ML17261A804

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Sections 3.5-5 & 3.5-6 Re P-10 Permissive

ML17261A804
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/22/1988
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17261A802	List: ML17261A800 ML17261A803 ML17261A804
References
NUDOCS 8901050229
Download: ML17261A804 (7)

Text

ATTACEBKST A Revise the Technical Specification pages as follows:

Remove Insert 3.5-5 3,5-5 3.5-6 3.5-6 8501050229 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P PDC

0

)

TABLE 3.5-1 PROTECTION ~.'EM INSTRUMENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTION rt TOTAL NO. of MIN PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL NO of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANN1KS TO TRIP CHANNEIS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE

1. Manual when RCCA is withdrawn

2. Nuclear Flux Power Range For low setting, 2 when RCCA is low setting 2 of 4 power range Note 1 withdrawn channels greater than 8% F.P.

high setting when RCCA is withdrawn

3. Nuclear Flux Intermediate 2 2 of 4 power range 3 when RCCA is channel greater Note 1 withdrawn than 8% F.P.

4. Nuclear Flux Source Range 2 1 of 2 intermediate Note 2

4) Note 1 Ql I

5. Overtemperature aT Hot Shutdown Ul Hot Shutdown

6. OverpowerAT

7. Low Pressurizer Pressure 8'%ower

8. Hi Pressurizer Pressure Hot Shutdown

9. Pressurizer - Hi Water 5% Power Level

10. Low Flow in One Loop 2/loop 2/loop 8% Power

(> 50%

Low Flow F.P.)

(8.5%-50'%.P.)'/loop Both Loops 3/loop (either loop) (both loops) 2/loop 2/loop (both loops) (either loop) 8% Power i0

TABLE 3. 5-1 Continu PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OP CHANNEL NO of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHAN&~ TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE Turbine Trip

'0%

11. Power

12. Steam Flow Feedwater 2 SF-FF 1 SF-PF 2 SF-FP Hot Shutdown flow mismatch with and 2 SG coincident or 2 Lo Lo Steam Generator level per w/1 Lo SG SG level Level loop level in per loop same loop

13. Lo Lo Steam Generator 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop Hot Shutdown Water Level

14. Undervoltage 4 KV Bus 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus 8% Power (both buses) (on either bus)

15. Underfrequency 4 KV Bus 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus 8% Power (both buses) (on either bus)

16. Quadrant power monitor (upper tilt NA 1 Log individual upper & lower ion

. Hot Shutdown lower ex-core neutron chamber currents detectors) once/hr & after a load change of 10%

or after 48 steps of control rod motion

ATTACHMENT B The P-10 permissive allows manual blocking of the intermediate range rod stop, the intermediate range high flux trip, and low setpoint of the power range high flux trip above 10-o power.

These trips are used to mitigate the consequences of a rod withdrawal transient from subcritical. P-10 also supplies an automatic permissive to P-7.

The proposed. Technical Specification change would allow the above trips to be bypassed (blocked) and the automatic permissive to P-7 be generated. at 8O power. This change is necessary because P-7 permissive is required at 8.5: power. Since one of the inputs to P-7 comes from the same power range bistable that supplies P-10, P-10 must be actuated at 8t power to satisfy the requirements for P-7. P-7 automatically unblocks the following reactor trips: 2 loop low flow, reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage, reactor coolant pump bus underfrequency, pressurizer low pressure and turbine trip with P-9. These trips are associated with the 130 MW which is the upper limit of heat removal while on natural. circulation.

The only transient analysis which uses this trip is a slow rod withdrawal. (Boron dilution is bounded by the slow rod withdrawal.) The only effect of reducing P-10 to 8: would be that a rod withdrawal accident (RWA) starting from 8% would be terminated by high flux and overtemperature ~ T versus the intermediate and reduced high power trips. An evaluation performed on the RWA starting from 8% and 10% for various reactivity insertion rates shows approximately the same DNBR when the RWA is initiated from, 8% versus 10% power. The maximum decrease in DNBR 'was approximately 0.007. Further, there is substantial margin between the DNBR for a RWA from 10% and the limiting RWA from 100-o power. The DNBR for a RWA starting from 8-o will also be greater than the i~DNBR for the limiting RWA started from 100% power. Therefore, reducing P-10 to 8'-o has negligible effect on the Ginna Safety Analysis and the minimum DNBR for all RWAs is unchanged.

The specific Technical Specification changes are listed on Table

1. In addition to the above changes, the power level at which the P-7 trip functions are required to be operable has been changed from 5-o to 8'%n Table 3.5-1. The reason for this change is that at Ginna, a function is not considered to be operable while it is blocked. Since the P-7 trip functions are not unblocked until 8%, they are not considered operable until 8%

even though they are automatically unblocked. The change from 5%

to 8-o, the point at which the trips are considered operable, maintains the setpoint within the analyzed range of up to 8.5'-o power.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, these changes to the Technical Specifications have been evaluated against three criteria to determine proposed if the operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would:

B-1

1. 'involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3. involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Reducing the P-10 setpoint from 10% to 8-o, or increasing the operability requirement of a blocked function from 5% to 8-o does not increase the frequency (probability) of a previously evaluated accident.

The consequences of an accident are not affected by the operability of a blocked trip function. Reduction in the P-10 setpoint has a negligible effect on the DNB associated with the RWA. Since the DNB criteria is met, there is no increase in the consequences of the accident.

The subject changes do not create the possibility of a new or different accident. Since the accident acceptance criteria are met, there is no reduction in any margin of, safety.

As outlined above, Rochester Gas and Electric submits that the issues associated with this amendment request are outside the criteria of 10 CFR 50.91, and therefore, a no significant hazards finding is warranted.

B-2

0 TABLE 1 DETAILED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Location Descri tion of Chan e Reason for Chan e Table 3.5-1 Item 2. Changed 10-o to 8% Make Specification consistent with equipment Item 3. Changed 10-o to 8-o Make Specification consistent with equipment Item 7. Changed 5: to 8: Make Specification consistent with interpretation of operability Item 10. Changed 5-o to 8-o Make Specification consistent with interpretation of operability Item 14. Change 5-o to 8-o Make Specification consistent with interpretation of operability Item 15. Change 5% to 8% Make Specification consistent with interpretation of operability