ML17329A672

Proposed Tech Specs Tables 4.7-1 & 3.7-4 Associated W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.1 Re Main Steam Safety Valve Tolerance

ML17329A672
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/11/1992
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17329A671	List: ML17329A670 ML17329A672 ML17329A673
References
NUDOCS 9211170212
Download: ML17329A672 (17)

Text

ATTACHMENT 2 to AEP:NRC:1169 PROPOSED REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 92iii702i2 92iiii ADOCK 050003i5 PDR P PDR to AEP:NRC:1169 Page 4 Lastly, we note that the Commission has provided guidance concerning determination of significant hazards by providing certain examples (48 FR 14780) of amendments considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. The sixth of these examples refers to changes that either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within the limits established as acceptable.

The analyses that are referenced in this submittal have been demonstrated to comply with the licensing basis of the plant.

Thus, we believe that the example cited is applicable and that the changes should not involve significant hazards consideration.

3 4 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3 4 1 TURBINE CYCLE 3 4 1 1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within llOX of its design pressure of 1085 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient.

The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a turbine trip from 100X RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The safety valve is OPERABLE with a lift setting of +3X about the nominal value. However, the safety valve shall be reset to the nominal value +1X whenever found outside the +1X tolerance. The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 17,153,800 lbs/hr which is approximately 121 percent of the total secondary steam flow of 14,120,000 lbs/hr at 100X RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of 2 OPERABLE safety valves per operable steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels. The reactor trip setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For 4 loop operation Where:

SP reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER V maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line 1, 201 3.

X - Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line-4,288,450 lbs/hour.

Y Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve 857,690 lbs/hour (109) Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for 4 loop operation.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 AMENDMENT NO. 420

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T~~ 2 350 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE safety injection pump C. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger,

d. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump,

e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation, and

f. All safety injection cross-tie valves open.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. With a safety injection cross-tie valve closed, restore the cross-tie valve to the open position or reduce the core power level to less than or equal to 3250 MW within one hour. Specification 3.0.4 does not apply.

C. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 AMENDMENT NO.

TABLE 3 7-4 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING k 3X

• ORIFICE SIZE

a. SV-1 1065 psig 16 in. 2

b. SV-1 1065 psig 16 in. 2

c. SV-2 1075 psig 16 in. 2 SV-2 1075 psig 16 in. 2

e. SV-3 1085 psig 16 in. 2

• The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 7-4 AMENDMENT NO.

3 4 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3 4 5 1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each RCS accumulator- ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3 4 5 2 and 3 4 5 3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent .-ECCS - subsystems - ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

If a safety injection cross-tie valve is closed, safety injection would be limited to two lines assuming the loss of one safety injection subsystem through a single failure consideration. The resulting lowered flow requires a decrease in THERMAL POWER to limit the peak clad temperature within acceptable limits in the event of a postulated small break LOCA.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 AMENDMENT NO.

'I

'II

3 4 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3 4 7 1 TURBINE CYCLE 3 4 1 1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within llOX of its design pressure of 1085 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient.

The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a turbine trip from 100X RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The accordance specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The safety valve is OPERABLE with a lift setting of +3X about the nominal value. However, the safety valve shall be reset to the nominal value +1X whenever found outside the +1X"tolerance. The total relieving capacity of all safety valves on all of the steam lines is 17,153,800 lbs/hr which is at least 105 percent of the maximum secondary steam flow rate at 100X RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of 2 OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary syst: em steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels. The reactor trip setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For 4 loop operation Where:

SP - reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER V maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line X total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs./hours - 4,288,450 Y maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs./hour - 857,690 109 - Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for 4 loop operation COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 AMENDMENT NO. 8R, 434

ATTACHMENT 3 to AEP:NRC:1169 CURRENT PAGES MARKED-UP TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES

p n

P,s 5%

$ 065 paig 16 in.

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bo SV~1 $ 065 paid 16 in.

~ L I oi SV-l 1075 paiy 16 in.

do SV-0 $ 075 peag 16 in.

eo SV-3 $ 0l1 paiy 16 in.

Is 4

>C J

• The 1 Ct setting preaaure aha11 oorreapjnd to aahient oonditione ol the va1ve at noaina1 operating taaporature and preaaure'

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4 7 v v 0 The OPERhbILZTY of the aain steaa ltno, code safecy va ves ensures that ehe secondary syscsls pressure vill bo lhaicad co vtthtn ita design pressure of 1085 pstg during the sost severe anticipated systaa opera-tional transtonc. The maxbaus reltevtng cayactty is associaeed vtch a curbine trip froa 100% RATEQ ZHl9WhL POMER coincident vteh an assuaged loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steaa bypass to che condenser).

The specified valve lift seeetnga and relieving cayactttes are tn accordance vtth the roqutroaents of Section III of ehe ASIDE boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieving capacity for all valves on a o ehe aceaN nes s 17.153.800 lba/hr which is approximately 121 percent of che cocal secondary steam flov of 14,120,000 lba/hr ae, 100%

RATED THECAL PORR. A IMeua of 2 OPQAILE safeey valves yor operahlo sceaa generator ensures ehac sufficient relieving cayacity is avai lo for che allovable THECAL POMER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POMER OPERATION is allovabie vith safety val tnoyerable vtthtn ehe liateattona of eho ACTZOf requtrolenta on ehe basis of the. reduction in secondary systaa steaa flov and THEL%L PSKR required by the reduced reactor trip sectinga of the Pover Range Neutron Flux channels. The reactor eriy seepotnt reductions are derived on the foll,ovtng bases:

For 4 looy operaeton

~ <i r

@here:

SP reduced reactor trip secyotne, in.perconc of RATED THKM.

