado missile.
Basis for Discretion: The NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with section 3.0 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. In general, the NRC has extensive history analyzing severe weather events including tornado hazard scenarios using probabilistic methods (or risk assessments) in licensing on a case-by-case basis to assess specific plant features to prevent a release of radioactivity exceeding regulatory limits. For ISFSIs, such methods can be employed, supported by analysis, to demonstrate that tornado hazards will not impair the capability of SSCs important to safety to perform their intended design functions.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) completed a generic risk analysis of potential tornado missile protection non-compliances to examine the risk significance of tornado hazard scenarios (ML14114A556). In this case, the generic bounding risk analysis performed by NRR concluded that a tornado missile scenario is of low-risk significance at power reactor sites, due in part to the low probability of wind speeds exceeding 75 miles per hour (less than 4x10-4 per year). This generic analysis did not specifically address ISFSI handling operations but there are several key insights in the analysis that may apply to a risk assessment for this issue. Specifically, rather than evaluate site-specific configurations, the NRR generic analysis used bounding assumptions regarding tornado and high winds initiating event frequencies (IEFs) coupled with bounding assumptions for missile strike area to develop conservative estimates of core-damage frequency. This generic analysis assumes that plants are in a condition vulnerable to a tornado for a full reactor-year worth of exposure time.
For ISFSI handling operations, the vulnerable configuration would be typically limited to a few weeks of exposure time per year which would result in additional conservatism to the results documented in the NRR generic analysis. Furthermore, ISFSI handling operations that may lead to loss of confinement of radioactive material due to a missile strike or high winds should be bounded by the assumptions regarding tornado and high winds IEFs. Appropriate administrative controls including compensatory measures would provide defense-in-depth and further reduce the likelihood of occurrence and mitigate loss of confinement events. This defense-in-depth approach should include provisions to
- (1) preclude ISFSI handling operations during periods of adverse weather or when adverse weather is predicted, and (2)provide compensatory measures to place important to safety SSCs in an analyzed condition or provide physical protection as necessary to maintain confinement of radioactive material during ISFSI handling operations.
In summary, the combination of the low probability of tornado events in conjunction with
formally documented administrative controls that
- (1) restrict initiation of ISFSI handling operations during projected periods of adverse weather and,
- (2) cease ISFSI handling operations and place important to safety SSCs in a protected configuration or analyzed condition at the outset of adverse weather conditions, form the basis for the exercise of enforcement discretion for ISFSI handling operations. As a further condition of this enforcement discretion, licensees will conduct a site-specific assessment to determine the appropriate corrective actions to ensure that important to safety SSCs will not be adversely impacted by tornado hazards. As such, the exercise of enforcement discretion limited to the conditions of this EGM will not impose significant additional risk to public health and safety.
Since this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 22-001, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of Tornado Hazard Protection requirements at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures and has taken the necessary actions to restore compliance, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and is allowing continued ISFSI handling operations.
Failure to Properly Pre-Plan and Perform Maintenance for Safety-Related 4160 Volt Siemens Vacuum Breakers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2023003-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of technical specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain Procedure MPE E009Q-03, Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers, revision 11, to perform maintenance on safety-related 4160-volt Siemens breaker closing spring charging motor electrical motor terminal set screws to verify they were snug tight. This resulted in the failure to charge the closing spring of safety injection pump B breaker NB0202 following surveillance testing, rendering safety injection pump B inoperable for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Description:
On June 6, 2023, a licensee operator discovered the white indicating light demonstrating the closing spring is charged for the safety-related 4160-volt Siemens vacuum circuit breaker NB00202 was not lit. The operator replaced the bulb and determined the issue was not caused by a blown bulb. The licensee troubleshooting identified the charging spring motor electrical terminal set screws had loosened on breaker NB0202, preventing the spring charging motor from operating and recharging the closing spring following safety injection pump B surveillance testing. This condition prevented breaker NB0202 from closing and automatically starting safety injection pump B starting on a safety injection signal, rendering it inoperable for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensees immediate corrective action was to tighten the terminal set screws and reconnect the associated wiring to restore NB0202 and safety injection pump B operability. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed a performance assessment worksheet (PAW) and an equipment
performance evaluation (EPE). The licensee determined the cause of the event was due to an unsecure connection to the charging spring motor terminal connections. Specifically, the procedural guidance contained in Procedure MPE E009Q-03, Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers, revision 11, did not have licensee personnel verify the charging spring motor terminal connections set screws were snug tight following maintenance activities.
