IR 05000250/2010010

IR 05000250-10-010; Florida Power & Light Company; 11/29/210 - 12/03/2010; Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Inspection Report

ML110060770
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	01/06/2011
From:	Rich D NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To:	Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co
References
EA-10-037 IR-10-010
Download: ML110060770 (24)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 January 6, 2011 EA-10-037 Mr. Mano Nazar Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION PROCEDURES 95001 SUPPLEMENTAL AND 92702 FOLLOW UP - INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2010-010

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On December 3, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff completed the supplemental and follow up inspections pursuant to Inspection Procedures 95001, Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, and 92702, Follow Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternate Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders, at your Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed at the exit meeting on December 3, 2010 with Mr. Michael Kiley and other members of your staff. Implementation of corrective actions was discussed during a Regulatory Performance Meeting on December 30, 2010, with Mr. Paul Ruben and other members of your staff.

As required by the NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix, the supplemental and follow up inspections were performed because a White finding was identified, traditional enforcement was involved, and a Confirmatory Action Letter had been issued. These issues were documented previously in NRC Inspection Reports 05000250, 251/2009005, 05000250/2010008, 05000250/2010009, and Confirmatory Action Letter 2-2010-002 dated February 19, 2010. The NRC staff was informed on June 28, 2010, of your staffs readiness for the supplemental inspection, and on October 1, 2010, the NRC staff was informed of your completion of actions required by the commitments in the Confirmatory Action Letter.

The objectives of the supplemental inspection were to provide assurance that: (1) the root causes and the contributing causes for the risk-significant issues were understood; (2) the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issues were identified; and (3) the corrective actions for risk significant performance issues were sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The objectives of the follow up inspection were to provide assurance that: (1) adequate corrective actions have been implemented for the traditional enforcement violations and Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL); (2) required actions for the CAL are completed; and (3) the root causes of these enforcement actions have been identified, that their generic implications have been addressed, and that the licensee's programs and practices have been appropriately enhanced to prevent recurrence.

FP&L 2 The inspections consisted of an examination of activities conducted under your license as they related to safety, compliance with the Commission=s rules and regulations, and the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected documents, conducted field walk downs, and interviewed personnel.

The inspectors determined that your staff performed an adequate evaluation of the Severity Level (SL)-III violation and White finding. Your staff=s evaluation identified the root causes of the issue to be inadequate procedures for the evaluation of degraded SSCs as it relates to Technical Specification Section 5.0, and failure to develop a formal comprehensive plan to ensure that the spent fuel pool storage racks were maintained in accordance with the design basis. Your staff also identified that there was a lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to Technical Specification Section 5.0 and there was an inadequate use of the Corrective Action Program by staff when an unwanted condition was discovered. The inspectors found the extent of condition and extent of cause reviews were adequate, and the corrective actions implemented were adequate. The inspectors also found that the corrective actions taken for the non-cited violation were completed and were acceptable. In addition, the CAL commitments to address the degraded spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorbers have been implemented, and the inspectors concluded that you re-established compliance with your license requirements for the spent fuel pool storage racks.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. However, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. Because of the very low safety significance of the violation, and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC staff is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system, Agency wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Daniel W. Rich, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-250 License No.: DPR-31

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000250/2010010 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

____ML110060770______________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP HQ: NRR SIGNATURE JSD SON JCP4 NAME JDodson SNinh JPaige DATE 12/23/2010 12/27/2010 12/23/2010 12/ /2010 12/ /2010 12/ /2010 12/ /2010 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

FP&L 3

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-250 License No.: DPR-31 Report No.: 05000250/2010010 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 Location: 9760 S. W. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Dates November 29 through December 3, 2010 Inspectors: J. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer J. Paige, Project Manager, Turkey Point Approved by: D. Rich, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000250/2010010; 11/29/2010 - 12/03/2010; Turkey Point Nuclear

Plant, Unit 3; Supplemental Inspection - Inspection Procedure (IP) 95001 and Follow Up IP 92702.

Two regional senior project engineers and one project manager from headquarters performed this inspection. One licensee identified finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., green, white, yellow, or red) using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

The NRC staff performed the supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95001, Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to assess the licensee=s evaluation associated with the failure to comply with TS 5.5.1.1.a, and the failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. This resulted in the failure to effectively manage known degradation of Boraflex, a neutron absorber material used in the Turkey Point Unit 3 and Unit 4 spent fuel pools. The NRC staff previously characterized this issue as having low to moderate safety significance (White), as documented in NRC IR 05000250/2010009. In addition, NRC staff performed the follow up inspection for the Severity Level (SL) III violation for failure to report the condition to the NRC, in accordance with IP 92702, Follow Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters,

Confirmatory Orders, and Alternate Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders.

During these inspections, the inspectors determined that your staff performed an adequate evaluation of the causes of the SL-III violation and White finding. Your staff=s evaluation identified the root causes of the issue to be inadequate procedures for the evaluation of degraded SSCs as it relates to Technical Specification (TS) Section 5.0, and a failure to develop a comprehensive plan to ensure that the spent fuel storage racks were maintained in accordance with the design basis. Your staff also identified that there was a lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0, and there was an inadequate use of the Corrective Action Program by staff when an unwanted condition was discovered. The inspectors found the extent of condition and extent of cause reviews were adequate, and the corrective actions implemented were adequate.

The inspectors also found that the corrective actions taken for the non-cited violation were completed and acceptable. In addition, the commitments identified in Confirmatory Action Letter 2-2010-002 to address the degraded spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorbers have been implemented, and the inspectors concluded that you re-established compliance with your license requirements for the spent fuel pool storage racks.

As a result of the NRC conclusion that the licensee appropriately addressed the above issues, the White finding associated with this issue was closed and will be considered in assessing plant performance for a total of five quarters in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0305,

AOperating Reactor Assessment Program.@ The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of corrective actions and found them acceptable

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-250/2010-001-00, Spent Fuel Storage Design

Feature Assumption for Boraflex Exceeded (Closed) LER 50-250, 251/2010-001-01, Spent fuel Storage Design Feature Assumptions Are Exceeded Supplement The original LER documented that a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS)5.5.1.1.a occurred in 2001 when the areal density of portions of the west panel in Unit 3 Region II spent fuel pool (SFP) storage cell M-16 was determined to be less than the licensing basis analysis minimum areal density of 0.006 gm-B10/cm square. The cause of the non-compliance with TS was Boraflex degradation. Interim measures were subsequently implemented to compensate for Boraflex degradation using empty storage spaces or rod cluster control assemblies to offset the Boraflex loss. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to recognize that Turkey Point Unit 3 no longer complied with the requirements of TS 5.5.1.1.a, and therefore, failed to report to the NRC the deviation from a licensing basis associated with TS 5.5.1.1.a, SFP criticality requirements. A Severity Level (SL) III violation with a Civil Penalty (CP) of $70,000.00 was issued for failure to provide notification to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This violation was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000250/2010009, Final Significance Determination of White Finding and Notice of Violation, dated June 21, 2010. The inspectors verified that a new licensing basis was implemented that no longer relies on Boraflex as a neutron absorber in the Unit 3 and Unit 4 SFPs.

As a result of an extent of condition review, flow -damaged storage cells in both Unit 3 and Unit 4 SFPs have been determined to not meet TS 5.5.1.1.c, which requires a nominal center- to- center spacing distance of 9.0 inches. The top of the cell walls in four Unit 3 and two Unit 4 SFP storage cells were identified to be damaged in 2005. The cause was attributed to high cycle fatigue due to flow induced vibration from the SFP cooling system discharge piping located above the affected cells. The damaged walls of the identified storage cells no longer maintained the required separation that met the nominal licensing basis center-to-center distance of 9.0 inches. The licensee identified that this was a non compliance with TS 5.5.1.1.c and subsequently submitted a supplemental LER to NRC on November 22, 2010. The inspectors determined that this finding was a licensee-identified violation (LIV) of low safety significance because these cells have never been used to store fuel, since they are inaccessible due to the configuration of spent fuel pool discharge piping. The affected and adjacent cells have been administratively removed from service. The analysis confirmed that the damaged SFP storage cells were structurally adequate and would maintain integrity during seismic events, even with the damaged cells. The enforcement aspect of the issue is documented in Section 4OA7 of this report. The inspectors determined that the licensee documented a corrective action in the CAP. While a permanent solution is being developed, the licensee will inspect these damaged cells once a year during fuel inventory, to ensure these storage racks remain structurally adequate. These LERs are closed.

4OA4 Supplemental Inspection

.01 Inspection Scope

The NRC staff performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95001 to assess the licensees evaluation of a White finding, which affected the Initiating Events cornerstone in the reactor safety strategic performance area. The inspection objectives were to:

• provide assurance that the root and contributing causes of risk-significant issues were understood;

• provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of risk-significant issues were identified; and

• provide assurance that the licensees corrective actions for the risk-significant issue were sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and to preclude repetition.

The licensee entered the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix in the fourth quarter of 2009 as a result of one inspection finding of low to moderate (White)safety significance. The finding was associated with the failure to comply with TS 5.5.1.1.a, and the failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality.

This resulted in the failure to effectively manage known degradation of Boraflex, a neutron absorber material used in the Turkey Point Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The finding was characterized as having low to moderate safety significance based on the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix M analysis. This issue was documented in inspection reports 05000250, 251/2009005, 05000250/2010008 and 05000250/2010009. The licensees commitments to restore compliance with license requirements were documented in Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-2010-002, dated February 19, 2010.

The NRC staff was informed on June 28, 2010, of your staffs readiness for the supplemental 95001 inspection, and on October 1, 2010 the NRC staff was informed of your completion of actions required by the commitments in the CAL. In preparation for the inspection, the licensee performed a root cause evaluation (RCE) to identify the root causes, contributing causes, organizational weaknesses, programmatic weaknesses, extent of condition and extent of cause that existed and resulted in the White finding.

The RCE was documented in the CAP as Action Request 567353. The licensee also evaluated safety culture components and identified immediate corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees RCE in addition to other evaluations conducted in support of and as a result of the RCE. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions that were taken and implemented to address the identified causes. The inspectors also held discussions with various licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes were understood, the contribution of safety culture components were understood, and corrective actions taken and implemented were appropriate to address the causes and prevent recurrence.

.02 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements

02.01 Problem Identification a. The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation of the issue documented that these non-compliances were not recognized by FPL until identified by the NRC. The NRC identified the issue during an annual problem identification and resolution sample review, and documented the Finding in inspection report 05000250, 251/2009005. The inspectors verified that this information was documented in the licensees condition report (CR) 2010-6254 and the RCE (AR567353567353.

b. The inspectors determined that the licensees RCE documented that from 2004 to May 10, 2010, Turkey Point failed to:

• Report to the NRC a condition that was prohibited by Technical Specifications.

• Maintain the Unit 3 spent fuel pool storage rack design such that Keff would remain less than 1.0 when flooded with unborated water.

• Promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Additionally, the RCE documented prior opportunities for identification which began with an operability evaluation performed for CR 2001-0234.

c. The NRC determined this issue was a White finding, as documented in IR 05000250/2010009. The licensees RCE documented that the finding associated with this issue had low to moderate safety significance. In addition, the RCE documented:

• The lack of a formal comprehensive plan resulted in incorrectly maintaining the design features of the SFP racks using knowledge based versus rule based controls.

• The compensatory measures, while appropriate for reactivity control, would not satisfy TS 5.5.1.1, since these compensatory measures were not part of the design as described in the UFSAR.

• The conclusion from CR 2001-0234 was carried forward for multiple years and was the basis for future incorrect assessments that concluded that continued compliance was being maintained.

• A White inspection finding from the NRC.

• There were two missed opportunities for the organization to document and correct the misunderstanding about the spent fuel rack design requirements.

• The need for a Boraflex remedy license amendment and the need to request taking credit for Metamic inserts, RCCAs, waterholes and administrative controls to remove reliance on Boraflex as a neutron absorber.

• The Condition Report 2004-3226 operability evaluation incorrectly concluded that compliance was met by assuring the Keff requirements of TS 5.5.1.1 were met, and therefore the condition was not reportable.

The licensee documented that the UFSAR, Chapter 5, Appendix 5A, designates the spent fuel pool (SFP) and racks as Class I structures, whose failure could cause an uncontrolled release of radioactivity in excess of the established guidelines prescribed in 10 CFR 100. In addition, the licensee documented the basis for determining nuclear safety significance including compensatory measures for the Boraflex degradation and compliance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4). The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately documented the risk consequences and compliance concerns associated with the issue.

d. Findings

No findings were identified.

02.02 Root Cause, Extent of Condition, and Extent of Cause Evaluation a. The inspectors determined that the licensee evaluated the issue using a systematic methodology to identify the root and contributing causes.

The licensee used the following systematic methods to complete the RCE:

• data gathering through interviews and document review;

• timeline construction;

• failure modes analysis;

• control barrier analysis; and

• Event and causal factors chart.

The licensee used both a failure modes analysis and barrier analysis to evaluate human performance issues. The inspectors determined that the licensee evaluated the issue using a systematic methodology to identify root and contributing causes.

b.

The licensees RCE included a timeline of events and an event and causal factor tree as discussed in the previous section. The licensee also identified several missed opportunities for identification of the issue related to programmatic and organizational failures. The licensees RCE documented the root causes of the issue to be failure to develop a formal comprehensive plan to ensure that the spent fuel storage racks were maintained in accordance with the design basis and inadequate procedures for the evaluation of degraded SSCs relative to TS Section 5.0. The licensee determined that the contributing causes included lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0 and inadequate use of the Corrective Action Program when an unwanted condition was discovered.

The inspectors concluded that the root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem.

c. The licensees RCE included an evaluation of internal and external OE. The licensee considered prior occurrences and industry OE. As a result of this review, the licensee determined that OE was used to evaluate both reportability and compliance with design bases, however an incorrect conclusion was reached. The licensee concluded that personnel did not recognize that the condition was outside of facility design basis, and that the conditions, which were prohibited by TS, were reportable.

In addition, the licensee performed a safety culture attribute evaluation, which identified procedural and training inadequacies. Based on review of the licensees evaluation and conclusions, the inspectors determined that the licensees RCE included a consideration of prior internal and external occurrences of the problem, and misinterpretation of the available OE.

d. The licensees evaluation considered the extent of condition associated with the SFP racks not being maintained as designed, incorrect reportability determination for operation prohibited by TS, and the failure to recognize in a timely manner that a condition adverse to quality developed separately from a known evaluated level of degradation. In 2005 the licensee determined that there was damage to the Unit 3 and Unit 4 SFP racks in the area of the cooling line discharge pipe and deferred the resolution of the flow induced damage. These concerns, which were previously documented in CR 2005-12609 and CR 2005-33602, are captured in follow up corrective actions from the licensees extent of condition evaluation. In addition, the licensees RCE documented potential weaknesses and corrective actions in evaluations conducted for thirteen RIS 2005-20 items, thirty items on the Margin List, and twenty-four items on the Maintenance Rule (A)(1) list.

The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition and found that the licensees review was not documented in adequate detail to fully substantiate the conclusions reached regarding operability and reportability of some identified issues. The inspectors conducted an independent assessment of two of those issues; control room habitability and ECCS leakage. The inspectors determined that the licensees conclusions were valid; however, the documentation in the RCE did not contain adequate depth.

The licensees evaluation also considered the extent of cause associated with the inadequate procedures for the evaluation of degraded SSCs as it related to TS Section 5.0, the lack of a formal comprehensive plan to ensure that the spent fuel storage racks were maintained in accordance with the design basis, lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0, and inadequate use of the Corrective Action Program when an unwanted condition is discovered. The licensee staff determined that TS Section 6, Administrative Requirements are to be included in process and procedure upgrades wherever TS Section 5 requirements are added. Juno Beach (JB) processes and procedures that interface and provide evaluation input to Turkey Point are to be upgraded. The licensee determined that a review of the listing of SSCs from Section 5 and 6 of TS identified that corresponding programs and processes for managing the systems conditions do exist as documented in the RCE. Additionally, the extent of cause identified that personnel who participate in operability and reportability evaluations for Turkey Point have a lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0. An operating experience review was also performed by the licensee.

The inspectors concluded that the licensees RCE was adequate to address the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issue.

e. The licensee found weaknesses in the cross-cutting areas of Human Performance, in the components of decision making and resources, and in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in the component of corrective action program. The licensee found that there was no formal Boraflex degradation management plan, there was a deviation from the license basis, there was lack of knowledge related to TS Section 5.0, there was lack of adequate guidance for reportability, the issue was not properly reported to the NRC, and the degradation was not properly identified. The licensee identified that these weakness correlate to cross-cutting aspects H.1.a, H.1.b, H.2.b, H.2.c, P.1.c, and P.1.d as described in IMC 0310, dated February 23, 2010.

The inspectors determined that the licensees RCE included a proper consideration of whether a weakness in any safety culture component was a root cause or a significant contributing cause of the issue.

f. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

02.03 Corrective Actions a. The inspectors found that the licensee identified corrective actions for the root causes, contributing causes, extent of cause, and extent of condition, listed in the RCE were appropriate. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions planned and taken as listed in the RCE to address the White finding were appropriate and adequate to address the issue.

b. The interim corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence were prioritized, scheduled and implemented accordingly. The licensees corrective actions to address the root causes, contributing causes, extent of cause and extent of condition corrective actions were prioritized and implemented. This prioritization considered licensing, regulatory performance and nuclear safety. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were appropriately prioritized with consideration for risk significance and regulatory compliance.

c. The licensee established a schedule for the implementation and completion of corrective actions, as described in RCE CR 2010-6254 and RCE AR 567353567353 Attachment 2. The inspectors determined that the licensee restored full compliance on November 22, 2010.

d. As documented in RCE AR 567353567353 Attachment 4, the licensee established measures for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions. These measures included the following:

• A formal self-assessment of the SFP management program will be performed between six and twelve months following implementation of the governing document. The assessment must conclude that the Unit 3 and 4 SFPs have been maintained in accordance with their design requirements in order to declare this corrective action as effective

• A multi-disciplined assessment team will validate that reportability determinations have been correctly performed within eighteen months from the MRC approval date of this evaluation. The team will review all CRs on SSCs contained in TS Section 5.0 which had the attribute of reportable to the NRC? marked as No.

The team must conclude that reportability determination procedures were followed and that the correct conclusion was reached in order to declare this corrective action as effective.

The licensee staff entered these corrective action items into their corrective action program to ensure that these effectiveness reviews and enhanced monitoring are performed. The inspectors determined that quantitative and qualitative measures of success had been developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

e. The NRC issued an NOV to the licensee on June 21, 2010. The licensee provided the NRC written responses to the NOV on July 21, 2010 and November 24, 2010. The licensees responses described:

(1) corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved;

(2) corrective steps which will be taken;

(3) the date when full compliance will be achieved; and

(4) the reasons for the violation. During this inspection, the inspectors confirmed that the licensees RCEs listed planned and corrective actions implemented to address the NOV. The licensee restored full compliance on November 22, 2010.

f. Findings and Observations

The inspectors reviewed White violation 05000250/201009-01, Violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 regarding Unit 3 spent fuel storage with degraded Boraflex panels, and failure to implement corrective actions regarding the Unit 3 spent fuel pool operation with degraded Boraflex. The inspectors concluded that the RCEs were adequate and conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problems, and the corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence. These items are closed.

02.04 Evaluation of IMC 0305 Criteria for Treatment of Old Design Issues The licensee did not request credit for self-identification of an old design issue; therefore, the risk-significant issue was not evaluated against the IMC 0305 criteria for treatment of an old design issue.

4OA5 Follow up Inspection

.01 Inspection Scope

The NRC staff performed this follow up inspection in accordance with IP 92702 to assess the licensees evaluation of the traditional enforcement SL-III violation for failure to make the required notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, the NCV involving the failure to update the UFSAR, and the Confirmatory Action Letter commitments to address the degraded spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorbers. The inspection objectives were to:

• determine that adequate corrective actions have been implemented for the traditional enforcement violations;

• determine if commitments in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) have been implemented;

• verify that the root causes of these enforcement actions have been identified;

• determine if their generic implications have been addressed; and

• determine that the licensee's programs and practices have been appropriately enhanced to prevent recurrence.

The licensee was informed by inspection report 05000250/2010009, dated June 21, 2010, of the traditional enforcement violations which were previously documented in inspection reports 05000250/2010008, and 05000250, 251/2009005. These violations were associated with the failure to provide notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, and failure to update the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

The NRC staff was informed on June 28, 2010, of your staffs readiness for the supplemental 95001 inspection, and on October 1, 2010, the NRC staff was informed of your completion of actions required by the commitments in the Confirmatory Action Letter. In preparation for the inspection, the licensee performed a root cause evaluation (RCE) for Action Request (AR) 567353, to identify the root causes, contributing causes, organizational weaknesses, programmatic weaknesses, extent of condition and extent of cause, that existed and resulted in the White finding, and the SL-III and non-cited violations. The licensee also evaluated safety culture components and identified immediate corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees RCE in addition to other evaluations conducted in support of and as a result of the RCE. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions that were taken and implemented to address the identified causes. The inspectors also conducted field verifications and visual inspections of the spent fuel pool areas and held discussions with various licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes and the contribution of safety culture components were understood. The inspectors verified that corrective actions planned and implemented were appropriate to address the causes and prevent recurrence.

.02 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements

02.01 Corrective Actions a. The inspectors verified that the licensee management assigned responsibility for implementing corrective actions, including update of the UFSAR, submission of a Licensee Event Report (LER), and changes to applicable procedures and processes.

b. The NRC issued an NOV to the licensee on June 21, 2010. The licensee provided the NRC written responses to the NOV on July 21, 2010, and November 24, 2010. The licensees responses described:

(1) corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved;

(2) corrective steps which will be taken;

(3) the date when full compliance will be achieved; and

(4) the reasons for the violation. During this inspection, the inspectors confirmed that the licensees RCEs listed planned and corrective actions implemented to address the NOV. The inspectors concluded that the licensee restored full compliance on November 22, 2010.

c.

Inspectors determined that follow up actions were delineated and scheduled in the RCE (AR 567353567353 as measures of effectiveness for corrective actions.

d.

The inspectors determined that the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) commitments to address the degraded spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorbers have been implemented. The inspection team concluded that Turkey Point re-established compliance with their license requirements for the spent fuel pool storage racks.

02.02 Root Cause Analysis a. The licensees RCE used both a failure modes analysis and barrier analysis to evaluate human performance issues. The inspectors determined that the licensee evaluated the issue using a systematic methodology to identify root and contributing causes.

The inspectors determined that the licensees RCE included a consideration of prior internal and external occurrences of the problem and available operating experience (OE); addressed the extent of condition and the extent of cause of the issue; and included a proper consideration of whether a weakness in any safety culture component was a root cause or a significant contributing cause of the issue.

During this inspection, the inspectors confirmed that the licensees RCEs listed implemented and planned corrective actions to address the NOV. The inspectors concluded that the RCEs were adequate and conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem. The licensee restored full compliance on November 22, 2010.

b. Findings and Observations

The inspectors reviewed Confirmatory Action Letter 2-2010-02 dated February 19, 2010, the licensee commitments specified in the CAL, and actions taken to address the degraded spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorbers. The inspectors verified and concluded that the licensee was in compliance with Technical Specification Amendments 234 and 229. The inspectors concluded that the licensee re-established compliance with their license requirements for the spent fuel pool storage racks. This item is closed.

The inspectors reviewed the SL-III violation, 05000250/201009-02, failure to report Unit 3 spent fuel pool operation with degraded Boraflex. The inspectors also reviewed NCV 05000250/201009-03, failure to update the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR part 50.71(e), to ensure that the FSAR accurately reflects significant changes made to the facility. The inspectors concluded that the RCEs were adequate and conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem, and that the corrective actions identified were adequate to prevent recurrence. This item is closed.

02.03 Generic Implications Analysis The licensees RCE considered the extent of condition associated with the SFP racks not being maintained as designed, incorrect reportability determination for operation prohibited by TS, and the failure to recognize in a timely manner that a condition adverse to quality developed separate from a known evaluated level of degradation. The licensee determined that there was damage to the Unit 3 and Unit 4 SFP racks in the area of the cooling line discharge pipe. The resolution of the flow induced damage to the cells has been deferred. These concerns, which were previously documented in CR 2005-12609 and CR 2005-33602, were captured in follow up corrective actions from the licensees extent of condition evaluation. In addition, the licensees RCE documented evaluations conducted for thirteen RIS 2005-20 items, thirty items on the reduced margin list, and twenty-four items on the Maintenance Rule (A)(1) list.

The licensees evaluation also considered the extent of cause associated with the inadequate procedures for the evaluation of degraded SSCs as it related to TS Section 5.0, the lack of a formal comprehensive plan to ensure that the spent fuel storage racks were maintained in accordance with their design, lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0, and inadequate use of the Corrective Action Program when an unwanted condition is discovered. The licensee staff determined that TS Section 6, Administrative Requirements are to be included in process and procedure upgrades where ever TS Section 5 requirements are added.

Juno Beach (JB) processes and procedures that interface and provide evaluation input to Turkey Point are to be upgraded. The licensee review of the listing of SSCs from Section 5 and 6 of TS have identified that corresponding programs and processes for managing the systems conditions do exist as documented in RCE AR 567353567353

Additionally, the extent of cause identified that personnel who participate in operability and reportability evaluations for Turkey Point have a lack of knowledge in reviewing design basis compliance as it relates to TS Section 5.0.

An OE review was also performed by the licensee. The licensees RCE included an evaluation of internal and external OE. The licensee considered prior occurrences and industry OE. As a result of this review, the licensee determined that OE was used to evaluate both reportability and compliance with design bases; however, an incorrect conclusion was reached.

The inspectors concluded that the licensees RCE adequately addressed the generic implications of the issue in both the extent of condition and extent of cause analysis, and in the operating experience review.

4OA6 Meetings

On December 3, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Michael Kiley, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the inspection that was considered proprietary and was not returned. The licensee did not identify any proprietary information that was not returned.

On December 30, 2010, a Regulatory Performance Meeting was held by telephone conference with Mr. Paul Ruben and other members of his staff. Licensee staff discussed implementation of corrective actions. NRC staff reviewed the Oversight Process timeline for closing inspection findings.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the Licensee and constituted a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.

• 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(B), states that the licensee shall report (to the NRC), any condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Technical Specification 5.5.1.1.c requires in part that a nominal 9.0 inch center-to-center distance for the Region II storage rack cells shall be maintained. Contrary to the above, in 2005 a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications was not reported to the NRC after the licensee identified the top of the cell walls in four Unit 3 and two Unit 4 SFP storage cells were damaged and no longer maintained the required separation that met the nominal licensing basis center-to-center distance of 9.0 inches. This issue was determined to be low safety significance because these cells have never been used to store fuel since they are not accessible due to interference from the discharge piping. The affected and adjacent cells have been administratively removed from service. The analysis results confirmed that the Unit 3 storage rack had significantly more damage than the Unit 4 racks, however they were structurally adequate to maintain their integrity during seismic events even with the damaged cells. These flow-damaged cells were discussed and documented in condition reports (CRs) 2005-12609, 2005-33602, 2006-13611, 2008-7031, and 2010-6225. The licensee has a monitoring plan in the CAP program to inspect these damaged cells once a year during the fuel inventory to ensure these storage racks still are structurally adequate while developing a permanent solution.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

J. Alvarez, Program Improvement Manager

N. Bach, Work Control Manager

C. Bibles, Juno Beach Engineering Programs Manager

M. Caselli, Engineering Manager

C. Cashwell, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Coffey, Maintenance Manager

N. Constance, Training Manager

M. Crosby, QA Manager

S. Franzone, EPU Manager

J. Garcia, FPL Engineering Site Director

M. Guth, Configuration Control Management Supervisor

T. Jones, Operations Shift Manager

C. Khan, Human Resource Manager

M. Kiley, Site Vice President

G. Mendoza, Chemistry Manager

L. Nicholson, Director, Fleet Licensing

C. OFarrill, Juno Beach Nuclear Fuels Manager

R. Tomonto, Licensing Manager

C. Villard, Nuclear Fuels Director

J. Voohrees, Fleet ECP Manager

NRC personnel

D. Rich, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3

S. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point

M. Barillas, Resident Inspector, Turkey Point

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

05000250/2010-001-00 LER Spent Fuel Storage Design Feature Assumption for Boraflex Degradation is exceeded (Section 4OA3)

05000250, 251/2010-001-01 LER Spent fuel Storage Design Feature Assumptions Are Exceeded, Supplement (Section 4OA3)

2-2010-02 CAL Confirmatory Action Letter - Turkey Point Unit Commitments to Address Degraded Spent Fuel Pool Storage Rack Neutron Absorber dated February 19, 2010 (Section 4OA5.02.02.b)

05000250/201009-01 VIO Violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 regarding Unit 3 spent fuel storage with degraded Boraflex poison (Section 4OA4.02.03.f. (tracked in the NRC Reactor Program System as

05000250/2009005-03);

and Failure to implement corrective actions regarding the Unit 3 spent fuel pool operation with degraded Boraflex (Section 4OA4.02.03.f), (tracked in the NRC Reactor Program System as

05000250/2009005-05).

05000250/201009-02 VIO Failure to report Unit 3 spent fuel pool operation with degraded Boraflex (Section 4OA5.02.02.b). This item was tracked in the NRC Reactor Program System as

05000250/2009005-04.

05000250/201009-03 NCV Failure to update the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.71(e) so that the reports accurately reflect significant changes made to the facility. This item was tracked in the NRC Reactor Program System as

05000250/2009005-06.

Discussed

None