POMMER V ~ eaxhua nuabor of inoperable safecy valves per seoaa line 1,2or3.

X ~ Total relf.evtng capactty of all safety valves por, steam line 4, 288,450 lba/hour.

Y Naxiaua relieving cayacity of any one safecy valve

~ 857,690 lbs/hour.

(109) Paver Range Neutron Flux-High Trty Soepoine for 4 loop oyeracion.

1. C. COOK UNIT 1 5 3/4 V~1 hk92tMENT HO. 120

il5NT A safety valve is OPERABLE with a lift setting I'he of +3'5 about the neainal value. Hcaevir, the safety valve shall be reset to the neainal value +1%

whenever fegd outside the +1% tolerance.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T 350'F LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE safety inIjection pump,

c. One OPERABLE residual heat rsnoval heat exchanger,

d. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and

.e. 'n OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water. storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recir-

'i(

culation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY:

5c 4e tV I ni c.di<~ B~s'S- fi~S MOOES 1, 2 and 3.

~ ValYeS Q Pqh.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable sub-system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within he next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant; System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2

'thin 90 days de cribing the circumstances of'he actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

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O.C. COOK - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3

TABLE 3. 7-4

~ STEiMl LINE SAKTV VALVES PER LOOP 810 VALVE NEER LlFT SETTING -

• ORIFICE SIZE

a. SV-1 1065 ps ig n

b. SV-1 1065 psig l6 in.~

c. SV-2 1075 psig l6 in.~

4I. SV-2 1075 psig 16 in.~

e. SV-3 1085 psig 16 in.~

~e Iif~so Hng pressure shall correspond to aablent conditions of the va)ve at noainal operating temperature.aad pressure.

3/4. 5 9lHKKHCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5. I ACCUNlLATORS The OPERABILITY of each RCS accumulator ensures that a sufffcfent volume of borated ~ater will be immediately forced inta the reacto~ core through each af

,the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the fnitfal cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, baron concentration and pressure ensure that, the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered tc be "operating bypasses" fn the context af IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions

. are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail ta meet single faflure criteria, removal of power to the valves is requfred.

l The limits for aperatfan with an accumulator inaperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the tfme exposure of the plant ta a LOCA event accurring concurrent with failure af an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a clased isolation valve cannot be fmmediately opened, the full capability of cne accumulator fs not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4. 5. 2 and 3/4. 5. 3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency care caoling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the lass of cne subsystem thraugh any single failure cansideraticn.

Either subsystem operating in conjunctian with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficfent care caolfng ta limit the peak cladding temperatures wi thin acceptable limits for all postulatac break sfzes ranging fram the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem pravfdes Iong term care cooling capability in the recircuIation made during the accident. recave~ period.

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0. C. CQQK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 S-1 Amendment No. 39

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3 a.1. VE5 The OPQAbKITT of she as'tean line code safety valves ensures shat.she secondary system yressure K11 be limited so vithin ll4i of iss design yressure of 10IS ysig during the aost severe anticiyated syssea oyerasional transient. The aaxinui relieving cayacity is associated vith a turbine triy froa 100% NhTLO T8LRNAL NSLR coincidens vish an assumed loss of condenser heat si!Lk (i ~ no sc44$ byyass so the condenser)

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The syecifie4 valve lift settings sn4 relieving cayacities are in accordance vish the repaireaeats of Section ZZZ ef the hSNE Ioiler and

~ggggT'p Pressure Code, 1%71 kantian Th>> total relieving cayacity ot all safety va ves on ~ tbe steae lines is 17,U3,NO lbs/hr vhich is at least 10f yercens of she Sax~ secot~ sse40 f14& rate at 100% NAZE THtRHhL PSCR. A IiaCaa of 2 OtNASLI safety valves yer steaa generator ensures that sufficient relieving cayacity is <<vailable for the alliable.T!CECAL POMER restriction in Table 3.7 l.

STAKUt and/or NMKL OPNATBN ts allevabl>> vish safety valves inoyerable vithin'the limitations et the ACTZM eapatreaents en the basis of the reduction in'secondary sysc4$ sc448 fltcf <<n4 TSUllAL NIAL'.

required by the reduce4 reactor triy settings ot the Powc Range'eatr flm channels. The reactor tziy setyeint reductions are darive4 on the following bases:

tor 4 looy oyeration a (IH)

Shore:

~QL NOR aiy setyoint St ~ reduce4 reactor in yercent ot NATQ

~ aaiae aahor ef iaeyerab4 safety valves yer steaa Mae

~ +:: X ~ Qaa

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toeaL relieving eayacity ef all safety valves yer steaa ia lbs./hours I,2II,ASO SC

~ auiae relieving ia Qa./hour eayacity of

~ 057,HO

~ ene safety valve XM ~-tower Range %easren qua Nigh Tsiy Setyoins fer A looy eyeration COONl NUCLQR KhNT NZT 2 i )/i 701 aaSumC IO. N, <34