ML18018B292

Appendix a, Justification for Continued Operation, Component Review Summary Sheet

ML18018B292
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	01/18/2018
From:	Niagara Mohawk Power Corp
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18018B292 (200)

Text

APPENDIX A NINE MILE POINT 'UNIT 1 JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED -OPERATION

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EcCEui ment: Control Rod Drive Scram Dump Control (SV NC-15A, SV NC-16A, SV NC-15B, SV NC-16B)

FRC E ui ment Item No.: 13 Manufacturer: ASCO Model: HVA904058A

~Sf F i: I 1 pV1 0 i d<<D igR S ualification Discre anc: A, gM, QT Justification for Continued 0 eration:

During a reactor scram the scram discharge volume isolates by the closure of two air operated vent valves and two air operated drain valves which are in series.

Solenoid operated valves NC 15A and 158 control the operation of only one set of isolation valves (one drain and one vent). The redundant set of isolation valves is controlled by solenoid operated valves NC 15C and 15D. These valves were not included in the original program but are now included. Simultaneous failure of both systems due to aging is highly improbable.

Solenoid operated valves NC 16A and B (Backup Scram Valves) perform a function which is redundant to the two (2) scram valve pilots on each of the 129 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units. Instrument air will be vented from the scram valve pilot air header, during a scram initiation, by either the Backup Scram Valves or the Scram Valve Pilots. Failure of solenoid operated valves NC 16A & B to operate would not adversely affect the scram function. Loss of power causes the valves to go to the correct position. Simultaneous failure of the scram valve pilots and the backup scram valves is highly improbable.

Based on the above, continued operation is justified until the SOV's are qualified or replaced with documented qualified valves.

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II NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Solenoid Valve (SV201.2-32, SV201.2-03)

FRC Equi ment Item No.: 16 Manufacturer: ASCO Model: WPLB300872F Safety Function: Drywell N2 Makeup and bleed valve operation Qualification Discrepancy: QM, Qualified Life Justification for Continued Operation:

These valves are used to makeup and bleed N2 following a loss of coolant accident. These valves are normally closed and the solenoids fail closed on loss of power.

This makeup and bleed path has a redundant path connecting to the torus which is in a lower elevation in the Reactor Building. Simultaneous failure of both systems due to aging is highly improbable.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

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Equipment: Master Trip Unit FRC E uipment Item-No.: 19 Manufacturer: Rosemount Model: 510 DU Safety Function: Drywell Pressure Trip Unit/Emergency Condenser High Flow Trip/Main Steam Line Flow Trip

/uglification Discrepancy: Radiation, qualification time, aging, qualification method.

Justification for-Continued 0 eration:

These instruments are located in the Reactor Building at elevation 281'ne in each of the four corners.

Drywell Pressure Trip Unit For breaks within the drywell temperature, pressure or humidity does not increase in the Reactor Building where these trip units are located.

Radiation is the only effect that these units would experience after a loss of coolant accident.

Only the drywell pressure trip units are needed to mitigate a loss of coolant accident. These units automatically perform their safety function within seconds. Once they have initiated their safety function no fai lure could negate it. They fail safe on trip unit failure or loss of power.

Emer ency Condenser Hi h Flow Tri The Emergency Condenser Flow trip units for PT-36-06A, B, C, 8 D are needed to mitigate an emergency condenser steam line break outside of containment'. These trip units are not in close proximity to the break locations and automatically perform their safety function within the first few seconds of the event.

Main Steam Line Flow Tri Main steam line flow trip units are not exposed to the harsh environment of a steamline break since they are not located near the breaks. These instruments automatically perform their safety function by isolating the steam line at the start of the event and once performed, instrument failure cannot open these valves. Subsequent instrument/trip unit failure has no effect on the operator's response.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EcCEui ment: Trip Units for LT 36-03A, 8, C, D; LT 36-04A, 8, C, D; LT 36-05A, B, C, D; PT 36-07A, B, C, D; PT 36-08A, B, C, D.

FRC E ui ment Item No.: 20 Manufacturer: Rosemount Model: 510 DU

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reactor pressure 11 1 1 11 1 high Qualification Discre anc : QT, A, QI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These trips units are located in the Reactor Building, one in each of the four ATS cabinets. These cabinets are located in the four corners of the building, one per corner.

They are all de-energized to actuate and provide inputs to the RPS. Their safety functions are automatically performed early in the event sequence as a result of process conditions or as the result of a trip unit failure. Failure of these level and pressure transmitter trip units can only affect long term monitoring and will not affect accident mitigation.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe oper ation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Temperature Switches located in Steam Tunnels TS lB-10A thru 10H, J thru N, P, Q, R FRC E ui ment Item No.: 28 Manufacturer: Fenwal Model: 1700240

~Sf F i: I 1<<%IV hi p Qualification Discre anc: QT, A Justification for Continued 0 eration:

The temperature switches monitor steam tunnel temperature and initiate main steam isolation valve closure on high steam tunnel temperature.

If the break is in the main steam line, increased pressure drop across the main steam line flow limiter will initiate main st'earn isolation valve closure. The pressure drop is measured by instruments PT 01-26A thru H located outside the steam tunnel (Reactor Building El. 237 North Instrument Room) which are not subject to the harsh environment.

A main steam line break in the tunnel will result in low reactor water level which will cause a scram and low low water level which will initiate both main steam isolation valve closure and containment isolation. This instrumentation is located in the Reactor Building which is not subjected to a harsh environment from a high energy line break in the steam tunnel.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

IJ NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Pressure Switches PS 40-07, 08 FRC E ui ment Item No.: 34 Manufacturer: Mercoid Model: 5432 i:

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ualification Oiscre anc: gT Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These pressure switches have been deleted from the environmental equipment qualification program since operation of the core spray pumps can be verified by pump flow measurement (FT RV-26A, B).

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

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~E ui ment: Vacuum Switches VCS63-11A, 11B, 12A, 12B, 13A, 13B FRC Equi ment Item No.: 37 Manufacturer: Mercoid Model: CP 4122 Safety Function: Controls Air Operated Isolation Valves 68-08, 09, 10 to admit building atmosphere to drywell/torus.

ualification Discrepancy: A, gI Justificat'ion for Continued=Operation:

The function of Vacuum Switches VCS68-11A, llB, 12A, 12B, 13A, 13B is to open air operated isolation valves 68-08, 09 and 10 when torus pressure is negative with respect to the reactor building. This will admit reactor building atmosphere to the torus, thus equalizing the pressure. There are two (2) vacuum switches associated with each valve. The switches are installed in parallel so that either switch can operate the valve. Simultaneous failure of both switches due to age-related degradation is highly improbable.

In addition, air operated check valves can provide the isolation function should these valves fail.

Based on the above, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Level Transmitter FRC Equipment Item No.: 38 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: 553 3456 19079 i:

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LT IA-12 is a wide range reactor vessel level monitor. The monitor does not provide a safety function and its failure would not prevent any safety related equipment from performing its intended safety function. It is used by the operator to monitor vessel water level during normal operation and Curing vessel filling prior to refueling.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E uipment: Radiation Detector located in the Turbine Building Condenser Area (RE RNOSA, B, C, C)

FRC Equipment Item No.: 51 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: 19492792 Safety Function: Isolates MSIV on high radiation ualification Discrepancy: R, QT, A, QM Justification for Continued Operation:

These radiation detectors monitor radiation levels in the main steam line and initiate a reactor scram and main steam isolation valve closure on high radiation level. Their only purpose is to detect major fuel failure and initiate main steam isolation valve closure to minimize the release of fission products. This equipment is not required to detect high energy pipe breaks and has been deleted from the environmental equipment qualification program.

The equipment required to detect high energy line breaks which occur in the Turbine Building are reactor vessel instrumentation which is located in the drywell and reactor building and is not subjected to a harsh environment.

This redundant equipment also scrams the reactor and closes the main steam isolation valve. In addition, temperature switches located in the main steam line tunnel initiate main steam isolation.

If somehow there is major fuel damage without a pipe break, the probability is extremely small that these detectors, whose only function is to detect radiation, will fail as a result of radiation exposure without initiating a scram and main steam isolation valve closure. Instrument failure is alarmed in the control room.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Eui ment: Terminal Boards Inside the Drywall FRC Equi ment Item-No.: 53 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: EB5 and EB25 Safety Function: Terminal Boards ualification Discrepancy: A, gI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

Testing of EB-5 and EB-25 terminal boards for conditions exceeding those at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 has been performed within the industry. The only differences were in the number of terminals. Therefore, continued operation is justified.

0 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET E ui ment: Coaxial Instrument Cable located in Drywell FRC E ui ment Item No.: 54 Manufacturer: Raychem Model: RG59B/U

~Sf F i: <<C I 1Cb1 ualification Discre anc: A, gI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

Coaxial instrument cable is used to transmit signals from detectors inside the drywell to signal processing equipment located outside the drywell. The cables are connected to the neutron flux detectors, LPRM's, which are inputs to the APRM's. The APRMs trip the reactor on high power. Loss of the APRM as a result of a loss of coolant accident does not present a safety hazard since high drywell pressure or low vessel level will initiate a reactor trip. These transmitters are located outside the drywell and are not affected by the same environment.

Small breaks which do not cause high drywell pressure or low vessel level but increase the drywell temperature will be detected by the drywell temperature monitors. The drywell temperature monitors (thermocouples) do not use coaxial cable.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Ground Connector located in the Drywell FRC E ui ment Item No.: 56 Manufacturer: Burndy Model: GZ Safety Function: Ground Connector

/uglification Discre ancy: gI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

The connector is manufactured with metallic components. The physical properties of the metallic components are not affected by the environment which they are subjected to.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Equi ment: Connection Terminal in the Steam Tunnel at Elev. 240'-0" FRC E ui ment Item No.: 57 Manufacturer: Burndy Model: gA-8 Safety Function: Cable to Terminal Connection ualification Discrepancy: A, gI Justification=-for Continued Operation:

The connector is manufactured with metallic components. The physical properties of the metallic components are not affected by the environment which they are subject to.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE NILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Ground Connector located in the Drywell FRC Equipment Item No.: 58 Manufacturer:- Burndy Model: QASC-B Qualification Oiscrepancy: A, QI Justification for Continued Operation:

The connector is manufactured with metallic components. The physical properties of the metallic components are not affected by the environment which they are subjected to.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~fui ment: Cable Splice located in the Steam Tunnel at flev. 240'-0" FRC E uipment- Item No.: 59 Manufacturer: AMP Inc.