The inspectors reviewed the PAW and EPE, vendor technical manual, procedure MPE E009Q-03 and concluded that the licensee failed to implement the vendors maintenance inspection checklist in procedure MPE E009Q-03. The vendor technical manuals maintenance section stated to check all terminal screws and check all screw connections and locking devices on mechanism parts. Procedure MPE E009Q-03 did not contain such instructions to verify component integrity. The inspectors did note that procedure MPE E009Q-03 contained a specific step to visually inspect torque seal on the mounting screws for the stationary auxiliary switch, which was implemented because of a failure of the essential service water pump A room supply fan to start in 1996. This failure was determined to be the result of loose mounting screws on the breaker NB0115 stationary auxiliary switch. A change was made to the procedure to add steps to check the stationary auxiliary switch mounting screws. However, the licensee did not expand the scope to include other mounting screws on similar breakers. The inspectors also identified NRC documentation with relevant information on integrity and maintenance of breaker internals. NRC Information Notice 87-41 Failures of Certain Brown Boveri Electric Circuit Breakers, outlined instances of circuit breakers that contained loose or missing charging motor mounting bolts. NRC Information Notice 2010-25 Inadequate Electrical Connections, noted operational experience that included failure to follow vendor-or industry-recommended torque requirements. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the failure of NB0202 closing spring to recharge following safety injection pump B surveillance testing was foreseeable and could have been prevented by the licensee.
Corrective Actions: The license updated procedure MPE E009Q-03 to include verification of closing charging spring motor electrical motor terminal set screws.
Corrective Action References: Condition report 10025080
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance to ensure safety-related 4160-volt Siemens breaker closing charging spring motor electrical motor terminal set screws were snug tight was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance for safety-related 4160-volt Siemens breaker resulted in rendering safety injection pump B inoperable for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a deficiency affecting design or qualification of a mitigating system,
- (2) does not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis (PRA) function of a single train technical specification system for greater than allowed outage time,
- (3) does not represent a loss of PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time,
- (4) does not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) does not represent a loss of PRA system and/or function as defined by the plant risk information e-book or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) does not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures in appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, section 9.a, states, in part, that maintenance that can affect performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established procedure MPE E009Q-03, Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers, revision 11, to verify that screw connections are secure after maintenance activities associated with safety-related 4160 volt Siemens vacuum circuit breakers.
Contrary to above, until June 2023, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance that can affect performance of safety-related equipment in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, procedure MPE E009Q-03 revision 11, was not appropriate, in that it, did not verify that the 4160-volt Siemens breaker closing charging spring motor electrical terminal set screws were snug tight, resulting in the safety injection pump B being inoperable.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inadvertent Entry into an Overhead High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees inadvertent entry into an overhead high radiation area (HRA). A non-licensed operator (operator) went outside the briefed work scope and work path to walkdown/review access to a valve in the overhead (an HRA) leading to a dose rate alarm.
Description:
On October 30, 2022, an operator removing a clearance order received a dose rate alarm upon accessing an overhead area within the steam generator B/C secondary side platform in containment. The operator was trying to determine a safe way to reach an overhead valve and unknowingly entered an HRA. A radiological survey (M-20221030-3) was performed in the area of the dose rate alarm and identified a valve reading 450 millirem per hour (mR/hr) on contact and 260 mR/hr at 30 centimeters. The operators self-reading dosimeter had a dose rate set point of 200 mR/hr.
