ML20067D494

Requests That Proprietary Version of Presentation Matls from 940222 Meeting on AP600 Design Changes Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790

ML20067D494
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	02/22/1994
From:	Liparulo N WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Borchardt R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML19304A011	List: ML20067D494 NRC-94-4066, Forwards Nonproprietary & Proprietary Versions of Presentation Matls Used During 940222 Meeting in Monroeville,Pa on AP600 Design Changes.Proprietary Version of Matl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
References
AW-94-593, NUDOCS 9403080250
Download: ML20067D494 (120)

Text

. __ -__ _-__ _ _ _____ _

Westinghouse Energy Systems Ba 3ss PinsbuqJh FennsyNania 15230 0355 Electric Corporation AW-94-593 February 22,1994 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: MR. R. W. BORCHARDT APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE SUBIECT: PRESENTATION MATERIAI S FROM THE FEBRUARY 22,1994 MEETING ON AP600 DESIGN CHANGES

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

The application for withholding is submitted by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse")

pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. It contains commercial strategic information proprietary to Westinghouse and customarily held in confidence.

The proprietary material for which withholding is being requested is identified in the proprietary version of the subject report. In conformance with 10CFR Section 2.790, Affidavit AW.94-593 accompanics this application for withholding setting forth the basis on which the identified proprietary information may be withheld from public disclosure.

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the subject information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.

Correspondence with respect to this application for withholding or the accompanying affidavit should reference AW-94-593 and should be addressed to the undersigned.

Very truly yours, l%h/f6 N. J. Liparuto, Man ger Nuclear Safety And Regulatory Activities

_ /nja -

cc: Kevin Bohrer NRC 12H5 u ts ^

9403080250 940222 PDR ADOCK 05200003 A PDR

AW-94-593 AFFIDAVIT 1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

l ss

. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:

1 1

, Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Brian A. McIntyre, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on j behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse") and that the averments of fact set forth j in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:

A~ / sv' -, ,

Brian A. McIntyre, Manager Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Sworn to sad subscribed before me this M2 day i

of u MW1 1994 i O'

, ,, ')

Notary Public Nctid 04N

%,e Mar;e Pam t hty Put*c Moner;.hnIJf0i t) W/CQJM Mj Ca amycer, C4cau !DV J 4, hy6 MemLis,Pennsyvana/esvoaaonof t<xame 1528A w

• AW-94-593 (1) I am Manager, Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing, in the Advanced Technology Business Area, of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rulemaking proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of the Westinghouse Energy Systems Business Unit.

I i

(2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse application for withholding accompanying this Affidavit.

l l (3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by the Westinghouse Energy Systems Business Unit in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.

(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

l I

(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.

(ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:

1528A

. l AW-94-593 (a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutes a  ;

4 competitive economic advantage over other companies, i

i 5 It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or (b) f component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved j

]

marketability. l 1

1 (c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve 1 his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

4 (d) It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.

(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded i

j development plans and programs of potential commercial value to a Westinghouse.

2 1

1 (f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

{

i 1

j There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:

i (a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a

] competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from i

j disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.

i 1

(b) It is information which is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such l

j_ information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to l sell products and services involving the use of the information.

i 1528A

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ __ - = -_ _

AW-94-593 (c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.

(d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular )

competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive l advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any i one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.

(e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.

l (f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and i l

l development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage, i

(iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the l

l provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.

(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available l information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method

to the best of our knowledge and belief.

(v) Enclosed is letter NTD-NRC-94-4066, February 22,1994, being transmitted by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (E letter and Application for Withholding l

Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, N. J. Liparulo (E, to Mr. R. W. Borchardt, Office of NRR. The proprietary information as submitted for use by Westinghouse Electric Corporation is in response to questions concerning the AP600 plant and the associated design certification application and is expected to be applicable in other licensee submittals in response to certain NRC requirements for justification of licensing advanced nuclear power plant designs.

I i

i 1528A

~ _

l- AW-94-593 This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to:

4 j (a) Demonstrate the design and safety of the AP600 Passive Safety Systems.

l (b) Establish applicable verification testing methods.

]

(c) Design Advanced Nuclear Power Plants that meet NRC requirements.

1

! (d) Establish technical and licensing approaches for the AP600 that will ultimately result in a certified design.

l 1

j (e) Assist customers i'i obtail ting NRC approval for future plants.

Further this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

1 (a) Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for

, purposes of meeting NRC requirements for advanced plant licenses.

i j (b) Westinghouse can sell support and defense of the technology to its customers I

i in the licensing process.

I i

j Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to e

l the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar advanced nuclear power designs and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the informations would enable others to use the information to meet NRC i

t requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the

information.

The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of

. applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort

and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money, t

3 i

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, , - . . . . , . _ m

AW-94-593 In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended for developing analytical methods and receiving NRC approval for those methods.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

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WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PRESENTATION TO UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AP600 Design Changes MONROEVILLE, PA FEBRUARY 22,1994

- ... .. . . =. _-- _. . .__ _ . . - _- _ . . _ _ . . ..

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AGENDA ..

