ST-HL-AE-1684, Forwards marked-up Changes to FSAR Section 3.5 & Responses to NRC Questions Re Results of Internal Missile Analysis/ Evaluations,Per SER (NUREG-0781) Open Item 2

Forwards marked-up Changes to FSAR Section 3.5 & Responses to NRC Questions Re Results of Internal Missile Analysis/ Evaluations,Per SER (NUREG-0781) Open Item 2

ML20199D898
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	06/17/1986
From:	Wisenburg M HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-#386-660, RTR-NUREG-0781, RTR-NUREG-781 OL, ST-HL-AE-1684, NUDOCS 8606230128
Download: ML20199D898 (34)

Text

r-The Light NE f Ifouston 1.ighting & Power P.O. Ika 1700 Ilouston, 'Icxas e dH)I (713) 228-921I June 17 1986 ST-HL-A$-1684 File No.: G9.18/C36.04 Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate #5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Response To Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0781 Open Item #2 Internal Missile Analysis

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Attached are annotated changes to the South Texas Project (STP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.5 and responses to NRC Questions which provide the results of the internal missile analysis / evaluations for the STP.

l These changes are being submitted in response to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-0781 open item number 2 (Table 1.1-4 of the SER).

As a result of the analysis, no modifications to the plant design were required.

If you should hav+ .ny questions on this matter, please contact Mr. M. E. Powell at ',71 ; ) 993-1328.

Very truly yours, M. R. Wi n g Manager,1(uclearLi ns ng MEP/yd

Attachment:

Annotated FSAR Pages to Section 3.5 8606230128 860617 PDR ADOCK 00000498 0 E

Ll/NRC/fr PDR -

i t i

flouston Lighting & Power Company ST-HL-AE-1684 File No.: G9.18/C36.04 Page 2 cc:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. , Director Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Division of PWR Licensing - A Assistant Attorney General for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the State of Texas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 Robert D. Martin Lanny A. Sinkin Regional Administrator, Region IV Christic Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1324 North Capitol Street 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20002 Arlington, TX 76011 Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Hearing Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director 7920 Norfolk Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20555 Claude E. Johnson Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Senior Resident Inspector /STP Chairman, Atomic Safety &

c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 910 Washington, DC 20555 Bay City, TX 77414 Dr. James C. Lamb, III M.D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire 313 Woodhaven Road Baker & Botts Chapel Hill, NC 27514 One Shell Plaza Houston, TX 77002 Judge Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board J.R. Newman, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Washington, DC 20555 1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc, c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn Director, Office of Inspection Route 1, Box 1684 and Enforcement Brazoria, TX 77422 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary T.V. Shockley/R.L. Range U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Central Power & Light Company Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 2121 (3 Copies)

Corpus Christi, TX 78403 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards H.L. Peterson/G. Pokorny U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City of Austin 1717 H Street l P.O. Box 1088 Washington, DC 20555 l Austin, TX 78767 l 1

J.B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg City Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Ll/NRC/fr Revised 5/22/86

3.5 MISSILE PROTECTION

- This section describes the missile protection design bases for Seismic Cate-I gory I structures, systems, and components. Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components and their safety classifications are identified in Section 3.2. Missiles considered are those which could result from: a plant-related failure / incident, including failures within and outside of the Reactor Containment Building (RCB), environmentally generated missiles, and site proximity missiles. Included in this section are descriptions of the structures, shields, and barriers which are designed to withstand missile

} effects, the possible missile loadings, and the procedures by which each

barrier is designed to resist missile impact.

To reduce the probability of unacceptable consequences related to missile 36 impact, key backup and/or redundant components and systems have been physi-cally separated and shielded so that a single missile is incapable of negating the redundant functions. In addition, essentially all Seismic Category I components are housed in Seismic Category I structures or analysis is 36

! performed to demonstrate that external missiles have an acceptably low proba-

) bility of striking them.

The following criteria were adopted for assessing the plant's capability to withstand the missiles postulated in Sections 3.5.1.1 and 3.5.1.2:

1. No perforation of the RCB (i.e., no loss of leaktightness) 4kue. uk

2. Assurance that the plant cangbe maintained-in-a safe shutdown condition Win coald 3

( 3. Offsite exposure vithin 10CFR100 guidelines for missile damagegresult 6es.

in activity release

3.5.1 Missile Selection and Description Wherever possible, component and system design precludes the generation of l

missiles. This is achieved by suitable choice of materials, use of normal and l

faulted stress levels, and system and component characteristics which avoid For exam

b ""* issi(egrguj[ingeffectsevenungr,faultedconditions.adeptses fe*alissDes he precluded b

• h,with bk f'*valves Wherever possible, systems and componeq,t,s i n ified as potential missile sources are arranged end eri;;;:' so tNe3 m ss e would impact on am-;;i;;i g structure or component capable of withstanding the impact. S.;;; : criti- '

..... : ' rinik ee..;e she.. . .. ..... ..y.... 7..,----- -

r-- ; -- -- 36 p ;;f' ' by ::h ;;;ing :: ::::i:: ing ith:: c'- 0:rg:: :: th: ;i;;il; : _:;;; '

