Text

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report
	ML16307A018
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/02/2016
From:	Jim Barstow; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	RS-16-178 15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1
	Download: ML16307A018 (59)
	v • d • e

Exelon Generation RS-16-178 10 CFR 50.54(f)

November 2, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 NRG Docket No. 50-220

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRG Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRG Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NRG Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML12333A168 and ML12333A170)

4. NRG Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, dated February 15, 2013 (ML12319A074)

5. Constellation Energy, LLC letter to NRG, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 -

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRG Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (ML14099A196)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 2, 2016 Page 2

6. NRC Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML14111A147)

7. NRC Memorandum, Support Document for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML14136A126)

8. NEI Letter, Request for NRC Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396),

dated July 30, 2015 (ML15223A100/ML15223A102)

9. NRC Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility," dated September 17, 2015 (ML15218A569) 1o. NRC Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRC letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31 , 2014.

By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (IHS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation. As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRC (Reference 6) on page 4 of Enclosure 2, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6), the NRC acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) for NRC review and endorsement. NRC endorsement was provided by Reference 9. Reference 10 provided the NRC final seismic hazard evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement November 2, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable. Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This transmittal completes the scope of work described in Section 4.2 of Reference 5, for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This letter closes the associated regulatory commitment contained in Reference 5 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 2nd day of November 2016.

Respectfully submitted, James Barstow Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report cc: NRC Regional Administrator - Region I NRC Project Manager, NRR - Nine Mile Point Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Nine Mile Point Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRC Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC

Enclosure Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report (55 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 348 Lake Rd, Oswego, NY 13126 Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 NRC Docket No. 50-220 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Exelon ~

E><elon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 1661 Feehanville Drive, Suite 150 Mount Prospect, IL 60056 Report Number: 15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Printed Name Signature

Document ID: 15C4344-RPT-002

Title:

High Frequency Confirmation Report for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 in Response to Near Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.1 Recommendation Document Type:

Criteria D Interface D Report IZI Specification D Other D Drawing D Project Name:

Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 Hi!:!h Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C4344

~

Client: ~ Exelon ~

This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

For Use (Rev. 0) p//*V~

Date: 9/29/2016 Originated by: M. Wodarcyk

~/I{~

Date: 9/29/2016 Checked bv: M. Delaney

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Date: 9/30/2016 Approved bv: M. Delanev Revision Record:

Revision Originated by/ Checked by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date 1 ~1~~ft(cr ~ft(cr See revision bars. This revision supersedes all M. Wodarcyk M. Delaney M. Delaney previous revisions in its 10/17/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 entirety.

DOCUMENT PROJECT NO.

APPROVAL SHEET 15C4344 Figure 2.8 Stevenson & Associates

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTIF developed a set of recommendations [16] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a S0.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (NMPl). The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

Page 3 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the NM Pl engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum {GMRS)

Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components

Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 1 Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1] . In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTIF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine ifthe agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTIF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3] .

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, NMPl (concurrently with Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant and R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant) submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for NM Pl using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results . The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 APPROACH EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the NM Pl engineering evaluations described in this report.

Section 4.1 of Reference [8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

NMPl SSE and GMRS Information

Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

Summary of Results 1.4 PLANT SCREENING NMPl submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 31, 2014[4]. In a letter dated June 16, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the NM Pl site [14).

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [2] that the NM Pl GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [6].

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15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 1.5 REPORT DOCUMENTATION Section 2 of this report describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 of this report (see [15] for the evaluation) using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4 of this report. The overall conclusions are discussed in Section 5 of this report.

Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report lists the devices identified in Section 2 of this report and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of this report.

Table B-2 identifies the reactor coolant leak path valves that could potentially cause a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

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15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference [8] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary."

2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The concern regarding the reactor vessel inventory control function is the actuation of valves that have the potential to cause a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). A LOCA following a seismic event could provide a challenge to the mitigation strategies and lead to core damage. Control circuits for the Electromatic Relief Valves (ERV) as well as other Reactor Coolant System (RCS) valves listed in Attachment A of this report were analyzed. In this case, the "undesirable state" criterion for selection of devices was any device that could lead to a listed valve opening and remaining open after the period of strong shaking.

The EPRI High Frequency Confirmation guidance [8] assumes AC power is available, and thus control devices for AC powered valves are included. The discussion of DC powered valves in this section applies. This section describes the analysis of devices controlling the valves listed in Attachment B, Table B-2 of this report. Based on this analysis, there are no contact devices that meet the criteria for selection in this category.

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15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Main Steam System Valves Electromatic Relief Valves PSV-01-102A/B/C/D/E/F Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays controlled by reactor pressure and the Auto Depressurization Logic [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27). There is no seal-in of the reactor pressure portion of the circuit. Seal-in of the Auto Depressurization Logic [28, 29) is prevented by the Low-Low-Low Water Level signal [30, 31).

Reactor Vessel Head Safetv Valves PSV-01-119A/B/C/D/F/G/H/J/M Per the UFSAR, these valves are spring-loaded, pop-open type safety valves [19, pp. V-8). As such they have no electric control and thus are not considered for high frequency effects.

Reactor Vent Valves BV-37-01, BV-37-02, BV-37-06 BV-37-01 is closed and depowered under normal operation [32). In this condition BV-37-01 can be credited to remain closed following a seismic event, and misalignment of the downstream valves BV-37-02 and BV-37-06 would not lead to a LOCA. For this reason, devices controlling these valves are not considered for high frequency effects.

Drywell and Torus Isolation Valves Main Steam Isolation Valves IV-01-01, IV-01-02, IV-01-03, IV-01-04 Seal-in of the opening contactor controlling normally open motorized valves IV-01-01 and IV 02 is blocked by rugged limit switches [33, 34). Chatter in the control circuits for the solenoid-operated pilot valves of normally-open IV-01-03 and IV-01-04 would have the beneficial effect of closing the valves; and thus no devices in these circuits meet the selection criteria [35). No SILO will block valve closure of any of these valves upon an isolation signal.

Reactor Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves IV-38-01, IV-38-13 These valves are closed and depowered under normal operation [36, p. 82). Chatter in the control circuits of these depowered valves has no effect on valve position and thus these valves can be credited to remain closed following a seismic event. For this reason, devices controlling these valves are not considered for high frequency effects.

Reactor Recirculation Sample Isolation Valve IV-110-127 Coincident chatter in the 42-0 contactor auxiliary contact and 4-llD or 4-120 may open the valve, however the valve would reclose immediately due to the normally closed contacts of 4-llD and 4-120 in the closing circuit [37).

Feedwater Isolation Valves 31-07, 31-08; Clean-up Return Isolation Valve IV-33-0lR; Clean-up Supply Isolation Valves IV-33-02R, IV-33-04 These valves are normally open and controlled by non-vulnerable hand switches. Seal-in ofthe opening contactor via its auxiliary contact is prevented by rugged limit and torque switches which are open when the valve is open [33, 38, 34, 39).

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15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Reactor Drain Valves BV-37-08R, BV-37-09R Valve BV-37-09R is closed and depowered under normal operation [40, p. 168]. Because it is depowered, chatter in its control circuit has no effect on this valve and it will remain closed following the seismic event. Valve BV-37-08R is in series with BV-37-09R and because BV-37-09R can be credited to remain closed following a seismic event, chatter in the control circuit of BV-37-08R would not lead to a LOCA.

Core Spray Isolation Valves Core Spray Vent Isolation Valves IV-40-30, IV-40-31: Core Spray Test Isolation Valves IV-40-05, IV-40-06 These valves are closed and depowered under normal operation [41 and 42, pp. 65 - 66].

Because they are depowered, chatter in their control circuits has no effect on these valves and they will remain closed following a seismic event. For this reason, devices controlling these valves are not considered for high frequency effects.

Core Spray Discharge Isolation Valves IV-40-01, IV-40-09, IV-40-10, IV-40-11 All four of these normally-closed valves have similar control circu its which contain potentially vulnerable devices capable of causing the valve to open. Due to check valves and the closed and depowered Core Spray Vent and Test Isolation Valves (described above), no leak path would be created should these valves open due to chatter in their control circuits [41] . For this reason, potentially vulnerable devices in the control circuits of these valves do not meet the selection criteria.

Containment Spray Valves Containment Spray Test to Torus Flow Control Valve FCV-80-118 Chatter in the opening circuit for this valve is blocked by a normally-open and rugged hand switch [43] and for this reason no devices in this valve's control circuit meet the selection criteria.

2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function."

2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

The selection of contact devices for the Emergency Condenser was based on the premise that condenser operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to condenser operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection. Only contact devices which could render the Emergency Condenser inoperable were considered.

