ML20203K321

Insp Repts 50-317/86-10 & 50-318/86-10 on 860616-20. Violations Noted:Maint on Steam Generator Level Transmitter 1 Lt 1124C Unclassified & Nonconformance Repts Per QA Procedure 17 Not Issued

ML20203K321
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	08/01/1986
From:	Eapen P, Harris D, Hunter J, Meils E, Napuda G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203K315	List: ML20203K309 ML20203K316 ML20203K321
References
50-317-86-10, 50-318-86-10, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8608200197
Download: ML20203K321 (20)

See also: IR 05000317/1986010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos. 50-317/86-10

50-318/86-10

Docket Nos. 50-317

50-318

License Nos. DPR-53

DPR-69

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

P. O. Box 1475

Baltimore, Maryland 21203

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Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2

Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland

Inspection Conducted: June 16-20, 1986

Inspectors: M 8//k

g Na IFda, ead Reador Engineer ' /date

@huh~ r III, Reactor Engineer

M

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g/  ! /f6/

D. la bri ,J RC Consultant date

FD K & #lfn.s /5

E. Meils, Consultant ' /date

Approved by: .

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Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chief ' date

QA Section, OB, DRS

I_nspection

n Summary: Special announced inspection on June 16-20, 1986 (Combined

Reoort No. 50-317/86-10 and 50-318/86-10)

Areas Inspected: Licensee's actions to address the concerns identified in NRC

Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of Equipment Classification, Vendor Inter-

face, Post Maintenance Testing, Plant Surveillance and QA/QC overview.  !

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Results: One violation (failure to follow procedures) and one unresolved item I

was identified. '

8608200197 860912-

PDR ADOCK 05000317

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1.0 Persons Contacted

Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E)

• E. R. Bauer, Engineer Analyst

• M. E. Bowman, Technical Services Engineering

J. Carroll, Quality Assurance General Supervisor (GS)

• S. R. Cowne, Licensing Engineer

G. Dare, Senior Quality Control Inspector

R. DeAtley, Quality Assurance Engineer

R. Douglas, Manager, Quality Assurance and Staff Services

A. Edwards, Administrative Services Assistant General Supervisor (AGS)

J. Lemons, Manager, Nuclear Operations

• R. M. Lloyd, AGS Material & Equipment Support

• D. S. Marinari, Senior Engineer

• A. Marion, Senior Engineer

P. McGrane, Technical Librarian

M. Michalski, Quality Assurance Auditor

B. Montgomery, Maintenance Supervisor

• J. Moreira, GS-Engineering and Construction ,

J. Parran, Quality Assurance Receiving Inspector

• W. E. Putman, Senior Quality Assurance Auditor

M. Roberson, Quality Control and Support Services General Supervisor

L. Russell, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

• L. E. Salyards, Principle Engineer Licensing

• L. A. Sundquist, GS-QC & Support

R. Sydnor, Senior Systems Engineer

• A. R. Thornton, Plant & Project Engineer

• K. Umphrey, Supervisor

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)

*T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector

• D. Trimble, Resident Inspector

• L. E. Tripp, Section Chief, Project Section 3A

The inspectors also contacted other administrative and technical licensee

personnel during the course of the inspection.

• denotes those present at the June 20, 1986 exit meeting

2.0 Inspection Summary

2.1 Background

The reactor trip system, as part of the reactor protection system,

is fundamental to reactor safety for all nuclear power reactor

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designs. Transient and accident analyses are predicated on the

assumption that the reactor trip system will automatically initiate

reactivity control systems on demand to assure that fuel design

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limits are not exceeded. The design and regulatory philosophies

for attaining the high reliability required of the reactor trip

system have been primarily on the use of redundancy, periodic

testing, and quality assurance. In February 1983 the Salem Nuclear

Power Station experienced two failures of the reactor trip system

on demand. Regulatory and industry task forces were formed to

determine the safety significance and generic implications of the.

events. Based on these findings, certain actions were required of

all licensees. These actions, transmitted in Generic Letter 83-28,

fell into 4 areas:

(1) post-trip review,

(2) equipment classification and vendor interface,

(3) post-maintenance testing, and

(4) reactor trip system reliability improvements.

BG&E submitted their response to Generic Letter 83-28 in letters

listed in Attachment A. This inspection included the areas of

equipment classification and vendor interface, post-maintenance

testing, and QA/QC interface.

2.2 Inspection Results

One violation with multiple examples and one unresolved item were

identified as detailed in paragraphs 3.2d, 3.2e, 5.2a, and 5.2c.