Ba e s are provided for missiles which cannot be orie g take advantage o structures and which could cause failure o a ety'-related struc-tures or compon ese bar rs d i d to contain or deflect the missiles from t ety-relate .E: y es gne:  : -without generating any secondary missiles. 36 Wherever possible. :d:::::g: i: ::h:2 cf ::11;  :: ;;;.;;.:;; :: icing f r-

> . . a a . a .. . .

s... . , a . , .....a --.... .g ..-.>2....> -. t

,.u.. a..a,.~.ni Q T[ T , M f.' % - "ts % 6' L ,2 Q s d O

~

1;;;;;~ C .'3 21.4- .Z l ,

g awk irNr skyscNd(.frev is rneit ohw' hs.+. cad vup M.-e M M seyarate e.nednal cowyone.ks fp> yobft;al vnM\c so w t.es.

3.5-1 Amendment 36

l ['

u, u

~ A ]% CMode STP FSAR %M NA%f'S N y

Vor scdthUdaM _

. . , y -

c.o9esh ,

s Table 3.5-2 lists and describes the barriers utilized for missile protection.

~

3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles outside the containment. Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components outside the Containment whose failure could result in radiological consequences in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines or which are required for attaining and maintaining a safe shutdown during normal or accident conditions are listed in Table 3.5-1.Y External missile protection provisions anc roterences to applicante system descriptions and drawings that demonstrate separation and independence are listed in Table 53 3.5-1. !niti:*'{nternalmissileprotectionAp;;cizi:2 are indicated in Table 3.5-1. Tinel intun 1-missi4+-design-proteeti n p;ccici:::, 1.-1 Ming -

Wi-it-reconciliatim. -ill h pravid d in T61: 3.5-1 prier te f= 1 1;;i Vretea m repch ah hon ink M minilc- tourted arc describui below

1. etential-sources-of-miss11 s ase+ ON McWiM PhnM MMMc souytcM f Coer vA er/ a.s c 14c6 are c;the- 1 o High-pressure systems se.wvahtd SA W fc. Ateck C omPenenh N e Rotating machinery CM) or hW%NA MO N 6 N Ynd IocMel wt h %e.sh doyca Wh:nk e Gravitational missiles houw.sait og $hs or -theq Yl36 k ^ Y' "- I" E - I e cenp e nek ec.r/ cd:du5 Systems outside the ontainment were reviewed to determine sources of q211.1 missiles.4The results of this review are discussed in the following section.

ggg 3.5.1.1.1 High-Pressure Systems: Valve bonnets and stems,and thermo-wells'are the potential missiles associated with high-pressure systems outside l36 the Containment.

Temperature or other detectors installed on piping or in wells are evaluated as potential missiles if a failure of a single circumferential weld would cause their ejection. This is highly improbable, since a complete and sudden failure of a circumferential veld is needed for a detector to become a 36 missile. In addition, because of the spatial separation of redundant refe-l ty-related equipment, a small missile such as a detector, assuming the circum-j ferential weld fails completely, is not likely to hit redundant safety-related equipment.

Two types of valve components, valve stems and valve bonnets, are potential missiles. Valves in high-pressure systems have bsen reviewed as potential missile sources. The provisions that valves have bolted bonnets or secondary retention devices, and that they be designed to ASME III requirements effec-tively eliminates credible sources of valve component missiles.

Valves of ANSI 900 psig rating and above, constructed in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, are pressure seal I

bonnet type valves. For pressure seal bonnet valves, valve bonnets are prevented from becoming missiles by the retaining ring, which would have to 36 fail in shear, and by the yoke, which would capture the bonnet or reduce bonnet energy.

Because of the highly conservative design of the retaining ring of these valves (safety factors in excess of 8 may be used), bonnet ejection is highly improbable and hence bonnets are not considered credible missiles.

Most valves of ANSI rating 600 psig and below are valves with bolted bonnets. n Valve bonnets are prevented from becoming missiles by limiting stresses in the 3.5-2 Amendment 53 O

STP FSAR bonnet-to-body bolting material by rules set forth in the ASME Boiler and j~ - Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, and by designing flanges in accordance with applicable code requirements. Even if bolt failure were to occur, the like-lihood of all bolts experiencing a simultaneous complete severance failure is very remote. The widespread use of valves with bolted bonnets, and the low historical incidence of complete severance valve bonnet failures confirm that bolted valve bonnets need not be considered as credible missiles.

Valve stems were not considered as potential missiles if at least one feature, in addition to the stem threads, is included in their design to prevent ejec- l tion. Valves with backseats are prevented from becoming missiles by this fea-ture. In addition, air- or motor-operated valve stems will be effectively 36 ,

4 restrained by the valve operators.

Nuts, bolts, nut and bolt combinations, and nut and stud combinations have only a small amount of stored energy and thus are of no concern as potential missiles.

! Valves with threaded bonnet studs are not utilized in high energy piping and thus are of no concern as potential missiles.

l h45EM A >

3.5.1.1.2 Rotating Machinery: Potential missile sources associated with rotating machinery were identified as:

e Motor-driven pumps and compressors e Turbine-driven pumps e Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) fans e Diesel generator turbocharger rotors e Motor generator set flywheels

! NSED 6 Missile selection was based on the following considerations:

Ape.# -

operated during normal plant conditions;35 ase-l 1. Rotatin g ; : rt that capable of b a-* - missiles,.