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15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 The emergency condenser is placed into operation by opening the condensate outlet isolation valves [19, pp. V-18] via by initiation relays 11K61A, 11K61X, 11K62A, and 11K62X [20] in Channel 11 and 12K61A, 12K61X, 12K62A, and 12K62X in Channel 12 [21]. These relays are normally energized and must de-energize to initiate the condenser. Chatter in the initiation circuit would tend to open these valves and this beneficial effect eliminates these relays and their input devices from consideration.

Chatter in the Auto Close circuit could lead to an undesired isolation of the Emergency Condenser, which would place it out of operation. Chatter in the normally de-energized isolation signal output relays 4-llA/B or 4-12A/B; or their input devices Kl7A/B/C/D and 36-06A-M/B-M/C-M/D-M could tend to seal-in the isolation relays [20, 21]. Chatter in normally-energized confirmatory logic relays 36A/B/C/D could break their seal-in. The potential effect of chatter in these devices meets the selection criteria and thus they must be considered for this program.

Chatter in the remote isolation bypass circuit (R38A/B/C/D or their input devices) would have no effect on the condenser control when it is available or operating. The remaining devices are slave relays to those listed and do not lead to SILO on their own.

2.5 AC/DC POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

Emergency Diesel Generators,

Battery Chargers and Inverters,

EDG Ancillary Systems, and

Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip resulted from a fault condition and could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from the NM Pl UFSAR. Nine Mile Point has two (2) EDGs which provide emergency power to two (2) divisions of Class lE loads, with one EDG for each division [19, pp. IX-10]. The overall emergency power distribution, both AC and DC, is shown on the C19950C One-Line Diagrams [44, 45].

The analysis necessary to identify contact devices in this category relies on conservative worse-case initial conditions and presumptions regarding event progression. The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available. The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

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1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class lE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EOGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class lE battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators, 102 and 103, is divided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [19, pp. IX-17].

Generator Protective Relaying The control circuits for the 102 DG circuit breaker R1022 include DG lockout relay 86DG-2/HR and R1012 feeder breaker lockout relay 86/ER [46]. If either of these lockout relays are tripped the EOG breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP. The Diesel Generator Lockout Relay 86DG-2/HR may be tripped by chatter in the three 87DG-2 Phase Differential Relays or the 67NI Directional Overcurrent Relay [46]. Feeder Lockout Relay 86/ER may be tripped by chatter in the three S0/51 Phase Overcurrent Relays and SOG/SlG Ground Overcurrent Protective Relay associated with Auxiliary Feeder 102 [47]. In addition to the lockout relays, the R1022 circuit breaker could be tripped by chatter in the three SlV Phase Time Overcurrent Relays [46].

The control circuits for the 103 DG circuit breaker R1032 is identical in design and sensitive to chatter in its equivalent devices: 86DG-3/HR, 86/ER@ R1013, 87DG-3, 67NI @ R1032, SO/Sl@

Rl013, SOG/SlG@ R1013, and SlV@ R1032 [48, 47].

Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the starting and control circuits of each EDG [49]. The 86DG-2/HR DG Lockout Relay (already covered) is the only SILO device which may prevent EDG Start. Chatter in the other devices in the start circuit would only have a temporary effect on EDG start during the period of strong shaking. The EOG Start Signal energizes engine Shutdown Relay SD, which de-energizes the Governor Shutdown Solenoid 6S.

Any chatter in the shutdown circuit which may energize the shutdown solenoid after EDG start may cause the EOG to shut down. The shutdown solenoid is controlled via two contacts of the Governor Shutdown Auxiliary Time Delay Relay 6SX-1, the normally closed instantaneous contact and the normally open time delay dropout (TDDO). When energized via the shutdown relay the instantaneous contacts open and the TDDO contacts close. When 6SX-1 is de-energized the contact configuration functions to energize the shutdown relay for SO seconds.

This mean that any chatter which de-energizes the solenoid of 6SX-1 would block EOG restart for SO seconds.

Due to relay contact construction, for any given relay with both open and closed contacts, the closed contacts will chatter open before the open contacts chatter closed. This means chatter in 6SX-1 would not cause the shutdown solenoid to energize. Chatter in Shutdown Relay SD or Fast Page 12 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Shutdown Relay SDE could de-energize 6SX-l, energizing the shutdown solenoid. Also chatter in any device which affect SD or SDE may cause shutdown: Start Relay 2-2X, Overcrank Time Delay Relay 2-3, Overspeed Relay 12X, Main Bearing Relay 38D-X, and Restart/No Start Relay 48. Other devices in this circuit do not meet the selection criteria due to their being non-vulnerable, chatter having no effect, or chatter having beneficial effect.

Battery Chargers The Control Circuits for Battery Charger 161A/B [SO, Sl, S2, S3, S4) and 171A/B [SS, S6, S7, S8, S9] contain a high voltage shutdown circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. The high voltage shutdown circuit has an output relay X308, which shunt-trips the AC input circuit breaker, shutting the charger down [S2, S4, S7, S9]. Chatter in the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

Uninterruptible Power Supplies Analysis of schematics for the Uninterruptable Power Supplies {UPS) 162A/B [60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 6S] and 172A/B [66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71) revealed the output is controlled by an overvoltage lockout via electrical contractors. Chatter in the 86-1 Lockout Relay or the two Overvoltage Relays feeding it, S9-1 and S9-2, may de-energize the output contactors and disable the UPS [61, 67). The DC supply was credited as the UPS power source because it uses rugged fuses.

EDG Ancillary Systems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators require a number of components and systems. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [19) was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [72, 73), which are covered under the EDG engine control analysis as discussed above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [72, 73) which do not rely on electrical control.

Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [72, 73) which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine shaft-driven mechanical pumps and motor-driven electric pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks [72, 73). The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps [74). Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered fuel oil and fuel oil transfer pumps [49) concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Page 13 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System consists of two cooling loops, jacket water and raw water. Engine driven pumps are credited for jacket water when the engine is operating. These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. Raw water flow is provided by the Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Raw Water Pump [72, 73] . This pump is controlled by the EDG start circuit via the governor solenoid auxiliary relay [75, 76]. This control circuit is covered in Section 6.5.1 above. No electrically operated valves are used to establish flow in either cooling loop [72, 73].

Ventilation Ventilation for each EDG room is achieved via two exhaust fans and a roll-up door. These components are controlled by room temperature [75, 76]. Strong shaking may temporarily prevent fan operation. It also may cause the roll-up door closing contactor to seal-in, however this would only lead to a temporary closing of the door because the high room temperature signal would command the door to reopen should this occur. Because the effect of strong shaking on this system is temporary, no devices in this system meet the selection criteria.

Switchgear, load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Ventilation Fans, etc.) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded the EDG output circuit breakers, which are covered above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis for each component above. Those medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4160V Busses and 600V AC Load Centers supplying power to loads noted in this section (battery chargers, EDG ancillary systems, etc.) have been identified for evaluation: Rl022/571, R1021/171, R1043/603, 52@ PB16 Cubicle lOB, 52@

PB16 Cubicle 12C, Rl032/581, Rl031/181, R1053/613, 52@ PB17 Cubicle SB 52@ PB17 Cubicle 3C [77, 78, 79]. DC Distribution uses four low voltage circuit breakers, 52@ BBll Unit E02, 52 @

BBll Unit F03, 52 @ BB12 Unit F02, 52 @ BB12 Unit G03, for the battery charger DC outputs and the batteries to the battery boards [80]. The DC distribution to the UPS uses fuses which do not have moving contacts. MCCBs in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets were considered rugged. The only circuit breakers affected by protective relaying (not already covered) were those that distribute power from the 4160V Busses to the 4160/600V step-down transformers.

An analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers, R1021 and R1031, indicates that chatter in the three 50/51 Phase Overcurrent Relays or the 50G Ground Overcurrent Relay in the trip circuits of these breakers could cause circuit breaker tripping [46, 48].

2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref. [81]. A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B-1 of this report. The identified devices are evaluated in [15] per the methodology and description of Sections 3 and 4 of this report. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B-1 ofthis report.

Page 14 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 3 Seismic Evaluation 3.1 HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8], Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the NM Pl horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS), which was generated as part of the NM Pl Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] submitted to the NRC on March 31, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on June 10, 2016

[14].

It is noted in Reference [8] that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. [8], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort."

For sites founded on soil, the soil layers will shift the frequency range of seismic input towards the lower frequency range of the response spectrum by engineering judgment. Therefore, for purposes of high-frequency evaluations in this report, the GMRS is an adequate substitute for the FIRS for sites founded on soil.