WESTINGHOUSE /NRC MEETING AP600 DESIGN CHANGES 8:30 INTRODUCTION J. Butler 8:45 DESIGN CHANGES T. Schulz 10:45 PRA EVALUATION T. Schulz LUNCH 12:30 SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS R. Kemper

- STEAMLINE BREAK P. Rosenthal

- STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE U. Bachrach

- LOCA R. Kemper 2:30 TEST PROGRAM IMPACT

- DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTING E. Piplica

- OTHER TESTS T. Schulz 4:00 DISCUSSION, MEETING WRAP-UP, ACTION ITEMS All

. . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _- _ ____ __ _ m_ _ _ _ _ - . _ __ __ _ _____m.

.-6 a m. a.d ah _A. a m _ama .,hta _44Aa,.u4 aM._ a. 3 .r % A hAs_ ,m.h.._h %As _ a _,2.A.. &_4e4A_L2La 4 a, mA, S 4, -4 wa 4 k._M _J-.4._.. .A~.m_mm* R 4,._.,c.,,a.gmL4. . .u_ ..&m._ m a_,a4, s.u_. E m.J.iLL.

A F' i ' i -

INTRODUCTION t

J.C. BUTLER ADVANCED PLANT SAFETY AND LICENSING h

lpmag INTRODUCTION

- While no changes to the AP600 design (as defined in SSAR) is preferred, some design changes are to be expected

- These changes could arise as a result of:

- Test program results

- Resolution of NRC review issues

- Resolution of Industry issues

- All potential changes undergo a rigorous program review and must receive approval by the AP600 Configuration Control Board (CCB)

- The impact of potential design changes on the design certification review is minimized by prudent review of program impacts and early involvement with NRC

INTRODUCTION F1 w ..-.

- The AP600 design changes were introduced at a Senior Management meeting on December 22,1993

- Changes to the ADS Phase B Test Program were discussed with NRC staff on January 25,1994

- A letter report discussing each change was provided to NRC staff on February 15,1994

- The purposes of today's meeting are to:

- continue discussions of AP600 design changes and

- obtain feedback from NRC staff, including identification of any outstanding issues or concerns

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malm DESIGN CHANGES T. L. SCHULZ SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FEBRUARY 22,1994

AP600 ADS / CMT CHANGES

- CMT Changes Logic Changes (PRHR Heat Exchanger, Pressurizer Heater, CVS, ADS)

CMT Inlet Diffuser DVI Nozzle Venturi

- PRHR Heat Exchanger Changes Inlet Valve Arrangement

- ADS Changes Stage 1 Characteristics Stage 2/3 Valve Type / Characteristics Stage 4 Configuration / Type / Characteristics

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PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER ACTUATION CHANGE ..

- Change SSAR: actuate on high pressurizer level or high SG level Revised: actuate on CMT actuation

- Purpose Increases margin to ADS during SGTR DBA assumptions Increases margin to pressurizer overfill No operator action required on best estimate basis Other changes being investigated to provide additional margin

mun; PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER ACTUATION LOGIC ..

DESCRIPTION SIGNAL SETPOINT PRHR Heat -

Low SG narrow range level in any SG + per SSAR Exchanger Actuation low SFW flow after time delay (165 gpm,60 sec)

(via PMS)

Low SG WR level in any SG per SSAR CMT actuation NA ADS actuation NA

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PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER ACTUATION CHANGE Impacts Safety Analyses SSAR analysis of SGTR shows no ADS actuation SGTR was re-analyzed Margin to ADS actuation significantly increased SSAR analysis of some Non-LOCA shows potential for long term pressurizer overfill Operator action assumed in SSAR Change in PRHR heat exchanger logic prevents pressurizer overfill on best estimate basis 1

PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER ACTUATION CHANGE F'1

- Impacts (continued)

PRA Minor impact on reliability of isolating PRHR heat exchanger after PRHR heat exchanger tube rupture

- Isolation reliability limited by I&C common mode failure and operator fallures

PRHR HX ACTUATION CHANGE

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Test Minor impact on control logic Will be incorporated for all matrix tests OSU Test Minor impact on control logic Will be incorporated for all tests

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PRESSURIZER HEATER LOGIC CHANGE , , , -

- Change SSAR: no block on CMT actuation Revised: block pressurizer heater operation on CMT actuation Nonsafety related automatic block (3 way redundant)

Local manual block provides backup

- Purpose Increases margin to ADS and SG overfill during SGTR and pressurizer overfill during non-LOCAs No operator action required on best estimate basis

- With DBA assumptions, auto heater block can fail Long term heater operation be blocked Operators can open breakers locally

PRESSURIZER HEATER BREAKER ARRANGEMENT ELECTRICAL Bus p__________ (t) 1 I

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CONTROL PROTECilON PIR I sySyty SYSTEM LEVEt - - -e= -J g

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CONTROL SYSTEM ---------

( ( ((2) e PROTECilON

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Aux BLDC (NNS) __ __

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CONI &lNedENI COGIAS8h(.N T l

1r 1r 1r 1r Breaker Sire Ooes Number p

(1) 300 NNS S (2) So NNs 52 NO TE . This figure 'stustrates one of five groups of Ptr heaters I _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PRESSURIZER HEATER LOGIC CHANGE

- Impacts Safety Analysis SSAR analysis of SGTR and non-LOCA does not include pressurizer heater operation Operators have long time to open breakers, if required PRA No impact Pressurizer heaters not modeled Pressurizer heater operation does not affect success criteria

iiiiii-iii[j PRESSURIZER HEATER LOGIC CHANGE _

- Impacts (continued)

Testing Program CMT Separate Effect Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Test Minor impact on control logic Will be incorporated for all matrix tests OSU Test Minor impact on control logic Will be incorporated for all tests i

pqg CVS MAKEUP LOGIC CHANGE u ...., .