0"N 4 W A kgb em. ssh

2. The energy of a rotating partrassociated th 20 percent overspeed is assumed - "i + -~ for component failure unless analysis is performed to indicate otherwise. Fw whic. e,wem sp% a.a\ Joe ue- 36 basci on vnmih p cm.h.kke.A to oct.e # woM S Pe.c15.

3. Determination of whether the energy of the missile is sufficient to per-forate the protective housing. For example, electrical motors are not considered potential missile sources due to their cast iron housing. The housing itself is capable of withstanding internal faults such as cooling fan break down or armature disintegration. "i::il:: .:::::ted 5 ; :: - .

1 tro f:ih::: :f p__p; e..d !.... ... d m y m ... ;f icir: cr '"-*=A 912 :: 10: Of th::: 21::11 : rill ;,; . m idad L. e f a .ae -- ad= _.. p The

! following are not potential missile sources:

l[ a. There are four turbine-driven pumps, of two types: the tur-bine-driven auxiliary feedvater pump and the three turbine-driven 3.5-3 Amendment 36

(

7 . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ ._ _. _ ._

Insert A Valves in high pressure systems have been reviewed. As a result of this review it has been determined that no failure associated with a single valve part can result in the generation of a missile.

Pressurized tanks in high pressure systems are either not located within the structures which house safety-related systems or.they are separated from safety-related components in cubicles or subcompartments within the structure.

Insert B Rotating equipment evaluated as potential sources of missiles were either determined incredible (based on supplier certifications) as missile sources, evaluated using the formulas given in FSAR Section 3.5.3, or the effect of loss of the potential missile impactees on the ability to shutdown safely was reviewed. A summary of rotating equipment considered as potential missile sources is given in Table 3.5-16.

Ll/NRC/fr

STP FSAR steam generator (SG) main feed pumps. The main feed pumps and their drive turbines are protected from overspeed by redundant overspeed

. trips. A single overspeed trip is provided on the auxiliary feed- 51 water pump drive turbine. These pumps are not considered to be a i source of missiles.

b7' -HYAC and chiller fans were reviewed. Chillers have very low r fans'which are not a credible source of missiles. Near of the l HVAC fans are' separated from safety-related equi and cable {

trays to the extent that postulated miss o not pose a safety i hazard. The supply subsyst'em-f _

e only fan which might be a l source of missiles and is ed in echanical-Electrical Aux- l l iliaries Buildin at El. 60.0 ft. es of this fan are i made of a and are postulated to impact the ho at 26.7 ft . The housing is 1/4-in.-thick steel and would conta ha missile.

! h. -ee The diesel generators (DCs) are designed to withstand overspeeds of 125 percent; redundant mechanical and electrical overspeed trips operate at 110 percent overspeed. The only portion of the diesels considered to be a credible source for postulated missiles is the turbocharger, which is not speed controlled and operates at high rpm. The turbocharger rotors weigh 270 pounds and are mounted on the diesels. In the event of failure, only one DG unit would be affected since each is separated from adjacent units by 2-ft-thick i

reinforced concrete walls which would contain any turbocharger missile.

CL -dv Motor generator (MG) set flywheels were reviewed to determine mis- ,

! sile generation potential. The fabrication specifications of the MG i set flywheels control the material to meet American Society for f Testing and Materials (ASTM) A533-70s, Grade B, Class I, with inspec- h4 i

tions in accordance with MIL-I-45208A and flame-cutting and machin-ing operations governed to prevent flaws in the material. Non-destructive testing for nil-ductility (ASTM-E-208), Charpy V-notch (ASTM A593-69), ultrasonic (ASTM A578-71b and A577-70s), and magne-tic particles (ASME Eaction III, NB2545) has been performed on each 44 flywheel material lot. In addition to these requirements, stress calculations have been performed consistent with guidelines of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code,Section III, Appendix A to show the combined primary stresses due to centrifugal forces and to show that the shaft interference fit does not exceed one-third of the yield strength at normal operating speeds (1,800 rpm) and does not exceed two-thirds of the yield strength at 25 percent overspeed. However, no overspeed is expected for the following reason: The flywheel weighs approximately 1,300 lbs and is 35.26 in. in diameter by 4.76 in, wide. The flywheel mounted on the generator shaft, which is directly coupled to the motor shaft, is driven by a 200-hp, 1,800-rpm synchronous motor. The torque developed by the motor is insufficient for overspeed. Therefore, there are no credible mis-siles from the MG sets.

I N SE- Q_-( C_ -

3.5-4 Amendment 51

-x?

Insert C.

4. Some equipment configurations provide an unprotected aspect of the rotating component most likely to eject a missile, .i.e. , they may provide an opportunity for a missile to be released without impacting the component housing. For' example, centrifugal fans may have'an open discharge scroll without a ducted exhaust. The connected ductwork on other centrifugal fans may not be as thick as the evaluation shows is needed to prevent perforation by an oblique or perpendicular missile impact.

5. Single failure considerations are similar.to those used in the pipe rupture analysis. See Section 3.6.1-1.

L1/NRC/fr

STP FSAR l t l are administrative 1y controlled so that missiles resulting from dropped loads l36 are not considered further. In addition, missiles could result from a crane derailing and falling. However, overhead cranes were designed with clamping devices to prevent derailing. Therefore, no generation of missiles is a expected from derailment of an overhead crane. Appropriate p::::: 1 r pn M eh ,

measures (such as interlocks, special slings, etc.) have been 4 dent 444ed3 to l prevent accidental drop of a heavy load that could impact nuclear fuel, safe-ty-related equipment, or components whose failure could result in radiological 36

, )l6 6 M g consequences  : exceeding 10CFR100.

3.5.1.2 Internally Generated Missiles Inside the containment. Systems and components inside the Containment whose failure could result in radiologi-cal consequences in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines or which are required for attaining and maintaining a safe shutdown during normal or accident conditions are listed in Table.3.5-1. No missile protection provision is necessary for the postulated missiles described in the following sections.

Potential sources of missiles are: 36 e High-pressure systems e Rotating machinery e Gravitational missiles l2 e Secondary missiles Q211.

(

Com$(2.1.cweb 3.5.1 Ak/ I

( ta dc6 36 High-PrkA3ssure kystems - Catastrophic failure of the reactor g l vessel, SGs, pressuriser, reactor coolant pump (RCP) casings,Kand piping g i

leading to generation of missiles is not considered credible. Massive and rapid failure of these components is incredible because of the material char- gN l acteristics, inspections, quality control during fabrication, erection and operation, conservative design, and prudent operation as applied to the parti-cular component.

l Components that nevertheless are considered to have a potential for missile generation inside the Containment are:

l 1. Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) housing plug, drive shaft, and drive

! shaft and drive mechanism latched together ,

2. Valves

3. Temperature and pressure sensor assemblies i 4. Pressuriser heaters These potential missile sources are discussed in the following sections.

3.5.1.2.1.1. Control Rod Drive Mechanism Missiles - Gross failure of a CRDM housing sufficient to allow a control rod to be rapidly ejected from the j, core was not considered credible for the following reasons:

1-1 1. The CRDMs are shop tested at 4,105 psig.

4 3.5-5 Amendment 36 4

7* .

- _ ._._____m_

Insert D 3.5.1.1.4 Compressed Air / Gas Cylinders: Compressed air or compressed gas cylinders not part of a connected system have been evaluated for their  ;

potential to damage essential safety-related equipment by ejecting missiles.

Most pressurized cylinders are located in areas outside structures housing safety-related equipment. Some are located in cubicles or compartments which

. separate them from safety-related equipment. Two types of high pressure compressed gas cylinders may be located in areas which contain essential safety-related equipment: portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers and miscellaneous gas cylinders used to support chemical analyses. These cylinders will be secured as appropriate, in vehicle-type brackets or seismically designed racks and oriented so that an ejected fitting could not strike an essential safety-related component.

f L1/NRC/fr

STP FSAR

2. The CRDM housings are individually hydrotested to 3,107 psig after they are installed on the reactor vessel to the head adapters and are checked 3 again during the hydrotest of the completed Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

3. The CRDM housings are made of type 304 stainless steel. This material )

exhibits excellent notch toughness at all temperatures that will be encountered. l

l

However, it was postulated that the top plug on the CRDM will become loose and 2 it will be forced upward by the water jet. The following sequence of events ecs assumed

The drive shaft and rod cluster control (RCC) are forced out of

the core by a differential pressure of 2,500 psi across the drive shaft. The drive shaft and RCC, latched together, are assumed fully inserted when the

'j cecident starts. After approximately 14 ft of travel, the RCC spider hits the underside of the upper support plate. Upon impact, the flexure arms in the crupling joining the drive shaf t and RCC fracture, completely freeing the drive shaft from the RCC. The RCC would be completely stopped by the upper cupport plate; however, the drive shaft would continue to be accelerated upward to hit the missile shield provided.

i The CRDM missiles are summarized in Table 3.5-3. The velocity of the missiles l36 ccs calculated by balancing the forces due to the water jet. No spreading of the water jet was assumed.

3.5.1.2.1.2 Valves - Valve bonnets and stems have been eliminated on the came basis as valve missiles outside Containment. Refer to Section 3.5.1.1.1.

3.5.1.2.1.3 Temperature and Pressure Sensor Assemblies - Temperature and 36 i

pressure sensor assembly (inside Containment) missiles are treated in the same cenner as those outside Containment. Refer to Section 3.5.1.1.1.

i 3.5.1.2.1.4 Pressurizer Heaters - It was assumed that the pressurizer l36 hasters could become loose and become jet-propelled missiles. The missile characteristics of the pressurizer heaters are given in Table 3.5-4. A l36 10-degree-expansion, half-angle water jet was assumed.