The applicable buildings at NM Pl are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference. [8], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VG MRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference. [4], Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Page 15 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Layer Depth (ft) Depth (m) Thickness, d1 (ft) Vs1 (ft/sec) d1/Vs1 I [ d1 /Vsi] Vs30 (ft/s) 1 10 3.05 10 6,000 1.67E-03 1.67E-03 2 20 6.10 10 6,000 1.67E-03 3.33E-03 3 35 10.7 15 6,500 2.31E-03 5.64E-03 4 51.2 15.6 16.2 8,000 2.03E-03 7.67E-03 7161 5 67.4 20.5 16.2 8,000 2.03E-03 9.69E-03 6 83 .6 25.5 16.2 8,000 2.03E-03 l.17E-02 7 99.8 30.4 16.2 8,000 2.03E-03 1.37E-02 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.5.

The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d ;) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs;) .

The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (I[d;/Vs;]).

The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/I[d;/Vs;].

Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 30.4m (99.8ft} instead of 30m (98.43ft}. This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30} and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8],

Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.122g and the shear wave velocity of 7161ft/s, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8],

Table 3-2 values are constant between O.lHz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VG MRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for NMPl.

Page 16 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz) HGMRS (g) V/H Ratio VGMRS (g) 100 0.122 0.8 0.098 90 0.123 0.82 0.101 80 0.123 0.87 0.107 70 0.125 0.91 0.114 60 0.130 0.92 0.120 so 0.144 0.9 0.130 45 0.157 0.89 0.140 40 0.170 0.86 0.146 35 0.186 0.81 0.151 30 0.202 0.75 0.152 25 0.221 0.7 0.155 20 0.236 0.68 0.160 15 0.245 0.68 0.167 12.5 0.241 0.68 0.164 10 0.236 0.68 0.160 9 0.219 0.68 0.149 8 0.206 0.68 0.140 7 0.201 0.68 0.137 6 0.196 0.68 0.133 5 0.172 0.68 0.117 4 0.142 0.68 0.097 3.5 0.129 0.68 0.088 3 0.116 0.68 0.079 2.5 0.100 0.68 0.068 2 0.093 0.68 0.064 1.5 0.081 0.68 0.055 1.25 0.075 0.68 0.051 1 0.059 0.68 0.040 0.9 0.052 0.68 0.035 0.8 0.047 0.68 0.032 0.7 0.042 0.68 0.029 0.6 0.038 0.68 0.026 0.5 0.033 0.68 0.023 0.4 0.027 0.68 0.018 0.35 0.023 0.68 0.016 0.3 0.020 0.68 0.014 0.25 0.017 0.68 0.011 0.2 0.013 0.68 0.009 0.15 0.010 0.68 0.007 0.125 0.008 0.68 0.006 0.1 0.007 0.68 0.005 Page 17 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 0.25 1.0 I

- VGMRS

-HGMRS 0.20 0.9

- - -v/H Ratio (B-Hard)

!I tlO

~ 0.15 0 0 *p

'.P ro ro

~

a::

QJ :c QJ 8 0.10 0.7 >

<(

I 0.05 I , I 0.6 0.00 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency [Hz]

Figure 3-1 Plot of the NMPl Horizontal Ground Motion Response Spectra (HG MRS), Vertical Ground Motion Response Spectra (VGMRS), and V/H Ratios for a B-Hard Soil Site Page 18 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 3.3 COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8], the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [13]

classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room bench board panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [8] as follows:

NM Pl Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

NM Pl Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

NM Pl Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

Page 19 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 3.4 COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGM RS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

Page 20 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 4 Contact Device Evaluations Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program (7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program).

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [Error! Reference source not found.], (11], and (12].

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

(d) Station A-46 program reports.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated (see [15]) with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8].

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report.

Page 21 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 5 Conclusions 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS NM Pl has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [8].

The evaluation identified a total of 88 components that required seismic high frequency evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 80 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity. The remaining 8 devices are adequate despite their seismic capacities' being less than seismic demand because any chatter in these 8 devices can be resolved by NM Pl operator actions.

5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS No follow-up actions are required.

Page 22 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 6 References 1 NRC (E. Leeds and M . Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." October 27, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility."' September 17, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. "Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." March 31, 2014. ADAMS Accession Number ML14099A196-1.

5 Not used.

6 EPRI 1025287. "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) forthe Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7 EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 201S 9 EPRI NP-7147-SL. "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." August 1991 10 Not used.

11 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", April 1995 12 EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004-02. "Relay GERS Corrections." September 10, 2004 13 EPRI NP-7148, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", 1990 14 NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (P. Orpha nos). "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Page 23 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC NOS. MF3973 and MF3974)." June 16, 2015.,

ADAMS Accession Number ML15153A660 15 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2, "High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays" 16 NRC (C. Miller et al.) Report, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

July 12, 2011, ADAMS Accession Number ML111861807 17 NEI 12-06, Rev. 2. "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 18 Not used.

19 NMP Report, "Final Safety Analysis Report (Updated)," Rev. 24, October 2015 20 NMP Drawing C19859C-008 Rev. 51, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Emergency Cooling Channel #11)"

21 NMP Drawing C19859C-008A Rev. 24, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Emergency Cooling Channel #12)"

22 NMP Drawing C19859C-024 Rev. 10, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Ch . 11 Automatic Depressurization - Core Spray) ERV Valve #111" 23 NMP Drawing C19859C-024A Rev. 7, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Channel #12 Automatic Depressurization-Core Spray) ERV Valve #121" 24 NMP Drawing C19859C-025 Rev. 9, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Ch. 11 Automatic Depressurization - Core Spray) ERV Valve #112" 25 NMP Drawing C19859C-025A Rev. 9, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Channel #12 Automatic Depressurization-Core Spray) ERV Valve #122" 26 NMP Drawing C19859C-026 Rev. 9, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Ch . 11 Auto Depressurization - Core Spray) ERV Valve #113" 27 NMP Drawing C19859C-026A Rev. 8, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Channel #12 Automatic Depressurization-Core Spray) ERV Valve #123" 28 NMP Drawing C19859C-018 Rev. 25, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System Auto Depressurization - Core Spray" 29 NMP Drawing C19859C-018A Rev. 16, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System Auto Depressurization - Core Spray" 30 NMP Drawing C19859C-002 Rev. 50, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Channel 11 Coincident Logic)"

31 NMP Drawing C19859C-005 Rev. 43, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System (Channel 12 Coincident Logic)"

32 NMP Drawing C18002C-001 Rev. 49, "P&ID Steam Flow Main Steam & High Pressure Turbine" Page 24 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 33 NMP Drawing C19437C-007 Rev. 31, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 161A and 161B Control Circuits" 34 NMP Drawing C19440C-007 Rev. 32, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 171B Control Circuits" 35 NMP Drawing C19859C-011 Rev. 32, "Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Protection System Vessel Isolation" 36 NMP Procedure Nl-OP-43A Rev. 03900, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Operating Procedure, Plant Startup" 37 NMP Drawing C19438C-008 Rev. 11, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 167 Control Circuits" 38 NMP Drawing C19437C-005 Rev. 25, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 161B Control Circuits" 39 NMP Drawing C19440C-005 Rev. 23, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 171B Control Circuits" 40 NMP Procedure Nl-OP-3 Rev. 04200, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Operating Procedure, Reactor Cleanup System" 41 NMP Drawing C18007C-001 Rev. 59, "P&ID Reactor Core Spray" 42 NMP Procedure Nl-OP-2 Rev. 03501, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Operating Procedure, Core Spray System" 43 NMP Drawing C19438C-009 Rev. 6, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 167 Control Circuits" 44 NMP Drawing C19950C-001 Rev. 29, "One Line Diagram Plant Control and Instrumentation Power Distribution" 45 NMP Drawing C19950C-002 Rev. 20, "One Line Diagram Plant Control and Instrumentation Power Distribution" 46 NMP Drawing C19410C-003 Rev. 31, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 4.16KV Emergency Power Board & Diesel Generator (#102 Control Circuits)"

47 NMP Drawing C19409C-002 Rev. 34, "One Line Diagram Auxiliary System 4160 Volt Power Boards 1112 & 101" 48 NMP Drawing C19410C-005 Rev. 33, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 4.16KV Emergency Power Board & Diesel Generator (#103 Control Circuits)"

49 NMP Drawing C19410C-010 Rev. 44, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 4.16KV Emergency Power Board & Diesel Generator (#102 & 103 Control Circuits)"

50 NMP Drawing C19436C-006 Rev. 18, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Static Battery Charger 161A & 161B Control Circuits" 51 NMP Drawing C19436C-006A Rev. 12, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 (Battery Charger 161B)"