Model: Pre-Insulated Safety Function: Butt Connector gualification Discrepancy: A, gI check Justification for Continued Operation:

The failure of equipment which is fed by cable routed through the steam tunnel at elevation 240'oes not prevent safe shutdown or result in unacceptable off-site doses as a result of a main steam line break inside the steam tunnel.

A large break in the main steam line, causes increased pressure drop across the main steam flow limiter which initiates main steam isolation valve closure. The pressure drop is measured by instruments PT 01-26A thru H located outside the steam tunnel (Reactor Building El. 237 North Instrument Room) which are not subject to the harsh environment. The inboard main steam isolation valve and its related electrical components are not subject to the harsh environment as they are located in the drywell. The outboard main steam isolation valves which are located in the steam 'tunnel are air operated valves which fail closed on loss of air or power.

A main steam line break in the tunnel will result in low reactor water level which will cause a scram, and low low reactor water level which will initiate main steam isolation valve closure and containment isolation. The motor operated feedwater isolation valves do not receive any isolation signal. In addition, there is a check valve in series which serves the isolation function.

Failure of the steam tunnel temperature switches, or main steam line radiation detectors does not prevent safe shutdown or result in unacceptable off-site doses.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E oi ment: Electrical Connector located inside the Drywall FRC E ui ment Item No.: 60 Manufacturer: AMP Model: RING Tongue Terminal

~5<<F <<: C ualification Discre anc  : A, gI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

Testing has been performed within the industry on cable terminations. These terminations are insulated with nylon, polyvinyl chloride or polyvinylidene fluoride. Test data on polyvinylidene fluoride, which is designed for nuclear applications has been tested at conditions which exceed those of Nine Mile Point Unit l. Therefore, continued operation is justified.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EsSEui ment: Circuit Breakers FRC E ui ment Item No.: 62 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: AK05

~Sf F i: P id E1 i P Generator Cooling C Sp V1 d ualification Discre anc: gualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These circuit breakers provide power to P81618 and PB1718 which are needed for loss of coolant accident/high energy line break mitigation and also provide power to various other non-loss of coolant accident/high energy line break electrical loads. The circuit breakers are passive in the safe guard mode, that is they are normally closed and are not required to operate during the course of the loss of coolant accident/high energy line break.

The operation of these breakers is mechanical in nature. Therefore, justification for continued operation is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EcCEui ment: Electrical Tape located in the Steam Tunnel at Elev. 240'-0" FRC E ui ment Item No.: 63 Manufacturer: 3M Electro Products Model: 83

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/uglification Discre anc: A, (}I (check)

Justification for Continued 0 eration:

The failure of equipment which is fed by cable routed through the steam tunnel at elevation 240'oes not prevent safe shutdown or result in unacceptable off-site doses as a result of a main steam line break inside the steam tunnel.

A large break in the main steam line, causes increased pressure drop across the main steam flow limiter which initiates main steam isolation valve closure. The pressure drop is measured by differential pressure instruments PT 01-26A thru H located outside the steam tunnel (Reactor Building El. 237 North Instrument Room) which are not subject to the harsh environment. The inboard main steam isolation valve and its related electrical components are not subject to the harsh environment. The outboard main steam isolation valves which are located in the steam tunnel, are air operated valves which fail closed on'oss of air or power.

A main steam line break in the tunnel will also result in low reactor water level which will cause a scram, and low low reactor water level which will initiate main steam isolation valve closure and containment isolation. The motor operated feedwater isolation valve do not receive any isolation signal.

In addition, there is a check valve in series which provides an isolation function.

Failure of the steam tunnel temperature switches, or main steam radiation detectors does not prevent safe shutdown or result in unacceptable off-site doses.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ni ment: Electrical Cable located inside the Drywall FRC E ui ment Item No.: 65 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: Vulkene

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i: P dC 1600V d1000V Qualification Discre anc : CS, A, QI Justification for Continued 0 eration:

Vulkene insulated cable without a jacket and with Neoprene and Irradiated Crosslinked Polymer jackets have operated properly under conditions exceeding the environment at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 have been tested with the industry. Unjacketed Vulkene cable and Vulkene insulated cable with a PVC jacket are utilized at Nine Mile Point Unit 1. The addition of a PVC jacket would further improve the environmental resistance of the overall system.

Therefore, continued operation is justified.

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NINE, MILE POINT'NIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

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FRC E i* d V ui ment Item No.: 73 1 A <<(I 80-115)

Manufacturer: Limitorque Model: SMB-000 HlBC Function: Primary Containment Isolation (Containment Spray to Waste Building) ualification Summar  :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 40 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-l2-7.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Motorized Yalve Actuator (IY 80-114)

FRC E ui ment Item Number: 74 Manufacturer: Limitorque SMB-000 HlBC and SMB-000-2 Model: SMB-000-MlBC Function: Primary Containment Isolation (Containment Spray to Waste Building) gualification Summar  :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 40 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-l2-8.

r NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Eui ment: Motorized Yalve Actuator (IY 110-127)

FRC E ui ment Item Number: 75 Manufacturer: Limitorque Model: SMB-000-2 Function: React'or Coolant Sample Isolation Valve

(}uglification Summar  :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 40 year qualified life based on Pastel Engineers Report PEI-TR-12-8.

0 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EcCEui ment: Motorized Va1ve Actuator (IV 110-128)

FRC E ui ment Item Number: 76 Manufacturer: Limitorque Model: SMB-000-2 Function: Reactor Coolant Sample Isolation qualification Summar :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 10 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-12-11.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment': Motorized Yalve Actuator (IY 80-118)

FRC E ui ment Item Number: 77 Manufacturer: Limitorque Model: SMB-0 Function: Flow Control Valve for Torus Cooling qualification Summar :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 10 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-12-11.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

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FRC E ui ment Item Number: 78 Manufacturer: Limitorque Model: SMB-000 Function: Emergency Condenser Vent to Torus gualification Summar  :

This valve operator is judged to possess a 10 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-12-11.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E oi ment: Solenoid Yalve FRC E ui ment Item No.: 79 Manufacturer: ASCO Model: HT 8317A29

~24 1 1: <<0 10 122-08 through 2 Blhgdl hdgg1

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(122-04 0 0 02.

ualification Discr e anc  : gualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These valves were recently installed as part of Niagara Mohawk's Post Accident Sampling System.

Failure of these valves would not prevent safety related equipment from performing its intended function. Failure would not affect the mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of plants'ccident radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Eui ment: PT 36-23A, 6 FRC E ui ment Item No.: Sl Manufacturer: Rosemount Model:

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1153GA9 M i<<P effects on LT-36-24A, B f 9 ualification Discre anc : qualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These pressure transmitters were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.F.2.3, Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling. This level monitoring system does not provide for actuation of any safety systems.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Containment Pressure Indication (PT201.2-483, 484)

FRC E ui ment Item No.: 82 Manufacturer: Rosemount

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<<P operator following a LOCA

<<C 1R i fi cati on Di sere anc: A, gT Justification for Continued 0 eration:

Pressure transmitters, PT 201.2-483 and 484, provide the'ontrol room operator with indication of pressure inside the primary containment following a loss of coolant accident. These transmitters do not initiate any safety systems, they provide indication only. In the event of failure of one of these devices due to age-related degradiation, the same function will be provided by the redundant transmitter. Simultaneous failure of both components due to aging is highly improbable.

In addition, both devices are located outside of the primary containment and wi 11 not be subjected to a steam environment during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: LT 36-24A, B FRC E ui ment Item No.: 83 Manufacturer: Rosemount Model: 1153DAS Safety Function: Monitor reactor vessel level in fuel zone ualification Discrepancy: gualification Not Established Justification for Continued Operation:

These pressure transmitters were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.F.2.3, Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling. This monitoring system does not provide for actuation of any safety systems.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated. I

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Flow Switch, FET-664 FRC E uipment Item No.: 84 Manufacturer: Foxboro Model: El 3DL Transmitter Safety Function: Flow Control qualification- Discre ancy: qualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

This flow switch was recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. The system does not provide information to indicate whether any plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of this flow switch would not prevent any safety-related equipment from performing their intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe oper ation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE NILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Pressure Switch (PS 122-14)

FRC E ui ment Item Number: 85 Manufacturer: Static-0-Ring Model: 5NNKK351ClA Function: Post Accident Sampling Pump By-Pass

/uglification Summary:

This pressure switch is judged to possess an 11 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-82-12-18.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Radiation getector located in Reactor Building Elev. 261'201.7

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FRC Equi ment Item No.: 86 Manufacturer: General Atomic Model: RD23 Safety Function: High Range Radiation Monitor

/uglification Discre ancy: Equipment gualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These radiation detectors were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.F.1.3. The system does not provide either actuation or indication that a safety system is performing its intended function.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Limit Switch FRC Equipment- Item No.: 87 Manufacturer: Micro Switch Model: F Safety Function: Position Indication for valves 122-04 through 06, 122-08 through ll Qualification Discre ancy: Qualification Not Established Justification for Continued-Operation:

These limit switches were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. The system does not provide information to indicate whether the plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of these limit switches would not prevent safety related equipment from performing its intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Tnermocouple FRC Equi ment Item No.: 88 Manufacturer: Omega Model: HWANSA22312DH114T834 Safety Function: Temperature Measurements (TE-70-269A, TE-70-276A) Note:

TE-70-269A has been deleted from system.

gualification Discre ancy: gualification Not Established Justification for Continued Operation:

This thermocouple was recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. The system does not provide information to indicate whether the plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of this thermocouple would not prevent safety related equipment from performing its intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of

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Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET Equipment: Thermocouple FRC E ui ment Item-Number: 89, 90 Manufacturer: Pyco Model: 02-317.1-082.0-3.95 Function: Temperature Measurement to Oetect Inadequate Core Cooling Oualification Summary:

This thermocouple is judged to posses a 22 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-82-12-4.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Equi ment: Electric Motor FRC Equipment- Item No.: 91 Manufacturer: Franklin Motor/Burks Pumps Model: 3CTSMJ Safety Function: Pump Motor (122-01, 122-02)

/uglification Discrepancy: gualification Not Established Justification for Continued 0 eration:

These motors were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. These motors drive the post accident sampling pumps. The system does not provide information to indicate whether the plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of these motors would not prevent safety related equipment from performing its intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Equi ment: Electrical Penetration Assemblies FRC E ui ment Item Number: 92, 93 Manufacturer: 0. G. O'rien Model: C10CC0001G14, ClOC1001G21 Function: Containment High Range Monitors Justification for Continued 0 eration The containment high range monitors provide only indication as to the activity within the primary containment. These monitors would not affect a safety system from performing its intended function. Therefore, justification for containment operation safe operation of the plant is justified.