Except for the violation and uniesolved item, the licensee's actions

were found to adequately address the concerns of the Generic Letter 83-28 and were consistent with their commitment in the letters listed

in Attachment A.

3.0 Equipment Classification

3.1 Program Review

The inspectors reviewed the applicable documents, listed in Attach-

ment A, and determined that the Equipment Classification Program

addressed the following:

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Safety-related components are identified as such in written

procedures for procurement, maintenance, and modification.

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Management oversight of source documentation for the desig-

nation of safety-related systems and components.

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Corporate level procedures for safety-related component

procurement, maintenance, and modification.

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Periodic Quality Assurance audits of activities impacting

safety-related equipment.

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Corrective action program for safety-related equipment.

3.2 Program Implementation

The system used by the licensee to identify safety-related items is

the Q-List and its attachments including " red-lined" P&ID drawings,

the list of class IE equipment and the Q-List interpretations. The

Instrument Index provides a list of components such as transmitters,

control devices, recorders, control valves, power supplies, indicators

and sensing elements and identifies which components are classified

as safety-related. The Instrument Index is referenced by and used in

conjunction with the Q-List to determine component classification.

Items are treated as safety-related when there is a doubt about their

classification. The licensee is currently updating and revising the

Q-List and its attachments to assure that safety-related components /

systems are properly classified. This update is scheduled to be

complete by the end of 1986.

A field comparison of system mechanical drawings and electrical

elementary diagrams versus installed equipment was performed. From

this comparison, components were selected to verify the effectiveness

of the licensee's Equipment Classification Program implementation.

For each component selected, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of

safety classification, procurement, receipt, storage, and handling

activities as discussed in the following sections of this report.

a. Reactor Trip System (RTS)

The Chairman of the Q-List committee provided the Q-List for

review. The RTS is specified as safety-related, Class IE.

During the walkdown of the system, components were compared

with the applicable plant drawings. All components were

labeled, cables entering switchgear were tagged and cable

separation was maintained. The inspector reviewed 16

Maintenance Orders (M0s) listed in Attachment A. The Safety

classification of the systems and components of these M0s

were consistent with the Q-List.

No violations were identified.

b. Class IE Electrical

Undervoltage and degraded voltage relays were reviewed for

proper safety classification. The selected components were

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identified during a walkdown with the Unit 2 electrical mainte-

nance supervisor. The supervisor provided information on cable

routing to verify separation criteria. Facility Change Request

(FCR) #86-15 was reviewed for proper classification of up graded

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components. This FCR is issued to change out the degraded

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voltage relays and correct relay drift. This work will be

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completed in the third quarter of 1986.

No violations were identified. ,

c. Safety Injection System

The inspector selected the following components during the walk-

downs of the Unit 1 High Pressure Safety Injection and Unit 2

Low Pressure Safety Injection systems:

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l Unit 1 Unit 2

j HPSI 12 - HPSI Pump LPSI 22 - LPSI Pump

1-MOV-655 - Motor operator 2-CV-306 - Control valve

j operator

j 1-MOV-656 - Motor operator 2-FE-306 - Flow element

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1-MOV-626 - Motor operator 2-MOV-635 - Motor operator

1-MOV-627 - Motor operator 2-SI-434 - Valve

1-FE-321 - Flow element 2-SI-435 - Valve

i 1-PT-301 X,Y - Pressure 2-I/P-306 - Controller

l Transmitter

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The Q-List and its attachments and the Instrument Index were

! reviewed to verify the safety classification of the selected

i components. The inspector also verified that the above com-

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ponents were correctly classified in the Maintenance Orders and

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Maintenance Procedures listed in Attachment A. The component

identification numbers were compared with those on the drawings

! and no discrepancies were found.

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During the system walkdowns, the inspector noted a Maintenance

! Request tag (4642) on valve 1-MOV-626 to identify a packing

i leak. However, this MR was not on the computer listing and the -

licensee could not locate the documentation for this Maintenance

Request. -A new Maintenance Order was generated to ensure com-

pletion and tracking of required work. The licensee informed

the inspector that they had previously identified similar

, problems. For example, the Nuclear operations department l

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monthly report for February 1986 reported that the status of 60

{ Maintenance Requests (MRs) were compared with the corresponding

l Maintenance Order and discrepancies were found in approximately

l 25% of the MRs. QC inspection reports 0-86-067 and 0-86-444

, also identified discrepancies in the closeout of MRs. The

licensee updates the status of MR tags through inspections and

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walkdowns, on a routine basis,

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The inspectors also noted, during a walkdown, that the packing

on valves 2-CV-306 and 2-SI-536 were leaking. There was boric

acid buildup on these valves. Valve 2-FE-306 had a catch basket

installed below it to collect leakage. However, there were no

MR tags on these components. The inspector informed the licen-

see of these deficiencies and they initiated corrective action

by generating MRs.