52 NMP Drawing C19436C-006B Rev. 4, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 (Battery Charger 161B)"

Page 25 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 53 NMP Drawing C19436C-006C Rev. 3, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 (Battery Charger 161A)"

54 NMP Drawing Cl9436C-006D Rev. 3, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 (Battery Charger 161A)"

55 NMP Drawing C19439C-006 Rev. 20, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Static Battery Charger 171A & 171B Control Circuits" 56 NMP Drawing C19439C-006A Rev. 13, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 (Battery Charger 171B)"

57 NMP Drawing C19439C-006B Rev. 5, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 (Battery Charger 171B)"

58 NMP Drawing C19439C-006C Rev. 3, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 (Battery Charger 171A)"

59 NMP Drawing C19439C-006D Rev. 3, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 (Battery Charger 171A)"

60 NMP Drawing C19436C-005 Rev. 20, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

61 NMP Drawing C19436C-005A Rev. 13, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

62 NMP Drawing Cl9436C-005B Rev. 10, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

63 NMP Drawing C19436C-005C Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

64 NMP Drawing C19436C-005D Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

65 NMP Drawing C19436C-005E Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 16 Control Circuits (UPS 162A & 162B)"

66 NMP Drawing C19439C-005 Rev. 22, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

67 NMP Drawing C19439C-005A Rev. 11, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

68 NMP Drawing C19439C-005B Rev. 10, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

69 NMP Drawing C19439C-005C Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

70 NMP Drawing C19439C-005D Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

71 NMP Drawing C19439C-005E Rev. 1, "Elementary Wiring Diagram, 600 Volt Power Board 17 Control Circuits (UPS 172A & 172B)"

Page 26 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 72 NMP Drawing C18026C-001 Rev. 26, "P&ID Emergency Diesel Generator #102 Starting Air, Cooling Water, Lube Oil, and Fuel" 73 NMP Drawing C18026C-002 Rev. 29, "P&ID Emergency Diesel Generator #103 Starting Air, Cooling Water, Lube Oil, and Fuel" 74 NMP Drawing C19410C-001 Rev. 31, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 4.16KV Emergency Power Boards and Diesel Generators (#102 & #103 Power Circuits)"

75 NMP Drawing C19437C-008 Rev. 18, "Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 161B Control Circuits" 76 NMP Drawing C19440C-008 Rev. 20, Elementary Wiring Diagram 600V Power Board 1718 Control Circuits.

77 NMP Drawing C19409C-001 Rev. 14, "One Line Diagram Auxiliary System (Power Boards)"

78 NMP Drawing C19409C-008 Rev. 53, "One Line Diagram Auxiliary System 600 Volt Power Board 16, 161A & 161B" 79 NMP Drawing C19409C-009 Rev. 47, "One Line Diagram Auxiliary System 600 Volt Power Board 17, 171A & 171B" 80 NMP Drawing C19839C-001Rev.17, "One Line Diagram 125V DC Control Bus."

81 15C4344-RPT-001, Rev. 2. "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

Page 27 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 A Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation is extracted from Reference [15] .

Notes:

1. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [15] reference section shown on the following page.

2. This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency-sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRI high-frequency guidance [8] and the flexible coping strategies guidance document NEI 12-06 [17] .

Page 28 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 10 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates IS 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes, Guidance, and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015.

1.2. EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary." September 2014.

1.3. EPRI NP-6041-SL. "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision l)." August 1991.

1.4. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2. "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."

1.5. EPRI NP-7147-SL, Volume 2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." April 1995.

1.6. SQUG Advisory Memorandum 2004-02. "Relay GERS Corrections." September 7, 2004.

1.7. ABS Consulting et al. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment." Rev. 3A.

1.8. IEEE Standard 344-1975. "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

1.9. SANDIA Report SAND92-0140, Part I. "Use of Seismic Experience and Test Data to Show Ruggedness of Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants." Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP). February 28, 1991.

1.10. IEEE Standard C37.98-1987. "IEEE Standard Seismic Testing of Relays."

1.11. EPRI NP-7147-SL. "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." August 1991.

2. Documents with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Accession Numbers 2.1. ML14099A196 . Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Renewed Facility Operating License No.

DPR-18, Docket No. 50-244; and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2, Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69, Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410. "Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident."

2.2. ML12053A340. Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status. "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident." March 12, 2012.

2.3. ML12054A735. Order EA-12-049 to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status. "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events." March 12, 2012 .

Page 29 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 11 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Assoc:iates18

3. Station Documents 3.1. UFSAR 3.1.1. Nine Mile Point UFSAR, Rev. 23.

3.2. Re~orts 3.2.1. Nine Mile Point IPEEE (SAS-13Ul-1) Rev. 0, "Identification of Structures, Systems, &

Components."

3.2.2. Nine Mile Point Report 1EQDP-PNL003, Rev. 3.

3.2.3. NER-lS-013, Rev. 1. "USI A-46 Relay Evaluation Path - Nine Mile Point Unit l."

3.2.4. NER-lS-018, Rev. 0. "Results of BWR Trial Plant Review - Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (SQUG)."

3.2.5. SAS-13Ul-4, Rev. 0. "Seismic Analysis - A46 Relay Outliers - Functional Evaluation ."

3.3. Drawings 3.3.1. C19184C-001, Rev . 4. "Diesel Gen. & Control Room -Walls & Piers below EL. 261'-0" &

Slab at EL. 250' -0" - Reinforcing Details."

3.3.2. C19453C-003, Rev. 21. "Conduit Detail -Turbine Bldg. EL. 277'-0" - (Control Room)."

3.3.3. C19794C-001, Rev. 10. "4160 Volt Power Board 101- Plan & Front View."

3.3.4. C19794C-002, Rev. 10. "4160 Volt Power Board 101- Plan & Front View."

3.3.5. C19795C-003, Rev. 3. "4160 Volt Power Boards 12 - 101- Summary Sheets."

3.3.6. C19798C-001, Rev. 10. "4160 Volt Power Board #102 - Plan & Front View."

3.3.7. C19798C-002, Rev. 4. "4160 Volt Power Board #102 - Plan & Front View - (Details &

Sections) ."

3.3.8. C19799C-001, Rev. 11. "4160 Volt Power Board #103 - Plan & Front View."

3.3.9. C19799C-002, Rev. 4. "4160 Volt Power Board #103 - Plan & Front View - (Details &

Sections)."

3.3.10. C18805C-001, Rev. 30. "Turbine Building-Turbine Generator Area - Floor Plan at EL. 277'-0" ."

3.3.11. C22238C-001B, Rev. 3. "Control Board - Panels 3A and 4A - Front View & Sections."

3.3.12. C22391C-001, Rev. 4. "Diesel Control Panels 1T & 2T - Front View & Sections."

3.3.13. C22449C-001, Rev. 11. "Floor Plan, Front View & Sections - Diesel Generators #102 &

103 - Control Cabinets."

3.3.14. C22449C-002, Rev. 1. "Front View - Details - Diesel Generators #102 & #103 - Control Cabinets."

3.3.15. C22238C-001C, Rev. 2. "Control Board - Panels SA and 6A - Front View & Sections."

3.4. Other Station Documents 3.4.1. Exelon Nuclear Issue 02608956. "Motor Starters for MOT-40-30 not in FCMS." January 7, 2016. (See Attachment D, pp. D-10 and D-11 of this calculation.)

Page 30 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 12 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & AssociateslB

4. S&A Documents 4.1. 15C4344-RPT-001, Rev. 2, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

4.2. 15C4344-LRC-001. "NM Pl: Request for site-specific EOG relay qualification information."

February 16, 2016. (See Attachment F of this calculation.)

4.3 . 15C4344-LRC-002. "Nine Mile Diesel Relays." January 29, 2016. (See Attachment G of this calculation.)

4.4. 15C4344-LRC-003. "NM Pl Relays Whose Schematic IDs Do Not Match Station IDs." (See Attachment J of this calculation.)

5. Other Documents 5.1. TE Connectivity Qualification Test Report 501-529, Rev. E, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Report on Agastat EGP, EML and ETR Control Relays by Control Products Division, Amerace Corporation ."

5.2. General Electric Report GE-101, Rev. 1, "GE Dynamic Qualification Report for Class lE Control Room Panels." (Note: GE-101 was originally supplied for Limerick Generating Station) 5.3. Farwell & Hendricks, Inc., Report No. 61409, Rev. 0. "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Report for Various Components - Prepared for the Virginia Electric & Power Company - Reference P.0. #SNS 411321."

5.4. Trentec Report No. T8357 .0, Rev. 0. "Seismic Test Report for Allen Bradley P/N: 700DC-R440-Zl w/

Allen Bradley Surge Suppressor P/N: 199-FSMAlO."

