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Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | issue date = 01/06/2017 | | | issue date = 01/06/2017 |
| | title = Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000247/2016007 | | | title = Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000247/2016007 |
| | author name = Dentel G T | | | author name = Dentel G |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2 | | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2 |
| | addressee name = Vitale A J | | | addressee name = Vitale A |
| | addressee affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc | | | addressee affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc |
| | docket = 05000247 | | | docket = 05000247 |
| | license number = DPR-026 | | | license number = DPR-026 |
| | contact person = Dentel G T | | | contact person = Dentel G |
| | document report number = IR 2016007 | | | document report number = IR 2016007 |
| | document type = Inspection Report, Letter | | | document type = Inspection Report, Letter |
Line 18: |
Line 18: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD. KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 | | {{#Wiki_filter:January 6, 2017 |
|
| |
|
| January 6, 2017 Mr. Anthony J. Vitale, Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| | | INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2016007 |
| Indian Point Energy Center
| |
| | |
| 450 Broadway, GSB
| |
| | |
| P.O. Box 249
| |
| | |
| Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
| |
| | |
| SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2016007 | |
|
| |
|
| ==Dear Mr. Vitale:== | | ==Dear Mr. Vitale:== |
Line 502: |
Line 493: |
|
| |
|
| ===Closed=== | | ===Closed=== |
| : NONE
| | |
| | NONE |
|
| |
|
| ===Discussed=== | | ===Discussed=== |
Line 509: |
Line 501: |
|
| |
|
| ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== |
| Fire Protection Licensing Documents Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Amended Facility Operating License, 9/28/73
| |
| : IP2
| |
| : EN-DC-330, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Fire Protection Program, Revision 4
| |
| : IP2 UFSAR, Revision 26
| |
| : IP2-RPT-03-00015, IP2 Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 7
| |
| : IP-RPT-04-00224, NFPA Code of Record Determination for Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Protection
| |
| : Design Basis Documents and Specifications
| |
| : IP2-DBD-221, IP2 Design Basis Document for Fire Protection System, Revision 3
| |
| : Calculations/Engineering Evaluation Reports
| |
| : 247-09-0013.024, IP2 Nuclear Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Multiple Spurious Operations Report, Revision 0
| |
| : CE-PS 100-79, Fireproofing of Diesel Generator Bldg., Revision 0
| |
| : FEX-00246-00, Evaluation of PAB Fire Protection Line at EL. 80' Due to Potential Flooding of
| |
| : RHR Pump Cells at
| |
| : EL 15', Revision 0
| |
| : IP2-RPT-03-00010, 3M INTERAM Fire-Resistant Enclosure at Electrical Penetration H20 &
| |
| : Response to NRC Information Notice 95-52, Supplement 1, Revision 1
| |
| : IP3-CALC-CVCS-393, Calculation of Allowable Time for Operating Charging Pumps Without Cooling Water, Revision 1
| |
| : IP-CALC-04-01171, the Hydraulic Analysis of Indian Point Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Protection Water
| |
| : Supply Systems and Several Unit 2 Suppression Systems, Revision 0
| |
| : IP-CALC-08-00024, Sizing Calculation for RHR Pump Flooding Line, Revision 0
| |
| : IP-RPT-04-00188, Evaluation of Hemyc Wrap Fire Protective Systems, Revision 1
| |
| : IP-RPT-05-00071, IP2 10
| |
| : CFR 50, Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Separation Analysis, Revision 2
| |
| : IP-RPT-09-00012, Validation of Operator Manual Actions Credited for Appendix R, Section
| |
| : III.G
| |
| : Fire Areas: IP2 and IP3, Revision 0
| |
| : IP-RPT-12-00022, Inaccessible Fire Barrier Penetration Seals, Revision 0
| |
| : PGI-00355, NRC Information Notice 92-18 MOV Control Hot Short Issue, Revision 4
| |
| : PGI-00581-00, Fire Protection 86-10 Evaluation for EDG Structural Steel Fire Resistant Coating, Revision 0
| |
| : SGX-00048-01, 480V Switchgear Coordination Calculation for Switchgears 21 and 22, Revision 1
| |
| : Engineering Change Requests (ECR)
| |
| : EC-40404, Relocate 21 Charging Pump Control Switch from 480V switchgear to the CCR and Install Solenoid and its control in CCR to Resolve U2-OMA-20 and 21, 3/24/14
| |
| : EC-41582, OMA Resolution:
| |
| : OMA-6, 4/07/14
| |
| : EC-42090, Resolve OMA 9 and 10, Support Safe Shutdown Instrument Indication in IP2 CCR,
| |
| : 3/24/14
| |
| : EC-45124, Update EP & Operations Communication to Address Fukushima FLEX
| |
| : Requirements in
| |
| : NEI 12-01, Revision 0
| |
| : EC-50149, FLEX Electrical EC for Phase 2, Revision 0
| |
| : FPX-93-09146-F, Removal of Thermal Lag Fire Barrier from RHR Pump 22 Feeder, dated
| |
| : 5/9/94
| |
| : Fire Barrier Tests
| |
| : CTP 1001A, Three Hour Fire Qualification Test, 7/25/80
| |
| : CTP 1076, Three Hour Fire Qualification Test, 3/28/85
| |
| : CTP 1098A, Three Hour Fire Qualification Test, 8/11/86
| |
| : CTP 2005/CTP 2008, Fire Endurance Test of 3M INTERAM Mat Fire Protective Envelopes, 11/12/98
| |
| : Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
| |
| : 21-F-2018, Flow Diagram Condensate & Boiler Feed Pump Suction, Revision 148
| |
| : 21-F-2019, Boiler Feedwater Flow Diagram, Revision 118
| |
| : 21-F-2036, Flow Diagram Instrument Air Control Bldg. Conventional Plant, Etc., Revision 101
| |
| : 21-F-2720, Auxiliary Coolant Syst em Flow Diagram, Revision 92
| |
| : 21-F-2722, Service Water System Flow Diagram, Revision 128
| |
| : 9321-F-2736, CVCS Flow Diagram, Revision 130
| |
| : 21-F-2738, Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Revision 122
| |
| ===Drawings===
| |
| and Wiring Diagrams
| |