Procedure AP-25B-100, Radiation Worker Guidelines, revision 56A, step 5.3.9 required, in part, radiation workers contact radiation protection prior to accessing overhead areas.
Workers accessing platforms or plant ladders are not allowed to reach off into the overhead, they must remain within the boundaries of the ladder or platform.
The area where the operator accessed the valve had not been surveyed and was outside the briefed work location. The operator did not communicate a potential for accessing the overhead off the steam generator B/C secondary side platform when discussing the work scope and work path for removing the clearance order with radiation protection staff.
Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated corrective actions to restrict the operator from accessing the radiologically controlled area. Radiation protection and craft supervisors coached personnel involved on the requirements to access an overhead area and to clearly communicate the work scope and work path with radiation protection. The licensee performed a performance assessment worksheet (PAW 20036453) to identify associated human performance issues related to the incident.
Corrective Action References: The condition was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 10019497.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: An inadvertent entry into an overhead HRA was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the program & process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the failure to follow procedure requirements involving radiological controls had the potential to increase the workers dose. The failure to follow the procedural requirement to contact radiation protection prior to accessing an overhead area, which contained an HRA, led to a worker accessing an area 60 mR/hr greater than anticipated.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not:
- (1) related to as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning,
- (2) did not involve an overexposure,
- (3) did not involve a substantial potential for overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear
safety is maintained. Specifically, the communication between operator and radiation protection staff did not ensure a comprehensive understanding for the removal of the clearance order work scope and the areas needing to be accessed.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, February 1978. Appendix A, section 7.e.1 requires procedures for Access Control to Radiation Areas Including a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) System. The licensee established procedure AB 25B-100, Radiation Worker Guidelines, revision 56A, which in step 5.3.9, required workers to contact radiation protection prior to accessing overhead areas. Workers accessing platforms or plant ladders are not allowed to reach off into the overhead, they must remain within the boundaries of the ladder or platform.
Contrary to the above, on October 30, 2022, an operator did not contact radiation protection prior to accessing an overhead area beyond the boundaries of the steam generator B/C secondary side platform. The operator inadvertently entered an HRA in the overhead.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71124.01 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: The licensee identified an improper entry into an HRA. Technical specification 5.7.1.d.4 stated, in part, entry into HRAs, with dose rates greater than 100 millirem per hour and not exceeding 1,000 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or any surface penetrated by the radiation, required each individual or group entering such an area shall possess a self-reading dosimeter (e.g., pocket ionization chamber or electronic dosimeter). Contrary to the above, on June 28, 2022, an electrician entered the posted HRA of the independent spent fuel storage installation (survey M-20220629-8) without a self-reading dosimeter.
The licensee initiated corrective actions to
- (1) promptly restrict the workers access to the radiologically controlled area until coaching from radiation protection and their supervision was completed,
- (2) complete a performance assessment worksheet (PAW 20034880) to identify an associated human performance cause,
- (3) provide a weekly observation coaching roll-up discussion to all maintenance groups, and
- (4) discuss the issue during the directors morning kick-off meeting.
Significance/Severity: Green. The significance of the finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, and because the finding was not: (1)related to as low ALARA planning,
- (2) did not involve an overexposure,
- (3) did not involve a substantial potential for overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action References: The condition was entered into the corrective action program as condition reports 10015652 and
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the triennial ISFSI loading inspection results to J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 2, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to M.
Boyce, Engineering Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855
Miscellaneous
APF 26A-010-01
CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report Wolf Creek Generating
Station Dry Fuel Storage System for Spent Nuclear Fuel
Docket Number 72-1042
60855
Miscellaneous
CR 10025327
EGM 22-001, Enforcement Discretion for Noncompliance of
Tornado Hazards Protection Requirements at Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installations, site response and
documentation.