5.5. Not used.

5.6. ABB Addendum to IB 7.4.1.7-7 Issue E, Rev. 1, "Type 27N High Accuracy Undervoltage Relay & Type 59N High Accuracy Overvoltage Relay." (See Attachment H of this calculation.)

5.7. General Electric Report RN-150. "Nuclear Qualified Devices - Relays, Control Switches, &

Accessories ." January 25, 1990.

5.8. General Electric Instruction Manual GEH-1753E. "Time Overcurrent Relays."

5.9. Wyle Test Report No. 41070-1. "Seismic Simulation Test Program on a 500-Ampere Battery Charger."

February 20, 1991.

Page 31 of SS

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No. : RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 13 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Assodat!!slS 7 INPUTS Inputs are provided as necessary within Section 8 of this calculation .

8 ANALYSIS A detailed example analysis of two relays is provided within this section . This example is intended to illustrate each step of the high frequency analysis methodology given in Section 2. A complete analysis of all subject relays is shown in tabular form in Attachment A.

8.1 Equipment Scope The list of essential relays at NM Pl are per Ref. 4.1, Table 7-1, and can be found in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation .

Page 32 of SS

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 14 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology from Ref. 1.1.

Sample calculations for the high-frequency seismic demand of components K17A and R36A are presented below.

A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A, Table A-2 oft his calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for NM Pl is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation .

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAGMRS := 0.245g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation) :

Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Foundation Elevation (Reactor Building): Elfound := 198ft (Ref. 3.1)

Relay floor elevation (See Table 1-1): Elrelay := 281ft Relay components K17A and R36A are both located in the Reactor Building at elevation 281'.

Distance between relay floor and foundation: hrelay := Elrelay - Elfound = 83.00 *ft Page 33 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 15 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor.

2.1 - 1.2 1 Slope of amplification factor line, mh := = 0.0225*-

40ft - Oft ft Oft < hrelay < 40ft Intercept of amplification factor line, Oft < hrelay < 40ft Horizontal in-structure amplification factor :

AFsH(hrelay) := (mh*hrelay + bh) if hrelay S 40ft 2.1 otherwise Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay.

Type of cabinet (per Ref. 3.2) cab := "Switchgear" (enter "MCC", "Switchgear", "Control Cabinet", or "Rigid"):

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc.h(cab) := 3.6 if cab= "MCC" (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13):

7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab = "Rigid" AFc.h(cab) = 7.2 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration between by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays.

Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-la):

Note that the horizontal seismic demand is the same for both relay components K17A and R36A.

Page 34 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale . No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 16 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GM RS between lS Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAGMRS = 0.245

g (at lS Hz) between lS Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation) .

PGAGMRS := 0.122g Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (V 530 ) from Ref. 1.1 and Attachment C.

(30m)

Shear Wave Velocity: vs30 =

~(::J where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft)

Vsi: Shear wave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Attachment C, the sum of thickness of the layer over shear wave velocity of the layer is 0.01374 sec.

30m ft Shear Wave Velocity: Vs30 := = 7163 * -

0.01374sec sec Page 35 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No. : RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 17 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.122g and shear wave velocity of 7163ft/sec at NM Pl, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz by the corresponding horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between lSHz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS.

See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between lSHz and 40Hz.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAvGMRSl between frequencies of lSHz and 40Hz. (By inspection of Attachment B, the SAvGMRS occurs at 15Hz.)

V/H ratio at 15Hz VH := 0.68 (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak HGMRS := 0.245g vertical GMRS (at 15Hz)

(See Attachment B of this calculation):

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between SAvGMR5 := VH*HGMRS = 0.167*g (at 15 Hz) 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is provided in Attachment B of this calculation.

Page 36 of SS

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 18 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Distance between relay floor and foundation hrelay = 83 .00 *ft (see Sect . 8.2.1 of this calculation):

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor.

2.7 - 1.0 1 Slope of amplification factor line: mv := = 0.017*-

lOOft - Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line:

Vertical in-structure amplification factor:

Per Ref. 1.1, the vertical in-cabinet amplification factor is 4.7 regardless of cabinet type.

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor: AFc .v := 4.7 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration between by the vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relay.

Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-lb) :

ICRSC.V := AFsv*AFc.v

SAvGMRS = l .89 *g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay components K17 A and R36A .

Page 37 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No. : RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 19 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of components K17A and R36A are presented here.

A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic capacities for all of the subject relays listed in Attachment A, Table A- 1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A, Table A-2 oft his calculation.

8.3. l Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the EPRI High Frequency Testing Program (Ref. 1.2) or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) or vendor qualification reports. Per Ref. 1.1, Sect . 4.5.2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency GERS ca pa city into the high frequency range to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz . Therefore, if the high frequency capacity was not available for a component, a SAT value equal to the GERS spectral acceleration from 4 to 16 Hz could be used.

The relay model for component K17A, an Agastat EGPB004 per Table 1-1, was not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program. However, a capacity of 5.2g was obtained from TE Qualification Report 501-529 (Ref. 5. 1).

The relay model for component R36A, an ASEA RXMAl per Table 1-1, was also not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program, but it was included in the EPRI (GERS) report NP-7147-SL Volume 2 Addendum 2 (Ref. 1.5). Since this relay is energized (operate) per Ref. 4.1, a capacity of 10.0g is selected from NP-7147-SL.

5.2) g K17A)

Seismic test capacity (SA*): SA':=

( 10.0 ( R36A 8.3.2 Effective Spectral Test Capacity Since neither Kl 7A nor R36A has a capacity derived from the Ref. 1.2 high frequency test program, there are no spectral acceleration increases for either relay; therefore, the effective spectral test capacity is equal to the seismic test capacity.

SA'1) K17A)

Effective spectral test capacity SA *= =( 5.20 )

g

( R36A (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16): T . ( SA1 2 10.00 Page 38 of SS

f 15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 20 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared : MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor far the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay.

Using Table 4-2 of Ref. 1.1 and the capacity sources from Section 8.3 .1 above (i.e ., K17A's capacity is per an IEEE-344 test, while R36A's capacity is per a GERS test), the knockdown factors are chosen as:

Seismic capacity knockdCJ1Nn factor : K17A)

( R36A 8.3 .4 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not.

Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-18, conservatively take the FMs value as 1.0 for both Kl 7A and R36A.

Single-axis correction factor (Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18):

Page 39 of SS

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 21 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3 .5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5.

Effective wide-band component capacity SAT]

FMS = (4.333) *g K17A)

TRS := -

acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq . 4-5) ( Fk 6.667 ( R36A 8.4 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4.1 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Per a review of the capacity generation methodologies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 re lay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% prob ab ii ity of failure (C 1%- Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability of failure (C10%* Ref. 1.4).

Per Ref. 1.4, App. H, Table H.l, use the C10%vs. Cl% ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays.

c10 := 1.36 Effective wide-band component capacity 5.893) K17A)

TRS 14 := TRS*C10 = *g acceleration (Ref. 1.4, App. H, Sect. H.5) . ( 9.067 ( R36A Page 40 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 22 of 23 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS {cont'd) 8.5 Relay (Ref. Ll)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for relay.; per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components Kl 7A and R36A is presented here . A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A, Table A-2 of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic demand Vertical seismic demand (see Section 8. 2.1 of this calculation) : (see Section 8.2.2 of this calculation):

ICRSc.h = 3.70

g ICRSc.v = l.89*g Ref. 1.1 component capacity acceleration TRS = ( 4.333) *g K17A)

( R36A (see Section 8.3 .5 of this calculation): 6.667 TRS (1.170) > 1.0, O.K. K17A)

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

ICRSc.h = 1.800 > 1.0, O.K. ( R36A TRS (2.295) > 1.0, O.K. K17A)

Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

ICRSC.V = 3.531 > 1.0, O.K. ( R36A Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for K17A and R36A are greater than 1.00; indicating that these components are adequate for high frequency seismic spectra I ground motion for its Ref. 1.1 functions.

Page 41 of SS

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4344-CAL-001, Rev. 2 Sheet 23 of 23

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Prepared: MW 10/17/16 Fragility Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MD 10/17/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.6 Relay (Ref. 1.4)H~h-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.4 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components Kl 7A and R36A is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A, Table A-2 of this calculation.

Horizontal seismic demand Vertical seismic demand (see Section 8.2.1 of this calculation): (see Section 8.2.2 of this calculation):

ICRSc.h = 3.70*g ICRSC.V = 1.89. g Ref. 1.4 component capacity acceleration TRS 14 = (5.893) *g (K17A)

(see Section 8.4.1 of this calculation): . 9.067 R36A TRSi.4 ( 1.591) > 1.0, O.K.