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NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET EqEui ment: Cable FRC E ui ment Item Number: 94, 9S, 96 Manufacturer: Rockbestos Model: RSS6104, TSP16, Control Cable a

Function: Radiation Monitor Signals, Instrument Cable, Control Cable (Post Accident Sampling)

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gualification Summar  :

These cables are judged to possess a 40 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PEI-TR-82-12-2.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~E ui ment: Kerite Tbermocouple Cable FRC E ui ment Item Number: 97 Manufacturer: Kerite Model: 16 AWG (FRII/FR)

Function: Temper ature Signals (Post Accident Sampling)

Oualification Summary:

This cable possesses a 40 year qualified life based on Patel Engineers Report PE I-TR-82-12-15.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Equi ment: iiotor Starter FRC Equi ment Item No-.: 98 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: CR 207B223AAA Safety. Function: Motor Starter and Disconnect

(}uglification Discrepancy: gualification Not Established Justification=for Continued 0 eration:

These motor starters were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. These are the motor starters for the post accident sample pump motors. The system does not provide information to indicate whether the plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of these motors would not prevent safety related equipment from performing its intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

4 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 COMPONENT REVIEW

SUMMARY

SHEET

~Equi ment: Circuit Breakers FRC Equipment- Item No.: 99 Manufacturer: General Electric Model: NTE 20

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/uglification Discrepancy: gualification Not Established Justification for Continued Operation:

These circuit breakers were recently installed as required by NUREG 0737 item II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling System. These provide circuit protection for the sampling pump motors. The system does not provide information to indicate whether the plant safety functions are being accomplished.

Failure of these circuit breakers would not prevent any safety related equipment from performing their intended safety function. Failure would not affect the plant's accident mitigation capability or its capability to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.

Therefore, justification for the continued safe operation of the plant is demonstrated.

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APPENDIX 8 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 EN II IR6CINEN Tl(I 3)UIPNENT glfALiF kCET iON 'NAS TER EI I ST'

SYSTEM LIST 01 Core Spray 02 Containment Spray 03 High Pressure Coolant Injection 04 Containment Spray Raw Water 05 Automatic Depressurization 06 Emergency Condenser 07 Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation 08 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic 09 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling 10 Service Water 11 Containment Atmosphere Dilution 12 Hydrogen Oxygen Monitoring 13 Station Electric Distribution 14 Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation 15 Post Accident Sampling 16 Instrument Air 17 Common Electrical Equipment 18 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation 19 Support Instrumentation

SYSTEM: Core Spray (01)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

Two independent core spray systems are provided to provide core cooling following a loss-of-coolant accident. Each system is designed to accommodate the range of loss-of-coolant accidents from the smallest to the largest line break as described in the FSAR.

The core spray system is an emergency core cooling system which is designed to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix K, as described in the accident analysis section of the FSAR. Plant operators are required to verify successful automatic initiation of this system in special operating procedures Nl-SOP-1, "Combined Loss of Coolant and 115 kV", and Nl-SOP-29, "Pipe Break Inside Drywell". Subsequent operator actions of special operating procedure Nl-SOP-30, "Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment", require the plant operator to continue to monitor and control reactor level using the available injection systems, one of which is the core spray system (Updated FSAR, Section VII-A.3.0). From the largest break down to about 0.30 ft.2, the reactor depressurizes fast enough for the core spray system to effect reactor core cooling. For breaks less than 0.30 ft.2, the automatic depressurization system is used in conjunction with the core spray system.

The reactor core spray system is required to achieve or support functions 3 and 5, Reactor Core Cooling and Core Residual Heat Removal, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

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SYSTEM: Containment Spray (02)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

Two separate and redundant containment spray systems are provided to remove heat, reduce pressure and reduce the pressure suppression chamber temperature following a loss-of-coolant accident (Updated FSAR, Section VII-B.1.0). Each system is capable of removing decay heat and energy from any credible metal-water reaction (0.8 to 27 percent). This will prevent containment pressures and temperatures from exceeding their design values, assuming a double-ended recirculation line break without core spray. To ensure proper containment atmosphere mixing following a loss of coolant accident, it will be necessary to maintain at least one loop of the containment spray system in service.

The containment spray system is used in conjunction with the core spray systems. Specifically, the core spray system removes heat from the core in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. In the heat removal process the core spray water is converted to steam and then released to the containment. The cooled spray of the containment spray system condenses the steam in the drywell and removes heat from the containment through heat exchangers.

Because the containment spray systems serve as a containment heat removal system and as core residual heat removal system, the plant operators are required to verify successful automatic initiation of these systems in special operating procedures Nl-SOP-l, "Combined Loss of Coolant and 115 kV", and Nl-SOP-29, "Pipe Break Inside Orywell". Subsequent operator actions of special operating procedure N1-SOP-30, "Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment", requires the plant operator to monitor suppression pool temperatures and begin suppression pooling cooling following automatic depressurization system actuation. Similarly, the operator is required to monitor and control containment pressure.

The containment spray systems are required to achieve or support functions 4 and 5, Containment and Core Residual Heat Removal, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

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I SYSTEM: High Pressure Coolant Inspection (03)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System consists of feedwater system components. It uses the two condensate storage tanks, the main condenser hotwell, two condensate pumps, condensate demineralizers, two feedwater booster pumps, feedwater heaters, and two motor-driven feedwater pumps. Its primary purpose is to provide an alternate means of providing cooling of the reactor core under certain abnormal and accident conditions, remove decay and residual heat from the reactor core at such a rate that fuel clad melting would be prevented, and provide for continuity of core cooling over the complete range of postulated break sizes in the primary system process barrier. The high-pressure coolant injection system is operated in the event of a reactor coolant line break which exceeds the capability of the control rod drive pumps (0.003 ft.2), but not large enough to allow rapid depressurization for core spray system to be effective (greater than 0.30 ft.~) at less than 365 psig.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection system should be included on the list of safety-related systems because it could be used to control reactor vessel water level for loss-of-coolant accident and high energy line breaks which have an area less than 0.03 ft.2. For postulated breaks in areas other than the steam tunnel and the Turbine Building condenser bay, the High Pressure Coolant Injection equipment is not exposed to a harsh environment by the accident it is intended to mitigate. Therefore, for postulated breaks within the dyrwell and the Reactor Building, the High Pressure Coolant Injection equipment can be exempted from environmental qualification, because "mild" environment.

it is in a For major steam line breaks inside the steam tunnel or the Turbine Building, the High Pressure Coolant Injection system is not used to maintain reactor vessel water level. Rather, the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System and the Emergency Condenser System are used to provide reactor water makeup and core cooling, respectively. An alternative would be the core spray system in conjunction with manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system.

For less severe steam line breaks, the condition inside the general areas of the Turbine Building are less than 133 F (the maximum temperature within the general area of the Turbine Building from a major steam line break).

Consequently, the temperature rise post-accident for less severe steam line breaks will be small and the High Pressure Coolant Injection system is like to be available for use.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection system is required to achieve or support functions 3 and 5, Reactor Core Cooling and Core Residual Heat Removal, and should be included on the list of all safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

'a SYSTEM: . Containment Spray Raw Water (04)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Raw Water Cooling System, a subsystem of the Containment Spray System, is designed to limit the containment spray water temperature to no greater than 140 F under the most limiting operating conditions (Updated FSAR, Section VII-B.2.0). The Containment Spray Raw Water Cooling System is considered operable when the flow rate is not less than 3000 gpm and the pressure on the raw water side of the containment spray heat exchangers is not less than 160 psig. The higher pressure on the raw water side assures that any leakage is into the containment spray system. The Raw Water Cooling System consists of four independent cooling trains, one for each of the containment spray heat exchangers. Each train consists of a remote, manually started raw water pump, a motor-operated isolation valve on the discharge of the containment spray heat exchangers, a flow element, a radiation monitor, and associated pipes and valves.

The Raw Water Cooling System is an essential support system of the containment spray system. It provides a heat sink to remove decay heat from the containment spray system following system actuation. The plant operators are required, as a subsequent operator action in Special Operating Procedures Nl-SOP-1 "Combined Loss of Coolant and 115 kV", to start a raw water pump in each of the containment spray loops in service. For high energy line breaks inside and outside the primary containment, the plant operators are directed to monitor suppression pool temperatures following a manual depressurization of the reactor and to effect suppression pool cooling in the normal mode per operating procedure Nl-OP-14, "Loss of Service Water Cooling".

The Raw Water Cooling System is required to support functions 4 and 5, Containment and Core Heat Removal, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

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SYSTEM: Automatic Depressurization (05)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Automatic Depressurization system consists of six solenoid-actuated pressure relief valves, located on the main steam lines, which discharge to the pressure suppression chamber (torus). 'These solenoid-actuated pressure relief valves serve two purposes: 1) provide sufficient capacity to prevent safety relief valve lift for a moderate frequency event such as main steam isolation valve closure with scram, and 2) depressurization of the reactor vessel in the event of a small break to permit timely operation of the core spray system (Updated FSAR, Section V-B.5.0). The Automatic Depressurization System solenoid-actuated pressure relief valves are protective devices which are independently actuated. Two valves are set at 1090 psig, two are set at 1095 psig and two are set at 1100 psig. These valves are set below the lowest safety relief valve setpoint of 1218 psig.

For posulated line breaks smaller than 0.30 ft.2, reactor pressure does not decrease rapidly enough to prevent fuel clad overheating if feedwater flow is stopped (Updated FSAR, Section VII-A.3.0). Therefore, the Automatic Depressurization System is designed to provide depressurization of the reactor so the low pressure permissive signal, in conjunction with low-low reactor water level or high drywell pressure, will permit oper ation of the core spray system admitting water into the reactor. The Automatic Depressurization System solenoid-actuated relief valves, either individually or together, depressurize the primary system to approximately 50 psi.. Three of the Automatic Depressurization System valves act as backups. Signals used for automatic initiation of the Automatic Depressur ization System are simultaneous low-low-low reactor water level, and high drywell pressure sustained for 120 seconds. If one set or any individual valve of a.set fails to operate, the logic circuitry will operate the second set or individual valve after a time delay. In addition, the Automatic Depressurization System can be manually initiated by the reactor operator.