08/28/2023
60855
Miscellaneous
K15-002-22-11-
ISFSI-Audit
ISFSI Program Audit Report
01/11/2023
60855
Miscellaneous
NUHOMS EOS
System Updated
Final Safety
Analysis Report
Docket Number 72-1042
60855
Procedures
AI 28A-010
Screening Condition Reports
60855
Procedures
CFR 72.48 Reviews
60855
Procedures
HTPT-DSC-
ORANO WOLF
CREEK
HIGH TEMPERATURE LIQUID PENETRANT (PT)
EXAMINATION USING THE COLOR CONTRAST
SOLVENT-REMOVABLE METHOD
6007-02
60855
Procedures
MSLT-DSC-
ORANO WOLF
CREEK
HELIUM MASS SPECTROMETER LEAK TEST
PROCEDURE DRY FUEL STORAGE CONTAINER
6007-01
60855
Procedures
PTIP 30501-
5.11B
EOS 37PTH Prep of the TC and DSC
60855
Procedures
PTIP 30501-
5.11C
EOS 37PTH TC Handling and Fuel Loading
60855
Procedures
PTIP 30501-
5.11D
DSC Insertion into HSM-MX
60855
Procedures
PTIP 30501-
5.11F
DSC Retraction into Transfer Cask
60855
Radiation
Surveys
RPF 02-210-01
Survey M-
220121-8
DFW-S13, Tech Spec Survey of HSM-MX Front Face, Lower
Compartment
01/21/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855
Work Orders
WO 22-477380-
000
Preventative Maintenance - Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane
Calculations
AN-07-009
GOTHIC Model for CCW Pump Room Temperature
Calculations
EJ-M-018
Rate of Heat Up of RHR System in Recirculation Mode due
to Pump Heat with no CCW
Calculations
GL-M-007
Calculate Cooling Load in SR Pump Rooms Post LOCA:
1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1401 &
1406
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report
10012165
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10027276
Drawings
M-12BG01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
Drawings
M-12EG02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling
Water System
Drawings
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
Drawings
M-12EM02
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Drawings
M-12GL02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Building HVAC
Drawings
M-13BG02
Piping Isometric CVCS-Max. Charging Flow A & B Train -
Auxiliary Bldg.
Engineering
Changes
CCP 05927
Low Flow Cavitation Time Limit Exceeded on PEJ01A
Miscellaneous
M-10GL
System Description Auxiliary Building Ventilation System
Miscellaneous
M-721-00099
Instruction Manual for Residual Heat Removal Pump
W28
Procedures
CKL BG-120
Chemical and Volume Control System Normal Valve Lineup
Procedures
CKL EM-120
Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists
Procedures
DB-EMG-ES-03
SI Termination
Procedures
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Procedures
EMG E-1
Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EMG E-2
Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
24A
Procedures
EMG E-3
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Procedures
EMG ES-03
SI Termination
Procedures
STS EJ-100A
RHR System Inservice Pump A Test
Procedures
SYS EJ-120
Startup of a Residual Heat Removal Train
Procedures
SYS EJ-320
Placing RHR System in Safety Injection Standby Condition
Work Orders
2-477350-00
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10022531, 10024812, 10025040, 10025138, 10027144
Miscellaneous
AP 10-106
Fire Preplans
Miscellaneous
Breach
Authorization
Permit
17166, 17217
Miscellaneous
E-1F9905
Fire Hazard Analysis
Miscellaneous
Permit
2320, 12340, 12341, 16416, 16697, 17249
Miscellaneous
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix
Procedures
AP 10-101
Control of Transient Ignition Sources
Procedures
AP 10-103
Fire Protection Impairment Control
40A
Procedures
AP 10-104
Breach Authorization
Procedures
On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment
Procedures
OFN RP-017
Control Room Evacuation
Procedures
STN FP-440
Fire Door Visual Inspection
Procedures
STN FP-817A
Trip Act. Device Oper. Test for Bechtel Zones 100, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 112, 113, and 114
11C
Work Orders
23-146042-000, 23-486877-000, 23-486877-001
Miscellaneous
CPE #3 FR-H1
Exercise Summary
Procedures
STN SF-001
Control Rod Parking
Procedures
STS BG-100B
Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Pump Test
56A
Procedures
STS SF-001
Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification
Calculations
JE-M-003
Emergency Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Access Vaults Minimum
Temperature
Corrective Action
Condition Reports
10010613, 10011637, 10014687, 10021301, 10023115,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
10023358, 10023490, 10023690, 10024714, 10025080,
10025661, 10025714, 10025758, 10026147, 10026684,
10025470, 10025950, 10026106, 10027058, 10017625,
10027129, 10027136, 10027148
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10023622, 10027120, 10027313, 10027402
Drawings
E-11NG20
Low Voltage System Class 1E Motor Control Center
Summary
317
Drawings
E-13GK35A
Schematic Diagram SGK05 Recirculation Air Flow Fans and
Drawings
E-13GK35B
Schematic Diagram SGK05 Recirculation Air Flow Fans and
Drawings
E-13GK35C
Schematic Diagram SGK05 Recirculation Air Flow Fans and
Drawings
E-13GL05
Schematic Diagram Pump Room Coolers
Drawings
KD-7496
One Line Diagram
Miscellaneous
Equipment Performance Evaluation - C071 - NB0202
breaker found not charged
Miscellaneous
E-009B-00009
Instruction Manual for Siemens Type 3AF-GER Vertical Lift
Direct Replacement Vacuum Circuit Breakers
W06
Miscellaneous
E-018-00190
Instruction Manual for Motor Control Centers
W41
Miscellaneous
E-018-01029
Instruction Manual for Safety Related 5600 Series Motor
Control Center Cubicles
W01
Miscellaneous
M-022-00001
Station Blackout Diesel Generator Kohler Instruction Manual
W03
Miscellaneous
M-022-00002
Kohler Station Blackout Diesel Generator
W04
Miscellaneous
M-022-00018
Station Blackout Diesel Operations and Maintenance Manual
W01
Miscellaneous
RER No.
20038974
Reportability Determination for NB0202 SI Pump B breaker
found not charged
Procedures
Procedures
AI 23O-001
Functional Importance Determination
7A
Procedures
AP 02-003
Chemistry Specification Manual
Procedures
Heat Exchanger Program
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EDI 23M-020
Engineering Desktop Instruction Determining the Safety
Significance of Structures, Systems, and Components within
the Scope of Maintenance Rule
Procedures
MGE EOOP-11
Molded Case Circuit Breaker and Ground Fault Sensor
Testing
Procedures
MGE LT-001
Wiring Termination and Lug/Connector Installation
26B
Procedures
MPE E009Q-03
Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers
Procedures
MPM OS-001
Preventive Maintenance Lubricant Sampling and
Replenishment
27A
Procedures
STN KU-010
Station Blackout Diesel and Non-Safety AFW Pump Test
Procedures
STN NB-001B
B Train Breaker Operability and ECCS Pump Recirc
Procedures
SYS GK-201
Mitigating Actions for Inoperable SGK05 Train
Work Orders
WO 6006, 7366, 17-431704-000, 20-467159-000, 21-475640-
001, 21-475640-002, 21-475640-010, 21-476112-000, 22-
2572-000, 22-483529-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10024348, 10025470
Drawings
E-13GL05
Schematic Diagram Pump Room Coolers
Procedures
AI 22C-013
Protected Equipment Program
Procedures
EMG C-0
Loss of All AC Power
45A
Procedures
OFN NB-030
Loss of AC Emergency Bus NB01(NB02)
Procedures
SYS NB-201
Transferring NB01 Power Sources
Procedures
SYS NB-202
Transferring NB02 Power Sources
Work Orders
Calculations
AN-07-009
GOTHIC Model for CCW Pump Room Temperature
Calculations
EF-M-046
UHS Analysis with Initial Lake Temperature Up to 94
degrees F
Calculations
GL-M-007
Calculate Cooling Load in SR Pump Rooms Post LOCA:
1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1401 and
1406
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10017591, 10020251, 10021303, 10023022, 10024802,
10025246, 10025470, 10025366, 10025491, 10025950,
10025664, 10026106, 10026286
Drawings
E-13GK02D
Schematic Diagram Control Room A/C Unit Fan Control
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
AP 10-106
Fire Preplans
Procedures
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
AP 28-007
Nonconformance Control
10A
Procedures
AP 28-011
Resolving Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Impacting
SSCS
Procedures
Corrective Action Program
Procedures
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip of Safety Injection
Procedures
STN PE-037B