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): (K17A)

ICRSc.h = 2.448 > 1.0, O.K. R36A TRSl.4 ( 3.122) > 1.0, O.K.

Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): (K17A)

ICRSc.v = 4.803 > 1.0, O.K. R36A Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for K17A and R36A are greater than 1.00; therefore, these components are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion for its Ref. 1.4 functions.

Page 42 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No. : RS 178 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. B1sfsfor Evaluatfon ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type lft) C.01cltv Result EMERGENCY Core CONDENSER Rosemount, A.T.S. Qualification 1 1 36-06A-M Trip Unit 510DU137020AOOS Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Coolln1 STEAM FLOW Inc. CABA Test TRIP UNIT EMERGENCY Core CONDENSER Rosemount, A.T.S. Qualification 2 1 36-06B-M Trip Unit SlODU 137020AOOS Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Coolin1 STEAM FLOW Inc. CAB B Test TRIP UNIT EMERGENCY Core CONDENSER Rosemount, A.T.S. Qualification 3 1 36-06C-M Trip Unit 510DU137020AOOS Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Coolln1 STEAM FLOW Inc. CABC Test TRIP UNIT EMERGENCY Core CONDENSER Rosemount, NUS- A.T.S. Qualification 4 1 36-06D-M Trip Unit Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap>Dem Cooling STEAM FLOW Inc. 110Duom1020 CA8D Test TRIP UNIT EMERGENCY High Freq.

Auxiliary Core General 5 1 4-llA CONDENSER 12HFA151A2F 1575 Switchgear Turbine 261 Test Cap> Dem Rel1y Cooling Electric RELAY Procram EMERGENCY High Freq.

Auxiliary Core General 6 1 4-118 CONDENSER 12HFA151A2F 1S65 Switchcear Turbine 261 Test Cap> Oem Relay Coolinc Electric RELAY Proeram EMERGENCY High Freq.

Auxiliary Core General 7 1 4-12A CONDENSER 12HFA1S1A2F 1S65 Switchgear Turbine 261 Test Cap> Oem Relay Cooling Electric:

RELAY Program EMERGENCY High Freq.

Auxiliary Core General 8 1 4-12B CONDENSER 12HFA151A2F 1575 Switchgear Turbine 261 Test Cap> Oem Rel1y Coolin1 Electric RELAY Proeram EMERGENCY Control Core CONDENSER Amerace/ A.T.S. Quallfication 9 1 K17A EGP8004 Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Relay Cooling STEAM FLOW A1astat CABA Test RELAY Page 43 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002,Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Floor Component Ev1lu1tlon No. Unit Bulldlns Elev. Basis for Evoluatlon ID Type System Function M1nufacturer Model No. ID Type (Ill Cloacllv Result EMERGENCY Control Core CONDENSER Amerace I A.T.S. Qualification 10 1 K17B EGPB004 Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Relay Coolin1 STEAM FLOW A1astat CABS Test RELAY EMERGENCY Control Core CONDENSER Amerace I A.T.S. Quallfication 11 1 K17C EGPB004 Swltch1ear Reactor 281 cap> Dem Relay Cooling STEAM FLOW A1astat CABC Test RELAY EMERGENCY 1

Control Core CONDENSER Amerace I EGPB004 A.T.S.

Switch1ear Qualification Cap> Dem 12 K17D Reactor 281 Relay Coolin& STEAM FLOW A1astat CABD Test RELAY EMERGENCY Output Core CONDENSER 13 1 R36A ASEA RXMAl SSCl Switch1ear Reactor 281 GERS cap> Dem Relay Coolin& AUTO CLOSE RELAY EMERGENCY Output Core CONDENSER 14 1 R36B ASEA RXMAl SSCl Switchgear Reactor 281 GERS cap> Dem Relay Cooling AUTO CLOSE RELAY EMERGENCY Output Core CONDENSER 15 1 R36C ASEA RXMAl SSC2 Swltch1ear Reactor 281 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cooling AUTO CLOSE RELAY EMERGENCY Output Core CONDENSER 16 1 R360 ASEA RXMAl SSC2 Switchgear Reactor 281 GERS Op> Dem Relay Cooling AUTO CLOSE RELAY AC/DC UPS 162 RLY* Overvoltage Power 59N,411U417S*Hf* PNL*

17 1 OVERVDLTAGE ABB Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap>Dem (PRC162)59-1 Relay Support L PRC162 RELAY Systems AC/DC UPS 162 RLY* Overvoltaa;e Power S9N,411U417S*Hf* PNL*

18 1 OVERVOLTAGE ABB Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem (PRC162)59*2 Relay Support L PRC162 RELAY Systems AC/DC UPS 162 RLY* Overvoltace Power S9N,411U417S*Hf* PNL*

19 1 OVERVOLTAGE ABB Swltchcear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem (PRC172J59-1 Relay Support L PRC172 RELAY Systems Page 44 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Floor Component Evlluatlon No. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. Basis for Evaluatlon ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) caaacllv Result AC/DC UPS 162 RLY* Overvoltage Power S9N,411U417S*HF- PNL-20 I OVERVOLTAGE ABB Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem (PRC172)S9-2 Relay Support L PRC172 RELAY Systems DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT AC/DC RELAY-EDG!02 67NI; RLY* Overcurrent Power General IT (aka Operator 21 I RELAYING 12CJCG!SE21A Switchgear Turbine 261 N/A (IS3)67NI Relay Support Electric IS3) Action CIRCUIT AND Systems LOCKOUT RELAY 86DG-2 DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT AC/DC RELAY* EDG103 67Nl; RLY- Overcurrent Power General 2T (aka Operator 22 I RELAYING 12CJCGISE21A Switchgear Turbine 261 N/A (IS4)67NI Relay Support Electric IS4) Action CIRCUIT AND Systems LOCKOUT RELAY B6DG-3 AC/DC 86DG-2/HR; Auxiliary Power DG #102 General Control 23 I RLY* 12HEA61B237 4A Turbine 277 GERS Cap>Oem Relay Support LOCKOUT RELAY Electric Cabinet (4A)86DG-2 Systems AC/DC RLY- Auxiliary Power DG#!03 General Control 24 I 12HEA61B237 SA Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem (SA)86DG-3 Relay Support LOCKOUT RELAY Electric C.blnet Systems AC/DC R1021 A PHASE 51-A; RLY- Overcurrent Power TIME General 2S I 121ACSIAIOIAAH PB 102 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap>Dem (102)50/Sl-1 Relay Support OVERCURRENT Electric Systems RELAY AC/DC R!021 B PHASE Sl-B; RLY- Overcurrent Power TIME General 26 I 121ACSIAIOIAAH PB 102 Switchgeilr Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem (102)50/Sl-2 Relily Support OVERCURRENT Electric Systems RELAY AC/DC R1021 C PHASE 51-C; RLY- Overcurrent Power TIME General 27 I 121ACSIAIOIAAH PB 102 Swltchcear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem (102)SO/Sl-3 Relay Support OVERCURRENT Electric Systems RELAY Page 45 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enck>sure Floor Component Ev*lu1tfon No. Unit Bulldln1 Elov. Basis far Evaluatlon ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) [an~ltv Result R1031 A PHASE TIME AC/DC OVERCURRENT Sl*A; RLY* OVercurrent Power General 28 1 RELAY AUX 121AC51Al01AAH PB 103 Swltch1eiilr Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem (103)SO/Sl*I Relay Support Electric FEEDER 178 Systems INST DC RELAY PHl R!031 B PHASE TIME AC/DC OVERCURRENT 51-8; RLY- Overcurrent Power General 29 1 RELAY AUX 121ACSIA101AAH P8103 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap>Oem (103)50/51-2 Relay Support Electric FEEDER 178 Systems INST CC RELAY PH2 R1031 C PHASE TIME AC/DC OVERCURRENT S!-C; RLY- Overcurrent Power Gener.ii 30 1 RELAY AUX 121ACSIA101AAH P8103 Swltch1ear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem (103)S0/51-3 Relay Support Electric FEEDER 178 Systems INST CC RELAY PH3 AC/DC R1012 A PHASE RLY-(101/28* OVercurrent Power General 31 1 CVERCURRENT 121AC51BB06A P8101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem 1)51/50-1 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC R1012 B PHASE RLY-(101/28- Overcurrent Power General 32 1 CVERCURRENT 121ACS!8806A P8101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem 1)51/50-2 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC R1012 C PHASE RLY-(101/ZB- Overcurrent Power General 33 1 CVERCURRENT 121ACS1BB06A PB 101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem 1)51/50-3 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC EDG102 SIV*A: RLY-Overcurrent Power CVERCURRENT Generill 34 1 (102/2-2)51V* 12JJCVSIA13A P8102 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Rel*y Support RELAY PHI* Electric 1