| : 25151, Elementary Wiring Diagram of Component Cooling Pump 23, Revision 15
| |
| : 260430, Loop Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Pressurizer Level Control, Revision 3
| |
| : 260510, Loop Diagram Feedwater
| |
| : SG 21 Wide Range Level, Revision 6
| |
| : 260511, Loop Diagram Feedwater
| |
| : SG 22 Wide Range Level, Revision 6
| |
| : 400400-05, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement Site Plan, Revision 2
| |
| : 400402, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement at EL. 36', Revision 3
| |
| : 400403-05, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement at EL. 53', Revision 5
| |
| : 400404-04, Fire Area/ Zone arrangement at
| |
| : EL 80', Revision 4
| |
| : 400405-02, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement at EL. 98', Revision 2
| |
| : 503797, Elementary Wiring Diagram for Charging Pump 21, Revision 0
| |
| : 503802, IP2 PAB, EL. 98' Valve
| |
| : LCV-112C Fire Enclosure Plan & Sections, Civil, Revision 0
| |
| : 21-F-3008, Single Line Diagram DC Power Panels, Revision 92
| |
| : 21-F-4006-78, Yard Fire Protection Piping, Revision 78
| |
| : A208088, One Line Diagram of 480Vac Switchgear 21 and 22, Revision 44
| |
| : A208377, Main One Line Diagram, Revision 17
| |
| : A208831, Schematic Diagram for Post-Accident
| |
| : MOV 250A, Revision 4
| |
| : A208832, Schematic Diagram for Post-Accident
| |
| : MOV 4925, Revision 7
| |
| : A227551-66, Sht. 1, Fire Protection System Diagram Details, Revision 66
| |
| : A227552-47, Sht. 2, Fire Protection System Diagram Details, Revision 47
| |
| : A227553-51, Sht. 3, Fire Protection System Diagram Detail, Revision 51
| |
| : A227554-27, Sht. 4, Fire Protection System Diagram Detail, Revision 27
| |
| : A231592, 6900Vac One Line Diagram, Revision 19
| |
| : A240128, Boiler Feedwater Level and Flow Instrumentation SG's 21 thru 24, Revision 5
| |
| : B192477-3, Flow Diagram Piping & Instrumentation Symbols, Revision 0
| |
| : B225115, Sht. 9, Elementary Wiring Diagram Switch Development, Revision 3
| |
| : B225133, Elementary Wiring Diagram on Component Cooling Pump 21, Revision 14
| |
| : B228010-04, Fire Barrier Penetrations Diesel Generator Building, Wall 1032A-W, 12/17/03
| |
| : B228016-05, Fire Barrier Penetrations Charging Pump Rooms, PAB Wells 7A/5-N, 7A/6-N,
| |
| : 7A/7-N, 12/17/03
| |
| : B228050-06, Fire Barrier Penetration Schedule Walls 7A/5-N, 7A/6-N, 7A/7-N, 12/17/03
| |
| : B228053-05, Fire Barrier Penetration Schedule Walls 14/ST3-S, 14/43A-W, 10/32A-W,
| |
| : 2/17/03
| |
| : IP2-S-000255, Elementary Wiring Diagram VCT Drain MOV
| |
| : LCV-112C, Revision 3
| |
| ===Procedures===
| |
| : 0-PT-M002, Alternate Safe Shutdown Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Revision 16
| |
| : 0-PT-Q001, Alternate Safe Shutdown Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Revision 13
| |
| : 2-AOP-SSD-1, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control, Revision 23
| |
| : 2BRK-021-CUB, Westinghouse 480V DB Series Breaker Cubicle Inspection and Cleaning, Revision 5
| |
| : 2-BRK-023-ELC, DB Breaker Amptector Overcurrent Test, Revision 6
| |
| : 2-BRK-024-ELC, DB Breaker Amptector Calibration Test, Revision 3
| |
| : 2-COL-3.1, Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 43
| |
| : 2-ELC-004-FIR, IP2 Repairs for Safe Shutdown in the Event of an Appendix R Fire, Revision 2
| |
| : 2-IC-PC-I-L-417, 21 SG Wide Range Level Calibration, Revision 2
| |
| : 2-IC-PC-I-L-417, 21 SG Wide Range Level Calibration, Revision 3
| |
| : 2-IC-PC-I-L-427, 22 SG Wide Range Level Calibration, Revision 2
| |
| : 2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 8
| |
| : 2-PC-R37, Alternate Safe Shutdown and Remote Shutdown Instruments, Revision 13
| |
| : 2-PT-2Y042, 21 CHP Central Control Room Station Switches, Revision 1
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017A, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 21 AFP, Revision 13
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017B, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 23 CHP, Revision 11
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017C, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 23 CCP, Revision 17
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017D, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 23 SWP, Revision 11
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017E, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 24 SWP, Revision 11
| |
| : 2-PT-Q017F, Alternate Safe Shutdown Supply Verification to 21 Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal Pumps, Revision 9
| |
| : EN-DC-127, Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources, Revision 15
| |
| : EN-DC-128, Fire Protection Impact Reviews, Revision 10
| |
| : EN-DC-161, Control of Combustibles, Revision 13
| |
| : EN-DC-186, Fuse Control, Revision 2
| |
| : EN-DC-330, Fire Protection Program, Revision 4
| |
| : SAO-703, Fire Protection Impairment Criteria and Surveillance, Revision 35
| |
| : SEP-FPP-IP-001, IPEG Fire Protection Program, Revision 4
| |
| : SEP-FPP-IP-002, IPEG Fire Watch Program, Revision 2
| |
| : Operations Procedures
| |
| : 2-AOP-SSD-1, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control, Revision 23
| |
| : 2-ONOP-FP-001, Plant Fires, Revision 17
| |
| : 2-SOP-ESP-001, Local Equipment Operation and Contingency Actions, Revision 12
| |
| : Operator Safe Shutdown Training
| |
| : IOLP-LOR-AOP010, 2/3-AOP-SSD-1, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control, Revision 1
| |
| : OPEX Reviews
| |
| : OE-NOE-2015-30
| |
| : CA-14,
| |
| : IN 2015-02, Antifreeze Agents in Fire Water Sprinkler Systems
| |
| : Quality Assurance Audits and Self Assessments
| |
| : QA-9-2016-IP-1, Fire Protection, Revision 6
| |
| : System Health Reports
| |
| : 480Vac Systems, 1
| |
| st and 3 rd Qtr. 2016
| |
| : IPEG Fire Protection, 2
| |
| nd Quarter 2016
| |
| : IPEG Fire Protection, 3
| |
| rd Quarter 2016
| |