While reviewing the Q-List and its attachments and the Instru-

ment Index, the inspector verified that the above components

were properly classified except that 1-PT-301 X and Y were not

classified as safety-related. However, 1-PT-301-Z was classi-

fied as safety-related. Valve controller 2-I/P-306, a safety-

related component, was identified as nonsafety in the Instrument

Index. The above discrepancies were brought to the licensee's

attention. The licensee informed the inspector that these

discrepancies were previously identified by the Q-List upgrading

project and will be resolved in the next revision of the Q-List.

The inspector had no further questions.

The inspector reviewed selected MOs (listed in Attachment A) for

proper safety classification, QC coverage, post-maintenance test

requirements, maintenance and test equipment used, spare parts

used and appropriate reviews and approvals. It was noted that

although the 2-I/P-306 controller was classified as nonsafety-

related on M0 205-170-868A and the Instrument Index listed.the

component as nonsafety-related, the spare components utilized

were purchased as safety-related equipment and received appro-

priate considerations. The balance of the M0s adequately

addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector had no

l further questions.

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The inspected components of LPSI 22 and HPSI 12 were installed

in accordance with plant drawings. Control circuit routings

were in compliance with separation criteria. All components

were labeled and cables tagged.

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d. Instruments and Controls

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The following components of 'A' reactor protection channel for

pressurizer pressure were examined in the field.

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Component Description

1-X 102A Pressurizer pressure transmitter 1-PT

102A power supply

1-E/E 102A RPS/ESFAS signal isolator

XA 9 Bistable switch

XA 10 Bistable switch

1-PI 201A Pressure indicator

ATU 7 Thermal margin / low pressure trip unit

ATU 6 High pressurizer pressure trip unit

K1,K2,K3,K4 Reactor trip relays

The field walkdown verified that all components identified were

properly and clearly marked in the field, and corresponded to

the current revision of system loop diagrams.

The licensee's Q-List properly designated the Reactor Protection

System (RPS) and the Emergency Safety Features Actuation System

(ESFAS), of which the above components are a subset, as safety-

related (i.e., quality class "Q").

The following components of tne Unit 1 High Pressure Safety

Injection (HPSI) system and Unit 2 Lov Pressure Safety Injection

(LPSI) system were examined during a field walkdown.

Component Description

HPSI

1-HS 301Y HPSI pump 22 hand switch

1-HS 3655 Valve 1-MOV 655 hand switch

1-HS 3656 Valve 1-MOV 656 hand switch

1-HS 3626 Valve 1-MOV 626 hand switch.

1-FI 321 Flow indicator

1-FT 321 Flow transmitter

LPSI

2-HS 302Y LPSI pump 22 hand switch

2-FT 306 Flow transmitter

2-FY 306 Flow integrator

2-FIC 306 Valve 2-C 306 flow indicating controller

2-HS 306 Valve 2-CV 306 hand switch

2-HS 3635 Valve 2-MOV 635 hand switch

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The field walkdown verified that all components listed above

corresponded to the current revision of the piping and instru-

ment diagrams of the systems. The licensee's Q-List properly

designated these components as safety-related (i.e., quality

class "Q").

Maintenance Orders (M0s) were examined for selected components

of the RPS, HPSI, and LPSI to verify proper safety classifica-

tion of repairs and spare parts. The M0s reviewed are listed

in Attachment A. In all cases, safety classification of work

and spare parts used were correct and in agreement with the

licensee's Q-List and supplementary Instrument Index.

The examination of the above M0s identified the following

examples of a violation:

Functional Test Procedure (FTI) 104 instructs the technician to

refer to the Class 1E equipment list (Appendix C of the Q-List).

If the instrument is on the list, the technician is then directed

to Calvert Cliffs Instruction (CCI) 208, Qualification Mainten-

a..ce Program. CCI-208 contains special maintenance requirements

for an instrument to maintain its environmental qualification.

The technician is also required to record the component quali-

fication number on the FTI-104 data sheet. This was not done

in any of the cases reviewed (M0 Nos. 205-347-209A, 205-141-984A,

and 106-070-337A) for 1E components. The failure to comply with

FTI-104 is the first example of a violation (50-317/86-10-01 and

50-318/86-10-01).