- Change SSAR: both CVS pumps start on CMT actuation Revised: one CVS pump starts / stops on pressurizer level Post CMT actuation setpoints Maximum CVS makeup flow Nonsafety related logic

- Purpose

- Increases margin to pressurizer overfill during non-LOCAs No operator action required on best estimate basis

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CVS MAKEUP LOGIC DESCRIPTION SIGNAL SETPOINT Normal RCS Makeup (1) Low pressurizer level relative to start - 0% (1)

(via PLS) programmed level starts makeup; stop - 18% (1) higher level stops makeup Post CMT Actuation RCS Makeup (2) CMT actuation + low pressurizer start - 10% level (via PLS) level starts makeup, higher level stop - 20% level stops makeup Notes:

(1) One CVS pump starts with suction from boric acid and makeup water blended to match RCS boron concentration. Flow is controlled to a fixed flowrate, at [TBD] gpm. Start / stop pressurizer levels (percent of level span) are relative to programmed level.

(2) One CVS pump starts with suction from boric acid tank. Flowrate is not controlled; valve will be full open to provide maximum flow. Start / stop pressurizer levels are absolute values (percent of level span).

pr,qj CVS MAKEUP LOGIC CHANGE y..

- Impacts Safety Analysis SSAR SGTR and non-LOCA analysis includes maximum CVS makeup from both pumps where conservative Re-analysis also includes maximum CVS makeup from both pumps where conservative PRA Minor impact on CVS reliability Operators can start second pump I&C common mode failure of PMS/PLS is limiting

CVS MAKEUP LOGIC CHANGE

- Impacts (continued)

Testing Program CMT Separate Effect Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Test Minor impact on CVS makeup logic Will be incorporated for appropriate tests OSU Test Minor impact on CVS makeup logic Will be incorporated for appropriate tests

==d ADS STAGE 1 SETPOINT CHANGE

- Change SSAR: CMT level 1500 ft3 Revised: CMT level 1350 ft3 Purpose Increases margin to ADS during SGTR and steam line breaks l

ADS STAGE 1 SETPOINT CHANGE F' no...1l'.

Impacts Safety Analysis SSAR SGTR and SLB analysis does not maximize potential for ADS Re-analysis includes more limiting assumptions Change increases margin to ADS LOCA impact evaluated Limiting LOCA is DVI break Re-analyzed with good results PRA No impact, does not affect ADS success criteria

=i ADS STAGE 1 SETPOINT CHANGE

- Impacts (continued)

Testing Program CMT Separate Effect Tests, ADS Phase B Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Tests Minor impact on control setpoints Will be incorporated for all matrix tests OSU Tests Minor impact on control setpoints Will be incorporated for all tests

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ADS STAGE 2 / 3 ACTUATION CHANGE l_

- Change SSAR: actuates on CMT level Revised: actuates on ADS stage 1 plus timers

- Purpose Removes dependance on CMT level for ADS stage 2 / 3 CMT level measurement difficult for stage 2 / 3 CMT can be hot -> flashing CMT level measurement used for ADS stage 1/ 4 CMT level measurement not difficult for stage 1/ 4 GMT cold or constant pressure -> no flashing

ADS ACTUATION LOGIC Pl y . L, .

DESCRIPTION SIGNAL SETPOINT First Stage ADS

- First Stage Actuation, Isolation Valve Actuation -

CMT actuation signal + Low-1 CMT level in 67% CMT volume either CMT

- First Stage Control Valve Actuation -

1st Stage actuation + time delay 20 sec delay Second Stage ADS

- Second Stage Actuation, Isolation Valve -

1st Stage actuation + time delay 60 sec delay Actuation

- Second Stage Control Valve Actuation -

2nd Stage actuation + time delay 30 sec delay Third Stage ADS

- Third Stage Actuation, Isolation Valve Actuation -

2nd Stage actuation + time delay 120 sec delay

- Third Stage Control Valve Actuation -

3rd Stage actuation + time delay 30 sec delay Fourth Stage ADS

- Fourth Stage A Actuation, Isolation Valve -

3rd Stage actuation + time delay + 120 sec delay Actuation low-2 CMT level in either CMT 20% CMT vol.

- Fourth Stage A Control Valve Actuation -

4th Stage A actuation + time delay 30 sec delay

- Fourth Stage B Actuation, Isolation Valve -

4th Stage A actuation + time delay 30 sec delay Actuation

- Fourth Stage B Control Valve Actuation -

4th Stage B actuation + time delay 30 sec delay l

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pr 8g ADS STAGE 2 / 3 ACTUATION CHANGE o ,.. ..

- Impacts Safety Analysis Only impacts accidents where ADS occurs -> LOCAs Spurious ADS and DVI line break were re-analyzed Improved performance compared to SSAR PRA No impact

- Does not affect modeling of ADS

ADS STAGE 2 / 3 ACTUATION CHANGE fl ar.....,

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Tests Minor impact on control logic Will be incorporated for all matrix tests i -

OSU Tests Minor impact on control logic i

Will be incorporated for all tests

CMT INLET DIFFUSER CHANGE Vl y...