! 3.5.1.2.2 Rotating Machinery - The RCP flywheel was not considered a l36 l cource of missiles for the reasons discussed in Section 5.4.1.

l hw.\c, 4.c\st,b is Wel ow-Ws. cam:).sent.m 4.ruuwd.M. s edtvw. 3. 5.l. l. 2. .

"f elle na......>.-

ted by

.e

tel

:d feil ::: Of p ,: ;;d f>-.a.......

.t.__ >__n, - _s.. +_ us

::: bef= e el^ >s. /

,ca. ---

.menv. A u m m rt d rote 6:[.[e [ cec dea [ p. h b f (c. .S- M. 36 Yht%N scurtc5Gravitational b 8lWex iAMissiles - The consequences of a load drop have 3.5.1.2.3 been studied. The drop of the most critical load lifted by the polar crane does not have unacceptable consequences. Clamping devices prevent the crane from derailing and generating missiles. Appropriate preventive measures (such

! cs interlocks, special slings, etc.) have been identified to prevent acci-j dental drop of a heavy load that could impact nuclear fuel, safety-related i

equipment, or components whose failure could result in radiological conse-( quences exceeding 10CFR100.

3.5.1.2.4 Secondary Missiles - Orientation of the possible missile 2 L cources and the design of the barriers is such that there is no possibility of a211.1 l

3.5-6 Amendment 36 l

1

-e .-

• "w

STP FSAR The only externally generated cissiles for which prst:cti n is requir d cro ternado missiles, as discussed ir. Section 3.5.1.4. .

B:rriers used for missile protection are listed in Table 3.5-2.

w 3.5.3 Barrier Design Procedures p riers ate designed to withstand the effects of missila impact. The bar-riers are designed or checked to assure that a missile strike does not cause 36 ccabbing. The overall effects are evaluated by the response of the structure er target and portions thereof to missile impact. Missiles are assumed to strike the barriers normal to the surface, and the axis of each missile is ccsumed to be parallel to the line of flight. These assumptions result in a c:nservative estimate of missile effect to barriers.

3.5.3.1 Local Damage Prediction. Prediction of local damage, i.e.,

damage in the immediate vicinity of the impact area, includes estimating the d:pth of penetration, minimum thickness required to prevent perforation, and cinimum thickness required to preclude spalling.

l 3.5.3.1.1 Reinforced Concrete Barriers: The depth of penetration of a

tissile (excluding turbine-generated missiles) into a reinforced concrete bar- 36 rier is calculated by the modified Petry formula, as set forth in Reference '

3.5-13. Depending upon the slab thickness penetration depth ratio, a', the following expressions are used:

12KAP log 10 * # "'

, 215,000 ,

D=

12KAP log 10 l [# \ [ + *[-4(a' -2))\

Il I ' # -

215,000j ( ) . .

f where:

I . I I D = penetration depth,-44. >

3,200

• K = 0.00476 gy ,,p) f, = material parameter A = W/A = sectional pressure, Ib/ft 8 P c I

V = impact velocity, ft/sec W = missile weight, Ib

"#'"' t*

Ac " "II1' * "**""

i e' = t/D = vall thickness / penetration depth 3.5-18 Amendment 36 i

3 '

STP FSAR l

TABLE 3.5-1 SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component, Missile Missile FSAR l

or Structure Location Protection

• Protection

• Reference Structures Section 4

3.8 Containment Building N/A A N/A Mechanical-Electrical Aux 11- N/A A N/A l iaries Building, including control room Fuel-Handling Building N/A A N/A Diesel-Generator Building N/A A N/A I Essential Cooling Water Intake N/A A N/A  !

and Discharge Structures s

- Essential Cooling Pond N/A A N/A 36 j MSIV structure (IVC) N/A A N/A I FW valve structure (IVC) N/A A N/A 7

i Class 1E Underground Elec- N/A A N/A q trical Raceway System 312 I .23

Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank N/A A N/A Containment Isolation Valves and RCB, IVC, B D Section I

Pipina -- FEB, MAB 6.2.4 Reactor Coolant System Chapter 5

l Reactor vessel & supports RCB B B CRDM assembly RCB B B f Thermal barrier RCB B 9&

Steam generator & supports F.,5 3 D Reactor Coolant pumps & supports RCB B D Pressuriser & supports RCB B D i

• See notes at the end of this table for code meanings.

f 3.5-24 Amendment 36

3. ,. - . . __

STP FSAR TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

(.-

SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component, Missile Missile FSAR or Structure Location Protection Protection Reference Reactor Coolant System (Continued)

Other RCS piping, supports valves RCB B D

& fittings required to maintain RC pressure boundary

!!.;. _1 i; . .-ie. 3C0 - .

Reactor Vessel head vent system RCB B D Reactor Head Degassing System RCB/MAB B D Chemical and Volume Control System Section 9.3.4.1 Regenerative HX RCB B D

(.,~ Centrifugal charging pump MAB B D 36 Positive displacement pump MAB B D Seal water injection filter MAB B D Seal water return filter MAB B D Boric acid transfer pump MAB B D Boric acid filter MAB B D RC purification pump MAB B D Boric acid tanks MAB B D Pulsation dampener MAB B D Piping and Valves RCB/MAB B C#

Emergency Core Coolina System Section 6.3 Accumulators RCB B D NHSI pumps FHB B D LHSI pumps FHB B D 3.5-25 Amendment 36 3 .. . .