| : Completed Tests, Surveillances, and Preventive Maintenance
| |
| : 0-ELC-420-FIR, Appendix R Emergency Light Unit Inspection, Battery Replacement, and test, Completed on 2/15/16 and 11/3/16
| |
| : 0-PT-M001, Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Completed11/6/16 and 12/3/16
| |
| : 2-PT-2Y017, Penetration Fire Barrier Seal Inspection, Completed 10/12/12 and 12/14/14
| |
| : 2-PT-2Y041, Fire Damper Functionality, Completed 6/12/12 and 4/6/15
| |
| : 2-PT-3Y015A, Underground Fire Loop Flow, Completed 10/24/11 and 7/12/15
| |
| : 2-PT-3Y015B, Turbine Building Fire Loop Flow, 5/17/11 and 7/27/14
| |
| : 2-PT-A023, Fire Main Booster Pump capacity Test, Completed 4/08/14 and 8/13/15
| |
| : 2-PT-A040, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Capacity, Completed on 2/15/15 and 2/14/16
| |
| : 2-PT-A048, Rollup Fire Doors, Completed 9/8/15 and 10/17/16
| |
| : 2-PT-A057, U1 Smoke Detector Test, Completed 9/30/14 and 9/28/15
| |
| : 2-PT-M034A, 11 Fire Main Booster Pump, Completed on 7/28/16 and 8/24/16
| |
| : 2-PT-M034B, 12 Fire Main Booster Pump, Completed on 7/28/16, 8/24/16, and 9/22/16
| |
| : 2-PT-M040, Diesel Fire Pump, Completed on 9/11/16 and 10/17/16
| |
| : 2-PT-M049B, Appendix R Emergency Lighting (Nuclear), Completed on 9/23/16 and 10/15/16
| |
| : 2-PT-SA012D, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (PAB-Specific), Completed 4/18/16 and 9/26/16
| |
| : 2-PT-SA012D, Ionization Type Smoke Detectors (PAB), Completed 11/19/15
| |
| : 2-PT-SA020, Swing Fire Doors, Completed 4/18/16 and 9/26/16
| |
| : PT-EM9, Fire Dampers Operability, Completed 5/1/14 and 1/6/16
| |
| : PT-SA11, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection System, Completed 1/15/16 and 8/16/16
| |
| : PT-SA12A, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (Conventional), Completed 2/9/16 and 7/19/16
| |
| : PT-SA12B, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (PAB), Completed 2/11/16 and 9/22/16
| |
| : PT-SA17, CCR Intake Smoke Detectors and Ventilation Control, Completed 1/15/16 and
| |
| : 8/26/16
| |
| : Transient Combustible Evaluations
| |
| : 16-046, SFP Equipment Area, 10/3/16
| |
| : 16-044, AFW Pump Room, 10/8/16
| |
| : 16-045, AFW Building 2
| |
| nd Elevation, 10/9/16
| |
| : 16-047, U2 AFW Pump Room, 10/17/16
| |
| : 16-048, Fan House/PAB Annex, 10/19/16
| |
| : Hot Work Permits
| |
| : 279749, U2, Turbine Bldg. 15' Col. 9 Line B-7, 9/15/16
| |
| : 297947, U2, Turbine Bldg. 33' Col. 3 Line B, 9/15/16
| |
| : 2864, U2, Telecom Room 15', 9/26/16
| |
| : 309854, U1,
| |
| : FP-1 Elbow (Tool Room) EL. 15', 10/26/16
| |
| : Fire Fighting Strategies (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans)
| |
| : PFP-211, General Floor Plan - Primary Auxiliary Building 80'EL., Revision 14
| |
| : PFP-212, General Floor Plan - Primary Auxiliary Building 98' EL., Revision 14
| |
| : PFP-253, Control Room - Control Building, Revision 13
| |
| : PFP-258, EDG #21-#22-#23-Diesel Generator Building/Electrical Tunnel Exhaust Fans, Revision 5
| |
| : Fire Brigade Training
| |
| : I0LP-OPS-FBT003, Fire Brigade Leadership (Initial/Retraining), 9/9/16
| |
| : Initial Fire Brigade Training Manual, 2016
| |
| : I0LP-OPS-FBT003, Fire Brigade Annual Retraining, 8/16
| |
| : I0LP-OPS-FBT003, Fire Brigade Annual Retraining, 12/16
| |
| : Fire Brigade Drills and Critiques
| |
| : U1 TB Appendix R EDG, 9/17/16
| |
| : U2 Dock Diesel Storage Tank, 9/14/16
| |
| : U2 Dryden Diving Trailers, 9/14/16
| |
| : U3 NLW Chem. App., 9/18/16
| |
| : U3 MBFPL0 Purifier, 9/25/16
| |
| : U3 Area 15' Water Factory, 11/1/16
| |
| : Large Fires and Explosions Mitigation Strategies Documents
| |
| : 0-AOP-SEC-3, Event Contingency Actions, Revision 3
| |
| : 0-SOP-ESP-002, Emergency Contingency Plan, Revision 12
| |
| : 0-SOP-ESP-003, Emergency Contingency Plant Strategy Attachments, Revision 1
| |
| : 2-SOP-ESP-001, Local Equipment Operations and Contingency Actions, Revision 4
| |
| : 3-SOP-ESP-001, Local Equipment Operations and Contingency Actions, Revision 9
| |
| : Corrective Action Program [Condition Reports (CR)]
| |
| : CR-IP2-2004-00609
| |
| : CR-IP2-2007-00719
| |
| : CR-IP2-2010-03184
| |
| : CR-IP2-2014-00128
| |
| : CR-IP2-2014-00528
| |
| : CR-IP2-2014-00904
| |
| : CR-IP2-2014-01970
| |
| : CR-IP2-2015-00483
| |
| : CR-IP2-2015-01702
| |
| : CR-IP2-2015-03333
| |
| : CR-IP2-2015-04087
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-00458
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-00517
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-00699
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-01146
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-02710
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-03052
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-03209
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-03554
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-05139
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-05584
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06527
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06584
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06637
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06650
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06674
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06737
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06828
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06977
