ML18078A521

Responds to 781116 Request for Info on Security Plan. Comments Incl Detailed Study to Determine Type I & II Vital Areas Is Unnecessary & Requests Response to Issues Raised in Kmc Ltr Re Insider Control Procedures

ML18078A521
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/14/1978
From:	Librizzi F Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18078A523	List: ML18078A521 ML18078A524
References
NUDOCS 7812210206
Download: ML18078A521 (7)

Text

• ,. e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201 /430-7000 December 14, 1978 Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

SECURITY PLAN SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 We have received your letter dated November 16, 1978, re-questing information on issues which the NRC staff feels are unresolved in our Salem Security Plan.

In response to the staff's concern on Vital Areas Desig-nation, P.S.E.&G. submits that 10CFR 73.55 makes no mention of categorizing vital areas into Type I or Type II as de-fined by Review Guideline #17. During the development of the Salem Security Plan, the only known Commission approved definition of vital are~s (10CFR 73.2(h)) was used and the vital areas at Salem are distinctly shown in the "Figures" section of the Security Plan. It is our position that a

~etailed study to determine Type I and Type II vital areas is unnecessary under the regulations; and would only create a document which could become a blueprint for saboteurs which would be revealed to intervenors and, as such, de-creases rather than increases security.

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In response to the staff's concern of "Insider" Control Pro-cedures; P.S.E.&G. is a member of the KMC Security Coordinat-ing Group and, as such, h~s participated in attempts to re-solve this issue. On November 28, 1978, KMC sent a letter to the Commission, on our behalf, which expresses our pre-sent position on the subject of the insider threat and the application of Review Guideline #23. We feel that a mean-ingful response to the issues raised in the KMC *letter should be made by the Commission before we reconsider our position. A copy of;*d::'hat letter is enclosed.

'I We strongly believe that our August 3, 1978 submittal of the Salem Security Plan represents a comprehensive program, ~

which when approved, would place us in complete compliance Cf..1 with all of the requirements of 10CFR 73.55, required for t-..0 implementation by February 23, 1979. __.) ~\\

The Energy People 7B1221 Cd..o(o 95-2001 (400M) 9-77

Mr. Albert Schwencer 12-14-78 We remain ready to discuss the staff's concerns and the items listed in the KMC letter or any other relevent information with you, the staff, or the Commission.

Very truly yours, F. P. Librizz General Manager -

Electric Production CC: Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.t. 20555 W/November 16, 1978 letter from Mr. Albert Schwencer Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.t. 20555 W/November 16, 1978 letter from Mr. Albert Schwencer

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On behalf of KMC, Inc. and the utilities listed in Attach-ment A we wish to apprise the Commission of the issuance of the Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Review Guideline #23, dated November 6, 1978, pertaining to security provisions for nuclear power plants. Review Guideline #23 (enclosed as Attachment B),

"Protection of Nuclear. Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage by the Insider," provides three options for the licensee to pro-tect against potential sabotage acts by the insider including:

(1) cqmpartmentalization, (2) two-man r*ule, or (3) personnel reliability. These options are not mentioned in the Commission's.

regulation of 10 CFR Part 73.55 and the issuance of this docu-ment represents a preemption by the staff of decisions on rule-making currently pending before the Commission since, in spite of the document title, our experience is that Review Guidelines are accorded the force and effect of rules by the staff reviewers.

As such, we believe this document, rather than solving any prob-lems, seriously aggravates reactor licensees' abilities to resolve their outstanding security plan issues prior to the existing February 23, 1979 deadline.

The first two options provided in Review Guideline #23, that of compartmentalization and two-man rule, have been long standing staff suggested generic solutions to the threat of the postulated insider to commit sabotage. These ideas were first suggested in a draft document, NUREG-0220, "Interim Acceptance Criteria for a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants,"

March, 1977. It was immediately recognized by licensees and dis-cussed with the NRC in a meeting on April 20, 1977, that neither approach provided a viable method to generically improve plant security and that these approaches introduced significant detri-mental safety and operational problems. In response to staff 781221. 0(7..l 0 KMC, Inc. 1747 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NW WASHINGTON. DC 20006 202, 223 3163

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Mr. Samu~l J. Chilk Novefnber 28, 1978 Page 2 requests for alternative suggestions, a number of industry studies and presentations have been made and submitted to the staff and the Commission which demonstrated adequate provision to meet the threat of an insider could be attained without imposing these onerous staff initiated requirements. One study of the insider threat was conducted by KMC, Inc. with the cooperation and sup-port of 24 utilities. The results and methodology of that study were.presented to both the NRC staff and an ACRS subcommittee, including closed sessions to discuss plant specific details; how-ever, we or any of the supporting utilities have not even been advised formally or informally of the NRC's findings. Five copies of the public version of that study are attached for your information.

The third option discussed in Review Guideline #23, obtain-ing clearances, cannot be i~plemented due to existing restrictions on the NRC's ability to grant clearances for other than national security. Justification for granting of security clearances does not include as a basis the protection of plants from acts of sabo-tage; hence, this option is a frivolous offer since at present it cannot be accomplished.

In a letter to the Commission dated May 3, 1978, we indi-cated that given sufficient time the staff and licensees could develop appropriate methods for improving physical security at nuclear power plants without employing methods (e.g., two-man rule and subcompartmentalization) which detract from safety and operability. We have made both formal and informal efforts to work with the staff to this end. We have been informed that until the staff completed its own evaluations (using a Sandia .

Laboratory developed computer model), they were not in a position to engage in such discussions. To our knowledge their evalua-tions were still incomplete at the time of issuing Review Guide-line #23 .

. In issuance and imposition of Review Guideline #23 there has been no recognition of the value impact of that decision nor opportunity for public comment. By Executive Order 12044 dated March 24, 1978, the President directed each Executive Agency to adopt procedures to improve existing and future regulations.

The Commission responded in 43 Federal Register 34356 that it would voluntarily implement that order and stated "the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is that value impact analy-sis be conducted for any proposed regulatory acti~ns that might

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk November 28, 1978 Page 3 impose a significant burden on the public (where the public is defined in its broadest sense)". In issuance of Review Guide-line #23 no value impact assessment was provided; however, we are aware of various impact studies for certain options discussed in Review Guideline #23. For example, a Commission sponsored report by Science Applications, Inc., SAI 77-868-LJ, dated May 4, 1978, provides some impact estimates of implementing the two-man rule. concept. Although, by our reference we are not ascribing agreement with that report, we note that SAI estimates an initial dollar cost of $536,000 and an annual cost of about $600,000 for each older plant which adopts this option. Further, they suggest that an increase .of about 15% in total radiation exposure could be expected. On the other side of the equation we have repeatedly expressed our view that little or no value is accrued from imposi-tion of the two-man rule for sabotage protection and that a nega-tive safety benefit is likely. Without debating absolute numbers, we can see no way in which a staff evaluation of Review Guideline

1. 23, had they provided one, could have other than a negative value-impact in each of the areas of security, safety and ALARA.

We consider the issuance of Review Guideline #23 to be extremely premature and in effect bypasses the established Com-mission method of rulemaking. KMC, Inc. on behalf of its utility clients has participated and currently has before the Commission motions for reconsideration and rulemaking which go to the heart of this issue. T~ese efforts include:

1. A petition for rulemaking requesting modification of 10 CFR Part 73.55(a) as it relates to the threat of the insider was filed with the Commission on June 9, 1978. By filing in the Federal Register on July 10, 1978, the Commission permitted 60 days comment on the petition. After expiration of the comment period, where no negative comments were received, we wrote a letter to Mr. Minogue on October 5, 1978, urging action and re-quested schedulin~ information. By letter dated November 6, 1978, Mr. Minogue indicated the Commission would not take action until February, 1979. By delaying response on our request until after the effective 10 CFR 73.55 implementation date of February 23, 1979, the staff is in effect subverting the rulemaking process by forcing compliance with the very regulations we are attempt-ing to have changed.

e Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Nove~er~28, 1978 Page' 4

2. A motion for reconsideration of the guard upgrade rule was filed with the Commission by KMC, Inc. on behalf of 21 util-ities on October 23, 1978. That motion requested that the imple-mentation of that rule be delayed until the entire threat level for sabotage to nuclear power plants could be reexamined. There has been no response to that petition.

3. KMC, Inc., with the support and sponsorship of 16 util-ities, participated in the R&U Clearances program hearings provid-ing testimony on employee screening on July 10 & 12, 1978. The hearing record with board recommendations on the efficacy of clearances is scheduled to be forwarded to the Commission by December 31, 1978.

In summary, we consider the actions of the staff in issuing Review Guideline #23, in addition to being insensitive to the recommendations of the licensees who must implement these require-ments, as. circumventing established rulemaking procedures and pro-ceedings already underway by the Commission. Accordingly, we con-sider it imperative that the Commission as an initial action take appropriate steps to have Review Guideline #23 withdrawn and further to direct the staff to develop guidelines for coping with the postulated insider threat which are achievable, are cost beneficial, and do not detract from plant safety. We repeat our offer on behalf of ourselves and our clients to assistthe staff in this *regard.

We would be pleased to meet with the Commission to provide any additional information required.

encl.

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Attachment A LIST OF PARTICIPATING UTILITIES Arizona Public Service Company Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Carolina Power and Light Company Commonwealth Edison Company Consumers Power Company Duke Power Company Duquesne Light Company Florida Power and Light Company GPU Corporation Nebraska Public Power District Northeast Utilities Service Company Northern States Power Company Omaha Public Power District Portland General Electric Company Public Service Electric and Gas Company Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Sacramento Municipal Utility District South Carolina. Electric and Gas Company Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Yankee Atomic Electric Company