- Change SSAR: CMT did not have inlet diffuser Revised: inlet diffuser is added to CMT Extension of inlet pipe, end capped Purpose

- CMT tests showed rapid steam condensation Occurred with cold CMT and high steam flows Only impacts larger LOCAs (>DVI break)

Period of reduced CMT injection and pressure spikes Improve CMT performance CMT tests show diffuser improves performance

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Impacts Safety Analysis Only impacts larger LOCAs

- DVI break re-analyzed Larger 1st CMT node simulated larger mixing volume Analysis with this and other changes show improved performance to SSAR PRA No impact System modeling and success criteria unchanged

P9 CMT INLET DIFFUSER CHANGE lli, . il

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Tests, SPES-2 Tests, OSU tests Tests No additional impact, diffuser already incorporated ADS Phase B Test No impact on range of parameters to be tested

li"im DVI NOZZLE VENTURI CHANGE ,, _

- Change SSAR: DVI nozzle has no venturi Revised: DVI nozzle has venturi

- Purpose Improves DVI LOCA performance No change in injection capability Very small L/D CMT and accumulator have adjustable orifices

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me DVI NOZZLE VENTURI CHANGE , ,_

- Impacts Safety Analysis

- Only impacts DVI LOCAs No change in injection capability

- DVI LOCA was re-analyzed (with other changes)

Limiting event; 1 CMT, accumulator, IRWST line spill SSAR analysis shows brief core uncovery Re-analysis (with other changes) shows no core uncovery PRA No impact

- System modeling and success criteria unchanged

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DVI NOZZLE VENTURI CHANGE ,_

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Tests No impact on range of paiameters to be tested ADS Phase B Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Tests Will be incorporated in DVI test OSU Tests Will be incorporated in DVI test

F~1 PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE CHANGE ar,.-

- Change SSAR: inlet to PRHR HX has common MOV and individual manual valves Revised: inlet to PRHR HX has individual MOVs Power removal not normally required

- Purpose Improves reliability of PRHR heat exchanger Chance of blocking both heat exchangers reduced, no common valve

- Reduces chance of violating PRHR heat exchanger tech spec During IST of PRHR heat exchanger outlet control valves, inlet MOV closed SSAR design; failure of 1 valve causes plant shutdown Revised design; 2 failures needed to cause plant shutdown

! MON PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER SYSTEM SKETCH -

PRESSURIZER STEAM IRWST GEN.

PRHR PRHR V u

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RCP REACTOR CORE VESSEL Westirighouse - 1/94

PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE CHANGE

- Impacts Safety Analysis No impact No change to limiting single failure System performance unaffected PRA No impact on PRHR heat exchanger reliability Inlet valves not modeled (normally open, position alarms, ..)

l Small impact on PRHR heat exchanger isolation reliability l

Have to close two MOV instead of 1 MOV l

Limiting failures are I&C common mode failure and operator action l

l

m qi PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER VALVE CHANGE ,. .

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Tests No impact on range of parameters to be tested SPES-2 Tests No impact, PRHR HX performance unaffected OSU Tests No impact, PRHR HX performance unaffected

ADS VALVE CHANGES

- Change SSAR:

(4,9 ADS stage 1 ADS stage 2/3 ADS stage 4

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ADS stage 1 ADS stage 2/3 ADS stage 4

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ADS VALVE CHANGES M

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- Purpose Addresses industry problems with MO gate valves

- NRC concerns on AP600 ADS

- Utility concerns on AP600 ADS Allows for flexibility in selecting ADS valve type

- Accommodates changing valve technology Improves design margin

- Limiting single failure is smaller valve

- More flow area provided, especially 4th stage

ADS VALVE CHANGES

- Impacts Safety Analysis Only affects accidents with ADS -> LOCAs Spurious ADS and DVI line break were re-analyzed Improved performance compared to SSAR PRA Sensitivity study performed Two different examples evaluated Insignificant change in CDF

e pamaq ADS VALVE CHANGES ,-

- Impacts (continued)

Test Program CMT Separate Effect Tests

- No impact on range of parameters to be tested ADS Phase B Tests

- Reconfigured as " systems" test

- Use different size orifice / nozzles to simulate range of valves SPES-2 Tests

- Orifices simulating ADS valves will be re-sized

- 4th stage discharge will be headered together OSU Tests

- Orifices simulating ADS valves will be re-sized

- 4th stage discharge will be changed

._- _- ._. . -, . . ..- - - - . _ _ . - _ - . . . . _ _ . _ . - . _ _ - . . . - . - _ _ - . = . . . - . - . _ . . - . . - . . _ - .

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PRA IMPACT OF ADS CHANGES T.L.SCHULZ SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FEBRUARY 22,1994

puun PRA IMPACT OF ADS CHANGES ,_

- PRA importance of ADS Inspection of dominant cutsets shows

- Many contain ADS failures

- Most failures are of actuation; I&C, operator

- First cutset with valve failure is #135 (2.15E-10/yr)

- ADS Sensitivity Study Study was performed to quantify impact of ADS changes Two different ADS designs were evaluated

- See examples shown in change description

- Success criteria was revised Four fault trees were re-quantified Important to PRHR HX tube rupture First cutsets with ADS hardware failures Full depressurization, auto / manual actuation

enne PRA IMPACT OF ADS CHANGES ,

- Revised ADS Success Criteria AP600 ADS design has multiple failure capability

- Can tolerate complete failure of stages 1/2/3 or 4 Smaller stage 2/3 reduces reliability