The licensee attributed this problem to the lack of clarity

in FTI-104 and nine other FTIs. The licensee recently revised

two additional FTIs to clarify the interface with CCI-208 and

more clearly state the need to incorporate the qualification

maintenance requirements of the CCI for the work performed. The

licensee further stated that personnel involved in the perform-

ance of qualification maintenance would be instructed in the

requirements of CCI-208 by June 27, 1986, and that an interim

change to FTI-104, clarifying the interface with CCI-208, would

be made by August 27, 1986. The schedule for making permanent

changes to FTI-104 and the other nine FTIs was pending.

The Steam Generator (SG) wide range level transmitters are

required to operate in the post-accident environment for both

Auxiliary Feedwater initiation and control room indication.

However, these transmitters are not on the IE equipment list

(Q-List, Appendix C) and maintenance on SG 11 level transmitter

ILT 1124C, under M0 206-112-327A, was performed as non-EQ. This

is the second example of c violation (50-317/86-10-01 and

50-318/86-10-01).

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e. Purchasing and Storage

Purchase Orders (P0s) associated with replacement parts identi-

fied on Maintenance Oiders (M0s) (see Attachment A for'a list of

both) were reviewed to verify the following:

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Proper safety classification

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Environmental requirements

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Seismic category

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National codes'(e.g., IEEE, ASME) criteria

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Applicability of 10 CFR 21

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Shelf life provisions

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Documentation (e.g., Certificate of Conformance, test

reports)

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Vendor technical information (e.g., manuals, storage

requirements)

The main warehouse was toured to determine the adequacy of clean-

ness, storage environment, item identification and traceability,

access restrictions, shelf life control and other aspects of

stcrage conditions for items similar to those associated with

the reviewed P0s.

It was noted that shelf life expiration was annotated on.the

"QA Accept" tags attached to items. Items subject to shelf life

control were stored in a temperature and humidity controlled

s ' dark' room.

No violations were identified, however, an unresolved item is

discussed below.

The shelf. life control program has not yet included those com-

ponents that contain nonmetallic internal parts subject to aging

deterioration. The adeo;acy and timeliness of identification of

such stored items and toe?.c inclusion into the shelf life control

program constitute Ad urn.;olved item (50-317/86-10-02 and

50-318/86-10-02)

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4.0 Vendor Interface

4.1 Program Review

The licensee has identi.fied approximately'1000 vendor technical manuals

in their possession. A review of these manuals was instituted and

approximately 85% of the manuals have been updated. The review was

prioritized as follows:

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1) safety-related needed as soon as possible,

2) nonsafety related needed as soon as possible,

3) other safety-related, and

4) other nonsafety-related; and user classified as a) manuals in

possession that were needed, b) manuals not possessed that are

needed, and c) manuals cut needed.

A centralized library has been established which contains a master

(not circulated) and two copies (can be borrowed) of those manuals

determined to be needed. Other controlled copies are issued to users

having a need and who must return pages/ sections for which they have

received updated information. Manuals are indexed by vendor name,

assigned number and component nomenclature.

Procedure CCI-1220 requires that snyone receiving vendor technical

information (VTI) forward same to the Technical Library. The library

logs the VTI and distributes it to engineering groups for review and

disposition. The results of engireering review are returned to the

Technical Library for implementing the disposition (e.g., updating

a manual). i

The program has recently been revised to assure vendor notification

when the licensee identifies any discrepancies and/or inaccuracies

in the vendor information. Also, the Technical Library had issued a

memorandum to engineering and plant project supervisors requesting

that an effort be initiated to establish contact with those vendors

who have not and normally do not provide updated VTI.

From the above, the inspector concluded that the licensee's control

of VTI closely parallels the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee

(NUTAC) recommendations. The NUTAC proposals are currently under NRC

review.

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No violations were identified. j

4.2 Program Implementation

a. Reactor Trip Switchgear

The inspector reviewed the General Electric vendor technical j

manual (Revision 0) for vendor bulletin interface. The system

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engineer has the. responsibility for reviewing the service

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advisories letters and incorporating applicable information in

the appropriate procedures. . The inspector noted that the system

for implementation was satisfactory. '

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b. Safety Injection Systems

The inspector reviewed applicable Preventive Maintenance cards

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and _ Facility Change Requests (FCRs) listed in Attachment- A for

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references and incorporation of vendor technical information-

(e.g., reports, manuals and instructions). The inspector deter-

mined that the documents reviewed' referenced vendor information

where applicable.

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The FCRs were reviewed for proper safety classification, perform-

ance of safety analysis, Technical Specification applicability,

purchase order component classification, QA/QC coverage, spare

parts classification, drawing change requests and required review

and approvals. For example; FCR #84-1032 was a vendor recom-

mended change initiated by Velan Valve Corporation to change the

disc material of certain safety injection valves. The reviewed

FCRs were determined to be adequate. The inspector had no

further questions. .

c. Instrumentation and Controls

)! Instrument functional test and calibration procedures listed in

Attachment A were reviewed to determine adequate incorporation

of vendor supplied information. All appropriate vendor infor-

j mation was found to be properly incorporated into the applicable

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procedures. Vendor manuals were administratively controlled and

were verified to pertain to the model number of the installed

component.

No violations were identified.

5.0 Post Maintenance and Surveillance Testing

5.1 program Review '

Procedures in Attachment A were reviewed and the-inspectors deter-

mined that the following were addressed during the performance.of

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maintenance:

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Written procedures provide for initiating requests for post-

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maintenance testing.

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Criteria and responsibilities for review and' approval of l

maintenance.

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Criteria and responsibilities for the basis of safety-related/ l

nonsafety-related activity designation.

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Criteria and responsibilities for inspection of post-maintenance

testing.

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Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance.

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Administrative controls for documentation of maintenance

activities.

5.2 Program Implementation

Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)-14, " Plant Maintenance," defines

the responsibilities associated with preventive and corrective main-

tenance, and modifications performed on safety related components.

CCI-200, " Maintenance Requests," establishes the responsibilities

and requirements for preparation and processing MRs required by

QAP-14. The MRs require the specification of post-maintenance test

requirements. CCI-201, " Maintenance Procedures," provides responsi-

bility for writing procedures whenever maintenance on safety-related

components is outside the scope of routine maintenance. The mainte-

nance procedures include sections addressing post-maintenance testing

prior to return to service, and ensuring lunctional acceptability of

the components. Surveillance tests are also often utilized to satisfy

post-maintenance operability testing pricr to returning the component

to service,

a. Reactor Trip System (RTS)

The inspector reviewed those MOs for the RTS listed in Attach-

ment A. Post-Maintenance Testing had met the requirements for

operation of the RTS. Calibration sheecs for selected measuring

ard test equipment (M&TE) used were reviewed and the results are

discussed below:

Item #8731 Digital Volt Meter (DVM), calibration sheet 1/8/86,

(last calibration 10/21/85). The 'as found' column was blank,

indicating that the calibration could not be verified from the

last calibration date. The usage log identified that this DVM

was used in the safety-related tests listed below:

Date Test

10/22/85 STP-M-150-2

10/23/85 STP-M-514-2

10/28/85 2-52-I-R-28

10/31/85 562-2

10/31/85 535-2

11/02/85 STP-M-510-2

11/04/85 STP-M-525-2

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Item #10278 DVM, calibration sheet 4/14/86, (last calibra-

tion 3/11/86). It was noted on the calibration sheet 'DC

amps out of cal.' The usage log sheet indicated that the

DC amp scale was used for STP-M-672-1 on 3/17/86.

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Item #10273 DVM, calibration sheet 6/5/85, the 'as found'

column was blank. Comments listed on the calibration sheet

noted ' meter not zeroing and reading way out.' The usage

log sheets showed that this DVM was used in the following

safety-related tests.

Date Test

5/16/85 M0 205-105-024A

5/16/85 STP-M-210B-2

5/16/85 STP-M-510

Procedure QAP 17, part 12.1, requires the issuance of a Noncon-

formance Report (NCR) when calibration problems are identified

for M&TE. The inspector requested the NCRs issued for the above

DVMs.

The licensee had no documented evidence indicating that the

required NCRs were issued for these three DVMs. These failures

to initiate NCRs constitute the third example of the violation

(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).

The inspector reviewed STP-M-511-1, which is a channel response

time test for the RTS. It was noted that the results were

within the limits of the Technical Specifications. However,

the original test had 15 places where data had been revised by

' whiting out' the original information with no indication of who

had changed the data or when it was changed. This is not in

conformance with QAP-7 that requires that the person making

changes and the date be documented. This is another example of

the violation (50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).

The performance of STP-M-200-1, Revision 5, was observed by an

inspector on 6/18/86. The test director failed to follow the

procedure step II.B.2 in that after tripping the first set of

breakers, the test director notified the control room to close

the breakers before he had checked the undervoltage (UV) device

armature, to assure the breaker would not ' trip free.' This

is the fourth example of violation (50-317/86-10-01 and

50-318/86-10-01).