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06593*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-06844*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07028*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07048*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07049*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07050*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07074*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07077*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07078*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07082*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07092*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07094*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07105*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07233*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07310*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07316*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07317*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07320*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07322*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07323*
| |
| : CR-IP2-2016-07340*
| |
|
| |
| *NRC identified during this inspection.
| |
| ===Work Orders===
| |
| : 00224629
| |
| : 00339098
| |
| : 00340641
| |
| : 00340644
| |
| : 00340653
| |
| : 50065602
| |
| : 51498409
| |
| : 51503416
| |
| : 2309599
| |
| : 52309622
| |
| : 52310161
| |
| : 52429908
| |
| : 2448198
| |
| : 52458897
| |
| : 52474186
| |
| : 52477866
| |
| : 2501024
| |
| : 52527196
| |
| : 52537922
| |
| : 52541985
| |
| : 2556636
| |
| : 52560550
| |
| : 52582200
| |
| : 52587735
| |
| : 2624553
| |
| : 52638317
| |
| : 52638848
| |
| : 52639020
| |
| : 2640117
| |
| : 52643882
| |
| : 52644044
| |
| : 52649255
| |
| : 2654544
| |
| : 52663061
| |
| : 52672476
| |
| : 52672477
| |
| : 2677506
| |
| : 52677933
| |
| : 52677934
| |
| : 52690147
| |
| : 2695005
| |
| : 52696115
| |
| : 52697773
| |
| : 52699588
| |
| : 2704374
| |
| : 52706670
| |
| : 52706673
| |
| : 52713556
| |
| : 2721451
| |
| : 52727166
| |
| ===Miscellaneous Documents===
| |
| : 10/32A-W001, IP2 Type 1, Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Index 9 PAB)
| |
| : 10/32A-W002, IP2 Type 1 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Index (Diesel Generator Building)
| |
| : CE-PS 100-79, Fireproofing of Diesel Generator Bldg., 6/21/79
| |
| : Daily Plant status report, 11/29/16
| |
| : Fire Protection System Impairment Summary Unit 2, Dated 11/01/16
| |
| : Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Impairment Log, 11/1/16
| |
| : IP2 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown OMA Timeline Validations on 12/18/12, 5/14/13, and 5/16/13
| |
| : IPEG Radio System Summary Description, 2016
| |
| : OAP, Operations Commitments and Policy Details, Revision 26
| |
| ==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
| |
|
| |
|
| CFR Title 10 of the
| |
| Code of Federal Regulations
| |
| : [[DRS]] [[Division of Reactor Safety]]
| |
| : [[FA]] [[Fire Area]]
| |
| : [[FHA]] [[Fire Hazards Analysis]]
| |
| : [[FPP]] [[Fire Protection Program]]
| |
| : [[FZ]] [[Fire Zone]]
| |
| : [[IP]] [[Inspection Procedure]]
| |
| : [[NFPA]] [[National Fire Protection Association]]
| |
| : [[NRC]] [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission,]]
| |
| : [[U.S.]] [[]]
| |
| : [[UFSAR]] [[Updated Final Safety Analysis Report]]
| |
| }} | | }} |
|
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Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000003/20230032023-11-21021 November 2023 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023003, 05000247/2023003, 05000286/2023003, and 07200051/2023003 IR 05000003/20230022023-08-22022 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000003/2023002, 05000247/2023002, 05000286/2023002, and 07200051/2023002 IR 05000003/20230012023-05-22022 May 2023 Unions 1, 2 and 3 - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023001, 05000247/2023001, 05000286/2023001, and 07200051/2023001 IR 05000003/20234012023-05-10010 May 2023 NRC Security Decommissioning Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023401, 05000247/2023401, and 05000286/2023401 IR 05000003/20220042023-03-13013 March 2023 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022004, 05000247/2022004, 05000286/2022004, and 07200051/2022002 IR 05000003/20220022022-11-17017 November 2022 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022002, 05000003/2022003, 05000247/2022002, 05000247/2022003, 05000286/2022002, 05000286/2022003, and 07200051/2022001 IR 05000003/20224022022-10-28028 October 2022 Reissued NRC Security Decommissioning Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022402, 05000247/2022402, and 05000286/2022402 (Letter Only) IR 05000003/20224012022-05-25025 May 2022 NRC Security Decommissioning Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022401, 05000247/2022401, and 05000286/2022401 IR 05000003/20220012022-05-25025 May 2022 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022001, 05000247/2022001, and 05000286/2022001 IR 05000003/20210042022-03-0404 March 2022 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2021004, 05000247/2021004, 05000286/2021004, and 07200051/2021001 IR 05000003/20210032021-11-0909 November 2021 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2021003, 05000247/2021003, and 05000286/2021003 IR 05000003/20210022021-08-0404 August 2021 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2021002, 05000247/2021002, and 05000286/2021002 IR 05000286/20210022021-06-0707 June 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000286/2021002 IR 05000286/20214022021-05-0505 May 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000286/2021402 IR 05000003/20210012021-04-21021 April 2021 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000003/2021001 and 05000247/2020001 IR 05000286/20210012021-04-15015 April 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000286/2021001 IR 05000286/20200062021-03-0303 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter for Indian Point Energy Center, Unit 3 (Report 05000286/2020006) IR 05000247/20200142021-02-0101 February 2021 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000247/2020014 IR 05000286/20200042021-01-28028 January 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000286/2020004 IR 05000003/20200012020-12-0808 December 2020 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2, NRC Inspection Report No. 05000003/2020001 and 05000247/2020013 IR 05000286/20200032020-10-28028 October 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000286/2020003 IR 05000286/20200102020-09-16016 September 2020 Evaluation of Changes, Tests and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000286/2020010 IR 05000286/20200052020-08-31031 August 2020 Updated Inspection Plan for Indian Point Energy Center, Unit 3 (Inspection Report 05000286/2020005) IR 05000247/20200022020-08-10010 August 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2020002 and 05000286/2020002 IR 05000286/20200122020-07-27027 July 2020 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000286/2020012 IR 05000247/20020102020-05-12012 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Indian Point 2 (IR 050002472002010) IR 05000247/20200012020-04-29029 April 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2020001 and 05000286/2020001 IR 05000247/20190062020-03-0303 March 2020 Annual Assessment Letter for Indian Point Energy Center, Units 2 and 3 (Report 05000247/2019006 and 05000286/2019006) IR 05000247/20190042020-02-10010 February 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2019004 and 05000286/2019004 IR 05000003/20190012020-01-16016 January 2020 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000003/2019001 IR 05000247/20190122020-01-0909 January 2020 Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Inspection Report 05000247/2019012 and 05000286/2019012 IR 05000247/20194112020-01-0909 January 2020 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000247/2019411 and 05000286/2019411 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000247/20194032019-11-0505 November 2019 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000247/2019403 and 05000286/2019403 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000247/20190032019-11-0404 November 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2019003 and 05000286/2019003 IR 05000247/20194102019-10-0202 October 2019 Security Inspection Report 05000247/2019410 and 05000286/2019410 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000247/20190102019-09-26026 September 2019 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000247/2019010 and 05000286/2019010 IR 05000247/20190052019-08-28028 August 2019 Updated Inspection Plan (Inspection Report 05000247/2019005 and 05000286/2019005) IR 05000247/20190022019-08-13013 August 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2019002 and 05000286/2019002 IR 05000247/20190112019-07-0909 July 2019 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000247/2019011 and 05000286/2019011 IR 05000247/20190012019-05-13013 May 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2019001 and 05000286/2019001 ML19130A0422019-05-0808 May 2019 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000247/2019403 and 05000286/2019403 IR 05000247/20193012019-04-18018 April 2019 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000247/2019301 IR 05000247/20180062019-03-0404 March 2019 Annual Assessment Letter for Indian Point Energy Center, Units 2 and 3 (Reports 05000247/2018006 and 05000286/2018006) IR 05000247/20180042019-02-0707 February 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2018004 and 05000286/2018004 IR 05000247/20180102019-01-15015 January 2019 Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) Report 05000247/2018010 and 05000286/2018010 IR 05000247/20180022019-01-0909 January 2019 Errata for Indian Point Nuclear Generating - Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2018002 and 05000286/2018002 IR 05000247/20184102018-12-0606 December 2018 Security Inspection Report 05000247/2018410 and 05000286/2018410 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000247/20182012018-11-27027 November 2018 NRC Inspection Report 05000247/2018201 and 05000286/2018201 IR 05000247/20180032018-11-0808 November 2018 Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2018003 and 05000286/2018003 IR 05000003/20180012018-10-25025 October 2018 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000003/2018001 Dated October 25, 2018 2023-08-22
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24011A1982024-01-12012 January 2024 ISFSI, Notice of Organization Change for Site Vice President ML23342A1082024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan ML23353A1742023-12-19019 December 2023 ISFSI, Emergency Plan, Revision 23-04 L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 ML23339A0442023-12-0505 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 68, 301 and 277 Regarding Changes to Implement the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Physical Security Plan ML23326A1322023-12-0505 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 67, 300 & 276 to Implement the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Plan ML23338A2262023-12-0404 December 2023 Signed Amendment No. 27 to Indemnity Agreement No. B-19 ML23356A0212023-12-0101 December 2023 American Nuclear Insurers, Secondary Financial Protection (SFP) Program ML23242A2772023-11-30030 November 2023 NRC Letter Issuance - IP LAR for Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Licenses and PDTS to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from SFPs ML23338A0482023-11-30030 November 2023 ISFSI, Report of Changes to Physical Security, Training and Qualification, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and ISFSI Security Program, Revision 28 ML22339A1572023-11-27027 November 2023 Letter - Indian Point - Ea/Fonsi Request for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E IR 05000003/20230032023-11-21021 November 2023 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2023003, 05000247/2023003, 05000286/2023003, and 07200051/2023003 ML23100A1172023-11-17017 November 2023 NRC Response - Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Letter with Enclosures Regarding Changes to