ESW Train B Heat Exchanger Flow and DP Trending
Work Orders
2-354664-000, 13-380154-007, 13-380154-010,
2-478811-000, 22-480069-000, 22-480994-000,
2-483479-000, 22-483480-002, 22-483530-000
Calculations
EG-M-046
Hydraulic Analysis of the Component Cooling Water System
for Break Flow Determination and Orifice Sizing
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10021612, 10024045, 10025470, 10025491, 10026957,
10027028, 10027036, 10027040, 10027313
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10026921, 10026959, 10027243
Drawings
M-11EG01
System Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water
Drawings
M-12EG01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling
Water System
Drawings
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
Miscellaneous
WCOP-02
Inservice Testing Program for Pumps, Valves, and Snubbers
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document
Procedures
AI 16C-007
Work Activity Planning
Procedures
Post Maintenance Testing Development
21A, 21B
Procedures
MPE FU-001
Fan Unit Maintenance
23A
Procedures
STN AL-201
Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Test
Procedures
STN EM-201
Safety Injection System Valve Test
Procedures
STN IC-252A
Calibration of RHR Pump A Mini Flow Valve Control Switch
8, 9
Procedures
STN IC-252B
Calibration of RHR Pump B Mini Flow Valve Control Switch
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
STN KU-010
Station Blackout Diesel and Non-Safety AFW Pump Test
Procedures
STS AL-102
MDAFW Pump B Inservice Pump Test
Procedures
STS EG-100A
Component Cooling Water Pumps A/C Inservice Pump
Testing
34A
Procedures
STS EG-100B
Component Cooling Water Pumps B/D Inservice Pump Test
30A
Procedures
STS EM-100A
Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test
43A
Procedures
STS PE-007
Periodic Verification of Motor Operated Valves
5A
Procedures
SYS NK-131
Energizing NK Buses
Work Orders
WO 13756, 13842, 17834, 7366, 16174, 17881, 19656,
15-408903-000, 17-427655-000, 18-445220-000,
20-460700-000, 21-468539-001, 21-468539-002,
21-475429-000, 22-480871-001, 22-481396-000,
2-482075-000, 22-482572-000, 22-483164-000,
2-483227-000, 22-483480-000, 22-483480-002,
2-484295-000, 23-483704-000, 23-484286-000,
23-484293-001, 23-485052-001, 23-485053-000,
23-485057-000, 23-486959-001, 23-486959-002,
23-487205-000, 23-488246-000, 23-488248-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10026590, 10026838
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 10010214, 10012071, 10014238, 10014482, 10015213,
10015213, 10015652, 10015653, 10015653, 10016703,
10017250, 10017940, 10018714, 10018748, 10018831,
10019497, 10019533, 10019805, 10019923, 10020039,
10020144, 10020160, 10020527, 10021452, 10021471,
10021474, 10022101, 10022981, 10023240, 10026863
Procedures
Access to Locked High or Very High Radiation Areas
29A
Procedures
RPP 02-105
Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
Procedures
RPP 02-205
Radiological Survey Frequency Requirements
Procedures
RPP 02-210
Radiation Survey Methods
Procedures
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
Procedures
RPP 02-405
Radiologically Controlled Area Access Control
Radiation
Surveys
M-20220519-3
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation pad RA down
post
05/19/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation
Surveys
M-20220606-3
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation pad area HRA
down post
06/06/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20220620-5
Digging dirt and asphalt for Electrical box
06/20/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20220628-2
Follow up survey for Entry into HRA with no dosimetry
06/28/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20221018-42
2000' CTMT 'D' Loop, BB8949D Dose rate alarm follow up
10/18/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20221030-29
CTMT 2068 dose alarm follow up
10/30/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20221030-3
CTMT B/C Secondary follow up for dose rate alarm
10/30/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20221109-5
Follow up survey for unsupported job, post Decon
11/09/2022
