Text

Provides Responses to Questions 430.74N-430.105N Re Communications,Lighting & Diesel Generators Received on 850304.Revised FSAR Text for Sections 9.5.2 Re Communications Sys & 9.5.3 Re Plant Lighting Sys Encl
	ML20116E500
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	04/24/1985
From:	Wisenburg M; HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Knighton G; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	CON-#285-731 OL, ST-HL-AE-1235, NUDOCS 8504300314
	Download: ML20116E500 (53)
	v • d • e

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Company m-,, ugiin,igu- m ux im m_,imxaamumnum April 24, 1985 ST-HL-AE-1235 File No.: G9.15 Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Request for Additional Information Regarding Power Systems Branch Questions

Dear Mr. Knighton:

On March 4, 1985 Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) received the subject questions numbered 430.74 through 430.105 regarding Commu-nications, Lighting and Diesel Generators. HL&P committed to provide responses by April 15, 1985. As a result of recent meetings with Power Systems Branch staff our responses have been delayed but have been reworked to incorporate staff comments. Enclosed are our responses to the following questions:

430.74N through 430.105N Revised Final Safet (Communications System) y Analysis cnd 9.5.3 ReportSystems)

(Plant Lighting (FSAR)are textalso for Sections 9.5.2 attached for your use. Some of the Communications and Lighting question responses (430.75N through 430.84N) refer to the revised FSAR text in these new sections. The revised FSAR sections and question responses will be submitted per the usual procedures in a future FSAR Amendment.

If you should have an Michael E. Powell at (713)y questions on this matter, please contact Mr.

993-1328.

Very truly,yours, O e r l

l\ A%%

M. R. Wise burg Manager, Nuclear Licensing CAA:yd Attachments: 1) NRC Question Responses 430.74N to 430.105N

2) Revised FSAR Section 9.5.2

3) Revised FSAR Section 9.5.3 00 i i W2/NRC2/h 8504300314 850424 PDR ADOCK 05000498 A PDR

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ST-HL-AE-1235 Houston Lighting & Power Company File No: G9.15 Page 2 cc:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Division of Licensing City Public Service Board Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation P.O. Box 1771 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission San Antonio, TX 78296 Washington, DC 20555 Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Robert D. Martin Assistant Attorney General for Regional Administrator, Region IV the State of Texas Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Austin, TX 78711 Arlington, TX 76011 Lanny A. Sinkin N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager 3022 Porter Street, N.W. #304 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20008 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire Hearing Attorney Claude E. Johnson Office of the Executive Legal Director Senior Resident Inspector /STP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 P. O. Box 910 Bay City, TX 77414 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Dan Carpenter U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector / South Texas Project Washington, DC 20555 c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2010 Dr. James C. Lamb, III Bay City, TX 77414 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, NC 27514 M. D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire Baker & Botts Judge Ernest E. Hill One Shell Plaza Hill Associates Houston, TX 77002 210 Montego Drive Danville, CA 94526 J. R. Newman, Esquire Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1615 L Street, N.W. 1001 Vaughn Building Washington, DC 20036 807 Brazos Austin, TX 78701 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn Washington, DC 20555 Route 1, Box 1684 Brazoria, TX 77422 E. R. Brooks /R. L. Range Central Power & Light Company Docketing & Service Section P. O. Box 2121 Office of the Secretary Corpus Christi, TX 78403 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 H. L. Peterson/G. Pokorny City of Austin P. O. Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767 W2/NRC2/h Revised 3/4/85

Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 1 of 35 Ouestion 430.74h Operating experience at two nuclear power plants has shown that during periodic surveillance testing of a standoy diesel generator, initiation of an emergency start signal (LOCA or LOOP resulted in the diesel failing to start and perform its function due to depletion of the starting air supply from repeated activa-tion of the starting relay. This event occurred as the result of inadequate procedures and from a hang-up in engine starting and control circuit logic failing to address a built-in time delay relay to assure the engine comes to a ccmplete stop before attempting a restart. During the period that the relay was timing out fuel to the engine was blocked while the starting air was uninhi-bited. This condition with repeated start attempts depleted starting air and rendered the diesel generator unavailable until the air system could be re-pressurized.

Review procedures and control system logic to assure this event will not occur at your plant. Provide a detailed discussion of how your system design, supplemented by procedures, precludes an occurrence of this event. Should the diesel generator starting and control circuit logic and procedures reauire changes, provide a description of the proposed modifications. (Refer to Request 430.96 for control air requirements) (SRP 8.3.1, Part II & III)

Response

HL&P has reviewed the standby diesel control system logics and has determined that the diesel does not have the built-in time delay feature which requires the engine to come to a complete stop before attempting to restart.

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Attachment 1 e- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 2 of 35 Question 430.75N The description of the intraplant and interplant (plant to offsite) communication systems is inadequate. Provide a detailed description for each communication system listed in Section 9.5.2.2 of the FSAR. The detailed description shall include an identification and description of each system's power source, a description of each system's components (headsets, handsets, switchboards, amplifiers, consoles, handheld radios, etc.), location of major component (power sources, consoles, etc.) and interfaces between the various systems. .(SRP 9.5.2, Parts II and III)

Response

See Section 9.5.2.2 for a detailed description of each of the available systems.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 3 of 35 i

Question 430.76N In Section 9.5.2.2.3 of the FSAR you state that inservice inspection tests, preventative maintenance, and operability checks are performed periodically to prove the availability of the communication systems. Provide the frequency for these tests. (SRP 9.5.2, Part II and III)

Response

The testing program for the communication systems are under development and frequencies for these activities have not been determined. This information will be provided in a later amendment.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 4 of 35 t

Question 430.77N ,

1 Section 9.5.2 of the FSAR describes the intraplant communication system at South Texas which is composed of five subsystems. They are the Public Address (PA),

Telephone, Fuel Loading Communications, Maintenance Communication, and Two-Way Radio Systems. _ A number of areas in the plant are served by one or more of these systems. All these systems are classified non-Class 1E. The PA and telephone systems are powered from Class 1E AC power system and the power sources for the other systems are undefined. Assuming a failure, non-availability, due to loss of power, or inability to use a system due to its interference with control instrumentation or equipment such as the radio system, of any or all of these systems following a seismic event, it is possible that portions of the plant may be without adequate communications for an extended period of time during the design basis event. This is unacceptable. It is a requirement that adequate communications be provided at all vital, hazardous, and safety related areas needed for the safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of a design basis event. Confirm this service is provided or modify your design to provide the necessary communication for postulated conditions above or justify the present design. (SRP9.5.2, Parts I and II)

Response

Table 1 below has been prepared to show the power sources for the various communications systems.

TABLE 1 System Primary Power Back-Up Telephone Normal Plant 8 Hr Battery EPBAX 120 Volts ac Public Address Normal Plant TSC Non-1E 120 Volts ac Diesel Maintenance Jack a. Normal Plant Sound Power and Refueling 120 Volts ac Communication b. Sound Power 2-Way Radio

a. Base / Normal Plant TSC Non-1E Repeater 120 Volts ac Diesel Stations

b. Hand-held Battery Packs Spare Batteries Transceivers Distributed Normal Plant TSC Non-1E Command Consoles 120 Volts ac Diesel W1/ LOO 6/g

Attachment 1

. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 5 of 35 The ability to provide back-up power sources and the proven reliability of the standard telecommunications products being supplied coupled with the diversity of systems furnished makes complete failure of the communications system necessary for safe shutdown unlikely.

Further, all locations needed for safe shutdown have radio, EPBAX telephone and maintenance jack stations available. If power should be lost or a major equipment failure should cccur to the telephone and radio systems, the maintenance jack stations are equipped with a sound powered telephone circuit in addition to 2 de powered electrosound loops.

The sound powered loops throughout the plant are interconnected at a sectionalizing panel in the Electrical Auxiliary Building. The simplicity of the sound powered system and the ability to isolate defective loops at the ,

sectionalizing panel make it a highly reliable emergency communication system. l W1/L006/g

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 6 of 35 Question 430.78N Expand the lighting section of the FSAR to include a discussion of how lighting will be provided for these areas listed in requests Q40.10 and Q40.11 and illuminated by the de emergency lighting system only, in the event of a sustained loss of offsite ac power (in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and up to 7 days), or provide the rationale why lighting is not required in these areas. Include in your discussion what, if any, other areas would require lighting during a sustained loss of ac power, and how it would be provided. (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II)

Response

The Emergency DC lighting system described in Section 9.5.3.2.3 is part of an integrated lighting system, backed up by the Essential AC Lighting System (described in Section 9.5.3.2.2 item 1), which is powered by onsite diesel generators in case of loss of offsite power, and is capable of providing illumination up to 7 days.