STP PSAR r TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component, Missile Missile PSAR or Structure Location Protection Protection Reference Sampling System Section 9.3.2 Sample delay coil RCB/MAB B D Piping and Valves RCB/MAB B D Steam Generator Blowdown System Section 10.4.8 Piping from SG out to and RCB/ IVC B D including the isolation valves Diesel Generator Lube Oil System DGB B D Diesel Generator Fuel Storage and Transfer System Section

(~ , . 9.5.4 Diesel oil storage tanks DGB B D Valves DGB B D 36 Piping except vent and fill DGB B D piping downstream of last valve in the line Diesel Generator Cooling Water DGB B D Section System 9.5.5 Diesel Generator Air Starting System Section 9.5.6 Air receivers DGB B D Piping and Valves DGB B D Containment Combustible Gas Control System Section 6.2.5 Electric hydrogen RCB B JD'Ce recombiner Containment Hydrogen Monitorina System Section 6.2.5 Hydrogen analyzer package MAB B .D* C.,

3.5-29 Amendment 36 7

• STP FSAR TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

. f. -

SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component, Missile Missile FSAR Location Protection Protection Reference or Structure Containment Hydromen Monitorina System (Continued)

Piping and valves inside the RCB/MAB B JW" 0' Containment to and including the analyzer package isolation valves B ;5 C-Remaining piping and valves MAB Heatina Ventilatina, and Air Conditionina System

1. Containment building HVAC RCB B D Section RCFCs including ductwork, 9.4.5 MS isolation valve structure ductwork containment cubicle fans, exhaust fans, ductwork.

C.-' dampera Containment purge isolation RCB/FHB B D 36 valves and penetrations MAB

2. Mechanical Auxiliary Section Building HVAC 9.4.3 Supplementary coolers MAB B W'C-subsystem

3. Control Room and Electrical Section Auxiliary Building HVAC 9.4.1 Air handling unit EAB B D Fans, ductwork, and dampers EAR R D Battery room exhaust fans EAR B D Filters EAR B D Chiller MAB B D Chilled water pump, piping ete NAB B D C

3.5-30 Amendment 36 z

STP FSAR TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued) 4 SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC j CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component, Missile Missile FSAR or Structure Location Protection Protection Reference Class IE Electrical System Components (Continued)

! 480 vac/125 vde battery EAR B D chargers (for vital de bus) 125 vde panels (vital de power EAB B D distribution)

Voltage regulators (backup for EAR B D instrumentation inverters) 120 vac instrument bus panels EAB B D 1

(vital instrumentation ac power distribution) 1

(,'

• Containment penetration assemblies EAB/RCB B D 36 Main control board EAB B D

, ESF Load sequencer EAR B D l Diesel generator and DGB B D accessories i Diesel generator control panels O B D t Relay boards and racks EAB B D 1

Wire and cable raceway I/O B C system i

! Underground electrical duct 0 B D l bank system l Cable system (power, control, I/O B C and instrumentation) l Blectrical supports I/O B D l  : Motors (1E) I/O B D Valve operators I/O B 4[ (/

3.5-32 Amendment 36 eg ,. . .

STP FSAR TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

C, SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED External Internal System, Component. Missile Missile FSAR or Structure Location Protection Protection Reference Instrumentation and Control System Components Chapter

'7 Radiation monitoring system I/O B .FC (safety-related components)

Reactor Trip System I/O B D Engineered Safety Feature EAB B D (EST) Actuation System Systems required for safe RCB/MAB/ B M shutdown FHB/TGB B D Fost accident monitoring system 0 B &C, Safety-related instruments, I/0 B 9C C~.* ' tubing, and fittings 36 Safety-related process instruments I/O B BL C.

Fuel-Handlina System Section 9.1 Fuel transfer tube RCB/FHB B D and flange Spent fuel racks FHB B D Incore Instrumentation Chapter 7

Seal table assembly RCB B D Flux thimble tubing RCB B D Flux thimble fittings RCB B D Flux guide tubing RCB B D 3.5-33 Amendment 36 3

STP FSAR TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

SAFETY CLASS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES TO BE PROTECTED Notes Location l 1 - Inside Containment f 1

0 - Outside Containment N/A - Not applicable RCB - Reactor Containment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building MAB - Mechanical Auxiliary Building EAR - Electrical Auxiliary Building 36 DGB - Diesel Generator Building IVC - Isolation Valve Cubicle TCB - Turbine Building ECWIS - Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure External Missile Protection A - Designed to withstand the impact of an external missile l

B - Housed in a structure designed to withstand the impact of an external missile 1

j Internal Missile Protection f A - Designed to withstand the impact of internal missiles d hA. m q N SYfiko ht, la Meud B - Protected from the impact of internal missiles by shield walls or the equivalent C c y- wek rtqWyt. A. 40 1

- Protection frwebs b not required W.hg46 %due to component c.ngsun e%' %,redundancy vw;w. \* er e ubig,gg{t,$hdks A D - Protection not required because no missiles strike the component N/A - Not applicable 3.5-34 Amendment 36

\

g ..