Radiation
Surveys
M-20230905-10
DFS - S1, Transport of the loaded DSC #2/TC from CLP to
09/05/2023
Radiation
Surveys
M-20230906-4
DFS, DSC #2 Post Blowdown/Dewatering Survey
09/06/2023
Radiation
Surveys
M-20230908-9
DFS - S17 HSM-MX Roof Vents for DSC #2 in HSM 6
position
09/08/2023
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 220010
General Access to HRA.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 221001
Operations Department RWP for pre-outage and outage
activities. RWP provides RCA access
for other support personnel working for Operations. RWP to
be used for RCA walk downs,
inspections, surveillances, valve line-ups, gauge hook-ups,
system venting & draining, and waste
processing activities.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 222600
Routine Outage Access (No High Radiation Areas Access).
RWP provides access for escorting
visitors, Security rounds, work groups without a department
RWP, or access for work approved by
Radiation Protection for this RWP.
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 224461
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Team activities. This RWP
includes valve operator and internals
work activities, inspection, repair, maintenance, boron
removal, valve adjustments, valve repacking,
valve internals overhaul, valve operator overhaul, and
diagnostic testing.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 226020
Reactor Vessel Head Lift Preparation and Post Head Set
Work Activities
Self-Assessments
NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, Radiological Hazard
Assessment
Self-Assessments CR 10013108
Self-Assessment for NRC Inspection 71124 Attachment 04
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10021371, 10021376, 10021398, 10022464, 10022476,
10022483, 10023126, 10023981
Miscellaneous
25% Variance External Exposure Review for nine employees
Miscellaneous
5-Year ALARA Dose Reduction Plan: 2023 - 2028
07/31/2023
Miscellaneous
Audit Report
- 25286
Wolf Creek Augmented Quality Audit of Landauer Inc.
2/06/2021
Procedures
RPP 03-210
Internal Exposure Calculations and Evaluations
17D
Procedures
RPP 03-406
RP Dosimetry/Records
Radiation
Surveys
M-20230909-3
HSM-MX Front Face, Upper Compartment-Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation
09/08/2023
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report
10014238
71151
Miscellaneous
22 Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Annual
Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/27/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
Surveillance - January - February 16, 2023
2/20/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
Surveillance - January 1-January 16, 2023
01/17/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
Surveillance - January 1 - April 17, 2023
04/24/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
Surveillance - January 1 - March 15, 2023
03/15/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
06/19/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Surveillance - January 1-June 15, 2023
71151
Miscellaneous
STN CH-024
Cumulative Doses and Projected Doses - Quarterly /Yearly
Surveillance - January - July 17, 2023
07/18/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
236, 75795, 75821, 81790, 81818, 10008050, 10023423,
10023559, 10024686, 10025432
Drawings
M-12AL01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater
System
Miscellaneous
23-Pre-Ex-01
Emergency Planning Drill
09/11/2023
Miscellaneous
E-025-00003
Limitorque Design Information
W13
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document
Procedures
AI 28A-100
Condition Report Resolution
Procedures
Motor Operated Valve Program
4A
Procedures
AP 28-011
Resolving Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Impacts
SSCS
Procedures
Corrective Action Program
Procedures
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Procedures
EMG FR-H1
Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
Procedures
MGE LT-001
Torque Switch Balancing
7B
Procedures
MGE LT-098
Limitorque Geared Limit Switch Overhaul
Procedures
OFN MA-001
Load Rejection or Turbine Trip
27