Remove the Cyber Security Plan License Condition ML23050A0032023-11-17017 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Indian Point Unit 2 License Amendment Request to Modify Tech Specs for Staffing Requirements Following Spent Fuel Transfer to Dry Storage ML23100A1252023-11-17017 November 2023 Letter and Enclosure 1 - Issuance Indian Point Energy Center Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemption for Offsite Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance Indemnity Agreement ML23100A1432023-11-16016 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemption Concerning Onsite Property Damage Insurance (Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, 50-286) ML23064A0002023-11-13013 November 2023 NRC Issuance for Approval-Indian Point EC Units 1, 2 and 3 Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme Amendments L-23-012, Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point2023-11-13013 November 2023 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point ML23306A0992023-11-0202 November 2023 and Indian Point Energy Center, Notification of Changes in Schedule in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7) ML23063A1432023-11-0101 November 2023 Letter - Issuance Holtec Request for Indian Point Energy Center Generating Units 1, 2, and 3 Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Part 50 ML23292A0262023-10-19019 October 2023 LTR-23-0211-RI Thomas Congdon, Executive Deputy, Department of Public Service, Chair, Indian Point Decommissioning Oversight Board, Letter Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection and Office of the Inspector General Report-RI ML23289A1582023-10-16016 October 2023 Decommissioning International - Registration of Spent Fuel Casks and Notification of Permanent Removal of All Indian Point Unit 3 Spent Fuel Assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pit ML23270A0082023-09-27027 September 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23237A5712023-09-22022 September 2023 09-22-2023 Letter to Dwaine Perry, Chief, Ramapo Munsee Nation, from Chair Hanson, Responds to Letter Regarding Opposition of the Release and Dumping of Radioactive Waste from Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Into the Hudson River ML23242A2182023-09-12012 September 2023 IPEC NRC Response to the Town of New Windsor, Ny Board Certified Motion Letter Regarding Treated Water Release from IP Site (Dockets 50-003, 50-247, 50-286) ML23250A0812023-09-0707 September 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23255A0142023-08-31031 August 2023 LTR-23-0211 Thomas Congdon, Executive Deputy, Department of Public Service, Chair, Indian Point Decommissioning Oversight Board, Letter Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection and Office of the Inspector General Report IR 05000003/20230022023-08-22022 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000003/2023002, 05000247/2023002, 05000286/2023002, and 07200051/2023002 ML23227A1852023-08-15015 August 2023 Request for a Revised Approval Date Regarding the Indian Point Energy Center Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML23222A1442023-08-10010 August 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23208A1642023-07-26026 July 2023 Village of Croton-on-Hudson New York Letter Dated 7-26-23 Re Holtec Wastewater ML23200A0422023-07-19019 July 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Casks ML23235A0602023-07-17017 July 2023 LTR-23-0194 Dwaine Perry, Chief, Ramapo Munsee Nation, Ltr Opposition of the Release and Dumping of Radioactive Waste from Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Into the Hudson River ML23194A0442023-07-11011 July 2023 Clarification for Indian Point Energy Center License Amendment Request, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Physical Security Plan ML23192A1002023-07-11011 July 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML23171B0432023-06-23023 June 2023 Letter - Indian Point Energy Center - Request for Additional Information for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Facility-Only Emergency Plan License Amendment ML23118A0972023-06-0606 June 2023 06-06-23 Letter to the Honorable Michael V. Lawler, Et Al., from Chair Hanson Regarding Holtec'S Announcement to Expedite Plans to Release Over 500,000 Gallons of Radioactive Wastewater from Indian Point Energy Center Into the Hudson River ML23144A3512023-05-25025 May 2023 Clementina Bartolotta of Pearl River, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3522023-05-25025 May 2023 Loredana Bidmead of New York E-Mail Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3412023-05-25025 May 2023 Dianne Schirripa of Rockland County, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3472023-05-25025 May 2023 David Mart of Blauvelt, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3402023-05-25025 May 2023 Melvin Israel of New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3542023-05-25025 May 2023 Terri Thal of New City, New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site ML23144A3532023-05-25025 May 2023 John Shaw of New York Email Against Treated Water Release from Indian Point Site 2024-01-09
[Table view] |
Text
January 6, 2017
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2016007
Dear Mr. Vitale:
On December 16, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial
fire protection inspection at your Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 and discussed the
results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this
inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing
large fires and explosions.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,
/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000247/2016007
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY
IR 05000247/2016007; 11/28/2016 - 12/16/2016; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2;
Triennial Fire Protection Inspection.