Areas that must be manned for cold shutdown, including all of the containment, are not required to have emergency lighting provided by sealed beam units with 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months minimum battery power supplies. The justification for this is that:

e Access to these areas is normally required at a time beyond the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery life.

e Fire brigade and operation personnel required to achieve cold shutdown will be provided with sealed beam battery-powered portable hand lights.

e Essential ac lighting is provided in these area.

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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 o

Page 7 of 35 Question 430.79N Sections 8.3.1 and 9.5.3 of the FSAR do not indicate how during accident and transient conditions the Essential AC Lighting System is connected to the Emergency Diesel Generator Bus. Identif automatic. (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II) y whether the connection is manual or i

Response

See Section 9.5.3.2.2, item 1.

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Attachment 1

. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 8 of 35 Question 430.80N Frovide a discussion on the protective measures taken to assure a functionally operable lighting system, including considerations given to component failures, loss of ac power, and the severing of lighting cables as a result of an accident or fire. (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II)

Response

As described in Section 9.5.3, the lighting system is comprised of three entities: the Normal AC Lighting, the Essential AC Lighting, and the Emergency DC Lighting System. The diversity of power sources fed from normal lighting and diesel generators together with the 8 hcur battery packs will assure that lighting froa one or more sources is available due to any single malfunction or failure due to fire in a particular fire zone. Upon loss of normal lighting or offsite power the Essential AC Lighting System will provide lighting in the safe shutdown areas. In the event of fire or severing of lighting cables, lighting is provided in the safe shutdown areas, including access / egress, by the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Holophane battery packs supported to withstand a SSE.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 9 of 35 Question 430.81N Section 9.5.3 of the FSAR describes the emergency lighting system which is composed of four subsystems. They are the 125 V dc, essential ac, 90 minute battery lighting, and 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery lighting systems. A number of areas in the plant are served by one or more of these systems. all these systems are classified non-Class 1E and receive power frem the following sources: non-Class 1E station batteries for the de lighting, the Class 1E emergency diesel generator for a few select areas of the plant and the non-Class 1E emergency diesel generator for the balance of the ac lighting. Assuming a failure or nonavailability of any or all of these systems following a seismic event, it is possible that portions of the plant particularly the control room may be without sufficient lighting or without lighting for an extended period of tine during this design basis event. This is unacceptable. It is a requirement that adequate lighting be provided to all vital, hazardous, cnd safety-related areas needed for the safe shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel in the event of any design bases accident. Confirm this service is provided or modify your design to provide this necessary lighting. (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II)

Response

The Holophane M-19-2A-X-SEIS-PT, 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs, supported to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake, integrated with the essential ac lighting system will provide lighting to vital, hazardous, and safety-related areas needed for the safe shutdown of the reactor and evacuation of personnel. See Section 9.5.3.

Note: The control room 125 V dc 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months station battery has been deleted.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 10 of 35 Question 430.82 You state in Sections 9.5.3.1 and 9.5.3.3 of the FSAR that illumination levels provided in the various areas of the plant either conform to or exceed that required in the Illumination Engineering Society (IES) Handbook. This statement is too general particularly for emergency lighting. Based on the guidelines in the IES Handbook (pages 2-11 and 2-45), the staff has determined that the plant emergency lighting for access and egress should be considered safety lighting for high hazards requiring visual detection and that a minimum of 10 foot-candles at the work station is required to adequately control, monitor and/or maintain safety-related equipment during accident and transient conditions and a minimum of 2 to 5 foot-candles in the corridors which provide access to and egress from these areas. For those safety-related areas listed in requests Q40.10 and Q40.11 and illuminated by the de lighting systems only verify that the minimum of 10 foot-candles at the work station is being met. Also verify that the 10 foot-candle minimum at the work station is being met in those safety-related areas illuminated by the ac emergency system. Verify that the access and egress corridors are illuminated by a minimum of 2 to 5 foot-candles. Confirm that the design provides the above or modify your design as necessary. (SRP 9.5.3, Parts I and II)

Response

A fixed de emergency lighting system (Section 9.5.3.2.3) consisting of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs is part of an integrated lighting system which meets applicable IES 1972 guidelines. The Essential AC Lighting System provides a minimum of 10 foot-candles at the work stations and illuminates the access / egress routes by a minimum of 2 to 5 foot-candles as described in Section 9.5.3.2.2.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 11 of 35-Question 430.83N Section 9.5.3 of the FSAR does not describe the inservice inspection tests, preventive maintenance, and operability checks that will be performed periodi-cally to prove the availability of the emergency lighting systems. Provide this information. (SRP 9.5.2 Part II & III)

Response

An annual inspection of battery leads and wiring connections will be performed as recommenced by the manufacturer. In addition an annual pushbutton light operability check will be performed. A representative sample of the batteries will be load tested or batteries will be replaced as necessary at five year intervals.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 12 of 35 Question 430.84N In Section 9.5.3 of the FSAR you state that the South Texas design includes a nonsafety-related emergency diesel generator that supplies power to various l

nonsafety-related systems including portions of the emergency lighting lighting and possibly the communications during accident conditions. Emergency lighting and communication systems are necessary and vital to the operation and safe shutdown of the plant during all accident and transient conditions and, therefore, are required to be powered from an acceptable power source. In the event of a design basis earthquake, this nonsafety-related power source is not considered available and results in loss of power to these vital systems. This does not meet the criteria and is, therefore, not acceptable. the applicant must show that adequate emergency lighting and communication systems are available for plant shutdown under any design basis accident condition. Confirm that these services are provided or revise your design accordingly. (SRP 9.5.2 and 9.5.3, Parts II and III)

Response

See response to Question 430.77N regarding communications and Question 430.81N regarding lighting.

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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 13 of 35 Question 430.85N In the FSAR you state the primary fire protection system for the diesel generator fuel oil storage rooms is a foam-water sprinkler system. The foam-water sprinkler is a nonsafety related system, and is not qualified for seismic events. The system is seismically supported. Show that spurious actuation or inadvertent manual actuation of the foam-water sprinkler fire protection system will not affect diesel generator availability and operability.

(SRP 9.5.4, Part III)

Response

Each of the three fuel oil storage tanks is physically separated from each other and its respective diesel engine by concrete walls and floors. The only entrance to each room has a water tight door. Foam-water from one tank room cannot enter another tank room or an engine room. There are no penetrations between rooms. Each tank room has an 8" drain (to oily waste) which is separated from the other room drains. Floor drains with normally closed valves and an 8-foot siphon room overflow are provided for the fire water removal. The design is such that wastes from one room cannot enter another tank or engine room. Foam water will not adversely impact the fuel oil tank, come in contact with the fuel oil or effect the gravity feed process to its diesel engine.

Accordingly, spurious actuation or inadvertent manual actuation of one or all the foam-water sprinkler fire protection system will not affect diesel generator availability or operability. Section 9.5.1.2.7 provides additional information regarding the foam-water system and the diesel generator fuel oil storage rooms.

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r Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 14 of 35 Question 430.86N In Section 9.5.4.3 of the FSAR you state that the emergency flood protected fill connection for the fuel oil storage tanks is located on the DG building roof.

It is also stated that "a hose could then be routed to the roof via an existing hose reel for tank filling when the flood level has receded. Provide the following:

a. State i ather the " existing hose reel" is located inside or outside the Db building. Describe any other uses (fire protection, etc.)

associated with this hose and hose reel.

b. Assuming the emergency fill connection must be used to refill the fuel oil storage tanks, describe how fuel oil will be delivered to the site during flood conditions and the procedures that will be used in refilling and storage tanks during flood conditions and non-flood conditions. The procedures should include fuel hose routing and fire watches. (SRP 9.5.4, Parts I, II and III)

Response

a. Present plans are not to provide a permanent existing hose reel in the DG Building, but to utilize a hose from the fuel delivery service (i.e. truck).

b. Plant procedures will detail the method for refilling the storage tanks using the emergency fill connection. The procedure will include provisions for routing the hose up to the roof from outside the building. The truck pump can supply sufficient head to transfer the fuel oil from the truck to the storage tank.

The method for delivery of fuel oil to the site will be via standard fuel-oil tank truck, even in the event of flood conditions. The duration of impassable flood water levels around the site is such that the on-site seven day fuel oil capacity is adequate to endure the maximum flood event.