The Automatic Depressurization System is required to achieve or support functions 3 and 5, reactor core cooling and core residual heat removal, and shall be included on the list of all safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

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SYSTEM: Emergency Condenser (06)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Emergency Condenser system provides for decay heat removal from the reactor fuel in the event that reactor feedwater capability is lost and the main condenser is not available. The heat removal capacity of one Emergency Condenser is approximately 3X of maximum reactor steam flow. This capacity is sufficient to handle the decay heat production at one hundred seconds following a scram.

The Emergency Condenser system is connected to the reactor and is operated by natural circulation. It serves as an alternate heat sink when the reactor is isolated from its normal heat sink (the main condenser). Automatic operation of the Emergency Condenser system is initiated by high reactor pressure in excess of 1080 psig sustained for ten seconds. To assist in depressurization for small breaks, the system is initiated on low-low reactor water level, five feet below minimum normal water level, sustained for 10 seconds. Because the emergency cooling system provides reactor core cooling and depressurization functions, the plant operators are required to manually initiate the emergency cooling system for a small line break in accordance with Special Operating Procedure Nl-SOP-1 "Combined Loss of Coolant and 115 kV". Similarly Special Operating Procedure Nl-SOP-29 "Pipe Break Inside Drywell" and Nl-SOP-30 "Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment" requires plant operators to verify that those automatic actions which should have occurred on high drywe11 pressure and/or decreasing level have occurred. If automatic actions have not occurred, the operator is required to manually initiate the appropriate actions.

The Emergency Condenser system is required to achieve or support function 3, Reactor Core Cooling, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

SYSTEM: Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (07)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Reactor Building has two ventilation systems, one used during normal operation (Reactor Building Normal ventilation) and the other to be used under ac'cident conditions (Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation). The ventilation system supplies filtered air to various parts of the Reactor Building with the exhaust fans discharging building exhaust air to the stack. Both supply and exhaust ducts are provided with quick-closing leak-tight valves in series which trip closed upon receipt of isolation signals. The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System operates automatically when the normal Ventilation System is shutdown and isolated upon receipt of high radiation in the discharge line, or from high radiation at the refueling platform during refueling operations.

The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system functions to minimize the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of an accident within the Primary Containment or Reactor Building.

The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system consists of: 1) supply header taking suction from the normal Reactor Building ventilation discharge before the inlet isolation valves to the normal Reactor Bui Tding exhaust fans,

2) a dual bank of filters in each train .(absolute and charcoal) for removal of particulate and halogens, 3) a 10 kw electric heater in the common supply duct to the trains to reduce relative humidity from 100 percent to 70 percent assuring filter efficiencies remain high; 4) a motor-driven fan in each tr ain, and 5) train inlet and outlet isolation valves. In addition, a 1 kW electric heater is provided for each charcoal filter train to prevent condensation when the system is first placed in service. Provision is also provided to admit Turbine Building atmosphere to each filter bank for cooling, should a filter become overloaded or damaged and removal from service is required.

Both Emergency Ventilation System fans are designed to:

1) Automatically start upon high radiation in the Reactor Building ventilation duct or at the refueling platform, and

2) Maintain the Reactor Building pressure to the design negative pressure to

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minimize uncontrolled outleakage and ensure exhaust filters through the charcoal filter trains. After automatic initiation of both trains, the redundant train can be shut down by the operator. The system can be manually started also.

If one Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation train fails to start automatically upon receipt of an initiation signal, the redundant standby train is designed to start automatically.

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SYSTEM: Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (cont'd)

The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system fans discharge a volume equal to 100 percent of reactor building volume per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The filter heating values are calculated from the amount of radioactive iodine which would be available to be deposited on the charcoal filters based on a leakage rate of 1.5 percent per day for containment.

The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system functions to minimize release of radioactivity to the environment when the Primary Containment is open during refueling and only the Secondary Containment is available. The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system also functions after a containment design basis accident. It is this, latter function that forms the basis for inclusion of this sytem under the IE Bulletin 79-01B qualification program. For example, credit is taken for the use of this system in calculating off-site radiation dose levels.

The Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System is required to achieve or support function 6, Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

SYSTEM: Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (08)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System is designed to achieve the following objectives'Updated FSAR, Section X-C):

a) Provide a water source at a constant pressure of 1,500 psig for charging the scram accumulations.

b) Provide a water source at a constant pressure of about 250 psi above reactor pressure to supply water for normal drive operation.

c) Provide a water source at a constant pressure of about 20 psi above reactor pressure to supply cooling water for each control rod drive mechanism.

This system also provides high pressure makeup to the reactor vessel for a specified primary system leakage of 25 gpm (technical specifications) and to provide core cooling in the case of a small line break (up to 0.003 ft.2).

The Control Rod Drive System makes changes in core reactivity by incrementally positioning neutron-absorbing control rods within the reactor core in response to manual control signals. The system is also designed to shutdown the reactor (scram) in emergency situations by rapidly inserting withdrawn control rods into the core in response to manual or automatic signals. The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System is a subsystem of the Control Rod Drive System that controls the pressure and flow to position the control rods, and cool the drive mechanisms and supply water for the scram. The hydraulic system directs the flow to the control rod drives for inserting or withdrawing the control rods at a controlled rate or provides the high pressure, high flow for fast insertion (scram) of the control rods. The Technical Specifications state that the high pressure coolant injection capability of the control rod drive pumps is used to provide high pressure makeup for the specified leakage of 25 gpm and to provide core cooling in the event of a small line break. Each pump can supply 50 gpm water makeup to the reactor vessel. This minimum delivery rate of 50 gpm within 60 seconds of receipt of automatic initiation signal wi 11 assure that Automatic Depressurization System is not actuated for the specified leakage of 25 gpm as described in operating procedure Nl-OP-5, "Control Rod Drive System". The 60-second delay in pump starting is acceptable since at least 15 minutes are available before the low-low-low reactor water level signals automatic depressurization. In summary, the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System provides a means to scram the reactor and provide makeup for small breaks.

The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System is required to achieve or support functions 1 and 3, Emergency Reactor Shutdown and Reactor Core Cooling. It should be, included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

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SYSTEM: Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System (09)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER=LIST:

The Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System provides deminer alized water at 85-95F to cool auxiliary equipment located in the Reactor and Waste Disposal Buildings. The closed loop permits isolation of systems containing radioactive liquids from the service water which is returned to the lake.

The system has a heat removal capability of 136xl06 BTU/hr and a flow capability of 9,000 gpm. The system consists of three half-capacity horizontal centrifugal pumps rated at 4500 gpm with a total developed head of 65 psi each three half-capacity counterflow shell and tube heat exchangers.

The Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System provides cooling water to the following major components:

Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers Instrument Air Compressors Electric Feedwater Pumps Condensate Pumps Feedwater Booster Pumps Control room, Laboratory, and Administration Building Air Conditioning Equipment Recirculation Pump Coolers Cleanup System Nonregenerative Heat Exchangers Drywell Air Coolers Waste Disposal System Heat Exchangers Shutdown Cooling System Heat Exchangers and Pump Coolers Off-Gas Vacuum Pump Coolers H2 - 02 Monitoring Systems Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, the special operating procedures require the following systems or equipment cooled by the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System to be operational:

High Pressure Coolant Injection System (electric feedwater pumps, condensate pumps, feedwater booster pumps)

Instrument Air Compressor H2 - 02 Monitoring Systems The Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System is required to support Functions 3 and 6, Reactor Core Cooling and Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment. It should be included on the list of all safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

Note: High Pressure Coolant Injection provides Safety Function 3 Instrument Air to CRD System (function 3), Emergency Condenser (function 3) and Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation (Function 6)

Hp - 02 coolers - Safety Function 6

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SYSTEM: Service Water (10)

BASES FOR INCLUDING OR DELETING FROM MASTER LIST'he Service Water System is designed to provide strained lake water for cooling the reactor and turbine building closed loop cooling systems, the steam jet air ejectors precooler, ejector vent cooler, the building local air coolers and other building services. The system is designed to be available to cool the reactor building cooling water system under all conditions of operation. The cooling water requirements during shutdown mode represent the most severe condition and is used as the design basis.

Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, the Service Water System is required to provide a heat sink for the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System.

The station Service Water System is required to support functions 3 and 6, Reactor Core Cooling and Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment, and should be included on the list of all safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

Note: Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water Supports Functions 3 and 6.

SYSTEM: Containment Atmospheric Dilution (11)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Containment Atmospheric Dilution System is designed to limit the oxygen concentration of the primary containment atmosphere to less than 4.05 during a loss-of-coolant accident (Updated FSAR, Section VII-G.3.0). Following a loss-of-coolant accident, hydrogen and oxygen may be released within the primary containment from postulated metal-water reactions and radiolysis. The initially inerted primary containment prevents the combustion of hydrogen evolved from a metal-water reaction. However, radiolytic decomposition results in the release of both hydrogen and oxygen. The Containment Atmospheric Dilution System functions by adding nitrogen to the primary containment atmosphere as the radiolytic formation of oxygen occurs. Oxygen concentration is, therefore, diluted to remain below 4X by volume. Since the radiolysis rate decreases with time as a result of fission product decay, the required nitrogen addition rate wi 11 also decrease.

Because the Containment Atmospheric Dilution System provides a means for limiting the oxygen concentration to less than 4.0 percent by volume (mitigates oxygen concentration produced by radiolysis after loss-of-coolant accident), it is concluded that the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System is required to achieve or support function 6, Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment. It should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

SYSTEM: Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring (12)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring System is a subsystem of the Combustible Gas Control System. The Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring system provides hydrogen-oxygen concentration monitoring of the primary containment atmosphere.

Two redundant Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Systems monitor the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the drywell and suppression chamber to minimize stratification and sampling errors. Five sampling probes check the drywell atmosphere (including the downcomer ring header), while two sampling probes check the suppression chamber atmosphere. An indication of hydrogen concentration (0-20 percent) and oxygen concentration (0-5 percent and 0-25 percent) in the primary containment atmosphere is provided in the control room.

5 In accordance with Nl-SOP-01, "Continual Loss of Coolant and 115 kV", the plant operator is required to monitor containment oxygen and maintain containment atmosphere at less than 4 percent oxygen. The operator, therefore, uses the Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring Systems following a line break in the drywell to assist him in limiting oxygen concentration.

Because the Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring Systems assist the operator in limiting the oxygen concentration to less than 4.0X by volume, it is required to support function 6, Prevention. of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment. It should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

SYSTEM: Station Electric Distribution (13)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Station Electrical Power System provides normal and emergency sources of electrical power for normal plant operation and for prompt shutdown. It also maintains the plant in a safe condition under various events.

Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, portions of the Electrical Power Systems support accident mitigating, containment isolation, and post-accident systems and components by providing electrical power for accomplishment of design basis safety-functions.

The electrical power system is required to support functions 1 through 6, and shall be included on the list of all safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

SYSTEM: Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation (14)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST'solation valves are provided on lines penetrating the drywell and pressure suppression chamber to assure integrity of the containment when required during emergency and post-accident periods. Isolation valves which must be closed to ensure containment integrity immediately after a major accident are automatically controlled by the reactor protection system. Reactor vessel isolation valves are also included in this system.

The design objective of the containment isolation system allows the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of fission products that may result from postulated accidents.

The containment isolation system is required to support functions 2 and 6, Containment Isolation and Prevention of Significant Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment, and,should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

SYSTEM: Post-Accident Sampling (15)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

Post-Accident Sampling meets the requirements of NUREG 0737.

This system and its electrical components are not required to be environmentally qualified by IE Bulletin 79-01B. However, environmental qualification of electrical equipment located in harsh environments is required for some TMI Lessons Learned requirements (NUREG 0737). Action Item II.B.3 "Post-Accident Sampling Capability of Reactor Coolant and Containment" is such an item. Consequently, the post-accident sampling system should meet environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B, Supplement 3.

SYSTEM: Instrument Air (16)

BASES-FOR DELETION FROM. MASTER LIST:

The Instrument Air System is a subsystem of the service, instrument and breathing air systems. The Instrument Air System provides a reliable source of clean dry air for use in instruments and controls. It functions as, a backup to the breathing air system. Compressed air is supplied by one or a combination of three air compressors. Two can be powered from the emergency diesel generators. The Instrument Air System provides air to safety-related components.

Although safety-related equipment that uses instrument air is designed to fail to its fail safe position on loss of instrument air, there are some safety-related components that require air in order to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. Following a loss-of-coolant accident Special Operating Procedure Nl-SOP-1 requires the operator under "Immediate Operator Action" to start an Instrument Air Compressor. Air provided by this Instrument Air Compressor is used for the following components:

Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation E/P converters for FCV 202-50 and FCV 202-51.

Control Rod Hydraulic System E/P converters for FCY-NC-30A and FCV-NC-30B.

Emergency Cooling System condensate return valves IV-39-05 and IV-39-06. These valves are to be cycled open and close to limit cooldown rate as described in Nl-OP-13.

H2 -02 System number 11 sample stream supply and return valves as well as System ll analyzer.

H2 -02 System number 12 Analyzer Containment N2 inverting and purge valves BV 201.2-02 IV- 201.1-14 BV- 201.2-04 IV- 201.1-16 BV- 201.2-46 PIC 201.2-532A FCV-201.8-02 IV- 201.2-32 PCV-201.8-01 IV- 201.2-03 Post Loss-of-Coolant Accident Sampling System Valves IV-122-03 BV-122-10 BV-122-04 BV-122-11 BV-122-05 BV-122-06 BV-122-08 BV-122-09 Vacuum Relief Valves require air to open IV 68-08 IV 68-09 IV 68-10

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SYSTEM: Instrument Air (cont'd)

The Instrument Air System is required to support functions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6; and it should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

Electrical components of the Instrument Air System are located in the Turbine Building. Therefore, for postulated breaks within the drywell and the reactor building, the Instrument Air System can be exempted from environmental equipment qualification because it is in a "mild" environment. For steam or feedwater line breaks in the Turbine Building, not all of the safety-related components supplied with air wi 11 need to operate. Only equipment from the control rod drive hydraulic and emergency condenser systems are required. For a major steam line break and feedwater line break inside the steam tunnel or condenser bay area, the control rod drive hydraulic and emergency cooling systems are not required to maintain adequate core cooling. For less severe high energy line breaks the conditions inside the general area of the turbine building are less than 133F (maximum temperature of turbine building general area from major steam line break). Since the temperature rise post-accident for less severe high energy line breaks is smaller (and negligible for small breaks), both systems are expected to operated.

The control rod drive hydraulic system provides makeup flow for small high energy line breaks (i.e. less than 0.003 ft.2) when off-site power is not available. As stated above, a high energy line break of this size would not be large enough to cause a harsh environment in the Turbine Building. The emergency core cooling system provides heat removal capability for both small and medium size breaks. Although the Instrument Air System is expected to function following a medium size break, the loss of instrument air to the emergency condenser will not prevent the system from removing decay heat. The emergency cooling system only requires instrument air for cycling open and closed the condensate return valves to regulate cooldown rate. Upon loss of air these valves move to their fail safe position of open permitting continuous cooldown.

Based upon the above discussions, it is concluded that the Instrument Air System is exempt from environmental equipment qualification because its equipment is not exposed to a harsh environment.

SYSTEM: Common Electrical Equipment (17)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON LIST:

Electrical equipment common to systems provides or facilitates normal and emergency electrical power distribution to system equipment which perform required safety-functions.

Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, electrical equipment items common to all safety-related systems support accident mitigating, containment isolation, and post-accident systems and components by providing or facilitating electrical power distribution for accomplishment of design basis safety-functions.

The electrical equipment common to systems is required to support functions 1 through 6, and should be environmentally qualified in accordance IE Bulletin 79-018. For convenience and accountability, this equipment has been compiled into a "system" and is included on the list of safety-related sytsems.

SYSTEM: Reactor Vessel Instrumentation (18)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

The Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System is a subset of a redundant fail-safe reactor protection system. It consists of instrumentation which automatically initiates safety-related systems and equipment whenever pre-established limits are exceeded.

The reactor protection system consists of two independent logic channels (channels ll and 12). Each channel has its own input sensors. Within each logic channel are two identical,subchannels (Channels A and B in Channel 11 and Channels C and D in Channel 12) consisting of trip devices. Thus, the system has a total of four independent subchannels. Each subchannel has an input from an independent sensor monitoring each of the critical parameters.

The outputs of two of the subchannels are combined in a one-out-of-two logic.

The outputs of the remaining two channels are also combined in a one-out-of-two logic. The'utputs of the two logic channels are combined so that they both must be tripped to initiate a scram or other protective function.

During normal operation, sensor and trip contacts are closed and=vital relays are energized. Thus, the protective system is designed to fail safe.

Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, the instrumentation and sensors of the Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System automatically provide signals to the reactor protection system logic channels to actuate systems and components required to perform design basis safety-functions.

The Reactor Vessel Instrumentation system is required to support functions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-01B.

SYSTEM: Support Instrumentation (19)

BASES FOR INCLUSION ON MASTER LIST:

Additional instrumentation is a subset of instrumentation in various systems that have not been accounted for during the review of the respective system and placed on the master list of safety-related equipment. The instrumentation in this "system" consists of equipment which provides various safety-related functions to support accident mitigation, containment isolation, or post-accident monitoring.

Following a loss-of-coolant accident or high energy line break, the instrumentation included herein supports accident mitigation, containment isolation, or post-accident monitoring.

This instrumentation is required to support functions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, and should be included on the list of safety-related systems requiring environmental equipment qualification in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-018.

APPENDIX C NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION COMPONENT CORRECTIVE ACTION LIST

0 LIST OF TABLES Table Title Pa e 1 System Codes 1 2 Locations Codes 2 3 Corrective Action Codes 3 4 Schedule Codes 4 5 Solenoid Actuators for Pressure Relief Valves 5 6 Solenoid Valves 6 7 Position Limit Switches 10 8 Electronic Trip Units 13 9 Cable 14 10 Motor Control Centers, MG Sets, Panels 15 ll Electrical Insulation/Tape 16 12 Electrical Terminal Blocks 17 13 Electrical Terminals 18 14 Temperature Switches 19 Temperature Elements 20 16 E/P Converters 21 17 Transmitters 22 18 Valve Actuators 24 19 Motors 26 20 Radiation Detectors 27 21 Pressure Switches 28 22 Penetrations/Connectors 29 23 Electric Heaters 30 24 H2 Monitors 31 2

25 Deleted Equipment 32 26 gualified Equipment 33

TABLE 1 System Code ~Set em 01 Core Spray (CS) 02 Containment Spray (COS) 03 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) 04 Raw Water System 05 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) 06 Emergency Cooling (EC) 07 Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation (RBEV) 08 Control Rod Hydraulic System (CRD) 09 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water (RBCLC) 10 Service Water ll Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) 12 Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring (H202) 13 Electrical Power Distribution (PD) 14 Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation 15 Reactor Vessel Post Accident Sampling 16 Instrument Air 17 Electrical Equipment Common to All Systems (CEE) 18 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation (RVI) 19 Additional Instrumentation

0 TABLE 2 LOCATION CODE Location Elevation Code Location (ft) ~8ui ldin Steam Tunnel 2'40 Turbine Condenser Bay 243-297 Turbine Area of Turbine Building Remainder of All Elevations Turbine Turbine Building Emergency Cooling 340 Reactor Condenser Area Containment Spray Heat 318 Reactor Exchanger Area Emergency Condenser 298 Reactor Isolation Valve Cubicle Emergency Condenser 281 Reactor Return Valve Cubicle Clean-up System Cubicles 261 Reactor Floor Area (general) 340 Reactor 10 Floor Area (general) 318 Reactor Floor Area (general) 298 Reactor 12 Floor Area (general) 281 Reactor 13 Floor Area (general) 261 Reactor 14 East Instrument Room 281 Reactor West Instrument Room 281 Reactor 16 Instrument Room (North) 237 Reactor 17 Floor Area (general) 237 Reactor 18 Floor Area 198 Reactor 19 Drywe1 1 Containment

TABLE 3 CORRECTIVE ACTION COOE Replacement with available qualified equipment Equipment modification Equipment relocation Replacement pending determination of suitably qualified equipment gualification by additional testing gualification testing of equipment in progress gualification by additional/supplemental analysis (other than qual i fi ed i fe) 1 gualification by supplemental analysis of qualified life or modification of maintenance/surveillance program requirements.

Obtain'qualification report from vendor and evaluate qualification.

Obtain technical information from manufacturer and evaluate.

gualify the equipment by supplemental analysis or replace with qualified equipment.

TABLE 4 SCHEDULE CODES Code Date September 30, 1983 December 30, 1983 March 30, 1984 June 29, 1984 September 28, 1984

TABLE 5 SOLENOID ACTUATORS FOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code GE 1525VX PSV-NR-108A 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2 GE 1525VX PSV-NR-108B 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2 GE 1525VX PSV-NR-108C 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2 GE 1525VX PSV-NR-108D 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2 GE 1525VX PSV-NR-108E 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 GE 1525VX PSV-NR-109F 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108A 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108B 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108C 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108D 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108E 05 19 14 N/A 7,8 2 Unimax KBL7HB-5 POS-NR-108F 05 19 14 N/A 7 8 2

TABLE 6 SOLENOID VALVES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code ASCO HT8360A90 SOV-40-32B 01 13 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8360A90 SOV-40-32C 01 13 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8350A90 SOV-40-33B 01 13 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8350A90 SOV-40-33C 01 13 N/A New 1 Decco 24166 SOV-80-15 02 12 12 N/A 1 Decco 24166 SOV-80-16 02 12 12 N/A 1 Decco 24166 SOY-80-35 02 12 12 N/A 1 Decco 24166 SOV-80-36 02 12 12 N/A 1 ASCO 8300 Series SV-39-05E 06 7 17 N/A 1 ASCO 8300 Series SV-39-05E 06 7 17 N/A 1 ASCO 8300 Series SV-39-06E 06 7' 17 N/A 1 ASCO 8300 Series SV-39-06E 06 17 N/A 1 ASCO HT8300B58BU SV/IV-39-05 06 7 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B58BU S V/IV-39-05 06 7 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300858BU SV/IV-39-06 06 7 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B58BU SV/IV-39-06 06 7 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-01R 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-01R 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-02R 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-02R 06 5 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-03R 06 5 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-03R 06 5 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-04R 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-04R 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-11 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-11 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* S V/IV-05-12 06 2 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E* SV/IV-05-12 06 2 N/A New 1 Valcor V70900-21-1 60-17E 06 2 N/A New 7,8 Valcor V70900-21-1 60-17D 06 2 N/A New 7,8 Valcor V70900-21-1 60-18D 06 9 N/A New 7,8 Valcor V70900-21-1 60-18E 06 9 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8315B3F SOV-39-11C 06 06 N/A New 1 ASCO 8315B3F SOV-39-11D 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-12C 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-12D 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-13C 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-13D 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-14C 06 6 N/A New 1 ASCO 831533F SOV-39-14D 06 6 N/A New 1

• Model number is for qualified replacement solenoid

TABLE 6 (Continued)

SOLENOID VALVES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code ASCO 8300C68F SV/BV-202-15 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68F SV/BV-202-15 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68F SV/BV-202-16 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68F SV/BV-202-16 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-31 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-31 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-32 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-32 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-34 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300C68 SV/BV-202-35 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-36 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-36 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-37 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-38 07 3 N/A New 7~8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-74 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90-405-2A 83160 SV/BV-202-75 07 3 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HVA 90 405 2A SV NC-15A 08 17 13 N/A 7,8 ASCO HVA 90 405 8A SV NC-15B 08 17 13 N/A 7,8 Valcor PNV 70900-21-1 SV NC-15C 08 17 N/A New 7,8 Valcor PNV 70900-21-1 SV NC-15D 08 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300B61RU SV 201-2-06 11 17 15 N/A 7,8 ASCO 8300B61RU SV 201-2-33 11 17 15 N/A 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV 201-2-03 11 6 16 N/A 1 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV 201-2-32 11 6 16 N/A 1 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/IV-201-10 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/IV-201-10 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/IV-201-08 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/IV-201-08 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/I V-201-16 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/I V-201-16 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/IV-201-16 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B72F SV/I V-201-16 11 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO NP8344A71E SV/IV-201.1-09 11 6 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E SV/IV-201.1-09 11 6 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E SV/I V-201.1-11 11 6 N/A New 1 ASCO NP8344A71E SV/I V-201.1-11 11 6 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8317A30 SOV-201.9-91 11 ll N/A New 1 ASCO HT8317A30 SOV-201.9-92 11 17 N/A New 7,8

R h

TABLE 6 (Continued)

SOLENOID VALVES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code ASCO 8300B61F SOV-201.2-02 ll 11 N/A New 1 ASCO 8300861F SOV-201.2-04 ll 11 N/A New 1 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-431 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.7-432 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-429 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-430 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-421 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-422 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-420 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.2-419 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.7-03 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO LB8320A-25 S V/IV-201. 7-03 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.2-04 12 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.2-04 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-23 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-23 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-25 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-26 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-27 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-28 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawrence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-29 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 Lawerence 26DCSWPS IV-201.2-30 12 16 10 N/A 7,8 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.7-01 12 ll N/A New 1 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.7-01 12 ll N/A New 1 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/IV-201.7-02 12 ll N/A New 1 ASCO LB8320A-25 SV/I V-201. 7-02 12 ll N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B6RU SOV-201.7-20 12 ll N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B6RU SOV-201.7-21 12 11 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B6RU SOV-201.7-23 12 12 N/A New 1 ASCO HT8300B6RU SOV-201.7-26 12 12 N/A New 1 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.7-24 12 11 N/A New 1 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.7-25 12 11 N/A New 1 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.7-22 12 12 N/A New 1 ASCO HT80173 SOV-201.7-27 12 12 N/A New 1

TABLE 6 (Continued)

SOLENOID VALVES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Decco 24166 SV/IV-01-05 14 ll N/A De'cco 24166 SV/IV-01-05 14 11, N/A Decco 24166 SV/I V-01-06 14 ll N/A Decco 24166 SV/IV-01-05 14 11 N/A ASCO WPLB 8300B68F SV 68-08C 14 17 18 N//A 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300B68F SV 68-09C 14 17 18 N/A 7,8 ASCO WPLB 8300868F SV 68-10C 14 17 18 N/A 7,8 ASCO WP8300B61RU SV/IV-83.1-10 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WP8300861RU SV/I V-83. 1-12 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WP8300B61RU SV/IV-83.1-12 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WPHTX 8300B61U SV/I V-01-03 14 1 N/A New 1 ASCO WPHTX 8300861U SV/IV-01-03 14 1 N/A New 1 ASCO WPHTX 8300861U SV/IV-01-04 14 1 N/A New 1 ASCO WPHTX 8300B61U SV/IV-01-04 14 1 N/A New 1 ASCO WP8300B61U SV/I V-83. 1-10 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WP8300B61U SV/IV-83.1-10 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO WP8300861U SV/I V-83. 1-12 14 17 N/A New 7,8 WP8300B61U SV/IV-83.1-12 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO 8300B61RU SV/I V-58. 1-01 14 18 N/A New 7,8

'SCO 8300861RU SV/I V-58. 1-01 14 18 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT8320A90MB SOV-122-03B 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT8320A90MB SOV-122-03C 14 17 N/A New 7,8 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-04 15 12 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-05 15 17 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-06 15 17 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-08 15 12 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-09 15 12 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A20 SOV-122-10 15 12 79 N/A 1 ASCO HT8317A29 SOV-122-11 15 17 79 N/A 1

TABLE 7 POSITION LIMIT SWITCHES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Limitorque N/A POS-81-02 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-81-01 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-81-21 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-81-22 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-40-02 01 17 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-40-12 01 17 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-40-01 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque N/A POS-40-09 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 3 POS-40-11 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 3 POS-40-10 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 000 POS-40-30 01 19 N/A New 1 4 NAMCO 17031100 POS-40-32 01 13 N/A New 9 2 Limitorque N/A POS-40-31 01 19 N/A New 1 4 NAMCO 17031100 POS-40-33 01 13 N/A New 9 2 Limitorque N/A POS-40-05 01 17 N/A New 7/8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-40-06 01 17 N/A New 7/8 5 NAMCO D2400X-2 POS-80-15 02 12 N/A New 7 2 NAMCO D2400X-2 POS-80-16 02 12 N/A New 7 2 NAMCO D2400X-2 POS-80-35 02 12 N/A New 7 2 NAMCO D2400X-2 POS-80-36 02 12 N/A New 7 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-01 02 18 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-02 02 18 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-21 02 18 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-22 02 18 N/A New 7,8 ~

2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-118 02 ll N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-114 02 12 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-80-115 02 12 N/A New 7,8 2 NAMCO SL3L POS-39-05 06 07 50 N/A 7 2 NAMCO SL3L POS-39-06 06 07 50 N/A 7 2 NAMCO 180 32302 POS-05-04 06 2 N/A New 8 2 NAMCO 180 32302 POS-05-12 06 2 N/A New 8 2 NAMCO 180 32302 POS-05-01 06 2 N/A New 8 2 NAMCO 180 32302 POS-05-11 06 2 N/A New 8 2 Limitorque N/A POS-39-07 06 6 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-39-08 06 6 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-39-09 06 6 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque N/A POS-39-10 06 6 N/A New 7,8 5 Fisher Control 304 POS-39-11 06 6 N/A New 1 5 Fisher Control 304 POS-39-12 06 6 N/A New 1 5 Fisher Control 304 POS-39-13 06 6 N/A New 1 5 Fisher Control 304 POS-39-14 06 6 N/A New 1 5 Limitorque N/A POS-05-05 06 18 N/A New 7,8 5

TABLE 7 (Continued)

POSITION LIMIT SWITCHES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Limitorque N/A POS-05-07 06 18 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-70-94 09 17 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-70-92 09 13 N/A New 7,8 NAMCO D2400X POS-201.2-32 ll 6 47 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-201.2-03 ll 6' 47 N/A 7 NAMCO D2400X POS-201.32 ll 47 N/A 7 NAMCO D2400X POS-201-08 ll 17 45 N/A 7 NAMCO D2400X POS-201-10 ll 17 45 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-201-16 ll 17 45 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-201.2-33 ll 17 45 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-201.2-06 11 17 45 N/A 7 Limitorque H/A POS-201.31 ll ll N/A New 7,8 NAMCO 2-180C1302 POS-201.1-09 ll 6 N/A New 8 NAMCO 2-180C1302 POS-201.1-11 ll 6 N/A New 8 Limitorque N/A POS-201-07 ll 17 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-201-09 ll 17 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-201-17 ll 17 N/A New 7,8 Microswitch LSD4L POS-201.9-46 ll ll N/A New 1 Microswitch LSD4L POS-201.9-47 17 N/A New 7 Microswitch 276 POS-201.2-02 11 ll N/A New 1 Microswitch E236 POS-201.2-04 ll 17 N/A New 7 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW-PS POS-201.2-24 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW-PS POS-201.2-24 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW-PS POS-201.2-25 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW-PS POS-201.2-26 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW-PS POS-201.2-27 12 17 N/A Hew 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW PS POS-201.2-28 12 17 N/A New 7,8 Lawrence 506WA26DC SW PS POS-201.2-29 12 17 N/A Hew 7,8 Crouse Hinds CPS 026 POS-201.2-30 12 17 N/A New 7,8 NAMCO EA-17031100 POS-201.2-111 12 17 N/A New 9 NAMCO EA-17031100 POS-201.2-110 12 17 N/A New 9 NAMCO EA-17031100 POS-201.2-109 12 17 N/A New 9 HAMCO EA-17031100 POS-201.2-112 12 17 N/A New 9 Micro DTE6-2RN POS-201.7-03 12 19 N/A New 1 Micro DTE6-2RN POS-201.7-04 12 19 N/A New 1 Micro DTE6-2RN POS-201.7-01 12 11 N/A New 1 Micro DTE6-2RN PS0-201.7-02 12 11 N/A New 1 NAMCO . D2400X-2 POS-201.7-08 12 11 N/A New 7 NAMCO D2400X-2 POS-201.7-09 12 11 N/A Hew 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-201-7-10 12 12 N/A New 7

TABLE 7 (Continued)

POSITION LIMIT SWITCHES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-201.7-11 12 12 N/A New 7 NAMCO SL3C58TW POS-01-01 14 01 49 N/A 7 NAMCO SL3CSBTW POS-01-02 14 01 49 N/A 7 NAMCO SL3CSBTW POS-01-03 14 01 100 N/A 7 NAMCO SL3C58TW POS-01-04 14 01 100 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-01-05 14 01 46 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-01-06 14 01 46 N/A 7 NAMCO D2400X POS-83.1-12 14 17 45 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-83.1-10 14 17 45 N/A 7 Microswitch 11LS1 POS-68-08 14 17 48 N/A 7 Microswitch 11LSl POS-68-09 14 17 48 N/A 7 Microswitch 11LS1 POS-68-10 14 17 48 N/A 7 NAMCO 02400X POS-58.1-01 14 18 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-01 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-02 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-03 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-04 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-05 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-06 14 17 N/A New 7 NAMCO 02400X-2 POS-68-07 14 17 N/A New 7 Limitorque N/A POS-33-01 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-33-02 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-33-04 14 8 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-38-01 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-38-13 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-38-02 14 13 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-31-08 14 01 N/A 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-31-07 14 01 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-34-01 14 6 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-83.1-09 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-83.1-11 14 19 N/A New 1 Rockwell CWP2075-8 00 POS-122-03 14 17 N/A New 7,8 Limitorque N/A POS-110-127 14 19 N/A New 1 Limitorque N/A POS-110-128 14 12 N/A New 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-04 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-05 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-06 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-08 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-09 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-10 14 17 87 N/A 7,8 Microswitch F POS-122-11 14 17 87 N/A 7,8

TABLE 8 ELECTRONIC TRIP UNTIS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Rosemount 510DU 201.2-476A 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 201.2-476B 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 201.2-476C 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 201.2-476D 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-06A 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-06B 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-06C 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-06D 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26A 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26B 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26C 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26D 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26E 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26F 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26G 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 01-26H 19 12 19 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-03A 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-03C 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-03D 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-04A 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-04B 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-04C 19 ~

12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-04D 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-05A 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-05B 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-05C 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-05D 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-07A 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-07B 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-07C 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-07D 19 12 20 '/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-08A 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-08B 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-08C 19 12 20 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 510DU 36-08D 19 12 20 N/A 7,8

TABLE 9 CABLE New/ Correct i ve Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Raychem RG59BU 17 19 54 N/A 9 2 GE Vulkene 17 19 65 N/A 7,8,9 2 Rockbestos . RSS6104 17 06 94 N/A 7,9 2 Kerite Power 17 01 71 N/A 7,8,9 3

TABLE 10 MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS, MG SETS, PANELS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code GE IC 7700 167 13 12 72 N/A 7,8 GE IC 7700 1718 13 13 72 N/A 7,8 GE IC 7700 161B 13 13 72 N/A 7,8 GE 5LS4404 A22Y25 MG-172 13 03 N/A New 7,8 GE 51S4404 A22Y25 MG-162 13 03 N/A New 7,8 GE IC 7700 161A 13 13 N/A New 7,8 GE IC 7700 171A 13 13 N/A New 7,8 GE AKD5 PB-16A 13 12 N/A New 7,8 Gf AKD5 PB-17A 13 12 N/A New 7,8 GE AKD5 PB-16B 13 12 62 N/A 7,8 GE AKD5 PB-17B 13 12 62 N/A 7,8 GE IC7700 PB-155 13 12 N/A New 7,8 GE IC7095 Battery 13 03 N/A New 7,8 Board 12 GE Control Panel MG-162 13 03 N/A New 7,8 GE Control Panel MG-172 13 03 N/A New 7,8

TABLE 11 ELECTRICAL INSULATION/TAPE New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code J-M Duxseal Sealant 17 01 55 N/A 7,8 2 Amp Pre-insul splice 17 01 59 N/A 7,8 2 Ring Connector 17 19 60 N/A 7,8 2 Amp'M/Electro 83 Tape 17 01 63 N/A 7,8 2 GE 227 Sealant 17 01 64 N/A 7,8 2 GE 1309 Varnish 17 01 66 N/A 7,8 2 GE 8380 Tape 17 01 67 N/A 7,8 2 Kerite Cement Sealant 17 01 68 N/A 7,8 2 Kerite Friction Tape 17 01 69 N/A 7,8 2 Kerite Splice Tape 17 01 70 N/A 7,8 2

TABLE 12 ELECTRICAL TERMINAL BLOCKS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code GE EB-5 . N/A 17 19 53 N/A 7 1 GE EB-25 N/A 17 19 53 N/A 7 1

TABLE 13 ELECTRICAL TERMINALS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Burndy GZ N/A 17 19 56 N/A 7,8 1 Burndy QAB N/A 17 01 57 N/A 7,8 1 Burndy QABCB N/A 17 19 58 N/A 7,8 1

TABLE 14 TEMPERATURE SWITCHES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10A 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-108 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-10C 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10D 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10E 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10F 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10G 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-10H 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10I 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-1 oj 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10K 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-10L 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TSlB-10M 19 01 28 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10N 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10P 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS1B-10Q 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 Fenwal 1700240 TS18-10R 19 01 29 N/A 7,8 3 United Elect. 829C TIS-202-54 07 03 N/A New 7,8 1 United Elect. 829C TIS-202-55 07 03 N/A New 7,8 1

TABLE 15 TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Pyco 0231710 820395 36-29A 18 19 89 N/A Pyco 0231710 820395 36-29B 18 19 89 N/A Pyco 0231710 820395 36-29C 18 14 90 N/A Pyco 0231710 820395 36-29D 18 15 90 N/A Pall Trinity CU/6 TE-70-23 09 12 22 N/A Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-13 06 06 32 N/A Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-14 06 06 32 N/A Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-23 06 06 32 N/A Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-24 06 06 32 N/A Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-15 06 06 N/A New Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-12 06 06 N/A New Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-21 06 06 N/A New Minco Nickel R-T-D TE IB06-22 06 06 N/A New Pall Trinity CU/6 TT IG01A 06 04 N/A New Pall Trinity CU/6 TE IG01B 06 04 N/A New Pall Trinity CU/6 TE IGOlC 06 10 N/A New Pall Trinity CU/6 TE IG01D 06 10 N/A New

TABLE 16 E/P CONVERTERS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Fisher 546 E/P 60-22A 06 04 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 60-17A 06 04 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 60-23A 06 04 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 60-18A 06 04 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher S/N 4247252 E/P 202-92D 07 03 N/A New 7,8 3' Fisher S/N 4354590 E/P 202-49D 07 03 N/A New 7,8 Fisher 546 E/P NC-30A 08 17 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P NC-308 08 17 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546/4154882 E/P 70-137 09 ll 21 N/A 7,8 3 fisher 546 E/P 201.9-48A ll 13 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 201.9-49A 11 13 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 201.8-01A ll 13 N/A New 7,8 3 Fisher 546 E/P 201.8-02A ll 13 N/A New 7,8 3

TABLE 17 TRANSMITTERS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf actus er No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Rosemount 1151OP FT-RV26A 01 17 39 N/A '10 GE/MAC 553-1120AA2 FT-RV26B 01 17 39 N/A 7,8,10 Rosemount 1153A LT-58-05 01 18 80 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153A LT-58-06 01 18 80 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153 DPT 201.2-476A 02 15 30 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153 OPT 201.2-476B 02 15 30 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153 DPT 201.2-476C 02 14 30 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153 OPT 201.2-4760 02 14 30 N/A 7,8 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-80-49A 02 13 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-80-71A 02 13 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BOLA2R-N FT-80-56A 02 13 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-80-76A 02 13 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-93-30A 02 10 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-93-33A 02 10 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-93-32A 02 10 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553-122BAAY2 FT-93-34A . 02 10 N/A New 7,8,10 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-19 05 19 N/A New 9 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-20 05 19 N/A New 9 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-21 05 19 N/A New 9 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-22 05 19 N/A New 9 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-23 05 19 N/A New 9 Endevco 2273AM20 FT-24 . 05 19 N/A New 9 Rosemount 1151OP DPT-36-06A 06 15 29 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151OP OPT-36-06B 06 15 29 N/A 10

~ Rosemount 11510pl OPT-36-06C 06 14 29 N/A 10 Rosemount 11510P1 DPT-36-060 06 14 29 N/A 10 GE/MAC 553- 112BAAY2 LT- I G06A 06 10 New N/A 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553- 112BAAY2 LT- IG06B 06 10 New N/A 7,8,10

TABLE 17 (Continued)

TRANSMITTERS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. IO No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Rosemount 1153DA5 LT-60-22 06 2 N/A New 7,8 Rosemount 1153OA5 LT-60-23 06 9 N/A New 7,8 GE/MAC 554 FT-202-52A 07 3 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 554 FT-202-49A 07 3 N/A New 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553 FT-RD-15 08 17 N/A New 7,8,10 Rosemount 1153A 201.2-483 11 12 82 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153A 201.2-484 11 12 82 N/A 7,8 Fisher 2340-390 PT-201.9-26 ll 13 N/A New 1 Fisher 2340-390 PT-201.9-80 ll 13 N/A New 1 Fisher 2340-390 FT-201.9-31 ll 13 N/A New 1 Fisher 2340-390 PT-201.8-45 11 13 N/A New 1 Fisher 2340-390 PT-201.8-35 ll 13 N/A New 1 Fisher 2340-380 FT-201.8-41 ll 13 N/A New 1 Foxboro E130L FET-664 15 84 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-07A 18 15 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-07B 18 15 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-07C 18 14 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-070 18 14 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-08A 18 15 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-08B 18 15 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 11510P PT-36-08C 18 14 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP PT-36-08D 18 14 27 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-03A 18 15 35 ll 10 Rosemount 11510P LT-36-03B 18 15 35 ll 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-03C 18 14 35 ll 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-03D 18 14 35 ll 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-04A 18 15 35 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-04B 18 15 35 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151OP LT-36-04C 18 14 35 N/A 10 Rosemount 1151DP LT-36-04D 18 14 35 N/A 10 GE/MAC 551 JB394616611 PT- ID-46A 18 '15 25 N/A 7,8,10 GE/MAC 551 JB394616611 PT- ID-46B 18 14 25 N/A 7,8,10 GE/MAC 553 HB345619079 LT- IA-12 18 15 38 N/A 7,8,10 Rosemount 1153GA9 PT-36-23A 18 15 81 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153GA9 PT-36-23B 18 15 81 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 11530A5 LT-36-24A 18 15 83 N/A 7,8 Rosemount 1153DA5 LT-36-24B 18 15 83 N/A 7,8

TABLE 18 VALVE ACTUATORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Limitorque SMB 3 IV-40-11 01 19 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SMB 3 IV-40-10 01 19 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-40-05 01 17 4 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-40-06 01 17 4 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB-3 IV-40-09 01 19 7 N/A 1 Limitorque SMB-3 IV-40-01 01 19 7 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-81-01 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-81-02 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-81-21 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-81022 01 18 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 3 IV-40-30 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 3 IV-40-31 01 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMO 0 BV-93-27 02 5 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMO 0 BV-93-28 02 5 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 0 BV-93-26 2 5 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 0 BV-93-25 2 5 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMBOOO HIBC 80-115 2 12 73 N/A 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 000 80-114 2 12 74 N/A 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 0 80-118 2 77 N/A 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-80-01 2 18 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-80-02 2 18 N/A New 7,8 .2 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-80-21 2 18'8 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 00 IV-80-22 2 N/A New 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-39-10 6 6 8 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-39-08 6 6 6 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-39-07 6 6 6 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-39-09 6 6 6 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 BV-05-05 06 18 78 N/A 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 000 BV-05-07 06 18 78 N/A 7,8 2 Limitorque SMB 000-5 IV-201-31 06 8 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-201-07 17 9 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-201-09 ll 17 9 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-201-17 ll 17 9 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SB 4 IV-01-02 14 19 2 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SB 4 IV-01-01 14 19 2 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SB 0 IV-33-01 14 19 2 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SB 0 IV-33-02 14 19 2 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SB 1 IV-33-04 14 8 1 N/A 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-83.1-09 14 19 7 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-83.1-11 14 19 7 N/A 1 4 Limitorque SMB 000 110-128 14 12 76 N/A 7,8 2

TABLE 18 (Continued)

VALVE ACTUATORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Oeleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Limitorque SMB 000 110-127 14 19 75 N/A 1 4 Limitorgue SMB 2 IV-38-02 14 13 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-38-01 14 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 2 IV-38-13 14 19 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB HOV- I V-31-08 14 1 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB HO V- I V-31-07 14 1 N/A New 1 4 Limitorque SMB 000 HOV-IV-34-01 14 6 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-70-92 9 13 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 000 IV-70-94 9 17 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SMB 00 PCV-NC-18 8 17 N/A New 7,8 5 Limitorque SHB 00 PCV-NC-40 8 17 N/A New 7,8 5

TABLE 19 MOTORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Oeleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code K X M 166A-HC8365174 01 18 44 N/A 7,8 2 5K6366XC M81-24 166A-HC8365174 01 18 44 N/A 7,8 2 5K6366XC M81-03 166A-HC8365174 01 18 44 N/A 7,8 2 5K6366XC M81-04 166A-HC8365174 01 18 44 N/A 7,8 2 GE 5K828837C7 M81-49 HC8365172 01 17 42 N/A 7,8 2 GE 5K828837C7 M81-50 HC8365172 01 17 42 N/A 7,8 2 5K828837C7 M81-51 HC8365172 01 17 42 N/A 7,8 2 GE 5K828837C7 M81-52 HC8365172 01 17 42 N/A 7,8 2 5K6338XC 136A M80-03 02 18 43 N/A 7,8 2 5K6338XC 136A M80-04 02 18 43 N/A 7,8 2 5K6328CX 136A M80-23 02 18 43 N/A 7,8 2 5K6328XC 136A M80-24 02 18 43 N/A 7,8 2 Franklin 3CT5MJ 122-01 15 16 91 N/A 7 8 3 Fr anklin 3CT5MJ 122-02 15 16 91 N/A 7 8 3 GE 5K334AK249A M70-01 CB161088 09 11 41 N/A 7,8 1 GE 5K334AK249A M70-02 CB161088 09 11- 41 N/A 7,8 1 5K334AK249A M70-03 CB161088 09 11 41 N/A 7,8 1 GE 5K184AL218 202-33 7 3 N/A New 7,8 1 GE 5K184AL218 202-53 7 3 N/A New 7,8 1 GE 5K8143 NC08A 16A73 17 N/A New 7,8 2 5K8143 NCOBB 16A73 17 N/A New 7 8 2

TABLE 20 RADIATION DETECTORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code GE 194X927 RE-RN04A3 06 2 N/A New 7,8,10 3 GE 194X927 RE-RN04B4 06 2 N/A New 7,8,10 3 GE 194X927 RE-RN04C 06 2 N/A New 7,8,10 3 GE 194X927 RE-RN04D 06 2 N/A New 7,8,10 3 GE 194X927 RE-RN04A 06 11 N/A New 7,8,10 3 GE 194X927 RE-RN04B 06 ll N/A New 7,8,10 3 General Atomic RD23 201.7-36A 11 13 86 N/A 7,8 1 Gener al Atomic RD23 201.7-37A 11 13 86 N/A 7,8 1

TABLE 21 PRESSURE SWITCHES New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Mercoid DA23-156 PS-R068A 8 17 N/A New 7,8 Mercoid DAW-43-103 PS-R0688 8 17 N/A New 7,8 Vibraswitch 366 PS-70-108 9 ll N/A New 1 Vibraswitch 366 PS-70-109 9 ll N/A New 1 Vibraswitch 366 PS-70-110 0 11 N/A New 1 Mercoid CP4122 VCS68-11A 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Mercoid CP4122 VCS68-118 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Mercoid CP4122 VCS68-12A 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Mercoid CP4122 VCS68-128 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Mercoid CP4122 VCS68-13A 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Mercoid Cp4122 VCS68-138 14 17 37 N/A 7,8 Static 0-Ring SNNKK3SlC1A 122-14 15 16 85 N/A 7,8 Barksdale 82S-H12SS NR-108A 18 15 N/A New 7,8 Barksdale 82S-HI2SS NR-1088 18 15 N/A New 7,8 Barksdale 82S-H12SS NR-108C 18 14 N/A New 7,8 Barksdale 82S-H12SS NR-1080 18 14 N/A New 7,8 Barksdale 82S-H12SS NR-108E 18 14 N/A New 7,8 Barksdale 82S-H12SS NR-108F 18 14 N/A New 7,8

TABLE 22 PENETRATIONS/CONNECTORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Oeleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code D.G. O'rien 19,5, 28 PIN 816 N/A 17 19 52 N/A 7 8 4 4 PIN 85 O.G. O'ri en Cl OC0001G14/ N/A 17 92 N/A 7,8 4 C10C0001G21 D.G. O'rien C10C0001G14/ N/A 17 93 N/A 7 8 4 C10C0001G21

TABLE 23 ELECTRIC HEATERS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Oeleted Action Schedule Manufacturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Thermon TFK 202-73 7 03 N/A New 7,8 3 Thermon TFK 202-73 7 03 N/A New 7,8 3 Honeywell R7283B1081 202-76 7 03 N/A New 7,8 3

TABLE 24 H2-02 MONITORS New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Beckman H2-02 No. 11 12 03 N/A New 7,8 3 Beckman H2-02 No. 11 12 03 N/A New 7,8 3

TABLE 25 DELETED EQUIPMENT New/ Corrective Model Plant System Location TER Deleted Action Schedule Manuf acturer No. ID No. Code Code No. Item Code Code Mercoid OA5432 PS-40-08 01 12 34 Deleted N/A N/A Mercoid DA5432 PS-40-07 01 12 34 Deleted N/A N/A GE/MAC 551 PT-80-75 02 18 23 Deleted N/A N/A GE/MAC 551 PT-80-69 02 18 24 Deleted N/A N/A GE/MAC 551 PT-80-47 02 18 24 Deleted N/A N/A GE/MAC 551 PT-80-54 02 18 24 Deleted N/A N/A Mercoid SD 8136 PS-80-61 02 12 33 Deleted N/A N/A Mercoid SD 8136 PS-80-60 02 12 33 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP FT- ID-33A 05 16 40 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 11510P FT- ID-33B 05 16 40 Deleted N/A N/A ASCO HVA904058A SV-NC-16A 08 17 13 Deleted N/A N/A ASCO HVA904058A SV-NC-16B 08 17 13 Deleted N/A N/A Omega HWANSA2231 TE-70-269A OH114T834 09 17 88 Deleted N/A N/A 0mega HWANSA2231 TE-70-276A DH114T834 09 17 88 Deleted N/A N/A GE IC7700 PB-1671 13 11 72 Deleted N/A N/A GE/MAC 551 PT-ID-45 18 15 26 Deleted N/A N/A 194X92792 RE-RN05A 19 2 51 Deleted N/A N/A 194X92792 RE-RN05B 19 2 51 Deleted N/A N/A 194X92792 RE-RN05C 19 2 51 Deleted N/A N/A GE 194X92792 RE-RN05D 19 2 51 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP OPT-01-26A 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP DPT-01-26B 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP OPT-01-26C 5 16 31 Deleted

• N/A N/A Rosemount 1151OP DPT-01-26D 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP DPT-01-26E 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP DPT-01-26F 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP OPT-01-26G 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151DP OPT-01-26H 5 16 31 Deleted N/A N/A Rosemount 1151OP LT 58-05 01 18 36 N/A N/A N/A Rosemount 1151OP LT 58-06 01 18 36 N/A N/A N/A 0

TABLE 26 QUALIFIED EQUIPMENT New/ Corrective Action Schedule Manuf acturer Model No.

Plant ID No.

System Code 'ode Location TER No.

Deleted Item Code Code ELECTRICAL TERMINALS OZ Gedney XL N/A 17 01 61 N/A N/A N/A CABLE Kerite FR2/FR 17 7 97 Rockbestos 16TSP N/A 17 06 95 N/A N/A N/A Rockbestos Control N/A 17 06 96 N/A N/A N/A r

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