Table 3.5-16 -

Rotating Equipment Missile Sources

-Outside Containment Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) -Prevent Concrete Spalling ECW Pumps ECW Intake Yes - Assumed -

.. ( A) ~

Structure Centrifugal Charging MAB No - --

Pumps lA,1B ,

-Boric Acid Transfer MAB No - -

Pumps CCW Pumps MAB No -- -

Reactor Maketp MAB No - -

Water Pumps ECW Screen Wash ECWIS No - -

Booster Pumps Essential Chilled

~

MAB No - -

Water Pumps Feedwater Isolation IVC Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Valves Hydraulic Pump Modules

-Refueling Water MAB No - - -j Purification Punp

_q Table 3.5-16 Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to ' Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling MAB Chilled Water MAB No - -

Ptmps Waste Evaporator MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Recirculation Pumps Low Activity _ Spent MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A).

Resin Sluice Ptnp Waste Concentrates MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Transfer Pump Condensate Polishing MAB Yes - Assumed - 3 (A)

Waste Collection Tank Transfer Pump LWPS Evaporator MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Distillate Pump ERS Evaporator MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)~

Ptaps LWPS Seal Water MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Ptnps

-Tabla 3.5-16 Rotatina Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spallina Resin Dewatering MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A).

Pug Spent Resin Transfer MAB Yes - Assumed - (A)

Pug LWPS Evaporator MAB Yes - Assumed - (A)

Condensate Return Pump Spent Fuel Cask F}E Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Pool Pump Waste Holdup Tank MAB Yes - Assumed - (A)-

Pump LWPS Surge Tank FIE Yes - Assumed - (A)

Ptaps Waste Condensate MAB Yes - Assumed - (A)

Tank Pumps ,

Waste Monitor MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Tank Ptnps 4

Table 3.5-16.

Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Outside Contairraent Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to- Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling Floor Drain Tank MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Pumps Spent Fuel Pool FH3 No - -

Cooling Punps lA,1B Reactor Coolant MAB No - -

l Purification Pump BTRS Criiller -MAB No - -

i Punps lA; IB Spent Fuel Pool FM3 No - -

Skinner Pump RCFC Chilled Water MAB No - -

l Ptrp l LWPS Auxiliary MAB Yes - Assumed -

.(A)

Feed Pung Laundry and Hot MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Shower Tank Pump BRS Evaporator MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Feed Pumps

Tabla 3.5-16

~

Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment EqJipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling Auxiliary Feedwater IVC No - -

Pumps BRS Condensate MAS Yes - Assumed -

(D)

Return Ptsps TSC Chilled Water EAB No - -

Pumps ,

FHB Main Exhaust FHB No -

(C)

Fans q I

MAB Main Supply Fans MAB No -

(C)

MAB Supplemental MAS No -

(C) l i

Exhaust Fans i

Penetration Space MAS No -

(C)

Exhaust Fans Tendon Gallery Tendon No - - l Fans Gallery MAB Main Exhaust MAS Yes <2 inches (B)

Fan RCB Normal Purge MAB No - -

Supply Fan

q

.l Table 3.5-16 ..

Rotatirx3 Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment-Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to- Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spallino RC8 Normal Purge Exhaust MAB No - -

' Fan Electrical Penetration EAB No -

(C)

Area M U Fans EAB Air Handling EAB No - -

thit Fans Low Pressure Breathing MAB- No - -

Air Compressor BTRS Chiller MAB No - -

Compressor RCB Supplementary MAB No -

(C)

Purge Supply Fans RCB Stoplementary MAB No -

(C)

Purge Exhaust Fans CCW Ptap Supplementary MAB No - -

Cooler M U Fans

Table 3.5-16 _

Rotating Equipment Missile Sources :3- ~

. Outside Containment Etpipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling -

Centrifugal Charging MAB No - -

Pump Stpplementary Cooler 4tJ Fans PD Charging Ptsup MAB No - -

S q lementary Cooler AttJ Fan MAB Supplewental Fan MAB No -

(C)

Coil Unit Fans EAB Return Fans EAB No - -

EAB ANJ Supply Fans EAB No - -

FHB Exhaust Booster Fle No - -

Fans FHB Supply Fans Fle No - -

(C)'

DGB 011 Tank Room DGB No -

Exhaust Fan Control Room Kitchen EAB No - -

and Toilet Exhaust Fan Tablo 3.5-16 Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling PASS Facility AFU Fan FHB No -

(C)

FHB Elevator Exhaust FHB No - -

Fans Computer Room AHU EAB No -

(C)

Fans TSC Computer Room EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

ALU Fans Control Room AHU EAB No -

(C)

Supply Fans TSC Makeup Air Fan EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

TSC Supply Fans EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

TSC Return Fans EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

TSC Exhaust Fans EAS Yes - Assumed -

(A)

TSC HVAC Equipment Room EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Exhaust Fan l

! -8

s Tablo 3.5

• Rotatina Equipment Missile Sources.

Outside Containment Ecpipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remrks

'(Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spallina

~

TSC Chiller EAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Locker Room / Office MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Supply Fan Radwaste Counting MAB Yes - Assumed -

(A)

Room AHJ Fan Spent Fuel Pool Cooling FHB No - -

Pump Rooms AHU Fans l

<*Iable 3.5-16 Kotating Equipment Missile Sources Outside Containment Notes (A) Potential missiles from this source.are separated from other essential systems by adequate barriers.

(B) Missiles from this source which might penetrata the housing or casing'will'not interact with any. equipment necessary to support safe shutdown or prevent uncontrolled releases of radioactivity.

(C) Missiles which might exit the scroll of this centrifugal fan will not cause interactions which might prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

(D) Missiles which might penetrate the casing of this component will not cause interactions which could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

4 L1/NRC/fr t

A'

Table 3.5-17-- ,

Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Inside Containment-Equipment Identification Location Casing Perforation Calculated Thickness to Remarks (Yes/No) Prevent Concrete Spalling RER Pumps El.-(-)4' 6" No - -

t Reactor Coolant El. (-) 9' 1" No - -

Drain Tank Pumps 4

RCFC Supply Fans El. (-) 2' 0" No - -

.; Containment Cubicle El. 68' 0" No - -

Exhaust Fans Reactor Cavlty El. (-) 11' 3"- Yes <2 Inches (A)

Vent Fans 4

Containment Carbon El. 52' No <12 inches (B)

Unit Supply Fans

,' Reactor Supports. El. 11' No - -

Exhaust Fans CROM Cooling El. 65' No - -

Fans RC8 Elevator 'El. 93' 8" No - -

Vcnt Fan Table 3.5-17

' Rotating Equipment Missile Sources Inside Containment Notes (A) Missiles from this source which might penetrate the housing or-casing will not interact with any equipment necessary to support safe shutdown or prevent uncontrolled releases of radioactivity.

(B) The containment carbon unit fans have a wire screen over the discharge which may not stop a postulated missile from leaving the scroll. The containment liner might be impacted by such a missile from two of the fans, but the liner would not be perforated. The loss of other equipment which might be damaged by missile impact would not prevent safe shutdown of the plant nor result in uncontrolled release or radioactivity.

b I

2-l l

l I

L1/NRC/fr i

l i-

_ -.,__.--,r,.-_,., . - - - . - . - . _ _ _ _ . , , . . . _ . - - _ . . . - - , _ . _ - . _ , . . _ - _ _ . _ _ _ .

STP FSAR Ouestion 410.01N The FSAR states that the auxiliary and main feedwater pump turbines are protected from overspeed by redundant overspeed trips and that neither turbine is considered to be a source of missiles. Regardless, provide the results of an analysis which shows safe shutdown will not be affected by such missiles.

Response

(hcldt C.u frent re5 on5t.)

IE 5 e$!c*' 'b & v<ersped -b;p en ha. u y;/. ,,y a s w E'c w k p g - k .-s ,u n 7, b,,y,,.2,,c, here a re- have ,- 4ke len s a ff:ci n-4~ % m m -b pro 4cA~ <sae t.,/ ms, t %

p kla k4 -bu<b,w fnyunt ,nisodes,3 u;p/fiwh> a risisg k a psk k M hwch,ue la6 <e d flw anihary fae d wa 4, pay ukael due h 120% onc woatl xd kw tuoj gy -A pelre/c,xedLu3,,x$kedw*oLr-

1. c -44,w . /m aduro~ , eaa. +re,x d m.x o k ,

Ibo Niho% ~

heeds /afi, - e.} v:fruss'l' ju ele.

LJ Au f fra

~ We, c a retc ( x L.Lwy 4te a -t;/, 5 4,d

4. y+ % k-

)

p sepaled k ha o her % by % he

, caserele- walls. Tv bi>w b[a4e> &le M h k c)cc1 4 fr.~ he_ w R,w /ted wak, 7m j%-t hdA dec/ d*e k povo ovmysed at -h p h. % h e k. 9 wo.IL m k kan. o u % f k y n n . >, 9 h a6nt~

o <- oyall % sden- x (11 f e d y o g r S & p& a. ,

beb, m a aility 6 3L% t v m/13.+5 g7>e the %br~es, ofe&L by ye,%Idet wrasile, hr

STP FSAR l

ouestion 410.02N Provide the results of an analysis, as per commitment in the FSAR, which provides information relating to missiles generated by postulated failures of pumps and fans. Note that your response should include single failure ,

criterion.

Response

kde. (R((M (C5 Ob $c Sec revud Fskt 5"t;" 3 T l' '

(-

Vol. 2 @R 3.5-5N

. r-

________- ____~_

I l

l

~ 1 STP FSAR I

, Ouestion 410.03N Verify that missiles produced from pressurized tanks and compressed air / gas cylinders have been evaluated and that they will not affect safe shutdown equipment.

Resnonse

- ~

.JLe-ous or m.

missile analysis, including nre==iirin d tanks and

~

compressed air / gas evlindere ns,iwill~be provided during the Fourth l__@  :::: ef luus 3.u

• aad f66

• s " A 7. C m T

1 I

l Vol. 2 Q6R 3.5-6N Amendment 51 i

L