Hydrology studies for STP show that the limiting flood event, the breech of upstream dams (see Section 2.4, event 7), results in flood levels that increase gradually to approximately four (4) feet above grade and decrease gradually afterwards. However, the total duration of flood water levels which exceed the local grade elevation is only 21 days. For further discussion of external flooding see section 2.4.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 I Page 15 of 35 Question 430.87N Section 9.5.4.2 of the FSAR states that "a nitrogen inerting system for each tank compartment" is being provided. This statement is too general to evaluate this system. Provide a more detailed description of the nitrogen inerting system. The description should include seismic classification, piping quality group classification, a failure modes and effects analysis, and procedures to be used during emergency refill operations (if different from normal refill operations) with the system in operation and in the failed mode. (SRP9.5.4, Parts I, II and III)

Response

The nitrogen inerting systems have been deleted from section 9.5.4.3 (Amendment 44). This was deleted as a result of modifications to the ventilation design which will isolate the tank rooms (see the Fire Hazards Analysis Report, section 3.4, Fire Areas 39, 40 and 41) and for personnel protection reasons.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 16 of 35 Question 430.88N >

Section 9.5.5-indicates that the function of the diesel generator cooling water system is to dissipate the heat transferred through the: 1) engine water jacket, 2) lube oil cooler; 3) engine air water coolers, 4) fuel oil cooler, and 5) governor lube oil cooler. Provide the design margin (excess heat removal capacity) included in the design of major components and subsystems. (SRP 9.5.5, Parts 11 and III)

Response

TheDieselGeneratorCoolingWagerSystem(DGCWS)isdesignedtohandlea maximum heat load of 13.99 x 10 BTU /hr, per engine, from the_ engine water jacket, lube oil cooler, engine air water coolers, fuel oil cooler and governor lube oil cooler. All the coolers are designed to dissipate the actual predicted heat losses. Various fouling factors are used which require the predicted heat loss still be dissipated given a fouled (or dirty) heat exchanger. In addition, the worst cases of coolant flow and temperature are used to maximize heat exchanger sizing and therefore capability. The heat exchangers are designed for a maximum ECW temperature of 115*F, however, the design basis ECW temperature is 105.7*F.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 17 of 35 Question 430.89N Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis to show that failure of a piping connection between subsystems (engine water jacket, lube oil cooler, governor lube oil cooler, ECWS, and engine air intercooler) will not degrade engine performance or cause the failure of more than one diesel generator. (SRP 9.5.5, Parts II and III)

Response

Please see FSAR Table 9.5.5-2 issued in Amendment 43.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 18 of 35 Question 430.90N Indicate the measures to preclude long-term corrosion and organic fouling in the diesel engine cooling water system that would degrade system cooling performance, and the compatibility of any corrosion inhibitors or antifreeze compounds used with the materials of the system. Indicate if the water chemistry is in conformance with the engine manufacturers recommendations. (SRP 9.5.5, Parts I and III)

Response

To preclude long-term corrosion and organic fouling in the diesel engine cooling water system, demineralized water is used together with a commercially available nitrite inhibitor as recommended by the engine manufacturer. The concentration level (ppm), of inhibitor and pH level will be in conformance with the engine mar.ufacture's recommendations.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 19 of 35 Question 430.91N Recent licensee event reports have shown that tube leaks are being experienced in the heat exchangers of diesel engine jacket cooling water systems with resultant engine failure to start on demand. Provide a discussion of the means used to detect tube leakage and the corrective measures that will be taken.

Include jacket water leakage into the lube oil system (standby mode), lube oil leakage into the jacket water (operating mode), jacket water leakage into the engine air intake and governor systems (operating or standby mode). Provide the permissible inleakage or outleakage in each of the above conditions which can be tolerated without degraded engine performance or causing engine failure. This discussion should also include the effects of jacket water / service water systems leakage. (SRP 9.5.5, Parts II and III)

Response

The jacket water system is completely separate from and does not interface (provide cooling) with the lube oil, air intake, and governor systems. The ECW system provides cooling water to these system coolers.

It is noted that a major cause of the reported tube leaks (see IE Information Notice 79-23) was attributed to inadequate tubesheet thicknesses and poor tube to tube sheet attachments. The STP lube oil and jacket water cooler tubesheets are greater than 1" in thickness (vs. 1/8" reported in IE 79-23) and the tubes are rolled (vs. soldered and epoxy reported in IE 79-23). Another potential cause of tube leaks is the quality of water used for cooling. The Essential Cooling Water quality has been evaluated in section 9.2.1.2.3. The STP diesel engine manufacturer is not aware of any tube leaks in these coolers on diesel engines they have supplied. They have supplied 36 diesel engines to the nuclear industry. Ten of these engines have been operated over ten years and there have been no reports of tube leaks. Based upon the construction of these coolers, tube leakage is considered improbable.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Pagn 20 of 35 Question 430.92N Operating experience indicates that diesel engines have failed to start on demand due to water spraying on locally mounted electronic / electrical components in the diesel engine starting system. Describe what measures have been incorporated in the diesel engine electrical starting system to protect such electronic / electrical components from such potential environment. (SRP9.5.5, Parts II and III)

Response

There are no locally mounted electronic / electrical components in the starting system. However, the potential sources of water and their impact have been determined as follows:

1. Fire protection system: a preaction sprinkler system is utilized inside each diesel engine room. The main water supply valve is closed and the sprinkler piping is dry. Both the main supply valve and sprinkler for each of the three rooms must malfunction before water spray can be generated from the fire protection system. Water spray from the fire protection system is not considered a potential problem.

2. Through-wall leakage cracks: there are no high tiergy lines in the diesel generator rooms. The only moderate energy line: which could produce spraying due to leakage are the ECW lines to the jacket water, lube oil, governor, and fuel oil coolers and demineralized water to the jacket water system.

The only electrical starting components are mounted inside the engine control panel (NEMA 3R) which is located in excess of 40 feet from the subject water sources. It is noted that the starting air valves are pneumatic. Water spray from a leak is not considered a potential problem.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 21 of 35 Question 430.93N Proper operation of the standby diesel generator during accident and transient conditions requires that heat removal capability is restored before the diesel engine exceeds its operating design temperature limits. In Section 9.5.5.2 of the FSAR you state that the essential cooling water system (ECWS) will begin operation within a specific time lapse from initial DG startup, but you do not state the time period between engine start and ECWS startup. Provide the following:

a. The time interval between the diesel engine start and the opening of any ECWS/DG inlet valve or ECWS water pump restart (assuming loss of offsite power) whichever is longer.

b. Results of an analysis which shows that cooling will be restored to the diesel engine before it overheats.

(SRP 9.5.5, Part II and III)

Response

a. The total time between the start of the diesel generator and the opening of the ECWS/DG inlet valve is comprised of:

o Diesel start to rated voltage and frequency - 10 seconds.

o Sequencer loading of ECW pumps - 25 seconds, o Venting of system prior to valve opening - 10 seconds.

Thus the total time is 45-50 seconds.

b. The diesel engine manufacturer has evaluated the time required for resumption of cooling water, before overheating occurs, and has determined that to be two minutes. Accordingly, ECW will be recirculating through the jacket water heat exchanger before overheating would occur.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 22 of 35 Question 430.94N

- Diesel generators in many cases utilize air pressure or air flow devices to control diesel generator operation and/or emergency trip functions such as air operated overspeed trips. The air for these controls is normally supplied frum the emergency diesel generator air starting system. Provide the following:

a) Expand your FSAR to discuss any diesel engine control functions supplied by the air starting system or any air system. The discussion should include the mode of operation for the control function (air pressure and/or flow), a failure modes and effects analysis, and the necessary P&ID's to evaluate the system, b) Since air systems are not completely air tight, there is a potential for slight leakage from the system. The air starting system uses a nonseismic air compressor to maintain air pressure in the seismic Category I air receivers during the standby condition. In case of an accident, a seismic event, and/or loop, the air in the air receivers is used to start the diesel engine. After the engine is started, the air starting system becomes nonessential to diesel generator operation unless the air system supplies air to the engine controls. In this case the controls must rely on the air stored in the air receivers, since the air compressor may not be available to maintain system pressure and/or flow. If your air starting system is used to control engine operation, with the compressor not available, show that a sufficient quantity of air will remain in the air receivers, following a diesel engine start, to control engine operations for a minimum of seven days assuming a reasonable leakage rate. If the air starting system is not used for engine control describe the air control system provided and provide assurance that it can perform for a period of seven days or longer. (SRP 9.5.6, Part III)

Response

a) Once the engine is operating in the emergency mode, air pressure is no longer required for control function. Air is needed only to start the engine. The shutdown devices which are active in the emergency mode do not require air to actuate. Thus, control functions which require air to operate (e.g. maintenance barring device) are not relied upon for emergency operation.

b) N/A, See a) above.

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ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 23 of 35 Question 430.95N Expand your FSAR to discuss the procedures that will be followed to ensure the air dryers are workin properly and the frequency of checking / testing. (SRP 9.5.6, Parts II 5 III

Response

A preventive maintenance (PM) task has been established to sa.mple and inspect the air dryer desiccant annually.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 24 of 35 Question 430.96N You state in Section 9.5.6.2 of the FSAR that "Each independent starting system if designed to te capable of starting the engine five times from an initial pressure of 275 psig without recharging the starting air tanks. Some information has been provided on system pressure alarms, compressor cut-in and cut-out. Provide additional information as follows:

a) Expand Section 9.5.6 of your FSAR to clarify the statement regarding the capability of the air start system of five consecutive start attempts without recharging the air receivers. A successful diesel generator start is defined as the ability of the air start system to crank the diesel engine to the manufacturer's recomended RPM, to enable the generator to reach voltage and frcquency and begin load sequencing in 10 seconds or less. With the receiver at the low pressure alarm setting and without recharging provide a tabulation of receiver pressure and diesel engine starting times for each of the five consecutive starts. In addition describe the sequence of events when an emergency start signal exists.

State whether the diesel engine cranks until all compressed air is exhausted, or cranking stops after a preset time to conserve the diesel starting air supply. Describe the electrical features of this system in Section 8.0 of the FSAR (in the appropriate subsection).

b) Provide the pressures at which the following alarms actuate: low pressure alarm, and high pressure alarm. (SRP 9.5.6, Part II)

Response

Please note that the 275 psig pressure identified in Section 9.5.6.2 is the design pressure, as stated. The maximum operating pressure is 250 psig. The FSAR will be modified to also reflect maximum operating pressure.

a) The STP air start system has the capability of five consecutive start attempts without recharging the air receivers. The requirement for the diesel generator to achieve rated voltage and frequency and begin load sequencing in 10 seconds, as required by safety analyses, is met.

The following table provides the results of the test for 5 consecutive starts:

AIR PRESS TIME TO RATED START (PSI) VOLT. & FREQ. (SEC) 1 250 6.32 2 168 7.92 l 3 126 9.2 10.6 4 100 5 86 11.48 It should be noted that the above test (performed at the manufacturer's i

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h. ST-HL-AE-1235 Pags 25 of 35 facility) was conducted, as required, with a single air starting tank and three of the starts were under 10 seconds. A second air tank is provided with each diesel engine and the two tanks are piped together to provide twice the volume of air used in the test described above. . Assuming the use of both tanks the engine manufacturer has indicated that the capability exists to obtain five consecutive starts within ten seconds.

The sequence of events for an emergency start will be provided in S:.ction 9.5.6.2.2. For normal starting operations a timer with a range of 5-50 seconds is provided to conserve the air supply. For emergency starting operations there is no timer. The electrical features of the timer will be provided in Section 9.5.6.

b) The low pressure alarm is set at 175 psig. There is no high pressure alarm.

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. ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 26 of 35 Question 430.97N You state in Section 9.5.7 of the FSAR that the lube oil to lubricate the engine is stored in the engine lube oil sump tank. During diesel engine operation a certain amount of lube oil is consumed as part of the combustion process. Since the diesel generator may be required to operate for a minimum seven days during a loss of offsite power or accident condition, sufficient lube oil should be stored in the sump and/or site to preclude diesel generator unavailebility due to lack of lube oil. Provide the following:

a) Provide the normal lube oil usage rate for each diesel engine under full load conditions, the lube oil usage rates which would be considered excessive, and the sump capacity, b) Show with the lube oil in the sump at the minimum recommended level (low level alarm setting) that the diesel engine can operate without refilling the lube oil sump for a minimum of seven days at full rated load. If the sump tank capacity is insufficient for this condition, show that adequate lube oil will be stored onsite for each engine to assure seven days of operation at rated load.

c) If the lube oil consumption rate becomes excessive, discuss the provisions for determining when to overhaul the engine. The discussion should include the procedures used and the quality of operator training provided to enable determination of excessive L.0. consumption rate. (Refer to requests 430.28 and 430.100 for additional requirements on procedures and training).

(SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III)

Response

a) Normal lube oil usage: approximately 12 gallons per 24 hrs. at rated load Excessive lube oil usage: See item (c) below Sump capacity: 1260 gallons b) The oil sump capacity between low oil level alarm and minimum operating oil level is 549 gallons. Thus, assurance of seven days of operation at rated load would be possible at a lube oil consumption rate of as much as 78 gallons per day before reaching minimum operating level, c) Logs of engine characteristics such as temperature, pressure, run time, as well as lube oil consumption rate, will be maintained. This information may be used to determine whether or not the lube oil consumption rate is excessive and to identify the need for an engine overhaul.

Licensed and non-licensed operators are presented a classroom lecture on ESF Diesel Generators followed by written examination and a system checkout. This training includes how to monitor the oil level in the engine sump and the alarms and setpoints associated with engine sump oil level. Operator training also alerts them to monitor for trends in operational parameters as good engineering practice.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 27 of 35 Question 430.98N In Section 9.5.4 you state that diesel fuel oil is available from local distri-bution sources, but you have not discussed the availability of the lube oil.

Identify the sources where diesel quality lube oil will be available and the distances required to be travelled from the source (s) to the plant. Also discuss how the lube oil will be delivered onsite under extremely unfavorable environmental conditions. (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II & III)

Pesponse Quality lube oil for the diesel may be obtained from the onsite lube oil storage facility. If this supply is unavailable, there are several local distribution sources of acceptable quality lube oil. The following lists the suppliers, locations, and approximate distance to the plant:

Gulf Oil Bay City 20 miles Gulf Oil El Campo 50 miles Gulf Oil Victoria 65 miles Gulf Oil Houston 110 miles The method for delivery of lube oil to the site will be via standard lube delivery service (i.e. truck), even in the event of extremely unfavorable environmental conditions, including flood conditions. The duration of impassable flood water levels around the site is such that the on-site lube oil capacity is adequate to endure the maximum flood event.

Hydrology studies for STP show that the limiting flood event, the breech of upstream dams (see Section 2.4, event 7), results in flood levels that increase gradually to approximately four (4) feet above grade and decrease gradually afterwards. However, the total duration of flood water levels which exceed the local grade elevation is only 2 1/2 days. For further discussion of external flooding see Section 2.4.

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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 28 of 35 Question 430.99N Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a diesel generator for a prolonged period that would require replenishment of lube oil without interrupting operation of the diesel generator. Provide the following:

s) What provisions will be made in the design of the lube oil system to add lube oil to the sump. These provisions shall include procedures or instructions available to the operator on the proper addition of lube oil to the diesel generator as follows:

1. How and where lube oil can be added while the equipment is in opera-tion,

2. Particular assurance that the wrong kind of oil is not inadvertently added to the lubricating' oil system, and

3. That the expected rise in level occurs and is verified for each unit of the lube oil added, b) Verification that these operating procedures or instructions will be posted locally in the diesel generator rooms, c) Verification that personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the diesel are trained in the use of these procedures. Verification of the ability of the personnel on the use of the procedures shall be demonstrated during preoperational tests and during operator requalification.

d) Verification that the color coded, or otherwise marked, lines associated with the diesel-generator are correctly identified and that the line or point has beenfor adding clearly lube oil (when identified. (SRPthe9.5.7, engine is on Parts standby)or II & III in operation)

Response

a) A plant procedure will be written for the addition of lube oil to an operating diesel generator. This procedure will address how to add lube oil and the type of lube oil to be used and will require the operator to verify the expected rise in oil level, b) The plant procedure for adding lube oil will be available for use at the operator's work station.

c) Training on the ESF Diesel Generators will provide operators with suffici-ent knowledge of the Diesel Engine Oil System such that they can safely follow the procedure for oil addition during engine operation.

d) The plant procedure for adding lube oil will contain adequate instructions such that special markings will not be required.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 29 of 35

.. Question 430.100N In Section 9.5.7.2 of the FSAR you state to ensure quality lube oil is present in the lube oil system and that it is within manufacturer's specifications, the lube oil will be sampled at regular intervals. Specify the sampling intervals.

(SRP 9.5.7, Part II)

Response

This 'information is under development and will be provided in a later amendment.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 30 of 35 Question 430.101N In Figure 9.5.8-1 of the FSAR a crankcase breather system is shown. Provide a more detailed description of the system including operating modes, and power sources. If this system is necessary during normal operation of the diesel engine (prevention of crankcase explosion) we require that the mechanical portions of this system be designed to Seismic Category I ASME Section III Class 3 (Quality Group C) requirements and the electrical systems (if any) to Class 1E requirements. The portion of the system extending outside the diesel generator building shall be tornado missile protected. Describe any other systems or devices used to preclude or mitigate the consequences of a crankcase explosion.

(SRP 9.5.7, Part II)

Response

The crankcase breather system is a static piping system that allows the evacu-ation of crankcase gases. This system does not need to be functional during any operation of the diesel engine. Since there is no fan required to evacuate these gases from the crankcase, there are no electrical power requirements. In addition to the crankcase vent system, rapid pressure relief valves (non ASME; Diesel meets DEMA standards) are provided on some of the crankcase doors to relieve over pressure in the event such would occur inside the engine crankcase.

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 31 of 35 Question 430.102N Diesel generators for nuclear power plant; should be capable of operating at maximum rated output under various service conditions. No load and light load operations, the diesel generator may not be capable of operating for extended periods of time under extreme service conditions or weather disturbances without serious degradation of the engine performance. This could result in the inability of the diesel engine to accept full load or fail to perform on demand.

Provide the following:

a) The environmental service conditions for which your diesel generator is designed to deliver rated load including the following:

Service Conditions (a) ambient air intake temperature range-F (b) humidity, max-%

b) Assurance that the diesel generator can provide full rated load under the following weather disturbances:

(1) A tornado pressure transient causing an atmospheric pressure reduction of 3 psi in 1.5 seconds followed by a rise to normal pressure in 1.5 seconds.

(2) A low pressure storm such as a hurricane resulting in ambient pressure of not less than 26 inches Hg for a minimum duration off two (2) hours followed by a pressure of no less than 26 to 27 inches Hg for an extended period of time (approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ).

c) In light of recent weather conditions (subzero temperatures), discuss the effects low ambient temperature will have on engine standby and operation and effect on its output particularly at no load and light load operation.

Will air preheating be required to maintain engine performance? Provide curve or table which shows, performance verses ambient temperature for your diesel generator at normal rated load, light load, and no load conditions.

Also provide assurance that the engine jacket water and lube oil preheat systems have the capacity to maintain the diesel engine at manufacturer's recommended standby temperatures with minimum expected ambient conditions.

If the engine jacket water and lube oil preheat systems' capacity is not sufficient to do the above, discuss how this equipment will be maintained at ready standby status with minimum ambient temperature, d) Provide the manufacturer's design data for ambient pressure vs engine derating.

e) Discuss the effects of any other service and weather conditions will have on engine operation and output, i.e., dust storm, air restriction, etc.

(SRP 8.3.1, Parts II and III; SRP 9.5.5, Part III, SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III; and SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III)

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- ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 32 of 35

, Question 430.103N Recent events have shown that not all aspects in the design of the DG combustion air intake and exhaust system have been taken into account resulting in the pressure losses through the system exceeding manufacturer's limitations. Verify that the pressure losses through your system do not exceed manufacturer's recommendations taking into consideration pipe losses, and pressure drops associated with the filters, silencers, and intake and exhaust structure openings. (SRP9.5.8,PartIII)

Response

The engine manufacturer's maximum allowable total inlet and exhaust system pressure drop is 25" Hp 0 (20 exhaust; 5 intake). A calculation has been performed to determine the actual values and they do not exceed the manufacturer's recomended pressure losses.

This calculation considers pipe losses, and pressure drops associated with filters, silencers, and intake and exhaust openings.

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Attachment 1 I.3 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 33 of 35

Response

a) The diesel generators are designed to deliver rated load at:

Ambient air intake temperature: 29 - 95 F 81 F Wet Bulb l b) The engines will continue to maintain 100 percent rated load given the

- pressure depression at 3 psi in 1.5 seconds followed by a rise to normal pressure in 1.5 seconds. -The postulated hurricane resulting in 25" Hg i.

ambient pressure for a time period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months minimum duration followed by a rise to a pressure of no less than 26" to 27" Hg for a minimum time of 12

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l hours will not prevent the diesel engine from maintaining 100 percent rated l t load.

c) It is not anticipated that the temperature at the STP location will be

subzero. The lowest recorded temperature is 5 F. Provision for air l preheating is included in the engine design. Whenever.the turbocharger blower discharge temperature is less than 105'F, heated jacket water will be circulated through the fore.section of the intercoolers and will there-i fore preheat the combustion air either for startup or light load operation.

3 The power to both the jacket water heater and circulation pump motor is Class IE. The heater and pump are seismically supported and the heater 4

meets the requirements of IEEE 323 (1974). The above is also true for the lube oil circulation pump and heater.

The engine jacket water and lube oil coolers are sized to a room ambient temperature down to 50* minimum. The engine manufacturer assures that the jacket water and lube oil systems will maintain their proper warm standby temperature conditions. Five heaters are provided in each of the three DGB engine rooms in order to maintain a minimum temperature of 50*F. In addition Class 1E temperature indication is provided for the rooms to alarm 1

i on high temperature.

d) The ability of the diesel engines to deliver rated load at various altitudes is affected by the ability of the turbocharger to develop the

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! required manifold pressures. The turbochargers on these engines are rated

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for a 3:1 pressure ratio. Based upon this rating, the turbocharger can-develop sufficient manifold pressure with a minimum ambient pressure of 25" Hg. Consequently, no engine derating applies with respect to the expected f ambient pressure. ,

e) In order to reduce the potential impact of the external environment, the engine combustion air intake system, including the intake filter, is installed indoors. The air intake filter is installed in a separate room i located on the second level of the DGB. Air is drawn from the outside -

- through a louvered / screened opening into the air filter room. The intake air filter is an oil bath type with a screened intake opening. As a result

- of abnormal climatic conditions, i.e. dust storms, or air restriction (due .'

to foreign objects), the air filter will of course require maintenance

- sooner than the scheduled maintenance. The air filter is provided with differential pressure indications to ensure that the intake pressure losses ,

l do not exceed manufacturer's recommendations. (See also Q430.103N.) !

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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 34 of 35 Question 430.104N j i

In the turbine generator section discuss the extraction valve closure times and extraction steam valve arrangements in relation to stable turbine operation after a turbine system trip. (SRP 10.2, Parts II and III) l

Response

Each extraction line to feedwater heaters 11A and B,13A and B and 14A and B has a bleeder trip valve and a motor operated isolation valve. This is shown on FSAR Figure 10.3-4. The motor operated isolation valve serves no function in stable operation after a turbine trip.

Bleeder trip valves are power assisted nonreturn valves with a free swinging clapper which is held open by steam flow in operation and closes of its own weight when steam flow is zero. In addition the clapper is closed rapidly by a reverse flow of steam into the turbine. An actuator is provided as a backup which partially closes the clapper should it stick for any reason. The clapper is free to close rapidly when reverse flow of fluid into the turbine occurs even if the actuator does not close. The actuator also assists in rapid closing of the clapper by driving it quickly into the reverse flow stream to take advantage of the additional closing force exerted by this flow and the additional pressure drop resulting from the reduced flow area. The actuators are held open by air pressure and are spring loaded to close on loss of air pressure. The actuators are closed on a turbine trip by redundant electrical and mechanical mechanisms.

Each actuator uses a three-way solenoid located close to the actuator to dump air rapidly on turbine trip. The electrical trip is backed up by an oil operated air pilot valve which mechanically cuts off the common air supply and dumps air from the bleeder trip valve air header when the turbine is tripped.

Similar valves are provided in the extraction lines to the deaerators. Because backflow from these lines would be isolated from downstream turbine stages by the reheat stop and intercept valves the bleeder trip valves in the deaerator extraction lines actually do not have a function in preventing turbine overspeed.

No bleeder trip valves are provided in the extraction lines to feedwater heater 15A, B and C and 16A, B and C. These are the two lowest pressure extraction points. These feedwater heaters, which are located in the condenser neck, use anti-flash baffles to control the rate of energy input to the turbine after a trip. .