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b. Class IE Electrical System

The inspector-reviewed STP-M-522-1, Revision 4, performed 5/1/86.

One relay was found to be out of Technical Specification limits

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and was recalibrated. The system as a whole was within the

limits of the technical specifications and satisfactory.

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c. Safety Injection Systems

The inspector reviewed M0s listed in Attachment A for_ adequate

post-maintenance testing. Surveillance test procedures (STP)

and completed surveillance tests performed as post-maintenance

tests, listed in Attachment A, were also reviewed for technical

adequacy, completeness, acceptance criteria, maintenance and

test equipment tracking, corrective action and appropriate

supervisory review and approval. Except for STP-0-65-2 per-

formed 12/16/85, the M0s and STPs reviewed were complete and ,

adequately addressed the attributes listed above. The inspector

noted that STP-0-65-2 performed 12/16/85 was missing information

on the cover sheet regarding test results and that all supple-

mental data did not properly identify the person providing the

data or the date. This is an additional example of violation

(50-317/86-10-01 and 50-318/86-10-01).

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The inspector reviewed Preventive Maintenance (PM) data cards,

(listed in Attachment A) for QC coverage requirements, refer-

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ences to vendor information, approval requirements, technical

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specifications restrictions and references, and plant condition

requirements. The PM data cards addressed the above attributes,

where applicable.

d. Instrumentation and Control

Maintenance Orders (MOs) for RPS and Safety Injection systems

were reviewed to verify adequacy of post-maintenance testing.

In all cases reviewed, post-maintenance testing was found to

be adequate and complete. The M0s reviewed are listed in

Attachment A.

e. Trending

The system engineer provided records for trending breaker

response times. The information included any work performed

on the breaker (s) relating to maintenance and new component

installation.

The performance test group has programs to monitor system

trending such as oil sampling, vibration monitoring, and pump

performance.

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6.0 QA/QC Interface

A recent reorganization has transferred the QC function from the QA group

to the operations or maintenance groups as appropriate. Two QC supervisors

and twenty-one inspectors report to a Quality Control and Support Services

General Supervisor who in turn reports to the Nuclear Maintenance Manager.

One QC Supervisor and five inspectors report to a Quality Control and

Support General Supervisor who reports to the Manager, Nuclear Operations.

Confidential organization charts, position descriptions and department

Purpose and Functions Authority and Responsibility Assignments were

reviewed and discussed with the General Supervisors and Managers.

Maintenance QC has developed written criteria that establish priorities

for the overview of work. Priority I requires 100% overview and includes

Emergency Diesel Generator, Main Steam Isolation Valve, Main Feed Pump

Controls and Turbine Rotor Inspection work. Priority II requires 50-100%

overview and includes Snubber, Machine and Weld Shop, other Valve Overhauls

and Pump Overhauls and Repacking work. Priority III requires 0-50% over-

view of Valve Repacking, Packing Adjustments, Grouting and Painting work.

l The QC Supervisors stated that notification was received on work for 2162

.

i

Maintenance Orders (M0s) between January I and June 18,19Eo. The 294 M0s

for which QC overview was waived represented approxiraately 13% of the total

work (i.e., 87% of work was monitored by QC).

1

I

Operations QC' reviews the monthly schedules for various activities and

then choose those they wish to observe, review or independently verify.

This includes log checks, plant evolutions, plant surveillance tests and

independent verification of valve lineups.

Based on an analysis and evaluation of the above, it was determined that

no apparent conflict existed between QC independence and the budget / cost /

schedule function.

Two QA Supervisors and twenty-five technical persons report to a Quality

knurance General Supervisor who reports to the Quality Assurance and Staff

Services Manager. The latter individual reports directly to the Nuclear

Energy Vice President. The duties of the QA Department include review of

Purchase Orders, vnndor evaluation and surveillance, and internal auditing.

Two audit packages and the 1986 audit schedule were reviewed to determine

the following:

--

Checklists were developed and used

--

Identified discrepancies were followed up '

--

Appropriate attributes and characteristics addressed the functional

,

'

areas audited

--

Conduct of audits generally adhered to the schedule

1

No violations were identified.

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16

7.0 Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violations.

An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 3.2.e.

8.0 Management Meetings

Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection

at an entrance meeting conducted June 16, 1986. The findings of the in-

spection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course

of the inspection. An exit meeting was conducted June 20, 1986 at the

conclusion of the inspection (see Paragraph I for attendees) at which time

the findings were presented to licensee management. At no time during

this inspection was written material provided to the licensee.

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ATTACHMENT A

1.0 References / Requirements

NRC Generic Letter 83-28, " Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events"

10 CFR 50, Appendix B

Technical Specifications

FSAR

Quality Assurance Program

ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the

Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants

ANSI N45.2.2-1972, Packing, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of

Items for Nuclear Power Plants

ANSI N45.2.12-1977, Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance

Programs for Nuclear Power Plants

NRC Safety Evaluation Regarding Generic Letter 83-28 Items, 11/21/85

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI,1974 edition with addenda

BG&E letter of 11/5/83, Subject: Required Actions based on Generic

Letter 83-28

BG&E transmittal of 2/29/84, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic

Letter 83-28

BG&E letter of 1/18/85, Subject: Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 83-28

2.0 Documents Reviewed

2.1 Procedures / Tests

CCI-200I Nuclear Maintenance System, Change 2, 4/1/85

CCI-208B Qualification Maintenance Program, 2/3/86

CCI-2110 Preventive Maintenance Program, Change 6, 6/6/86

FTI-104 Transmitter Calibration / Calibration Check, Revision 4, 5/8/85

STP No. M2108-1 RPS Functional Test, Revision 26, 4/23/86, performed

on 5/15/86

STP No, M220-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System

Functional Test, Revision 7, performed on 6/4/85

STP No. M510-1 RPS Channel Calibration Check, Revision 12,

performed on 5/3/85

STP No, M520-1 ESFAS Calibration, Revision 7, 4/10/85, performed on

5/13/85

STP No. M200-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time

STP No. M511-1 Reactor Trip Switchgear response time '

STP No. M522 4kV relay calibration

FTE-57 Reactor Trip Switchgear Preventive Maintenance

CCI-104A Surveillance Test Program, Change 1, 6/1/86

CCI-309A Locked Valves, Change 2, 9/27/85

CCI-122C Control of Technical Manuals, Change 1, 8/24/84

CCI-1220 Control of Technical Manuals, Proposed Revision

QAP-7 Records Management, Revision- 19, 6/4/86

QAP-14 Plant Maintenance, Revision 29, 1/10/86

. -

Attachment A 2

QAP-15 Changes, Tests & Experiments, Revision 45, 6/4/86

QAP-16 Surveillance Testing, Revision 16, 1/1/86

QAP-28 Control of Items Covered by QA Program, Revision 23, 1/1/86

1-52-M-2M-1 #11 LPSI Pumps, Revision 1, 6/6/85

1-52-M-A-4 #12 HPSI Pump, Revision 6, 3/27/85

1-52-M-R-5 1-MOV-4144, Revi sion 0, 8/30/85

1-52-M-R-31 1-MOV-652, Revision 0, 9/4/85

STP-0-67-2 Check Valve Operability Verification, Revision 14,

11/28/84 results of 4/27/85, 5/2/85 and 5/5/85

STP-0-65-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations,

Revision 26, 3/6/35 results of 5/28/85

STP-0-65-2 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Operations,

Revision 28, 10/2/85 results of 12/16/85

STP-0-93-1 Locked Valve Verification, Revision 20, 2/28/85

STP-0-73-1 ESF Equipment Performance Test, Revision 23, 11/5/85

STP-0-66-1 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification-Shutdown,

Revision 18, 12/4/85

STP-0-62-1 Monthly Valve Position Verification, Revision 25, 2/5/86

2.2 Vendor Manuals

ITT Barton Installation & Operation Manual, Model 764, Differential

Pressure Electronic Transmitter, 9/83

GEI-50299A, Revision 0, GE Technical Manual for Reactor Trip.

Switchgear

Ingersoll. Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 1 Installation, Operations and

'

Maintenance, 4/8/85

Ingersoll Rand LPSI Pumps Unit 2 Installation, Operations and

Maintenance, 2/24/86

Limitorque SMB Installation and Maintenance Manual

GE HK-2-25 Breaker Manual GEI-50 299A

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2.3 Procedures

&

DESP-3, Establishment and Control of the List of Safety-Related

Items, Reviston 0

DESP-8, Equipment Qualification, Revision 1

DESP-10, Control of Calvert Cliffs Equipment Data Base, Revision 0

2.4 Prints / Drawings

60-933-B, Sh. IA 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0 '

60-933-B, Sh. 18 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0

60-933-B, Sh. 1C 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0

60-933-B, Sh. 10 11 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Diagram, Revision 0

12125-16, Sh. 8 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3

12125-16, Sh. 10 RTS Breaker Control Circuit, Revision 3

63-005-E Meter & Relay Diagram 4kV System, Revision 11

6750-M590-17-2 RTS One-Line Diagram, Sh. 3

IE76, Sh. 2 LPSI 22 Control Diagram, Revision 9

IE76, Sh. 4 HPSI 12 Control Diagram, Revision 9

. . . - .

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Attachment A 3

IE7, Sh. 1 UV Relay Control Diagram, Revision 10

62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems

M-462, Sh. 1 of.3, P&ID

62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems

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M-462, Sh. 2 of 3, P&ID

62-257-E Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems

M-74, Sh.1 of 3, P&ID

2.5 Maintenance Orders

205-347-209A ILIC 1123D, Steam Generator (S/G) 12 Level

203-001-256A AJ2, RPS Channel B Variable Output Power Transformer

205-141-984A ILT 1113A, S/G 11 Level

205-267-695A BBE, RPS Channel B Thermal Margin Calculator

205-274-941A IJIO11, XC933 Average RPS Internal ASI

206-133-256A AAG3, RPS Channel C Trip Unit 3 (TV-3) Low Flow

206-134-860A CCG4, RPS Channel C TU-4

206-112-327A ILT 1124C S/G 11 Level

206-134-876A AAF, Channel A S/G 11 ASGT

205-064-545A 2-PIA 102A, Pressure Indication / Annunciation

205-064-550A 2-PIA 102C, Pressure Indicator / Annunciation

, 206-070-337A 2-PT 102A,B,C,D, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters

205-358-494A RTS breaker will not close from control room

.

205-131-751A RTS replace lug on pushbutton

i 205-204-655A RTS replace defective UV coil

205-087-472A RTS breaker wouldn't-trip on UV signal

206-023-245A RTS breaker would not close

.: 205-036-499A RTS test UV in place for response times

205-147-186A RTS repair or replace trip unit

205-067-681A RTS ensure breaker trips on demand

206-066-274A RTS remove and install springs

203-001-025A RTS replace overcurrent trip device

205-085-344A RTS install NC pushbutton

205-149-237A RTS breaker will not close

, 205-087-439A RTS replace HFA relay

i 205-199-573A RTS UV coil did not pick up trouble shoot

206-056-977A RTS breaker failed to close

203-001-035A RTS breaker will not close properly

205-294-721A RTS perform GE SAL

203-003-330A,B,C 1-SI-450

203-003-388A 1-PT-3014

205-162-640A HPSI Pump #12 coupling bolts

205-229-677A 1-SI-627 MOV

) 206-085-735A 2-CV-306 Shutdown cooling flow' control

j 203-001-424A Repair CV-306

203-001-524A Troubleshoot & Repair SI-306-FT

2-SI-635 repack

'

203-003-009B

205-029-189A 2-SI-440 packing

205-035-450A 2-SI-440 repack on back seat

205-035-455A Breakers 20417 & 20416 for MOV-635

.

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Attachment A 4

205-119-412A HPSI MOVs 2-616,626,617,627

205-141-001A 2 M0V-615,625,635,645

205-145-168A MOV 626 set limits

205-150-287A 2-HS-3626

205-155-437A 1-HS-3626

205-170-868A LPSI 2-I/P-306 Recalibrate

205-247-197A HPSI Pump #12 loose screw

205-304-036A 1-MOV-626 repack

205-304-037A 1-MOV-627 repack

205-347-212A FY-306 eratic output

206-064-240A 2-SI-306 packing

206-078-530A Calibrate FIC-306

2.6 Miscellaneous

Relay setting sheets for under voltage and degraded voltage relays

FCR #86-15 Facility Change Request for up grading degraded voltage

relays

FCR #84-1032, Safety Injection System Valves, 12/14/84

FCR #83-102, HPSI Pump #22, 1/25/84

2.7 Purchase Orders

44784-EX, Power Supply

62346-GX, Barton Transmitters

59558-EX and 59560-EX, Linear Amplifier Module Board

72466-GX, Barton Transmitter 0-Rings

67817-GX, Packing

38849-GX, Electro pneumatic Transducers

75187-GX, Valve Packing

49551-EX, Relays

54284-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Terminals

61254-EX, Reactor Trip Breaker Cutoff Switch

70492-EX, 125 Vdc Closing Coil

2.8 Audits

2-31-85, Procurement and Storage

86-14, Plant Maintenance Activities