- Success was 3 of 4 stage 2/3 paths

- Success is now 4 of 4 stage 2/3 paths More stage 4 paths improves reliability

- Success was 1 of 2 stage 4 paths

- Success is now 2 of 4 stage 4 paths

- Added Pressure Interlock to 4th Stage SSAR design assumed 4th stage valves could be designed so they could not physically open at normal RCS pressures Revised ADS design uses interlock with RCS pressure

- Modeled in PRA sensitivity studies

24sjsi PRA IMPACT OF ADS CHANGES _

- ADS Sensitivity Study Results SSAR EXAMPLE 1 EXAMPLE 2 ADS Stage 2/3 MO gate MO globe MO globe ADS Stage 4 AO gate AO gate squib Fault Tree ADN 2.77E-3 2.77E-3 2.77E-3 Fault Tree ADC 3.32E-3 3.32E-3 3.32E-3 Fault Tree ADS 2.91 E-5 4.86 E-5 4.93E-5 Fault Tree ADA 5.79E-4 6.09E-4 6.09E-4

- Change in AP600 CDF is insignificant ADS mechanical failures account for CDF of 1.4E-9/yr (.4% of total)

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SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS R.M.KEMPER ADVANCED AND VVER PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS

trreg SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS _

AP600 SSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analyses

- Condition 11/ Ill / IV Design Basis Events

- Deterministic Analyses  ;

- Standard LOCA, non-LOCA Analysis Computer Codes Utilized i

I

m anga SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS ,.,_

- The SSAR Chapter 15 Analyses were evaluated in conjunction with the Passive Safeguards System Design Changes

- Selected events modeling affected systems were reanalyzed

- Steamline break

- Steam generator tube rupture

- Small break LOCA (DVI line break, inadvertant ADS)

I

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• _ _ . ~u..um.m_.mm_- m__m_.-.. m._2.mm_-.=.._.

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jj-ii rN-SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS STEAMLINE BREAK i

P.W.ROSENTHAL ADVANCED AND VVER PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS

1

-m 4

STEAMLINE BREAK _

- Identified changes with potential impact

- Do changes affect modeled components or functions

- PRHR HX actuation signal

- Delete high pressurizer & high SG level signals

- Add signal on CMT actuation

- ADS stage 1 actuation .

- Reduce CMT level setpoint

- In volume: from 1500 to 1350 ft (CMT volume = 2000 ft )

- CMT inlet diffuser - a new component

- DVI nozzle venturi - a new component D

t

w:::

STEAMLINE BREAK ,. . _

- PRHR heat exchanger actuation signal change

- Limiting steamline break cases

- SG water level typically falls to low level setpoint

- Pressurizer water level falls initially; restored by CMTs and/or accumulators

- Conservative core response cases start PRHR at time zero -

maximizes cooldown & negates design change effect on analysis

- PRHR actuation change: no effect on limiting steamline break core response analysis l

l l

i p,ig STEAMLINE BREAK y,-.

- ADS Stage 1 Actuation

- Initiating signal: CMT level

- Design goal: no ADS actuation on any non-LOCA event (including Conditions 3 & 4)

- Design requirement: no ADS actuation on any Condition 2 events

- Examined spectrum of cases for ADS actuation; limiting case:

concerns with modified SSAR case

- Smaller break: 0.4 vs.1.4 ft2in SSAR

- Reduced condensation: 10% of SSAR

- Reduced minimum CMT volume: 1590 vs.1890 ft in SSAR

- 1350 ft setpoint provides additional margin to ADS actuation for non-LOCA events

r ,i!

STEAMLINE BREAK 1, L"

- CMT inlet diffuser

- Based on pre-operational test data: diffuser does not affect CMT l draindown behavior when steam is injecting from the pressurizer balance line

- For limiting CMT drain down case, flow into CMT is steam via the pressurizer balance line

- CMT inlet diffuser has no impact on limiting steamline break modeling

- DVI Nozzle Venturi

- Mitigates DVI LOCA

- Orifices in discharge lines allow adjustments; total resistance from CMTs and accumulators will not change due to DVI venturi

- Steamline break analysis unaffected by. venturi

STEAMLINE BREAK F'l ar...

Sequence of Events - Steamline Break with Offsite Power Available Time Event (Seconds) 0.4 ft2 double-ended steamline rupture occurs 0 Reactor and turbine assumed tripped 0 PRHR heat exchanger assumed to actuate 0 Low steamline pressure SIS setpoint reached 2.5 Steamline isolation 14.5 Feedwater isolation 14.5 Reactor coolant pumps trip 17.5 CMT actuation 24.5 Startup feedwater isolated to all SGs 28.9 Accumulators actuate 1046 Faulted steam generator blowdown ends ~2600

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STEAMLINE BREAK Core Flow Transient 1 4 g 1 2-3 Q 1.

E 5 g.

t

$ .6-C i

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$ i o

i

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10 4 10 0 to1 102 103 TIWE (SEC)

..ii! E dini STEAMLINE BREAK ,_ _

Core Boron Transient 700.

- 600.

i 8 500. ,

I E

E 400.

d 5

" 300.

5 8

200.4 Ei!

8 '

100.

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0. 4 10 1 102 103 10 100 TiWE (SEC)

= . _ - - = _ _ _ -

g- ~y STEAMLINE BREAK u.. . Z Core Makeup Tank Water Volume 2500.

2250 2000.

G

{ 1750

$ 1500.

1250 j d

g 1000  :

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500.

250.

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00 10 1 102 103 10 4 T1WE (SEC)

1 i

SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE U.BACHRACH ADVANCED AND VVER PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS

weg STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ._

DESIGN CHANGES THAT IMPACT SGTR ANALYSIS PRHR HX ACTUATION SIGNAL

- Assures PRHR Actuation For SGTR

- No Longer Dependant On SG Level

- Provides Benefit For Offsite Doses AUTOMATIC PRESSURIZER HEATER BLOCK

- Facilitates Pressure Equalization between Primary And Secondary l

l CVS CONTROLS POST CMT ACTUATION

- Provides Benefit By Reducing Break Flow ADS STAGE 1 ACTUATION

- Lower Setpoint increases Margin To ADS Actuation

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE El u ......,

PRHR HX ACTUATION SIGNAL ANALYSIS

- SSAR: INITIATES PRHR ON HIGH SG LEVEL SIGNAL

- ANALYSIS HAS BEEN PERFORMED WITH REVISED PRHR INITIATION LOGIC PRHR initiation on CMT actuation signal Analysis assumptions and single failure identical to SSAR analysis Transient progression not significantly changed

- Sequence of events compared in Table 1

- Break flow transient plots compared in Figure 1 Benefit for offsite dose analysis due to reduced break flow and steam releases Integrated break flow and steam releases compared in Table 2

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE El!

y . ...;

FIGURE 1 COMPARISON OF PRIMARY TO SECONDARY BREAK FLOW 50

4) -

,i .

8 s SSAR m . .

] i 30 -

.c ..-

.e . NEW 3 20 -

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O 1(H)O 2(MH) 3(MM) 4(HXI 5(HX) 6(H H) 7(H)O 8 XX) 9(HHi 1(NHH)

! Time (sec) 1

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SSAR NEW EVENT Time (sec) Time (sec)

Double Ended SG Tube Rupture 0 0 Reactor Trip On Low Pressurizer Pressure 1074 1074 CMT Actuation On Low-1 Pressurizer Pressure 1411 1411 PRHR Initiation On CMT Actuation (+ Delay) -------

1471 Faulted SG PORV Fails Open 3706 3742 Faulted SG PORV Block Valve Closed On Low 4346 4000 Steamline Pressure CVS And Startup Feedwater isolated On High- 5174 4576 2 SG Level PRHR Initiation on High-2 SG Level 5234 -------

l Break Flow Terminated And Stable Condition 10000 10000 Reached -__ ---___- -

-_.m _______-_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __-_________-__._____m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

. - . . . . - . . - - - . . _. . _ = . . _ - . . . . ..- . - .

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED BREAK FLOW AND STEAM RELEASE LOFTTR2 Integrated LOFTTR2 Faulted Loop Break Flow (Ibm) At integrated Steam Release (Ibm) At PORV 7200 Sec 10000 Sec PORV 7200 Sec Failure Failure SSAR 136262 209781 212362 33710 118700 NEW 129945 183897 186940 27480 59610 J

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE N~.1 a r. . .

ANALYSIS FOR ADS ACTUATION CONCERNS

- Assumptions That Minimize CMT Water Volume No CVS Flow Reduced CMT Condensation Faulted SG PORV Fails Open

- Minimum CMT Water Volume > 1500 ft l

l

l" pl 4V*c ' .

SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATIONS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS R.M.KEMPER ADVANCED AND VVER PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS

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lmap; LOCA EVALUATION 1._

- SSAR NOTRUMP Break Spectrum includes

- Inadvertent ADS actuation inch cold leg break inch cold leg break inch DVI line break inch cold leg pressure balance line break

- DEDVI line break (2*6.8-inch equivalent diameter)

- Double ended cold leg pressure balance line break (same size as DEDVI)

- Result Highlights:

- Core uncovery is predicted only during the very early portion of the DEDVI break (PCT of 1009 F non-limiting)

- All cases achieve stable IRWST injection with margin to core uncovery

. . . .. - =. . - - - . -. .. - . . - - - . - .- - -. - .

LOCA EVALUATION V]

,y, ..,

- The Passive Safeguards System Changes Affect Small Break LOCAs

- Direct vessel injection line venturi limits DEDVI break area

- ADS changes have impact First stage actuation setpoint Second/ third stage actuation via timers More fourth stage venting capability with single failure assumed

- PRHR actuation on CMT signal (vs. ADS stage 1 CMT level signal in SSAR) l l

l

"8#il LOCA EVALUATION _

- The Limiting Small Break LOCA SSAR Cases were Analyzed with NOTRUMP Modeling the Design Changes

- DEDVI break for minimum safety injection availability

- Inadvertent ADS actuation for test of ADS venting capability

- No Active Systems Modeled

- Single Active Failure Assumed Exacerbates Limiting Phenomena t-

- A first/ third stage ADS valve combination for the DEDVI case

- One fourth stage ADS valve for the inadvertent ADS case

- Appendix K Evaluation Model Approach as in SSAR

= m:

LOCA EVALUATION -__

DEDVI lireak Sequence of Events Case SSAR New design with senturi Break open 03) seconds 0.0 seconds Reactor trip signal 3.5 seconds 7.2 seconds "S" signal 4.2 seconds 8.65 secosals Reactor coolant pumps stan to 20.4 seconds 24.85 secoixls coast down ADS stage 1 75 seconds 164.2 secoixls Accurnulator injection stans 117 seconds 206 seconds ADS stage 2 135 seconds 234.2 secornis ADS stage 3 255 seconds 354.2 secoixls ADS stage 4 375 seconds 474.2 secoixls in contaiiunent refuelling water 1839 seconds i178.7 seconds storage tank injection stans w_---__-_

l l

1 atamig!