The turbine manufacturer has performed an analysis of turbine operation after a sudden loss of load including the actual volumes of extraction steam upstream of the bleeder trip valves, actual steam and water volumes in the heaters which do not have bleeder trip valves and assuming the worst case bleeder trip valve sticks open. The resulting maximum speed is within the design envelope.

(Closure time is on the order of one second).

Provisions are included for periodic testing of the bleeder trip valves as recommended by the turbine manufacturer. These valves will be tested on a monthly basis as recommended by the turbine manufacturer.

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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 35 of 35 1

'e Question 430.105N In section 10.4.4.4 you have discussed tests and initial field inspection and inservice testing and inspection, but not the frequency of inservice testing and inspection of the turbine bypass system. Provide this information in the FSAR.

(SRP 10.4.4, Part I)

Response

The inservice tests an'd inspections of the turbine bypass system will be con-ducted at least once every eighteen (18) months.

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ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 1 of 8 9.5.2 Comunications Systems 9.5.2.1 Design Basis. The communications system is designed to provide rapid, efficient operation for administration of the plant and emergency conditions. Diverse subsystems are supplied to assure that adequate onsite and offsite communications will be available to support orderly plant shutdown and evacuation.

Steps are taken to provide back-up power and to assure audibility in high noise areas of the plant serviced by the various systems.

Special attention is given to maintaining offsite contact with the Matagorda County Sheriff's Office, the Bay City Fire Department and the HL&P Energy Control Center in Houston.

9.5.2.2 Description. Communication systems serve all modes of plant operations and maintenance including all levels of emer-gency conditions. The following systems are provided:

1. Telephone System

2. Public Address Paging System / Alarm System

3. Maintenance Jack System

4. Refueling Communication System

5. Two-Way Radio System

6. Radio Paging System

7. Distributed Command Control Consoles 9.5.2.2.1 On Site Systems.

1. Telephone Systems - The telephone system consists of an onsite PBX (private branch exchange) telephone system, private business lines and trunk connections with the local telephone utility central office, and multiplexed telephone circuits through the HL&P private regional microwave system.

The onsite PBX system consists of two (2) separate EPBX (electronic private branch exchange) switches. Switch No. 1 is located in the telephone building which is located north of Unit

2. Switch No. 2 is located in the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) building.

l Both switches are interconnected with the tie trunks in addition to trunk connection with the local telephone utility central office.

PBX telephone instruments are distributed throughout the plant facilities for operating convenience. Instrument distribution is designed to load each switch with one half the telephones in any given area. Therefore, one half the telephones in any one area will be operable in the event of a major failure of either switch.

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Attachment 2 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 2 of 8

-Each switch is powered by its own 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery system.

Loss of normal 120 volts ac and low battery voltages are annunciated to the control room.

Both switches are provided with stored-program control Pulse Code Multiplexing (PCM) digital transmission and Time Division Multiplexers (TDM). Each switch provides 31 standard system features such as conferencing, speed dial-ing, etc. and 29 special features. Single line telephones are afforded access to 23 different operational features.

Telephones located in some high noise areas (90db ambient) are installed with wrap around noise reducing telephone booths. Also, noise cancelling hand sets and headsets are provided in high noise areas where required.

The offsite telephone system access is provided through the local telephone utility central office. Private business lines from the central office terminate at designated plant instruments which bypass the onsite PBX system. Additional offsite telephones bypass both the PBX system and the local utility central office. These telephones are provided with access to the HL&P private microwave network. This network provides PBX gateways distributed throughout the HL&P regional private telephone system. This includes the HL&P headquarters and energy control center in Houston.

2. Public Address Paging System / Alarm System - A centralized 70.7 volt output public address rack is provided in the Electrical Auxiliary Building. The paging system may be accessed from any plant telephone or the distributed command control consoles. The control rooms have priority access to the public address system. Selected areas may be paged or the entire plant by dialing preselected numbers or using the command consoles.

Speakers are divided between amplifiers for reliability and are located in all areas where operating and maintenance personnel may be working. Sufficient amplifier power is provided to assure audibility over anticipated maximum plant noise levels. Automatic gain amplifiers are used to adjust individual amplifier output in accordance with noise levels sensed by microphones in the areas served.

Normal power for the public address system is from normal plant 120 Volt ac sources. A Non-Class 1E diesel back-up is available during emergency conditions.

Plant emergency and fire alarm signals are routed through the public address system. Designated alarm actuation push buttons are provided on each distributed control console.

These alarms have priority over other paging and the amplifier automatic gain feature is bypassed for alarms to W1/L006/g

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' assure maximum volume.' In areas where noise levels are too high for audible alarms to be heard, flashing lights are supplied in additice to audible alarms for emergency warning.

3. Maintenance Jack Communication System - Maintenance jacks are provided throughout the plant fonoperating convenience including all areas required for safe' shutdown. Each jack station consists of 3 jacks. Two are powered by 8 volts de i for use with electrosound telephones. The third jack is reserved for sound powered telephones.

i A sectionalizing panel is provided in the Electrical Auxiliary Building to interconnect jack loops between the various plant buildings. Inoperable loops can be identified and quickly isolated using this panel.

In high noise areas (greater than 90 db ambient), noise cancelling headsets are provided for use with the maintenance jack system.

4. Refueling Communications System - Communications for fueling and refueling activities will be by maintenance jack type talking circuits between the control room operator and designated points in the Fuel Handling Building and the Reactor Containment Building. Two de powered jacksiand a sound powered circuit are available at each station similar to the maintenance jacks. Telephone circuits and two-way radio are also usable if needed for refueling communications.

5. Two-Way Radio System - Radio repeater base stations operating in the 450 MHz band provide; communication between control base stations, mobile units and hand held portables.

Repeaters and control base stations are powered by normal plant 120 volt ac power backed up with a non-Class :1E diesel generator. Mobile radios are powered by vehicular batteries. Hand held portables are powered with self contained, batteries and spare batteries.

In the event of major failure of any repeater, a talk around channel is provided on control base stations, mobile units, and hand held portables. This allows limited direct unit-to-unit communication between control bases, mobile units, and portables. Portables that must be used in high noise level areas (90 dB ambient) are provided with a jack, plug, and noise cancelling tieadsets. Solid state panels will be tested during startup for possible interference with

'cther control circuits using hand held UHF transceivers.

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Attachment 2 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 4 of 8

Lossy loop antenna systems are being provided for required radio coverage within power block structures. These antenna systems make possible radio propagation into and out of these buildings where otherwise the mass of building materials block radio propagation. The lossy loop antenna system is constructed of two-way broad-band /in-line repeaters, coaxial cable, leaky loss coaxial cable, inside building antennas, and conventional outside antennas.

Broad-band /in-line repeaters are powered by nonnal plant 120 volt ac power backed up with non-Class 1E diesel generators and provided with 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months back-up batteries.

6. Radio set-up facilities for outside agencies are provided at the E0F. Outside agencies providing their own HF/VHF/UFH radio systems are provided with work station counter top and desk space, normal facility 120 volt ac power backed up with a non-Class 1E diesel generator, and a self supporting tower for mounting antennas.

Radio Paging System - A UHF radio paging system is used to page individuals carrying portable receivers, groups of individuals, or all personnel simultaneously. A paging call can be initiated by an attendant through a counter top paging terminal. In addition, a paging terminal telephone interface allows designated individuals with specified telephone instruments the capability to select and call any pocket pager unit.

The radio paging transmitter and counter top paging terminal are powered by normal plant 120 volts ac backed up by a non-class 1E diesel generator. The pocket pager units are supplied with a self contained battery backed up with spare batteries.

7. Distributed Command Control Consoles - Command Control Consoles provide plant operators with access to onsite/off-site telephone systems, two-way radio channels, radio paging system, activation of the plant emergency and fire alarm signals, and the public address paging system. Consoles are designed for 24 channel operation. All channels are open loop. Therefore, no console can be degraded to a 100 percent failure and any channel failure at any console location cannot appear as an upset or interrupt at any other location. Consoles are powered with normal plant 120 volts ac and backed up with non-Class 1E diesel generators.

Consoles are distributed in control rooms 1 and 2, technical i support centers 1 and 2, operational support centers 1 and 2, E0F, central / secondary alarm stations, east / west gate houses, fire brigade house, and the training facility.

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Operators at each console may select monitor only, talk / listen, or off for any two-way conversation loop.

Operators communicate over the two-way radio system using a console mounted boom microphone and built in speaker.

Communication over other channels is conducted with a telephone handset. The console is provided with 2 jack positions for a second operator and an observer. Each jack position provides a second operator or observer the capability for communication with a telephone headset.

The operator uses console push buttons with lamp supervision to select channels, to select automatic ring down telephone hot lines, to interface channels for conferencing, to monitor single channels or to monitor more than one channel simultaneously. The console provides a volume control for a panel mounted loud speaker. A telephone ringer is installed in each console. A push-to-talk foot pedal is provided for hands free talk / listen operation.

9.5.2.2.2 Offsite Communication Systems: Offsite communications are provided by General Telephone Company trunk circuits and the HL&P microwave system. Telephone circuits have access to the telephone switching network in Palacios, Texas, while the microwave system provides a direct link to the HL&P headquarters and Energy Control Center in Houston. Direct lines to the Palacios central office such as hot lines, dedicated business, and data lines are distributed from the plant main distribution frame.

These special lines are not routed through PABX circuits.

9.5.2.2.3 Emergency Communication Systems: Emergency communications for the STP are dealt with expressly in the Emergency Plan. The communications system has been designed to allow contact among plant personnel and plant-to-offsite communications during normal and all emergency conditions.

During normal conditions with all equipment in service, the following systems are available:

1. An EPBX system, with dial access to trunks to General Telephone Company of the Southwest in Palacios and microwave circuits to Bay City and Houston (also, dial access to the plant voice paging system and the radio system)

2. Direct (automatic or code ring) telephones to the HL&P dispatcher in Houston and the Matagorda County Sheriff's Office

3. Palacios business telephones

4. Two-way radio system W1/ LOO 6/g u

Attachment 2 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 6 of 8 5 5. Maintenance Jack Comunication System In the event the EPBX system is disabled, operating personnel have the following systems available:

1. Direct access to the plant voice paging system from the control room

2. The radio system, accessed from the control points in the control rooms and the security office or a mobile unit

3. All direct telephones

4. All Palacios business telephones

5. Refueling Communication System

6. Maintenance Jack System Other possible conditions include:

1. Loss of the microwave system removes the dial access circuits to Bay City and Houston, along with the direct telephones, leaving private lines.

2. In the event radio repeaters for all frequencies are lost, the radios operate mobile-to-mobile (portable-to-mobile or portable-to-portable).

3. In the event power is lost on the Maintenance Jack comunication System, sound-powered sets are used instead of the regular handsets or headsets.

The bulk of the communications subsystems are used in normal plant operations thus providing an ongoing test of the systems.

Additionally all onsite and offsite comunications systems are tested periodically to verify operability. Maintenance logs are maintained in the various equipment rooms, with a summary of each log in the control room files. The logs are updated by technicians responsible for each type of communications equipment in use.

Spare parts for communications systems are securely stored near the equipment requiring such parts. Special tools or test equipment required for each system are on the plant site for use by the technicians. Cables for the EPBX system, paging systems, other in-plant telephone systems, microwave channels, and radio W1/L006/g

c- -

Attachment 2 ST-HL-AE-1235 Pagn 7 of 8 t.

' ' systems will be terminated in each building in such a manner as to permit ease in testing and trouble-shooting. Alarms indicate abnormalities in any of the communications systems. Service personnel are dispatched to correct identified faults. A current list of all technicians' business and homa telephone numbers, as well as mobile radio numbers, is maintained in the control room.

Each week the control room operators are supplied with a list of

-technicians who are on duty for maintenance of all plant communications systens.

l l

I l

W1/ LOO 6/g

Attachment 2 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 8 of 8 s CONTROL ROOM NOISE SENSORS 1

OICE PAGING TELEPHONES v BUSINESS N \/\ / \

~-

(- L- I TELEPHONES /

PAGING AMP.

l- I

i ~ 0 PAGERS IN-PLANT _ l EXTENSIONS ~ :

I ! l MOBILE RADIOS RADIO

^

COMMAND REPEATERS TRUNK LINES CONTROL PABX TO PALACIOS : CONSOLE j HAND HELD I

TRANSCEIVERS H.L.&P. _

DISPATCHER ~ L MAINTENANCE

! o--c 0 0 0

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM MATAGORDA ; (BATTERY / SOUND POWERED) l CD. SHERIFF

FUEL HANDLING i D-C 0 0 0

! COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BAY CITY A (8ATTERY/ SOUND POWERED)

F1RE DEPT. 4 , \.

DISTRIBUTED !

COMMAND l CONTROL l CONSOLES i

I VI A H.L.&P. CO.

I MICROWAVE SYSTEM SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT UNITS 1 & 2 i

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

! CONTROL ROOM l

Figure 9.5.2 2 l

l l

F Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1235

-s Page 1 of 4

2. Essential AC Lighting System for other areas in the power block.

G The TSC diesel generator provides backup power to ten percent of the lighting fixtures including access / egress routes with the exception of the Containment, Turbine Generator Building, Essential Cooling Water Structure, intake / discharge structures and other outlying areas.

9.5.3.2.3 Emergency DC Lighting Systems: The Emergency DC Lighting System consists of lighting supplied from batteries upon loss of other means of lighting. The Emergency DC Lighting System provides illumination at safe shutdown areas including access / egress routes to and access / egress routes from fire areas during fire, transients, and accident conditions, including a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) as follows:

1. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sealed beam battery packs, Holophane M-19-2A-X-SEIS-PT, are supported to withstand a SSE. They are mounted in the safe shutdown areas: control room, auxiliary shutdown panel, transfer switch panels, standby diesel generator control panels, chiller control panels, other areas in the auxiliary building requiring manual valve operation, and access / egress to these areas.

2. The Technical Support Center (TSC), also uses the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs.

3. Lighting from sealed beam lights with at least 90 minute battery packs $s provided in other access / egress routes upon loss of normal area lighting.

4. Emergency lighting in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

facilities not within the plant boundary, shall consist of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs for ingress / egress.

W1/ LOO 6/d

Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1235 o

Page 2 of 4 e

Y Plant lighting is comprised of the following systems:

1. Normal AC

2. Essential AC

3. Emergency DC The Normal and Essential AC Lighting Systems operate together to generate the normal operating condition lighting source for the plant. Operation of the Emergency DC Lighting only occurs when normal and essential ac is not available in any given area. This system is also backed up by the Essential AC Lighting System as described in Section 9.5.3.2.2.

9.5.3.2.1 Normal AC Lighting System: The Normal AC Lighting System provides the major portion of the illumination requirements throughout the power block as well as the power for the 120V convenience receptacles. The Normal AC system is supplied from the non-Class IE system. A non-1E lighting diesel is provided to generate backup power for the yard area lighting.

9.5.3.2.2 Essential AC Lighting System: The Essential AC Lighting System consists of lighting normal power (supplied supply i.e., loss of from offsitebuses power)which upon loss of the are powered from two of the Class 1E (trains A and C) and one non-Class 1E (TSC) diesel generators as described below.

The Essential AC lighting system provides illumination as follows:

1. Essential AC Lighting System for safe shutdown areas and access / egress routes.

During accident and transient conditions the Essential AC Lighting System is connected automatically to the Class IE standby diesel generator by the ESF sequencer. Power is supplied from the Class 1E distribution system through qualified isolation transformer (s). This will provide lighting during a sustained loss of offsite power.

Either of the two Class IE diesel generators (trains A or C) provides a minimum of 10 foot-candles at work stations. In the control room, at the auxiliary shutdown panel, and at the transfer switch panels. For the access / egress routes to these work stations either the A or the C diesel generator provides backup power which will provide sufficient illumination. The TSC diesel generator will provide lighting at work stations at the Diesel Generator Control Panels and the Chiller Control Panels and other areas in the auxiliary building requiring manual valve operation and also access / egress from these areas.

W1/ LOO 6/d

Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 3 of 4 9.5.3 Plant Lighting Systems 9.5.3.1 Design Bases.

1. The Lighting Systen is designed so that a single failure of any electrical component, assuming loss of offsite power (LOOP), will not terminate the system's ability to illuminate those areas where, during emergency conditions, reactor shutdown is carried out.

2. The lighting subsystems that serve the maia control room, the remote shutdown areas and the access / egress routes thereto, and other areas in which the collapse of the Lighting System would physically impact on Class 1E equipment are seismically supported to prevent their collapse during and after a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The Lighting System supports for equipment and raceway in close proximity to Category I equipment are designed for seismic concerns, and to prevent structural collapse during and after a SSE.

3. Lighting fixturcs containing mercury lamps and mercury switches are not used inside the Reactor Containment Building (RCB), specific Mechanical Auxiliary Building (MAB) areas and Fuel Handling Building (FHB).

Lighting fixtures with lamps containing mercury, if used in the turbine building over the turbine or portions of the secondary system which can be opened during maintenance operations, and over the condensate polishing demineralizer regeneration equipment area, are provided with solid translucent lamp guards to prevent falling lamps.

All MAB lighting fixtures with lamps containing mercury are provided with solid translucent lamp guards.

The above restrictions also apply to sodium vapor lamp fixtures.

The design of the integrated Lighting System is based on the applicable portions of the following codes and standards:

Illumination Engineering Society (IES) Lighting Handbook -(1972)

Occupational Safety and Health Standards (OSHA) 29CFR 1910 National Electric Code (NEC) NFPA 70-1981 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Obstruction Marking and Lighting - Advisory Circular No. 70/7460-1F, dated September 27, 1978 9.5.3.2 System Description. The Lighting System provides illumination for normal and emergency plant operations, and access / egress routes for fire fighting and safe building evacuation.

W1/L006/d

[ Attachment-3

( ST-HL-AE-1235 l P ge 4 cf 4 TABLE 9.5.3-1 LIGHTING AT SAFE SHUTDOWN AND ACCESS / EGRESS AREAS l

100% Essential AC 10% Essential AC Lighting Backed By Lighting Backed By 8 Hr Emergency Normal AC Areas Class IE DG Non-Class 1E DG DC Lighting Lighting Control Room Yes N/A Yes N/A 1.

N/A Yes N/A

2. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Yes

3. Transfer Switch Panels Yes N/A Yes N/A

4. Access / Egress between Yes N/A Yes N/A 1,2, and 3 Yes Yes Yes

5. Standby Diesel Generator N/A Control Panels Yes Yes Yes Chiller Control Panels

6. N/A Areas in the Aux. Bldg. Yes Yes Yes

7. N/A Requiring Manual Valve Operation Yes Yes Yes

8. Access / Egress between N/A 5,6,and 7 J1/ LOO 6/d

i 1 Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page I cf 4 Y 2. Essential AC Lighting System for other areas in the power block.

The TSC diesel generator provides backup power to ten percent of the lighting fixtures including access / egress routes with the exception of the Containment, Turbine Generator Building, Essential Cooling Water Structure, intake / discharge structures and other outlying areas.

9.5.3.2.3 Emergency DC Lighting Systems: The Emergency DC Lighting System consists of lighting supplied from batteries upon loss of other means of lighting. The Emergency DC Lighting System provides illumination at safe shutdown areas including access / egress routes to and access / egress routes from fire areas during fire, transients, and accident conditions, including a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) as follows:

1. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sealed beam battery packs, Holophane M-19-2A-X-SEIS-PT, are supported to withstand a SSE. They are mounted in the safe shutdown areas: control room, auxiliary shutdown panel, transfer switch panels, standby diesel generator control panels, chiller control panels, other areas in the auxiliary building requiring manual valve operation, and access / egress to these areas.

2. The Technical Support Center (TSC), also uses the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs.

3. Lighting from sealed beam lights with at least 90 minute battery packs is provided in other access / egress routes upon loss of normal area lighting.

4. Emergency lighting in the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F),

facilities not within the plant boundary, shall consist of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months battery packs for ingress / egress.

W1/ LOO 6/d

Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1235 Paga 2 of 4 Y Plant lighting is comprised of the following systems:

1. Normal AC

2. Essential AC

3. Emergency DC The Normal and Essential AC Lighting Systems operate together to generate the normal operating condition lighting source for the plant. Operation of the Emergency DC Lighting only occurs when normal and essential ac is not available in any given area. This system is also backed up by the Essential AC Lighting System as described in Section 9.5.3.2.2.

9.5.3.2.1 Normal AC Lighting System: The Normal AC Lighting System provides the major portion of the illumination requirements throughcut the power block as well as the power for the 120V convenience receptacles. The Normal AC system is supplied from the non-Class IE system. A non-1E lighting diesel is provided to generate backup power for the yard area lighting.

9.5.3.2.2 Essential AC Lighting System: The Essential AC Lighting System consists of lighting normal power supply (supplied i.e., loss offrom buses offsite which power) are upon loss of the powered from.two of the Class IE (trains A and C) and one non-Class 1E (TSC) diesel generators as described below.

The Essential AC lighting system provides illumination as follows:

1. Essential AC Lighting System for safe shutdown areas and access / egress routes.

During accident and transient conditions the Essential AC Lighting System is connected automatically to the Class 1E

standby diesel generator by the ESF sequencer. Power is supplied from the Class 1E distribution system through qualified isolation transformer (s). This will provide lighting during a sustained loss of offsite power.

Either of the two Class IE diesel generators (trains A or C) provides a minimum of 10 foot-candles at work stations. In the control room, at the auxiliary shutdown panel, and at the transfer switch panels. For the access / egress routes to these work stations either the A or the C diesel generator provides backup power which will provide sufficient illumination. The TSC diesel generator will prcvide lighting at work stations at the Diesel Generator Control Panels and the Chiller Control Panels and other areas in the auxiliary building requiring manual valve operation and also access / egress from these areas.

W1/ LOO 6/d

Attachment 3 l ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 3 of 4 9.5.3 Plant Lighting Systems 9.5.3.1 Design Bases.

1. The Lighting System is designed so that a single failure of any electrical component, assuming loss of offsite power (LOOP), will not tenninate the system's ability to illuminate those areas where, during emergency conditions, reactor shutdown is carried out.

2. The lighting subsystems that serve the main control room, the remote shutdown areas and the access / egress routes thereto, and other areas in which the collapse of the Lighting System would physically impact on Class 1E equipment are seismically supported to prevent their collapse during and after a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The Lighting System supports for equipment and raceway in close proximity to Category I equipment are designed for seismic concerns, and to prevent structural collapse during and after a SSE.

3. Lighting fixtures containing mercury lamps and mercury switches are not used inside the i<eactor Containment Building (RCB), specific Mechanical Auxiliary Building (MAB) areas and Fuel Handling Building (FHB).

Lighting fixtures with lamps containing mercury, if used in the turbine building over the turbine or portions of the secondary system which can be opened curing maintenance operations, and over the condensate polishing demineralizer regeneration equipment area, are provided with solid translucent lamp guards to prevent falling lamps.

All MAB lighting fixtures with lamps contair;ing mercury are provided with solid translucent lamp guards.

The above restrictions also apply to sodium vapor lamp fixtures.

The design of the integrated Lighting System is based on the applicable portions of the following codes and standards:

Illumination Engineering Society (IES) Lighting Handbook (1972)

Occupational Safety and Health Standards (OSHA) 29CFR 1910 National Electric Code (NEC) NFPA 70-1981 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Obstruction Marking and Lighting - Advisory Circular No. 70/7460-1F, dated September 27, 1978 9.5.3.2 System Description. The Lighting System provides illumination Tor normal and emergency plant operations, and access / egress routes for fire fighting and safe building evacuation.

W1/L006/d

Attachrent 3 ST-HL-AE-1235 Page 4 ef 4 TABLE 9.5.3-1 LIGHTING AT SAFE SHUTDOWN 3.ND ACCESS / EGRESS AREAS 100% Essential AC 10% Essential AC Lighting Backed By Lighting Backed By 8 Hr Emergency Nonnal AC Areas Class IE DG Non-Class IE DG DC Lighting Lighting

1. Control Room Yes N/A Yes N/A _

2. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Yes N/A Yes N/A

3. Transfer Switch Panels Yes N/A Yes N/A

4. Access / Egress between Yes N/A Yes N/A 1,2, and 3

5. Standby Diesel Generator N/A Yes Yes Yes Control Panels

6. Chiller Control Panels N/A Yes Yes Yes

7. Areas in the Aux. Bldg. N/A Yes Yes Yes Requiring Manual Valve '

Operation Access / Egress between Yes Yes Yes

8. N/A 5,6,and 7 M I/ LOO 6/d ,

ST-HL-AE-1235, Provides Responses to Questions 430.74N-430.105N Re Communications,Lighting & Diesel Generators Received on 850304.Revised FSAR Text for Sections 9.5.2 Re Communications Sys & 9.5.3 Re Plant Lighting Sys Encl

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ST-HL-AE-1235, Provides Responses to Questions 430.74N-430.105N Re Communications,Lighting & Diesel Generators Received on 850304.Revised FSAR Text for Sections 9.5.2 Re Communications Sys & 9.5.3 Re Plant Lighting Sys Encl

Text

Dear Mr. Knighton:

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