Systems R1022/571 AC/DC EDG102 SIV-8; RLY*

OVercurrent Power CVERCURRENT General 35 1 (102/2-2)SIV- IZIJCVSIA13A PB 102 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support RELAY PH2

Electric 2

Systems R1022/S71 Page 46 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Floor Component Evlfuatlan Na. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. Basis far Evaluation ID Type System Function M1nufacturer Madel Na. ID Type lltl Cloaclty Result AC/DC EDG102 SlV-C; RLY-Overcurrent Power OVERCURRENT General 36 1 (102/2-2)51V- 121JCV51Al3A PB 102 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Reloy Support RELAY PH3 - Electric 3

Systems Rl022/571 AC/DC EDG103 SlV-B; RLY-OVercurrent Power OVERCURRENT General 37 1 (103/l-2)51V- 121JCV51Al3A PB 103 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Reloy Support RELAY PH2 - Electric 2

Systems Rl032/581 AC/DC EDG103 SlV-A; RLY-Overcurrent Power OVERCURRENT General 3B 1 (103/l-2)51V- 121JCV51Al3A PB 103 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support RELAY PHl - Electric 1

Systems Rl032/581 AC/DC EDG103 SlV-C: RLY-Overcurrent Power OVERCURRENT General 39 1 (103/1-2J51V- 121JCV51Al3A PB 103 Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap>Oem Relay Support RELAY PH3 - Electric 3

Systems Rl032/5Bl AC/DC DG-102 2-2X; RLY- Control Power PNL-DC Qualification 40 1 AUXILIARY Allen-Bradley 700DC-R440Zl Switch1ear Turbine 261 Cap>Oem (DC102)2-2X Relay Support 102 Test RELAY, 2-2X Systems AC/DC DG-103 2-2X; RLY- Control Power PNL-DC Qualification 41 1 AUXILIARY Allen-Bradley 700DC-R440Zl Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap>Oem (DC103J2-2X Relay Support 103 Test RELAY, 2-2X Systems AC/DC DG-102TIME 2-3: RLY- Timing Power PNL-DC Qualification 42 1 DELAY RELAY, 2- Allen-Bradley 700*RTC11110Ul Swltchgeilr Turbine 261 Cap>Dem (DC102)2-3 Relay Support 102 Test 3

Systems AC/DC DG-103TIME 2-3: RLY- Tim Inc Power PNL-DC Qualificiltion 43 1 DELAY RELAY, 2- Allen-Bradley 700-RTCllllOUl Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DC103J2-3 Relay Support 103 Test 3

Systems AC/DC DG-102 EMO- Mounted 12X; RLY- Overs peed Power DG-102 Bounding 44 1 OVERS PEED General CLASS7001PO *S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE102)12X Relay Support PNL DE Spectrum RELAY, 12X Motors Skid Systems AC/DC DG-102 MAIN EMO- Mounted 380-X: RLY- Overs peed Power DG-102 Bounding 45 1 BEARING RELAY, General CLASS7001P0-53 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE102J3BD-X Relay Support PNLDE Spectrum 380-X Moton Skid Systems Page 47 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Floor Component Ev*l**llon No. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. 8"slsfor Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) capacity Result AC/DC DG-103 MAIN EMO- Mounted 3BD-X; RLY- Overs peed Power DG-103 Bounding 46 1 BEARING RELAY, General CLASS7001PO-S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE103)3BO-X Relay Support PNL DE Spectrum 3BD-X Motors Skid Systems AC/DC DG-103 EMO- Mounted 12X: RLY- OVerspeed Power DG-103 Bounding 47 1 OVERSPEED General CLASS7001PO-S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE103)12X Relay Support PNLDE Spectrum RELAY, 12X Motors Skid Systems AC/DC DG-103 EMO- Mounted RLY- Overspeed Power PNL-DE Bounding 4B 1 SHUTDOWN General CLASS 7001 PO-S2 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE103)SD Relay Support 103 Spectrum RELAY Motors Skid Systems AC/DC OG-102 EMO- Mounted RLY- Overspeed Power PNL-DE Bounding 49 1 SHUTDOWN General CLASS 7001 PO-S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap>Dem (DE102)SO Relay Support 102 Spectrum RELAY Motors Skid Systems AC/DC EMO- Mounted RLY- Overspeed Power OG-102 FAST PNL-DE Boundine so 1 STOP RELAY General CLASS 7001 PO-S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap>Oem (DE102)SDE Relay Support 102 Spectrum Motors Skid Systems AC/DC EMO- Mounted RLY- Overs peed Power DG-103 FAST PNL*OE Bounding:

Sl 1 General CLASS 7001 PO-S3 to EOG Turbine 261 Cap> Dem (DE103)SDE Relay Support STOP RELAY 103 Spectrum Motors Skid Systems B7DG-2/A; AC/DC BUS 102 PHASE RLY- Olfferential Power General 1T (*k* Operator S2 1 DIFFERENTIAL 121JDS2A11A Swltch1ear Turbine 261 GERS (1S3)B7DG Relay Support Electric 1S3) Action RELAY PHASE 1 1 Systems 87DG-2/B; AC/DC BUS 102 PHASE RLY- Differential Power General 1T (aka Operator S3 1 DIFFERENTIAL 1ZIJDS2A11A Swltch1ear Turbine 261 GERS (1S3)B7DG Relay Support Electric 1S3) Action RELAY PHASE 2 2 Systems B7DG-2/C; AC/DC BUS 102 PHASE RLY- Olfferentlal Power General 1T (aka Operator S4 1 DIFFERENTIAL 121JDS2A11A Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS (1S3)B7DG Relay Support Electric 1S3) Action RELAY PHASE 3 3 Systems B7DG-3/A; AC/DC BUS 103 PHASE RLY- Different/al Power General 2T (aka Operator SS 1 DIFFERENTIAL 121JDS2A11A Swltchcear Turbine 261 GERS (154)B70G Relay Support Electric 154) Action RELAY PHASE 1 1 Systems Page 48 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Fl oar Component Ev*luatlan Na. Unit Bulldln1 EllY. Basis for Evoluatlan ID Type Syst11m Function Manufacturer Madel Na. ID Type (ftl C.pacltv Result B7DG-3/B; AC/DC BUS 103 PHASE RLY- Differential Power General 2T (aka Operator S6 1 DIFFERENTIAL 121JDS2Al1A Switch1ear Turbine 261 GERS (154IB7DG*3* Relay Support Electric 154) Action RELAY PHASE 2 2 Systems B7DG-3/C; AC/DC BUS 103 PHASE RLY* Dlfferentlal Power General 2T (aka Operator 57 1 DIFFERENTIAL 121JDS2Al1A Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS (154IB7DG*3* Relay Support Electric 1541 Action RELAY PHASE 3 3 Systems AC/DC AUXILIARY RLY*(101/2B* Auxiliary Power General SB 1 FEEDER 102 12HFA154E26F PB-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem 1IB6 Relay Support Electric LOCKOUT RELAY Sy.stems AC/DC AUXILIARY RLY*(101/2A* Auldliary Power General 59 1 FEEDER 103 12HFA1S4E26F PB-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap>Dem 1IB6 Relay Support Electrlc LOCKOUT RELAY Systems AC/DC RLY* Auxiliary Power DG-102 RESTART General PNL*DC 60 1 12HMA11 DC Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap>Oem (DC102l4B Relay Support RELAY Electric 102 Systems AC/DC RLY* Au1111iary Power DG-103 REST ART General PNL*DC 61 1 12HMA11 DC Switchgear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem (DC103l4B Relay Support RELAY Electric 103 Systems AC/DC RLY- Auxiliary Power UPS 162 General PNL*

62 1 HEA61 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS C11p>Dem UPS162/B6*1 Relay Support LOCKOUT RELAY Electric PRC162 Systems AC/DC RLY* Auxiliary Power UPS 172 General PNL-63 1 HEA61 Swltch1eu Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem UPS172/B6*1 Relay Support LOCKOUT RELAY Electric PRC172 Systems BATTERY AC/DC CHARGER 161A, BKR* Circuit Power General Bounding 64 1 1618 DC AK*2S*400 BB 11 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem SBC161/72 Breaker Support Electric Spectrum CIRCUIT Systems BREAKER BATTERY AC/DC CHARGER 171A, BKR* Circuit Power General Bounding 65 1 171B DC AK-25-400 BB 12 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem SBC171/72 Breaker Support Electric Spectrum CIRCUIT Systems BREAKER Page 49 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Comoonent Enclosure Floor Comaanent Evalu1tlon No. Unit Bulldln1 Elov. Basis far Evalu1tlon ID Type System Function Manufacturer Mod1INa. ID Type (ft) caaacltv Result AC/DC POWER BOARD BKR- Circuit Power Ganeral Boundln1 66 I 161B FEEDER AK-2A-25-I PB-16B Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap>Oem (16B/OIOB)52 Breaker Support Electric Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC BATIERY SKR- Circuit Power CHARGER 161A, General Bounding 67 I AK-2A-25-l PB-16B Switch1ear Reactor 281 cap> Dem (16B/012C)S2 BrHker Support 161B AC CIRCUIT Electric Spectrum Systems BREAKER AC/DC POWER BOARD BKR- Circuit Power General Bounding 68 I 171B FEEDER AK-2A-25-I PB-17B Switchgear Reactor 2BI Cap> Dem (17B/OOSB)52 Breaker Support Electric Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC BATIE RY BKR- Circuit Power CHARGER 171A, General Bounding 69 I AK-2A-25*1 PB-178 Switchgear Reactor 281 cap>Oem (178/003C)52 Bruker Support 1718 CIRCUIT Electric Spectrum Systems BREAKER AC/DC BKR- POWER BOARD Circuit Power General Bounding 70 l (168/0138) 16 FEEDER AK-2A*SO PB-16B Switch1ear Reactor 281 Cap>Oem Breaker Support Electric Spectrum RI043/603 BREAKER Systems AC/DC BKR- POWER BOARD Circuit Power General Bounding 71 I (17B/002B) 17 FEEDER AK-2A-50 PB-178 Switchgear Reactor 281 Cap> Dem Breaker Support Electric Spectrum RIOS3/613 BREAKER Systems AC/DC BATIERY II BKR*Bll/72* Circuit Power Gener.11 Bounding 72 I CIRCUIT AK-2A*SO BB II Switchgear Turbine 261 cap> Dem M Breaker Support Electric Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC BATIERY 12 BKR-B12n2- Circuit Power General Boundin1 73 l CIRCUIT AK*2A-50 BB 12 Swltch1ear Turbine 261 Cap>Dem M Breaker Support Electrlc Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC DG #102 BKR-(102/2* Circuit Power General Bounding 74 l CIRCUIT AM-4.16-350-IH PB-102 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap>Dem l)RI022/571) Breaker Support Electric Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC AUXILIARY BKR-(102/2- Circuit Power FEEDER 16B General Bounding 75 1 AM-4.16-350-lH PB-102 Switchgear Turbine 261 Op>Oem 9)RI021/171 Breaker Support CIRCUIT Eltttric Spectrum Systems BREAKER Page 50 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer Model No. ID Type (ft) caoacltv Result AC/DC DG #103 BKR-(103/1- Circuit Power General Bounding 76 1 CIRCUIT AM-4 16-350*1H PB-103 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem l)Rl032/581 Breaker Support Electric Spectrum BREAKER Systems AC/DC AUXILIARY BKR-(103/1- Circuit Power FEEDER 178 Gener.ii Boundin1 77 1 AM-4.16-350-lH PB-103 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem 9)Rl031/18l Breaker Support CIRCUIT Electric Spectrum Systems BREAKER AC/DC R1013 A PHASE RLY-(101/2A- Overcurrent Power General 78 1 OVERCURRENT IACSl PB-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap>Dem 1)51/50-1 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC Rl013 B PHASE RLY-(101/2A- Overcurrent Power General 79 1 OVERCURRENT IACSl PB-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem 1)51/50-2 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC Rl013 C PHASE RLY-(101/ZA- Overcurrent Power General 80 1 OVERCURRENT IACSl PB-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem l)Sl/S0-3 Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC Rl013 GROUND RLY-(101/2A- Overcurrent Power General 81 1 OVERCURRENT IACSl PB-101 Swltchcear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem l)SlG/50G Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC Rl012 GROUND RLY-(101/28- Overcurrent Power General 82 1 OVERCURRENT IACSl P8-101 Switchgear Turbine 277 GERS Cap> Dem l)S1G/50G Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC 8ATIERY Overvoltage Power CHARGER l61A Relay is part of a Solidstate No. 85- Qualification 83 l X308 SBC161A Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem Relay Support OVERVOLTAGE CCS000-03 battery charger. Telit Systems RELAY AC/DC BATIERV Overvolta1e Power CHARGER 1618 Relay is part of a Solldstate No. 85- Qualification 84 1 X308 SBC1618 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap>Dem Relay Support OVERVOLTAGE CCS000-03 battery charger. Test Systems RELAY AC/DC BATIERY Overvoltage Power CHARGER l 71A Relay Is part of a Solidstate No. 85- Qualification SS 1 X308 S8Cl71A Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap>Dem Relay Support OVERVOLTAGE CCS000-03 b*ttery charger. Test Systems RELAY Page 51of55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Companent Enclosure Floor ComPon*nt Evalu1tlon No. Unit Bulldln1 Elev. Basis for Evaluotlon ID Type System Function Manufattur1r Model No. ID Type (ftl Cooacltv Result AC/DC BATTERY overvoltaee Power CHARGER 1719 Rel*Y is part of a Solidstate No. 8S- Qualification 86 1 X308 S8C1718 Switchgear Turbine 261 Cap> Dem Relay Support OVERVOLTAGE CCS000-03 battery charger. Test Systems RELAY AC/DC R1021 GROUND Overcurrent Power General 87 1 RLY-(102ISOG DVERCURRENT 12PJC11AV1A P8-102 Switch1ear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems AC/DC R1031 GROUND Overcurrent Power General 88 1 RLY-(103ISOG DVERCURRENT 12PJC11AV1A P8-103 Switch1ear Turbine 261 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support Electric RELAY Systems Page 52 of 55

1SC4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Evaluated for P&ID Valve P&ID Sh. Note Electrical Impact In (FCMS Format) 1SC4344-RPT-001 PSV-01-102A C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV*Ol-1028 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV-01-102C C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV-01-1020 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV-Ol-102E C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV-Ol-102F C18002C 1 C18002C-001 SRV Yes*

PSV-01-119A C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-1198 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-119C C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-1190 C18002C 1 Cl8002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-119F C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

Potentially -- Would PSV-01-119G C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open only be a Leak Path if 37-01 fails to be closed Potentially -- Would Type Safety Valve only be a Leak Path if 37-01 fails to be closed PSV-01-119H C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-119J C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Type Safety Valve Yes*

PSV-01-119M C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Spring-loaded Pop-open Yes*

Page 53 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Evaluated for P&ID Valve P&ID Sh. Note Electrical Impact In (FCMS Format) 15C4344-RPT-001 Type Safety Valve Yes*

BV-37-01 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Yes*

This is the second in series both 37-01 and this would have to fail BV-37-02 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Yes*

open This is the second in series both 37-01 and this would have to fail BV-37-06 C18002C 1 C18002C-001 Yes*

open IV-38-01 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No IV-38-13 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No IV-01-01 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No IV-01-02 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Yes*

IV-01-03 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Yes*

IV-01-04 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Yes*

IV-110-127 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Yes*

IV-31-07 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Yes*

IV-31-08 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No 31-0lR C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Simple Check Valve (No need to be included) No 31-02R C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Simple Check Valve (No need to be included) No 42.1-02 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 Simple Check Valve (No need to be included) No IV-33-0lR C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No IV-33-02R C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No IV-33-04 C18006C 1 C18006C-001 No BV-37-08R C18009C 1 C18009C-001 No BV-37-09R C18009C 1 C18009C-001 No Downstream of Simple Check Valve IV-40-03; therefore, no IV-40-01 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 No Leakage IV-40-03 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 Simple Check Valve (No need to be included) Yes*

Per the Plant on 22 Feb 2016 this Valve is normally closed and IV-40-05 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 deenergized with breakers locked open except during testing or No fill and vent operations Page 54 of 55

15C4344-RPT-002, Rev. 1 Correspondence No.: RS-16-178 Evaluated for P&ID Valve P&ID Sh. Note Electrical Impact In (FCMS Format) 15C4344-RPT-001 Per the Plant on 22 Feb 2016 this Valve is normally closed and IV-40-06 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 deenergized with breakers locked open except during testing or No fill and vent operations Downstream of Simple Check Valve IV-40-03; therefore, no IV-40-09 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 No Leakage Downstream of Simple Check Valve IV-40-13; therefore, no IV-40-10 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 No Leakage Downstream of Simple Check Valve IV-40-13; therefore, no IV-40-11 C18007C 1 C18007C-001 No Leakage

Note: the evaluation of this valve is discussed in Section 2.2 of this report as well as in report 15C4344-RPT-001 (Ref. 81).

Page 55 of 55

RS-16-178, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report

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RS-16-178, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report

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