LOCA EVALUATION ,. . _

DEDVI Break, Upper Plenum Pressure 2e::

i 20C0-7 1500-

~

n b

c g 1000-500-0 -

1250 0 250 500 750 1000 iluE (SEC)

nw LOCA EVALUATION 1.

DEDVI Break, Break Liquid Flow Rate 33C0 2000-7 x

a W

s a

3 1000-I d

l- I 0

O 250 500 750 1003 25:

tuE (SEC)

i 1

44* 41115 4 *.:

LOCA EVALUATION lE DEDVI Break, Core Stack Mixture Level

~t 27 5 26-u 1

g 0 250 500 750 1000 ~25J 4

TiuE (SEC)

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= wmm LOCA EVALUATION N DEDVI Break, ADS Stage 4 Vapor Mass Flow Rate

'00 80-I l

$ 60 -

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4 3

'40-20-I

~

I 0 250 ab0 750 1000 '250 TiuE (SEC) i

ll-- i LOCA EVALUATION __

DEDVI Break, Primary Mass inventory i

' C OO-n :5C:C0 E

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llE 2 C:00-

'5::00 13CCC0 0 25C 500 750 COO *:t:

~iuE (SEC)

1. nan #$41 LOCA EVALUATION ljE Inadvertent ADS Actuation Sequence of Events Case SSAR New Design inadvertent opening of the ADS valve 8U) seconds (U) seconds Reactor trip signal 28.5 seconds 25.0 seconds "S" signal 33.5 seconds 28.97 secoikis Reactor coolant purnps start to coast down 49.7 seconds 45.2 seconds Accumulator injection starts 633 seconds 2(M seconds PRilR Actuation 726 seconds 30.2 seconds ADS stage 2 916 seconds 70 seconds Accumulator erupty 1325 seconds 565 seconds ADS stage 3 1390 seconds 190 seconds ADS stage 4 1902 seconds 1617 seconds Core make up tank einpty 2260 seconds 1967 seconds in contaitunent refuelling water storage tank injection stans 2792 seconds 2176 secosuls

nsangy LOCA EVALUATION __

inadvertent ADS Actuation, Downcomer Pressure 25CO 2000-

{1500<

I g 1000-500-T-

i 0 0 500 1000 1500 2003 25CG l

• tWE (SEC)

pr Hi LOCA EVALUATION y ,,,, ,.

t l

Inadvertent ADS Actuation, Pressurizer Mixture Level N

80

=

b C

$70' 2

5 2

60-50 0 500 1000 1500 200G :t:0 inuE (SEC)

!! Hist!!!il LOCA EVALUATION ,_ _

Inadvertent ADS Actuation, Core Stack Mixture Level 25 26-l 24 3

5 2

22 20 0 500 1000 1500 2000 ZiC0 TiuE (SEC) i

rainmap LOCA EVALUATION , . _

i Inadvertent ADS Actuation, Loop 1, CMT to DVI Flow Rate 303 203-2 1

S 2

g 100-

]

s 3, 'l ..u.

-100 0 SCO 1000 1500 2000 ~:0^

T VE '5EC)

l esMEHti LOCA EVALUATION ,,__

inadvertent ADS Actuation, ADS 1-3 Vapor Flow Rate 3::

203 3

1

'?

~

l y 100 3

v, s

O-

-100 0 500 1000 1500 2000  ; GC TiVE (SEC)

liR l

:i LOCA EVALUATION y, , , ', l Inadvertent ADS Actuation, ADS 1-3 Liquid Flow Rate 20C0 500-2 1

0 1000< j U

5 5

500-

=  !

d 0- A

~ ~

0 500 1000 1500 2C00 25CC TivE (SEC)

LOCA EVALUATION ,g,,,.,.

Inadvertent ADS Actuation, ADS 4 Liquid Mass Flow Rate 400

, 300-d g 200-a G

5 100 i

1 0 500 1000 1500 2000 _:00 T VE (SEC) f I

LOCA EVALUATION Inadvertent ADS Actuation, ADS 4 Vapor Mass Ficw Rate e.:

q 60-I m

h40-S c

s 20 t

O 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 TIME (SEC) i

l 'i LOCA EVALUATION A Fs - r inadycrtent ADS Actuation, Primary Mass inventory f

30C 00-25C: :

5 e

s 2

20C000 15C 00-10C000 0 500 '0C0 1500 2C00 25::

• uE (SEC)

yng LOCA EVALUATION J,...

- Conclusions The passive core cooling system design changes:

- Beneficially impact small break LOCA events

- Do not affect large break LOCAs The SSAR cases remain bounding for the new design

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TEST PROGRAM IMPACT DESIGN CERTIFICATION TEST PROGRAM 4

E. J. PIPLICA, MANAGER TEST ENGINEERING

mm DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS , . . _

l Each AP600 test program has been systematically investigated to l assess the impact of each design change l

- Hardware changes Test articles Test instrumentation Facility support systems

- Software changes Test matrix Test operating procedures Initial test conditions Control logic

- Test Schedule

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS F1 o , ....