This report covered a two week on-site triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6, dated July 2016.
No findings were identified.
3
REPORT DETAILS
Background
This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance
with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection." An objective of the inspection
was to assess whether Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) has implemented an
adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been
established and are being properly maintained at the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 (IP2). The following fire areas (FA) and associated fire zones (FZ) were selected for detailed
review based on prior inspection results and risk insights from the IP2 Individual Plant
Examination of External Events:
Fire Area / Fire Zone FZ 15 Main Control Room FZ 10 Diesel Generator Building FA F PAB Corridor 80' & 98' and Fan House 89' Inspection of these FAs/FZs fulfilled the IP requirement to inspect a minimum of three samples.
The inspectors evaluated Entergy's fire protection program (FPP) against applicable
requirements which included Unit 2 Operating License Conditions 2.K. and 2.N., Unit 3
Operating License Condition 2.AC., NRC Safety Evaluations, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.48, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The inspectors also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the Fire
Protection Program Plan, the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), and the Safe Shutdown Analysis
Report.
The team evaluated aspects of three mitigating strategies for responding to large fires and
explosions, which are required by Operating License Condition 2.N for Unit 2, Operating
License Condition 2.AC for Unit 3, and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). The team also reviewed related
documents that included Nuclear Energy Institute 06-12, "B.5.b Phases 2 & 3 Submittal
Guidance," Revision 2 (ML070090060). Inspection of these strategies fulfills the IP requirement
to inspect a minimum of one sample.
Documents reviewed for each section of this report are listed in the Attachment.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R05 Fire Protection (IP 71111.05T)
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the FHA, post-fire safe shutdown analyses, and supporting drawings
and documents to verify whether the safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected from fire damage. The team evaluated equipment and cable separation to determine whether the applicable separation requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G, and the
IP2 design and licensing bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown
equipment and their supporting power, control, and instrumentation cables. The team's
review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactor
pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to evaluate whether the
material conditions of the FA boundaries were adequate for the fire hazards in the area.
The team compared the FA boundaries, including walls, ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire
dampers, penetration seals, electrical raceway and conduit fire barriers, and redundant
equipment fire barriers to design and licensing basis requirements, industry standards, and the IP2 FPP, as approved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-
conformances.
The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations, installation and repair work
orders, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether
the fill material was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied
design requirements for the intended fire rating. The team also reviewed similar records
for selected fire protection wraps and an encapsulation system to verify whether the
material and configuration was appropriate for the required fire rating and conformed to
the engineering design.
The team also reviewed recent inspection records and functional test procedures for fire
dampers, and the inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers, to verify
whether the inspection was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.03 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the selected FAs to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained, and
operated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes of record, and the IP2 FPP, as approved by the NRC. The team also
assessed whether the suppression systems capabilities were adequate to control and/or
extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas.
The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verify the design and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements were satisfied, and to
assess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazards involved. The team
reviewed the fire water system hydraulic analyses to assess the adequacy of a single
fire water pump to supply the largest single hydraulic load on the fire water system plus
concurrent fire hose usage. The team evaluated the fire pump performance tests to
assess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pump minimum discharge
pressure at the required flow rate, to verify the criteria was adequate to ensure that the
design basis and hydraulic analysis requirements were satisfied. The team also
evaluated the underground fire loop flow tests to verify the tests adequately
demonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet design basis
requirements. In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flow test results to
verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any
potential performance degradation was identified.
The team walked down accessible portions of the detection and water suppression
systems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supply system, including motor and diesel driven fire pumps, interviewed system and program engineers, and reviewed condition reports to independently assess the material
condition of the systems and components. In addition, the team reviewed recent test
results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected FAs to verify the
testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any
performance degradation was identified.
The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and
drill critique records. The team also reviewed Entergy's fire-fighting strategies (i.e., pre-
fire plans) and smoke removal plans for the selected FAs to determine if appropriate
information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe
shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that
could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. The team independently inspected the
fire brigade equipment, including personnel protective gear (e.g., turnout gear) and
smoke removal equipment, to determine operational readiness for fire-fighting. In
addition, the team reviewed Entergy's fire brigade equipment inventory and recent
inspection and inventory results to verify adequate equipment was available, and any
potential material deficiencies were identified.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed document reviews and plant walkdowns to verify that redundant
trains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same FA, are
not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent
operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:
A fire in one of the selected FAs would not indirectly, through production of smoke, heat or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that could
potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains; A fire in one of the selected FAs (or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of a fire suppression system) would not indirectly cause damage to all redundant trains (e.g. sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); and, Adequate drainage is provided in areas pr otected by water suppression systems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the UFSAR, and other supporting documents for the selected FAs to determine whether Entergy had properly identified the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions. The team evaluated selected systems and components credited by the safe shutdown analysis for reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant
makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions to assess the adequacy of Entergy's alternative shutdown methodology. The team also assessed whether alternative post-fire shutdown could be performed both with and without the availability of off-site power. The team walked down selected plant
configurations to verify whether they were consistent with the assumptions and descriptions in the safe shutdown and the FHA. In addition, the team evaluated whether the systems and components credited for use during post-fire safe shutdown would
remain free from fire damage.
The team reviewed the training program for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify whether it included alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified whether personnel, required for post-fire safe shutdown, using either the normal or alternative shutdown methods, were trained and available on-site at all times, exclusive
of those assigned as fire brigade members.
The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown and performed an independent walk through of procedure steps (i.e., a procedure tabletop)to assess the adequacy of implementation and human factors within the procedures.
The team also evaluated the time required to perform specific actions to verify whether operators could reasonably be expected to perform those actions within sufficient time to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included:
2-AOP-SSD-1, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control, Revision 23; 2-ONOP-FP-001, Plant Fires, Revision 17; and, 2-SOP-ESP-001, Local Equipment Operation and Contingency Actions, Revision 12.
The team reviewed selected operator manual actions to verify whether they had been
properly reviewed and approved and whether the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each FA. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer and isolation capability, and instrumentation and control functions, to evaluate whether the tests were adequate to ensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.06 Circuit Analysis
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Entergy's post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected FAs to determine whether the analysis identified both required and associated electrical circuits and cables for the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for power, control, and instrumentation associated with selected components. Specifically, the team evaluated the selected circuits and cables to determine whether they were
- (a) adequately protected from potential fire damage, or
- (b) analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown, or
- (c) analyzed to show that potential damage could be mitigated with approved operator manual actions, in order to determine whether fire-induced faults could adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities. The team's evaluations considered credible fire scenarios, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, cable routing, and common power supply or electrical bus configurations.
In addition, the team reviewed cable raceway drawings and cable routing databases for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to determine whether those cables were routed as described in the safe shutdown analysis. The team also reviewed equipment important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to assess whether Entergy's safe shutdown methodologies were appropriate, conformed to design and licensing basis requirements, and appropriately considered the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.
Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:
21CHP , 21 Charging Pump 21CCP, 21 Component Cooling Pump 250A and 4925, 21 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Injection Line Isolation Valves LCV-112C, Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation Valve LT-417D(427D), Steam Generator 21(22) Level Indicators The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker and fuse over-current protection coordination studies to determine whether equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown activities could be adversely affected due to a lack of coordination that could result in a common power supply or common electrical bus concern. The team also evaluated whether coordination studies appropriately considered multiple faults due to fire. In
addition, the team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records, for components required for safe shutdown, to determine whether the breakers were properly maintained.
The team assessed the transfer of control from the main control room to the alternative shutdown location to determine whether it would be adversely affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, and
associated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would be
available to plant operators following a fire. During this review, the team considered the
effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability, and coverage patterns.
The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify the
availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and for plant operators. The team also
verified that communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not be
affected by a fire.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lights
throughout the selected FAs to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and
egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery power
supplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenance
procedures, the vendor manual, completed surv eillance tests, and battery replacement practices were also reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintained
consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and in a manner that would ensure
reliable operation.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Entergy's dedicated repair procedures for components which might be damaged by fire and were required to achieve post-fire cold shutdown. The team evaluated selected cold shutdown repairs to determine whether they could be achieved
within the time frames assumed in the design and licensing bases. In addition, the team verified whether the necessary repair equipment, tools, and materials (e.g., pre-cut cables with prepared attachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g. detection and suppression systems and equipment; passive fire
barriers; or pumps, valves, or electrical dev ices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The team also verified that the short term compensatory measures
compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action
could be taken and that Entergy was effective in returning the equipment to service in a
reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 Review and Documentation of FPP Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed recent changes to the approved FPP to verify that the changes did
not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.12 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Entergy's procedures and programs for the control of ignition
sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and
in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hot
work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The team
performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources
were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.13 Large Fires and Explosions Mitigation Strategies
a. Inspection Scope
The team conducted a review of selected mitigation strategies intended to maintain or
restore core decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the
circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions
and/or fires. The team assessed whether Entergy continued to meet the requirements
of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 Operating Licenses and 10 CFR
50.54(hh)(2).
The team reviewed the following mitigation strategies:
Unit 3 Makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool with Permanently Installed and Portable Equipment; Unit 3 External Spray; Unit 2 Manual Operation of Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valves; and, Unit 2 Makeup to the Steam Generators with the Portable Pump
The team's review included: a detailed assessment of the procedural guidance; a
tabletop discussion with licensed operators; and a walk down of four mitigation
strategies with operators to assess the feasibility of the strategies and operator
familiarity, maintenance and surveillance testing of selected strategy equipment, and an
inventory check of the B.5.b pump and equipment trailers to ensure the appropriateness
of equipment storage and availability.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with the FPP, post-fire safe
shutdown issues, and mitigation strategy issues to determine whether Entergy was
appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these
areas and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Anthony J. Vitale, Site Vice President, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on December 16, 2016. The team
verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Balletta Senior Reactor Operator
S. Bianco Fire Brigade Training
T. Chan Design Engineer
G. Dahl Licensing Engineer
K. Elliot Appendix R Engineer
D. Powell Senior Reactor Operator
C. Wilson Fire Protection Engineer
NRC
- B. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point
- S. Rich Resident Inspector, Indian Point
- C. Safouri Acting Resident Inspector, Indian
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
NONE
Opened and Closed
NONE
Closed
NONE
Discussed
NONE
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED