ML082120390: Difference between revisions

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Though the SSF exterior concrete wall was not originally designed for external flooding due to a Jocassee dam failure, the design of the SSF exterior concrete wall is considered to be inherently capable of providing adequate flood protection." Bolted plate and bolted access plate located at CO 2 fill lines that penetrate the South wall of the SSF.An access hole through the bolted plate that surrounds the CO 2 fill lines at the South wall penetration was installed to provide a path for providing temporary power to the SSF. Since the access hole is located below 801', the bolted access cover shall be installed to provide external flood protection.
Though the SSF exterior concrete wall was not originally designed for external flooding due to a Jocassee dam failure, the design of the SSF exterior concrete wall is considered to be inherently capable of providing adequate flood protection." Bolted plate and bolted access plate located at CO 2 fill lines that penetrate the South wall of the SSF.An access hole through the bolted plate that surrounds the CO 2 fill lines at the South wall penetration was installed to provide a path for providing temporary power to the SSF. Since the access hole is located below 801', the bolted access cover shall be installed to provide external flood protection.
* SSF sewer system piping including check valve ST-53 and downstream SSF sewer system piping located inside the SSF.Check valve ST-53 prevents flood water from entering the SSF via the SSF sewer system.,16.9.21-2 06/30/08 1 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 Piping and electrical exterior wall penetration seals located below 801' elevation.
* SSF sewer system piping including check valve ST-53 and downstream SSF sewer system piping located inside the SSF.Check valve ST-53 prevents flood water from entering the SSF via the SSF sewer system.,16.9.21-2 06/30/08 1 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 Piping and electrical exterior wall penetration seals located below 801' elevation.
When flood protection integrity of the SSF is degraded, a risk assessment shall be performed immediately by RA A.1. RA A.1 is required to be performed in conjunction with either, RA A.2.1 to implement compensatory measures in accordance with Table 16.9.21-1 or RA A.2.2 to restore SSF External Flood Protection Integrity within 7 days. A 7-day Completion Time is sufficient for either of these RA.Table 16.9.21-1 Compensatory Actions Com# Protective Measure Compensatory Actions 1 Flood protection integrity of the 1. Place sandbags at breach.SSF building shall be maintained  
When flood protection integrity of the SSF is degraded, a risk assessment shall be performed immediately by RA A.1. RA A.1 is required to be performed in conjunction with either, RA A.2.1 to implement compensatory measures in accordance with Table 16.9.21-1 or RA A.2.2 to restore SSF External Flood Protection Integrity within 7 days. A 7-day Completion Time is sufficient for either of these RA.Table 16.9.21-1 Compensatory Actions Com# Protective Measure Compensatory Actions 1 Flood protection integrity of the 1. Place sandbags at breach.SSF building shall be maintained
: 2. Place sealing materials at breach.3. Take other appropriate measures to provide flood protection to SSF.This SLC addresses SSF external flood protection which is considered in the Oconee PRA for floods up to elevation 801'. SSF External flood protection is not a licensed requirement of the SSF. Therefore, entry into Condition A of this SLC does not require entry into any TS.However, there is a potential that the SSF's mitigation of a Turbine Building flood could be affected if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.
: 2. Place sealing materials at breach.3. Take other appropriate measures to provide flood protection to SSF.This SLC addresses SSF external flood protection which is considered in the Oconee PRA for floods up to elevation 801'. SSF External flood protection is not a licensed requirement of the SSF. Therefore, entry into Condition A of this SLC does not require entry into any TS.However, there is a potential that the SSF's mitigation of a Turbine Building flood could be affected if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.
Condition B requires immediate entry into applicable TS (TS 3.10.1 Condition A, B, C, D, and E) if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.Condition C will also initiate a PIP within 24 hours if required actions and associated completion times are not met.The Actions are modified by a NOTE that states that the Conditions are not applicable if SSF External Flood protection integrity is breached due to planned maintenance activities which require contingency measures prior to breaching the barrier. Contingencies as specified by Table 16.9.21-1 or the Control of Passive Design Features Site Directive will be in place when SSF External Flood protection integrity is intentionally breached.
Condition B requires immediate entry into applicable TS (TS 3.10.1 Condition A, B, C, D, and E) if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.Condition C will also initiate a PIP within 24 hours if required actions and associated completion times are not met.The Actions are modified by a NOTE that states that the Conditions are not applicable if SSF External Flood protection integrity is breached due to planned maintenance activities which require contingency measures prior to breaching the barrier. Contingencies as specified by Table 16.9.21-1 or the Control of Passive Design Features Site Directive will be in place when SSF External Flood protection integrity is intentionally breached.
SLC actions will not be required.16.9.21-3 06/30/08 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 REFERENCES
SLC actions will not be required.16.9.21-3 06/30/08 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 REFERENCES
: 1) OSS-0254.00-00-1005,-Design Basis Document for SSF ASW System 2) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report dated December 21, 1995 3) Letter from JW Hampton (Duke) to NRC dated 3/14/94, Providing Response to Several Findings from the Service Water Audit.4) Letter from AF Gibson (NRC) to JW Hampton (Duke) dated 2/21/94, Sending Notice of Violation and Deviation for Service Water Audit.5) Generic Letter 88-20, dated 11/23/88, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities" 6) Letter from JF Stolz (NRC) to HB Tucker (Duke), dated 8/14/85, Providing Review of the Oconee PRA that was Performed in Conjunction with NAC of EPRI.7) NSD 213, "Risk Management Process." 8) NSD 415, "Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 9) NSD 403, "Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6, and No-Mode) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 10) PIP 0-05-3770, SSF Risk Reduction PIP 11) PIP 0-05-4978, Access panel on south side of SSF below flood level 12) PIP 0-06-740, SSF sewage lift station vent line elevation is too low to prevent backflow into the SSF during a Turbine Building Flood.13) PIP 0-06-5375, MRFF on SSF Flood System 14) PIP 0-06-5649, NRC letter dated August 31,2006, issued a preliminary white finding, associated with a failure to maintain control of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) flood protection barrier.15) O-320-Z-3, External Barrier Walls Concrete 16) OSC-631, Standby Shutdown Facility Design 17) SD 3.2.16, Control of Passive Design Features 16.9.21-4 06/30/08 I}}
: 1) OSS-0254.00-00-1005,-Design Basis Document for SSF ASW System 2) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report dated December 21, 1995 3) Letter from JW Hampton (Duke) to NRC dated 3/14/94, Providing Response to Several Findings from the Service Water Audit.4) Letter from AF Gibson (NRC) to JW Hampton (Duke) dated 2/21/94, Sending Notice of Violation and Deviation for Service Water Audit.5) Generic Letter 88-20, dated 11/23/88, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities" 6) Letter from JF Stolz (NRC) to HB Tucker (Duke), dated 8/14/85, Providing Review of the Oconee PRA that was Performed in Conjunction with NAC of EPRI.7) NSD 213, "Risk Management Process." 8) NSD 415, "Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 9) NSD 403, "Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6, and No-Mode) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 10) PIP 0-05-3770, SSF Risk Reduction PIP 11) PIP 0-05-4978, Access panel on south side of SSF below flood level 12) PIP 0-06-740, SSF sewage lift station vent line elevation is too low to prevent backflow into the SSF during a Turbine Building Flood.13) PIP 0-06-5375, MRFF on SSF Flood System 14) PIP 0-06-5649, NRC letter dated August 31,2006, issued a preliminary white finding, associated with a failure to maintain control of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) flood protection barrier.15) O-320-Z-3, External Barrier Walls Concrete 16) OSC-631, Standby Shutdown Facility Design 17) SD 3.2.16, Control of Passive Design Features 16.9.21-4 06/30/08 I}}

Revision as of 08:50, 12 July 2019

Revisions to the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)
ML082120390
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/2008
From: Baxter D
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML082120390 (25)
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Text

Duke DAVE BAXTER Energy. Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation ON01 VP17800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864-885-4460 864-885-4208 fax dabaxter@dukeenergy.

corn July 28, 2008 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket 50-269, -270, -287 Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.4 and 50.71, please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC). SLC Change 2006-09 will add SLC 16.9.21, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) External Flood Protection in order to identify barriers that must be maintained for the SSF to be capable of mitigating a Jocassee dam failure induced externalflood.

Very truly yours, Dave B xter V ice resident Oconee Nuclear Station RGJ/rgj Attachment www. duke-energy.

corn U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 28, 2008 Page 2 xc: Mr. Luis Reyes Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Lenny Olshan Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Andy Hutto Senior NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station Bxc: ELL ONS Document Management MR Coordinator (Ron Harris)

July 28, 2 008

Subject:

Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)Revision On 6/26/08, Station Management approved Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) 2006-09 to add SLC 16.9.21, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) External Flood Protection in order to identify barriers that must be maintained for the SSF to be capable of mitigating a Jocasee dam failure induced external flood.Please revise your manual as instructed below.Remove these pages Insert these pages 16.0-1 thru 6.0-6 16.0-1 thru 6.0-6 SLC Page 16.9.21-1 SLC Page 16.9.21-2 SLC Page 16.9.21-3 SLC Page 16.9.21-4 Any questions concerning these revisions may be directed to Reene' Gambrell at 864-885-3364.

By: Gail Joyner Regulatory Compliance Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date LOEP 1 06/30/08 LOEP 2 2/05/08 LOEP 3 3/31/08 LOEP 4 3/9/06 LOEP 5 1/04/07 LOEP 6 02/05/08 LOEP 7 3/10/08 LOEP 8 06/30/08 LOEP 9 12/04/07 LOEP 10 12/04/07 LOEP 11 11/08/07 LOEP 12 9/i 0/07 16.0-1 06/30/08 16.0-2 06/30/08 16.0-3 06/30/08 16.0-4 06/30/08 16.0-5 06/30/08 16.0-6 06/30/08 16.1-1 10/15/07 16.2-1 3/27/99 16.2-2 3/27/99 16.2-3 3/27/99 16.3-1 3/27/99 16.5.1-1 7/18/00 16.5.1-2 7/18/00 16.5.1-3 7/18/00 16.5.2-1 5/11/99 16.5.2-2 5/11/99 16.5.2-3 5/11/99 16.5.2-4 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.2-5 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.3-1 02/21/07 16.5.3-2 02/21/07 16.5.3-3 02/21/07 16.5.4-1 1/05/06 16.5.4-2 1/05/06 16.5.5-1 6/28/07 16.5.5-2 6/28/07 16.5.5-3 6/28/07 16.5.5-4 6/28/07 16.5.5-5 6/28/07 LOEP 1 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.5.6-1 02/05/08 16.5.6-2 02/05/08 16.5.7-1 12/13/06 16.5.7-2 12/13/06 16.5.7-3 12/13/06 16.5.7-4 12/13/06 16.5.7-5 12/13/06 16.5.7-6 12/13/06 16.5.8-1 01/31/07 16.5.8-2 01/31/07 16.5.8-3 01/31/07 16.5.8-4 01/31/07 16.5.8-5 01/31/07 16.5.8a-1 5/19/95 16.5.8a-2 5/19/05 (Delete)16.5.8a-3 5/19/05 (Delete)16.5.9-1 3/27/99 16.5.9-2 3/27/99 16.5.10-1 10/8/03 16.5.10-2 10/8/03 16.5.11-1 1/31/00 16.5.12-1 3/27/99 16.5.13-1 3/27/99 16.5.13-2 12/01/99 16.5.13-3 12/01/99 16.6.1-1 03/14/07 16.6.1-2 03/14/07 16.6.1-3 03/14/07 16.6.1-4 03/14/07 16.6.1-5 Delete 16.6.2-1 01/31/07 16.6.2-2 01/31/07 16.6.2-3 01/31/07 16.6.2-4 01/31/07 16.6.2-5 01/31/07 16.6.2-6 01/31/07 16.6.2-7 01/31/07 16.6.2-8 Delete 16.6.2-9 Delete 16.6.2-10 Delete 16.6.2-11 Delete LOEP 2 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.6.2-12 Delete 16.6.3-1 3/27/99 16.6.4-1 3/13/07 16'6.4-2 3/13/07.16.6.4-3 3/13/07 16.6.4-4 3/13/07 16.6.4 3/13/07 16.6.4-6 3/13/07 16.6.5-1 12/14/00 16.6.6-1 3/27/99 16.6.7-1 3/27/99 16.6.8-1 3/27/99 16.6.9-1 6/12/01 16.6.9-2 3/27/99 16.6.10-1 12/15/04 16.6.10-2 12/15/04 16.6.10-3 12/15/04 16.6.11-1 10/1/02 16.6.11-2 10/1/02 16.6.12-1 03/14/07 16.6.12-2 03/14/07 16.6.12-3 03/14/07 16.6.12-4 5/17/05 (Delete)16.6.12-5 Delete 16.6.12-6 Delete 16.6.12-7 Delete 16.6.13-1 03/31/08 16.6.13-2 03/31/08 1H66.13-3 03/31/08 16.6.14-1 8/15/02 16.6.14-2 8/15/02 16.6.14-3 8/15/02 16.6.14-4 8/15/02 16.6.15-1 03/14/07 16.6.15-2 03/14/07 16.7.1-1 3/27/99 16.7.1-2 3/27/99 16.7.2-1 12/14/04 16.7.2-2 12/14/04 16.7.2-3 12/14/04 16.7.3-1 3/27/99 LOEP 3 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.7.3-2 3/27/99 16.7.4-1 7/14/05 16.7.4-2 7/14/05 16.7.4-3 7/14/05 16.7.5-1 10/8/03 16.7.5-2 10/8/03 16.7.5-3 10/8/03 16.7.5-4 10/8/03 16.7.6-1 3/27/99 16.7.7-1 3/27/99 16.7.7-2 3/27/99 16.7.8-1 3/27/99 16.7.8-2 3/27/99 16.7.9-1 10/23/03 16.7.10-1 3/27/99 16.7.10-2 3/27/99 16.7.11-1 3/9/06 16.7.11-2 3/9/06 16.7.11-3 3/9/06 16.7.12-1 6/30/04 16.7.12-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-1 6/30/04 16.7.13-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-3 6/30/04 16.7.14-1 2/17/00 16.7.14-2 2/17/00 16.7.14-3 2/17/00 16.7.14-4 2/17/00 16.8.1-1 8/09/01 16.8.1-2 8/09/01 16.8.2-1 2/10/05 16.8.2-2 2/10/05 16.8.3-1 3/27/99 16.8.3-2 1/31/00 16.8.3-3 1/31/00 16.8.3-4 3/27/99 16.8.3-5 1/31/00 16.8.3-6 1/31/00 16.8.3-7 1/31/00 16.8.4-1 2/10/05 16.8.4-2 2/10/05 LOEP 4 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.8.4-3 2/10/05 16.8.4-4 2/10/05 16.8.4-5 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-6 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-7 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-8 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-9 Delete 9/25/04 16.8.5-1 4/27/06 16.8.5-2 4/27/06 16.8.5-3 4/27/06 16.8.5-4 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.5-5 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.6-1 01/04/07 16.8.6-2 01/04/07 16.8.6-3 01/04/07 16.8.7-1 1/31/00 16.8.8-1 1/31/00 16.8.9-1 6/21/05 16.8.9-2 6/21/05 16.8.9-3 6/21/05 16.8.9-4 6/21/05 16.9.1-1 1/31/00 16.9.1-2 3/27/99 16.9.1-3 3/27/99 16.9.1-4 3/27/99 16.9.1-5 6/12/01 16.9.2-1 6/28/05 16.9.2-2 6/28/05 16.9.2-3 6/28/05 16.9.2-4 6/28/05 16.9.2-5 6/28/05 16.9.3-1 1/14/04 16.9.3-2 1/14/04 16.9.4-1 1/31/00 16.9.4-2 1/31/00 16.9.4-3 1/31/00 16.9.4-4 3/27/99 16.9.4-5 6/12/01 16.9.5-1 1/31/00 16.9.5-2 4/29/99 16.9.5-3 4/29/99 LOEP 5 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.9.5-4 6/12/01 16.9.6-1 02/05/08 16.9.6-2 02/05/08 16.9.6-3 02/05/08 16.9.6-4 02/05/08 16.9.6-5 02/05/08 16.9.6-6 02/05/08 16.9.6-7 02/05/08 16.9.6-8 02/05/08 16.9.6-9 02/05/08 16.9.7-1 3/31/05 16.9.7-2 3/31/05 16.9.7-3 3/31/05 16.9.7-4 3/31/05 16.9.7-5 3/31/05 16.9.7-6 3/31/05 16.9.7-7 3/31/05 16.9.7-8 3/31/05 16.9.7-9 Delete 16.9.8-1 2/15/06 16.9.8-2 2/15/06 16.9.8-3 Delete 2/15/06 16.9.8-4 Delete 16.9.8-5 Delete 16.9.8-6 Delete 16.9.8-7 Delete 16.9.8a-1 2/7/05 16.9.8a-2 2/7/05 16.9.8a-3 2/7/05 16.9.9-1 11/27/07 16.9.9-2 11/27/07 16.9.9-3 11/27/07 16.9.9-4 11/27/07 16.9.10-1 1/12/04 16.9.10-2 1/12/04 16.9.11-1 3/31/05 16.9.11-2 3/31/05 16.9.11-3 3/31/05 16.9.11-4 3/31/05 16.9.11-5 3/11/05 16.9.11-6 3/31/05 LOEP 6 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.11-7 3/31/05 16.9.11-8 3/31/05 16.9.11 a-1 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-2 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-3 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-4 3/10/08 16.9.1 la-5 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-6 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-7 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-8 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-9 3/10/08 16.9.1 la-10 3/10/08 16.9.1 la-11 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-1 2 3/10/08 16.9.11a-13 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-14 3/10/08 16.9.1 la-15 3/10/08 16.9.11 a-16 Deleted 3/10/08 16.9.12-1 5/31/04 16.9.12-2 5/31/04 16.9.12-3 5/31/04 16.9.12-4 5/31/04 16.9.12-5 5/31/04 16.9.12-6 5/31/04 16.9.12-7 5/31/04 16.9.12-8 5/31/04 16.9.12-9 5/31/04 16.9.12-10 5/31/04 16.9.12-11 5/31/04 16.9.12-12 5/31/04 16.9.12-13 5/31/04 16.9.12-14 5/31/04 16.9.12-15 5/31/04 1,6.9.12-16 5/31/04 16.9.12-17 5/31/04 16.9.12-18 5/31/04 16.9.12-19 5/31/04 16.9.12-20 5/31/04 16.9.12-21 5/31/04 16.9.12-22 5/31/04 16.9.13-1 01/31/07 LOEP 7 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.13-2 01/31/07 16.9.13-3 01/31/07 16.9.13-4 01/31/07 16.9.14-1 10/28/04 16.9.14-2 10/28/04 16.9.15-1 3/27/99 16.9.15-2 3/27/99 16.9.15-3 3/27/99 16.9.16-1 4/01/08 16.9.16-2 4/01/08 16.9.16-3 4/01/08 16.9.17-1 5/23/01 16.9.17-2 3/27/99 16.9.18-1 5/02/07 16.9.18-2 5/02/07 16.9.18-3 5/02/07 16.9.18-4 5/02/07 16.9.18-5 5/02/07 16.9.18-6 5/02/07 16.9.18-7 5/02/07 16.9.18-8 5/02/07 16.9.18-9 5/02/07 16.9.18-10 5/02/07 16.9.18-11 5/02/07 16.9.18-12 5/02/07 16.9.18-13 5/02/07 16.9.18-14 5/02/07 16.9.18-15 5/02/07 16.9.18-16 5/02/07 16.9.19-1 3/31/05 16.9.19-2 3/31/05 16.9.20-1 09/06/06 16.9.20-2 09/06/06 16.9.20-3 09/06/06 16.9.20-4 09/06/06 16.9.21-1 06/30/08 16.9.21-2 06/30/08 16.9.21-3 06/30/08 16.9.21-4 06/30/08 16.10.1-1 Deleted 9/18/03 16.10.1-2 Deleted 9/18/03 LOEP 8 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.10.1-3 Deleted 9/18/03 16.10.2-1 12/2/03 16.10.2-2 12/2/03, 16.10.3-1 3/27/99 16.10.3-2 3/27/99 16.10.4-1 1/31/00 16.10.5-1 Deleted 8/24/04 16.10.6-1 3/27/99 16.10.7-1 4/29/99 16.10.7-2 , 4/29/99 16.10.7-3 1/31/00 16.10.7-4 4/29/99 16.10.7-5 4/29/99 16.10.7-6 4/29/99 16.10.7-7 4/29/99 16.10.7-8 4/29/99 16'10.7-9

.4/29/99 16.10.8-1 11/27/06 16.10.8-2 11/27/06 16.10.8-3 11/27/06 16.10.8-4 11/27/06 16.10.8-5 11/27/06 16.11.1-1 7/12/01 16.11.1-2 7/12/01 16.11.1-3 7/12/01 16.11.1-4 7/12/01 16.11.1-5 7/12/01 16.11.1-6 7/12/01 16.11.1-7 7/12/01 16.11.2-1 1/31/00 16.11.2-2 3/27/99 16.11.2-3 1/31/00 16.11.2-4 3/27/99 16.11.2-5 1/31/00 16.11.2-6 1/31/00 16.11.3-1 12/04/07 16.11.3-2 12/04/07 16.11.3-3 12/04/07 16.11.3-4 12/04/07 16.11.3-5 12/04/07 16.11.3-6 12/04/07 LOEP 9 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.11.3-7 12/04/07 16.11.3-8 12/04/07 16.11.3-9 12/04/07 16.11.3-10 12/04/07 16.11.3-11 12/04/07 16.11.3-12 12/04/07 16.11.3-13 12/04/07 16.11.3-14 12/04/07 16.11.3-15 12/04/07 16.11.3-16 12/04/07 16.11.3-17 12/04/07 16.11.3-18 12/04/07 16.11.3-19 11/10/04 (Deleted)16.11.4-1 11/10/04 16.11.4-2 11/10/04 16.11.4-3 11/10/04 16.11.4-4 11/10/04 16.11.4-5 11/10/04 16.11.4-6 11/10/04 16.11.4-7 11/10/04 16.11.4-8 11/10/04 (Delete)16.11.5-1 10/30/02 16.11.5-2 10/30/02 16.11.5-3 10/30/02 16.11.5-4 10/30/02 16.11.6-1 2/1/05 16.11.6-2 2/1/05 16.11.6-3 2/1/05 16.11.6-4 2/1/05 16.11.6-5 2/1/05 16.11.6-6 2/1/05 16.11.6-7 2/1/05 16.11.6-8 2/1/05 16.11.6-9 2/1/05 16.11.6-10 2/1/05 16:11.7-1 1/31/00 16.11.7-2 1/31/00 16.11.7-3 3/27/99 16.11.7-4 1/31/00 16.11.8-1 9/25/03 16.11.8-2 9/25/03 LOEP 10 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.11.9-1 11/14/00 16.11.9-2 1/31/00 16.11.9-3 1/31/00 16.11.10-1 2/25/03 16.11.10-2 2/25/03 16.11.11-1 3/27/99 16.11.12-1 4/10/03 16.11.12-2 4/10/03 16.11.13-1 3/27/99 16.11.13-2 3/27/99 16.11.14-1 3/27/99 16.11.14-2 3/27/99 16.12.1-1 3/27/99 16.12.2-1 5/3/07 16.12.2-2 5/3/07 16.12.3-1 5/1/03 16.12.3-2 5/1/03 16.12.4-1 3/27/99 16.12.5-1 3/27/99 16.12.6-1 11/08/07 16.13.1-1 5/13/04 16.13.1-2 5/13/04 16.13.1-3 5/13/04 16.13.1-4 5/13/04 16'13.1-5 5/13/04 16.13.1-6 5/13/04 16.13.1-7 5/13/04 16.13.1-8 5/13/04 16.13.1-9 5/13/04 16.13.2-1 12/15/04 16.13.2-2 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.2-3 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.2-4 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.3-1 12/15/04 16.13.3-2 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.4-1 3/27/99 16.13.5-1 Delete 16.13.5-2 Delete 16.13.6-1 3/27/99 16.13.7-1 12/15/04 16.13.7-2 12/15/04 LOEP 11 Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 06/30/08 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.13.8-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-2 3/27/99 16.13.10-1 3/27/99 16.13.11-1 3/27/99 16.14.1-1 3/27/99 16.14.2-1 12/14/04 16.14.2-2 12/14/04 16.14.3-1 3/27/99 16.14.4-1 12/14/04 16.14.4.a-1 12/14/04 16.15.1-1 4/12/06 16.15.1-2 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-3 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-4 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-5 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.2-1 09/10/07 16.15.2-2 09/10/07 16.15.2-3 09/10/07 16.15.2-4 09/10/07 16.15.2-5 09/10/07 16.15.3-1 4/12/06 16.15.3-2 4/12/06 16.15.3-3 4/12/06 16.15.3-4 4/12/06 16.15.3-5 4/12/06 LOEP 12 SECTION NO 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.5.1 16.5.2 16.5.3 16.5.4 16.5.5 16.5.6 16.5.7 16.5.8 16.5.8a 16.5.9 16.5.10 16.5.11 16.5.12 16.5.13 16.6 16.6.1 16.6.2 16.6.3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS INTRODUCTION APPLICABILITY DEFINITIONS COMMITMENTS RELATED TO REACTOR COMPONENTS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Reactor Coolant System Vents Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System Loss of Decay Heat Removal Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Boron Sampling Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Inspection Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Unidentified Leakage Chemistry Requirements Pressurizer

[DELETED]Testing Following Opening of System (Core Barrel Bolt Inspections)

Loss of Reactor Coolant Subcriticality RCS Leakage Testing Following Opening of System High Pressure Injection and the Chemical Addition Systems COMMITMENTS RELATED TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (NON-ESF SYSTEMS)Containment Leakage Tests Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System Containment Heat Removal Verification Frequency PAGE 16.1-1 16.1-1 16.2-1 16.3-1 Pending 16.5.1-1 16.5.1-1 16.5.2.1 16.5.3-1 16.5.4-1 16.5.5-1 16.5.6-1 16.5.7-1 16.5.8-1 16.5.8a-1 16.5.9.1 16.5.10-1 16.5.11-1 16.5.12-1 16.5.13-1 16.6.1-1 16.6.1-1 16.6.2-1 16.6.3-1 16.0-1 06/30/08 I SECTION NO 16.6.4 16.6.5 16.6.6 16.6.7 16.6.8 16.6.9 16.6.10 16.6.11 16.6.12 16.6.13 16.6.14 16.6.15 16.7 16.7.1 16.7.2 16.7.3 16.7.4 16.7.5 16.7.6 16.7.7 16.7.8 16.7.9 16.7.10 16.7.11 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TITLE Low Pressure Injection System Leakage Core Flood Tank Discharge Valve Breakers Core Flooding System Test BWST Outlet Valve Control LPI System Valve Test Restrictions Containment Purge Valve Testing Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)Containment Debris Sources Additional High Pressure Injection (HPI) Requirements Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI)Operability Control of HPI and LPI/RBS Pump Room Temperatures High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Liquid Waste Disposal (LWD)Leakage INSTRUMENTATION Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Anticipated Transient Without Scram Emergency Feedwater System Hydrogen Analyzers Steam Generator Overfill Protection Deleted Position Indicator Channels Incore Instrumentation RCP Monitor Core Flood Tank Instrumentation Display Instrumentation PAGE 16.6.4-1 16.6.5-1 16.6.6-1 16.6.7-1 16.6.8-1 16.6.9-1 16.6.10-1 16.6.11-1 16.6.12-1 16.6.13-1 16.6.14-1 16.6.15-1 16.7.1-1 16.7.1-1 16.7.2-1 16.7.3-1 16.7.4-1 16.7.5-1 16.7.6-1 16.7.7-1 16.7.8-1 16.7.9-1 16.7.10-1 16.7.11-1 16.0-2 06/30/08 1 SECTION NO 16.7.12 16.7.13 16.7.14 16.8 16.8.1 16.8.2 16.8.3 16.8.4 16;8.5 16.8.6 16.8.7 16.8.8 16.8.9 16.9 16.9.1 16.9.2 16.9.3 16.9.4 16.9.5 16.9.6 16.9.7 16.9.8 16.9.8a TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TITLE SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Air Start System Pressure Instrumentation SSF Instrumentation Rod Withdrawal Alarm Limit ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS Control of Room Temperatures for Station Blackout Additional Requirements to Support Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU)OPERABILITY Power Battery Parameters Keowee Operational Restrictions Keowee Hydro Unit Steady State Frequency Lee/Central Alternate Power System Auctioneering Diodes External Grid Trouble Protection Keowee Governor Speed Out Of Tolerance (OOT) Alarm AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Fire Suppression Water System Sprinkler and Spray Systems Keowee CO 2 Systems Fire Hose Stations Fire Barriers Fire Detection Instrumentation Keowee Lake Level Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) Booster Fans HPSW System Requirements to Support Loss of LPSW PAGE 16.7.12-1 16.7.13-1 16.7.14-1 16.8.1-1 16.8.1-1 16.8.2-1 16.8.3-1 16.8.4-1 16.8.5-1 16.8.6-1 16.8.7-1 16.8.8-1 16.8.9-1 16.9.1-1 16.9.1-1 16.9.2-1 16.9.3-1 16.9.4-1 16.9.5-1 16.9.6-1 16.9.7-1 16.9.8-1 16.9.8a-1 16.0-3 06/30/08 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION NO TITLE PAGE 16.9.9 Auxiliary Service Water System and Main Steam Dump Valve Operability requirements 16.9.10 Component Cooling and HPI Seal Injection to Reactor Coolant Pumps 16.9.11 Turbine Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11 a Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System Operability Requirements 16.9.13 Spent Fuel Cooling System 16.9.14 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Inspection Requirements 16.9.15 Radioactive Material Sources 16.9.16 Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist (RCS System Open)16.9.17 Reactor Building Polar Crane (RCS at elevated temperature and pressure)16.9.18 Snubbers 16.9.19 Gravity Induced Reverse Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)Through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors 16.9.21 Standby Shutdown Facility External Flood Protection 16.10 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO STEAM & POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS 16.10.1 [DELETED]16.10.2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits 16.10.3 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump and Valve Testing 16.10.4 Low Presssure Service Water System Testing 16.10.5 [DELETED]16.10.6 Emergency Feedwater Controls 16.9.9-1 16.9.10-1 16.9.11-1 16.9.11a-1 16.9.12-1 16.9.13-1 16.9.14-1 16.9.15-1 16.9.16-1 16.9.17-1 16.9.18-1 16.9.19-1 16.9.20-1 16.9.21-1 16.10.1-1 16.10.1-1 16.10.2-1 16.10.3-1 16.10.4-1 16.10.5-1 16.10.6-1 16.0-4 06/30/08 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION NO TITLE 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW)16.10.8 Upper Surge Tank (UST) Riser Branch Line Automatic Isolation Valves 16.11 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS CONTROL 16.11.1 Radioactive Liquid effluents 16.11.2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluents 16.11.3 Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 16.11.4 Operational Safety Review 16.11.5 Solid Radioactive Waste 16.11.6 Radiological Environmental Monitoring 16.11.7 Dose calculations 16.11.8 Reports 16.11.9 Radioactive effluent release report 16.11.10 Radiological Environmental Operating Reports 16.11.11 Iodine Radiation Monitoring Filters 16-.11.12 Radioactive Material in Outside Temporary Tanks Exceeding Limit 16.11.13 Radioactive Material in Waste Gas Holdup Tank Exceeding Limit 16.11.14 Explosive Gas Mixture 16.12 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1 Decay Time for Movement of Irradiated Fuel 16.12.2 Area Radiation Monitoring for Fuel Loading and Refueling 16.12.3 Communication Between Control Room and Refueling Personnel 16.12.4 Handling of Irradieted Fuel Assemblies 16.12.5 Loads Suspended over Spent Fuel in Spent Fuel Pool PAGE 16.10.7-1 16.10.8-1 16.11.1-1 16.11.1-1 16.11.2-1 16.11.3-1 16.11.4-1 16.11.5-1 16.11.6-1 16.11.7-1 16.11.8-1 16.11.9-1 16.11.10-1 16.11.11-1 16.11.12-1 16.11.13-1 16.11.14-1 16.12.1-1 16.12.1-1 16.12.2-1 16.12.3-1 16.12.4-1 16.12.5-1 16.0-5 06/30/08 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION NO 16.12.6 16.13 16.13.1 16.13.2 16.13.3 16.13.4 16.13.5 16.13.6 16.13.7 16.13.8 16.13.9 16.13.10 16.13.11 16.14 16.14.1 16.14.2 16.14.3 16.14.4 16.14.4.a 16.15 16.15.1 16.15.2 16.15.3 TITLE PAGE Fuel Damage During Fuel Handling Operations in Containment CONDUCT OF OPERATION Minimum Station Staffing Requirements

[DELETED][DELETED]Reactivity Anomaly Deleted Retraining and Replacement of Station Personnnel Procedures for Control of Ph in Recirculated Coolant after Loss-of-coolant Accident & Long-term Emergency Core Cooling Systems Respiratory Protective Program Startup Report Core Operating Limits Reports Procedure for Station Survey Following an Earthquake CONTROL RODS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION APSR Movement Control Rod Program Verification Power Mapping Control Rod Drive Patch Panels Engineering Work Station VENTILATION FILTER TESTING PROGRAM[DELETED]Control Room Pressurization and Filtering System Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System 16.12.6-1 16.13.1-1 16.13.1-1 16.13.2-1 16.13.3-1 16.13.4-1 16.13.5-1 16.13.6-1 16.13.7-1 16.13.8-1 16.13.9-1 16.13.10-1 16.13.11-1 16.14.1-1 16.14.1-1 16.14.2-1 16.14.3-1 16.14.4-1 16.14.4.a-1 16.15.1-1 16.15.1-1 16.15.2-1 16.15.3-1 16.0-6 06/30/08 I SSF External Flood Protection I 16.9.21 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.21 Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) External Flood Protection I COMMITMENT APPLICABILITY:

SSF External Flood protection integrity shall be maintained.

Whenever the SSF is required to be OPERABLE ACTIONS---------------------------

NOTE----------------------------------

Conditions are not applicable if SSF External Flood protection integrity is breached due to planned maintenance activities which will require contingency measures prior to breaching the barrier..............................................................................................................................

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SSF External Flood A.1 Perform a risk Immediately protection integrity assessment using the maintained

-801 feet. Electronic Risk Assessment Tool.AND A.2.1 Implement contingency 7 days actions in accordance with Table 16.9.21-1.

OR A.2.2 Restore the SSF External 7 days Flood Protection integrity of SSF building.B. SSF External Flood B.1 Enter applicable TS Immediately protection integrity of the Condition.

SSF building maintained 5 796.5 feet.C. Required Actions and C.1 Initiate a PIP. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Associated Completion Times not met.16.9.21-1 06/30/08 I SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.21.1 NA NA BASES This SLC provides monitoring of Maintenance Rule High Safety Significant Function 8094.3, Provide barrier to external flooding of the SSF. Based on information from the Oconee Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), external flood walls were installed at the south and north entrances to the SSF Building to reduce the consequences of a Jocassee dam failure.Following installation of the flood walls, the SSF is protected from flooding to an elevation of 801'. SSF flood barriers are adequate to protect the SSF from the most probable Jocassee dam failure flood scenarios.

Access through the south wall is provided through a water tight door. A stairway over the north flood wall provides access to the north entrance.

Flood protection integrity of the SSF must be maintained except for normal ingress and egress through the south side water tight door. In addition to the flood wall located at the north entrance to the SSF and to the flood wall and water tight door located at the south entrance to the SSF, the following features prevent flood water from entering the SSF: " SSF exterior concrete wall (not located within area protected by north and south flood walls).SSF exterior concrete wall located below 801' is credited.

Though the SSF exterior concrete wall was not originally designed for external flooding due to a Jocassee dam failure, the design of the SSF exterior concrete wall is considered to be inherently capable of providing adequate flood protection." Bolted plate and bolted access plate located at CO 2 fill lines that penetrate the South wall of the SSF.An access hole through the bolted plate that surrounds the CO 2 fill lines at the South wall penetration was installed to provide a path for providing temporary power to the SSF. Since the access hole is located below 801', the bolted access cover shall be installed to provide external flood protection.

  • SSF sewer system piping including check valve ST-53 and downstream SSF sewer system piping located inside the SSF.Check valve ST-53 prevents flood water from entering the SSF via the SSF sewer system.,16.9.21-2 06/30/08 1 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 Piping and electrical exterior wall penetration seals located below 801' elevation.

When flood protection integrity of the SSF is degraded, a risk assessment shall be performed immediately by RA A.1. RA A.1 is required to be performed in conjunction with either, RA A.2.1 to implement compensatory measures in accordance with Table 16.9.21-1 or RA A.2.2 to restore SSF External Flood Protection Integrity within 7 days. A 7-day Completion Time is sufficient for either of these RA.Table 16.9.21-1 Compensatory Actions Com# Protective Measure Compensatory Actions 1 Flood protection integrity of the 1. Place sandbags at breach.SSF building shall be maintained

2. Place sealing materials at breach.3. Take other appropriate measures to provide flood protection to SSF.This SLC addresses SSF external flood protection which is considered in the Oconee PRA for floods up to elevation 801'. SSF External flood protection is not a licensed requirement of the SSF. Therefore, entry into Condition A of this SLC does not require entry into any TS.However, there is a potential that the SSF's mitigation of a Turbine Building flood could be affected if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.

Condition B requires immediate entry into applicable TS (TS 3.10.1 Condition A, B, C, D, and E) if a flood protection feature located at an elevation of < 796.5' is defeated.Condition C will also initiate a PIP within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if required actions and associated completion times are not met.The Actions are modified by a NOTE that states that the Conditions are not applicable if SSF External Flood protection integrity is breached due to planned maintenance activities which require contingency measures prior to breaching the barrier. Contingencies as specified by Table 16.9.21-1 or the Control of Passive Design Features Site Directive will be in place when SSF External Flood protection integrity is intentionally breached.

SLC actions will not be required.16.9.21-3 06/30/08 SSF External Flood Protection 16.9.21 REFERENCES

1) OSS-0254.00-00-1005,-Design Basis Document for SSF ASW System 2) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report dated December 21, 1995 3) Letter from JW Hampton (Duke) to NRC dated 3/14/94, Providing Response to Several Findings from the Service Water Audit.4) Letter from AF Gibson (NRC) to JW Hampton (Duke) dated 2/21/94, Sending Notice of Violation and Deviation for Service Water Audit.5) Generic Letter 88-20, dated 11/23/88, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities" 6) Letter from JF Stolz (NRC) to HB Tucker (Duke), dated 8/14/85, Providing Review of the Oconee PRA that was Performed in Conjunction with NAC of EPRI.7) NSD 213, "Risk Management Process." 8) NSD 415, "Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 9) NSD 403, "Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6, and No-Mode) per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)." 10) PIP 0-05-3770, SSF Risk Reduction PIP 11) PIP 0-05-4978, Access panel on south side of SSF below flood level 12) PIP 0-06-740, SSF sewage lift station vent line elevation is too low to prevent backflow into the SSF during a Turbine Building Flood.13) PIP 0-06-5375, MRFF on SSF Flood System 14) PIP 0-06-5649, NRC letter dated August 31,2006, issued a preliminary white finding, associated with a failure to maintain control of the standby shutdown facility (SSF) flood protection barrier.15) O-320-Z-3, External Barrier Walls Concrete 16) OSC-631, Standby Shutdown Facility Design 17) SD 3.2.16, Control of Passive Design Features 16.9.21-4 06/30/08 I
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