CORE MAKEUP TANK TESTS

- Minimal impact No hardware changes required Minor software changes No effect on test schedule

- Hardware changes have already been made to the facility Depressurization capability improved by adding a two inch line and globe valve off of the steam / water reservoir A steam distributor has been installed in the Core Makeup Tank for all matrix testing

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS ll9 o , ...;

CORE MAKEUP TANK TESTS (continued)

- Software changes will be incorporated in the Operating Procedures Depressurization rates Flow draindown rates

! - Test matrix was modified to include additional natural circulation and depressurization tests will be specified for each test

an DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS ._

INTEGRAL SYSTEMS TESTS AT OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY

- Some impact Hardware changes required Software changes will be incorporated

' - Hardware changes A steam distributor installed in the CMT for all matrix testing The Break and ADS Measurement System will be reconfigured to accommodate flow from both 4th stages for single ended breaks and will be headered together for DEG breaks The DVI line venturi will be installed New orifices required for ADS Stages 1,2 and 3 Additional orifices required for Stage 4, w/o single failure of one Stage 4 valve i

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS El m ., ..

INTEGRAL SYSTEMS TESTS AT OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY (continued)

- Software changes Control logic will be implemented to reflect the revised AP600 design Test operating procedures will be written to include the revised AP600 logic changes No changes are required to the test matrix

l DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS N

o ,..,.,

INTEGRAL SYSTEMS TESTS AT SPES-2

- Status The first matrix test at SPES-2 (reference 2 inch SBLOCA) was performed as configured for the current AP600 design The facility has been modified to incorporate the revised AP600 configuration The first matrix test will be rerun pending completion of repairs to the seals on the power channel All subsequent tests will be performed with the revisc.d design changes incorporated

- Impact Minor hardware changes required Software changes have been incorporated No schedule impact

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . . __. ____-__---__-____--______l

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS I INTEGRAL SYSTEMS TESTS AT SPES-2 (continued)

- Hardware changes

- A steam distributor has been installed in the Core Makeup Tank for all matrix testing Both 4th stages have been headered together The DVI line venturi will be installed as part of the break package for the DEC DVI line break New orifices have been installed for ADS Stages 1,2 and 3 New orifices have been installed for ADS Stage 4. Single failure of one 4th stage valve is assumed

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS ._

INTEGRAL SYSTEMS TESTS AT SPES-2 (continued)

- Software changes Control logic has been modified to reflect the revised AP600 design Test operating procedures have been/will be written to include the revised AP600 logic changes No changes are required to the test matrix

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS L AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS TESTS AT VAPORE

- Minimal Impact Minor hardware changes required Software changes have been incorporated No schedule impact

- Hardware changes The valve piping package has been redesigned to accommodate spool pieces to reprenent the isolation valve in stage 1 and the

control valves in stages 2 and 3 l

Orifices will be used to represent minimum vent capability and a i flow nozzle will be used to represent maximum vent capability

nm--

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS =._

ADS Phase B Test Facility Schematic a egre  ;;

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'i DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS ADS Phase B Test Valve Package Configuration j

t DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS TESTS AT VAPORE (continued)

- Software changes Pre-test analysis of the facility is being performed to establish the initial test conditions and operating parameters The test matrix has been restructured to provide data over a range of thermal / hydraulic conditions representing both high resistance (minimum vent capability) and low resistance (maximum vent capability)

DESIGN CERTIFICATION TESTS l

SUMMARY

- All Design Certification Tests have been evaluated with respect to the revised AP600 design and, in general, the impact on the tests is minimal

- The Design Certification Tests have been or will be modified to reflect the revised AP600 design changes

- All matrix testing will be performed with the revised AP600 design changes incorporated

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l i

ADS VALVE TESTS i T. L. SCHULZ SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

ADS VALVE TESTING 1

- Several ADS Valve Tests Will Be Performed Outside of design certification Includes tests to support Valve type selection Valve qualification Valve production Plant pre-operational testing Plant in-service testing

1 i

lP !Q ADS VALVE TESTING o,.?'

ADS Valve Type Selection Testing Full sized, prototypical stage 1/2/3 valves Different valve types and vendors Installed in full sized, prototypical ADS pipe package Flow conditions will bound ADS operation Data collected; valve thrust during open/close and visual wear Objectives are to provide data Support decision on type of valve For valve specification For later valve equipment qualification

ADS VALVE TESTING

- ADS Valve Qualification Testing Analysis of valve / operator ASME design report (pres / temp, nozzle loads, seismic)

Operator sizing analysis Weak link analysis Functional testing of valve / operator Dimensional inspection Test safety functions under conditions determined by ADS Phase B system tests and by ADS Valve Type Selection tests Operator qualification Tests based on IEEE-382 Aging (cyclic, vibration, environmental)

Seismic Special (MO effects)

ADS VALVE TESTING

- ADS Valve Production Testing For each valve:

Hydrostatic test of body and seat Leakage test of seat, backseat, packing Stroke test; design DP, no flow

- ADS Valve Testing During Pre-Operational Testing Baseline tests (static stroke)

Stroke tests (design DP, low flow)

Blowdown test; intermediate pres,1st plant only

- ADS Valve in-service Testing Periodic tests; at power every :TBD' months, static stroke test Flow test; every refueling, stroke test with partial DP, low flow

m-2auaemzi-yam i

- OPEN DISCUSSION ,

- MEETING WRAP-UP i

- ACTION ITEMS 1

e a

l I

J I

l 9

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . __ ____. - __ . _____i . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _