Text

Emergency Plan PLP-007, Revision 93
	ML20016A004
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	01/16/2020
From:	Nolan M; Duke Energy Progress
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	RA-19-0468
	Download: ML20016A004 (625)
	v • d • e

M. CHRISTOPHER NOLAN J_DUKE Vice President ENERGY Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, Policy &

Emergency Preparedness 526 South Church Street, EC-07C Charlotte, NC 28202 980-382-7426 Chris.Nolan@duke-energy.com Serial: RA-19-0468 10 CFR 50.54(q)

January 16, 2020 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261 / RENEWED LICENSE NO. DPR-23

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan PLP-007, Revision 93 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), Duke Energy Progress, LLC (Duke Energy) is submitting Revision 93 for H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2 Emergency Plan PLP-007 along with a revision summary describing the changes made. PLP-007, Revision 93, is effective December 16, 2019. Also submitted is CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, Revision 0.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), Attachment I includes a summary of analyses associated with the emergency plan changes. Attachment II is Revision 93 of PLP-007, HBRSEP Unit No. 2 Emergency Plan. Attachment 111 is CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study.

This document contains no new Regulatory Commitments.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, or require additional information, please contact Art Zaremba, Director - Nuclear Fleet Licensing, at 980-373-2062.

Sincerely,

-'/4_

M. Christopher Nolan Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, Policy & Emergency Preparedness Attachment I: 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Attachment II: PLP-007, Robinson Emergency Plan, Revision 93 Attachment Ill: CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, Revision 0

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 Serial: RA-19-0468 cc: L. Dudes, NRC Regional Administrator, NRC, Region II M. Fannon, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HBRSEP, Unit No. 2 A. Hon, NRC Project Manager, NRR

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 1 Serial: RA-19-0468 Attachment I: 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 2 Serial: RA-19-0468

<< 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form >>

Screening and Evaluation Number Applicable Sites BNP EREG #: 2305625 CNS CR3 HNP MNS 5AD #: 2304810 ONS RNP GO Document and Revision PLP-007 Rev 93 Robinson Emergency Plan Part I. Description of Activity Being Reviewed (event or action, or series of actions that may result in a change to the emergency plan or affect the implementation of the emergency plan):

E-Plan/ Current (Existing) Proposed (Change) Supporting Rationale Procedure Text Text (Justification) for Change Section Reference Title Page & Revision 92 Revision 93 Revision updated to reflect Header of change of procedure pages Table of N/A N/A Aligned information in table of Contents contents to reflect changes made within procedure.

1 Throughout EPNOT-01 AD-EP-ALL-0111 Procedure is superseded by fleet procedure. Editorial 2 Throughout EPCLA-01 AD-EP-ALL-0111 Procedure is superseded by fleet procedure. Editorial 3 Throughout Robinson Nuclear Plant CSD-EP-0603-03, Corrected reference to Evacuation Time Robinson Evacuation document. Editorial Estimate prepared by Time Estimate Study KLD Engineering P.C.,

November,2012 4 Throughout Emergency Action Level CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 Corrected reference to Matrix 2, Emergency document. Editorial Action Level Matrix Hot Conditions 5 Throughout Emergency Action Level CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 Corrected reference to Matrix 3, Emergency document. Editorial Action Level Matrix Cold Conditions

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 3 Serial: RA-19-0468 6 Throughout Emergency Action Level CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 Corrected reference to Matrix All Conditions document. Editorial 7 Throughout EPCLA-04 CSD-EP-RNP0101- Corrected reference to 01, Emergency Action document. Editorial Level Basis Document 8 Throughout EAL Matrices EAL Wallchart Editorial 9 Step 5.3.1 One Work Control One Fire Brigade Editorial to align with current Bullet 5 Center SRO, Leader staffing analysis verbiage and procedures 10 Table 5.3.2- SRO Fire Brigade Leader Editorial to align with current 1 line 7 staffing analysis verbiage and procedures 11 Table 5.3.2- Note1 Deleted Corrected note to align with 1 line 7 current procedure and staffing (Minimum analysis. Editorial Staff Colum) 12 Table 5.3.2- Non-Licensed Operator- Security Officer Title change to align with 1 line 8 AO current MERT procedures.

(Emergency Editorial Position Colum) 13 Table 5.3.2- 2 [Note1] [Note4] [Note2] Corrected note to align with 1 Line 8 current procedure and staffing (Minimum analysis. Editorial Staff Colum) 14 Table 5.3.2- 14 15 Typographical error, the total 1 (Total was corrected to align with the Line) staffing analysis.

15 Step 4.1.8 Emergency Action Levels - Emergency Action Levels Step 4.1.8 Step 1, 2 Moved Plant or environmental - Plant or environmental these document references conditions used to conditions used to from Step 4.1.7 & 4.1.13. These determine the existence of determine the existence reference steps were an emergency and to of an emergency and to inadvertently moved when PLP-classify its severity. The classify its severity. The 007 Revision 80 placed Section conditions include specific conditions include 4.0 Definitions in alphabetical instrument readings (e.g., specific instrument order. PLP-007 Revision 79 has radiation release rates out readings (e.g., radiation these references under the of a building vent) that release rates out of a correct step 4.1.8. The step was may be used as thresholds building vent) that may be also revised to Delete "Matrix 1, for initiating emergency used as thresholds for 2, & 3, change "four separate measures such as initiating emergency documents" to "two separate initiating a notification measures such as documents". Editorial procedure. The initiating a notification Emergency Action Levels procedure. The CSD-EP-(EAL) are made up of RNP-0101-02, EAL three separate matrices, Wallchart (Both Hot and ALL Conditions EAL Matrix Cold), are made up of 1, HOT Conditions EAL three separate wallchart, Matrix 2, and COLD ALL Conditions EAL, Conditions EAL Matrix 3. HOT Conditions EAL, and The EAL matrices, along COLD Conditions EAL.

with the EAL Technical The EAL wallchart, along

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 4 Serial: RA-19-0468 Bases Document, are with the EAL Technical individually distributed, as Bases Document, are four separate documents, individually distributed, as within the Document two separate documents, Management System. within the Document Management System.

1. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

2. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document 16 Step 5.1.1.5 Figure 5.1.1-6 CSD-EP-0603-03, This information is in CSD-EP-Robinson Evacuation 0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study Time Estimate Study. Editorial 17 Figure 5.1.1- HBRSEP Site Sector Figure 5.1.1-6 This information is in CSD-EP-6 Permanent Population Intentionally Left Blank 0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Totals Time Estimate Study. Editorial 18 Table 5.4.4- Deleted Table 5.4.4-4 Table 5.4.4-4 This information is in CSD-EP-4, Notes, Evacuation Times and Intentionally Left Blank 0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Comments Zones, Notes, and Time Estimate Study. Editorial comments 19 Step 5.4.4.6 Table 5.4.4-4 Evacuation CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, This information is in CSD-EP-Times and Zones Robinson Evacuation 0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study Time Estimate Study. Editorial 20 Attachment CSD-EP-RNP-0101- Since the EAL Wall Charts are 6.7 Section 02(2) EAL Wallchart referenced by title and number in 5.2 (Both Hot and Cold) this plan 50.54Q screen will be performed but will not be required to be submitted to the NRC.

Therefore Note 2 is added to CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 reference.

Editorial 21 Attachment Figures 5.1.1-2, 5.1.1-6 Figures 5.1.1-2, CSD-EP- This information is in CSD-EP-6.8 Sec J. RNP-0603-03 0603-03, Robinson Evacuation

10. b Time Estimate Study. Editorial Part II. Activity Previously Reviewed? Yes No Is this activity Fully bounded by an NRC approved 10 CFR 50.90 submittal or 10 CFR 50.54(q) Continue to Alert and Notification System Design Report? Effectiveness Attachment 4, Evaluation is not 10 CFR If yes, identify bounding source document number or approval reference and required. Enter 50.54(q) ensure the basis for concluding the source document fully bounds the proposed justification Screening change is documented below: below and Evaluation complete Form, Part III Justification: Attachment 4, Part V.

Bounding document attached (optional)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 5 Serial: RA-19-0468 Part III. Editorial Change No or Yes Is this activity an editorial or typographical change only, such as formatting, Partially paragraph numbering, spelling, or punctuation that does not change intent? 10 CFR 50.54(q) Continue to Effectiveness Attachment 4, Evaluation is not Part IV and Justification:

required. Enter address non-The proposed changes outlined above are editorial as defined by AD-EP-ALL-justification and editorial 0602, EMERGENCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS complete changes EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q) and do not cause a reduction in effectiveness Attachment 4, of the Robinson Emergency Plan.

Part V.

Part IV. Emergency Planning Element and Function Screen (Reference Attachment 1, Considerations for Addressing Screening Criteria)

Does this activity involve any of the following, including program elements from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Section II? If answer is yes, then check box.

1 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) 1a Responsibility for emergency response is assigned.

1b The response organization has the staff to respond and to augment staff on a continuing basis (24-7 staffing) in accordance with the emergency plan.

2 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) Onsite Emergency Organization 2a Process ensures that on shift emergency response responsibilities are staffed and assigned 2b The process for timely augmentation of on shift staff is established and maintained.

3 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) Emergency Response Support and Resources 3a Arrangements for requesting and using off site assistance have been made.

3b State and local staff can be accommodated at the EOF in accordance with the emergency plan. (NA for CR3) 4 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classification System 4a A standard scheme of emergency classification and action levels is in use. (Requires final approval of Screen and Evaluation by EP CFAM.)

5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) Notification Methods and Procedures 5a Procedures for notification of State and local governmental agencies are capable of alerting them of the declared emergency within 15 minutes (60 minutes for CR3) after declaration of an emergency and providing follow-up notification.

5b Administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway. (NA for CR3) 5c The public ANS meets the design requirements of FEMA-REP-10, Guide for Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, or complies with the licensee's FEMA-approved ANS design report and supporting FEMA approval letter. (NA for CR3) 6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) Emergency Communications 6a Systems are established for prompt communication among principal emergency response organizations.

6b Systems are established for prompt communication to emergency response personnel.

7 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) Public Education and Information

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 6 Serial: RA-19-0468 7a Emergency preparedness information is made available to the public on a periodic basis within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ). (NA for CR3) 7b Coordinated dissemination of public information during emergencies is established.

8 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) Emergency Facilities and Equipment 8a Adequate facilities are maintained to support emergency response.

8b Adequate equipment is maintained to support emergency response.

9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) Accident Assessment 9a Methods, systems, and equipment for assessment of radioactive releases are in use.

10 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10) Protective Response 10a A range of public PARs is available for implementation during emergencies. (NA for CR3) 10b Evacuation time estimates for the population located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ are available to support the formulation of PARs and have been provided to State and local governmental authorities. (NA for CR3) 10c A range of protective actions is available for plant emergency workers during emergencies, including those for hostile action events.

10d KI is available for implementation as a protective action recommendation in those jurisdictions that chose to provide KI to the public.

11 10 CFR 50.47(b) (11) Radiological Exposure Control 11a The resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers are established.

12 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12) Medical and Public Health Support 12a Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated, injured individuals.

13 10 CFR 50.47(b) (13) Recovery Planning and Post-Accident Operations 13a Plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

14 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14) Drills and Exercises 14a A drill and exercise program (including radiological, medical, health physics and other program areas) is established.

14b Drills, exercises, and training evolutions that provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, and demonstrate key skills are assessed via a formal critique process in order to identify weaknesses.

14c Identified weaknesses are corrected.

15 10 CFR 50.47(b) (15) Emergency Response Training 15a Training is provided to emergency responders.

16 10 CFR 50.47(b) (16) Emergency Plan Maintenance 16a Responsibility for emergency plan development and review is established.

16b Planners responsible for emergency plan development and maintenance are properly trained.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment I, Page 7 Serial: RA-19-0468 PART IV. Conclusion If no Part IV criteria are checked, then provide Justification and complete Part V below.

Justification:

ALL changes listed above are editorial and do not impact planning standards If any Attachment 4, 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form, Part IV criteria are checked, then complete , 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form, Part V and perform a 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Effectiveness Evaluation. Program Element 4a requires final approval of Screen and Evaluation by EP CFAM.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment II Serial: RA-19-0468 Attachment II: PLP-007 Robinson Emergency Plan, Revision 93

I Information Use H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 PLP-007 ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 93 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 1 of 208

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES PRR 2276986 SECTION/STEP REVISION COMMENTS Operations is changing their fire brigade leader from an SRO to an AO. References to the Fire Brigade Leader should remain neutral so it may be staffed with either position. (PRR 2276986)

Step 5.3.1 Bullet 5

Changed 'one work control center SRO' to 'one Fire Brigade Leader' Table 5.3.2.1 line 7 Page 86

Changed 'SRO' to 'Fire Brigade Leader' Corrected to match ERO Staffing Analysis (PRR 2293731)

Page 88 Table 5.3.2-1 Item 7 Under Minimum Shift Size column Deleted "[Note 1]".

Page 88 Table 5.3.2-1 Item 8 Under Emergency Positions column Changed "Non-Licensed Operator - AO" to "Security Officer" Under Minimum Shift Size column Changed "2 [Note 1] [Note 4]" to "[Note 2]"

Page 88 Table 5.3.2-1 Under Total line Changed from "14 to "15".

Throughout updated EPCLA-04 with CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01 Emergency Action Level Basis Document.

(Editorial)

Throughout updated EAL MATRIX 1, EAL MATRIX 2, EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 1, Emergency Action Level Matrix ALL Conditions, EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 2, Emergency Action Level Matrix HOT Conditions, & EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 3, Emergency Action Level Matrix COLD Conditions with CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

Throughout updated EAL matrices with EAL Wallchart Per AD-EP-ALL-0602, Step 5.1.3 The NRC does not consider lower tier documents, (i.e., emergency plan implementing procedures, EAL Wall Charts, program maintenance procedures, administrative procedures), to be part of the emergency plan and subject to 10 CFR 50.54(q), for the purpose of evaluating proposed changes. Since the EAL Wall Charts are referenced by title and number in this plan 50.54Q screen will be performed but will not be required to be submitted to the NRC. Therefore Note 2 is added to CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 reference Emergency Plan Change Screening and Effectiveness Evaluations 10 CFR 50.54(Q) EREGs are not required for sub tier documents. The procedure gives specific examples of the EAL wallchart. This is because all the words in the EALs of the wallchart are contained in the EALs technical basis document. If we change words in the Basis, then we will change the words on the wallchart, and the Q for the Tech Basis will suffice.

Attachment 6.7 Section 5.2 replaced references of EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 1, Emergency Action Level Matrix ALL Conditions, EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 2, Emergency Action Level Matrix HOT Conditions, & EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 3, Emergency Action Level Matrix COLD Conditions with CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold).

Attachment 6.7 Section 5.2 Added reference to Note (2) to CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

Step 4.1.8 Step 1, 2 Moved these document references from Step 4.1.7 & 4.1.13. These reference steps were inadvertently moved when PLP-007 Revision 80 placed Section 4.0 Definitions in alphabetical order.

PLP-007 Revision 79 has these references under the correct step 4.1.8. (Editorial)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 2 of 208

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES SECTION/STEP REVISION COMMENTS Step 4.1.8, 4.1.8.1, 4.1.8.2 Revised step to Delete "Matrix 1, 2, & 3, change "four separate documents" to "two separate documents".

From:

Emergency Action Levels - Plant or environmental conditions used to determine the existence of an emergency and to classify its severity. The conditions include specific instrument readings (e.g., radiation release rates out of a building vent) that may be used as thresholds for initiating emergency measures such as initiating a notification procedure. The Emergency Action Levels (EAL) are made up of three separate matrices, ALL Conditions EAL Matrix 1, HOT Conditions EAL Matrix 2, and COLD Conditions EAL Matrix 3.

The EAL matrices, along with the EAL Technical Bases Document, are individually distributed, as four separate documents, within the Document Management System.

1. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 1, Emergency Action Level Matrix ALL Conditions

2. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 2, Emergency Action Level Matrix HOT Conditions

3. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX 3, Emergency Action Level Matrix COLD Conditions

4. EPCLA-04, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document To:

Emergency Action Levels - Plant or environmental conditions used to determine the existence of an emergency and to classify its severity. The conditions include specific instrument readings (e.g., radiation release rates out of a building vent) that may be used as thresholds for initiating emergency measures such as initiating a notification procedure. The CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold), are made up of three separate wallchart, ALL Conditions EAL, HOT Conditions EAL, and COLD Conditions EAL.

The EAL matrices, along with the EAL Technical Bases Document, are individually distributed, as two separate documents, within the Document Management System.

1. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

2. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document Updated the following reference to CSD for ETE reports, AD-EP-ALL-0109 Revision, and AD-EP-ALL-0111 implementation (PRR 2277812)

Step 2.7 Replaced "Robinson Nuclear Plant Evacuation Time Estimate prepared by KLD Engineering, P.C., November, 2012" with "CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study" Step 5.1.1.5 Replaced "Figure 5.1.1-6" with "CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study" Figure 5.1.1-6 Deleted Figure 5.1.1-6 HBRSEP Site Sector Permanent Population Totals and replaced with "Figure 5.1.1-6 Intentionally Left Blank".

Steps 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, Replaced "EPCLA-01, Emergency Control" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control 5.2.6, 5.4.1, 5.4.1.1, 5.4.1.2, Room Activation of the ERO" 5.4.1.3, 5.4.1.4, 5.4.1.5, 5.4.4.2.a, 5.4.4.6 Attachment 6.7 Sec. 5.2 & Replaced "EPCLA-01" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111" 5.4, Attachment 6.8 Sec.

F.1.e & J.7 Steps 5.3.1.2, 5.4.1.1, 5.4.4.6 Replaced "EPNOT-01, CR Offsite Communicator" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO" Table 5.4.4-4, Notes,

Deleted Table 5.4.4-4 Evacuation Times and Zones, Notes, and Comments comments replaced with "Table 5.4.4-4 Intentionally Left Blank" PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 3 of 208

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES SECTION/STEP REVISION COMMENTS Step 5.4.4.6

Deleted EPNOT-01, CR Offsite Communicator.

Replaced "Robinson Nuclear Plant Evacuation Time Estimate prepared by KLD Engineering, P.C., November, 2012" with "CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study"

Replaced "Table 5.4.4-4 Evacuation Times and Zones" with "CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study" Step 5.4.4.7.c Added "located in CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study" Attachment 6.7 Sec. 5.3 Replaced "EPNOT-01" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111" Attachment 6.7 Sec. 5.4 Deleted EPNOT-01, CR Offsite Communicator. .8 Sec. E.4.a-n Replaced "Procedure EPNOT-01" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111" Attachment 6.8 Sec. F.1.a Replaced "EPNOT-01" with "AD-EP-ALL-0111" Attachment 6.8 Sec. F.1.e Deleted "EPNOT-01" Attachment 6.8 Sec J.10.b Replaced "Figures 5.1.1-5, 5.1.1-6" with "Figure 5.1.1-5, CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03" PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 4 of 208

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE................................................................................................................ 7

2.0 REFERENCES

......................................................................................................... 7 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................. 10 4.0 DEFINITIONS / ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................... 10 5.0 PLAN ...................................................................................................................... 16 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 16 Figure 5.1.1-1, Robinson Site Plan..................................................................... 24 Figure 5.1.1-2, 10 - Mile Plume Exposure EPZ ................................................. 25 Figure 5.1.1-3, Emergency Response Facility Locations ................................... 26 Figure 5.1.1-4, Wind Rose for H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 . 27 Figure 5.1.1-5, 50 - Mile Ingestion Exposure EPZ ............................................. 28 Figure 5.1.1-6, Intentionally Left Blank ............................................................... 29 Figure 5.1.1-7, Concept of Emergency Planning Zones ..................................... 30 5.2 Emergency Classifications ..................................................................................... 31 Figure 5.2-1, Response Sequence to off Normal Conditions ............................. 37 5.3 Emergency Response Organization ....................................................................... 38 Figure 5.3.1-1, HBRSEP Shift Organization ....................................................... 84 Figure 5.3.2-1, Technical Support Center ERO .................................................. 85 Figure 5.3.2-2, Operations Support Center ERO ............................................... 86 Figure 5.3.2-3, Emergency Operations Facility ERO .......................................... 87 Figure 5.3.2-4, Joint Information Center ERO .................................................... 88 Table 5.3.2-1, On shift Staffing for Emergencies ............................................... 89 Table 5.3.2-2, Augmented Staffing for Emergencies.......................................... 92 Table 5.3.5-1, Notification and Activation of Principal Emergency Response Organizations ..................................................................................................... 94 Figure 5.3.5-1, Interfaces for Unusual Event ...................................................... 96 Figure 5.3.5-2, Interfaces for Alert ...................................................................... 97 Figure 5.3.5-4, Interfaces for Site Area Emergency ........................................... 98 Figure 5.3.5-6, Interfaces for General Emergency ............................................. 99 5.4 Emergency Measures .......................................................................................... 100 Table 5.4.3-1, List of Procedures at HBRSEP for Off-Normal Conditions ........ 124 Table 5.4.4-1, Factors Related to Warning/Evacuation Time ........................... 127 Table 5.4.4-2, Representative Shielding Factors From Gamma Cloud Source 128 Table 5.4.4-3, Evacuation Routes for the 10 Mile EPZ .................................... 129 Table 5.4.4-4, Intentionally Left Blank .............................................................. 132 5.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment ................................................................... 133 Table 5.5.0-1, Functional Objectives of Emergency Facilities .......................... 146 Table 5.5.7-1, Onsite Meteorological Instrumentation ...................................... 149 Table 5.5.7-2, Seismic Monitoring .................................................................... 150 Table 5.5.7-3, Radiation Monitoring System .................................................... 151 Table 5.5.7-4, Portable Radiation Survey Instruments ..................................... 153 Table 5.5.7-5, Location of Environmental Sampling Stations ........................... 154 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 5 of 208

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 5.6 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness ................................................................ 163 5.7 Recovery .............................................................................................................. 173 Figure 5.7.2.1, Recovery Organization ............................................................. 181 6.0 ATTACHMENTS .................................................................................................. 182 6.1 Communications Systems .................................................................................... 183 6.2 Offsite Emergency Response Plans/Letters of Agreements ................................ 186 6.3 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Offsite Agency Support Summary188 6.4 Distribution Lists for Plan and Procedures ........................................................... 191 6.5 Medical Treatment and Assistance ...................................................................... 192 6.6 Technical Basis of Emergency Dose Projection Program .................................... 195 6.7 Procedures Required to Implement Sections of the Plan..................................... 201 6.8 Cross-Reference Between NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criteria and the Robinson Emergency Plan .......................................................................................................... 204 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 6 of 208

1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 The purpose of this plan is to provide the methodology to ensure protection of plant personnel and the general public and to prevent or mitigate property damage that could result from an emergency at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, (HBRSEP) Unit No. 2.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants 2.2 PD-RP-ALL-0001, Radiation Worker Responsibilities 2.3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 2.4 EPA-400/R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, May, 1992 2.5 RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, USNRC, Volume 1, Revision 4, Washington, D. C., March 1996 2.6 RCM-96, Response Coordination Manual, USNRC, September 1996 2.7 CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study 2.8 National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) Report No. 55, August 1, 1977, Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of Radioiodine 2.9 South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Part 2 - H. B.

Robinson FNF Site Specific 2.10 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, January 1980 2.11 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, dated October 1980 2.12 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report of the Clinch Valley Study, ORNL-4835 (January 1973), J. A. Auxier and R. O. Chester, eds.

2.13 SAND 77-1725, Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Accidents, Sandia Laboratory PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 7 of 208

2.14 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations 2.14.1 Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation 2.14.2 Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 2.14.3 Part 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities 2.14.4 Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria 2.15 Engineering Evaluation 94-079, Administrative Building Public Address 2.16 Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) 2.17 ESR 96-00441, Service Water Pump Vortexing Determination 2.18 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 - Issuance of Amendment to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels For Non-Passive Reactors (CAC No. MF6222), Dated April 28, 2016 2.19 H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 - Correction of Implementation Date for License Amendment No. 245 Regarding Adoption Of Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors (CAC No. MF6222), Dated May 11,2016 2.20 RNP-RA/95-0096 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exception to Location of the Technical Support Center in the Protected Area Submitted February 24, 1995. (CR-43869) 2.21 NRC Memo Information Assessment Team Recommended Actions In Response to Site Specific Credible Threat at Nuclear Power Plant (1A-01-1), dated 11/06/01 2.22 ESR 96-00446, Revision 4/EC 47646, Met Tower Mod 2.23 RNP RA/01-0164, Request for Technical Specification Change to Eliminate the Requirements for the Post-Accident Sampling System 2.24 NRC Amendment No. 192, Elimination of Requirements for the Post-Accident Sampling System 2.25 EC 49849, Set-Point, Declaration Evaluation for EP 2.26 EC 47069, Main Steam N-16 Monitors 2.27 EC 47088, Obsolete Strong Motion Recorders - Kinemetrics 2.28 RRA-04-0099: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 - Issuance of an Amendment on Full Implementation of the Alternative Source Term (TAC No.

MB5105): Amendment 201 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 8 of 208

2.29 NUREG-1940 RASCAL 4.0: Description of models and methods 2.30 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Guidance for Protective Action Strategies (November 1980) 2.31 NRC Amendment No. 254, Issuance of Amendment to Consolidate Emergency Operations Facility and Associated Emergency Plan Changes 2.32 NRC Bulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events (RNP-RA05-0082, NTM 166410) 2.33 SOER 02-1, Severe Weather 2.34 NRC Security Order Section B.5.b 2.35 NGGM-PM-0024, NGG Plant Digital Systems Cyber Security Program 2.36 NEI 99-01 Revision 6, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.37 CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document 2.38 CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold) 2.39 EC 58638, Install Indicating Light for OBE Setpoint Earthquake 2.40 SOER 99-1, Loss of Grid - Addendum 2.41 NEI 10-05 On-Shift Staffing Analysis for H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant 2.42 IER L1-13-10, Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Recommendation 5H 2.43 Memorandum to MR. E .E. Utley of Carolina Power & Light from the NRC, Ronnie H. Lo dated December 16, 1988 with the subject of "H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, - Alternate Locations of Emergency Operating Facilities (TAC No 71208, 71440, 71441, and 71442) (Ref-Table 5.5.0-1) 2.44 AD-RP-ALL-7002, Operation of Radiation Protection Portable Survey Instruments 2.45 DUKE-QAPD-001, Quality Assurance Program Description 2.46 AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations 2.47 AD-EP-ALL-0500, Emergency Response Training 2.48 AD-LS-ALL-0019, On-Site Review Committee 2.49 CAPR 199340-23, Correct and Clarify Expected Response Time of ERO Personnel PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 9 of 208

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 Individual responsibilities are as noted within the body of this plan. These responsibilities may be different within different portions of the Emergency Plan.

4.0 DEFINITIONS / ABBREVIATIONS 4.1 Definitions 4.1.1 Accident - Any unforeseen, or unintentional occurrence or mishap resulting in, or potentially resulting in, physical injury or injury due to radiation exposure or excessive exposure to radioactive materials.

4.1.2 Activated - A position or facility has sufficient resources to perform required functions for the event in progress.

4.1.3 Annual - Once every 364 days +91 days (unless otherwise stated).

4.1.4 Augmented - A facility is said to be augmented when staffing meets the requirements of Table 5.3.2-1, On shift Staffing for Emergencies, and

.Table 5.3.2-2, Augmented Staffing for Emergencies.

4.1.5 B.5.b Area - Predesignated area containing communications equipment and procedures for Operations in the event they are unable to reach the Main Control Room.

4.1.6 Biennial - Once every 728 days +182 days (unless otherwise stated).

4.1.7 Corrective Actions - Those emergency measures taken to lessen or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem, to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or to reduce the magnitude of a release (e.g., equipment shutdown, fire fighting, repair, and damage control).

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4.1.8 Emergency Action Levels - Plant or environmental conditions used to determine the existence of an emergency and to classify its severity. The conditions include specific instrument readings (e.g., radiation release rates out of a building vent) that may be used as thresholds for initiating emergency measures such as initiating a notification procedure. The CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold), are made up of three separate wallchart, ALL Conditions EAL, HOT Conditions EAL, and COLD Conditions EAL. The EAL wallchart, along with the EAL Technical Bases Document, are individually distributed, as two separate documents, within the Document Management System.

1. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02, EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

2. CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document 4.1.9 Emergency Classification - The characterization of emergency situations consisting of several groupings including the entire spectrum of possible radiological emergencies. The four classes of emergencies, listed in order of increasing severity (and decreasing probability), are (1) Unusual Event, (2) Alert, (3) Site Area Emergency, and (4) General Emergency.

4.1.10 Emergency Operating Procedures - Specific procedures that provide step-by-step instructions to guide plant operations during potential or actual emergency situations.

4.1.11 Emergency Operations Centers - Designated facilities designed and equipped for effective coordination and control of emergency operations carried out within an organization's jurisdiction.

4.1.12 Emergency Operations Facility - An offsite support facility for the management of overall licensee emergency response including coordination with federal, state, and local officials, coordination of offsite radiological and environmental assessment, and determination of recommended public protective actions.

4.1.13 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) - A generic area defined about a nuclear plant to facilitate emergency planning offsite. The plume exposure EPZ is described as an area with a 10-mile radius and the ingestion exposure EPZ is described as an area with a 50-mile radius in NRC NUREG-0654. (See Figure 5.1.1-7) 4.1.14 Exclusion Area - Duke Energy-owned property that surrounds the reactor plant as defined in 10 CFR 100.3. The RNP 1400 ft radius exclusion area ensures the Dose criteria of 10 CFR 50.67 are met.

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4.1.15 Hostile Action - An act towards a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. (Hostile Actions do not include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP, e.g. violent acts between individuals within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities).

4.1.16 Hostile Force - One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

4.1.17 Ingestion Exposure Pathway also known as Ingestion Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (IPZ) - The potential pathway of radioactive materials to the public through consumption of radiologically contaminated water and foods such as milk or fresh vegetables.

4.1.18 Joint Information Center (JIC) - An offsite support facility for the coordinated release of public information by Duke Energy and various governmental agencies.

4.1.19 Monthly - Once every 31 days +7 days. May be scheduled every 28 or 31 days. If scheduled on 28 day interval the grace period is as follows: 31 x

.25 = 7.75 + 3 or once every 28 days + 10.4.

4.1.20 Nuclear Incident - An event or series of events, either deliberate or accidental, leading to the release or potential release into the environment of radioactive material in sufficient quantity warranting consideration of protection actions.

4.1.21 Onsite Protective Measure - An action taken to avoid or reduce exposure to personnel onsite.

4.1.22 Operations Support Center -An onsite facility for coordinated dispatch of emergency repair missions.

4.1.23 Plant Operator (NRC Definition) - Any member of the plant staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensees emergency classification scheme. 'Plant operators' may be, but need not be, licensed operators or members of the ERO. 'Plant operators' may be located in the control room or in another emergency facility in which emergency declarations are performed. A 'plant operator' does not encompass plant personnel such as chemists, radiation protection technicians, craft personnel, security personnel, and others whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the Control Room. (Reference 2.1)

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4.1.24 Plume Exposure Pathway - The potential pathway of radioactive materials to the public through 50 year committed internal dose and external exposure from the plume and deposited materials.

4.1.25 Population-at-Risk - Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be taken.

4.1.26 Projected Dose - An estimate of the potential radiation dose which affected population groups could receive.

4.1.27 Protected Area - Area encompassed by physical barriers and to which access is controlled.

4.1.28 Protective Action - An activity conducted in response to an incident or potential incident to avoid or reduce radiation dose to the members of the public.

4.1.29 Protective Action Guide - The projected dose to reference man, or other defined individual from an accidental release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is warranted.

4.1.30 Quarterly - Once every 92 days +23 days.

4.1.31 Radiological Emergency - An off-normal situation that has or may have a radiological impact on the public health and safety.

4.1.32 Recovery Actions - Those actions taken after an emergency to restore the HBRSEP and the surrounding environment as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency condition.

4.1.33 Remote Emergency Response Facility (RERF) - An offsite facility where the ERO can assemble and activate when the on-site facilities are not accessible. The facility can support the operations of the TSC, and OSC until the on-site facilities are available to support the ERO.

4.1.34 Restricted Area - Any area, access to which is limited by a physical barrier such as a wall, fence, or continuous surveillance and control of access by a representative of the company for the purpose of protecting individuals against undue risks from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.

4.1.35 Semi-Annual - Once every 184 days +46 days.

4.1.36 Site Boundary - An area whose boundary encompasses a 1400 ft. radius from the center of the reactor. This distance is specific for the HBRSEP.

4.1.37 State - The State of South Carolina.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 13 of 208

4.1.38 Technical Support Center - A center outside of the control room that supplies information on the status of the plant to those individuals who are knowledgeable or responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event of an emergency, and to those persons who are responsible for management of the emergency response.

4.1.39 TEDE - (Total Effective Dose Equivalent), the sum of the deep dose equivalent (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures).

4.1.40 Unrestricted Area - An area, at or beyond the site boundary, access to which is neither limited nor controlled by the company.

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4.2 Abbreviations 4.2.1 AOP - Abnormal Operating Procedures 4.2.2 CCD - Corporate Communications Department 4.2.3 EAL - Emergency Action Levels 4.2.4 EOC - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.5 EOF - Emergency Operations Facility 4.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedures 4.2.7 EPZ - Emergency Planning Zones 4.2.8 FPB - Fission Product Barrier 4.2.9 GPD - gallons per day 4.2.10 HBRSEP - H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 4.2.11 ISFSI - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 4.2.12 JIC - Joint Information Center 4.2.13 OSC - Operations Support Center 4.2.14 PAG - Protective Action Guide 4.2.15 PC - Personal Computer 4.2.16 RERF - Remote Emergency Response Facility 4.2.17 SEOC - State Emergency Operations Center 4.2.18 TSC - Technical Support Center PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 15 of 208

5.0 PLAN 5.1 Introduction The Emergency Preparedness Program for the HBRSEP consists of the Robinson Emergency Plan and its implementing Emergency Procedures. Also included are references to related radiological emergency plans and procedures of state and local organizations. The combined emergency preparedness programs have the following objectives:

1. Effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizations having a response role.

2. Early warning and clear instructions to the population-at-risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency.

3. Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite.

4. Effective and timely implementation of emergency measures.

5. Continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.

The Emergency Preparedness Staff performs the function of Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. The Robinson Emergency Plan and Procedures are contained in the Controlled Procedure Manual, which consists of the following parts:

Robinson Emergency Plan Emergency Procedures (EP)

A list of procedures required to implement the plan can be found in Attachment 6.7.

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5.1.1 General Information

1. Plant Site Description The HBRSEP is located due west of the dam of Lake Robinson in Western Darlington County at Longitude W. 80º, 9 min., 5 sec.,

Latitude N. 34º, 24 min, 2 sec. It is owned and operated by Duke Energy with Corporate Headquarters at Charlotte, North Carolina.

The facility has one (1) nuclear reactor of Westinghouse Corporation manufacture. It has been in operation since March 1971 and is licensed to operate at 2339 megawatts-thermal with an associated gross electrical output of approximately 747 megawatts.

Additionally, the facility has a decommissioned fossil fuel (coal) fired generating unit, a combustion turbine producing approximately 13 megawatts, and two dry fuel storage facilities (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - ISFSI). The 7P ISFSI facility operates under Material License SNM-2502. The 24 P ISFSI operates under a general license per 10CFR72.

Figure 5.1.1-1 shows a site plan for the HBRSEP.

2. Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone The South Carolina Counties of Darlington, Chesterfield, Lee, and Kershaw have portions of the counties that lie within a ten-mile radius of the Robinson site. Only a very small portion of Kershaw County falls within this 10-mile radius, from generally the seven to ten-mile distance from the plant. A sparsely inhabited area of Kershaw County lies within the nine-to-ten-mile distances. The remainder of the area is the Lynches River Swamp and basically uninhabitable. The area also lays 90º out of the prevailing winds.

Resultingly, the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is comprised of those portions of Darlington, Chesterfield, and Lee Counties lying within 10 miles of the HBRSEP (see Figure 5.1.1-2).

3. Principal exposure sources from the plume exposure pathways are:

External exposure to gamma and beta radiation from the plume and from deposited material; and Committed dose to internal organs from inhalation of radioactive gases and/or radioactive particulates.

Major weather systems moving over the facility are primarily from the west with prevailing winds shown graphically in Figure 5.1.1-4 (wind rose).

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5.1.1 (Continued)

4. Ingestion Exposure Emergency Planning Zone The Ingestion Exposure EPZ is defined to be the area within a 50 mile radius of HBRSEP. The South Carolina Counties of Darlington, Chesterfield, Lee, Kershaw, Marlboro, Dillon, Marion, Florence, Williamsburg, Clarendon, Sumter, Richland, Fairfield, Lancaster and Chester, along with Anson, Robeson, Richmond, Union, and Scotland Counties in North Carolina, (or portions thereof) lie within a 50 mile radius of HBRSEP (See Figure 5.1.1-5).

The principal exposure sources from the ingestion pathway are contaminated water or food, such as milk or fresh vegetables. The time of potential exposure can range in length from hours to months.

5. Demographic Information Demographic information for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zones is presented in CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study.

5.1.2 Scope and Applicability This document describes the Robinson Emergency Plan (Plan) which has been prepared in accordance with Section 50.47 and Appendix E, of Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Plan shall be implemented whenever an emergency situation is indicated as defined in Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications. Radiological emergencies can vary in severity from the occurrence of an abnormal event, such as a minor fire with no radiological health consequences, to nuclear incidents having substantial onsite and/or offsite consequences.

In addition to emergencies involving a release of radioactive materials, events such as security threats or breaches, fires, electrical system disturbances, and natural phenomena that have the potential for involving radioactive materials are included in the Plan.

The activities and responsibilities of outside agencies providing an emergency response role at the HBRSEP are summarized in the Plan and detailed in the State and County Emergency Plans.

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5.1.3 Summary of Emergency Preparedness Program The HBRSEP Emergency Preparedness Program consists of the Robinson Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures. The Plan provides the basis for performing advance planning and for defining specific requirements and commitments to be implemented by other documents and procedures. HBRSEP procedures provide the detailed actions and instructions that will be required to implement the Plan in the event of an emergency. The Plan and its implementing procedures are briefly described below.

1. Concept of Operations The Robinson Emergency Plan describes the general nature of emergency response activities, the available emergency response resources and facilities, and the means for maintaining emergency preparedness. Specific plant implementing procedures have been developed to describe in detail how involved plant personnel carry out their specific responsibilities as identified in the Plan. Each team and individual assignment carries with it specific emergency response duties, and each is provided with an on-shift person to perform those duties on an interim basis. This approach ensures under all conditions that every emergency response duty falls under some predesignated individual and provides a smooth transition as additional people are called to the plant, since each one knows ahead of time what area of responsibilities will be.

a. Emergency Response Activities The first step in responding to an emergency is recognizing and classifying the nature of the emergency. In order to standardize this process, the four emergency classifications described in NEI 99-01 Rev 6 are adopted for use in this Plan. Each class of emergency (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) encompasses a predefined set of increasingly severe circumstances, including plant, ISFSI, or Security conditions, instrument readings, and effectiveness of in-plant corrective actions, known as Emergency Action Levels. The process of properly classifying an emergency is important because the subsequent response activities are dependent on the severity of the emergency.

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5.1.3.1.a (Continued)

The next step is to notify (and activate as conditions warrant) the proper emergency organizations, both inside and outside Duke Energy. Proper integration of the efforts of the various response organizations is important to prevent omission or unnecessary duplication of key activities. Therefore, the Robinson Emergency Plan identifies in terms of information flow and communications links the interfaces between pertinent organizations, and identifies the role each is to perform.

The emergency response measures to be taken by Duke Energy are discussed in detail in this Plan, while those taken by the State and Counties are summarized herein with details provided in the South Carolina State Emergency Plans.

Beyond the process of notification and activation of support groups, a variety of efforts must be made to assess and minimize the consequences of an emergency condition.

These efforts include estimates of the radiation exposures that may occur to plant and offsite personnel if the emergency is not brought quickly under control. Such estimates can be used to initiate preplanned protective actions. The decisions on protective actions offsite, such as taking shelter, limiting access to high-risk areas, or perhaps evacuation, are the responsibility of state and local authorities. The Plan provides for technical assessments of the course and consequences of the emergency and the means for providing state and local agencies with adequate information upon which to make their decisions. Emergency response activities also include personnel accountability, search and rescue, first aid, personnel decontamination, fire fighting, and damage control.

The final step is to declare the emergency over and perform any necessary post-accident recovery operations. The Plan and AD-EP-ALL-0110, Recovery, describes the post-accident recovery provisions and identifies the transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase.

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5.1.3.1 (Continued)

b. Emergency Response Resources The first line of defense in responding to an emergency lies with the normal operating shift on duty when the emergency begins. Therefore, members of the HBRSEP staff are assigned defined emergency response roles that are to be assumed whenever an emergency is declared. The overall management of the emergency is normally performed by the Plant Management. Onsite personnel have pre-assigned roles to support the Emergency Coordinator and EOF Director and to implement their directives. These roles, for the purpose of emergency planning, are cast in terms of emergency teams and assignments, each having designated personnel assigned to it. The emergency response resources available to respond to an emergency consist of the personnel at Corporate Headquarters, at other Duke Energy facilities, and, in the longer term, at organizations involved in the nuclear industry.

The Emergency Coordinator will also have ready access to the TSC Support Personnel. These personnel are knowledgeable of, and responsible for, various areas of emergency response. They may assemble in the TSC shortly after an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency is declared, or earlier at the discretion of the Emergency Coordinator, in order to assist the Emergency Coordinator and to carry out directives. Radiation Protection, Maintenance, Security, and Engineering are among the disciplines available to assist.

Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been activated, the EOF Director will be responsible for radiological and environmental assessment, determination of recommended public protective actions, and coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies. Corporate response activities and Corporate resources, such as equipment and response centers, are available to relieve the HBRSEP personnel of any activities that could hamper their response efforts.

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5.1.3.1.b (Continued)

Requests for support at HBRSEP will be coordinated by the EOF. Other Duke Energy nuclear facilities also maintain a staff of well-trained and experienced engineers, and technicians. These personnel represent a pool of technical expertise which can be called upon to provide additional support to HBRSEP, if required.

The Joint Information Center is activated at an Alert. These personnel and equipment are available to support onsite emergency management by providing a single point of information for the media. The Corporate Communications Department and site personnel will provide public information services to the Joint Information Center to interface with the media and general public.

In addition, as outlined in Attachment 6.3, Duke Energy has arranged for support from outside Duke Energy in the areas of fire fighting, rescue and medical assistance, as well as that support delineated in the State and County emergency plans.

Assistance may also be available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Energy, Westinghouse, and URS Corporation. Industry resources identified by INPO are also available as Duke Energy is a signatory to the mutual assistance agreement.

c. Emergency Response Facilities Special provisions have been made to assure that ample space and proper equipment are available to effectively respond to the full range of possible emergencies.

The emergency response facilities available include the Robinson Plant Control Room, Operations Support Center, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, the Remote Emergency Response Facility, the B.5.b Area, Joint Information Center, Duke Energy Environmental Center, and Corporate Communications Department. Each of these facilities, as well as the South Carolina Emergency Operations Center, the Darlington County Emergency Operations Center, the Lee County Emergency Operations Center, and the Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Center are described in Section 5.5, Emergency Facilities and Equipment.

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5.1.3.1 (Continued)

d. Emergency Plan Maintenance The Plan provides for maintenance of emergency preparedness by establishing the framework and requirements for training, drills and exercises, and periodic updating. Each HBRSEP Emergency Response Organization member is trained, qualified, and requalified as described in Section 5.6 of this Plan. The effectiveness of such training is gauged by the use of drills and exercises. Drills are supervised instruction periods aimed at developing, maintaining, and testing skills in a specific operation such as communications or radiation monitoring. An exercise tests the overall capability of the plant, state, and county emergency organizations to properly respond to an emergency. The Plan sets forth the frequency and purpose of such drills and exercises.

The Plan also delineates the requirements for reviewing, updating, and auditing the Plan and for performing maintenance on and taking inventories of emergency equipment and supplies. The Emergency Preparedness Staff is designated to be responsible for overseeing this process as outlined in Section 5.6.1.3, Emergency Preparedness Staff.

5.1.4 Robinson Emergency Procedures The Plan implementing procedures define the specific (i.e., step-by-step) actions to be followed in order to recognize, assess, and correct an emergency condition and to mitigate its consequences. Procedures to implement the Plan have been developed to provide the following information:

1. Specific instructions to the plant operating staff for the implementation of the Plan.

2. Specific authorities and responsibilities of plant operating personnel.

3. A source of pertinent information, forms, and data to ensure prompt actions are taken and that proper notifications and communications are carried out.

4. A record of the completed actions.

5. The mechanism by which emergency preparedness will be maintained at all times.

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FIGURE 5.1.1-1 ROBINSON SITE PLAN Reference Use Only. Refer to Plant Drawing No. HBR2-09800 Plot Plan PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 24 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-2 10 - MILE PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 25 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY LOCATIONS Reference Use Only. Refer to Plant Drawing No. HBR2-09800 Plot Plan PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 26 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-4 WIND ROSE FOR H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 27 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-5 50 - MILE INGESTION EXPOSURE EPZ PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 28 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-6 Intentionally Left Blank PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 29 of 208

FIGURE 5.1.1-7 CONCEPT OF EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 30 of 208

5.2 Emergency Classifications A key element of this Plan is a pre-planned system of notifying and activating various emergency response organizations. This system, in accordance with NRC recommendations, uses graded levels of emergency response where the actions specified are organized according to the general severity of the emergency condition.

This section discusses the criteria for determining the level of the emergency condition. It also illustrates how a decision is made to declare that an emergency exists by providing example initiating conditions that could correspond to each emergency class. Section 5.3, Emergency Response Organization, in turn will discuss the plans for notification of offsite agencies and mobilization of emergency teams and how they may vary with the level of the emergency.

5.2.1 General Classification System The four classes of emergency are Unusual Event (equivalent to NRC Notification of Unusual Event), Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. The operating staff is provided formal training to recognize off-normal plant, ISFSI, or Security conditions and categorize them within the parameters of the four emergency classes.

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) are based upon the fission product barrier concept and upon events. The three barriers that protect the public from a release of radioactive fission products (fission product barriers, FPB) are the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary, and the containment (CV). This concept has its basis in NEI 99-01 Revision 6 where emergency events are found that correspond to failures or jeopardy of the three basic fission product barriers. The concept used is that:

Any loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS requires an Alert

Any loss or potential loss of any two barriers requires a Site Area Emergency

Any loss of two barriers with a loss or potential loss of a third requires a General Emergency PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 31 of 208

5.2.1 (Continued)

In addition to looking at the status of fission product barriers, the Emergency Action Levels include the NEI 99-01 emergency action level events that are external to the plant, i.e., natural or man-made disaster phenomena, or are not directly attributable to the condition of the reactor, i.e., shutdown systems, fire, dose projections. These events based on Emergency Action Levels (EAL) are direct precursors to loss or jeopardy of the FPBs.

5.2.2 The categorization of events according to one of the four emergency classes is implemented through the (EAL) wallchart and associated technical bases.

The Emergency Coordinator (or the Shift Manager when no emergency has been declared) will declare any one of the four emergency classes where EALs have been exceeded, or in judgment, the status of plant warrants such a declaration.

The time to assess, classify, and declare will not exceed 15 minutes.

The 15 minute criterion to commence when plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that correspond to an EAL first become available to any plant operator. (Reference 2.1)

Each of the four emergency classes is discussed below.

5.2.3 Unusual Event An Unusual Event is declared when events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occur.

Determination of an Unusual Event (or any emergency condition) may be accomplished in one or more of the following ways:

Observations/inspections Automatic alarms (e.g., Radiation and Process Monitoring Systems)

Communications from Regulatory or outside agencies (e.g., aircraft threat, bomb threats)

As in all cases, the Emergency Coordinator will declare an Unusual Event in any circumstance where, in judgment, the status of the plant warrants it. Emergency Action Levels are established for determination of this class.

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5.2.3 (Continued)

An Unusual Event does not require the activation of the entire emergency organization, but the Emergency Coordinator can direct that additional personnel come to the site to support shift workers. Offsite emergency organizations shall be notified as necessary for informational purposes and aid from off-site fire fighting, medical services, and security organizations can be requested.

Notifications are discussed in Section 5.3.5, Notification and Activation, and emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 5.4, Emergency Measures. Specific emergency actions to be followed during an Unusual Event are contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification.

5.2.4 Alert An Alert is declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment of intentional malicious dedicated efforts of a hostile act. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guides.

Emergency Action Levels are established for determination of an Alert and are contained in the EAL wallchart and associated technical bases.

Additionally, the Emergency Coordinator will declare an Alert whenever it's concluded that plant or Security conditions so warrant.

Offsite assessment actions will be initiated to ensure that radiation levels in the environment do not require protective actions offsite. Normally the OSC, TSC, EOF, and JIC will be activated at the Alert level; however, for events of short duration the SEC has discretion for activation of any or all of the facilities. Notifications and activation of emergency organizations are discussed in Section 5.3.5, and the emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 5.4. Specific emergency actions to be followed during an Alert are contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification.

5.2.5 Site Area Emergency A Site Area Emergency is declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or security events that result in intentional damage or malicious acts: (1) towards site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) prevents effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 33 of 208

releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guides except near the site boundary.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 34 of 208

5.2.5 (Continued)

Emergency Action Levels are established for determination of the Site Area Emergency class and are contained in the EAL wallchart and associated technical bases. Additionally, the Emergency Coordinator will declare a Site Area Emergency whenever it's concluded that plant or Security conditions so warrant.

The Site Area Emergency class is more severe than the Alert class because significant radiation releases may occur. However, most of the initiating conditions associated with the Site Area Emergency class do not result in an immediate release and may never result in a significant release if emergency repairs are successful.

Although immediate on-site protective actions are not automatically required, declaration of a Site Area Emergency will result in activation of the OSC, TSC, EOF, and JIC and will result in a Protected Area evacuation of non-essential personnel and an accountability of personnel in the Protected Area unless this action would jeopardize the health and safety of plant employees. Section 5.3.5, Notification and Activation, discusses the planned process of notification and activation of emergency organizations. Emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 5.4, Emergency Measures. Specific emergency actions to be followed during a Site Area Emergency are contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification.

5.2.6 General Emergency A General Emergency is declared when events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or security events that result in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guides offsite.

Emergency Action Levels are established for determination of the General Emergency classification and are contained in the EAL wallchart and associated technical bases. Additionally, the Emergency Coordinator will declare a General Emergency whenever, in judgment, conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency response efforts including offsite monitoring and prompt public notification, as applicable.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 35 of 208

5.2.6 (Continued)

The General Emergency class includes accident conditions that involve severe core damage or melting. Such conditions will result in major releases to the primary containment and extremely high levels of contamination in the reactor coolant. Releases to the environment may be kept low unless leak paths in the primary containment develop (as from containment failure or failures in pumps, valves and other equipment which circulate reactor coolant outside primary containment).

If major releases do occur, it is probable that they will occur hours to days after the onset of the emergency and that offsite exposures will approach or exceed EPA recommended protective action guides unless protective measures are instituted. Response sequence to off-normal conditions is shown in Figure 5.2-1, Response Sequence to Off Normal Conditions. Notifications and activation of emergency organizations are discussed in Section 5.3.5, Notification and Activation. The emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 5.4, Emergency Measures. Specific emergency actions to be followed during a General Emergency are contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 36 of 208

FIGURE 5.2-1 RESPONSE SEQUENCE TO OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS Event Occurs - plant conditions outside of specified acceptable range Operators made aware of events by observation, alarms or systematic response of equipment Accident Control Emergency Response Evaluate potential Confirm that planned Radiological consequences:

automatic actions have 1) Release occurring / likely?

occurred 2) Estimate projected dose.

3) Compare to EALs (dose / conditions)

Classify event in accordance Conduct specified manual with EALs:

actions in accordance with Unusual Event AOPs and EOPs Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Plant conditions worse than Implement predicted.

SAMP Reassess accident class.

Initiate various emergency Perform followup actions in procedures according to accordance with AOPs / EOPs emergency class determined to complete emergency actions to exist.

Event terminated AOP - Abnormal Operating Procedure EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure EAL - Emergency Action Level SAMP - Severe Accident Management Program PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 37 of 208

5.3 Emergency Response Organization There are requirements for action in an emergency that go beyond those encountered during routine operations. To meet these extra demands and provide an effective response to the emergency, the Robinson Emergency Plan employs an organizational concept that has four features.

Whenever the Plan is activated (i.e., an EAL is exceeded), a single individual is charged with the responsibility for and authority to direct all actions necessary to respond to the emergency.

The primary responsibility of the individual in charge is to assure that all critical actions (emergency response functions) are carried out. Upon activation of the Plan, the individual in charge is freed of all other responsibilities and thus able to devote their entire effort to managing the emergency response.

Specific individuals are assigned the responsibility of carrying out predefined critical actions.

There is a mechanism established to provide additional resources as necessary to respond to the emergency, which provides continuity of response on each critical action.

This concept of organization is compatible with and integrated into the normal mode of operation. The operating crew is routinely required to correct minor malfunctions of equipment and to diagnose the consequences of radioactivity releases. There are a number of procedures to guide Operations in responding to equipment malfunctions and instrument alarms. There are also procedures to maintain effective control over contamination and radiation exposures.

Emergency procedures basically involve an extension of these existing plant procedures.

Organizational control of emergencies is accomplished in several steps. First, as is discussed in Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications, conditions associated with the various emergency classes are clearly defined. Second, emergency response functions are specified with levels of action appropriate to each emergency class (e.g., notification, offsite radiation monitoring, etc.). Third, individuals are assigned to be responsible for carrying out each emergency response function, with the assignments to cover all phases of the emergency -

from its initial declaration to the final recovery operations.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 38 of 208

5.3 (Continued)

Finally, the position of Emergency Coordinator is established to be activated immediately on declaration of an emergency. To that individual is delegated the immediate and unilateral authority to act on behalf of the Company to manage and direct all emergency operations involving the facility. Upon activation of the EOF, the EOF Director assumes responsibility of overall emergency response and performs those requirements for all offsite related activities. The Emergency Coordinator maintains focus for onsite emergency response and reports to the EOF Director.

Initially the Emergency Coordinator would be the Shift Manager. This individual would act in that capacity until formally relieved by the designated Emergency Coordinator. In this manner, the individual usually in charge of activities in the Control Room is responsible for initiating the necessary emergency response, but Plant Management is expected to manage the emergency response as soon as available to do so in anticipation of the possible wide-ranging responsibilities associated with managing a major emergency.

This section of the plan delineates the various emergency actions and separates them into groups of related functions. These functions are then assigned to emergency "teams" with designated Directors who are responsible to the Emergency Coordinator for the performance of the activities required to fulfill those functions.

Upon the declaration of an emergency, specified on-shift individuals are assigned as interim leaders (i.e., a designated interim leader is always available on site). Such individuals assume the responsibility for performing the required emergency response actions until properly relieved by the assigned team Director or one of the alternates. All team Directors, alternates, and interim leaders are trained as described in Section 5.6.1.1, Training.

If necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will allocate available resources based on existing plant, ISFSI, or Security conditions. Where necessary, additional personnel will be notified and requested to augment onsite personnel. Any personnel who are augmented will be screened in accordance with Fitness for Duty Regulations.

A current callout list of the Emergency Response Organization phone numbers is maintained by Emergency Preparedness in the Robinson Nuclear Plant Emergency Response Organization Phone Book located in the Emergency Response Facilities onsite. Names in the Robinson Nuclear Plant Emergency Response Organization Phone Book are generated from the ERO Data Base.

The emergency phone listings shall be verified quarterly and updated as necessary. Since most of the HBRSEP management staff and substantial numbers of its support personnel live in the site vicinity (i.e., Hartsville and surrounding areas) additional assistance can be quickly provided.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 39 of 208

5.3.1 Normal Operating Organization The Plan utilizes the basic plant organizational structure and available manpower as the principal means of responding to an emergency condition.

There are, of course, times when the full complement of staff are unavailable, just as there are times when one or a few key supervisory officials are away from the plant. Therefore, the shift organization must be prepared to provide the initial response to an emergency. The following on-shift expertise will be maintained 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per day:

One Shift Manager (SRO),

One Shift Technical Advisor,

One Control Room Supervisor/Senior Reactor Operator (SRO),

Two Reactor Operators (RO),

One Fire Brigade Leader,

Seven additional shift personnel (AO),

One Radiation Protection Technician,

One Chemistry Technician,

Security personnel as required by the Security Plan.

The above listed shift complements meet or exceed the requirements of Technical Specifications and may be one less than listed for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

As will be described below, the general approach is to assign all necessary emergency response functions to the individuals on site.

Each individual, on declaration of an emergency, would be responsible for carrying out one or more emergency actions until additional personnel arrive on site. These shift personnel are identified as "interim" team leaders. It should be noted that they are initially responsible under all circumstances, and remain so until relieved by the designated team leader (or alternate). This arrangement provides for a clear and uniform assignment of responsibility and provides a mechanism to assure that all important emergency response functions are dealt with from the very beginning of the accident.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 40 of 208

5.3.1 (Continued)

1. On-Shift Operations Personnel During an emergency, the on-shift operations personnel (including the Shift Manager) are the nucleus of the initial effort to control the plant and take steps to protect the public.

The on-shift operations personnel primary responsibility is to carry out assigned actions necessary during an emergency to provide initial emergency response per established Emergency Operating Procedures and perform initial calculations of projected offsite consequences. Specific emergency response duties of the on-shift operations personnel are found in the Emergency Procedures which implement the Plan and in the Emergency Operating Procedures.

2. Offsite Communicator The Offsite Communicator is designated by the ERO data base which is maintained by Emergency Preparedness. The Offsite Communicator reports to the Emergency Coordinator (or the EOF Director when the EOF is activated) and functions as the liaison between the EC or EOF Director and the Offsite agencies.

The Offsite Communicator also initiates augmentation of onsite and on call personnel at the direction of the Emergency Coordinator or EOF Director. Specifically, this individual assists in the preparation of messages, and upon approval relays these messages to the proper individuals or agencies. This individual uses the "agency specific" communicators to transmit the majority of this information. The Offsite Communicator uses the communication equipment discussed in Attachment 6.1, Communications Systems. These responsibilities and objectives, along with agency specific communicators are contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0304, State and County Notifications.

5.3.2 Onsite Emergency Response Organization The minimum onsite emergency organization for non-normal working hours, backshifts, and holidays for HBRSEP is described above in Section 5.3.1, Normal Operating Organization, Compliance with the staffing level goals of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Table B-1, has been assured. Guidance for augmenting the emergency organization is found in the Emergency Response Organization Phone Book and the Emergency Procedures. Individual's names and roles in the emergency organization, phone numbers, and alternates are also described in the Emergency Response Organization Phone Book and maintained in onsite Emergency Response Facilities and with Non Responding Emergency Communicators (NREC). Personnel may be contacted using any combination of public address (PA), Emergency Response Organization Notification System, Non-Responding Emergency Communicator (NREC), or other ERO communication device.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 41 of 208

5.3.2 (Continued)

The Company is committed to provide staffing to effectively contain any emergency which might occur at its nuclear facilities. Depending on the emergency at hand, personnel will be contacted with required expertise on a priority basis. The facility staffing is shown in Figure 5.3.2-1, Technical Support Center ERO, Figure 5.3.2-2, Operations Support Center ERO. Figure 5.3.2-3, Emergency Operations Facility ERO, and Figure 5.3.2-4, Joint Information Center ERO. Since a large portion of the staff lives in the vicinity of the ERO facilities, additional personnel will be available for communications, onsite and offsite Radiological assessment, repair and corrective actions and technical support within a short period of time. The minimum staffing to activate an emergency response facility is incorporated into the facility procedures and is based on the functionality of the facility rather than the facility staffing as prescribed in Figure 5.3.2-1 through Figure 5.3.2-4. Depending on weather conditions, 45 minutes should provide enough time to make the appropriate staff available to augment the onsite organization. The onsite organization will continue to be augmented such that within 75 minutes after declaration, additional personnel will be added to provide the necessary support and will meet the intent of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Table B-1. Additional personnel will continue to supplement the plant emergency organization, as necessary to meet the requirements of this Plan. An augmentation drill requiring travel to the site shall be conducted at least once every 24 months. This may be performed as part of a quarterly drill, exercise or real event.

As an aid toward assuring that critical emergency actions are given proper attention, the plant's emergency procedures provide for emergency "teams" (or individual assignments) established to carry out specific types of functions such as accident assessment and offsite notification. ERO positions designated to support the critical emergency actions have been assigned a response time of 45 minutes to ensure timely support and supplemental staffing is provided to augment the onsite organization. These individuals will take direction from the Emergency Coordinator - Control Room (EC - CR) or the Work Control Center Senior Reactor Operator (WCC SRO) until activation of their assigned facilities. As discussed below, the leader and members of each team have been selected with an aim toward making a smooth and rapid transition to the emergency mode of operation.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 42 of 208

5.3.2 (Continued)

The functions specifically assigned to each element of the emergency response organization are intended to encompass all critical response functions, from command and control to communications. One function assigned to each is that of record keeping. Typical of the records to be maintained are the emergency communications, the radiation records (i.e., surveys, projected dose calculations, personnel/population-at-risk evacuations, etc.), the sequence of events (i.e., the managerial decisions and essential occurrences that evolve throughout the emergency), and the security/accountability record (i.e., who is presently on each team or at each center and any security threats).

The following sections describe the specific emergency assignments, which are kept current in the Plan's implementing procedures. The team members' telephone numbers are kept current in an EP Data Base. In all emergencies, the on-duty Shift Manager or Control Room Supervisor/Senior Reactor Operator is authorized and qualified to implement the Plan and to classify the emergency condition.

1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The Emergency Coordinator is responsible for managing a wide range of activities at the plant.

The various technical and administrative functions to be performed at the plant have been grouped into six categories similar to the organization for routine operations plus Emergency Communications. These are as follows:

Plant Operations

Emergency Repair

Logistics Support

Radiological Control

Engineering Support

Emergency Communications PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 43 of 208

5.3.2.1 (Continued)

Directors/Managers are assigned to be responsible for activities within each category. Each of the above functions will be supported in either the TSC or EOF. An Offsite Communicator is assigned the responsibility of communications activities.

The staff within the Technical Support Center may be relieved by designated plant personnel or subsequently by qualified personnel from other Duke Energy locations.

The TSC Organization Chart is shown in Figure 5.3.2-1 . Position responsibilities are as follows:

a. Emergency Coordinator (EC) or Assistant Emergency Coordinator The Emergency Coordinator reports to the EOF Director and supervises and directs the site ERO. The Assistant Emergency Coordinator reports to the Emergency Coordinator and manages the operation of the TSC. The Emergency Coordinator and Assistant Emergency Coordinator positions are equally qualified. Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate response activities with offsite response agencies (Emergency Management, Incident Command Post, Field Monitoring, etc.)

Verify that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list has been completed

Coordinate ERO/facility shift turnover

Assume/maintain command and control

Transfer command and control

Manage all onsite emergency response activities

Manage facility emergency response activities

Coordinate integration of the NRC site team

Prioritize and authorize requests for external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Approve equipment, supply, and logistics expenditures for response to the event

Arrange for equipment and supply resources PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 44 of 208

5.3.2.1.a (Continued)

Arrange for logistics support

Request Federal support and resources

Classify and declare emergencies

Assist with emergency classification

Approve and direct offsite emergency notifications to state and local authorities

Direct notifications and Emergency Notification System (ENS) communications with the NRC

Ensure flow of information within and between the emergency response facilities

Perform or direct emergency PA announcements

Ensure minimum staff is available (facility staffed)

Determine current/projected staff needs

Ensure facility staff is prepared to perform their activities (facility ready)

Activate the facility (facility activated)

Direct/coordinate facility relocation

Determine and direct site response priorities

Support determination of site response priorities

Determine and direct the actions for mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Coordinate between CR, OSC and TSC to set OSC Team task priorities

Direct/support site assembly, accountability and search and rescue activities

Establish and maintain facility accountability

Coordinate site evacuation

Approve use of KI

Approve offsite Protective Action Recommendations PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 45 of 208

5.3.2.1.a (Continued)

Approve emergency exposures

Ensure habitability is established and maintained for occupied areas

Terminate the emergency event

Develop recovery plans

Authorize and direct extreme measures (FLEX, EDMG, SAMG, §50.54(x) or security controls)

Conduct facility briefs and updates

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

b. Offsite Communicator The Offsite Communicator reports to the Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Perform offsite emergency notifications to state and local authorities

Distribute forms, reports, etc. as needed

c. Log Keeper The Log Keeper reports to the Emergency Coordinator.

Key responsibilities include:

Maintain status and information boards/displays

d. Incident Command Post (ICP) Liaison The ICP Liaison position is only filled during a security related event in which the offsite agencies activate the ICP.

The ICP Liaison reports to the Emergency Coordinator.

Key responsibilities include:

Communicate with ICP to provide information and coordination PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 46 of 208

5.3.2.1 (Continued)

e. Security Coordinator The Security Coordinator reports to the Assistant Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Request and coordinate emergency activities with law enforcement agencies

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Communicate with ICP to provide information and coordination

Provide security related information to the NRC

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Direct/support site assembly, accountability and search

& rescue activities

Establish and maintain accountability for security personnel

Provide support and logistics for site evacuation activities

Direct site access controls activities

Ensure radiological conditions are known for occupied areas

Support MERT activities

Coordinate security activities

Provide input for facility briefs and updates PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 47 of 208

5.3.2.1 (Continued)

f. Site Evacuation Coordinator The Site Evacuation Coordinator reports to the Assistant Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Establish and maintain facility accountability

Coordinate site evacuation

g. IT Support The IT Support position reports to the Assistant Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor facility equipment (computer, communications, etc.) for proper operation

Activate ERDS or confirm ERDS operation

h. Engineering Manager The Engineering Manager reports to the Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support determination of site response priorities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Analyze and develop extreme measures actions (FLEX, EDMG, SAMG, §50.54(x))

Provide input for facility briefs and updates PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 48 of 208

5.3.2.1 (Continued)

i. Reactor Engineer The Reactor Engineer reports to the Engineering Manager.

Key responsibilities include:

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Provide analysis of core damage and fission product release potential

j. Electrical Engineer The Electrical Engineer reports to the Engineering Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

k. Mechanical Engineer The Mechanical Engineer reports to the Engineering Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

l. Operations Manager The Operations Manager reports to the Emergency Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor status of the Emergency Operations Procedures PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 49 of 208

5.3.2.1.l (Continued)

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Assist with emergency classification

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support determination of site response priorities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Coordinate between CR, OSC and TSC to set OSC Team task priorities

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Analyze and develop extreme measures actions (FLEX, EDMG, SAMG, §50.54(x))

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

m. Assistant Operations Manager The Assistant Operations Manager reports to the Operations Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor status of the Emergency Operations Procedures

Assist with emergency classification

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Perform event detection and assessment activities PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 50 of 208

5.3.2.1.m (Continued)

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Coordinate between CR, OSC and TSC to set OSC Team task priorities

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

n. NRC Communicator The NRC Communicator reports to the Operations Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Provide event data and plant information to the NRC via the ENS

Activate ERDS or confirm ERDS operation

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

o. CR Operations Bridge The CR Operations Bridge reports to the Operations Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Support development of mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Communicate the activities of Ops personnel dispatched out of the CR to the OSC

p. RP Manager The RP Manager reports to the Emergency Coordinator.

Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Assist with emergency classification PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 51 of 208

5.3.2.1.p (Continued)

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Monitor, evaluate and communicate conditions involving any release of radioactivity

Direct/perform dose assessment

Brief and dispatch the onsite/offsite radiation monitoring teams

Provide support and logistics for site assembly activities

Provide support and logistics for site evacuation activities

Evaluate the need for and ensure proper use of KI

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Ensure approved emergency exposure controls are issued

Direct personnel monitoring and decontamination activities

Ensure habitability is established and maintained for occupied areas

Establish contamination controls for occupied areas

Support MERT activities

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

q. Dose Assessor The Dose Assessor reports to the RP Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Assist with emergency classification

Provide event data and plant information to the NRC via the Health Physics Network (HPN)

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 52 of 208

5.3.2.1.q (Continued)

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Monitor, evaluate and communicate conditions involving any release of radioactivity

Direct or perform dose assessment

Direct field monitoring team activities

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Establish facility ventilation and monitoring for habitability controls PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 53 of 208

5.3.2. (Continued)

2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The Emergency Operations Facility is activated at the Alert classification. The EOF Director assumes leadership of the EOF.

The EOF Organization Chart is shown in Figure 5.3.2-3. Position responsibilities are as follows:

a. EOF Director or Assistant EOF Director The EOF Director is the head of the ERO and directs the overall response. The Assistant EOF Director reports to the EOF Director and manages the operation of the EOF. The EOF Director and Assistant EOF Director positions are equally qualified. Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate response activities with offsite response agencies (Emergency Management, Incident Command Post, Field Monitoring, etc.)

Verify that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list has been completed

Coordinate ERO/facility shift turnover

Perform position turnover when a shift change occurs

Assume/maintain command and control

Transfer command and control

Manage facility emergency response activities

Coordinate integration of the NRC site team

Prioritize and authorize requests for external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Approve equipment, supply, and logistics expenditures for response to the event

Request Federal support and resources

Assist with emergency classification

Approve and direct offsite emergency notifications to state and local authorities

Ensure flow of information within and between the emergency response facilities PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 54 of 208

5.3.2.2.a (Continued)

Perform or direct emergency PA announcements

Provide technical assistance for the development of news releases and statements

Ensure minimum staff is available (facility staffed)

Determine current/projected staff needs

Ensure facility staff is prepared to perform their activities (facility ready)

Activate the facility (facility activated)

Direct/coordinate facility relocation

Determine and direct the actions for mitigation strategies and contingency plans

Approve offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Terminate the emergency event

Develop recovery plans

Conduct facility briefs and updates

b. Log Keeper The Log Keeper reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Distribute forms, reports, etc. as needed

Maintain status and information boards/displays

c. Data Coordinator The Data Coordinator reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor facility equipment (computer, communications, etc.) for proper operation PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 55 of 208

5.3.2.2 (Continued)

d. Emergency Planner The Emergency Planner reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate information and activities with offsite agency personnel in the facility

Coordinate integration of the NRC site team

Support State/County EOC Liaisons

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

e. State and County Liaisons The State and County Liaisons report to the Emergency Planner. Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate information with government officials/agencies and EOCs

Report status of state and county emergency response activities from the EOCs

f. Accident Assessment Manager The Accident Assessment Manager reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Assist with emergency classification

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Provide input for facility briefs and updates PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 56 of 208

5.3.2.2 (Continued)

g. Accident Assessment Interface The Accident Assessment Interface reports to the Accident Assessment Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor status of the Emergency Operations Procedures

Assist with emergency classification

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Provide analysis of core damage and fission product release potential

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Analyze and develop extreme measures actions (FLEX, EDMG, SAMG, §50.54(x))

h. Radiological Assessment Manager The Radiological Assessment Manager reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Assist with emergency classification

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Monitor, evaluate and communicate conditions involving any release of radioactivity PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 57 of 208

5.3.2.2.h (Continued)

Direct/perform dose assessment

Brief and dispatch the onsite/offsite radiation monitoring teams

Provide support and logistics for site evacuation activities

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations

Direct post-accident environmental sampling and exposure activities

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

i. Dose Assessor The Dose Assessor reports to the Radiological Assessment Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Assist with emergency classification

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Provide event data and plant information to the NRC via the Health Physics Network (HPN)

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Monitor, evaluate and communicate conditions involving any release of radioactivity

Direct/perform dose assessment

Evaluate conditions and develop offsite Protective Action Recommendations PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 58 of 208

5.3.2.2 (Continued)

j. Field Monitoring Coordinator The Field Monitoring Coordinator reports to the Radiological Assessment Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Brief and dispatch the onsite/offsite radiation monitoring teams

Direct field monitoring team activities

Coordinate activities with the external agency field monitoring teams.

Coordinate the receipt, analysis, storage and transfer of field monitoring samples

Record/review radiological sampling and survey data

k. Offsite Communicator The Offsite Communicator reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Provide event notification/information to industry groups (INPO, ANI, etc.)

Perform offsite emergency notifications to state and local authorities

Support completion of the ENF to state and local authorities

Distribute forms, reports, etc. as needed

l. Services Manager The Services Manager reports to the EOF Director. Key responsibilities include:

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Provide event notification/information to industry groups (INPO, ANI, etc.)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 59 of 208

5.3.2.2 (Continued)

m. Services Admin / Commissary The Services Admin / Commissary reports to the Services Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Arrange for logistics support

Provide administrative support for facility operation

Distribute forms, reports, etc. as needed

3. Operations Support Center (OSC)

The Operations Support Center is activated at the Alert classification.

The functional requirements of the OSC are met by the establishment of teams discussed in the following paragraphs.

Specific team assignments and duties including on-shift priorities of assignments are included in the various procedures. The procedures also give specific direction regarding the priority of roles to perform as off-duty members of the Radiological Emergency Teams arrive at the site.

The OSC Organization Chart is shown in Figure 5.3.2-2. Position responsibilities are as follows:

a. OSC Manager/Assistant OSC Manager The OSC Manager reports to the Emergency Coordinator.

The Assistant OSC Manager reports to the OSC Manager.

The OSC Manager and Assistant OSC Manager positions are equally qualified. Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Verify that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list has been completed

Coordinate ERO/facility shift turnover

Manage facility emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 60 of 208

5.3.2.3.a (Continued)

Ensure flow of information within and between the emergency response facilities

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Ensure minimum staff is available (facility staffed)

Determine current/projected staff needs

Ensure facility staff is prepared to perform their activities (facility ready)

Activate the facility (facility activated)

Direct/coordinate facility relocation

Support facility relocation

Support determination of site response priorities

Coordinate between CR, OSC and TSC to set OSC Team task priorities

Coordinate OSC Team dispatch and control

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Direct/support site assembly, accountability and search

& rescue activities

Establish and maintain facility accountability

Ensure habitability is established and maintained for occupied areas

Conduct facility briefs and updates

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

b. Log Keeper The Log Keeper reports to the OSC Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Ensure minimum staff is available (facility staffed)

Maintain status and information boards/displays

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 61 of 208

5.3.2.3 (Continued)

c. Maintenance Supervisor The Maintenance Supervisor reports to the OSC Manager.

Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

d. Operations Supervisor The Operations Supervisor reports to the OSC Manager.

Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

Perform event detection and assessment activities

Perform chemical sampling and analysis

e. Operations Liaison The Operations Liaison reports to the Operations Supervisor. Key responsibilities include:

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 62 of 208

5.3.2.3 (Continued)

f. RP Supervisor The RP Supervisor reports to the OSC Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Monitor status and information boards/displays/systems

Perform radiological sampling and surveys

Record/review radiological sampling and survey data

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Establish and maintain facility accountability

Track emergency worker exposure and evaluate the need for dose extensions

Coordinate the monitoring of site evacuees

Ensure habitability is established and maintained for occupied areas

Establish contamination controls for occupied areas

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

g. Field Monitoring Team Member The Field Monitoring Team members initially report to the RP Supervisor, until turned over to the TSC Dose Assessor or EOF Field Team Coordinator. Key responsibilities include:

Perform surveys

Take environmental samples

Identify airborne plumes or liquid effluents PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 63 of 208

5.3.2.3 (Continued)

h. Operations and Craft Personnel Additional Ops, Maintenance, RP and Chemistry personnel report to their associated supervisor in the OSC. Response activities involve their current job tasks.

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

i. Generation Supply Chain Liaison The Generation Supply Chain Liaison reports to the OSC Manager. Key responsibilities include:

Develop requests and coordinate external assistance (technical, craft, admin, etc.)

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Arrange for logistics support

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Participate with OSC Team dispatch and control

Serve as primary point of contact for SAFER and FLEX support PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 64 of 208

5.3.2. (Continued)

4. Joint Information Center (JIC)

The JIC is activated at the Alert or higher level. It is staffed by Robinson and Corporate ERO personnel and is designed as a host center for Media personnel. The JIC will provide an area of operations supporting media releases and news conferences for Duke Energy communications personnel and risk and host county, state, and federal Public Information Officers.

The JIC Organization Chart is shown in Figure 5.3.2-4. Position responsibilities are as follows:

a. Company Spokesperson (Near Site JIC)

The Company Spokesperson reports to the EOF Director.

Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate information with government officials/agencies

Coordinate information to the Incident Support Team

Approve/review news releases, statements and messages

Perform media briefings and interviews

Correct rumors in media briefings and interviews

Provide input for facility briefs and updates

b. Information Gathering Lead (Corporate JIC)

The Information Gathering Lead reports to the Corporate Communications Lead Public Information Officer (PIO) (a corporate non-nuclear position not part of the site emergency plan). Key responsibilities include:

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Coordinate distribution of news releases, statements and messages

Coordinate development of a communications strategy PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 65 of 208

5.3.2.4.b (Continued)

Assist the Spokesperson in gathering information for media briefings and interviews

Coordinate the conduct of media briefings and interviews

Coordinate information flow between the station, corporate JIC and Federal, State, and local PIOs

Perform rumor control activities

c. Media Monitor (Near Site JIC)

The Media Monitor reports to the Information Gathering Lead. Key responsibilities include:

Monitor media outlets for event related information

Coordinate monitoring activities with public information personnel

Perform rumor control activities

Monitor facility equipment (computer, communications, etc.) for proper operation

d. JIC Technical Liaison (Near Site JIC)

The JIC Technical Liaison reports to the Information Gathering Lead. Key responsibilities include:

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Provide technical assistance for the development of news releases and statements

Provide support for the development of the chronology of events

Provide site event and response information for public information

Perform rumor control activities

Provide input for facility briefs and updates PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 66 of 208

5.3.2.4 (Continued)

e. News Writer (Corporate JIC)

The News Writer reports to the Corporate Communications Lead PIO (a corporate non-nuclear position not part of the site emergency plan). Key responsibilities include:

Develop news releases, statements and messages

Coordinate distribution of news releases, statements and messages

f. EOF Technical Liaison (EOF)

The EOF Technical Liaison reports to the Corporate Communications Lead PIO (a corporate non-nuclear position not part of the site emergency plan). Key responsibilities include:

Communicate on assigned communication line and provide information to facility staff

Provide technical assistance for the development of news releases and statements

Provide site event and response information for public information

g. Media Center Coordinator (Near site JIC)

The Media Center Coordinator reports to the Logistics Lead. Key responsibilities include:

Arrange for equipment and supply resources

Arrange for logistics support

Coordinate distribution of news releases, statements and messages

Register personnel at the assigned location

Coordinate accommodation of news media personnel

Monitor facility entrance areas

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 67 of 208

5.3.2.4 (Continued)

h. Site JIC Manager (Near Site JIC)

The Site JIC Manager reports to the Corporate Communications Lead PIO (a corporate non-nuclear position not part of the site emergency plan). Key responsibilities include:

Develop facility 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing list

Manage facility emergency response activities

Coordinate integration of the NRC site team

Ensure flow of information within and between the emergency response facilities

Coordinate information flow between the station, corporate JIC and Federal, State, and local PIOs

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Ensure minimum staff is available (facility staffed)

Ensure facility staff is prepared to perform their activities (facility ready)

Activate the facility (facility activated)

Develop recovery plans

Conduct facility briefs and updates

i. Logistics Lead (Near Site JIC)

The Logistics Lead reports to the Near Site JIC Manager.

Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate ERO/facility shift turnover

Manage assigned group emergency response activities

Arrange for logistics support

Make staffing notifications

Coordinate JIC security and media badging PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 68 of 208

5.3.2.4.i (Continued)

Prepare for facility activation (rooms, work area, equipment, etc.)

Determine current/projected staff needs

Provide administrative support for facility operation

Coordinate distribution of news releases, statements and messages

Distribute forms, reports, etc. as needed

j. Government Liaison (Near Site JIC)

The Government Liaison reports to the Logistics Lead. Key responsibilities include:

Coordinate information and activities with offsite agency personnel in the facility

Coordinate information with government officials/agencies

Arrange for logistics support

Coordinate distribution of news releases, statements and messages

Coordinate information flow between the station, corporate JIC and Federal, State, and local PIOs PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 69 of 208

5.3.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Response Organization If conditions at the plant degrade to the extent that further onsite assistance is needed, assistance is available from the Corporate personnel, other Duke Energy nuclear site personnel, contracted services, and certain locally available service groups, as described in the following subsections.

1. Corporate Communications Department (CCD)/Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel The Corporate Communications Function may be activated by the Corporate Communications personnel when notified that an Alert condition exists at HBRSEP. Activation is discretionary for lesser emergencies. The CCD will handle public and media inquires in the early stages of the event until the Joint Information Center is activated.

2. Duke Energy Each Duke Energy site has qualified emergency response personnel serving in similar capacities and having similar training and responsibilities, as the RNP ERO. These personnel may be activated to provide relief or additional resources to support an emergency. These sites include: Duke Energy Corporate, Catawba Nuclear Station, McGuire Nuclear Station, Oconee Nuclear Station, Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Duke Energy Environmental Center, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, or Crystal River Unit 3.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 70 of 208

5.3.3 (Continued)

3. Contracted Services A number of active outside contracts are maintained in order to ensure continuing access to qualified personnel when and if they are needed to supplement Duke Energy resources. These contracts provide the capability of obtaining, on an expedited basis, additional maintenance support personnel (such as mechanics, electricians, and I&C Technicians), other technical personnel (such as Radiation Protection and Environmental &

Chemistry Technicians), and engineering and consulting services.

For example, contracts are maintained with Westinghouse and URS Corporation.

The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) serves as a clearinghouse for industry wide support during an emergency.

When notified of an emergency situation at a nuclear plant, INPO will provide emergency response as requested. INPO will be able to provide the following emergency support functions:

Assistance to the affected utility in locating emergency resources and equipment.

Analysis of the operational aspects of the incident.

Dissemination to member utilities of information concerning the incident.

Organization of industry experts who could advise on technical matters.

If requested, one or more suitably qualified members of the INPO staff will report to the EOF Director and will assist in coordinating INPO's response to the emergency.

4. Local Services Support The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 is equipped and staffed to cope with many types of emergency situations.

However, if a fire or other type of incident occurs that requires outside assistance, such assistance is available as described in the following subsections.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 71 of 208

5.3.3 (Continued)

a. Medical Assistance Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center in Hartsville, South Carolina, has medical facilities immediately available for the treatment of contaminated and non-contaminated injured personnel. McLeod Health Cheraw in Cheraw, South Carolina, will serve as the back-up facility, should Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center become full or uninhabitable.

In addition, the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REACTS) located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee will provide advice and assistance to HBRSEP in the event of a severe radiation accident.

In addition, medical assistance is available on or offsite from a group of physicians in the Hartsville area, who are on the staff of Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center and who have agreed to provide medical assistance to contaminated patients. (See Attachment 6.5, Medical Treatment and Assistance, for more details.)

b. Ambulance Service The Hartsville Rescue Squad and the Darlington County Emergency Medical Service have agreed to respond to emergency calls from the plant, just as they respond to other calls from the Hartsville area. Ambulance assistance may be requested through the Darlington County 911 Center. A copy of the response agreement are maintained with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

c. Fire Assistance Agencies with fire protection resources in the vicinity of HBRSEP are as follows:

Fire Protection resources will be dispatched through the Darlington County 911 Center.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 72 of 208

5.3.3 (Continued)

The Darlington County Fire District is the primary fire protection response agency for HBRSEP and will coordinate assistance activities, if required, of the other above agencies. A copy of the agreement with the County Fire District is maintained with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

Additional fire fighting services in response to a large scale fire can be provided by Hartsville Fire Department or Shaw AFB. A copy of the agreement or memorandum with each of these facilities is maintained with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

d. Airport Facility Support In the event that additional equipment or personnel are needed to support the emergency response at HBRSEP, Hartsville Regional Airport, Darlington County Jetport, Columbia Metropolitan Airport, and Florence Regional Airport will permit the landing of aircraft supplying those needs. A copy of the agreement with each of these facilities is maintained with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

5.3.4 Coordination with Participating Governmental Agencies A summary of each governmental organization having major responsibilities for the planning and response to HBRSEP radiological emergencies is described below; comprehensive summary tables of emergency response organizations are included in Attachment 6.3, HBRSEP Unit No. 2 Offsite Agency Support Summary, and a detailed description of the authority, responsibilities, and duties of each organization is presented in their respective emergency plans. Each of these organizations having response duties is capable of providing such on a 24-hour-per-day basis.

1. State of South Carolina The state officials and agencies identified in the State Plans have overall command, coordination, and support responsibilities.

In particular, part 2 of South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan (SCORERP) establishes the responsibilities and duties of agencies lying within the Plume Exposure EPZ as follows.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 73 of 208

5.3.4 (Continued)

a. Office of the Governor Provide state direction, control, and guidance.

Provide a representative at the SEOC.

Direct release of information relating to a radiological incident at HBRSEP.

b. Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG)

Assist the Governor in providing State direction, control, and guidance.

Provide representatives at the SEOC.

Assist in decontamination in coordination with DHEC through the National Guard.

Assist the Office of the Governor in public information.

c. Department of Health & Environmental Control (DHEC)

Bureau of Land and Waste Management Maintain a radiological hazard assessment capability and provide radiological technical support, coordination, and guidance for the State. Prepare the supporting technical Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Provide representatives at HBRSEP and the SEOC.

Obtain and coordinate radiological assistance resources from the federal government, other states, and the nuclear industry as required.

Direct monitoring efforts in the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ.

Coordinate decontamination and/or disposal procedures.

Coordinate radiological medical health care.

Assist the Office of the Governor with public information.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 74 of 208

5.3.4 (Continued)

d. Emergency Management Division (EMD), Office of the Adjutant General Assure preparation and maintenance of the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan for state areas which could be affected by an emergency at HBRSEP.

Provide SEOC capability and control.

Coordinate offsite support from state, federal, and other agencies.

Provide and/or coordinate with DHEC the radiological emergency response training of state and local government personnel.

Assist, in coordination with DHEC, the Federal Government and the Nuclear Industry, in the development and conduct of radiological emergency response drills and exercises.

Provide, in coordination with DHEC, for review and update of state and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans.

Maintain liaison and coordination with State Civil Defense Agencies in adjoining states in planning for and executing Radiological Emergency Operations for interstate hazards.

Assist DHEC in decontamination recovery control procedures.

Operate the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Warning Point for the State of South Carolina.

These items are discussed in the Memorandum Of Understanding.

A copy of this memorandum is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 75 of 208

5.3.4. (Continued)

e. Clemson University Cooperative Extension Service Assist in the decontamination or disposal of livestock, feed, milk, and other contaminated farm products in coordination with DHEC.

Maintain agricultural data required for radiological assessment in the ingestion pathway in coordination with DHEC.

Provide representative to DHEC and SEOC.

f. Forestry Commission Assist in decontamination in coordination with DHEC.

g. Division of General Services Assist in decontamination through urban and rural fire services in coordination with DHEC.

h. Department of Public Safety Coordinate traffic control support.

Provide security for the SEOC.

Assist Office of the Governor with public information.

i. Department of Social Services Coordinate Reception Center operations.

Coordinate emergency welfare services for evacuees.

j. South Carolina Educational Television Provide radiological emergency television and radio coverage of the affected area(s) from the SEOC and the Joint Information Center.

Assist in communications.

k. Department of Transportation Operate the 24 Hour Backup Warning Point for the state.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 76 of 208

5.3.4. (Continued)

2. Darlington County

a. Darlington County Emergency Preparedness Agency The Darlington County Emergency Preparedness Agency has overall responsibility for Darlington County's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of Darlington County's emergency response plan, and coordination between the County and Duke Energy and other local government response agencies. It functions as the lead county agency for radiological monitoring and decontamination activities as directed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

b. Darlington County Sheriff's Department The Sheriff's Department emergency response functions are:

Coordinate all local law enforcement and traffic control.

Provide immediate assistance to facility management and local authorities during initial onset of the emergency.

Provide traffic control in support of evacuation.

Re-route traffic around contaminated areas and report traffic problems to the County Emergency Operations Center.

Provide traffic control in the vicinity of shelter areas.

Establish road blocks, re-route traffic, and prevent entry into contaminated zones.

Provide assistance to municipal law enforcement agencies in warning and evacuating persons in designated zones.

Provide security for county property.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 77 of 208

5.3.4.2. (Continued)

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

c. Darlington County 911 Center The Darlington County 911 Center emergency response functions are:

Operate the county warning point on a 24-hour basis.

Provide dispatch services for Emergency Response.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

3. Lee County

a. Lee County Disaster Preparedness Agency The Lee County Disaster Preparedness Agency has overall responsibility for Lee County's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of Lee County's emergency response plan, and coordination between the County, Duke Energy, and other local government response agencies. It functions as the lead county radiological response agency and provides any required radiological monitoring and decontamination activities as directed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

b. Lee County Sheriff's Department The Sheriff's Department emergency response functions are:

Coordinate all local law enforcement and traffic control.

Provide immediate assistance to facility management and local authorities during initial onset of the emergency.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 78 of 208

5.3.4.3 (Continued)

Provide traffic control in support of evacuation.

Re-route traffic around contaminated areas and report traffic problems to the County Emergency Operations Center.

Provide traffic control in the vicinity of shelter areas.

Establish road blocks, re-route traffic, and prevent entry into contaminated zones.

Provide assistance to municipal law enforcement agencies in warning and evacuating persons in designated zones.

Provide security for county property.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

c. Lee County Enhanced 911 Facility The Lee County Enhanced 911 Facility emergency response functions are:

Operate the county warning point on a 24-hour basis.

Provide dispatch services for Emergency Response.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

4. Chesterfield County

a. Chesterfield County Emergency Preparedness Agency The Chesterfield County Emergency Preparedness Agency has overall responsibility for Chesterfield County's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of Chesterfield County's emergency response plan, and coordination between the County, Duke Energy, and other local government response agencies.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 79 of 208

5.3.4.4 (Continued)

It functions as the lead county radiological response agency and provides any required radiological monitoring and decontamination activities as directed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

b. Chesterfield County Sheriff's Department The Chesterfield County Sheriffs Department emergency response functions are:

Coordinate all local law enforcement and traffic control.

Provide immediate assistance to facility management and local authorities during initial onset of the emergency.

Provide traffic control in support of evacuation.

Re-route traffic around contaminated areas and report traffic problems to the County Emergency Operations Center.

Provide traffic control in the vicinity of shelter areas.

Establish road blocks, re-route traffic, and prevent entry into contaminated zones.

Provide assistance to municipal law enforcement agencies in warning and evacuating persons in designated zones.

Provide security for county property.

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

c. Chesterfield County 911 Center The Chesterfield County 911 Center emergency response functions are:

Operate the county warning point on a 24-hour basis.

Provide dispatch services for Emergency Response.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 80 of 208

5.3.4.4 (Continued)

Specific items of interface are discussed in the Letter of Agreement. A copy of this agreement is on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

5. Florence County

a. Florence County Sheriffs Department The Florence County Sheriffs Department emergency response functions are:

- Provide security for the Joint Information Center

6. Federal Agencies

a. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office The Savannah River Operations Office coordinates, under the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Plan (FRMAP), federal resources as required to: minimize accidental radiation exposure; minimize the spread of radioactive materials into the environment; and carry out countermeasures to control and eliminate radiation hazards. Upon request of the Emergency Coordinator (or the EOF Director after the Emergency Operations Facility is activated) or of the State of South Carolina, Department of Health and Environmental Control, Department of Energy will: provide equipment, supplies, and personnel to evaluate radiological hazards and to minimize radiation exposures; assist in carrying out emergency response operations and implementing protective actions; and provide an aerial radiological measuring system for mapping radioactive plumes. Resources available in the area to facilitate federal assistance include the Hartsville Airport, located approximately four miles from HBRSEP.

The Darlington National Guard Armory located in Darlington, South Carolina could be used as a Federal Command Post meeting the requirements of FRMAP.

b. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates, through the Atlanta, Georgia (Region IV) Office, federal response as required to supplement FRMAP.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 81 of 208

5.3.4.6 (Continued)

c. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides two resident inspectors at HBRSEP. The NRC provides additional technical advice, technical assistance, and personnel during and following a radiological emergency in accordance with their emergency plan and federal regulations. The Directorate of Regulatory Operations will be notified of radiation incidents in accordance with 10CFR20.2202 and will conduct appropriate investigative activities.

d. Weather Service The National Weather Service in Columbia, South Carolina will provide meteorological information during emergency situations, if required. Severe weather watches and warnings will be issued by the National Weather Service Station at Wilmington, North Carolina. Data available will include existing and forecasted surface wind directions, wind speed with azimuth variability, and ambient surface air temperature.

7. Agreements Attachment 6.2, Offsite Emergency Response Plans/Letters Of Agreements, presents the list of agreements. Copies of the agreements are on file with the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

5.3.5 Notification and Activation Notification and activation of the onsite and offsite emergency response organizations is dependent upon the emergency classification and is listed in Table 5.3.5-1, Notification and Activation of Principle Emergency Response Organizations. Details of notification responsibilities are described in the Plan's implementing procedures. The communications systems utilized to make these notifications are described in Attachment 6.1, Communications Systems. The Emergency Response Organization Notification System may be used to aid in the callout of ERO personnel.

Any time that an emergency is reclassified, the initial notification scheme will apply.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 82 of 208

5.3.5 (Continued)

The State of South Carolina and the Counties of Darlington, Lee, and Chesterfield are responsible for the process of notification of the public.

Prewritten emergency messages to be used for public notification are contained in the procedures of the State of South Carolina, and Darlington, Lee, and Chesterfield Counties.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 83 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.1-1 HBRSEP SHIFT ORGANIZATION Shift Manager (1)

Control Room Supervisor / Radiation Protection Senior Reactor Operator Shift Technical Advisor Technician (1)

(1) (1)

Work Control Center Chemistry Technician Reactor Operator Senior Reactor Operator (1)

(2)

(1)

Auxiliary Operators Security Staff (7)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 84 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.2-1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ERO PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 85 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.2-2 OPERTIONS SUPPORT CENTER ERO PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 86 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.2-3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ERO PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 87 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.2-4 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER ERO PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 88 of 208

TABLE 5.3.2-1 ON SHIFT STAFFING FOR EMERGENCIES Minimum Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions Shift Size Shift Manager (SM) 1

1. Plant Operations and Control Room Supervisor 1 Assessment of --

Reactor Operators 2 Operational Aspects Non-Licensed Operators - AO 2[Note 3]

2. Emergency Direction and Command and EC-Control Room (SM) 1[Note 1]

Control Control Licensee,

3. Notification &

Local/State, and Non-Licensed Operator - AO 1[Note 3]

Communication Federal Offsite Dose

4. Radiological Assessment Shift Technical Advisor 1[Note 1]

Assessment Onsite Surveys RP Technician 1 [Note 1]

In-plant Surveys RP Technician 1 Chemistry Chemistry Technician 1 Technical Support Shift Technical Advisor 1

5. Plant Engineering Repair Repair and and Corrective Actions Non-Licensed Operator - AO 2[Note 1][Note 3][Note 5]

Corrective Actions

6. In-Plant Protective Radiation Protection RP [RM1]Technician 2 [Note 1]

Actions Non-Licensed Operators - AO 4

7. Fire Fighting --

Fire Brigade Leader 1

8. Rescue Operations -- Security Officer [Note 2]

9. First Aid -- Security Team Personnel [Note 2]

Security &

10. Site Access Control Security Team Personnel [Note 2]

Accountability TOTAL (Less Security): 15 Note 1. May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions.

2. Per Security Plan.

3. Individual cannot be assigned to the Fire Brigade or auxiliary duties

4. Rescue is a collateral duty of Fire Brigade/Non-Licensed Operators.

5. The ERO function is fulfilled by Auxiliary Operators performing the following types of activities: performing Emergency Procedures (EOP, AOP, FRP, Foldout, Supplements, and DSP) actions, which may include aligning alternate/back-up cooling water sources and power supplies; isolating leaks by closing manual valves, motor operated valves (electronically or manually), closing air operated valves by isolating air or removing power: removing faulty equipment from service by removing power and performing mechanical isolations; or placing standby equipment in service.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 89 of 208

TABLE 5.3.2-1 NOTES Additional Notes on Shift ERO:

1. The purpose of this note is to show how the on-shift chemistry technician, Operations personnel, and Radiation Protection technician are capable of fulfilling the requirement for:

Evaluation of in-plant protective actions listed in NUREG 0654: {CAPR 199340}

Access Control o Access control to radiologically controlled areas of the plant is currently performed via computer system. Each shift ERO member is expected to obtain and wear a dosimeter throughout his shift. Based on this expectation, there is limited other guidance as to what other access control activities are required. Emergency RWPs are active at all times, and can be utilized in the event of an emergency as needed.

In addition, security personnel have been supplied dosimetry and trained on providing them to off-site agencies responding to plant emergencies. The chemistry technician, qualified as an ARW or equivalent may not establish or change radiological boundary postings. As an ARW or equivalent, however, the chemistry technician may determine if a change in radiological conditions has occurred, and can limit access to an affected area until further evaluation by a qualified HP technician.

RP Coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue, first-Aid & firefighting o The shift RP technician is qualified to perform all of the tasks listed in this bullet. As qualified Advanced Radworkers, the chemistry technicians can provide self-coverage for tasks that they perform. Of the tasks listed in bullet b, the chemistry technician may perform self-coverage for tasks that they are qualified to perform, such as, sampling activities (corrective action activity), search and rescue, and first aid activities. Chemistry Technicians (as well as Radiation Protection Technicians) may also perform independent verification for operations during valve manipulations (considered repair/corrective action activities). For each of these activities, the chemistry technician may provide self coverage, within the limitations of ARW or equivalent training.

Personnel Monitoring o The primary responsibility of Radiation Protection technicians assigned to shift is to perform personnel monitoring of shift personnel. Given that access control functions are automated and dosimetry functions are automated, then a single technician can adequately respond to accident scenarios. Chemistry technicians and Operations personnel on shift may augment this by performing self-monitoring within the limitations specified in site procedures.

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TABLE 5.3.2-1 NOTES Note 1. (continued)

Dosimetry o The chemistry technicians and Operations personnel are qualified (as are all site personnel), to obtain dosimetry required to perform their normal and accident functions. These personnel cannot perform manual issuance of dosimetry, nor can they issue multi-badges. These two activities are not considered plausible in the first 30 minutes of a declared event. Dosimetry issuance at the time NUREG-0654 was issued involved manual entry of individuals onto an accountability document.

Today, dosimetry issuance is automated. As stated above, on-site, shift individuals are expected to obtain and maintain dosimetry throughout their shift, so that issuance of further dosimetry, especially in the first 30 minutes of an event, is not required. Also, as previously stated, emergency RWPs are active and can be utilized to log onto in the event of an emergency prior to facility activation. This login is automated as in normal operations.

Conclusions:

o The Table B-1 Protective Actions (in-plant) Radiation Protection activities may be accomplished by the on-shift health physics, chemistry technician, and Operations personnel. It is recognized that the chemistry technician and Operations personnel are not qualified to perform all of the individual tasks listed in the table, however changes in technology, and work practices since the development of NUREG 0654 have reduced or eliminated some aspects of access control and dosimetry issuance. Also, since NUREG 0654 allows that these tasks may be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions the individuals assigned as fulfilling these activities are not required to be qualified to perform each individual activity.

2. The Shift Technical Advisor is trained to perform dose projections in the event of a fast breaking event that requires dose projections to be made. Otherwise dose projections will be done by the Dose Projection Team Leader in the EOF. During operational conditions below 200º F, dose projections may be performed by either a qualified STA or a qualified Dose Projection Team Leader.

3. Individual cannot be assigned to the Fire Brigade or auxiliary duties.

4. Depending on weather conditions, 45 minutes should provide enough time to make the appropriate staff available to augment the onsite organization. The onsite organization will continue to be augmented such that within 75 minutes after declaration, additional personnel will be added to provide the necessary support and will meet the intent of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Table B-1. (Section 5.3.2)

5. The on-shift staffing complement provided in this table is based on the NEI 10-05 On-Shift Staffing Analysis for H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant which is incorporated by reference into this Emergency Plan.

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TABLE 5.3.2-2 AUGMENTED STAFFING FOR EMERGENCIES

{2.51}

Functional Area Major Tasks Standard ERO Emergency Positions 45 75 Full Min. Min. Staff Direction and Control Command and Emergency Coordinator (EC) (TSC) 1 Control EOF Director (EOF) 1 Facility Control Assistant EC (TSC) 1 Assistant EOF Director (EOF) 1 OSC Manager (OSC) 1 Assistant OSC Manager (OSC) 1 Notification & Comm. Emergency Offsite Communicator (TSC) 1 1 Communications NRC Communicator (TSC) 1 Offsite Communicator (EOF) 2 Plant Status & CR Operations Bridge (TSC) 1 Technical Activities OSC Operations Liaison (OSC) 1 State & County EOC Liaisons (EOF) 4 Radiological Assessment Offsite Dose Dose Assessor (TSC) 1 Assessment Dose Assessor (EOF) 2 Offsite Surveys FMT Members - 2 teams (OSC) 2 2 FMT Coordinator (EOF) 2 Onsite Surveys RP Qualified Personnel (OSC) 1 1 In-plant Surveys RP Qualified Personnel (OSC) 1 1 RP Supervisory RP Manager (TSC) 1 Rad Assessment Manager (EOF) 1 RP Supervisor (OSC) 1 Plant System Technical Support / Operations Manager (TSC) 1 Engineering, Repair, and Accident Analysis Assistant Ops Manager (TSC) 1 Corrective Actions Engineering Manager (TSC) 1 Reactor Engineer (TSC) 1 Electrical Engineer (TSC) 1 Mechanical Engineer (TSC) 1 Maintenance Supervisor (OSC) 1 Operations Supervisor (OSC) 1 Chemistry Supervisor (OSC) 1 Chemistry Technician (OSC) 1 Accident Assessment Manager (EOF) 1 Accident Assessment Interface (EOF) 1 Repair and Corrective Generation Supply Chain Liaison 1 Actions (OSC)

IAE Technician [Note 1] (OSC) 2 1 Mechanical Technician (OSC) 2 In-Plant PAs Radiation Protection RP Qualified Personnel (OSC) 2 2 Access Control Sec & Accountability Security Coordinator (TSC) 1 Site Evacuation Coordinator (TSC) 1 EC 58638 updated technology of seismic monitors to provide alarm and visual indication on the monitors. These alarms and indications identify Operating Basis Earthquake magnitude earthquake on monitors. Personnel will Note 1 visually check monitors for initial indications and IAE personnel will collect and read technical data once ERO is activated. IAE Technician is one of the required 45 or 75 minute responders and not considered NUREG-0654 Required On-Shift individual.

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TABLE 5.3.2-2 AUGMENTED STAFFING FOR EMERGENCIES

{2.51}

45 75 Full Functional Area Major Tasks Standard ERO Emergency Positions Min. Min. Staff Resource Allocation and Administration Log Keeper (TSC) 1 Admin Log Keeper (OSC) 1 Log Keeper (EOF) 1 Services Manager (EOF) 1 Facility Operations IT Support (TSC) 1 Emergency Planner (EOF) 1 Data Coordinator (EOF) 1 Services Admin/Commissary (EOF) 1 11 20 35 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 93 of 208

TABLE 5.3.5-1 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF PRINCIPAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS Unusual Site Area General Agency Event Alert Emergency Emergency Onsite:

On-Shift Operations Personnel Activate Activate Activate Activate Radiological Emergency Teams (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Technical Support Center (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Other Emergency Teams (a),(c) (a),(c) (a),(c) (a),(c)

Operations Support Center (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Offsite:

Emergency Operations Facility (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Joint Information Center (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Corporate Headquarters Notify(a) Notify(a) Activate Activate State of South Carolina Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate Darlington County Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate Lee County Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate Chesterfield County Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Notify Notify Activate Activate American Nuclear Insurers (c) Notify Notify Activate Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d)

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TABLE 5.3.5-1 (Continued)

NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF PRINCIPAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS Unusual Site Area General Agency Event Alert Emergency Emergency McLeod Health Cheraw (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d)

Hartsville Rescue Squads or Darlington EMS (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d) (b),(d)

Darlington County Fire District (b),(e) (b),(e) (b),(e) (b),(e)

Westinghouse (a),(c) (a),(c) (a),(c) (a), (c)

URS Corporation (a),(c) (a),(c) (a),(c) (a), (c)

INPO (c) Notify,(b) Notify,(b) Notify,(b)

Law Enforcement Agencies (b),(e) (b),(e) (b),(e) (b),(e)

(a) Mobilize, if deemed necessary.

(b) Request assistance, if required.

(c) Notify, if deemed necessary.

(d) Communications link between mobile and fixed medical support facilities is by radio or other mobile communications devices.

(e) Communications link between mobile units and the Incident Command Post is by radio PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 95 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.5-1 INTERFACES FOR UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Coordinator On-Shift Operations State of Nuclear Regulatory Local Support Personnel South Carolina Commission Agencies Darlington County Chesterfield County Westinghouse Plant Manager Lee County URS Corporation Key Activate Notify Corporate Headquarters Other Emergency Teams Request Assistance if necessary Possible Notification if necessary (Note 1) (Note 1)

Note 1: Mobilize if deemed necessary.

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FIGURE 5.3.5-2 INTERFACES FOR ALERT Emergency Coordinator On-Shift Operations State of Nuclear Regulatory Westinghouse Personnel South Carolina Commission Radiological Emergency Insurers URS Corporation Darlington County Teams Technical Support Lee County Chesterfield County Local Support Personnel Agencies Key Activate / Mobilize Other Emergency Notify Corporate Notify: mobilize/activate if necessary Teams Headquarters Request assistance if required PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 97 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.5-4 INTERFACES FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY EOF Director Emergency Coordinator State of Nuclear Regulatory Westinghouse South Carolina Commission On-Shift Operations Darlington County Chesterfield County URS Corporation Personnel Radiological Emergency Lee County Corporate Local Support Team Headquarters Agencies Key Notify: Activate / Mobilize Request assistance if required Technical Support Joint Information American Nuclear Other Emergency Notify: mobilize if deemed necessary Personnel Center Insurers Teams PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 98 of 208

FIGURE 5.3.5-6 INTERFACES FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY EOF Director Emergency Coordinator State of Other Emergency Westinghouse South Carolina Teams Radiological Emergency Darlington County American Nuclear URS Corporation Teams Insurers Technical Support Lee County Nuclear Regulatory Local Support Personnel Commission Agencies Key Notify: Activate / Mobilize Request assistance if required On-Shift Operations Corporate Joint Information Chesterfield County Notify: Activate if necessary Personnel Headquarters Center PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 99 of 208

5.4 Emergency Measures This section identifies the measures to be taken for each class of emergency described in Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications. The measures presented in this section are used as the basis for the detailed Emergency Response Plan procedures which define the specific actions to be taken for each emergency class. Emergency measures begin with the recognition and declaration of an emergency class, notification of the applicable agencies for that emergency class, and mobilization of the appropriate portions of the emergency organization. Subsequent measures include damage assessment, corrective actions, protective actions, and aid to affected personnel. Recovery operations are discussed in Section 5.7, Recovery.

5.4.1 Activation of Emergency Response Organizations

1. General The Plant Operating Manual contains Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs).

These are intended to aid the On-Shift Operations Personnel in responding to an accident. The EOPs and AOPs identify actions which should be accomplished to safely terminate the accident and manual actions which should be taken to verify that automatic actions have produced the desired results. The volume of Emergency Operating Procedures also provides, for the operator's use, guidelines which alert the operators to conditions where inadequate cooling of the core exists or where radioactivity releases may occur. Accordingly, if it should appear that any of the Emergency Action Levels are exceeded, as described in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification, the operators are instructed to activate the Emergency Plan.

The Shift Manager activates the Plan, assumes the Emergency Coordinator's responsibilities, initially classifies the emergency, and ensures that the required notifications are made. The Emergency Coordinator will activate portions of, or the entire emergency organization, as warranted for the emergency situation. A more detailed discussion of the methodology that is used in activating the emergency organizations during each class of emergency is provided below and in the Emergency Procedures. Additional detail of the communications networks to be used for notification requirements, for information reporting, and for decision-making with respect to taking protective action onsite and for the general public is contained in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0304, State and County Notifications.

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5.4.1 (Continued)

2. Unusual Event The Shift Manager, when informed of conditions which may be an Unusual Event, confirms that an Emergency Action Level has been exceeded and implements AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification. Position then is responsible for immediately assuming the role of the Emergency Coordinator and for notifying and activating those portions of the emergency organization as appropriate to the emergency class which then exists. The Emergency Coordinator can augment the onsite shift personnel by activating one or more emergency teams described in Section 5.3.2, On-site Emergency Response Organization.

Typical of the teams that may be notified are the Damage Control Teams and the Fire Brigade.

3. Alert Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications and AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification, describe the types of emergencies that are classified as an Alert. Since the conditions in this emergency class indicate an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security threat, and could culminate with the potential of limited releases of radioactive material to the environment, offsite groups will be activated to standby status so that if the emergency level is escalated, the essential offsite emergency organizational groups can be notified and readily mobilized to augment the onsite emergency groups.

At the onset of the Alert, the Shift Manager assumes the role of the Emergency Coordinator until relieved by a trained TSC SEC and ERM, for their applicable duties.

The Emergency Coordinator implements AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification, and promptly determines the need to activate the rest of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

The Emergency Coordinator normally initiates the activation of the Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility, and the Joint Information Center or the Remote Emergency Response Facility. State and local agencies are notified of the Alert condition. The HBRSEP Damage Control teams will be activated upon activation of the OSC. The Joint Information Center will be activated for the purpose of providing information to the public.

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5.4.1.3 (Continued)

The appropriate County and State emergency group leaders will be requested to remain in a readiness condition in case additional augmentation of support personnel is needed and alerting the population-at-risk is warranted.

A decision to go beyond the initial response associated with an Alert class would be based on further degradation of plant parameters, operational experience, or release of radioactive materials that are projected to escalate beyond the Emergency Action Levels for an Alert.

4. Site Area Emergency Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications, and AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification, describe the types of emergencies classified as a Site Area Emergency. The Emergency Coordinator, when classifying the emergency, takes appropriate predefined steps to correct the situation as described in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification.

If not done so earlier, the Shift Manager assumes the role of the Emergency Coordinator until formally relieved. This individual activates the necessary emergency organizations as indicated in Table 5.3.5-1, Notification and Activation of Principal Emergency Response Organizations, and directs that the essential emergency personnel be notified.

If they have not been previously requested to do so, the offsite groups will be mobilized as soon as possible; and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be activated. Radiation monitoring teams will be augmented to permit an expanded onsite and offsite monitoring program.

If the plant parameters indicate further degradation of plant safety or projected radiation levels which exceed the recommended values, the emergency will be escalated to the General Emergency.

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5.4.1 (Continued)

5. General Emergency Section 5.2, Emergency Classifications, and AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification, describe the types of emergencies classified as a General Emergency. The Emergency Coordinator upon classifying the situation as a General Emergency takes appropriate, predefined steps to respond to and correct the situation as described in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO, and AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification. This includes arranging for personnel to be available, both onsite and offsite, to perform actions up to and including evacuation of the affected sectors of the 10-mile EPZ. A flow chart for determining which Sectors to shelter or evacuate is provided in AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations.

If not done so earlier, the Shift Manager immediately assumes the role of the Emergency Coordinator until formally relieved. The SEC activates the necessary emergency organizations, as indicated in Table 5.3.5-1, Notification and Activation of Principal Emergency Response Organizations, and directs that the essential emergency personnel be notified.

The activation and notification process should have begun well before a General Emergency is declared. If the event has not been previously classed as a Site Area Emergency, it may be recommended that the process of warning and notifying the population-at-risk in the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone commence immediately (so that notification should be complete before a major release occurs). In addition, an initial protective action recommendation will be made for sheltering and/or evacuation based upon the criteria established in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Guidance for Protective Action Strategies, and EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions For Nuclear Incidents, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., May 1992.

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5.4.2 Accident Assessment Actions

1. General Effective coordination and direction of all elements of the emergency organization require continuing accident assessment throughout an emergency situation. The process of accident assessment involves several different types of activities, in-plant and offsite, depending on the nature and severity of the emergency.

The magnitude of releases of radioactive material can be determined from effluent and process monitors, meteorological data and other sources of information. Additionally, an independent confirmation of the magnitude of the release can be obtained based on the measured dose rates in the environment.

Given these measured releases or environmental levels and estimates of the amount of dispersion between the plant and the various points of interest, projected doses can be estimated.

These doses can then be related to Protective Action Guides.

The various steps in this process are discussed in the following sections and in the Emergency Procedures.

2. Source Term Assessment

a. Effluent and Radiation Readings The most direct indication of a radiological emergency is a high reading in the effluent radiation monitors. The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) monitors the airborne gaseous and particulate activity in the reactor containment structures. Additional channels of the Radiation Monitoring System also monitor the gaseous activity in the condenser vacuum pumps, Fuel Handling Building ventilation, and main plant vents. These channels indicate, record, and alarm in the main control room. The RMS gives early warning of a plant malfunction and warns plant personnel of increasing radiation activity which might result in a radiation health hazard. See EPTSC-07, Damage Assessment, for procedures that discuss core damage assessment which could be used to help identify the source term for dose projection.

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5.4.2.2.a (Continued)

These monitors are also the primary means of determining that an emergency exists for accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from tanks housing radioactive materials. Such leaks could lead to a release to the environment. In such instances, the following types of emergency actions would take place:

1. The Shift Manager on duty would be promptly notified.

2. Personnel from the affected plant area would be evacuated, if required.

3. Access to the plant area involved would be restricted.

4. All plant personnel directly involved would be monitored for contamination.

5. A determination would be made of the potential for an offsite release.

6. The Emergency Procedures would be activated if conditions so indicate.

b. Potential Consequences Based on In-Plant, ISFSI, or Security conditions When a General Emergency has been declared, the potential consequences require that immediate protective action recommendations be based on core status and containment status. This method does not require that dose projections be made for immediate notification considerations. The initial offsite protective action recommendation based on core and containment status requires, as a minimum, an evacuation for a two mile radius and for affected downwind sectors out to five miles. These initial protective action recommendations may be modified based on known impediments to implementation of offsite protective actions.

If conditions indicate doses that exceed the protective action guides beyond the 10 miles, PARs may be modified and geographical boundaries defined for the affected areas beyond the emergency planning zone.

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5.4.2.2.b (Continued)

As assessment of the General Emergency continues, core and containment status, as well as dose projections will be used to determine follow up protective action recommendations to offsite agencies. Further evaluations of dose assessments against the protective action guidelines will be conducted to determine additional sectors/areas to evacuate/shelter. The criteria for these determinations reflects NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Guidance for Protective Action Strategies, and methodology established in EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., May 1992, stipulating a recommendation for evacuation of a sector if the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) dose is 1 rem or greater or the committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the thyroid is 5 rem or greater.

c. Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis of Reactor and Containment To aid in the assessment of core damage, capabilities have been provided to permit sampling for chemical and radioanalysis under a wide range of accident conditions.

The collection and analysis of samples can be performed without incurring radiation exposures to any individual in excess of 10CFR20.1201, the Occupational Limits for Adults.

During situations involving gross damage to the core, where access to the sampling stations and handling of samples may be limited due to high radiation levels, procedures have been developed to minimize the time required to obtain samples and to reduce the radiation levels during transport and analysis of samples. (See EPRAD-02, Processing Very High Level Radioactive Samples).

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5.4.2. (Continued)

3. Dose Projection and Meteorological Systems Once the source term is estimated, exposures to onsite and offsite individuals can be estimated as described in AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment. Prior to receipt of information from the emergency radiation monitoring teams, exposure rates at various locations onsite and offsite will be estimated from the airborne concentrations of radioactive material as calculated from plant radiation monitors and the atmospheric dispersion characteristics.

Meteorological measurements, specifically the change in temperature with height, wind velocity, and wind direction, are used to determine the atmospheric dispersion conditions.

Necessary information is available through the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) and Emergency Preparedness Network (EP NET). Rapid evaluation of potential radiation levels of any downwind area can be made through the use of ERFIS or other computer-based software systems.

The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 has an onsite meteorological station with a backup source of additional meteorological data to provide sufficient information for utilization in a dose assessment capability. This system is further described in Section 5.5.8.2, Meteorological Instrumentation and Procedures.

Currently, the plant staff has an automated dose projection capability as described in AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment.

By entering critical plant data and meteorological information obtained from the onsite meteorological station, dose projections can be made for various locations using the plant computer systems. This function has been designed and implemented to allow for the rapid determination of dose isopleths for immediate use by plant personnel.

The Emergency Response Facility Information Systems (ERFIS) and Emergency Preparedness Network (EP NET) computer system provides for monitoring of plant parameters, and meteorological data display is a part of the system for remote interrogation, thus satisfying NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 criteria for meteorological evaluation and remote interrogation.

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5.4.2.3 (Continued)

When measurements of radiation levels offsite are reported by the emergency Field Monitoring Teams, the initially projected doses will be confirmed or modified. The information can be used by the Emergency Coordinator and their staff (or the EOF Director and their staff after the EOF is activated) in responding to the emergency.

4. Emergency Environmental Monitoring The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director is responsible for quickly evaluating meteorological conditions existing at the time of the incident and, where releases are or soon will be occurring, for dispatching monitoring teams to specified, predetermined downwind locations. The prime objective of the initial emergency offsite monitoring is to confirm or modify the initial projections of the consequences of any release of radioactive material into the environment as described in AD-EP-ALL-0203, Field Monitoring During Declared Emergencies.

The Field Monitoring Teams collect samples and survey data and transmit information to and/or receive instructions from the Radiological Assessment Manager who uses this information for determining protective actions.

Calculational aids, site maps, and actual radiation survey data collected by offsite survey teams define affected areas and assess the extent and significance of the release.

Information is required for decision making with as little delay as possible; therefore, the initial environmental surveys involve simple-to-perform measurements so that the dose assessments based on plant parameters can be quickly confirmed or modified.

Subsequent environmental monitoring efforts will be aimed at further defining the offsite consequences including estimates of total population exposure and instituting an expanded program to enable prompt assessments of any subsequent releases from the plant. The agencies identified in Section 5.3.4, Coordination with Participating Governmental Agencies, that are to assist in this expanded radiological monitoring effort will coordinate their efforts with those of the Duke Energy Field Monitoring Team.

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5.4.2.4 (Continued)

Field monitoring equipment will have at least the capability to detect and measure radioiodine in the vicinity of the plant site as low as 1 x 10-7 µCi/cm3. The collected air sample can easily be measured by hand held survey meters, a simple test that can serve as an initial check of projected releases based on plant data and can confirm that significant quantities of elemental iodine have been released (the chemical form that would pose a health hazard)

{RNP RA/01-0164}. More detailed measurements (e.g., Sodium Iodide scintillation counters) can be quickly brought into service to provide the longer term higher capabilities to detect and measure very low levels of contamination in the environment, as would be planned for subsequent radiation monitoring efforts.

At least two Field Monitoring Teams will initially be activated from the plant staff upon activation of the EOF, if conditions warrant.

Additional teams from other Duke Energy sites will be available for plant support.

5. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

The Emergency Response Data System will supply the NRC with selected Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) data points on a near real time basis. The Control Room Staff will ensure that this function will be activated within one hour of the declaration of an Alert or higher. The selected data points are transmitted to the NRC electronically at approximately 1 minute intervals.

If the primary ERFIS system fails (failover), the backup ERFIS system will continue to make data available for ERDS.

5.4.3 Corrective Actions Corrective actions that may be taken to mitigate the circumstances of various levels and types of emergencies identified in this plan are given in the plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). A list of subjects addressed by the EOP Network is tabulated in Table 5.4.2-1, List of Procedures at HBRSEP for Off-Normal Conditions. In addition, there are fire protection procedures that delineate fire prevention measures and fire detection and suppression systems.

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5.4.3 (Continued)

There is also a Security Plan and its associated implementation procedures which provide protection against successful acts of industrial sabotage. Generally, corrective actions include any actions that are taken to repair damaged equipment, to install emergency structures, systems, and components, or to reduce the releases of radioactivity.

In order to maintain proficiency in implementing the various procedures and plans, there are training and retraining programs which in some cases are augmented by periodic drills and exercises. A description of this specialized training is given in Section 5.6.1.1, Training.

1. Severe Accident Management Personnel in the Severe Accident Management (SAM) organization are generally organized into three categories. First, the Decision Makers, are those who will approve strategy and actions recommended by the Evaluators and authorize instructions given to the Implementers. The TSC Emergency Coordinator will fill this role. Second, the Evaluators are those who will determine the appropriate strategy, action and procedure to implement. The TSC Operations Manager and Engineering Manger will fill this role.

Third, the Implementers are those who will carry out the actions recommended by the Evaluators and approved by the Decision Makers. The Control Room Operators and Operations Support Center Damage Control Teams will fill this role.

The SAM procedures are composed of a set of diagnostics flow charts, procedures, setpoints and calculational aids which are separate from the Emergency Plan Procedures. SAM entry points are defined and indicate when the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Network has been ineffective in mitigating the accident. Once the SAM program is entered, the TSC will transition from the role of Control Room advisor to directing accident response.

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5.4.3.1 (Continued)

SAM training and table tops/exercises will be conducted in accordance with SAM Program Procedures. While some aspects of the SAM Program may be discussed, these will not be objectives during regular Emergency Plan exercises. The SAM table top/exercise program will be evaluated separately. This is, in part, due to the differing strategies and philosophy associated with severe accident management.

5.4.4 Protective Actions Protective Actions must take into consideration the potential risks of implementing such measures versus the reduction of the radiological risk achieved by their use. Analyses of the spectrum of emergencies show that only those in the General Emergency class are expected to have consequences in excess of one Rem TEDE, but events in this category generally progress so slowly that some hours are available to alert and take measures to protect the public.

Protective Action Guides for external and internal exposures to airborne radioactive material in the early phase are described in AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations.

Protective actions planned for onsite personnel are described in Section 5.4.4.2, Protective Action - Onsite. Protective actions for the offsite population-at-risk are the responsibility of state and local agencies; however, representative actions at various dose levels are described in Section 5.4.4.6, Public Warning and Notification, and Section 5.4.4.7, Protective Actions - Offsite/Public. The evaluation of protective action guides for intermediate phase and ingestion pathways are the responsibility of the State.

1. Criteria for Requesting Outside Assistance Notification of offsite agencies will take place when EALs are exceeded (see Section 5.3.5, Notification and Activation) for situations where major releases are occurring, or will soon occur, it will be recommended that the process of public notification begin. Any incident that is projected to result in radiation doses to the general public in excess of the Protective Action Guides listed in AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, requires the Emergency Coordinator to declare a General Emergency and issue Protective Action Recommendations to the off-site agencies responsible for implementing protective measures on behalf of the public.

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5.4.4. (Continued)

2. Protective Action - Onsite

a. Warning and Notification The onsite Public Address (PA) system, appropriate alarms, and, as appropriate, the Emergency Response Organization Notification System will be used to alert/warn and notify onsite personnel of an emergency and necessary protective actions, as described in AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO.

Such warning and notification will include persons at the Visitors Center and the Recreation Area. Outside the plant protected area, warning will be accomplished as described in Section 5.4.4.6, Public Warning and Notification for the public.

b. Evacuation & Personnel Accountability For emergencies requiring protective actions in accordance with Emergency Procedure EPSPA-01, Evacuation and Accountability; AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radiological Release; and AD-EP-ALL-0105, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, personnel will proceed by the safest, most direct routes to the assembly location as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

On-shift operating personnel will assemble as directed by the Shift Manager.

All plant personnel and visitors not specifically involved in responding to the emergency will assemble in Building 110 or interior lower level Unit 2 Administrative Building unless otherwise directed.

Personnel accountability, for persons in the protected area will be carried out within 30 minutes from declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE), or GENERAL EMERGENCY (If no SAE has been declared). Personnel accountability will occur at the assembly locations in accordance with EPSPA-01, Evacuation and Accountability, and all personnel will return dosimeters and be checked for radioactive contamination. Contaminated and/or injured individuals will be directed to an area set aside for decontamination and/or medical aid as described in EPSPA-02, First Aid and Medical Care; and EPRAD-04, Personnel Decontamination.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 112 of 208

5.4.4.2.b (Continued)

Search for missing persons and rescue will be performed as described in EPSPA-01, Evacuation and Accountability.

Onsite personnel will evacuate the area when directed using transportation as appropriate. Personnel without transportation will be identified during the assembly phase and provided transportation. Security will monitor the areas outside the Protected Area and within the 1400 ft.

exclusion area to ensure that all non-ERO personnel have evacuated the Site.

The west access road will be used as the primary route to depart from the site. Alternate routes through the east access road and the north access road to Silo Road will be used as appropriate. Evacuation from the 10-mile EPZ will be by way of appropriate evacuation routes identified in Figures 5.1.1-2, 10-Mile Plume Exposure EPZ and the annual Duke Energy Safety Information.

3. Control of Personnel Radiation Exposures Although an emergency situation transcends the normal requirements for limiting exposures to ionizing radiation, guideline levels are established in AD-EP-ALL-0205, Emergency Exposure Controls, for exposures that may be acceptable in emergencies.

The maximum TEDE received by any worker should not exceed established regulatory limits (see 5.4.4.3.a, Lifesaving Actions).

Every reasonable effort will be used to ensure that an emergency is handled in such a manner that no worker exceeds these limits.

This also includes the following personnel: assessment groups, first aid, personnel decontamination, ambulance service, and medical personnel.

The administration of radioprotective drugs to Duke Energy personnel and contractor employees may also be useful in mitigating the consequences of inhalation of radioactive materials during an emergency.

Procedures for the administration of radioprotective drugs to Duke Energy and contractor employees are described in AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radiological Release.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 113 of 208

5.4.4.3 (Continued)

Decision-making is based on conditions at the time of an emergency and should always consider the probable effects of an exposure prior to allowing any individual to be exposed to radiation levels exceeding the established occupational limits. The probable high radiation acute exposure effects are:

Up to 50 Rem in 1 day - no physiological changes are likely to be observed.

50 to 100 Rem in 1 day - no impairment likely but some physiological changes, including possible temporary blood changes, may occur. Medical observations would be required after exposure.

100 to 300 Rem in 1 day - some physical impairment possible.

Some lethal exposures possible.

The following subsections describe the criteria to be considered for life-saving and facility protection actions.

a. Lifesaving Actions In emergency situations that require personnel to search for and remove injured persons or entry to prevent conditions that would probably injure numbers of people, a planned dose shall not exceed limits as outlined below:

Dose Limit Rem TEDE1 Activity Condition 5 All (except as listed below) 10 Protecting valuable property Lower dose not practicable 25 Lifesaving or protection Lower dose not of large populations practicable

>25 Lifesaving or protection of Only on a voluntary large populations basis to persons fully aware of the risks involved 1Doses to the lens of the eye should be limited to three times the stated TEDE value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) should be limited to ten times the stated TEDE value.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 114 of 208

5.4.4.3.a (Continued)

The following additional criteria should be considered:

1. Rescue personnel should be volunteers or professional rescue personnel (e.g., fire fighters or first-aid and rescue personnel who volunteer by choice of employment.)

2. Rescue personnel should be broadly familiar with the probable consequence of exposure.

3. Women capable of reproduction should not take part in these actions.

4. Other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected whenever possible for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary genetic effects.

5. Internal exposure should be minimized by the use of the most appropriate respiratory protection, and contamination should be controlled by the use of protective clothing when practical.

6. Exposures under these conditions shall be limited to once in a lifetime.

7. Persons receiving exposures as indicated above should avoid procreation for a period up to a few months.

8. Entry into high radiation areas shall not be permitted unless instrumentation capable of reading radiation levels of up to 1,000 Rem/hour (gamma) is provided.

9. Each emergency worker entering a high radiation area shall wear direct reading dosimetry capable of measuring the expected exposure to be received.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 115 of 208

5.4.4.3 (Continued)

b. Exposures During Repair/Re-entry Efforts There may be situations where saving of life is not at issue but where it is necessary to enter a hazardous area to protect valuable installations or to make the facility more secure against events which could lead to radioactivity releases (e.g., entry of damage repair parties who are to repair valve leaks or add iodine fixing chemicals to spilled liquids). In such instances, planned dose to emergency workers should not exceed limits as outlined below:

Dose Limit Rem TEDE1 Activity Condition 5 All (except as listed below) 10 Protecting valuable property Lower dose not practicable 25 Lifesaving or protection Lower dose not of large populations practicable

>25 Lifesaving or protection of Only on a voluntary large populations basis to persons fully aware of the risks involved 1Doses to the lens of the eye should be limited to three times the stated TEDE value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) should be limited to ten times the stated TEDE value.

The following additional criteria should also be considered:

1. Persons performing the planned actions should be volunteers broadly familiar with exposure consequences.

2. Women capable of reproduction should not take part in these actions; and declared pregnant women shall not take part in these actions.

3. Internal exposures should be minimized by respiratory protection and contamination controlled by the use of protective clothing.

4. If the retrospective dose from these actions is a substantial fraction of the prospective limits, the actions shall be limited to once in a lifetime.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 116 of 208

5.4.4.3.b (Continued)

5. Entry into high radiation areas shall not be permitted unless instrumentation capable of reading radiation levels of up to 1,000 Rem/hour (gamma) is provided.

6. Each emergency worker entering a high radiation area shall wear direct reading dosimetry capable of measuring the expected exposure to be received.

Emergency teams that must enter areas where they might be expected to receive higher than normal doses will be fully briefed regarding their duties and actions and what they are to do while in the area. They will also be fully briefed as to expected dose rates, stay time, and other hazards. All such entries will include one member from the Plant Monitoring Team, or other person adequately trained in health physics. All team members will use protective devices as specified by the Radiological Protection Manager. The team members will be instructed not to deviate from the planned route unless required by unanticipated conditions, such as rescue or performance of an operation that would minimize the emergency condition.

If the monitored dose rates or stay times encountered during the entry exceed the limits set for the operation, the team will immediately communicate with the OSC Leader or will return to the area from where they were dispatched.

Once their operation has been completed, the team personnel will follow established monitoring and personnel decontamination procedures as specified by the Radiological Protection Manager.

4. Radioactive Contamination Reasonable limits and actions will be the basis for determining release of personnel and equipment. The term reasonable is based on mitigation of the accident and protecting the health and safety of the public.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 117 of 208

5.4.4.4 (Continued)

a. Onsite Personnel Radiation safety controls are established to contain the spread of loose surface radioactive contamination which will be controlled and removed, in accordance with existing site procedures. Personnel leaving the contaminated areas are monitored to ensure that they or their clothing are not radioactively contaminated.

Additionally, in the event of a site evacuation, personnel will be monitored prior to leaving the site or sent to alternate monitoring sites on an as needed basis. If there is a need for decontamination actions outside the plant site, a contingency plan will be developed per AD-EP-RNP-0203, RNP Site Specific Field Monitoring Information.

Contaminated clothing or personal articles will be decontaminated. Any difficult to remove skin contamination will be removed in accordance with existing site procedures. Drinking water and food supplies will be monitored and, during an emergency, permitted only in specified clean areas. Contamination on personnel will be removed in accordance with established procedures described in EPRAD-04, Personnel Decontamination. If normal decontamination procedures do not reduce contamination to acceptable levels, the case will be referred to a competent medical authority.

b. Equipment and Vehicles Equipment and tools will be released for use outside of the contaminated areas only if loose surface radioactive contamination is within reasonable limits. All tools and items of equipment must be checked for contamination before being taken from a known contaminated area. If the item is found to be contaminated and decontamination is not practical, the item must remain in that area. In the event of a site evacuation, all vehicles will be surveyed for contamination before they are allowed to leave the plant site or sent to alternate monitoring sites as needed.

Contaminated vehicles should be decontaminated before being released.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 118 of 208

5.4.4 (Continued)

5. Treatment of Injured and Contaminated Persons Personnel showers and chemical decontamination agents are available on site and, except in cases of serious or life-threatening injury, established decontamination procedures will be employed on site prior to medical treatment. Decontamination showers and supplies are provided adjacent to the radiation control area and in the TSC. Additional personnel decontamination equipment is located in the first aid room.

Shower and sink drains in the radiation control area are routed to the miscellaneous waste processing system where the liquid is processed and monitored prior to discharge.

Ambulance service is available through the local rescue squads and emergency medical service. It is anticipated, however, that in cases not involving severe injury, one of the plant vehicles could normally be used to transport individuals to the hospital, especially if radioactive contamination is present. Private automobiles of on-duty personnel could also be used.

Arrangements and facilities for medical treatment of injured plant personnel are described in detail in Attachment 6.5, Medical Treatment and Assistance, and in EPSPA-02, First Aid and Medical Care. Depending on the nature and severity of injury, injured personnel may be treated in-plant by individuals trained in first aid, treated in-plant by a physician, or transported to the hospital for treatment.

In cases of severe injury, lifesaving first aid or medical treatment will take precedence over personnel decontamination. In general, the order of medical treatment will be:

1. Care of severe physical injuries.

2. Personnel decontamination.

3. First aid to other injuries.

4. Definitive medical treatment and subsequent therapy as required.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 119 of 208

5.4.4.5 (Continued)

Definitive medical treatment, therapy, and evaluation may include radioprotective drugs, urinary bioassays or whole body counts on persons suspected of inhaling or ingesting a significant amount of radioactive material or may include surveillance and therapy for persons receiving a large whole body dose.

6. Public Warning and Notification In the event of an emergency, the plant will notify designated County, State and Federal officials in accordance with AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO.

During an ALERT, the appropriate county and state emergency agencies will be notified of conditions and alert the population at risk if needed. Upon declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the plant will predict plant trends for use by public officials. The plant will recommend protective actions for the public upon declaration of a General Emergency.

Public warning, when deemed necessary, will be accomplished as described by the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The primary method for warning and notification is the Alert Notification System. The sirens can be supplemented by radio, television, sound trucks, bullhorns, and knocking on doors. Aircraft and patrol boats will be used in notifying people in wooded areas and on Lake Robinson where appropriate and necessary. These supplemental methods are also a backup method to alert and notify the public of protective actions if the sirens should fail.

Alert Notification System sirens mounted on 50-foot utility poles have been installed by Duke Energy at 59 locations within a 10-mile radius of the HBRSEP. The average ambient noise level throughout the EPZ is below FEMA guidelines. The Siren System is designed to provide a minimum of 60dBA throughout the EPZ.

The siren system is activated and monitored by a Motorola Feedback System. This system provides for activation, by county, from designated locations within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Activation of the sirens will be performed by County Emergency Management Personnel. At the request of the responsible county authorities, HBRSEP may activate any part of the siren system. The warning (Alert) signal will be a 3-minute steady tone from the sirens. The warning system will be reviewed annually and upgraded when conditions warrant.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 120 of 208

5.4.4.6 (Continued)

The population at risk in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is subdivided into three general categories: resident (permanent) population, transient population, and special facility population as described in CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study and subsequent annual updates. The total resident population within the 10-mile EPZ is estimated to be 35,927. Notification times will be determined by the State of South Carolina and the risk counties (Darlington, Chesterfield, and Lee). Notification times should be: less than 15 minutes for all people within 5 miles and less than 45 minutes for those people between 5 and 10 miles.

Evacuation routes and times for specific evacuation zones are given in Tables 5.4.4-3, Evacuation Routes for the 10 Mile EPZ, and in CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, respectively. Evacuation Time Estimates are also used by the State of South Carolina in the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Part 2 -H.

B. Robinson FNF Site Specific.

7. Protective Actions - Offsite/Public

a. Public Education and Information Occupants in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be provided information prepared by Duke Energy in conjunction with the state and county agencies. This public education and information program is intended to ensure that members of the public are: (a) aware of the potential for an occurrence of a radiological emergency; (b) able to recognize a radiological emergency notification; and (c) knowledgeable of the proper, immediate actions to be taken upon notification.

EPPRO-02, Maintenance and Testing, addresses this area.

This will be accomplished by: (1) distribution of the annual Duke Energy safety information which contains educational information on emergency preparedness, sheltering, sirens, and radiation including telephone numbers of agencies to contact for more information; (2) availability of qualified personnel to address civic, religious, social, and occupational organizations; and (3) distribution of news material to the media and numerous community and business newsletters.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 121 of 208

5.4.4.7.a (Continued)

Emergency information will be made available to transient populations through the distribution of Duke Energy safety information to commercial establishments in the 10-mile EPZ (e.g., brochures, telephone book inserts, etc.)

During an actual emergency, provisions will be established through the Joint Information Center and the Corporate Communications Department to make available and distribute information to the news media. The JIC will implement provisions for a number of telephones which members of the public, who hear rumors, can call for factual information.

The public education and information program is further described in Section 5.6.1.4, Public Education, and in the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

b. General For emergencies requiring protective actions for the general public in designated offsite areas, state agencies will determine the advisability of any necessary evacuation or sheltering. Local agencies will conduct the protective actions as warranted. Assembly points would vary depending on the severity of the incident and on the prevailing weather conditions. To assist in this effort, Duke Energy will provide up-to-date assessments of the condition of the plant and of the quantity and rate of release of radioactivity. Duke Energy will also assist by performing dose assessments which can be compared to pre-planned protective action thresholds.

The protective actions that Duke Energy recommends to the state will be based upon in-plant conditions as well as current meteorological data such as Wind Direction, Speed and Stability Class, and other factors. A flow chart for determining which Sectors to shelter or evacuate is provided in AD-EP-ALL-0109, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 122 of 208

5.4.4.7.b (Continued)

Releases affecting offsite areas may not be of the magnitude requiring evacuation, but other public protection measures may be taken at the discretion of the appropriate agencies. These measures may include radio broadcasts warning people to avoid designated areas, to remain indoors, close windows, and avoid consuming uncovered food or drink.

Detailed procedures for public protective action are contained in the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

c. Evacuation In the event that evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ is required, the evacuation routes shown in Figure 5.1.1-2, 10 Mile Plume Exposure EPZ, and Table 5.4.4-3, Evacuation Routes for the 10 Mile EPZ will be used by onsite and offsite personnel.

The time required to evacuate personnel from the 10-mile EPZ varies depending on whether a part of the EPZ is to be evacuated or all of it, on the time of year such as winter or summer, etc. as illustrated in CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, and on other factors as shown in Table 5.4.4-1, Factors Related to Warning/Evacuation Time.

It should be noted that the evacuation process in itself will produce casualties. Casualties resulting from evacuation based on EPA report EPA-400-R-92-001 Appendix C, Risk of Evacuation are:

Deaths - 9.0 x 10-8 per person mile

d. Shelter Consideration for sheltering should be done if the release is short term or any impediments to evacuation, such as weather, known route problems or concerns, exists. The State may consider sheltering of special populations -

institutionalized or infirm persons.

e. Respiratory Protection It is unlikely that effective public respiratory protection can be provided by improvised devices.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 123 of 208

TABLE 5.4.3-1 LIST OF PROCEDURES AT HBRSEP FOR OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS AOP-001 Malfunction of Reactor Control System AOP-003 Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control AOP-004 Control Room Inaccessibility AOP-005 Radiation Monitoring System AOP-006 Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration AOP-007 Turbine Trip Below P-8 AOP-008 Accidental Release of Liquid Waste AOP-009 Accidental Gas Release From a WGDT AOP-010 Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction AOP-012 Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating Water Pump Trip AOP-013 Fuel Handling Accident AOP-014 Component Cooling Water System Malfunction AOP-015 Secondary Load Rejection AOP-016 Excessive Primary Plant Leakage AOP-017 Loss of Instrument Air AOP-018 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions AOP-019 Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control AOP-020 Loss of Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling)

AOP-021 Seismic Disturbances AOP-022 Loss of Service Water AOP-024 Loss of Instrument Bus AOP-025 RTGB Instrument Failure AOP-026 Grid Instability AOP-028 ISFSI Abnormal Events AOP-031 Operation with High Switchyard Voltage AOP-032 Response to Flooding from the Fire Protection System AOP-033 Shutdown LOCA AOP-034 Security Events AOP-035 S/G Tube Leak AOP-036 SFP Events AOP-037 Large Transformer Malfunctions AOP-038 Rapid Downpower AOP-041 Response to Fire Event AOP-042 Loss of Spent Fuel Pit Cooling AOP-054 Loss of Control Room Annunciators PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 124 of 208

TABLE 5.4.3-1 (Continued)

LIST OF PROCEDURES AT HBRSEP FOR OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS EOP-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant EOP-E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation EOP-E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP-ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power EOP-ECA-0.1 Loss of All AC Power Recovery without SI Required EOP-ECA-0.2 Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required EOP-ECA-1.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation EOP-ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment EOP-ECA-2.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators EOP-ECA-3.1 SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired EOP-ECA-3.2 SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Saturated Recovery Desired EOP-ECA-3.3 SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control EOP-ES-0.0 Rediagnosis EOP-ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response EOP-ES-0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown EOP-ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS)

EOP-ES-0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (Without RVLIS)

EOP-ES-1.1 SI Termination EOP-ES-1.2 Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization EOP-ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation EOP-ES-1.4 Transfer to Long Term Recirculation EOP-ES-3.1 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill EOP-ES-3.2 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Blowdown EOP-ES-3.3 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump EOP-SUPPLEMENTS EOP-FOLDOUTS EPP-21 Energizing Pressurizer Heaters from Emergency Busses EPP-22 Energizing Plant Equipment using the Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator EPP-24 Isolation of Leakage in the RHR Pump Pit EPP-25 Energizing Supplemental Plant Equipment Using the DS DG EPP-26 Loss of DC Bus "A" EPP-27 Loss of DC Bus "B" EPP-28 Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 125 of 208

TABLE 5.4.3-1 (Continued)

LIST OF PROCEDURES AT HBRSEP FOR OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS CSFST Critical Safety Function Status Trees FRP-S.1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS FRP-S.2 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown FRP-C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling FRP-C.2 Response to Degraded Core Cooling FRP-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling FRP-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FRP-H.2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure FRP-H.3 Response to Steam Generator High Level FRP-H.4 Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capability FRP-H.5 Response to Steam Generator Low Level FRP-P.1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock FRP-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock FRP-J.1 Response to High Containment Pressure FRP-J.2 Response to Containment Flooding FRP-J.3 Response to High Containment Radiation Level FRP-I.1 Response to High Pressurizer Level FRP-I.2 Response to Low Pressurizer Level FRP-I.3 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 126 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-1 FACTORS RELATED TO WARNING/EVACUATION TIME

1. Facility to Offsite Agencies Alert Phase

a. Decision-making time

b. Physical actions/calling time

2. Governmental Agencies to Public Alert Phase

a. Decision-making time

b. Physical actions/calling-alerting time

3. Public Alert and Notification Phase

a. Hear signal

b. Recognize signal

c. Seek confirmation of signal meaning and validity

d. Find confirmation of signal meaning

e. Relate signal meaning to self

f. Decide to act

4. Movement Preparation Phase

a. Time between deciding to act and departing location

b. Shutting off utilities

c. Packing bags

d. Deciding on destination and routes

e. Taking care of livestock, etc.

f. Collecting other family members

g. Loading the automobile and departing

5. Movement/Travel Phase

a. Movement time is a function of road distance to the boundary of the evacuation area, vehicle used for evacuation, and auto traffic conditions (traffic volumes, road capacity, weather conditions, etc.).

b. Road capacity under emergency conditions per FEMA CPG-2-8-C is assumed to be 850 vehicles per hour (vph) per lane; under foul weather conditions 450-500 vph.

c. Traffic volume is determined by: (1) dividing the EPZ population by the average number of persons per dwelling unit; or (2) obtaining statistical data on number of vehicles registered in the EPZ, or; (3) other.

6. Evacuation Verification Phase

a. Marker Technique (NRC NUREG-0654)

Auto check - Total road distances: Ave. 15 mph Aircraft check

b. Telephone poll: 0.5 min. per residence PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 127 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-2 REPRESENTATIVE SHIELDING FACTORS FROM GAMMA CLOUD SOURCE(*)

Shielding Representative Structure or Location Factor(a) Range Outside 1.0 --

Vehicles 1.0 --

Wood-frame house(b) (no basement) 0.9 --

Basement of wood house 0.6 0.1 to 0.7(c)

Masonry house (no basement) 0.6 0.4 to 0.7(c)

Basement of masonry house 0.4 0.1 to 0.5(c)

Large office or industrial building 0.2 0.1 to 0.3(c,d)

(a) The ratio of the dose received inside the structure to the dose that would be received outside the structure.

(b) A wood frame house with brick or stone veneer is approximately equivalent to a masonry house for shielding purposes.

(c) -This range is mainly due to different wall materials and different geometries.

-The shielding factor depends on where the personnel are located within the building (e.g., the basement or an inside room).

(d) Shielding Factor = Shielded Dose Rate/Unshielded Dose Rate

From: SAND 77-1725, Public Protection Strategies For Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents, Sandia Laboratory PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 128 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-3 EVACUATION ROUTES FOR THE 10 MILE EPZ COUNTY SECTOR ROUTE EVACUATION ROUTE RELOCATION CENTER Darlington A-0 #1 Rancho Rd., Substation Rd., Clyde Rd., Westover Florence City-County Civic Center Drive, Old Camden Rd., New Market Rd., 3300 West Radio Drive Whippoorwill Rd. - All to Bo Bo Newsome Hwy to Florence, SC 29501 Darlington; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 Located off David McLeod Blvd approximately South to I-95 South to Exit 160 to Relocation Center in 1 mile east of I-95 and I-20 Florence County Chesterfield Senior High School Chesterfield A-1 #2 S13-763 (Prospect Church Road) to S13-29 (Ruby-401 N. Page St.

Hartsville Road) to SC-145 to Chesterfield.

Chesterfield, SC Located off Hwy. 145 North of Chesterfield 0.5 mile on the left.

Chesterfield A-2 #3 S13-149 (Cedar Creek Church Road) to SC-102 to Chesterfield Senior High School SC-145 to Chesterfield, OR, S13-491 (Bullard Ford (see address in Sector A-1)

Road) to S13-29 (Ruby-Hartsville Road) to SC-145 to Chesterfield.

Darlington B-1 #4 14th St., W. Home Ave., W. Carolina Ave., S. Fifth St., Florence City-County Civic Center New Market Rd., Old Camden Rd. - All to Bo Bo (see address in Sector A-0)

Newsome Hwy to Darlington; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to Exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

5 Lakeview Blvd., Old Camden Rd., Ruby Rd.,

Ousleydale Rd., N. Fifth St., Miller Ave., Railroad Ave.,

Coker Ave., Marquis Hwy, Fourth St. - All to Bo Bo Newsome Hwy to Darlington; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to Exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 129 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-3 (Continued)

EVACUATION ROUTES FOR THE 10 MILE EPZ COUNTY SECTOR ROUTE EVACUATION ROUTE RELOCATION CENTER Darlington B-2 #6 Ousleydale Rd., Old Camden Rd., Patrick Hwy, Antioch Rd., Florence City-County Civic Center Miller Ave., E. Home Ave., E. Carolina Ave., N. Center Rd., (see address in Sector A-0)

W. Billy Farrow Hwy, Swift Creek Rd., Fourth St. - All to N. Fifth St. and Marquis Hwy to Bo Bo Newsome Hwy to Darlington; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

7 Old Camden Rd., Rolling Rd., Antioch Rd., N. Center Rd.,

Bethlehem Rd. - All to US-15; then take Dovesville Hwy to Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

8 E. Home Ave., E. Carolina Ave., Centerville Rd., N. Center Rd.

W. Billy Farrow Hwy - All to Floyds Rd.; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

9 Flinn's Cross Rd., Swift Creek Rd., Center Rd., All to W. Billy Farrow Hwy; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

Darlington C-1 #10 Hillcrest Rd., Clyde Rd., Kellytown Rd., Bay Rd., High Point Rd. Florence City-County Civic Center

- All to Bo Bo Newsome Hwy to Darlington; then take Governor (see address in Sector A-0)

Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 130 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-3 (Continued)

EVACUATION ROUTES FOR THE 10 MILE EPZ COUNTY SECTOR ROUTE EVACUATION ROUTE RELOCATION CENTER Highway 403 to Windhams Crossroads (401) to I-20 East to Florence City-County Civic Center Darlington C-2 #11 Relocation Center. (see address in Sector A-0)

Darlington D-1 #12 Old Camden Rd., Rainbow View Rd., Family Rd., Clyde Florence City-County Civic Center School Rd., Ashland Rd., Kelleybridge Rd. - All to Bo Bo (see address in Sector A-0)

Newsome Hwy to Darlington; then take Governor Williams Hwy to US-52 South to I-95 South to Exit 160 to Relocation Center in Florence County.

Lee D-2 #13 SC-341 to US-15 through Bishopville to SC-34 Traffic Control Lee Central High School Point OR SC-34 through Bishopville to Relocation Center 1800 Wisacky Hwy.

located at Lee Central High School. Bishopville, SC 29010 Chesterfield E-1 #14 S13-150 (New Hope Church Rd.) to S13-711 (Sowell Rd.) to Chesterfield Senior High School SC-151 to US-1 to SC-145 to Chesterfield. (see address in Sector A-1)

OR, S13-46 (Middendorf Road) to S13-346 (Lake Robinson Road) to SC-151 to US-1 to SC-145 to Chesterfield.

OR, SC-151 to US-1 to SC-145 to Chesterfield.

Chesterfield E-2 #15 S13-296 (Old Creek Road) to US-1 to SC-145 to Chesterfield. Chesterfield Senior High School OR, US-1 to SC-145 to Chesterfield. (see address in Sector A-1)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 131 of 208

TABLE 5.4.4-4 Intentionally Left Blank PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 132 of 208

5.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment To facilitate efficient and effective control and coordination of the numerous actions required during emergency situations, several facilities have been designated as emergency centers for HBRSEP. These facilities are linked by a comprehensive communications network to allow accurate and timely communications between the facilities, outside agencies, and the public. The communications network uses commercial telephone company, VoiceNet, Emergency Telecommunication System (ETS), data links, and radio to provide:

Voice communication through normal commercial telephone, Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET) and automatic ringdown (hot line) between selected facilities, conference call capability, speaker phones, satellite phone, and assistance where required; Radio communications between selected Duke Energy vehicles and appropriate fixed locations, as well as with state mobile units and fixed locations (using Darlington County Fire District, Palmetto 800);

Facsimile. (A detailed discussion of the HBRSEP emergency communications systems is presented as Attachment 6.1, Communications Systems). Data transmission by the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is established with the NRC at Alert and higher classifications.

The purpose of emergency response facilities is to provide centralized locations for organized coordination and control of onsite and offsite activities during an emergency. A location is provided from where ERO members may direct the activities for which they are responsible, while providing for coordination of activities with other organizations.

Facilities function as a center for the licensee's command and control functions of onsite operations, including coordination of all licensee activities, onsite and offsite. Also needed is a center for the analysis of plant effluent monitors, meteorological conditions, and offsite radiation measurements, and for offsite dose projections. As discussed in Section 5.3, Emergency Response Organization, additional facilities are needed where information regarding current and projected plant status needed by federal, state, and local authorities for implementation of offsite emergency plans can be transmitted, where key representatives of the agencies can meet and where the press can operate.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 133 of 208

5.5 (Continued)

The above functions are carried out by the interaction of the Control Room, the Operations Support Center, the Technical Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility, the Corporate Communication Department, Joint Information Center, the State and County Emergency Operating Centers, and the NRC Operations Center. These centers are connected with a comprehensive, redundant communications network.

The functional capabilities of the HBRSEP emergency facilities are presented in Table 5.5.0-1, Functional Objectives of Emergency Facilities, and the physical locations of on-site emergency facilities are shown on Figure 5.1.1-3, Emergency Response Facility Locations. Specific information about the facilities and equipment available for dealing with emergencies at HBRSEP is presented in the following sections.*

5.5.1 Control Room The function of the Control Room is plant control. All plant-related operations are directed from the Control Room. The Control Room is designed to meet habitability standards as described in the HBRSEP UFSAR.

Nuclear plant instrumentation, including area and process radiation monitoring system instrumentation, is provided in the Control Room to give early warning of a potential emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the emergency situation. The Control Room contains the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactor and turbine generator under normal and emergency situations.

Additional equipment such as portable radiation survey instruments, readout of meteorological instrumentation and communication equipment are available in the Control Room. A supply of protective clothing, respiratory equipment, and self-contained breathing apparatus will also be maintained in the Control Room.

In the event that a verified aircraft threat to HBRSEP is received, designated personnel will relocate to an area outside the Protected Area.

This area is provided with necessary procedures, equipment, and communications capabilities to maintain command and control of the emergency response activities until the augmented Emergency Response Facilities are activated and command and control can be transferred.

Recovery operations and the Recovery Center are discussed in Section 5.7, "Recovery".

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 134 of 208

5.5.2 Technical Support Center {2.44}

The Technical Support Center (TSC) provides a location to house individuals who are knowledgeable of and responsible for engineering and management support of plant operations during an emergency.

Plant design/operation information in the form of drawings, UFSAR, Technical Specifications, visual display of parameters, and local TSC radiation monitors have been placed in the facility. The Technical Support Center is a reinforced concrete building situated on a concrete slab located as shown in Figure 5.1.1-1, Robinson Site Plan. The TSC is adjacent to the Protected Area in the TSC/Training Building `and was built in accordance with the local building code.

The Technical Support Center has been designed to allow continuous occupancy during an emergency. It is supplied by electrical service from two separate sources through an automatic transfer switch. Upon loss or degradation of the normal source, the vital building loads will be automatically transferred to the alternate source. One of the power sources is fed from offsite power and the other source is fed from the TSC/Security Diesel Generator.

The TSC provides Emergency Response equipment:

1. To acquire Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) plant data and present the data on display terminals. The capability will exist to present the data in various formats and provide hard copies on demand.

2. Radiation monitors (area and atmosphere) to determine the radiological habitability of the TSC.

3. Charcoal and HEPA Filters to provide personnel habitability during radioactive releases.

If the TSC becomes uninhabitable, the TSC plant management function shall relocate to the Control Room or the Remote Emergency Response Facility (RERF). In the event TSC personnel are unable to report to the site, the Remote Emergency Response Facility will serve as an alternate facility for the TSC.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 135 of 208

5.5.3 Operations Support Center {2.44}

The purpose of the Operations Support Center (OSC) is to minimize congestion in the Control Room during emergencies by providing a location, separate from the Control Room, where Maintenance, Radiation Protection technicians, Environmental and Chemistry technicians, additional Operations personnel, and other plant emergency support personnel will assemble and assist as needed. The Operations Support Center is located in the O&M Building on Unit 2.

In the event of an OSC evacuation, the Training Building 410 or the Remote Emergency Response Facility will serve as the back-up OSC.

5.5.4 Emergency Operations Facility {2.44}

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), located in the Energy Center at 526 South Church Street, Charlotte, NC, provides space for management of overall emergency response including coordination with federal, state, and county officials, coordination of offsite radiological and environmental assessment, and determination of recommended public protective actions.

Because the EOF is located greater than 25 miles from the TSC, the Remote Emergency Response Facility in Hartsville, SC can be used as a near site location for the NRC and other off-site agency staff.

If the Church street location cannot be used, alternate locations are available at either the McGuire or Catawba sites.

5.5.5 Remote Emergency Response Facility {2.44}

A Remote Emergency Response Facility has been established away from the plant site. It is located in the Duke Energy Hartsville Operations Center in Hartsville, South Carolina. The remote facility will serve as a location for ERO members to assemble and activate in the event that access to the plants on site Emergency Response Facilities (TSC/OSC) is not possible. The remote facility is intended to be staffed short term during the period when the on-site facilities are not accessible and will contain minimal equipment necessary for operation.

Because the EOF is located greater than 25 miles from the TSC, the Remote Emergency Response Facility can also be used as a near site location for the NRC and other off-site agency staff. Minimum provisions at this location include the following items: conference area with whiteboards, separate areas suitable for briefing and debriefing response personnel, telephones, site ERO contact lists, computers with internet access, access to a copier and office supplies, and radiation monitoring capability (i.e. access to plant radiological information).

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 136 of 208

5.5.6 Joint Information Center (JIC)

The JIC is tied into the Duke Energy emergency communications network. Work stations are available for Company personnel assisting the media, and a briefing room is available. Provisions have been made for separate telephones and workspace, for use by news media personnel. The near site Joint Information Center is located in the Southern Division Operations Building, Florence, South Carolina.

The JIC is staffed by site communications personnel and other Duke Energy personnel as is the Corporate JIC which provides support to the near site JIC.. The near site JIC is designed to house representatives from county, state and federal agencies. The JIC is located in excess of 10 miles from HBRSEP, as well as the Corporate JIC located in the Duke Energy Center, 526 S Church St. Charlotte, NC.

5.5.7 Offsite Emergency Facilities

1. Both Harris Nuclear Plant and Brunswick Nuclear Plant have Technical Specialists and equipment available for HBRSEP as needed.

2. Duke Energy Environmental Center Duke Energy Environmental Center operated by Duke Energy near Charlotte, NC provides extensive technical support capabilities including the provision of radiation monitoring equipment and dosimetry as well as analytical support of radiological and environmental samples.

3. State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Operations Center, located in Columbia, South Carolina, is established by the Governor of South Carolina and is staffed to support state and local activities. Duke Energy provides, at the request of the Emergency Management Division, liaison personnel to the Center. Duke Energy, commercial telephone, and state communications equipment is provided.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 137 of 208

5.5.7 (Continued)

4. County Emergency Operations Centers A County Emergency Operations Center provides a location where county authorities can direct offsite activities within their jurisdiction. The county facilities for HBRSEP are as follows:

1. Darlington County Emergency Operations Center, EMS/EPA Building - Courthouse Annex, Darlington, South Carolina.

2. Chesterfield County Emergency Operations Center, Chesterfield, South Carolina.

3. Lee County Emergency Operations Center, Bishopville, South Carolina.

5.5.8 Assessment Capabilities

1. General The instrumentation and control systems 1) monitor, 2) provide indication and recording, and 3) automatically regulate the variables necessary for safe and orderly operation of the plant.

These systems provide the Operations with the information and controls needed to start up, operate at power, and shut down the plant. They further provide means to cope with all abnormal operating conditions. Plant control and display of information from these various systems are centralized in the Control Room on ERFIS at locations convenient to the operator. This instrumentation, in conjunction with projected off-site doses, provides the basis for initiation of protective actions.

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5.5.8 (Continued)

2. Meteorological Instrumentation and Procedures The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 has a permanent meteorological monitoring station located on site for display and recording of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature differences for use in making off-site dose projections, etc. Meteorological information is presented in the Control Room by means of the plant computer. Meteorological parameters are measured by sensors located on the tower as listed in Table 5.5.7-1, Onsite Meteorological Instrumentation. In addition, barometric pressure, solar radiation, precipitation and dew point temperature data are recorded at the station. This information is remotely interrogatable using a computer or other data access terminal.

The meteorological sensors used at the Meteorological monitoring station are included in the RNP Preventative Maintenance Program to ensure that required calibrations are performed at least once every 184 days +46 days with a minimum of two calibrations each calendar year. The calibrations consist of the necessary maintenance activities to maintain sensor accuracy within original equipment manufacture specifications. Replacement sensors are obtained with NIST-traceable calibration documentation. Between the scheduled calibrations, a bimonthly station check (site inspection) of the system confirms system operational status. This system verification will be performed at least once between calibrations. HBRSEP personnel will make periodic visits to the monitoring station to assure that components are functioning as anticipated. Further checks of the data are made by remote interrogation of the monitoring station by contract Meteorological personnel. This data is reviewed by contract meteorological personnel to determine system performance and the acceptability of the reported information. Data will be provided to Duke Energy.

The meteorological instrumentation which Duke Energy uses at the meteorological monitoring station, meets the requirements of N.R.C. Regulatory Guide 1.23 (Rev. 0) and provides the meteorological parameters to the locations specified in our December 31, 1984 and July 18, 1985 responses to N.R.C. on Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 3), Table 1 and Table 3. As specified within Section 8.2 of Supplement Number 1 to NUREG-0737, PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 139 of 208

5.5.8.2 (Continued)

Duke Energy maintains telephone numbers for voice communications to the nearest National Weather Service, first order observation station (Florence, S.C.) for twenty-four hour per day access to this backup meteorological information should the onsite system fail. This backup source of meteorological data is the closest location which can provide reliable representative meteorological information for HBRSEP.

Should the onsite meteorological data collection system exhibit suspect information, loss of data due to computer or instrument failure, or plant personnel require additional technical assistance, National Weather Service or off site meteorologists are available to provide needed expertise. In the event that the onsite meteorological tower or monitoring instrumentation becomes inoperative and the off site meteorologists cannot be contacted, meteorological data may be obtained from the National Weather Service in Columbia, South Carolina or Wilmington, North Carolina.

Available internet sites for weather data are listed in the ERO phone book.

3. Seismic Monitoring The HBRSEP Seismic Monitoring System senses and records earthquake ground motion. The system is comprised of two (2) strong motion seismic recorders. A computer is used for downloading stored data from the recorders.

The recorders measure and record the acceleration of the structure, primarily the concrete floors near the purge valve outside containment and south of the Unit 2 Waste Retention Basin.

Earthquakes produce low frequency accelerations which, when detected by the remote sensing devices, will be recorded at the remote locations. The Seismic Monitoring System remains in a standby condition until an earthquake causes the remote unit(s) to activate the recording circuits.

The recorder senses and permanently records the information defining a response spectrum. It also provides signals for immediate indication on the RTGB that specific preset response accelerations have been exceeded. Table 5.5.7-2, Seismic Monitoring, shows instrument and sensor locations along with measurement range of HBRSEP seismic monitoring.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 140 of 208

5.5.8.3 (Continued)

A considerable array of seismometers is located in the region. A central point of contact to obtain information about a seismic event is the U. S. Geological Survey in Reston, Virginia.

4. Radiological Monitors The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) is available to give early warning of a possible emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the emergency situation in the Control Room.

Radiation monitoring instruments are located at selected areas within the facility to detect, measure, and record radiation levels. In the event the radiation level should increase above a preset level, an alarm is initiated in the Control Room. Certain radiation monitoring instruments also alarm locally in selected areas of the facility. The radiation monitoring system is divided into three subsystems:

a. Process Radiation Monitoring System (which includes effluent monitors) monitors various fluid streams in operating systems.

b. Area Radiation Monitoring System monitors radiation levels at various locations within the operating area. In addition to permanent plant monitors, portable Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) measure airborne activity at various locations within the Radiologically Controlled Area. Also, the Environmental Monitoring System monitors airborne activity at various outdoor locations in the restricted area and offsite.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 141 of 208

5.5.8.4 (Continued)

c. Accident Radiation Monitoring System monitors radiation levels at various locations. These are high range instruments to track radiation levels in an accident or post accident conditions.

The types, ranges, and locations of RMS monitors are listed in Table 5.5.7-3, Radiation Monitoring System. Typical portable radiation monitors are listed in Table 5.5.7-4, Portable Radiation Survey Instruments. The radiation monitors are designed to permit monitoring of activity releases during a broad spectrum of postulated emergency situations.

The locations of the offsite and onsite environmental monitoring stations, and the location of the emergency TLD monitoring stations are listed in Table 5.5.7-5.

5. Process Monitors Instrumentation used to monitor vital plant parameters is described in Section 7.5 of the HBRSEP UFSAR. This instrumentation is continuously monitored in the Control Room. Essential process monitoring will also be available in the Technical Support Center.

6. Laboratory Facilities Support of the radiation monitoring and analysis effort is provided by an onsite laboratory. The onsite laboratory includes equipment for chemical analyses and for analysis of radioactivity.

The wet chemistry equipment is used to perform a variety of analyses (pH, conductivity, boron content of reactor coolant, etc.).

It is also used in the performance of radiochemical analyses and preparation of samples to permit analysis of the radioactivity content.

Equipment used to analyze the type and amount of radioactivity in filters, smears, etc., is located adjacent to the chemistry lab. This includes a multi-channel analyzer (Ge-Li) used to determine the isotopic content in a sample, a liquid scintillation counter for tritium analyses, and gas proportional counter for gross alpha, and gross beta activity.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 142 of 208

5.5.8 (Continued)

Much of this equipment is rack mounted; some is readily portable.

Additional facilities for counting and analyses of HBRSEP samples can be provided by laboratory facilities at the Duke Energy Environmental Center, near Charlotte, NC, and by the Brunswick Plant.

As described in the State of South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan (SCORERP), the SC DHEC Bureau of Land & Waste Management maintains a mobile radiological laboratory and can provide independent analysis.

7. Dose Projection The magnitude of releases of radioactive material can be determined from effluent and process monitors based on procedures contained in AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment. Additionally, an independent confirmation of the magnitude of a release can be obtained by environmental monitoring as described in AD-EP-ALL-0203, Field Monitoring During Declared Emergencies. Given a source term, or the magnitude and rate of release to the environment, and meteorological data previously described, the control room may make the initial dose projections and is capable of performing this function on a 24 hour-per-day basis. After activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, the Radiological Assessment Manager described in Section 5.3, Emergency Response Organization, is responsible to the EOF Director for determining initial dose projections from readily available data. AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment, describes a computer program which automates dose projection calculations when used in conjunction with the meteorological systems.

5.5.9 Fire Detection The Fire Detection System is designed to quickly detect visible or invisible smoke (or other products of combustion) and/or heat in designated areas of the plant.

The Fire Detection System consists primarily of fire detectors, control panel units, and process computer. A fire signal initiated by a detector travels to the respective Fire Detection and actuation Panel (FDAP), then to a Fire Alarm Computer. The control panel unit is located in the same or adjacent building as the detector. The Fire Alarm Computer is located in the Unit 2 Control Room.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 143 of 208

5.5.9 (Continued)

The types and number of detectors have been selected in accordance with the combustible materials and electrical equipment present in the area and the physical surroundings of each area. Ionization detectors sense the presence of products of combustion before they are visible in the form of smoke. Thermal detectors are sensitive to both temperature and the rate of rise of increasing temperature.

The Fire Protection Surveillance Tests lists the following information regarding the fire detectors used:

1. Building location.

2. Number of ionization detectors.

3. Number of thermal detectors.

5.5.10 Protective Facilities and Equipment Complete personnel decontamination facilities are located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building and in the TSC. Each facility includes a decontamination shower. The First Aid Room contains equipment which may be used for personnel decontamination. Alternate means for decontamination are also available.

The type of emergency kits and their locations are found in RST-003, Emergency Kit Inventory.

5.5.11 First Aid, Medical and Triage Facilities A first aid room is located in the O&M Building. First aid kits and supplies are also available in the Storeroom.

Offsite medical facilities which have agreed to accept personnel are described in Attachment 6.5, Medical Treatment and Assistance.

A Triage Area is established in the Bulk Warehouse just outside the Protected Area fence. Triage supplies are available to provide Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment for mass causality events.

5.5.12 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies In the event of an emergency, certain immediate repairs may be necessary to minimize the further release of radioactivity and also ensure the protection of plant equipment. Damage control equipment and supplies that would be used to effect repair would depend on the nature of the repairs to be performed.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 144 of 208

5.5.12 (Continued)

Damage control equipment and supplies are located in the tool room and the maintenance shops.

5.5.13 Offsite Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Supplies In the event of an emergency, the plant has the capability to deploy two offsite Field Monitoring Teams as described in AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the EOF. Three environmental monitoring kits with the necessary equipment and supplies for offsite radiological monitoring (as per RST-003, Emergency Kit Inventory) are designated for use in the event of an emergency. Transportation for offsite Field Monitoring Teams will be supplied by plant vehicles, such as maintenance, environmental and other Company trucks if available or private autos at the site.

5.5.14 Darlington County Fire District Station #8 In the event of a large fire onsite, personnel are notified and assemble at this facility to support the onsite response activities. Radio communication devices, radiological monitoring instruments, and appropriate guidance documents are available at this location for their use. In addition, containers of Aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) are strategically stored at Darlington County Fire district Stations and the Hartsville Fire Department to provide an offsite supply of AFFF if needed.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 145 of 208

TABLE 5.5.0-1 FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES Facility Name Location Functional Objectives Control Room Control Building 1) Plant control.

(CR) 2) Initial direction of all plant-related operations.

3) Backup location for the Technical Support Center.

State Columbia, 1) Assembly location for Governor Emergency South Carolina and state emergency Operations response officials to Center perform overall direction and (SEOC) control of plume and ingestion EPZ protection actions in the State of South Carolina.

2) Coordination with federal authorities and the State of North Carolina.

3) Overall direction and control of offsite recovery and re-entry activities.

4) Dissemination of media information.

Technical Support TSC/Training 1) Assembly location for Center (TSC) Building (North Side) technical personnel to provide engineering and management support of plant operations following an accident.

2) Direction and coordination of overall plant emergency activities.

Operations 1st Floor O&M Bldg. 1) Reporting place for emergency Support Center support personnel.

(OSC) 2) Dispatching location of personnel to support actions as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 146 of 208

TABLE 5.5.0-1 (Continued)

FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES Facility Name Location Functional Objectives Joint Southern Division 1) Provide immediate access to Information Operations Building accurate emergency related Center (JIC) Florence, SC information generated by all involved agencies to media representatives.

2) Provide equipment for document reproduction, telecopying, communications, and television electrical connections.

Corporate Charlotte, NC 1) Support JIC.

Communications 2) Distribute background information.

Department (CCD) 3) Provide information to media representatives.

4) Provide information to Corporate management.

Emergency Charlotte, NC 1) Provide working space and Operations communication links for the Facility (EOF) EOF Director and staff.

2) Provide primary interface point for Duke Energy and offsite support personnel (Federal, State, and Local).

3) Provide point of coordination for offsite radiological and environmental assessment.

Remote Hartsville 1) Provide a near site assembly area Emergency Operations for ERO personnel in the event Response Center that response to the onsite facilities Facility are not safe for the responders. Facility can be activated and utilized to augment the on shift ERO. The TSC and OSC staffs will operate from this facility until it is safe to utilize the onsite facilities.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 147 of 208

TABLE 5.5.0-1 (Continued)

FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES Facility Name Location Functional Objectives Chesterfield County Chesterfield, 1) Direction and coordination of Emergency Operations South Carolina Chesterfield County emergency and Center (EOC) protective response actions.

Darlington County Darlington, 1) Direction and coordination of Emergency Operations South Carolina Darlington County emergency and Center (EOC) EMS/EPA Building- protective response actions.

Courthouse Annex Lee County Bishopville, 1) Direction and coordination of Lee Emergency Operations South Carolina County emergency and protective Center (EOC) response actions.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 148 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-1 ONSITE METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION SENSORS APPROXIMATE OPERATIONAL ELEVATIONS ABOVE TOWER BASE (METERS)

Wind (speed and direction) 11.0 and 62.0 Relative Humidity 10.0 Differential Temperature 10.0 to 61.0 Ambient Temperature 10.0 NOTE: The above information is displayed in the Control Room via the plant computer. The Atmospheric Stability Class is available from the computer.

NOTE: The upper temperature is the ambient temperature plus the differential temperature value as displayed on the plant computer.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 149 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-2 SEISMIC MONITORING Measurement Instrument and Sensor Locations Range

1. South of the Unit 2 Waste Retention Basin 0-2g

2. Containment Building Inlet Purge Valve 0-2g NOTES:

1. Powered by plant non-vital AC with battery backup.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 150 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-3 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL LOCATION TYPE RANGE Area Monitors R-1 Control Room GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-2 Containment (Normal Range) GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-3 PASS Panel GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-4 Charging Pump Room GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-5 Spent Fuel Building GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-6 CVCS Sampling Room GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-7 In-Core Instrumentation GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr Cubicle R-8 Drumming Station GM Tube 10-1-104 mR/hr R-9 Letdown Line Ion Chamber 10-0-105 mR/hr R-32 Containment (High Range Ion Chamber 100-107 R/hr (A&B) - 2 Channels)

R-33 Monitor Building GM Tube 100-105 mR/hr Effluent Monitors Sensitivity R-11 Containment Atmosphere Off-Line 10-9-10-6 µCi/cc or Plant Vent Particulate ()

R-12 Containment Atmosphere Off-Line Noble Gas () 10-6-10-1 µCi/cc or Plant Vent R-14C Plant Vent Noble Gas Off-Line Noble Gas 10-7-10-2 µCi/cc

(, )

R-14D Mid-Range Plant Vent Off-Line Noble Gas 10-3-102 µCi/cc

(, )

R-14E High-Range Plant Vent Off-Line Noble Gas 100-105 µCi/cc

(, , with passive particulate

& iodine samplers)

R-18 Waste Disposal Liquid In-Line Liquid () 10-5-10-2 µCi/cc Discharge PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 151 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-3 (Continued)

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL LOCATION TYPE RANGE Effluent Monitors (Cont.)

R-20 Fuel Handling Building: Off-Line Noble Gas () 10-6-10-1 µCi/cc Basement Exhaust R-30 High-Range Basement On-Line Noble Gas 10-2-103 µCi/cc Exhaust (, with passive particulate

& iodine samplers)

R-22 E&RC Building Off-Line Particulate() 10-5-10-1 µCi/cc Off-Line Iodine () 10-9-10-6 µCi/cc Off-Line Noble Gas () 10-7-10-2 µCi/cc R-23 Radwaste Building Noble Gas Grab Sample Only Particulate Air Sampler Only Iodine Sampler Only Process Monitors R-15 Condenser Air Ejector In-line Noble Gas l0-6-l0-1 µCi/cc

(, GM Tube)

R-16 Containment Fan In-line Liquid () l0-5-l0-2 µCi/cc Cooling Water R-17 Component Cooling Water In-line Liquid () 10-5-l0-2 µCi/cc R-19A Steam Generator Liquid Off-line Liquid () l0-7-l0-2 µCi/cc R-19B Steam Generator Liquid Off-line Liquid () l0-7-l0-2 µCi/cc R-19C Steam Generator Liquid Off-line Liquid () l0-7-l0-2 µCi/cc R-24A N-16 Main Steam Line A On-line () 1 - 150 gpd R-24B N-16 Main Steam Line B On-line () 1 - 150 gpd R-24C N-16 Main Steam Line C On-line () 1 - 150 gpd R-21 Upper Level Exhaust Off-line Noble () 10-6-10-1 µCi/cc R-31A Main Steam Line A On-Line Noble Gas () 10-0-105 mR/hr R-31B Main Steam Line B On-Line Noble Gas () 10-0-105 mR/hr R-31C Main Steam Line C On-Line Noble Gas () 10-0-105 mR/hr PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 152 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-4 PORTABLE RADIATION SURVEY INSTRUMENTS TYPE RANGE Gamma Survey 0 - 1000 Rem/hr Beta / Gamma Frisker 0 - 500,000 cpm Neutron Survey (He3) 0 - 10,000 mRem/hr Beta / Gamma Survey 0 - 50 Rem/hr Alpha Frisker/Scaler 0 - 999 kcpm Gamma Survey 0.001 - 10,000 mRem/hr PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 153 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction

1. Airborne Florence, S. C. (Control Particulates and 1. Station)2 I-131 for Air Cartridges Radioiodines 24.4 miles ESE Information Center

2. Gross Beta3 0.2 miles S Microwave tower Gamma Scan4 of 3.

0.5 miles N composite (by location)

Spillway 4.

0.4 miles ESE East Shore of lake near

5. Johnson's Landing 0.9 miles ENE Information Center 6.

0.2 miles SSW PGN facility on Railroad Ave.,

7. Hartsville 6.4 miles ESE South of the West Settling

55. Pond 0.2 miles SSE Robinson Picnic Area 60.

0.2 miles SE West parking lot near RR

61. tracks 0.3 miles WSW PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 154 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction

2. Direct Radiation Florence, S. C. (Control Station)2

1. Gamma Dose5 (TLD) 24.4 miles ESE Information Center10,11 2.

0.2 mile S Microwave tower 3.

0.5 mile N Spillway 4.

0.4 mile ESE East shore of lake near

5. Johnson's landing 0.9 mile ENE Information Center10,11 6.

0.2 mile SSW PGN facility on Railroad Ave.,

7. Hartsville 6.4 miles ESE Transmission right-of-way 8.

0.8 mile SSE Transmission right-of-way 9.

1.0 mile S PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 155 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction

2. Direct Radiation Clyde Church of God

10. Gamma Dose5 (TLD) 1.0 mile WSW Old Camden Road 11.

1.0 mile SW Off of Old Camden Road 12.

1.2 miles SSW Corner of Saluda and Sandpit

13. Roads 0.7 miles W First Baptist Church of Pine

14. Ridge 0.8 mile WNW Transmission right-of-way 15.

0.7 miles NW South side of Darlington County

16. I.C. Turbine Plant 1.0 mile NNW Darlington County Plant

17. emergency fire pump 1.2 miles N PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 156 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction Old Black Creek RR trestle

2. Direct Radiation 18. Gamma Dose5 0.7 mile SE Old Camden Road (#S-16-23) 19.

1.0 mile E New Market Road (#S-16-39) 20.

1.0 miles ENE New Market Road (#S-16-39) 21.

1.4 miles NE Shady Rest entrance off of

22. Cloverdale Drive 1.7 miles NNE New Market Road (#S-16-39) 23.

1.0 miles ESE Sowell Road (#S-13-711) 24.

4.6 miles NW Lake Robinson Road

25. (#S-13-346) 4.0 miles NNW Lake Robinson Road

26. (#S-13-346) 5.0 miles N PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 157 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction Prospect Church Road

2. Direct Radiation 27. (#S-13-763) Gamma Dose5 5.4 miles NNE New Market Road (#S-13-39) 28.

4.3 miles NE Ruby Road (#S-16-20) 29.

4.0 mile ENE Ruby Road (#S-16-20) 30.

4.4 miles E Lakeshore Drive 31.

4.6 miles ESE Transmission right-of-way 32.

4.0 miles SE Bay Road (#S-16-493) 33.

4.5 miles SSE Kellybell Road (#S-16-772)

34. 4.7 miles S PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 158 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction

2. Direct Radiation Kelly Bridge Road (#S-31-51)

(continued) 35. 4.5 miles SSW Gamma Dose5 Kingston Drive

36. 5.0 miles SW Pine Cone Road 37.

5.0 miles WSW Union Church Road

38. 4.9 miles W Kings Pond Road 39.

5.1 miles WNW South of the West Settling

55. Pond 0.2 miles SSE North of the center of the

56. 7P-ISFSI10,11 0.4 miles NNW West parking lot near RR

61. tracks11 0.3 miles WSW Northwest of the 24P-ISFSI11 65.

0.3 WNW PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 159 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway and/or Sample Sample Point Sample Point Description, Distance, and Direction Analysis1

40. Black Creek at Old Camden Road (S-16-23) 0.6 mile ESE

3. Waterborne Gamma Scan4

a. Surface Water H-3

41. Black Creek at US Highway 1 (Control Station) 8.0 miles N 2

b. Groundwater 42. Unit 1 Deep Wells

64. Artesian well (0.6 miles SE) 68 Well A located between Unit 1 Switchyard and break room 69 Well B located behind the Training Building 70 Well C located the O&M Building and Fab Shop MW-03R, (NPDES Ash (0.87 miles NNW) Between Ash Pond &

71 Railroad tracks MW-06 (0.10 miles east) 20 ft. from FP/FH 7 fire hydrant and 72 Unit 1 North Deep Well Pump MW-13 (0.11 miles ENE) Between Discharge Canal and Unit 1 73 Stand Alone Fuel Tanks Gamma Scan PSW-02 (0.05 miles NE) By Unit 1 boundary fence to Unit 2 75 across paved road from Hydrogen Gas Tanks PSW-03 (0.49 miles North) Northeast corner of the MET Tower 76 Station 77 TS-01B (0.25 miles SSE) By entrance road to Unit 1 TS-02C (0.17 miles SSE) Northeast corner by East Settling Pond 78 influent by fence TS-07C (1.0 miles North) South corner by cove and Discharge 79 Canal TS-17B (0.19 miles SSE) West of West Settling Pond across 81 paved road 82 PDW-01 (0.3 miles SSE) By entrance road to Unit 1.

c. Drinking water N/A Not required7 N/A

d. Shoreline Sediment 44. East Shore of Lake, Shady Rest Club 1.6 miles NNE Gamma Scan4 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 160 of 208

TABLE 5.5.7-5 LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS Exposure Pathway Sample Sample Point Description, Analysis1 and/or Sample Point Distance, and Direction (There are no milk samples

4. Ingestion available within 8 Km of Plant.

NA The following broad-leaf NA

a. Milk vegetation is to be sampled and analyzed.)

50. SSE Close to Site Boundary9.

51. SSW Close to Site Boundary.

Broadleaf Gamma Scan4 10 miles W, near Bethune I-131

52. (Control Station for Broad-leaf Vegetation).

62. SE Close to Site Boundary.

67. S Close to Site Boundary9.

Site varies within lake Gamma Scan4 Edible

b. Fish 45. portion Robinson Site varies within Prestwood 46.

Lake Control station2, Any lake not

47. influenced by plant discharge.

Auburndale Plantation8

c. Food Products 10.1 miles E leafy vegetables 54. (One sample of each principal Gamma Scan4 class of irrigated food products).

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 161 of 208

Table 5.5.7-5 (Continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. The LLD for each analysis is specified in Table 4.1-3 of the HBR ODCM.

2. Control stations are locations outside the influence of plant effluents.

3. Airborne particulate sample filter shall be analyzed for gross beta radioactivity 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or more after sampling to allow for radon and thoron daughter decay. If gross beta activity in air particulate is greater than ten times the yearly mean of control samples, gamma isotopic analysis shall be performed on the individual samples.

4. Gamma scan means the identification and quantification of gamma-emitting radionuclides that may be attributable to the effluents from the facility.

5. Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) is considered to be one phosphor; two or more phosphors in a packet are considered as two or more dosimeters.

6. Composite sample aliquots shall be collected at time interval that are short (5 or 6 times daily) relative to the compositing period (monthly in order to assure obtaining a representative sample).

7. Collection of drinking water samples is not required since there are not known reservoirs on Black Creek used for drinking purposes.

8. Water from Black Creek is sometimes used to irrigate food crops at Auburndale Plantation which is located 11 miles east @ 90° from the plant.

9. Sample Points 50 and 67 are the highest and the second highest D/Q values, respectively.

10. These samples are required for monitoring of the 7P-ISFSI.

11. These samples are required for monitoring of the 24P-ISFSI.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 162 of 208

5.6 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Emergency preparedness at HBRSEP will be maintained by:

Preparing the emergency organization members and the public for proper emergency response actions through training, drills and exercises, and public education programs; Periodic review and update of the Robinson Emergency Plan and its implementation procedures; Periodic inventory and calibration of emergency equipment and instrumentation; and Cognizance of the On-Site Review Committee (ORC) over safety-related issues.

The Emergency Preparedness Staff is responsible for maintaining Emergency Preparedness at HBRSEP Plant as outlined in Section 5.6.1.3, Emergency Preparedness Staff.

5.6.1 Organizational Preparedness Organizational preparedness is maintained through an integrated training program that includes general orientation of all persons at the site and detailed training of individuals and groups required to perform specific functions and actions during an emergency condition. The training program provides initial training and annual continuing training as outlined in AD-EP-ALL-0500 Emergency Response Training.

Classroom training may be provided as necessary.

Annual, as used herein, indicates once per calendar year.

1. Training The primary objectives of the training program are to:

1. Familiarize appropriate individuals with the Plan and the procedures that implement the Plan.

2. Instruct individuals in their duties and responsibilities.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 163 of 208

5.6.1.1 (Continued)

3. Periodically present significant changes in the scope or contents of the Plan or procedures which implement the Plan.

4. Provide continuing training, once per calendar year, to ensure that personnel are familiar with weaknesses in ERO performance and current industry issues.

Each individual, other than escorted personnel who are to be badged for Unit 2 Protected Area access must receive Plant Access Training (PAT) Level I which consists of notification, basic fundamentals of radiation, and instruction methods used at HBRSEP in the event of an emergency.

Each individual badged for Unit No. 2 access to the Radiation Control Area (RCA) and/or is a member of the onsite Emergency Response Organization also receives Radiation Worker Training (RWT) on the basic principles of radiological safety including the effects of radiation and use of radiation detection devices.

The Emergency Plan Training Program described in AD-EP-ALL-0500, Emergency Response Training, and AD-EP-ALL-0501, Emergency Preparedness Staff Training and Qualification, assures training of those individuals who may be called to respond to an emergency at HBRSEP. Initial training and retraining is included in this program.

The Emergency Plan Training Program provides training for the following groups of personnel to perform the specific tasks assigned to them in the emergency organization.

Emergency Coordinator TSC Staff Offsite Communicators Accident Assessment Personnel Security Personnel Dose Projection Personnel Radiation Protection Personnel Environmental Monitoring Personnel Damage Control Personnel EOF Staff JIC Staff PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 164 of 208

5.6.1.1 (Continued)

Offsite groups who may be requested to assist in emergency first aid Fire Brigade (Operations Training)

All ERO positions are required to re-qualify annually.

The specific training is described in lesson plans, study guides, and in AD-EP-ALL-0500, Emergency Response Training, and AD-EP-ALL-0501, Emergency Preparedness Staff Training and Qualification.

Training of offsite organizations is described in their radiological emergency plans and is their responsibility. Training for Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center, McLeod Health Cheraw, Darlington County Emergency Medical Service, Hartsville Rescue Squad and off site fire response organizations will include the procedures for notification, basic radiation protection, and their expected roles. For those local support services organizations that may enter the site (ambulance, rescue, and fire), training by Duke Energy will also include site access procedures and the identity (by position and title) of the individual in the HBRSEP organization who will control the organization's support activities. Duke Energy will assist these offsite organizations in performing their radiological emergency response training as related to HBRSEP and as requested by them.

Duke Energy will conduct a coordinated public information program to acquaint the news media with emergency plans, information concerning radiation and points of contact for release of public information during an emergency. This may include providing prepared information or formal presentations. The program also includes information on nuclear plant operations. Another method used by Duke Energy public information staff is periodic visits to the various media around the site. HBRSEP relationships with corporate personnel in this area are described in AD-EP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness.

2. Drills and Exercises This section describes provisions for conducting periodic drills and exercises to test the adequacy of the Plan and implementing procedures, emergency equipment, and the preparation and training of emergency personnel.

Each exercise scenario will include the following:

1. The basic objective(s) of the exercise.

2. The date(s), time period, place(s), and participating organizations.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 165 of 208

5.6.1.2 (Continued)

3. The simulated events.

4. A time schedule of real and simulated initiating events.

5. A narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire or police department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities.

6. Arrangements for qualified evaluators.

a. Drills Emergency drills are supervised instruction periods aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. Practice drills, such as table top exercises and practical exercises may be used as training for on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance. Personnel will participate in periodic drills, an exercise, or table tops to test their skills as follows:

Communication Drills: Communications with state and local governments within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone shall be tested monthly.

Communications with federal emergency response organizations and states within the ingestion pathway shall be tested quarterly. Communications between the nuclear facility, state and local emergency operations centers, and field assessment teams shall be tested annually. Communications drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.

Fire Drills: Fire drills will be held in accordance with the Fire Protection Manual.

Medical Emergency Drills: Medical emergency drills involving a simulated contaminated and injured individual will be conducted annually. The actual offsite portions of these drills may be conducted as part of an exercise.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 166 of 208

5.6.1.2 (Continued)

Radiological Monitoring Drills: Radiological monitoring drills will be conducted annually. These drills will include environmental measurement and analysis of external whole body doses, and water, vegetation, soil, and air sample media.

In-Plant Radiation Protection Drills: Radiation protection drills, including response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements, will be conducted semiannually.

The above drills will be evaluated by a qualified evaluator.

The degree of participation by outside agencies in conducting these drills may vary and their action may actually be simulated.

b. Exercises An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability of major response organizations. Periodic exercises will be conducted as required by 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E.

These exercises will be based on a scenario which is ultimately declared as at least a Site Area Emergency. The scenario will be varied from exercise to exercise such that major elements of the plant, county, and state plans and emergency organizations are tested within a 8-year period.

One exercise shall start between 6:00 pm and 4:00 a.m. or any weekend hours once every 8 years. Every eighth year, the exercise will be expanded to involve the federal response organizations in addition to the state and local organizations. Implement the initial 8-year exercise cycle in the year of the first Hostile Action Based (HAB) exercise evaluated by the NRC. Advance knowledge of the scenarios and the times of the exercises will be kept to a minimum to ensure a realistic participation by those involved. Exercises should be conducted under various weather conditions. Some exercises should be unannounced.

Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 167 of 208

5.6.1.2 (Continued)

Each exercise scenario will include a list of performance objectives and a description of the expected responses.

Specific functions to be evaluated are:

Condition recognition and reporting.

Assessment.

Offsite notification, including Duke Energy offsite personnel and protective action determination/recommendations.

Offsite response (when participation is required).

Site response coordination, including communications, logistics, facility staffing, information gathering and analysis, and coordination with offsite agencies.

Corrective actions.

Protective actions.

Record keeping.

Monitoring.

Plant operation.

Qualified evaluators from Duke Energy, federal, state, or local governments will observe and critique each exercise.

A critique will be scheduled at the conclusion of each exercise to evaluate the ability of all participating organizations to respond. The critique will be held as soon as possible after the exercise. A formal written evaluation of the exercise will be prepared by the Support Services Manager or designee, following the critique. The performance of exercises and drills and the mechanism for documenting and using information learned in drills and exercises is shown in AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evacuation and Critique of Drills and Exercises.

Exercise controllers, evaluators, and participants (if appropriate) will prepare written descriptions of the actions they observed and will comment as to how the part of the exercise they observed matched the performance criteria.

The Emergency Preparedness Staff will determine the corrective actions necessary and the schedules for performing them and will evaluate the corrective actions taken.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 168 of 208

5.6.1 (Continued)

3. Emergency Preparedness Staff The Support Services Manager is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the EP program.

The Emergency Preparedness Staff is responsible for coordinating onsite and offsite radiological emergency response planning. They prepare and maintain the implementing procedures and ensure that these procedures are properly implemented. They are also responsible for performing the following planning functions:

1. Interfacing with federal, state, county, and local planners.

2. Revising and updating the Plan in response to new federal regulations, modifications identified during exercises and drills, and changes in hardware and personnel.

3. Coordinating an exercise and other periodic drills.

4. Arranging for training to meet the identified needs of offsite support personnel.

5. Identifying corrective actions needed following an exercise, assigning responsibility for implementing these actions, specifying a schedule for completion of these actions, and evaluating the adequacy of the actions taken.

6. Maintaining and negotiating agreements with state and county response agencies, federal assistance agencies, and medical and fire support agencies. Agreements will be signed at the appropriate level of management.

4. Public Education The Governor's Office, through the Public Information Office, has overall responsibility for maintaining a continuing disaster preparedness public education program. Such a program, prepared by the State of South Carolina, with the cooperation of the local governments and Duke Energy, is intended to ensure the members of the public are:

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 169 of 208

5.6.1.4 (Continued)

Aware of the potential threat of a radiological emergency; Able to recognize a radiological emergency notification; and Knowledgeable of the proper immediate actions (e.g., return to home, close windows and turn on radio) to be taken.

A program of this type includes education on protective actions to be taken if shelter is prescribed and the general procedures to follow if an evacuation is required. It also includes general educational information on radiation and how to learn more about emergency preparedness.

Additional information about public education and information can be found in Section 5.4.4.7, Protective Actions - Offsite/Public, and in the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

5.6.2 Review and Update of the Plan and Implementation Procedures The Plan and its implementation procedures are intended to provide for continuous emergency preparedness. In addition to the training, drills, and exercises, regular reviews and audits are performed. The reviews and audits are described in the following sections.

1. Plan Updates The Emergency Preparedness Staff is responsible for coordinating the update of the Plan and implementing procedures.

They schedule an annual review of the Robinson Emergency Plan. Changes are provided to the On-Site Review Committee (ORC). ORC is required to review and approve changes to the Emergency plan that require NRC approval. See Section 5.6.4, On-Site Review Committee (ORC).

Any proposed changes to the Plan due to regulatory revisions, experiences of drills and exercises, or other requirements are approved by the Director Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness.

Approved changes to the Plan will be distributed to organizations and individuals with responsibility for implementation of the Plan.

Revisions will be listed on the Summary of Changes page.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 170 of 208

5.6.2 (Continued)

2. Independent Audit and Review In addition to the reviews conducted at the Plant, an independent review of the Plan, procedures which implement the Plan, and the overall state of emergency preparedness will be conducted as specified in 10CFR50.54(t) by the Nuclear Oversight Section.

Written reports of the findings of these audits and reviews will be provided to Corporate Management. Each report will specifically address the adequacy of interfaces with state and local governments, of drills and exercises, and of emergency response capabilities and procedures. The reports will be retained for five years. Corrective actions from reviews/audits will be addressed through the Corrective Action Program.

3. Offsite Agreements Agreements with supporting organizations are reviewed annually and updated as necessary.

4. Evacuation time estimate updates The Emergency Preparedness staff is responsible for coordinating periodic updates to the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) and its underlying permanent resident population estimates.

During the years between decennial censuses, the plume exposure pathway EPZ permanent resident population is estimated based on the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate. State/local population data may also be used, if available.

The ETE is updated based on criteria provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6. In addition, the ETE is updated within 365 days of the availability of decennial census data from the U.S.

Census Bureau.

RNP submits updated ETE analyses to the NRC and implements use of the updated ETE data in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4 or IV.6, as applicable.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 171 of 208

5.6.3 Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies To ensure that equipment and supplies are maintained in a readiness state, periodic maintenance and inventories are performed as described in the following sections.

1. Emergency Equipment and Supplies A listing of emergency equipment and supplies to be inventoried is included in EPPRO-02, Maintenance and Testing. This listing provides information on frequency of inventory and work group responsible for equipment and supplies.

An inventory of emergency equipment and supplies is held on a quarterly basis and after use in an emergency. During this inventory, radiation monitoring equipment is to be checked to verify that required calibration and location are in accordance with the procedure requirements. Respiratory protection equipment, maintained for emergency purposes, is also inspected and inventoried.

2. Medical Equipment and Supplies At least twice each year and after use in an emergency, the contents of emergency medical equipment and supplies located in the First Aid Room is to be inventoried, inspected, replaced, replenished and/or resterilized as necessary. Company personnel inspect and inventory emergency medical supplies required to support a medical emergency at the plant.

5.6.4 On-Site Review Committee The On-Site Review Committee (ORC) is a multi-disciplined committee responsible for review of activities that have the potential to affect nuclear safety.

The ORC must review changes to the Robinson Emergency Plan that require NRC approval per DUKE-QAPD-001, Quality Assurance Program Description and AD-LS-ALL-0019, On-Site Review Committee.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 172 of 208

5.7 Recovery 5.7.1 General Once the Emergency Coordinator has declared that the emergency condition has passed, steps will be taken to recover from the incident.

The EOF Director will advise appropriate organizations that recovery operations are initiated and that the Recovery Organization as shown in Figure 5.7.2.1, Recovery Organization, will be assembled in the EOF or onsite, as appropriate. All recovery actions will be pre-planned in order to minimize radiation exposure or other hazards to recovery personnel.

The overall goals of the recovery effort are to assess the in-plant consequences of the emergency and perform cleanup and repair operations. This effort includes marshaling of the Corporate resources and interfacing with outside agencies.

5.7.2 Recovery Organization The recovery organization consists of the Recovery Manager, directors of support areas who are responsible to the Recovery Manager, and supporting personnel. This organization may be modified during the recovery process to better respond to the conditions at the plant.

Recovery activities will be directed from the Recovery Center (EOF) or onsite, as appropriate.

The Recovery Center will be established in the Emergency Operations Facility or onsite, as appropriate. Provisions have been made for expansion into construction buildings and mobile facilities, if required to support an extensive recovery effort.

Activation of the recovery organization will be initiated by the Vice -

President, Robinson Nuclear Plant (or designated alternate). The recovery organization will then be established to provide for recovery of the facility. The recovery organization may begin to develop plans for recovery of the facility while the emergency is still in progress. However, these efforts will not be permitted to interfere with or detract from the efforts to control the emergency situation. During the emergency phases of the incident, the recovery organization resources will be available to assist and provide support for the Emergency Coordinator.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 173 of 208

5.7.2 (Continued)

1. Recovery Manager The Recovery Manager will normally be designated by the EOF Director. The recovery organization, under the direction of the Recovery Manager, will have the following responsibilities:

1. Develop a recovery plan.

2. Identify resources needed to complete the recovery.

3. Obtain any services and equipment necessary to complete the needed repair.

4. Conduct post-accident evaluations of the causes and consequences of the incident.

5. Assess and determine the overall damage.

6. Obtain all necessary licenses, or amendments to licenses, required for repair of the unit and disposal of waste products.

7. Oversee coordination with local and state agencies to keep them informed of onsite activities on a timely basis and provide support for any offsite protective actions required during the recovery phase.

8. Maintain security for the plant and associated facilities.

9. Coordinate with NRC activities at the site in an effort to avoid duplication and minimize impact on the plant staff.

10. Control personnel exposure during re-entry and recovery (See Section 5.4.4.3.b, Exposures During Repair/Re-entry Efforts).

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 174 of 208

5.7.2.(Continued)

2. Onsite Recovery Director Responsible for implementation of in-plant recovery activities with the objective of maintaining a safe shutdown condition and controlling sources of radioactivity in the plant. The Onsite Recovery Director will report to the Recovery Manager during the recovery phase.

Responsibilities of the Onsite Recovery Manager include the following:

1. Direct operations of the plant site.

2. Coordinate the plant staff's efforts to identify any damages to the facility.

3. Approve and implement license change requests.

4. Approve and implement required engineering modifications resulting from the incident.

5. Approve and implement tests and experiments proposed for the plant that affect nuclear safety.

6. Approve and implement special procedures required to recover from the incident.

7. Provide security forces as necessary for the plant site, including the visitor center.

8. Coordinate in-plant maintenance and control activities utilizing plant maintenance and support personnel.

9. Coordinate training of in-plant personnel on any required emergency operating and maintenance plan and procedures in support of the recovery operation.

10. Coordinate onsite health physics activities, including onsite sampling program, dose assessment, dose management, and radiation protection programs.

11. Provide information and recommendations to the Recovery Manager concerning future operations that could affect the plant or the environment.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 175 of 208

5.7.2. (Continued)

3. Onsite Recovery Director The Offsite Recovery Director directs the interface with Federal, State and Local government agencies.

4. Radiological Assessment Manager (if needed)

The Radiological Assessment Manager is normally a member of the Chemistry or RP Staff. This staff will report to the Offsite Recovery Director.

Responsibilities of the Radiological Assessment Manager include:

o Assist in assessment of offsite radiological consequences of the event utilizing information from available sources, and keep the Recovery Manager informed of the assessment.

o Develop methods for sampling, treatment, and/or disposal of offsite radioactive wastes resulting from the emergency and recovery operation.

o Provide dose calculations to the Recovery Manager for offsite areas based on data from available sources and/or mathematical modeling.

5. Company Spokesperson o Manages communications of recovery activities. Informs the news media, employees, etc.

5.7.3 Recovery Planning For convenience in planning, the recovery operations can be classified as follows:

1. Onsite recovery

2. Offsite recovery

3. Public Information These in turn will be considered in terms of three phases:

1. Emergency cleanup and repair,

2. Routine or long-term repair and recovery,

3. Decommissioning of plant.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 176 of 208

5.7.4 Onsite Recovery Operations Onsite recovery operations are performed in accordance with established plant procedures. Radiation and contamination levels for determining the need for decontamination and for returning areas or items to normal use are contained in existing site procedures. Additional procedures will be developed as appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

5.7.5 Offsite Recovery Operations

1. General The Duke Energy Recovery Manager and Offsite Recovery Director will coordinate with and assist offsite agencies in the recovery operations.

The State will be the lead organization for offsite recovery operations and put emergency regulations into effect to ensure that no food items in the contaminated area are consumed or put on the market without the required health physics monitoring, and to control access into contaminated areas. Authorization for re-entry to offsite areas will be made by the senior elected official (Governor or designee) of the area concerned after consultation with the Recovery Manager and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) and South Carolina Emergency Management Division.

2. Emergency Cleanup Operations The most urgent tasks will be to clear (i.e., partially decontaminate) emergency paths to allow access to critical facilities and inhabited areas. These clearing operations will be necessary particularly to:

Allow health physics teams to survey the contaminated areas, Allow farmers to provide emergency care for livestock that had to be left in contaminated areas or to assist them in moving the stock to uncontaminated areas, Allow emergency operations of utilities and services (power, water, telephone, sewage treatment, etc.) during the cleanup operation, Allow decontamination teams to perform the emergency and priority decontamination tasks (these emergency tasks will consist primarily of fire-hosing pavements, plowing or scraping unpaved areas adjacent to roads, and spraying paint or asphalt to fix loose contamination in place),

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 177 of 208

5.7.5.2 (Continued)

Stabilize the contaminated areas so that the radioactive materials are not spread to other areas or leaked into streams.

In particular, if public roads run through the area, cleanup of the road will be required, and cleanup of the area to some distance from the road will be needed to minimize exposure to travelers.

After the main roads and utilities have been put back into service, the urgency of the cleanup tasks will drop. However, the population that was evacuated will be eager to return, industrial operations that had to be shut down need to start up as soon as possible, and business operations need to be resumed.

Some farmland may have to be removed from use, which would cause hardship primarily to the occupants. Thus, it may be feasible to permanently evacuate such areas and pay the owner the market value. Such a step would probably occur at contamination levels where future crops would not be marketable due to the uptake of long-lived isotopes (primarily strontium).

Some of the buildings and houses may be contaminated to such a high level that it is more economical to demolish them than to decontaminate them. Areas where this occurs can be kept vacated; in such cases, demolition and burial can be a routine task, and the work can be scheduled over a longer period of time.

Decontamination of the agricultural land may or may not be feasible. Where it is feasible, the changes in agricultural operations that are required can be made on a routine basis.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 178 of 208

5.7.5. (Continued)

3. Countermeasures*

Countermeasures will have serious impact on the economy of contaminated areas, so they must be applied judiciously. They must be no more restrictive than necessary; however, once determined, they will be applied quickly and equitably, and may consist of:

Reducing contamination on the surface of any fruits and vegetables that were in the field at the time of the accident by ensuring that the surfaces are washed, that the outer leaves of leafy vegetables are removed, and that more than normal preference is given to peeling.

Altering production, processing, or distribution practices that affect the movement of radioactive contamination through food chain and into the human body. This will include storage of some food (primarily milk products) and animal feed supplies to allow radioactive decay (particularly of Iodine 131).

Diverting affected products to uses other than human consumption.

Condemning food.

Decontaminating farmland where practical.

Converting farmland to other uses for extended periods of time when decontamination is not practical.

Decontaminating industrial buildings, stores and shops, and residences and removing milk-producing cattle from the contaminated pastures should be priority items.

The longer these activities are delayed, the greater will be the costs and consequently the claims.

J. A. Auxier and R. O. Chester, eds., Report of the Clinch Valley Study, ORNL-4835 (January, 1973).

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 179 of 208

5.7.5. (Continued)

4. Monitoring and Dose Assessment The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Bureau of Land and Waste Management, will be the lead agency in the collection and analysis of radiation monitoring reports and of environmental air, foliage, food, and water samples. DHEC will be assisted by qualified personnel from HBRSEP, and the Westinghouse Water Reactor Division.

Total population exposure will be periodically determined through a variety of procedures including:

Examination of prepositioned TLDs.

Bioassay.

Estimates based on release rates and meteorology.

Estimates based on environmental monitoring of food, water, and ambient dose rates.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 180 of 208

FIGURE 5.7.2.1 RECOVERY ORGANIZATION PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 181 of 208

6.0 ATTACHMENTS 6.1 Communications Systems 6.2 Offsite Emergency Response Plans/Letters of Agreements 6.3 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Offsite Agency Support Summary 6.4 Distribution Lists for Plan And Procedures HBRSEP Plant Operating Manual 6.5 Medical Treatment and Assistance 6.6 Technical Basis of Emergency Dose Projection Program 6.7 Procedures Required to Implement Sections Of The Plan 6.8 Cross-Reference Between NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criteria and the Robinson Emergency Plan PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 182 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.1 Page 1 of 3 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

[SOER 99-1 Addendum, Recommendation 7]

A.0 INTRODUCTION Communications systems are designed to facilitate emergency communications within HBRSEP and between HBRSEP and emergency facilities. Redundant means of communication are provided to locations which provide vital emergency response roles.

A.1 Plant Communication Systems A.1.1 Public Address System The public address system provides paging and party line communications between stations located throughout the plant. Inside and outside type wall and desk-mounted stations are used to communicate between roaming personnel and fixed work locations.

Plant-wide instructions are issued using the paging feature. This system is powered from MCC 6, which can be supplied from diesel generator emergency supply. The one exception is the Administrative Building which does not have an uninterruptible power supply. See EE 94-079.

A.1.2 PBX Telephone System (AVAYA)

The private branch exchange (PBX) telephone system provides communication capability between telephone stations located within the plant by dialing the four-digit telephone station code. The PBX telephone system also provides for outside communications as discussed in Sections A.2.1, "Corporate Telephone Communications System" and A.2.2, commercial telephone lines.

A.1.3 Radio Transceivers for HBRSEP and Vicinity

1. Ultra high frequency (UHF) or 900 MHz transceivers (portables) are used for point-to-point communications in the plant vicinity. A base station is located in the TSC to provide radio communications through ultra-high or 900 MHz frequency repeaters. A primary and secondary source of power is provided for fixed base radio, with portable units powered by battery.

2. Ultra high frequency (UHF) or 450 MHz transceivers (portables) are used for point-to-point communications in the plant vicinity for Operations, Radiological Controls, and the Fire Brigade. Radio communications utilize 450 MHz frequency repeaters.

A.1.4 Radio Transceivers for Darlington County Fire District (DCFD)

Very high frequency (VHF) radios are utilized to communicate with the Darlington County Fire District during a fire or other incident when DCFD support is needed.

A.1.5 Radio Transceivers for Palmetto 800 This is a statewide radio frequency for emergency response activities. These radios are strategically placed throughout the site to provide interface with responding state and federal agencies.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 183 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.1 Page 2 of 3 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

[SOER 99-1 Addendum, Recommendation 7]

A.1.6 Back-up Telephone System (ESSX)

The Telephone System consists of lines between facilities and commercial telephone lines. It consists of a separate offsite PBX system with back-up power systems for reliability. The Control Room, TSC, and OSC have phones which operate through this system. The ESSX can be used as a back up method for teleconferencing State and County Warning Points.

A.1.7 Plant Security Radio Transceivers These transceivers are used by the plant security force for communications in and around the plant.

A.1.8 Vital Plant Parameter and Meteorological Data Communications During an emergency, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) or EP NET, provides information that is displayed in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. Primary and secondary power sources are supplied to this system.

A.2 Offsite Communications Systems A.2.1 Corporate Telephone Communications System (VoiceNet)

Interconnected through the plant PBX, the Corporate telephone system provides a means to communicate with any other Corporate locations. This system is fiber optic cable routed separately, via transmission lines, and is separate from commercial telephone service. The Corporate Telephone Communications System equipment is supplied power through a reserve battery bank which is backed up by an emergency generator at each terminal and repeater.

A.2.2 Commercial Telephone Service Commercial telephone lines, which supply public telephone communications, are used by Duke Energy to provide lines to plant emergency facilities. Commercial telephone service provides primary and secondary power for their lines at the Central Office.

A.2.3 Facsimile Capability All State and County warning points and Emergency Operations Centers along with the Control Room, TSC, EOF and JIC are equipped with facsimile machines. These may be used as a back up to the Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET).

A.2.4 Dedicated Telephone System to Load Dispatcher This system provides direct links between the Control Room and the load dispatcher.

Transmission facilities are via the fiber optic VoiceNet system. These lines appear on several phones in the Control Room and are selected by pushing the appropriate button on a multibutton phone. The lines are automatically rung at the load dispatcher identifying HBRSEP as the caller. Primary and secondary power is supplied at both ends.

A.2.5 The Technical Support Center has a satellite telephone that will permit another back-up method to communicate with offsite response agencies.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 184 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.1 Page 3 of 3 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

[SOER 99-1 Addendum, Recommendation 7]

A.2.6 Cellular Telephones Cellular Telephones are available to the Control Room to communicate with offsite agencies or management/corporate personnel and the Field Monitoring Teams to communicate with the Field Monitoring Team Leader.

A.2.7 Plant Security Control Station The plant security radio control station, which is a part of the system discussed in Section A.1.6, Plant Security, provides for radio communications to the Darlington County Sheriff's Office. Primary and secondary power is supplied.

A.2.8 Corporate Informational Data System (WAN/LAN)

Corporate Information Technologies (IT) and local IT systems used to link HBRSEP, Corporate headquarters, and other Duke Energy systems and allowing the interchange, storage, and processing of electronic data and information.

A.2.9 NRC Emergency Telecommunication System (ETS)

Telephone lines allow communications from RNP to the NRC regional and national offices. Telephones connected through these circuits are located in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center, the NRC office, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

Circuits for this system are available through the plant PBX and the Duke Telecommunications System. Primary and secondary sources of power are supplied.

A.2.10 Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET)

The Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET) consists of equipment and circuits linking HBRSEP with the offsite agencies involved in initial emergency notifications. This system can quickly conference the offsite agencies for notifications.

The Control Room, TSC, EOF, Remote Emergency Response Facility (RERF), Work Control Center, and the Simulator Control Room have these phones.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 185 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.2 Page 1 of 2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS/LETTERS OF AGREEMENTS Emergency Response Plans for Offsite Agencies are listed as follows:

1. South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Part 2 -

H. B. Robinson FNF Site Specific

2. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Standard Technical Operating Procedure and Technical Radiological Emergency Response Plan Letters of agreement will be maintained between the following off site organizations.

1. Memorandum of Understanding Between the South Carolina Emergency Management Division, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and Duke Energy Carolinas, Inc. (Ref-5.3.4.1, 5.6.2.3)

2. Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center (Ref-5.3.3.4a)

3. McLeod Health Cheraw (Ref-5.3.3.4a)

4. Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center Emergency Room Supervisor (Ref-5.3.3.4a)

5. Darlington County (Ref-5.3.4.2)

6. Darlington County Emergency Medical Service's (Ref-5.3.3.4b)

7. Hartsville Rescue Squad (Ref-5.3.3.4b)

8. Darlington County Fire District (Ref-5.3.3.4c)

9. Darlington County Sheriff's Department (Ref-5.3.4.2b)

10. Lee County Sheriffs Department (Ref-5.3.4.3b)

11. Chesterfield County (Ref-5.3.4.4)

12. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) (Ref-5.3.3.)

13. Darlington County 911 Communications Center (Ref-5.3.4.2c)

14. Lee County (Ref-5.3.4.3)

15. Lee County Enhanced 911 Facility (Ref-5.3.4.3c)

16. Hartsville Fire Department (Ref-5.3.3.4c)

17. Medshore Ambulance Service (Ref-5.6.2.3)

18. Duke Energy Southern Region Engineering & Operations (Ref-5.6.2.3)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 186 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.2 Page 2 of 2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS/LETTERS OF AGREEMENTS

19. Duke Energy Hartsville Operations Center (Ref-5.5.5)

20. Darlington County Combustion Turbine Plant (Ref-5.4.4.2b)

21. Hartsville Regional Airport (Ref-5.3.3.4c & d)

22. Dove Aviation Marine, Darlington County Jetport (Ref-5.3.3.4c & d)

23. Florence Regional Airport (Ref-5.3.3.4d)

24. Columbia Metropolitan Airport (Ref-5.3.3.4d)

25. Shaw Air Force Base (5.3.3.4c)

26. Florence County Sheriffs Department (5.3.4.5)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 187 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.3 Page 1 of 3 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 OFFSITE AGENCY SUPPORT

SUMMARY

FUNCTION PRIMARY SUPPORT (NUREG-0654, II.A) RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY

1. Command and Control

a. Onsite HBRSEP NRC

b. Offsite State, County FEMA, Duke Energy

2. Accident Classification

a. Onsite HBRSEP NRC

b. Offsite N/A N/A

3. Warning

a. Onsite HBRSEP Local

b. Offsite County State

4. Notification

a. Onsite HBRSEP Local

b. Offsite HBRSEP State, Local, Media

5. Communications

a. Onsite HBRSEP NRC, Duke Energy

b. Offsite State, County Commercial Telephone, Duke Energy

6. Transportation

a. Onsite HBRSEP/Employees Local

b. Offsite Local/Residents FEMA, State, County

7. Traffic Control Security

a. Onsite HBRSEP Security County

b. Offsite County State

8. Accident Assessment

a. Onsite HBRSEP Duke Energy Environmental Center, BNP, NRC, HNP, URS Corporation Westinghouse

b. Offsite State County, Duke Energy FEMA, EPA, DOE, CAP PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 188 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.3 Page 2 of 3 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 OFFSITE AGENCY SUPPORT

SUMMARY

FUNCTION PRIMARY SUPPORT (NUREG-0654, II.A) RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY

9. Public Information/Education

a. Onsite HBRSEP, Corp.Comm. NRC

b. Offsite State County, Corp. Comm.,

Media, FEMA

10. Protective Response

a. Onsite HBRSEP County, Duke Energy

b. Offsite County, State Duke Energy, FEMA, EPA USDA

11. Radiological Exposure Control

a. Onsite HBRSEP Duke Energy, HNP, BNP

b. Offsite State County, FEMA, EPA, Duke Energy

12. Fire and Rescue

a. Onsite HBRSEP County/Local Organ.

b. Offsite County State

13. Medical

a. Onsite HBRSEP County/Local Organ.

b. Offsite Local State, U.S. DHHS

14. Public Health & Sanitation

a. Onsite HBRSEP State, Local, Duke Energy

b. Offsite County State, FEMA, U.S. DHHS

15. Social Services

a. Onsite N/A N/A

b. Offsite State County, Red Cross, Salvation Army

16. Training

a. Onsite HBRSEP Duke Energy, NRC

b. Offsite County State, Duke Energy, HBRSEP PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 189 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.3 Page 3 of 3 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 OFFSITE AGENCY SUPPORT

SUMMARY

FUNCTION PRIMARY SUPPORT (NUREG-0654, II.A) RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY

17. Exercises

a. Onsite HBRSEP Duke Energy, NRC

b. Offsite State State, County, Duke Energy, HBRSEP

18. Recovery/Reentry

a. Onsite HBRSEP Duke Energy, NRC

b. Offsite State URS Corporation Westinghouse, FEMA, Local Duke Energy, DOE, EPA, U.S. DHHS, USDA NOTE: BNP Brunswick Nuclear Plant CAP Civil Air Patrol CORP. COMM Duke Energy Corporate Communications DOE U.S. Department of Energy EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency W Westinghouse HBRSEP H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 HNP Harris Nuclear Plant NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission URS United Research Services USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture US DHHS U.S. Department of Health & Human Services PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 190 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.4 Page 1 of 1 DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR PLAN AND PROCEDURES NOTE: This list contains only the minimum distribution locations and does not contain position specific locations within the same facility.

TITLE: EMERGENCY PLAN ISSUED TO

RNP ERO OSC Operations Support Center

NGO EOF Emergency Operations Facility

RNP Work Control Center

RNP Darlington County Civil Def. Dir.

RNP Chesterfield County Civil Def. Dir.

RNP Hartsville Fire Department

RNP B5b Area

RNP Lee County EPD Dir.

RNP SC Emer Prep Div - HBR Coord.

RNP Bureau of Land And Waste Management

RNP 50.54(Q) Submittals

RNP ERO RERF Remote Emergency Response Facility TITLE: EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ISSUED TO

RNP Control Room

RNP Simulator Control Room

RNP Work Control Center

RNP ERO OSC Operations Support Center

RNP B5b Area

RNP Bureau of Land And Waste Management

RNP 50.54(Q) Submittals

RNP ERO JIC Joint Information Center

RNP ERO TSC Technical Support Center

NGO EOF Emergency Operations Facility

RNP ERO RERF Remote Emergency Response Facility PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 191 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.5 Page 1 of 3 MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ASSISTANCE A.1. INTRODUCTION The Medical Treatment and Assistance Plan provides for several levels of treatment based on the severity of injury and degree of radioactive contamination involved, if any.

The first level of assistance will be given onsite at the accident location, in the plant First Aid Room, or the Triage Area. In this facility, initial evaluation of the severity of the injury will be made by personnel qualified as first responders, and emergency treatment started. In many cases, it may be possible to provide complete treatment at this location.

Concurrently, the degree of radiation exposure and/or contamination will be assessed by radiation safety personnel and decontamination begun. All injuries occurring in a contaminated area will be considered as contaminated until monitored and cleared.

If the severity of the injury requires more extensive or prolonged treatment, the patient can be transported to the second level of assistance located at the Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center where special facilities for treatment of contaminated patients have been provided (see Section E.2.2). McLeod Health Cheraw in Cheraw, S. C., provides a backup facility should Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center become full or uninhabitable.

When the level of radiation exposure (either external or internal) requires specialized evaluation and treatment, the patient can be transported to a third level of assistance. Examples are the North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill or The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REACTS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Assistance from REACTS, as with other governmental agencies, may be requested through the State of South Carolina.

REACTS will provide advice and assistance to HBRSEP in the event of a severe radiation accident.

Transfer from any level of assistance to the next higher level will be effected only after medical evaluation (unless the urgency of the patient's condition requires immediate action) and will be under the control of the attending physician or the alternate senior physician.

A.2. Medical Emergencies A.2.1 Onsite First Aid Facilities It is anticipated that contaminated personnel will not leave the facility for medical treatment except for cases thought to require immediate hospitalization.

Emergency medical treatment of contaminated personnel will be handled on site by personnel qualified as first responders. This includes all injuries thought not to require immediate hospitalization.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 192 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.5 Page 2 of 3 MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ASSISTANCE A.2.2 Hospitalization If emergency medical treatment can best be given at Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center in Hartsville (or another facility as may be advised by a competent medical authority), the injured person may be transported to Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center. Good health physics practices will be followed to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination to offsite areas and facilities.

If possible, contaminated clothing and equipment should be removed, or the patient should be wrapped in clean sheets or clothing to prevent contamination of the transporting personnel and vehicle.

Medical assistance is immediately available in the Hartsville area from a group of physicians, who are on the staff of Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center, and who have agreed to provide medical assistance for contaminated patients.

In addition, McLeod Health Cheraw in Cheraw, S. C., provides back-up services. Also, the U. S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team will provide medical assistance, if required, through their REACTS facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

A.2.3 Treatment Facility A specially designated emergency area is maintained in readiness at Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center and McLeod Health Cheraw for Duke Energy's use for the treatment of contaminated patients. Although this area will be utilized by the hospital when not required by Duke Energy, it will be made immediately available to Duke Energy when required. Equipment is available in the hospital for the emergency treatment of patients. With the facilities and equipment available, extensive decontamination and treatment of an injured patient could be performed, including surgical treatment that may be required.

A.2.4 Onsite Medical Services On site personnel qualified as first responders will provide initial medical treatment utilizing pre-staged first aid kits, medical response equipment and triage materials.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 193 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.5 Page 3 of 3 MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ASSISTANCE A.2.5 Emergency Equipment An emergency kit is maintained at Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center and at McLeod Health Cheraw containing supplies and equipment for personnel monitoring and the control of radioactive contamination. This kit contains the following:

a. Radiation monitoring instruments, one low-level instrument for determining contamination levels, and one intermediate-range instrument for determining dose rates.

b. Personnel monitoring equipment such as TLDs and direct reading dosimeters.

c. Decontamination equipment and supplies for both personnel and facility.

d. Contamination control equipment and supplies such as protective clothing, signs, ropes, tags, plastic bags, etc.

A.2.6 Ambulance Service The Hartsville Rescue Squad, and Darlington County Emergency Medical Service have agreed to respond to all emergency calls from the plant, just as they respond to other calls from the Hartsville area.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 194 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 1 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM I. Background When a potential or actual unanticipated release of radioactive material occurs which meets the initiating condition of the Dose Assessment Procedures, a dose assessment is performed. Initially, prior to activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, the Control Room staff is responsible for performing dose assessments. Once the Emergency Operations Facility is activated, the radiological control staff assumes responsibility for dose assessments. These dose assessments are used to classify emergencies, formulate follow-up protective action recommendations to the State and Counties, and to characterize the overall health risk to the public of any releases. The methodology for dose assessments is based upon the referenced documents at the end of this discussion. The methods, assumptions and equations used to estimate projected doses are presented herein.

The exposure to the public during an airborne release (early phase) is via direct exposure to an overhead plume or immersion in a radioactive plume, direct exposure from deposited radioactive materials, and the committed dose to internal organs from inhalation of radioactive materials. These doses are expressed in terms of Total Effective Dose Equivalent, which is the sum of external exposure doses from the plume and deposited materials and the internal dose commitment from intake of radioactive materials, and Committed Dose Equivalents to the critical organ (Thyroid), which is the radiation dose due to radionuclides in the thyroid over a fifty year period following intake.

The fundamental equation used to estimate projected dose is D = X/Q

Q

DCF [Reference 1]

Where:

D = Dose in Rem [TEDE or CDE]

X/Q = Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficient in Sec./M3 Q = Radioactive Source Term in Curies DCF = Dose Conversion Factor in (Rem - M3) / (Ci - Sec.)

As shown, three components are required to project the dose to the public. The first factor, X/Q, is derived from data obtained from the plant's meteorological tower. The parameters of wind speed wind direction, and differential temperature are measured by instruments on the tower and are used in the Gaussian diffusion model to derive the X/Q factor.

The second parts of the equation, Q, or source term, is determined from plant effluent monitor reading(s), from analysis of a sample of effluent gas or water, from selection of a default accident category, or from a manual method of analysis.

Implicit in the dose equation are input variables such as estimated duration of release and distances from the release point to points of interest.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 195 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 2 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM II. Source Term A. Background Since 1962, source term mixes for nuclear power plants have been derived from TID-14844. This report established what was believed to be a bounding case for release of radionuclides in a severe core damage accident. The release consisted of 100% of the core inventory of noble gases, 50% of the core inventory of iodines, and 1% of the core inventory of particulates. Since that time the use of probabilistic risk assessments in examining accident consequences has been developed and has culminated in the NRC report NUREG-1465, "Accident Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants". In this document, new source terms were proposed that utilized the risk assessments of five typical PWRs and five BWRs to develop a mean in-containment isotopic release fraction for various core damage events.

In any risk assessment study, a large number of accident sequences and their probabilities of occurrence are analyzed. A separate isotopic release fraction is developed for each accident sequence. The major isotopic release factions are those fractions of core inventory that are released either through failure of the fuel cladding, melting of the core within the reactor vessel, or release of melted core materials through a breach of the reactor vessel. These fractions are values that when multiplied by the core inventory in curies of the particular isotopes, give curie amounts of isotopes immediately available for release from the containment. The effects of cleanup and engineered safety features are taken to the extent consistent with the failures that led to the particular accident sequence. To make the results manageable, the accident sequences and the accident isotopic releases are grouped. NUREG-1465 then uses the accident sequence probabilities as a means to weigh the release fractions for that sequence category. The weighted release fractions are added up to determine a "mean" in-containment release fraction.

The Duke Energy Risk Assessment Unit is responsible for the development of the Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs), or risk assessment studies, for all three plants.

These studies factor in the status of the containment and cleanup systems to determine a release source term directly to the environment. The studies do not normally report the "in-containment" source term nor do they develop a mean value. The computer code for the study was rerun with new outputs to determine the in-containment release fractions for each accident sequence. The probabilities of the accident sequences were used to weight the release fractions to develop plant specific mean in-containment release fractions similar to NUREG-1465.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 196 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 3 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM B. Source Term Categories NUREG-1228, Table 2.2 describes the core inventory and coolant concentrations (PWR).

Source terms are based upon the core melt sequences, four categories of core damage:

1) normal coolant leakage, 2) spiked coolant leakage, 3) gap release, and 4) in-vessel core melt. These categories have an associated release duration based upon the length of time that the core is uncovered. As a result, it is possible to construct a source term mix matrix that is dependent on two parameters, whether or not the fuel is uncovered, and the length of time that the fuel is uncovered. A separate isotopic release fraction is developed for each accident sequence. The major isotopic release fractions are those fractions of core inventory that are released either through failure of the fuel cladding and melting of the core within the reactor vessel. These fractions are values that when multiplied by the core inventory in curies of the particular isotopes, give curie amounts of isotopes immediately available for release from the containment.

The effects of cleanup and engineered safety features are taken into account to the extent consistent with the failures that led to the particular accident sequence. To make the results manageable, the accident sequence and the accident isotopic release are grouped. NUREG-1465 is utilized as a means to weigh the release fractions for that sequence category. The weighted release fractions are added up to determine a mean in-containment release fraction.

In order to have a dose assessment capability that can be utilized under many circumstances, the vast majority of which are less consequential than a melt of the core with no removal mechanisms, the effect of engineered safety features and removal phenomena must be included in the source term mix. RTM-96, Table C-5 lists the reduction factors, and Table C-6 escape fractions are used in developing source term categories that account for removal process. In order to select the proper mix, a release pathway and estimated time duration of core uncovery is determined. Reduction factors are applied as scaling factors, as described in NUREG-1228.

There remain three source term special cases of accident mixes which are handled separately in the dose assessment process. 1) Fuel stored in a pool, and the fuel is uncovered; 2) Fuel stored in a pool that is damaged underwater; and 3) Damage to fuel cladding stored in a dry storage cask. Fuel release fractions used in these accidents are derived from NUREG/CR-6451.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 197 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 4 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM C. Development of Source Terms Based on Effluent Monitor Readings Radiation monitors in effluent streams or other release pathways are used to define a release activity based on the sensitivity of the monitor to the particular radionuclide mix. The effect of radioactive decay in changing the mix of isotopes is taken into account up to a maximum decay from time of reactor shutdown of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months .

Effluent monitors are calibrated to a reference Xe-133 or Kr-85 standard and are sensitive to both betas and gammas. The sensitivity of the monitor varies with the energy of the betas and gammas detected, and this sensitivity curve is used to develop an accident specific sensitivity for the monitor which is converted to a Xe-133 or Kr-85 equivalent. The radionuclide mix for each accident category is thus converted into a multiplication factor for the calibrated detector sensitivity.

D. Development of Source Terms Based on Effluent Samples Effluent samples, when analyzed, will provide a decay corrected activity from time to reactor shutdown expressed in terms of µCi/cc for each isotope. These values are then multiplied by the process flow to provide a curies/second source term for each radionuclide present.

III. Atmospheric Dispersion The models used to predict the reduction in concentration of radionuclides as a function of meteorological conditions and distance are the Gaussian Plume Model and the Gaussian Puff Model using the Pasquill-Gifford curves for dispersion modeling.

Two meteorological parameters are needed to compute the atmospheric dispersion factor X/Q. They are wind speed and the stability class as determined by the differential air temperature as a function of height above ground level. These three parameters can be obtained in one of four ways:

1. The plant computer receives data from the meteorological tower data acquisition system every 15 minutes and reports the most recently obtained data.

2. A remote computer can acquire meteorological tower data through a secure proxy server.

3. The National Weather Service can be contacted to provide information which can be used to derive the required parameters.

4. As a last resort, a visual scan of the surrounding skies can be used with information from Reference 6 to choose the approximate parameters.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 198 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 5 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM

References:

1. NUREG-1465, Accident Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, Draft Report for Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, June 1992

2. RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, Vol. 1, Rev. 4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, October 1996-NUREG/BR 0150

3. NUREG-1940 RASCAL 4.0: Description of models and methods

4. NUREG-1228, Source Term Estimation during Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents. 1988

5. Regulatory Guide 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Revision 1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 1975

6. Regulatory Guide 1.145, Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accidents Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C., August 1979

7. Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, D. Bruce Turner, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D. C., 1970

8. EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D. C., May 1992

9. Technical Information Document (TID)-14844, Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites, J. J. DiNunno et al, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., 1962

10. Calculation RNP-M/MECH-1742, Design Inputs for Emergency Plan Dose Assessment, Source Term, Rad Monitor Information

11. Calculation RNP-F/NFSA-0267, Radiological Consequence Analysis of the AST Loss of Coolant Accident

12. Calculation RNP-M/MECH-1746, Calculation of Inputs for Dose Projection Software PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 199 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.6 Page 6 of 6 TECHNICAL BASIS OF EMERGENCY DOSE PROJECTION PROGRAM Source Term Category: Description Normal RCS Accidents that do not result in core uncovery.

Gap Release Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery < 30 With Cleanup minutes, or mechanical fuel damage has occurred.

Filtration, partitioning, and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective.

Gap Release Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery < 30 No Cleanup minutes or mechanical fuel damage has occurred. Filtration, partitioning, and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective.

Early Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery from In Vessel 0.5 to 1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Filtration, partitioning, and/or With Cleanup containment sprays are considered to be effective.

Early In Vessel Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery from No Cleanup 0.5 to 1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Filtration, partitioning, and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective.

Ex-Vessel Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery With Cleanup >1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Filtration, partitioning, and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective.

Ex-Vessel Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery No Cleanup >1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Filtration, partitioning, and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective.

Spent Fuel An Accident involving the damage of a freshly unloaded With Cleanup spent fuel assembly. Filtration is considered to be effective. For spent fuel assembly accidents with no filtration, use "Gap Release No Cleanup."

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 200 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.7 Page 1 of 3 PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT SECTIONS OF THE PLAN PLAN PROCEDURES (1)

Section 5.1: Introduction N/A Section 5.2: Emergency AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO Classifications AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02(2), EAL Wallchart (Both Hot and Cold)

CSD-EP-RNP-0101-01, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document AOP-034, Security Events AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO Emergency Section 5.3: Response AD-EP-ALL-0304, State and County Notifications Organization AD-EP-ALL-0301, Activation of Emergency Response Organization Notification System AD-EP-ALL-0105, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center AD-EP-RNP-0105 RNP Site Specific TSC Support AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-ALL-0108, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center AD-EP-ALL-0106, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center EPSPA-05, Unified Incident Command AOP-034, Security Events AOP-041, Fire Response AD-EP-ALL-0301, Activation of The Emergency Response Organization Notification System (ERONS)

AD-EP-ALL-0100, Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 201 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.7 Page 2 of 3 PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT SECTIONS OF THE PLAN PLAN PROCEDURES (1)

Emergency Section 5.4: AD-EP-ALL-0111, Control Room Activation of the ERO Measures AD-EP-ALL-0101, Emergency Classification AD-EP-ALL-0304, State and Country Notifications AD-EP-ALL-0406, Duke Emergency Management Network (DEMNET)

AD-EP-ALL-0109, Protective Action Recommendations EPSPA-01, Evacuation and Accountability EPSPA-02, First Aid and Medical Care AD-EP-ALL-0204, Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radiological Release.

AD-EP-ALL-0205, Emergency Exposure Controls AD-EP-ALL-0203, Field Monitoring During Declared Emergencies AD-EP-RNP-0203, RNP Site Specific Field Monitoring Information EPRAD-02, Processing Very High Level Radioactive Samples AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment EPRAD-04, Personnel Decontamination AD-EP-RNP-0203, RNP Site Specific Field Monitoring Information AD-EP-ALL-0205, Emergency Exposure Controls EPTSC-07, Damage Assessment EPPRO-07(2) Operation and Maintenance of the Alert and Notification System PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 202 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.7 Page 3 of 3 PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT SECTIONS OF THE PLAN PLAN PROCEDURES (1)

Emergency AD-EP-ALL-0105, Activation and Operation of the Technical Section 5.5: Facilities and Support Center Equipment AD-EP-RNP-0105, RNP Site Specific TSC Support AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the EOF AD-EP-ALL-0103, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-ALL-0107, Emergency Operations Facility Services AD-EP-ALL-0108, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center AD-EP-ALL-0106, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center AD-EP-RNP-0106, RNP Site Specific OSC Support AD-EP-ALL-0203, Field Monitoring During Declared Emergency AD-EP-RNP-0203, RNP Site Specific Field Monitoring Information AD-EP-ALL-0202, Emergency Response Offsite Dose Assessment RST-003(2) Emergency Kit Inventory EPSPA-05, Unified Incident Command PLP-069, Emergency Response Equipment Responsibilities Maintaining EPPRO-02(2) Maintenance and Testing Section 5.6: Emergency Preparedness AD-EP-ALL-1000(2), Conduct of Emergency Preparedness AD-EP-ALL-0501(2) Emergency Preparedness Staff Training and Qualification AD-EP-ALL-0801(2) Design and Development of Drills and Exercises AD-EP-ALL-0802(2) Conducting Drills and Exercises AD-EP-ALL-0803(2) Evaluation and Critiques of Drills and Exercises Section 5.7: Recovery AD-EP-ALL-0110, Recovery Note (1) Changes to the above procedures require a 10 CFR 50.54(q) screen at a minimum.

(2) These procedures are considered administrative procedures that support the Emergency Plan. Changes to these procedures do not require submittal to the NRC.

PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 203 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.8 Page 1 of 5 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND THE ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 CRITERION HBRSEP SECTION(s)

A.1.a 5.3.3, 5.3.4, ATTACHMENT 6.3 A.1.b 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.3.5 A.1.c Figures 5.3.1-1, 5.3.2-1, 5.3.5-1 to 5.3.5-6 A.1.d 5.3, 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2 A.1.e 5.3.1, 5.3.5, TABLE 5.3.2-1 A.2.a Onsite: 5.3.2, Offsite: 5.3.3, 5.3.4 ATTACHMENT 6.3 A.2.b N/A A.3 ATTACHMENT 6.2 A.4 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3, 5.3.2.4, TABLE 5.3.2-1 B.1 5.3, 5.3.1 B.2 5.3, 5.3.2.1, TABLE 5.3.2-1 B.3 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3 B.4 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2 B.5 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, Table 5.3.2-1 B.6 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.5, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.6, ATTACHMENT 6.3 (see also A.1.c above)

B.7 5.3, Table 5.3.2-1 B.7.a 5.7.2.6, 5.3.2.2 B.7.b 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4 B.7.c 5.3.1.2, 5.3.2.2, 5.3.3.1 B.7.d 5.3.3.1, 5.3.2.4 B.8 5.3.3, ATTACHMENT 6.3 B.9 5.3.3.4, ATTACHMENT 6.2, ATTACHMENT 6.3, ATTACHMENT 6.5 C.1.a 5.3.4.6.a, ATTACHMENT 6.2 C.1.b 5.3.4.6, ATTACHMENT 6.2 C.1.c 5.3.4.1 to 5.3.4.4, 5.3.3.4, ATTACHMENT 6.2 C.2.a N/A C.2.b 5.3.2.2.e C.3 5.3.3.2, 5.5.8.6, ATTACHMENT 6.3 C.4 5.3.3, 5.3.4, ATTACHMENT 6.2, ATTACHMENT 6.3 D.1, Appendix 1 5.2, CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 D.2 5.2, CSD-EP-RNP-0101-02 D.3 N/A D.4 N/A PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 204 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.8 Page 2 of 5 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND THE ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 CRITERION HBRSEP SECTION(s)

E.1 5.1.4, 5.3.2, 5.3.5, 5.4.1, 5.4.4.1 E.2 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.3.5 E.3 5.3.5 E.4.a-n AD-EP-ALL-0111 E.5 N/A E.6 5.3.5, 5.4.4.6, 5.4.4.7 E.7 5.3.5, 5.4.4.6, 5.4.4.7 F.1.a 5.3.1, 5.3.5, AD-EP-ALL-0111 F.1.b 5.3.5, ATTACHMENT 6.1 F.1.c 5.3.5, ATTACHMENT 6.1 F.1.d 5.3.5, 5.5, ATTACHMENT 6.1 F.1.e 5.3.5, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, AD-EP-ALL-0111 F.1.f 5.4.2.5, 5.5, ATTACHMENT 6.1, Procedures F.2 5.5, ATTACHMENT 6.1, Table 5.3.5-1 F.3 5.6.1.2 G.1 5.4.4.7, 5.6.1.4 G.2 5.4.4.7, 5.6.1.4 G.3.a 5.3.3.1, 5.5.6 G.3.b 5.2, 5.3.2, 5.3.3.1, 5.5.4, 5.5.6 G.4.a 5.3.3.1 G.4.b 5.3.3.1 G.4.c 5.3.3.1, 5.4.4.7.1 G.5 5.6.1.4, EPPRO-02 H.1 5.5.2, 5.5.3 H.2 5.5.4 H.3 N/A H.4 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.5 Table 5.3.5-1 H.5 5.5.8 H.5.a 5.5.8.3 H.5.b 5.5.8.4 H.5.c 5.5.8.4, 5.5.8.5 H.5.d 5.5.9 H.6.a 5.5.8.3 H.6.b 5.5.8.4 H.6.c 5.5.8.6 H.7 5.5.8.4, 5.5.13 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 205 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.8 Page 3 of 5 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND THE ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 CRITERION HBRSEP SECTION(s)

H.8 5.5.8.2 H.9 5.5.3, Table 5.5.0-1 H.10 5.6.3.1 H.11 5.5.10, 5.5.11 H.12 5.4.2.4, 5.5.4, Table 5.5.0-1 I.1 POM VOL. 3 PARTS 4 & 5, EPs I.2 5.4.2 {RNP RA/01-0164; NRC Amendment No. 192}

I.3.a 5.4.2.2 I.3.b 5.4.2.25.4.2.3, ATTACHMENT 6.6 I.4 5.4.2.2, 5.4.2.3, ATTACHMENT 6.6 I.5 5.5.8.2 I.6 5.4.2.1, ATTACHMENT 6.6, AD-EP-ALL-0202 I.7 5.4.2.4 I.8 5.4.2.3, 5.4.2.4, 5.5.8.5, 5.5.8.4 I.9 5.4.2 I.10 5.4.2 J.1.a 5.4.4.2, 5.6.1.1, ATTACHMENT 6.1 J.1.b 5.4.4.2, 5.6.1.1, ATTACHMENT 6.1 J.1.c 5.4.4.2, 5.6.1.1 J.1.d 5.4.4.2, 5.4.4.6 J.2 5.4.4.2 J.3 5.4.4.2, 5.4.4.4 J.4 5.4.4.2 J.5 5.3.2.1, 5.4.4.2 J.6.a 5.4.4.3, 5.5.1, 5.6.3.1, EPPRO-02 J.6.b 5.4.4.3, 5.5.1, 5.6.3.1, EPPRO-02 J.6.c 5.4.4.3 J.7 5.4.4, 5.4.1.1, 5.4.4.7 ATTACHMENT 6.4, AD-EP-ALL-0111 J.8 5.4.4.7.3 J.9 N/A J.10.a 5.4.4.7.3, Figures 5.1.1-2 J.10.b Figure 5.1.1-2, CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03 J.10.c 5.3.5, 5.4.4.6 J.10.d N/A J.10.e N/A J.10.f N/A J.10.g N/A PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 206 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.8 Page 4 of 5 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND THE ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 CRITERION HBRSEP SECTION(s)

J.10.h N/A J.10.i N/A J.10.j N/A J.10.k N/A J.10.l N/A J.10.m See item J.7, Table 5.4.4-2 J.11 N/A J.12 N/A K.1.a-g 5.4.4.3 K.2 5.4.4.3 K.3.a 5.4.4.3 K.3.b 5.4.4.3 K.4 N/A K.5.a 5.4.4.4, Procedures K.5.b 5.4.4.4, 5.4.4.5 K.6.a 5.4.4.4 K.6.b 5.4.4.4, Procedures K.6.c 5.4.4.4, Procedures, 5.7.4 K.7 5.4.4.4, 5.4.4.5 L.1 5.3.3.4, 5.4.4.5, ATTACHMENT 6.2, 5.5.11 ATTACHMENT 6.5 L.2 5.3.3.4, 5.4.4.5, 5.5.11, ATTACHMENT 6.2, ATTACHMENT 6.5 L.3 N/A L.4 5.3.3.4, 5.4.4.5, ATTACHMENT 6.2, ATTACHMENT 6.5 M.1 5.4.4.3, 5.7.3, 5.7.4, 5.4.4.3.1 5.7, Procedures M.2 5.7.2, Figure 5.7.2-1 M.3 5.7.2, ATTACHMENT 6.1, Procedures M.4 5.4.2.3 N.1.a 5.6.1.2 N.1.b 5.6.1.2 N.2.a 5.6.1.2 N.2.b 5.6.1.2 N.2.c 5.6.1.2 N.2.d 5.6.1.2 N.2.e 5.6.1.2 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 207 of 208

ATTACHMENT 6.8 Page 5 of 5 CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND THE ROBINSON EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 CRITERION HBRSEP SECTION(s)

N.3.a 5.6.1.2 N.4 5.6.1.2 N.5 5.6.1.2 O.1 5.6.1.1 O.1.a 5.6.1.1 O.1.b N/A O.2 5.6.1.2 O.3 5.6.1.1, AD-EP-ALL-0500 O.4.a 5.6.1.1, AD-EP-ALL-0500 O.4.b 5.6.1.1, AD-EP-ALL-0500 O.4.c 5.6.1.1, AD-EP-ALL-0500 O.4.d 5.6.1.1 O.4.e 5.6.1.1 O.4.f 5.6.1.1, AD-EP-ALL-0500 O.4.g 5.6.1.1 O.4.h 5.6.1.1 O.4.i 5.6.1.1 O.4.j 5.6.1.1 O.5 5.6.0, 5.6.1, 5.6.1.1 P.1 5.6.1.1, 5.6.1.3 P.2 5.6.1.3 P.3 5.6.1.3 P.4 5.6.2, ATTACHMENT 6.2 P.5 5.6.2.1, ATTACHMENT 6.4 P.6 5.6.2.3 P.7 ATTACHMENT 6.7 P.8 Table of Contents P.9 5.6.2, 5.6.2.1, 5.6.2.2 P.10 5.6.2.1 PLP-007 Rev. 93 Page 208 of 208

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment III Serial: RA-19-0468 Attachment III: CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, Revision 0

NUCLEAR OPERATING FLEET CONTROLLED SUPPORTING DOCUMENT CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03 ROBINSON EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE STUDY Revision 0 Tier 3 Effective Dates:

7/2/2019 7/2/2019 Robinson NGO

CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03 ROBINSON EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE STUDY Rev. 0 Page 1 REVISION

SUMMARY

DRR 02279538 DESCRIPTION

Implement CSD-EP-RNP-0603-03, Robinson Evacuation Time Estimate Study, revision 0.

Robinson Nuclear Plant Development of Evacuation Time Estimates Work performed for Progress Energy, by:

KLD Engineering, P.C.

43 Corporate Drive Hauppauge, NY 11788 mailto:kweinisch@kldcompanies.com November 2012 Final Report, Rev. 1 KLD TR - 534

Robinson Nuclear Plant KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 11 1.1 Overview of the ETE Process...................................................................................................... 12 1.2 The Robinson Nuclear Power Plant Location ............................................................................. 13 1.3 Preliminary Activities ................................................................................................................. 15 1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study .............................................................................................. 19 2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS............................................................................................. 21 2.1 Data Estimates ........................................................................................................................... 21 2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions .......................................................................................... 21 2.3 Study Assumptions ..................................................................................................................... 25 3 DEMAND ESTIMATION ....................................................................................................................... 31 3.1 Permanent Residents ................................................................................................................. 32 3.2 Shadow Population .................................................................................................................... 37 3.3 Transient Population ................................................................................................................ 310 3.4 Employees ................................................................................................................................ 314 3.5 Medical Facilities ...................................................................................................................... 318 3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population .............................................................. 318 3.7 Special Event ............................................................................................................................ 318 3.8 Summary of Demand ............................................................................................................... 320 4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY................................................................................................ 41 4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections .............................................................. 42 4.2 Capacity Estimation along Sections of Highway ........................................................................ 44 4.3 Application to the RNP Study Area ............................................................................................ 46 4.3.1 TwoLane Roads ................................................................................................................. 46 4.3.2 MultiLane Highway ........................................................................................................... 46 4.3.3 Freeways ............................................................................................................................ 47 4.3.4 Intersections ...................................................................................................................... 48 4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation .......................................................................................... 48 5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME .......................................................................................... 51 5.1 Background ................................................................................................................................ 51 5.2 Fundamental Considerations ..................................................................................................... 53 5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Activities Preceding Event 5 ................................................... 56 5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution .................................................................... 512 5.4.1 Statistical Outliers ............................................................................................................ 513 5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation ................................................................................. 516 5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas ................................................. 518 6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS ..................................................................... 61 7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) .......................................................... 71 7.1 Shadow Evacuation .................................................................................................................... 71 7.2 Staged Evacuation ...................................................................................................................... 71 Robinson Nuclear Plant i KLD Engineering, P.C.

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7.3 Patterns of Traffic Congestion during Evacuation ..................................................................... 72 7.4 Evacuation Rates ........................................................................................................................ 73 7.5 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Results .................................................................................... 73 7.6 Staged Evacuation Results ......................................................................................................... 75 7.7 Guidance on Using ETE Tables ................................................................................................... 76 8 TRANSITDEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ................................. 81 8.1 Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate ............................................................................ 82 8.2 School Population - Transit Demand ......................................................................................... 84 8.3 Medical Facility Demand ............................................................................................................ 84 8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People ....................................................... 84 8.5 Special Needs Population......................................................................................................... 810 9 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ................................................................................................... 91 10 EVACUATION ROUTES .................................................................................................................. 101 A. GLOSSARY OF TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TERMS .................................................................................. A1 B. DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MODEL ......................................................... B1 C. DYNEV TRAFFIC SIMULATION MODEL ............................................................................................... C1 C.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. C5 C.1.1 The Fundamental Diagram ................................................................................................. C5 C.1.2 The Simulation Model ........................................................................................................ C5 C.1.3 Lane Assignment .............................................................................................................. C12 C.2 Implementation ....................................................................................................................... C12 C.2.1 Computational Procedure ................................................................................................ C12 C.2.2 Interfacing with Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTRAD) ................................................... C15 APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................................................... D0 D. Detailed Description of Study Procedure ......................................................................................... D1 E. FACILITY DATA .................................................................................................................................... E1 F. TELEPHONE SURVEY ........................................................................................................................... F1 F.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... F1 F.2 Survey Instrument and Sampling Plan ....................................................................................... F2 F.3 Survey Results ............................................................................................................................ F3 F.3.1 Household Demographic Results ........................................................................................... F3 F.3.2 Evacuation Response ............................................................................................................. F8 F.3.3 Time Distribution Results ..................................................................................................... F10 F.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. F13 G. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN .......................................................................................................... G1 G.1 Traffic Control Points ................................................................................................................ G1 G.2 Access Control Points ................................................................................................................ G1 H. EVACUATION REGIONS ..................................................................................................................... H1 J. REPRESENTATIVE INPUTS TO AND OUTPUTS FROM THE DYNEV II SYSTEM ..................................... J1 Robinson Nuclear Plant ii KLD Engineering, P.C.

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K. EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK .................................................................................................. K1 L. ZONE BOUNDARIES ............................................................................................................................ L1 M. EVACUATION SENSITIVITY STUDIES ............................................................................................. M1 M.1 Effect of Changes in Trip Generation Times ............................................................................ M1 M.2 Effect of Changes in the Number of People in the Shadow Region Who Relocate ................. M2 M.3 Effect of Changes in EPZ Resident Population ......................................................................... M3 M.4 Effect of Additional Traffic Control Points on E Old Camden Rd ............................................. M5 N. ETE CRITERIA CHECKLIST ................................................................................................................... N1 Note: Appendix I intentionally skipped Robinson Nuclear Plant iii KLD Engineering, P.C.

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List of Figures Figure 11. RNP Location ........................................................................................................................... 14 Figure 12. RNP LinkNode Analysis Network ........................................................................................... 17 Figure 21. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology ....................................................................................... 24 Figure 31. RNP EPZ ................................................................................................................................... 33 Figure 32. Permanent Resident Population by Sector ............................................................................. 35 Figure 33. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector ................................................................................. 36 Figure 34. Shadow Population by Sector ................................................................................................. 38 Figure 35. Shadow Vehicles by Sector ..................................................................................................... 39 Figure 36. Transient Population by Sector............................................................................................. 312 Figure 37. Transient Vehicles by Sector ................................................................................................. 313 Figure 38. NonEPZ Employee Population by Sector ............................................................................. 316 Figure 39. NonEPZ Employee Vehicles by Sector ................................................................................. 317 Figure 41. Fundamental Diagrams ............................................................................................................ 49 Figure 51. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip .............................................................. 55 Figure 52. Evacuation Mobilization Activities ........................................................................................ 511 Figure 53. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution ...................................................... 515 Figure 54. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions....................................................................... 520 Figure 55. Comparison of Staged and Unstaged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region ................................................................................. 522 Figure 61. RNP Zones ............................................................................................................................... 68 Figure 71. Shadow Evacuation Methodology ........................................................................................ 717 Figure 72. RNP Shadow Region .............................................................................................................. 718 Figure 73. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate .................................... 719 Figure 74. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour after the Advisory to Evacuate ............................................ 720 Figure 75. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour and 50 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate .................. 721 Figure 76. Congestion Patterns at 2 Hours and 45 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ................ 722 Figure 77. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours after the Advisory to Evacuate .......................................... 723 Figure 78. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 1 for Region R03 ...................................................... 724 Figure 79. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 2 for Region R03 ...................................................... 724 Figure 710. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 3 for Region R03 .................................................... 725 Figure 711. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 4 for Region R03 .................................................... 725 Figure 712. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 5 for Region R03 .................................................... 726 Figure 713. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 6 for Region R03 .................................................... 726 Figure 714. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 7 for Region R03 .................................................... 727 Figure 715. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 8 for Region R03 .................................................... 727 Figure 716. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 9 for Region R03 .................................................... 728 Figure 717. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 10 for Region R03 .................................................. 728 Figure 718. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 11 for Region R03 .................................................. 729 Figure 719. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 12 for Region R03 .................................................. 729 Figure 720. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 13 for Region R03 .................................................. 730 Figure 721. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 14 for Region R03 .................................................. 730 Figure 81. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations ...................................................................... 812 Figure 82. TransitDependent Bus Routes ............................................................................................. 813 Figure 101. General Population and School Relocation Centers ........................................................... 102 Figure 102. Major Evacuation Routes .................................................................................................... 103 Robinson Nuclear Plant iv KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure B1. Flow Diagram of SimulationDTRAD Interface........................................................................ B5 Figure C1. Representative Analysis Network ........................................................................................... C4 Figure C2. Fundamental Diagrams ........................................................................................................... C6 Figure C3. A UNIT Problem Configuration with t1 > 0 .............................................................................. C6 Figure C4. Flow of Simulation Processing (See Glossary: Table C3) .................................................... C14 Figure D1. Flow Diagram of Activities ..................................................................................................... D5 Figure E1. Schools within the EPZ ............................................................................................................ E8 Figure E2. Preschools / Daycares within the EPZ ..................................................................................... E9 Figure E3. Preschools / Daycares within Downtown Hartsville ............................................................. E10 Figure E4. Medical Facilities within the EPZ .......................................................................................... E11 Figure E5. Major Employers within the EPZ............................................................................................ E12 Figure E6. Major Employers within Downtown Hartsville ...................................................................... E13 Figure E7. Recreational Areas within the EPZ ........................................................................................ E14 Figure F1. Household Size in the EPZ ....................................................................................................... F3 Figure F2. Household Vehicle Availability ................................................................................................ F4 Figure F3. Vehicle Availability 1 to 5 Person Households ...................................................................... F5 Figure F4. Vehicle Availability 6 to 9+ Person Households .................................................................... F5 Figure F5. Household Ridesharing Preference......................................................................................... F6 Figure F6. Commuters in Households in the EPZ ..................................................................................... F7 Figure F7. Modes of Travel in the EPZ ..................................................................................................... F8 Figure F8. Number of Vehicles Used for Evacuation ............................................................................... F9 Figure F9. Households Evacuating with Pets ........................................................................................... F9 Figure F10. Time Required to Prepare to Leave Work/School .............................................................. F11 Figure F11. Work to Home Travel Time ................................................................................................. F11 Figure F12. Time to Prepare Home for Evacuation................................................................................ F12 Figure F13. Time to Clear Driveway of 2"3" of Snow ........................................................................... F13 Figure G1. Traffic Control Points for the RNP Site .................................................................................. G2 Figure H1. Region R01 ............................................................................................................................. H4 Figure H2. Region R02 ............................................................................................................................. H5 Figure H3. Region R03 ............................................................................................................................. H6 Figure H4. Region R04 ............................................................................................................................. H7 Figure H5. Region R05 ............................................................................................................................. H8 Figure H6. Region R06 ............................................................................................................................. H9 Figure H7. Region R07 ........................................................................................................................... H10 Figure H8. Region R08 ........................................................................................................................... H11 Figure H9. Region R09 ........................................................................................................................... H12 Figure H10. Region R10 ......................................................................................................................... H13 Figure H11. Region R11 ......................................................................................................................... H14 Figure H12. Region R12 ......................................................................................................................... H15 Figure H13. Region R13 ......................................................................................................................... H16 Figure H14. Region R14 ......................................................................................................................... H17 Figure H15. Region R15 ......................................................................................................................... H18 Figure H16. Region R16 ......................................................................................................................... H19 Figure H17. Region R17 ......................................................................................................................... H20 Figure H18. Region R18 ......................................................................................................................... H21 Figure H19. Region R19 ......................................................................................................................... H22 Figure H20. Region R20 ......................................................................................................................... H23 Robinson Nuclear Plant v KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure H21. Region R21 ......................................................................................................................... H24 Figure H22. Region R22 ......................................................................................................................... H25 Figure H23. Region R23 ......................................................................................................................... H26 Figure H24. Region R24 ......................................................................................................................... H27 Figure H25. Region R25 ......................................................................................................................... H28 Figure H26. Region R26 ......................................................................................................................... H29 Figure H27. Region R27 ......................................................................................................................... H30 Figure H28. Region R28 ......................................................................................................................... H31 Figure H29. Region R29 ......................................................................................................................... H32 Figure H30. Region R30 ......................................................................................................................... H33 Figure H31. Region R31 ......................................................................................................................... H34 Figure H32. Region R32 ......................................................................................................................... H35 Figure J1. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 1) .............. J9 Figure J2. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) ............................... J9 Figure J3. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 3)............ J10 Figure J4. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) ............................ J10 Figure J5. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 5) ..................................................................................... J11 Figure J6. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 6) .............. J11 Figure J7. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) ............................... J12 Figure J8. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) ............................. J12 Figure J9. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 9) .............. J13 Figure J10. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) ........................... J13 Figure J11. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) ......................... J14 Figure J12. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 12) ................................................................................. J14 Figure J13. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter Weekend Midday, Good Weather, Special Event (Scenario 13) ........................................................................ J15 Figure J14. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14)................................................................... J15 Figure K1. RNP LinkNode Analysis Network ........................................................................................... K2 Figure K2. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 1 ..................................................................................... K3 Figure K3. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 2 ..................................................................................... K4 Figure K4. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 3 ..................................................................................... K5 Figure K5. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 4 ..................................................................................... K6 Figure K6. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 5 ..................................................................................... K7 Figure K7. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 6 ..................................................................................... K8 Figure K8. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 7 ..................................................................................... K9 Figure K9. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 8 ................................................................................... K10 Figure K10. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 9 ................................................................................. K11 Figure K11. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 10 ............................................................................... K12 Figure K12. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 11 ............................................................................... K13 Figure K13. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 12 ............................................................................... K14 Figure K14. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 13 ............................................................................... K15 Figure K15. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 14 ............................................................................... K16 Figure K16. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 15 ............................................................................... K17 Figure K17. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 16 ............................................................................... K18 Robinson Nuclear Plant vi KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure K18. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 17 ............................................................................... K19 Figure K19. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 18 ............................................................................... K20 Figure K20. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 19 ............................................................................... K21 Figure K21. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 20 ............................................................................... K22 Figure K22. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 21 ............................................................................... K23 Figure K23. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 22 ............................................................................... K24 Figure K24. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 23 ............................................................................... K25 Figure K25. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 24 ............................................................................... K26 Figure K26. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 25 ............................................................................... K27 Figure K27. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 26 ............................................................................... K28 Figure K28. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 27 ............................................................................... K29 Figure K29. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 28 ............................................................................... K30 Figure K30. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 29 ............................................................................... K31 Figure K31. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 30 ............................................................................... K32 Figure K32. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 31 ............................................................................... K33 Figure K33. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 32 ............................................................................... K34 Figure K34. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 33 ............................................................................... K35 Figure K35. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 34 ............................................................................... K36 Figure K36. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 35 ............................................................................... K37 Figure K37. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 36 ............................................................................... K38 Figure K38. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 37 ............................................................................... K39 Figure K39. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 38 ............................................................................... K40 Figure K40. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 39 ............................................................................... K41 Figure K41. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 40 ............................................................................... K42 Figure K42. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 41 ............................................................................... K43 Figure K43. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 42 ............................................................................... K44 Figure K44. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 43 ............................................................................... K45 Figure K45. LinkNode Analysis Network - Grid 44 ............................................................................... K46 Robinson Nuclear Plant vii KLD Engineering, P.C.

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List of Tables Table 11. Stakeholder Interaction ........................................................................................................... 11 Table 12. Highway Characteristics ........................................................................................................... 15 Table 13. ETE Study Comparisons ............................................................................................................ 19 Table 21. Evacuation Scenario Definitions............................................................................................... 23 Table 22. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather................................................................................. 27 Table 31. EPZ Permanent Resident Population ....................................................................................... 34 Table 32. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by Zone ........................................................... 34 Table 33. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector ............................................................................. 37 Table 34. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles ..................................................................... 311 Table 35. Summary of NonEPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles...................................... 315 Table 36. RNP EPZ External Traffic ......................................................................................................... 319 Table 37. Summary of Population Demand ........................................................................................... 321 Table 38. Summary of Vehicle Demand ................................................................................................. 322 Table 51. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities ................................................................................ 53 Table 52. Time Distribution for Notifying the Public ............................................................................... 56 Table 53. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work ................................................... 57 Table 54. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel Home .................................................................. 58 Table 55. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to Evacuate ....................................................... 59 Table 56. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 23" of Snow ........................................................ 510 Table 57. Mapping Distributions to Events ............................................................................................ 512 Table 58. Description of the Distributions ............................................................................................. 513 Table 59. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Unstaged Evacuation ..................... 519 Table 510. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation ....................... 521 Table 61. Description of Evacuation Regions........................................................................................... 66 Table 62. Evacuation Scenario Definitions............................................................................................... 69 Table 63. Percent of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios .......................................... 610 Table 64. Vehicle Estimates by Scenario................................................................................................ 611 Table 71. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population ........................... 79 Table 72. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population ....................... 711 Table 73. Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2Mile Area within the Indicated Region ............................ 713 Table 74. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2Mile Area within the Indicated Region .......................... 714 Table 75. Description of Evacuation Regions......................................................................................... 715 Table 81. TransitDependent Population Estimates .............................................................................. 814 Table 82. School and Daycare Population Demand Estimates .............................................................. 815 Table 83. School Relocation Centers ..................................................................................................... 817 Table 84. Medical Facility Transit Demand ............................................................................................ 819 Table 85. Summary of Transportation Resources .................................................................................. 820 Table 86. Bus Route Descriptions .......................................................................................................... 821 Table 87. School Evacuation Time Estimates Good Weather .............................................................. 822 Table 88. School Evacuation Time Estimates Rain............................................................................... 823 Table 89. School Evacuation Time Estimates Snow ............................................................................. 824 Table 810. Summary of TransitDependent Bus Routes ........................................................................ 825 Table 811. TransitDependent Evacuation Time Estimates Good Weather ........................................ 826 Table 812. TransitDependent Evacuation Time Estimates Rain ......................................................... 827 Table 813. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates Snow ....................................................... 828 Robinson Nuclear Plant viii KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 814. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates Good Weather ............................................. 829 Table 815. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates Rain .............................................................. 830 Table 816. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates Snow ............................................................ 831 Table 817. Homebound Special Needs Population Evacuation Time Estimates .................................... 832 Table 818. Homebound Special Needs Persons Evacuation Time Estimates Second Wave for Ambulatory ............................................................................................... 832 Table A1. Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms .................................................................................... A1 Table C1. Selected Measures of Effectiveness Output by DYNEV II ........................................................ C2 Table C2. Input Requirements for the DYNEV II Model ........................................................................... C3 Table C3. Glossary ....................................................................................................................................C7 Table E1. Schools within the EPZ ............................................................................................................. E2 Table E2. Preschools and Daycares within the EPZ ................................................................................. E3 Table E3. Medical Facilities within the EPZ .............................................................................................. E5 Table E4. Major Employers within the EPZ .............................................................................................. E6 Table E5. Recreational Areas and Lodging within the EPZ....................................................................... E7 Table F1. RNP Telephone Survey Sampling Plan...................................................................................... F2 Table H1. Percent of Zone Population Evacuating for Each Region ....................................................... H2 Table J1. Characteristics of the Ten Highest Volume Signalized Intersections........................................ J2 Table J2. Sample Simulation Model Input ............................................................................................... J3 Table J3. Selected Model Outputs for the Evacuation of the Entire EPZ (Region R03) ........................... J4 Table J4. Average Speed (mph) and Travel Time (min) for Major Evacuation Routes (Region R03, Scenario 1) ................................................................. J5 Table J5. Simulation Model Outputs at Network Exit Links for Region R03, Scenario 1 ......................... J7 Table K1. Evacuation Roadway Network Characteristics ...................................................................... K47 Table K2. Nodes in the LinkNode Analysis Network which are Controlled ........................................... K67 Table M1. Evacuation Time Estimates for Trip Generation Sensitivity Study ....................................... M1 Table M2. Evacuation Time Estimates for Shadow Sensitivity Study .................................................... M2 Table M3. ETE Variation with Population Change Scenario 6 ............................................................... M4 Table M3. ETE Variation with Population Change Scenario 8 ............................................................... M4 Table M4: Effect on ETE of Two Additional TCPs .................................................................................... M5 Table N1. ETE Review Criteria Checklist ................................................................................................. N1 Robinson Nuclear Plant ix KLD Engineering, P.C.

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to develop Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) located in Darlington County, South Carolina. ETE provide Progress Energy and State and local governments with sitespecific information needed for Protective Action decisionmaking.

In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are:

Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies, NUREG/CR7002, November 2011.

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG0654/FEMAREP1, Rev. 1, November 1980.

Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR6863, January 2005.

Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Overview of Project Activities This project began in April, 2012 and extended over a period of 6 months. The major activities performed are briefly described in chronological sequence:

Attended kickoff meetings with Progress Energy personnel and emergency management personnel representing state and county governments.

Accessed U.S. Census Bureau data files for the year 2010.

Studied Geographical Information Systems (GIS) maps of the area in the vicinity of the RNP, then conducted a detailed field survey of the highway network.

Synthesized this information to create an analysis network representing the highway system topology and capacities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), plus a Shadow Region covering the region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles radially from the plant.

Designed and sponsored a telephone survey of residents within the EPZ to gather focused data needed for this ETE study that were not contained within the census database. The survey instrument was reviewed and modified by the licensee and offsite response organization (ORO) personnel prior to the survey.

Data collection forms (provided to the OROs at the kickoff meeting) were returned with data pertaining to employment, transients, and special facilities in each county.

Telephone calls to specific facilities supplemented the data provided.

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The traffic demand and tripgeneration rates of evacuating vehicles were estimated from the gathered data. The trip generation rates reflected the estimated mobilization time (i.e., the time required by evacuees to prepare for the evacuation trip) computed using the results of the telephone survey of EPZ residents.

Following federal guidelines, the EPZ is subdivided into 11 zones. These zones are then grouped within circular areas or keyhole configurations (circles plus radial sectors) that define a total of 32 Evacuation Regions.

The timevarying external circumstances are represented as Evacuation Scenarios, each described in terms of the following factors: (1) Season (Summer, Winter); (2) Day of Week (Midweek, Weekend); (3) Time of Day (Midday, Evening); and (4) Weather (Good, Rain, Snow). One special event scenario involving a NASCAR race and related activities, at the Darlington Raceway, was considered. One roadway impact scenario was considered wherein a section of SR 151 was closed southbound for the duration of the evacuation.

Staged evacuation was considered for those regions wherein the 2 mile radius and sectors downwind to 5 miles were evacuated.

As per NUREG/CR7002, the Planning Basis for the calculation of ETE is:

A rapidly escalating event at the plant wherein evacuation is ordered promptly and no early protective actions have been implemented.

While an unlikely accident scenario, this planning basis will yield ETE, measured as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the stated percentage of the population exits the impacted Region, that represent upper bound estimates. This conservative Planning Basis is applicable for all initiating events.

If the emergency occurs while schools are in session, the ETE study assumes that the children will be evacuated by bus directly to reception centers or host schools located outside the EPZ. Parents, relatives, and neighbors are advised to not pick up their children at school prior to the arrival of the buses dispatched for that purpose. The ETE for schoolchildren are calculated separately.

Evacuees who do not have access to a private vehicle will either rideshare with relatives, friends or neighbors, or be evacuated by buses provided as specified in the county evacuation plans. Those in special facilities will likewise be evacuated with public transit, as needed: bus, van, or ambulance, as required. Separate ETE are calculated for the transitdependent evacuees, for homebound special needs population, and for those evacuated from special facilities.

Computation of ETE A total of 448 ETE were computed for the evacuation of the general public. Each ETE quantifies the aggregate evacuation time estimated for the population within one of the 32 Evacuation Regions to evacuate from that Region, under the circumstances defined for one of the 14 Evacuation Scenarios (32 x 14 = 448). Separate ETE are calculated for transitdependent Robinson Nuclear Plant ES2 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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evacuees, including schoolchildren for applicable scenarios.

Except for Region R03, which is the evacuation of the entire EPZ, only a portion of the people within the EPZ would be advised to evacuate. That is, the Advisory to Evacuate applies only to those people occupying the specified impacted region. It is assumed that 100 percent of the people within the impacted region will evacuate in response to this Advisory. The people occupying the remainder of the EPZ outside the impacted region may be advised to take shelter.

The computation of ETE assumes that 20% of the population within the EPZ but outside the impacted region, will elect to voluntarily evacuate. In addition, 20% of the population in the Shadow Region will also elect to evacuate. These voluntary evacuees could impede those who are evacuating from within the impacted region. The impedance that could be caused by voluntary evacuees is considered in the computation of ETE for the impacted region.

Staged evacuation is considered wherein those people within the 2mile region evacuate immediately, while those beyond 2 miles, but within the EPZ, shelterinplace. Once 90% of the 2mile region is evacuated, those people beyond 2 miles begin to evacuate. As per federal guidance, 20% of people beyond 2 miles will evacuate even though they are advised to shelter inplace.

The computational procedure is outlined as follows:

A linknode representation of the highway network is coded. Each link represents a unidirectional length of highway; each node usually represents an intersection or merge point. The capacity of each link is estimated based on the field survey observations and on established traffic engineering procedures.

The evacuation trips are generated at locations called zonal centroids located within the EPZ and Shadow Region. The trip generation rates vary over time reflecting the mobilization process, and from one location (centroid) to another depending on population density and on whether a centroid is within, or outside, the impacted area.

The evacuation model computes the routing patterns for evacuating vehicles that are compliant with federal guidelines (outbound relative to the location of the plant), then simulate the traffic flow movements over space and time. This simulation process estimates the rate that traffic flow exits the impacted region.

The ETE statistics provide the elapsed times for 90 percent and 100 percent, respectively, of the population within the impacted region, to evacuate from within the impacted region. These statistics are presented in tabular and graphical formats. The 90th percentile ETE have been identified as the values that should be considered when making protective action decisions because the 100th percentile ETE are prolonged by those relatively few people who take longer to mobilize. This is referred to as the evacuation tail in Section 4.0 of NUREG/CR7002.

Traffic Management This study references the comprehensive traffic management plans provided by Darlington, Chesterfield and Lee Counties, and identifies critical intersections. The existing TCPs are well placed and adequate. Two additional locations were evaluated (see Section 9 and Appendix M).

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Selected Results A compilation of selected information is presented on the following pages in the form of Figures and Tables extracted from the body of the report; these are described below.

Figure 61 displays a map of the RNP EPZ showing the layout of the 11 zones that comprise, in aggregate, the EPZ.

Table 31 presents the estimates of permanent resident population in each zone based on the 2010 Census data.

Table 61 defines each of the 32 Evacuation Regions in terms of their respective groups of zones.

Table 62 lists the Evacuation Scenarios.

Tables 71 and 72 are compilations of ETE. These data are the times needed to clear the indicated regions of 90 and 100 percent of the population occupying these regions, respectively, for the general population. These computed ETE include consideration of mobilization time and of estimated voluntary evacuations from other regions within the EPZ and from the Shadow Region.

Tables 73 and 74 present ETE for the 2mile region for unstaged and staged evacuations for the 90th and 100th percentiles, respectively.

Tables 87, 88, and 89 present ETE for the schoolchildren in good weather, rain and snow respectively.

Tables 811, 812 and 813 present ETE for the transitdependent population in good weather, rain and snow respectively.

Figure H8 presents an example of an Evacuation Region (Region R08) to be evacuated under the circumstances defined in Table 61. Maps of all regions are provided in Appendix H.

Conclusions General population ETE were computed for 448 unique cases - a combination of 32 unique Evacuation Regions and 14 unique Evacuation Scenarios. Table 71 and Table 72 document these ETE for the 90th and 100th percentiles. These ETE range from 1:50 (hr:min) to 3:15 at the 90th percentile.

Inspection of Table 71 and Table 72 indicates that the ETE for the 100th percentile are significantly longer than those for the 90th percentile. There are two factors that contribute to this large difference. Firstly, the population trip generation curves have a long tail due to the fact that a small number of people take a long time to complete all the activities necessary to start their trip. Secondly there is congestion within the EPZ.

When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ at rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand.

See Figures 78 through 721.

Inspection of Table 73 and Table 74 indicates that a staged evacuation provides no benefits to evacuees from within the 2 mile region and unnecessarily delays the Robinson Nuclear Plant ES4 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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evacuation of those beyond 2 miles (compare Regions R04 through R10 with R25 through R31 and R02 with R32 in Tables 71 and 72). See Section 7.6 for additional discussion.

Comparison of Scenarios 9 (winter, weekend, midday, good weather) and 13 (winter, weekend, midday, good weather, special event) in Table 72 indicates that the special event does not materially affect the ETE, although it does create significant and prolonged congestion outside of the EPZ. See Section 7.5 for additional discussion.

Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 71 indicates that the roadway closure -

closure of the section of SR 151 southbound between Bethel Road and Faith Road - can increase the 90th percentile ETE by up to 15 minutes for evacuation of the more populous regions. For most regions, however, there is sufficient capacity on neighboring routes to accommodate the evacuating flow.

Routes out of the EPZ from Hartsville and North Hartsville carry the most traffic, in particular SR 151. The traffic control points on SR 151 are very important, given the demand for that route. The congestion patterns are described in Section 7.3 and shown in Figures 73 through 77.

Separate ETE were computed for schools, medical facilities, transitdependent persons, and homebound special needs persons. The average singlewave ETE for these facilities are within a similar range as the general population ETE at the 90th percentile. See Section 8.

Table 85 indicates that there are enough buses available to evacuate the schools in a single wave; however there are not enough buses to evacuate the schools, daycares and transit dependents in a single wave. See Sections 8.4 and 8.5.

There are insufficient ambulances available to evacuate the bedridden patients at medical facilities in a single wave. See Table 85.

The general population ETE at the 90th percentile is insensitive to reductions in the base trip generation time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 15 minutes due to the traffic congestion within the EPZ.

See Table M1. The 100th percentile ETE is shortened when the trip generation time is reduced.

The general population ETE is insensitive to the voluntary evacuation of vehicles in the Shadow Region. See Table M2.

Population changes of +40 to 50% results in ETE changes that meet the criteria for updating ETE between decennial Censuses in Scenario 6 and Scenario 8. See Section M.3.

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Figure 61. RNP Zones Robinson Nuclear Plant ES6 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 31. EPZ Permanent Resident Population Subarea 2000 Population 2010 Population A0 2,161 2,281 A1 670 669 A2 852 1,426 B1 12,721 16,584 B2 8,998 5,645 C1 2,555 2,578 C2 1,903 1,931 D1 1,039 1,114 D2 1,409 1,196 E1 295 396 E2 1,931 2,106 TOTAL 34,534 35,927 EPZ Population Growth: 4.03%

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Table 61. Description of Evacuation Regions Zone Wind Direction Region Description From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 R01 2Mile Ring N/A X R02 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X R03 Full EPZ N/A X X X X X X X X X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R04 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R05 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R06 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R07 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R08 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R08) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R09 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R10 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary R11 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X R12 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X R13 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X R14 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X R15 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X (R15) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X R16 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X R17 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X Evacuate 5Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R18 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X X X R19 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X X X R20 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X X X X R21 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X X X R22 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X X X (R22) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X X X R23 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X X X R24 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X X X X Robinson Nuclear Plant ES8 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R25 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R26 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R27 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R28 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R29 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R29) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R30 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R31 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X R32 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) Evacuate until 90% ETE for R01, then Evacuate Note: Regions that are repeated for a different wind direction are written in parentheses Robinson Nuclear Plant ES9 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 62. Evacuation Scenario Definitions Day of Time of Scenario Season1 Week Day Weather Special 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None Midweek, 5 Summer Weekend Evening Good None 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None Midweek, 12 Winter Weekend Evening Good None 13 Winter Weekend Midday Good Darlington NASCAR Race Roadway Impact -

Roadway Closure on SR 14 Summer Midweek Midday Good 151 Southbound 1

Winter means that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer means that school is not in session.

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Table 71. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2Mile Region, 5Mile Region, and EPZ R01 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R02 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R03 2:30 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:15 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:30 2:30 2:50 2:15 2:35 2:45 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R05 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:50 2:00 2:05 R06 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R07 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:50 2:00 2:05 R08 2:10 2:15 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 2:00 2:00 2:20 1:50 2:00 2:10 R09 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R10 2:05 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:05 2Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R11 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:15 2:35 2:45 R12 2:10 2:10 2:05 2:05 1:55 2:10 2:10 2:25 2:05 2:05 2:20 1:55 2:05 2:20 R13 2:10 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:10 2:10 2:20 2:05 2:05 2:20 2:00 2:05 2:15 R14 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:10 2:20 2:00 2:05 2:15 1:55 2:00 2:05 R15 2:30 2:40 2:20 2:25 2:10 2:30 2:40 3:05 2:20 2:25 2:45 2:10 2:55 2:40 R16 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:50 2:10 2:30 2:45 R17 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:15 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:15 2:35 2:45 5Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R18 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:10 2:30 2:45 R19 2:10 2:20 2:00 2:05 1:50 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:00 2:05 2:25 1:50 2:00 2:30 R20 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 1:55 2:10 2:20 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:30 1:55 2:05 2:20 R21 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:10 2:20 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:25 2:00 2:05 2:15 R22 2:30 2:40 2:20 2:25 2:10 2:30 2:40 3:05 2:20 2:25 2:45 2:10 2:45 2:40 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES11 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact R23 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:50 2:10 2:30 2:45 R24 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:10 2:30 2:45 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R25 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:45 2:45 R26 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:20 R27 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:35 2:15 2:15 2:35 2:20 2:15 2:15 R28 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:15 R29 2:45 2:50 2:45 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:50 3:10 2:45 2:50 3:10 2:45 2:45 2:45 R30 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 2:45 R31 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:55 3:15 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 2:45 R32 2:40 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:40 2:45 3:00 2:45 2:45 3:00 2:45 2:45 2:40 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES12 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 72. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2Mile Region, 5Mile Region, and EPZ R01 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 R02 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R03 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:35 4:50 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R05 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R06 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R07 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R08 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R09 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R10 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 2Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R11 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:45 R12 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R13 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R14 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:35 4:30 R16 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 R17 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 5Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R18 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 R19 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R20 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R21 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R22 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES13 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact R23 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:45 R24 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R25 4:25 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 4:25 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 R26 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R27 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R28 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R29 4:25 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 R30 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 R31 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 R32 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES14 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 73. Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2Mile Region within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region 5Mile Region R01 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R02 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R04 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R05 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R06 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R07 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R08 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R09 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R10 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R25 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R26 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R27 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R28 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R30 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R31 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R32 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES15 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 74. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2Mile Region within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region 5Mile Region R01 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 R02 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R04 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R05 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R06 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R07 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:15 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R08 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R09 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R10 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R26 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R27 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R28 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R29 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R31 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R32 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES16 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 87. School Evacuation Time Estimates - Good Weather Travel Time Travel Dist. EPZ from EPZ Driver Loading Dist. To Average Time to Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time EPZ Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 90 15 3.9 45.0 5 1:50 19.2 26 2:20 McBee High School 90 15 3.4 45.0 5 1:50 19.2 26 2:20 McBee Headstart 90 15 7.4 45.0 10 1:55 19.2 26 2:25 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 90 15 15.5 39.5 24 2:10 18.2 24 2:35 Carolina Elementary School 90 15 9.9 39.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 North Hartsville Elementary School 90 15 10.2 39.0 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 First Presbyterian Church School 90 15 9.2 38.2 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Hartsville Middle School 90 15 9.5 38.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Hartsville Senior High School 90 15 9.3 38.6 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Washington Street Elementary School 90 15 8.5 38.6 13 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Southside Early Childhood Center 90 15 7.0 15.5 27 2:15 18.2 24 2:40 1st Baptist Church Preschool 90 15 9.1 37.9 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Coker College 90 15 9.4 41.1 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Thornwell School for the Arts 90 15 11.4 42.1 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Governor's School for Science & Math 90 15 9.5 40.3 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Eastside Christian Academy 90 15 11.1 42.1 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Emmanuel Christian School 90 15 11.5 42.0 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Calvary Christian School 90 15 1.9 45.0 3 1:50 14.7 20 2:10 Forest Hills Academy 90 15 10.2 43.2 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 West Hartsville Elementary School 90 15 10.8 43.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Thomas Hart Academy 90 15 5.1 43.2 7 1:55 18.2 24 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 2:15 Maximum: 2:40 Average for EPZ: 2:00 Average: 2:25 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES17 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 88. School Evacuation Time Estimates Rain Travel Time Travel Dist. EPZ from EPZ Driver Loading Dist. To Average Time to Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time EPZ Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 100 20 3.9 40.0 6 2:10 19.2 29 2:40 McBee High School 100 20 3.4 40.0 5 2:05 19.2 29 2:35 McBee Headstart 100 20 7.4 40.0 11 2:15 19.2 29 2:45 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 100 20 15.5 36.0 26 2:30 18.2 27 3:00 Carolina Elementary School 100 20 9.9 34.8 17 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 North Hartsville Elementary School 100 20 10.2 34.9 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 First Presbyterian Church School 100 20 9.2 35.1 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Hartsville Middle School 100 20 9.5 35.1 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Hartsville Senior High School 100 20 9.3 35.4 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Washington Street Elementary School 100 20 8.5 34.2 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Southside Early Childhood Center 100 20 7.0 12.8 33 2:35 18.2 27 3:05 1st Baptist Church Preschool 100 20 9.1 34.9 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Coker College 100 20 9.4 38.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Thornwell School for the Arts 100 20 11.4 38.5 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Governor's School for Science & Math 100 20 9.5 38.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Eastside Christian Academy 100 20 11.1 38.5 17 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Emmanuel Christian School 100 20 11.5 38.3 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Calvary Christian School 100 20 1.9 40.0 3 2:05 14.7 22 2:30 Forest Hills Academy 100 20 10.2 40.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 West Hartsville Elementary School 100 20 10.8 40.0 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Thomas Hart Academy 100 20 5.1 40.0 8 2:10 18.2 27 2:40 Maximum for EPZ: 2:35 Maximum: 3:05 Average for EPZ: 2:20 Average: 2:50 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES18 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 89. School Evacuation Time Estimates Snow Travel Time Travel Dist. EPZ from EPZ Driver Loading Dist. To Average Time to Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time EPZ Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 110 25 3.9 33.1 7 2:25 19.2 33 3:00 McBee High School 110 25 3.4 33.1 6 2:25 19.2 33 3:00 McBee Headstart 110 25 7.4 31.7 14 2:30 19.2 33 3:05 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 110 25 15.5 32.7 28 2:45 18.2 31 3:20 Carolina Elementary School 110 25 9.9 31.5 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 North Hartsville Elementary School 110 25 10.2 31.6 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 First Presbyterian Church School 110 25 9.2 31.6 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Hartsville Middle School 110 25 9.5 31.6 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Hartsville Senior High School 110 25 9.3 31.8 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Washington Street Elementary School 110 25 8.5 31.8 16 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Southside Early Childhood Center 110 25 7.0 10.9 38 2:55 18.2 31 3:30 1st Baptist Church Preschool 110 25 9.1 31.5 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Coker College 110 25 9.4 33.4 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Thornwell School for the Arts 110 25 11.4 33.7 20 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Governor's School for Science & Math 110 25 9.5 33.3 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Eastside Christian Academy 110 25 11.1 33.4 20 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Emmanuel Christian School 110 25 11.5 33.5 21 2:40 18.2 31 3:15 Calvary Christian School 110 25 1.9 35.0 3 2:20 14.7 25 2:45 Forest Hills Academy 110 25 10.2 34.9 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 West Hartsville Elementary School 110 25 10.8 34.9 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Thomas Hart Academy 110 25 5.1 35.0 9 2:25 18.2 31 3:00 Maximum for EPZ: 2:55 Maximum: 3:30 Average for EPZ: 2:35 Average: 3:10 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES19 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 811. TransitDependent Evacuation Time Estimates - Good Weather OneWave TwoWave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 4 90 10.4 17.4 36 30 2:40 14.7 20 5 10 49 30 4:35 1

3 105 10.4 18.1 34 30 2:50 14.7 20 5 10 49 30 4:45 3 90 13.7 16.7 49 30 2:50 14.7 20 5 10 58 30 4:55 2

2 105 13.7 17.6 47 30 3:05 14.7 20 5 10 58 30 5:10 2 90 12.8 17.7 43 30 2:45 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 4:50 3

1 105 12.8 18.4 42 30 3:00 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 5:05 2 90 5.5 40.0 8 30 2:10 14.7 20 5 10 35 30 3:50 4

1 105 5.5 40.0 8 30 2:25 14.7 20 5 10 35 30 4:05 1 90 6.5 40.0 10 30 2:10 14.7 20 5 10 38 30 3:55 5

1 105 6.5 40.0 10 30 2:25 14.7 20 5 10 38 30 4:10 2 90 7.2 40.0 11 30 2:15 14.7 20 5 10 40 30 4:00 6

1 105 7.2 40.0 11 30 2:30 14.7 20 5 10 41 30 4:20 1 90 4.3 5.8 44 30 2:45 14.3 19 5 10 31 30 4:25 7

1 105 4.3 7.5 34 30 2:50 14.3 19 5 10 31 30 4:30 8 1 90 7.9 9.8 49 30 2:50 14.3 19 5 10 41 30 4:40 3 90 13.0 20.0 39 30 2:40 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 4:45 9

2 105 13.0 20.9 37 30 2:55 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 5:00 4 90 14.3 15.8 54 30 2:55 14.7 20 5 10 60 30 5:00 10 3 105 14.3 16.2 53 30 3:10 14.7 20 5 10 60 30 5:15 3 90 5.8 20.4 17 30 2:20 14.7 20 5 10 36 30 4:05 11 2 105 5.8 23.2 15 30 2:30 14.7 20 5 10 36 30 4:15 Maximum ETE: 3:10 Maximum ETE: 5:15 Average ETE: 2:40 Average ETE: 4:35 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES20 KLD Engineering, P.C.

Evacuation Time Estimate Rev. 1

Table 812. TransitDependent Evacuation Time Estimates Rain OneWave TwoWave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 4 100 10.4 14.5 43 40 3:05 14.7 22 5 10 52 40 5:15 1

3 115 10.4 14.8 42 40 3:20 14.7 22 5 10 52 40 5:30 3 100 13.7 13.9 59 40 3:20 14.7 22 5 10 62 40 5:40 2

2 115 13.7 14.6 56 40 3:35 14.7 22 5 10 62 40 5:55 2 100 12.8 14.7 52 40 3:15 14.7 22 5 10 58 40 5:35 3

1 115 12.8 15.0 51 40 3:30 14.7 22 5 10 58 40 5:50 2 100 5.5 40.0 8 40 2:30 14.7 22 5 10 38 40 4:30 4

1 115 5.5 40.0 8 40 2:45 14.7 22 5 10 38 40 4:45 1 100 6.5 39.5 10 40 2:30 14.7 22 5 10 41 40 4:30 5

1 115 6.5 40.0 10 40 2:45 14.7 22 5 10 41 40 4:45 2 100 7.2 40.0 11 40 2:35 14.7 22 5 10 43 40 4:40 6

1 115 7.2 40.0 11 40 2:50 14.7 22 5 10 42 40 4:50 1 100 4.3 6.8 38 40 3:00 14.3 21 5 10 34 40 4:55 7

1 115 4.3 9.3 28 40 3:05 14.3 21 5 10 34 40 5:00 8 1 100 7.9 12.0 39 40 3:00 14.3 21 5 10 44 40 5:05 3 100 13.0 16.7 47 40 3:10 14.7 22 5 10 59 40 5:30 9

2 115 13.0 17.3 45 40 3:20 14.7 22 5 10 59 40 5:40 4 100 14.3 13.3 64 40 3:25 14.7 22 5 10 66 40 5:50 10 3 115 14.3 14.0 61 40 3:40 14.7 22 5 10 66 40 6:05 3 100 5.8 22.2 16 40 2:40 14.7 22 5 10 38 40 4:40 11 2 115 5.8 34.7 10 40 2:45 14.7 22 5 10 38 40 4:45 Maximum ETE: 3:40 Maximum ETE: 6:05 Average ETE: 3:05 Average ETE: 5:15 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES21 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 813. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates Snow OneWave TwoWave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 4 110 10.4 12.4 50 50 3:30 14.7 25 5 10 57 50 6:00 1

3 125 10.4 12.6 49 50 3:45 14.7 25 5 10 57 50 6:15 3 110 13.7 12.5 66 50 3:50 14.7 25 5 10 67 50 6:30 2

2 125 13.7 13.0 63 50 4:00 14.7 25 5 10 68 50 6:40 2 110 12.8 12.7 61 50 3:45 14.7 25 5 10 64 50 6:20 3

1 125 12.8 13.2 58 50 3:55 14.7 25 5 10 64 50 6:30 2 110 5.5 35.0 9 50 2:50 14.7 25 5 10 42 50 5:05 4

1 125 5.5 35.0 9 50 3:05 14.7 25 5 10 42 50 5:20 1 110 6.5 35.0 11 50 2:55 14.7 25 5 10 45 50 5:15 5

1 125 6.5 35.0 11 50 3:10 14.7 25 5 10 46 50 5:30 2 110 7.2 35.0 12 50 2:55 14.7 25 5 10 47 50 5:15 6

1 125 7.2 34.7 12 50 3:10 14.7 25 5 10 47 50 5:30 1 110 4.3 8.7 30 50 3:10 14.3 25 5 10 38 50 5:20 7

1 125 4.3 14.5 18 50 3:15 14.3 25 5 10 38 50 5:25 8 1 110 7.9 14.2 33 50 3:15 14.3 25 5 10 49 50 5:35 3 110 13.0 14.3 55 50 3:35 14.7 25 5 10 65 50 6:15 9

2 125 13.0 14.7 53 50 3:50 14.7 25 5 10 65 50 6:30 4 110 14.3 11.9 72 50 3:55 14.7 25 5 10 71 50 6:40 10 3 125 14.3 12.4 69 50 4:05 14.7 25 5 10 72 50 6:50 3 110 5.8 35.0 10 50 2:50 14.7 25 5 10 43 50 5:05 11 2 125 5.8 35.0 10 50 3:05 14.7 25 5 10 43 50 5:20 Maximum ETE: 4:05 Maximum ETE: 6:50 Average ETE: 3:25 Average ETE: 5:55 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES22 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure H8. Region R08 Robinson Nuclear Plant ES23 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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1 INTRODUCTION This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to develop Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP), also known as the H. B.

Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, located in Darlington County, South Carolina. ETE provide Progress Energy and State and local governments with sitespecific information needed for Protective Action decisionmaking.

In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are:

Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies, NUREG/CR7002, November 2011.

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1, November 1980.

Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR 6863, January 2005.

Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

The work effort reported herein was supported and guided by local stakeholders who contributed suggestions, critiques, and the local knowledge base required. Table 11 presents a summary of stakeholders and interactions.

Table 11. Stakeholder Interaction Stakeholder Nature of Stakeholder Interaction Kickoff meeting to define data requirements and set up contacts with local government agencies.

Progress Energy acted as point of contact for data Progress Energy emergency planning personnel collection and reviewed and approved study assumptions. Final meeting to present results and solicit comments. Comments provided were addressed.

Kickoff meeting to define data requirements.

Counties reviewed and approved study Chesterfield, Darlington, Florence and Lee County assumptions. Final meeting to present results and Emergency Management Divisions solicit comments. Comments provided were addressed.

Kickoff meeting to define data requirements. Final SC Emergency Management Division, SC meeting to present results and solicit comments.

Department of Health and Environmental Control Comments provided were addressed.

Other agencies (e.g. GIS departments) Communication to define data requirements Robinson Nuclear Plant 11 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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1.1 Overview of the ETE Process The following outline presents a brief description of the work effort in chronological sequence:

1. Information Gathering:

a. Defined the scope of work in discussions with representatives from Progress Energy.

b. Attended meetings with emergency planners from Darlington, Chesterfield, Lee and Florence County Emergency Management Divisions as well as SC EMD and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC DHEC) to identify issues to be addressed and resources available.

c. Conducted a detailed field survey of the highway system and of area traffic conditions within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ1) and Shadow Region.

d. Obtained demographic data from the 2010 census and Chesterfield, Darlington and Lee County agencies.

e. Conducted a random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents.

f. Conducted a data collection effort to identify and describe schools, special facilities, major employers, transportation providers, and other important information.

2. Estimated distributions of Trip Generation times representing the time required by various population groups (permanent residents, employees, and transients) to prepare (mobilize) for the evacuation trip. These estimates are primarily based upon the random sample telephone survey.

3. Defined Evacuation Scenarios. These scenarios reflect the variation in demand, in trip generation distribution and in highway capacities, associated with different seasons, day of week, time of day and weather conditions.

4. Reviewed the existing traffic management plan to be implemented by local and state police in the event of an incident at the plant. Traffic control is applied at specified Traffic Control Points (TCPs) located within the EPZ.

5. Used existing Zones to define Evacuation Regions. The EPZ is partitioned into 11 Zones along jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. Regions are groups of contiguous Zones for which ETE are calculated. The configurations of these Regions reflect wind direction and the radial extent of the impacted area. Each Region, other than those that approximate circular areas, approximates a keyhole section within the EPZ as recommended by NUREG/CR7002.

6. Estimated demand for transit services for persons at Special Facilities and for transit dependent persons at home.

1 All references to EPZ refer to the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

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7. Prepared the input streams for the DYNEV II system which computes the ETE (see Appendices B and C).

a. Estimated the evacuation traffic demand, based on the available information derived from Census data, and from data provided by local and state agencies, Progress Energy and from the telephone survey.

b. Applied the procedures specified in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM2) to the data acquired during the field survey, to estimate the capacity of all highway segments comprising the evacuation routes.

c. Developed the linknode representation of the evacuation network, which is used as the basis for the computer analysis that calculates the ETE.

d. Calculated the evacuating traffic demand for each Region and for each Scenario.

e. Specified selected candidate destinations for each origin (location of each source where evacuation trips are generated over the mobilization time) to support evacuation travel consistent with outbound movement relative to the location of the Robinson Nuclear Plant.

8. Executed the DYNEV II model to determine optimal evacuation routing and compute ETE for all residents, transients and employees (general population) with access to private vehicles. Generated a complete set of ETE for all specified Regions and Scenarios.

9. Documented ETE in formats in accordance with NUREG/CR7002.

10. Calculated the ETE for all transit activities including those for schools and special facilities, for the transitdependent population and for homebound special needs population.

1.2 The Robinson Nuclear Power Plant Location Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) is located in northeastern South Carolina, approximately five miles westnorthwest of Hartsville. The nearest large city is Columbia, South Carolina, approximately 55 miles southwest. The site is approximately 30 miles south of the North Carolina border and 90 miles from the Atlantic Ocean. Figure 11 displays the area surrounding the RNP. This map identifies the major cities and communities in the area as well as the major roads.

2 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM 2010), Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 2010.

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Figure 11. RNP Location Robinson Nuclear Plant 14 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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1.3 Preliminary Activities These activities are described below.

Field Surveys of the Highway Network KLD personnel drove the entire highway system within the EPZ and the Shadow Region which consists of the area between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles radially from the plant. The characteristics of each section of highway were recorded. These characteristics are shown in Table 12:

Table 12. Highway Characteristics Number of lanes Posted speed Lane width Actual free speed Shoulder type & width Abutting land use Interchange geometries Control devices Lane channelization & queuing Intersection configuration (including capacity (including turn bays/lanes) roundabouts where applicable)

Geometrics: curves, grades (>4%) Traffic signal type Unusual characteristics: Narrow bridges, sharp curves, poor pavement, flood warning signs, inadequate delineations, toll booths, etc.

Video and audio recording equipment were used to capture a permanent record of the highway infrastructure. No attempt was made to meticulously measure such attributes as lane width and shoulder width; estimates of these measures based on visual observation and recorded images were considered appropriate for the purpose of estimating the capacity of highway sections. For example, Exhibit 157 in the HCM indicates that a reduction in lane width from 12 feet (the base value) to 10 feet can reduce free flow speed (FFS) by 1.1 mph - not a material difference - for twolane highways. Exhibit 1530 in the HCM shows little sensitivity for the estimates of Service Volumes at Level of Service (LOS) E (near capacity), with respect to FFS, for twolane highways.

The data from the audio and video recordings were used to create detailed geographical information systems (GIS) shapefiles and databases of the roadway characteristics and of the traffic control devices observed during the road survey; this information was referenced while preparing the input stream for the DYNEV II system.

As documented on page 155 of the HCM 2010, the capacity of a twolane highway is 1700 passenger cars per hour in one direction. For freeway sections, a value of 2250 vehicles per hour per lane is assigned, as per Exhibit 1117 of the HCM 2010. The road survey has identified several segments which are characterized by adverse geometrics on twolane highways which are reflected in reduced values for both capacity and speed. These estimates are consistent with the service volumes for LOS E presented in HCM Exhibit 1530. These links may be Robinson Nuclear Plant 15 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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identified by reviewing Appendix K. Link capacity is an input to DYNEV II. Further discussion of roadway capacity is provided in Section 4 of this report.

Traffic signals are either pretimed (signal timings are fixed over time and do not change with the traffic volume on competing approaches), or are actuated (signal timings vary over time based on the changing traffic volumes on competing approaches). Actuated signals require detectors to provide the traffic data used by the signal controller to adjust the signal timings.

These detectors are typically magnetic loops in the roadway, or video cameras mounted on the signal masts and pointed toward the intersection approaches. If detectors were observed on the approaches to a signalized intersection during the road survey, detailed signal timings were not collected as the timings vary with traffic volume. TCPs at locations which have control devices are represented as actuated signals in the DYNEV II system.

If no detectors were observed, the signal control at the intersection was considered pretimed, and detailed signal timings were gathered for several signal cycles. These signal timings were input to the DYNEV II system used to compute ETE, as per NUREG/CR7002 guidance.

Figure 12 presents the linknode analysis network that was constructed to model the evacuation roadway network in the EPZ and Shadow Region. The directional arrows on the links and the node numbers have been removed from Figure 12 to clarify the figure. The detailed figures provided in Appendix K depict the analysis network with directional arrows shown and node numbers provided. The observations made during the field survey were used to calibrate the analysis network.

Telephone Survey A telephone survey was undertaken to gather information needed for the evacuation study.

Appendix F presents the survey instrument, the procedures used and tabulations of data compiled from the survey returns.

These data were utilized to develop estimates of vehicle occupancy to estimate the number of evacuating vehicles during an evacuation and to estimate elements of the mobilization process.

This database was also referenced to estimate the number of transitdependent residents.

Computing the Evacuation Time Estimates The overall study procedure is outlined in Appendix D. Demographic data were obtained from several sources, as detailed later in this report. These data were analyzed and converted into vehicle demand data. The vehicle demand was loaded onto appropriate source links of the analysis network using GIS mapping software. The DYNEV II system was then used to compute ETE for all Regions and Scenarios.

Analytical Tools The DYNEV II System that was employed for this study is comprised of several integrated computer models. One of these is the DYNEV (DYnamic Network EVacuation) macroscopic simulation model, a new version of the IDYNEV model that was developed by KLD under contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

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Figure 12. RNP LinkNode Analysis Network Robinson Nuclear Plant 17 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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DYNEV II consists of four submodels:

A macroscopic traffic simulation model (for details, see Appendix C).

A Trip Distribution (TD) model that assigns a set of candidate destination (D) nodes for each origin (O) located within the analysis network, where evacuation trips are generated over time. This establishes a set of OD tables.

A Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) model which assigns trips to paths of travel (routes) which satisfy the OD tables, over time. The TD and DTA models are integrated to form the DTRAD (Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Distribution) model, as described in Appendix B.

A Myopic Traffic Diversion model which diverts traffic to avoid intense, local congestion, if possible.

Another software product developed by KLD, named UNITES (UNIfied Transportation Engineering System) was used to expedite data entry and to automate the production of output tables.

The dynamics of traffic flow over the network are graphically animated using the software product, EVAN (EVacuation ANimator), developed by KLD. EVAN is GIS based, and displays statistics such as LOS, vehicles discharged, average speed, and percent of vehicles evacuated, output by the DYNEV II System. The use of a GIS framework enables the user to zoom in on areas of congestion and query road name, town name and other geographical information.

The procedure for applying the DYNEV II System within the framework of developing ETE is outlined in Appendix D. Appendix A is a glossary of terms.

For the reader interested in an evaluation of the original model, IDYNEV, the following references are suggested:

NUREG/CR4873 - Benchmark Study of the IDYNEV Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code NUREG/CR4874 - The Sensitivity of Evacuation Time Estimates to Changes in Input Parameters for the IDYNEV Computer Code The evacuation analysis procedures are based upon the need to:

Route traffic along paths of travel that will expedite their travel from their respective points of origin to points outside the EPZ.

Restrict movement toward the plant to the extent practicable, and disperse traffic demand so as to avoid focusing demand on a limited number of highways.

Move traffic in directions that are generally outbound, relative to the location of the RNP.

DYNEV II provides a detailed description of traffic operations on the evacuation network. This description enables the analyst to identify bottlenecks and to develop countermeasures that Robinson Nuclear Plant 18 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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are designed to represent the behavioral responses of evacuees. The effects of these countermeasures may then be tested with the model.

1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study Table 13 presents a comparison of the present ETE study with the 2006 study. The factors contributing to the differences between the ETE values obtained in this study and those of the previous study can be summarized as follows:

Changes which cause an increase in the ETE o Transitdependent households assigned one vehicle per household in the 2006 study; evacuated on buses in this study.

o Decrease in the resident vehicle occupancy of approximately 25%.

o A small increase in permanent resident population.

o Voluntary and shadow evacuations are considered.

o Longer 100% mobilization time.

Changes which cause a decrease in the ETE o Bad weather (rain and snow) reductions in freeflow speed and roadway capacity higher for the 2006 study.

o DYNEV II is a dynamic evacuation model and it therefore supports dynamic route selection.

o Decrease in the number of vehicles loaded to evacuate transit dependents.

o Lower transient population estimate.

o Doublecounting of residents is minimized in this study by only counting employees and transients who are nonEPZ residents.

o County and State TCPs that are listed in the emergency plans are modeled in this study. This improves the performance of those key intersections.

Table 13. ETE Study Comparisons Topic Previous ETE Study Current ETE Study Population data from Synergos ArcGIS Software using 2010 US Census Resident Population Technologies blocks; area ratio method used.

Basis Population = 35,588 (est. for 2010) Population = 35,927 2.5 persons/household, 1 vehicle 2.27 persons/household, 1.20 Resident Population

/household yielding 2.5 evacuating vehicles/household yielding:

Vehicle Occupancy persons/vehicle 1.89 persons/vehicle.

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Topic Previous ETE Study Current ETE Study Employee estimates based on information provided about major From 2006, firstquarter population employers in EPZ, supplemented by Employee estimates obtained from Synergos telephone calls to individual employers.

Population Technologies, Inc.

1.05 employees per vehicle based on Employees =3,680 telephone survey results.

Employees = 2,918 Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of the telephone survey.

Estimated 11% of households have no A total of 1,130 people who do not vehicle. One vehicle per transit have access to a vehicle, requiring at TransitDependent dependent household is added to the least 38 buses to evacuate. An Population model to represent the use of a additional 59 homebound special needs friends or family members car or a persons needed special transportation public evacuation vehicle.

to evacuate (51 require a bus, 8 require an ambulance).

Transient estimates based on Transient estimates based upon discussions with Progress Energy, local information provided about transient emergency managers and information attractions in EPZ, observations of the Transient on Carolina Sandhills National Wildlife facilities during the road survey, tourist Population Refuge and supplemented by information and internet searches. See previous report. Section 3 for details.

Transients = 18,715 Transients = 380 Special facility population based on Special facility population based on information provided by each county information provided by each county within the EPZ.

within the EPZ.

Special Facilities Current census = 454 Special Facility Population = 1,438 Population (includes staff) Buses Required = 9 Patients: 25 / vehicle Wheelchair Vans Required = 31 (capacity 4 per bus)

Staff: 1 / vehicle Ambulances Required = 70 Local school data was obtained from School population based on commercially available geographic information provided by each county information system (GIS) data and within the EPZ. Includes Coker College through contact with individual and Daycares.

School Population facilities. School enrollment = 8,918 School enrollment = 8,531, Buses required = 173 52 students per bus. Commuter college students 1.05 per College 1.5 students per vehicle vehicle, on average.

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Topic Previous ETE Study Current ETE Study Voluntary evacuation from 20 percent of the population within the within EPZ in areas Not considered EPZ, but not within the Evacuation outside region to be Region (see Figure 21) evacuated 20% of people outside of the EPZ within Shadow Evacuation Not considered the Shadow Region (see Figure 72)

Network Size 1,873 links 487 links; 332 nodes Geometric data from NAVTEQ street Field surveys conducted in April 2012.

Roadway Geometric network data and validated by field Roads and intersections were video Data surveys conducted in 2006. archived.

Road capacities based on 2000 HCM. Road capacities based on 2010 HCM.

Direct evacuation to designated Direct evacuation to designated School Evacuation Relocation Center. Relocation Center.

Not applicable - one vehicle added 50 percent of transitdependent Ridesharing per household with no vehicles of persons will evacuate with a neighbor their own. or friend.

Notification complete within 45 minutes Notification complete within 90 Trip generation time based on minutes.

residential telephone survey of specific Trip Generation curves adapted from pretrip mobilization activities:

data collected during evacuations in Residents with commuters returning Trip Generation for response to chemical spills. One leave between 20 and 255 minutes.

Evacuation mobilization curve for all population groups. Residents without commuters returning leave between 10 and 165 minutes.

Trip generation between 5 and 140 minutes. Employees and transients leave between 5 and 120 minutes.

All times measured from the Advisory to Evacuate.

Good weather and adverse weather Normal, Rain, or Snow. The capacity conditions. The capacity and free flow and free flow speed of all links in the Weather speed of all links in the network are network are reduced by 10% in the reduced by 25% and 40% respectively event of rain and 20% for snow.

for adverse weather.

PTV Vision VISUM and VISSIM Modeling DYNEV II System - Version 4.0.15.0 simulation models Robinson Nuclear Plant 111 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Topic Previous ETE Study Current ETE Study Darlington NASCAR race Peak Special Event Population = 60,000 Special Events None considered (including residents)

Peak number transients =

15,000 transient vehicles 13 Regions and 16 Scenarios 32 Regions (central sector wind producing 204 unique cases for 2006 direction and each adjacent sector Evacuation Cases population and 104 for 2010 technique used) and 14 Scenarios population estimate. producing 448 unique cases.

ETE reported for 90th and 100th Evacuation Time ETE results presented by Evacuation percentile population. Results Estimates Reporting Area and Scenario.

presented by Region and Scenario.

90th percentile: Winter Weekday Midday, 2010, Winter, Weekday, Midday, Good Weather: 2:35 Good Weather: 12:05 Summer Weekend, Midday, Evacuation Time 2010, Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:25 Estimates for the Good Weather: 8:55 entire EPZ (Report does not state whether 90th 100th percentile: Winter Weekday or 100th percentile ETE) Midday, Good Weather: 4:25 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 4:25 Robinson Nuclear Plant 112 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS This section presents the estimates and assumptions utilized in the development of the evacuation time estimates.

2.1 Data Estimates

1. Permanent resident population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data.

2. Estimates of employees who reside outside the EPZ and commute to work within the EPZ are based upon data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies and surveys of major employers in the EPZ.

3. Population estimates at special facilities are based on available data from county emergency management offices and from phone calls to specific facilities.

4. Roadway capacity estimates are based on field surveys and the application of the Highway Capacity Manual 2010.

5. Population mobilization times are based on a statistical analysis of data acquired from a random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents (see Section 5 and Appendix F).

6. The relationship between resident population and evacuating vehicles is developed from the telephone survey. Average values of 2.27 persons per household and 1.20 evacuating vehicles per household are used. The relationship between persons and vehicles for transients and employees is as follows:

a. Employees: 1.05 employees per vehicle (telephone survey results) for all major employers.

b. Special Events: Data for transients attending a race weekend at the Darlington Raceway was provided by track officials, averaging at 4 persons per vehicle.

c. Transient attractions: 2 transients per vehicle for golf courses, based on information from individual facilities. A total of 173 transients in 113 vehicles are assigned to lodging facilities in the EPZ.

2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions

1. ETE are presented for the evacuation of the 90th and 100th percentiles of population for each Region and for each Scenario. The percentile ETE is defined as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate issued to a specific Region of the EPZ, to the time that Region is clear of the indicated percentile of evacuees. A Region is defined as a group of zones that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate. A scenario is a combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, and weather conditions.

2. Evacuation movements (paths of travel) are generally outbound relative to the plant to the extent permitted by the highway network. All major evacuation routes are used in the analysis.

3. Regions are defined by the underlying keyhole or circular configurations as specified in Section 1.4 of NUREG/CR7002. These Regions, as defined, display irregular boundaries reflecting the geography of the zones included within these underlying configurations.

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4. As indicated in Figure 22 of NUREG/CR7002, 100% of people within the impacted keyhole evacuate. 20% of those people within the EPZ, not within the impacted keyhole, will voluntarily evacuate. 20% of those people within the Shadow Region will voluntarily evacuate. See Figure 21 for a graphical representation of these evacuation percentages. Sensitivity studies explore the effect on ETE of increasing the percentage of voluntary evacuees in the Shadow Region (see Appendix M).

5. A total of 14 Scenarios representing different temporal variations (season, time of day, day of week) and weather conditions are considered. These Scenarios are outlined in Table 21. The two seasons used are winter and summer; winter is when schools are in session and summer is when schools are not in session.

6. Scenario 14 considers the closure of section of SR 151 southbound located directly south of the intersection with S. 5th Street in Hartsville.

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Table 21. Evacuation Scenario Definitions Day of Time of 1

Scenario Season Week Day Weather Special 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None Midweek, 5 Summer Evening Good None Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None Midweek, 12 Winter Evening Good None Weekend Darlington NASCAR 13 Winter Weekend Midday Good Race Roadway Impact -

14 Summer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Closure on SR 151 Southbound 1

Winter assumes that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school is not in session.

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Figure 21. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology Robinson Nuclear Plant 24 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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2.3 Study Assumptions

1. The Planning Basis Assumption for the calculation of ETE is a rapidly escalating accident that requires evacuation, and includes the following:

a. Advisory to Evacuate is announced coincident with the siren notification.

b. Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after siren notification.

c. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate.

2. It is assumed that everyone within the group of zones forming a Region that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate will, in fact, respond and evacuate in general accord with the planned routes.

3. 48 percent of the households in the EPZ have at least 1 commuter; 55 percent of those households with commuters will await the return of a commuter before beginning their evacuation trip, based on the telephone survey results. Therefore 26 percent (48% x 55% = 26%) of EPZ households will await the return of a commuter, prior to beginning their evacuation trip. It is assumed that the responses to the telephone survey regarding the return of commuters prior to evacuating are applicable for this study

4. The ETE will also include consideration of through (ExternalExternal) trips during the time that such traffic is permitted to enter the evacuated Region. Normal traffic flow is assumed to be present within the EPZ at the start of the emergency.

5. Access Control Points (ACP) will be staffed within approximately 120 minutes following the siren notifications, to divert traffic attempting to enter the EPZ. Earlier activation of ACP locations could delay returning commuters. It is assumed that no through traffic will enter the EPZ after this 120 minute time period.

6. Traffic Control Points (TCP) within the EPZ will be staffed over time, beginning at the Advisory to Evacuate. Their number and location will depend on the Region to be evacuated and resources available. The objectives of these TCP are:

a. Facilitate the movements of all (mostly evacuating) vehicles at the location.

b. Discourage inadvertent vehicle movements towards the plant.

c. Provide assurance and guidance to any traveler who is unsure of the appropriate actions or routing.

d. Act as local surveillance and communications center.

e. Provide information to the emergency operations center (EOC) as needed, based on direct observation or on information provided by travelers.

In calculating ETE, it is assumed that evacuees will drive safely, travel in directions identified in the plan, and obey all control devices and traffic guides.

7. Buses, vans, wheelchair vans and ambulances will be used to transport those without access to private vehicles (t is assumed that drivers are available for these vehicles):

a. If schools are in session, transport (buses) will evacuate students directly to the designated relocation centers.

b. Based on information provided, for most daycares parents will pick up children prior to evacuation; those daycares that do evacuate their students will provide transportation.

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c. Buses, wheelchair vans and ambulances will evacuate patients at medical facilities and at any senior facilities within the EPZ, as needed.

d. Transitdependent general population will be evacuated to relocation centers.

e. Schoolchildren, if school is in session, are given priority in assigning transit vehicles.

f. Bus mobilization time is considered in ETE calculations.

g. Analysis of the number of required roundtrips (waves) of evacuating transit vehicles is presented.

h. Transport of transitdependent evacuees from relocation centers to congregate care centers is not considered in this study.

8. Provisions are made for evacuating the transitdependent portion of the general population to relocation centers by bus, based on the assumption that some of these people will rideshare with family, neighbors, and friends, thus reducing the demand for buses. We assume that the percentage of people who rideshare is 50 percent. This assumption is based upon reported experience for other emergencies2, and on guidance in Section 2.2 of NUREG/CR7002.

9. Two types of adverse weather scenarios are considered. Rain may occur for either winter or summer scenarios; snow occurs in winter scenarios only. It is assumed that the rain or snow begins earlier or at about the same time the evacuation advisory is issued.

No weatherrelated reduction in the number of transients who may be present in the EPZ is assumed. It is assumed that roads are passable and that the appropriate agencies are plowing the roads as they would normally when snowing.

Adverse weather scenarios affect roadway capacity and the free flow highway speeds.

The factors applied for the ETE study are based on recent research on the effects of weather on roadway operations3; the factors are shown in Table 22.

7. The ETE are computed and presented in tabular format and graphically, in a format compliant with NUREG/CR7002.

8. The models of the IDYNEV System were recognized as state of the art by the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board (ASLB) in past hearings. (Sources: Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Hearings on Seabrook and Shoreham; Urbanik4). The models have continuously been refined and extended since those hearings and were independently validated by a consultant retained by the NRC. The new DYNEV II model incorporates the latest technology in traffic simulation and in dynamic traffic assignment.

2 Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto, THE MISSISSAUGA EVACUATION FINAL REPORT, June 1981. The report indicates that 6,600 people of a transitdependent population of 8,600 people shared rides with other residents; a ride share rate of 76% (Page 510).

3 Agarwal, M. et. al. Impacts of Weather on Urban Freeway Traffic Flow Characteristics and Facility Capacity, Proceedings of the 2005 MidContinent Transportation Research Symposium, August, 2005. The results of this paper are included as Exhibit 1015 in the HCM 2010.

4 Urbanik, T., et. al. Benchmark Study of the IDYNEV Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code, NUREG/CR4873, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June, 1988.

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10. School buses used to transport students are assumed to transport 70 students per bus for elementary schools and 50 students per bus for middle and high schools, based on discussions with county offices of emergency management. Transit buses used to transport the transitdependent general population are assumed to transport 30 people per bus.

11. School bus speeds are capped at 45 mph in the calculation of ETE, in order to ensure compliance with South Carolina state laws.

Table 22. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather Highway Free Flow Scenario Capacity* Speed* Mobilization Time for General Population Rain 90% 90% No Effect Clear driveway before leaving home Snow 80% 80%

(See Figure F13)

Adverse weather capacity and speed values are given as a percentage of good weather conditions. Roads are assumed to be passable.

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3 DEMAND ESTIMATION The estimates of demand, expressed in terms of people and vehicles, constitute a critical element in developing an evacuation plan. These estimates consist of three components:

1. An estimate of population within the EPZ, stratified into groups (resident, employee, transient).

2. An estimate, for each population group, of mean occupancy per evacuating vehicle. This estimate is used to determine the number of evacuating vehicles.

3. An estimate of potential doublecounting of people and vehicles.

Appendix E presents much of the source material for the population estimates. Our primary source of population data, the 2010 Census, however, is not adequate for directly estimating some transient groups.

Throughout the year, vacationers and tourists enter the EPZ. These nonresidents may dwell within the EPZ for a short period (e.g. a few days or one or two weeks), or may enter and leave within one day. Estimates of the size of these population components must be obtained, so that the associated number of evacuating vehicles can be ascertained.

The potential for doublecounting people and vehicles must be addressed. For example:

A resident who works and shops within the EPZ could be counted as a resident, again as an employee and once again as a shopper.

A visitor who stays at a hotel and spends time at a park, then goes shopping could be counted three times.

Furthermore, the number of vehicles at a location depends on time of day. For example, motel parking lots may be full at dawn and empty at noon. Similarly, parking lots at area parks, which are full at noon, may be almost empty at dawn. Estimating counts of vehicles by simply adding up the capacities of different types of parking facilities will tend to overestimate the number of transients and can lead to ETE that are too conservative.

Analysis of the general population characteristics of the Robinson Nuclear Plant EPZ indicates the need to identify three distinct groups:

Permanent residents people who are year round residents of the EPZ.

Transients people who reside outside of the EPZ who enter the area for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation) and then leave the area.

Employees people who reside outside of the EPZ and commute to work within the EPZ on a daily basis.

For this study, employees and transients have different scenario percentages (see Table 63).

For example, employees peak during the winter, weekday, midday scenarios while transients peak during summer evenings. For this reason, employees were treated separately from transients.

Estimates of the population and number of evacuating vehicles for each of the population Robinson Nuclear Plant 31 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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groups are presented for each zone and by polar coordinate representation (population distribution figures). The RNP EPZ is subdivided into 11 zones. The EPZ is shown in Figure 31.

3.1 Permanent Residents The primary source for estimating permanent population is the latest U.S. Census data. The average household size (2.27 persons/household - See Figure F1) and the number of evacuating vehicles per household (1.20 vehicles/household - See Figure F8) were adapted from the telephone survey results.

Population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data. The estimates are created by cutting the census block polygons by the zone and EPZ boundaries. A ratio of the original area of each census block and the updated area (after cutting) is multiplied by the total block population to estimate the population within the EPZ. This methodology assumes that the population is evenly distributed across a census block. Table 31 provides the permanent resident population within the EPZ, by zone based on this methodology.

The year 2010 permanent resident population is divided by the average household size and then multiplied by the average number of evacuating vehicles per household in order to estimate number of vehicles. Permanent resident population and vehicle estimates are presented in Table 32. Figure 32 and Figure 33 present the permanent resident population and permanent resident vehicle estimates by sector and distance from the Robinson Nuclear Plant. The population distribution figures were constructed using GIS software.

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Figure 31. RNP EPZ Robinson Nuclear Plant 33 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 31. EPZ Permanent Resident Population Zone 2000 Population 2010 Population A0 2,161 2,282 A1 670 670 A2 852 1,426 B1 12,721 16,584 B2 8,998 5,645 C1 2,555 2,578 C2 1,903 1,931 D1 1,039 1,114 D2 1,409 1,196 E1 295 395 E2 1,931 2,106 TOTAL 34,534 35,927 EPZ Population Growth: 4.03%

Table 32. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by Zone 2010 Zone 2010 Population Resident Vehicles A0 2,282 1,210 A1 670 353 A2 1,426 759 B1 16,584 8,927 B2 5,645 2,992 C1 2,578 1,366 C2 1,931 1,023 D1 1,114 591 D2 1,196 642 E1 395 208 E2 2,106 1,118 TOTAL 35,927 19,189 Robinson Nuclear Plant 34 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 32. Permanent Resident Population by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 35 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 33. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 36 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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3.2 Shadow Population A portion of the population living outside the evacuation area extending to 15 miles radially from the RNP (in the Shadow Region) may elect to evacuate without having been instructed to do so. Based upon NUREG/CR7002 guidance, it is assumed that 20 percent of the permanent resident population, based on U.S. Census Bureau data, in this Shadow Region will elect to evacuate.

Shadow population characteristics (household size, evacuating vehicles per household, mobilization time) are assumed to be the same as those for the EPZ permanent resident population. Table 33, Figure 34, and Figure 35 present estimates of the shadow population and vehicles, by sector.

Table 33. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector Sector Population Evacuating Vehicles N 175 93 NNE 906 484 NE 651 345 ENE 919 490 E 1,577 837 ESE 1,298 689 SE 1,154 612 SSE 1,312 693 S 738 395 SSW 6,076 3,220 SW 828 440 WSW 430 233 W 1,261 674 WNW 382 207 NW 304 165 NNW 19 11 TOTAL 18,030 9,588 Robinson Nuclear Plant 37 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 34. Shadow Population by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 38 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 35. Shadow Vehicles by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 39 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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3.3 Transient Population Transient population groups are defined as those people (who are not permanent residents, nor commuting employees) who enter the EPZ for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation).

Transients may spend less than one day or stay overnight at hotels and motels. The RNP EPZ includes the following types of facilities that attract transients:

Lodging Facilities Golf Courses Coker College Surveys of lodging facilities within the EPZ were conducted to determine the number of rooms, percentage of occupied rooms at peak times, and the number of people and vehicles per room for each facility. These data were used to estimate the number of transients and evacuating vehicles at each of these facilities. A total of 173 transients in 113 vehicles are assigned to lodging facilities in the EPZ.

Two golf courses within the EPZ were located. One golf course, Hartsville Country Club was determined to be predominantly local usage and no transients were assigned. The second golf course, Fox Golf Club was contacted to determine the number of golfers and vehicles at each facility on a typical peak day, and the number of golfers that travels from outside the area. A total of 20 transients and 10 vehicles are assigned to golf courses within the EPZ.

Coker College provided student enrollment numbers as of August 2012 which is 1,100 students, 875 of which attend the campus within the EPZ. The remainder of those students attend the three satellite campuses outside the EPZ. Students who reside on campus, out of the 875 EPZ students, were reported at 525, with 425 vehicles. These students have been included as a part of the permanent population in Table 32. There are 100 students (included in the 525 total) without personal vehicles. Assuming 50% ride share with friends, 50 students have been assigned to the campus as transit dependent. 1 bus has been assigned to Coker College for these students. Commuting students for the campus were reported at 350 students. Using the same percentages estimated for the employees as travel habits mimic those of employees, 53.5% of these students are assumed to live within the EPZ, 187 students in 178 vehicles which have been included in the transient populations.

The Darlington County emergency plans included sites for three boat landings within the EPZ.

No transients were assigned to the landings as they were also determined to be predominantly for local usage.

The previous ETE Report included estimates of transients within the Robinson EPZ at approximately 18,000 people. This number includes employees, motel guests and transient estimates from 2006. The previous report also estimated transients at the Sandhills State Forest and Wildlife Refuge but the majority of the park is located outside the EPZ. No transients were assigned to this facility as the major attractions, hunting, camping and hiking, take place outside the EPZ. Local authorities and RNP confirmed that such a high number of transients could not be substantiated.

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Appendix E summarizes the transient data that was estimated for the EPZ. Table E5 presents the number of transients visiting recreational areas and the transient students. Also included in this table are the lodging facilities. The number of transients and transient vehicles listed is the result of peak usage details while subtracting out the local population.

Table 34 presents transient population and transient vehicle estimates by Zone. Figure 36 and Figure 37 present these data by sector and distance from the plant.

Table 34. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles Zone Transients Transient Vehicles A0 A1 A2 B1 282 252 B2 78 39 C1 C2 20 10 D1 D2 E1 E2 TOTAL 380 301 Robinson Nuclear Plant 311 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 36. Transient Population by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 312 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 37. Transient Vehicles by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 313 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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3.4 Employees Employees who work within the EPZ fall into two categories:

Those who live and work in the EPZ Those who live outside of the EPZ and commute to jobs within the EPZ.

Those of the first category are already counted as part of the permanent resident population. To avoid double counting, we focus only on those employees commuting from outside the EPZ who will evacuate along with the permanent resident population.

Data provided by Darlington and Chesterfield counties and the previous ETE report were used to estimate the number of employees commuting into the EPZ for those employers who did not provide data or were not able to provide information from phone calls made to facilities.

In Table E4, the Employees (Max/Shift) is multiplied by the percent NonEPZ factor to determine the number of employees who are not residents of the EPZ. A vehicle occupancy of 1.05 employees per vehicle obtained from the telephone survey (See Figure F7) was used to determine the number of evacuating employee vehicles for all major employers. For employers that did not provide percentage of nonEPZ employers, 53.5% was used. This was based on data provided by the U.S. Census Bureaus Longitudinal EmployerHousehold Dynamics interactive website1 which is able to calculate the average inflow/outflow of employees within a specified area.

Table 35 presents nonEPZ Resident employee and vehicle estimates by Zone. Figure 38 and Figure 39 present these data by sector.

http://lehdmap.did.census.gov/

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Table 35. Summary of NonEPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles Zone Employees Employee Vehicles A0 289 275 A1 A2 B1 1,719 1,638 B2 70 67 C1 45 43 C2 75 71 D1 D2 E1 E2 720 685 TOTAL 2,918 2,779 Robinson Nuclear Plant 315 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 38. NonEPZ Employee Population by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 316 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 39. NonEPZ Employee Vehicles by Sector Robinson Nuclear Plant 317 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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3.5 Medical Facilities Data were provided by the counties for each of the medical facilities within the EPZ. Table E3 in Appendix E summarizes the data gathered. Section 8 details the evacuation of medical facilities and their patients. The number and type of evacuating vehicles that need to be provided depend on the patients' state of health. It is estimated that buses can transport up to 30 people; wheelchair vans, up to 4 people; and ambulances, up to 1 person for critical care and 2 for noncritical.

3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population Vehicles will be traveling through the EPZ (externalexternal trips) at the time of an emergency event. After the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, these throughtravelers will also evacuate.

These through vehicles are assumed to travel on the major routes traversing the EPZ - US 1, US 15, I120 and SR 151. It is assumed that this traffic will continue to enter the EPZ during the first 120 minutes following the Advisory to Evacuate.

Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) data was obtained from Federal Highway Administration to estimate the number of vehicles per hour on the aforementioned routes. The AADT was multiplied by the KFactor, which is the proportion of the AADT on a roadway segment or link during the design hour, resulting in the design hour volume (DHV). The design hour is usually the 30th highest hourly traffic volume of the year, measured in vehicles per hour (vph). The DHV is then multiplied by the DFactor, which is the proportion of the DHV occurring in the peak direction of travel (also known as the directional split). The resulting values are the directional design hourly volumes (DDHV), and are presented in Table 36, for each of the routes considered. The DDHV is then multiplied by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (access control points - ACP - are assumed to be activated at 120 minutes after the advisory to evacuate) to estimate the total number of external vehicles loaded on the analysis network. As indicated, there are 11,216 vehicles entering the EPZ as externalexternal trips prior to the activation of the ACP and the diversion of this traffic. This number is reduced by 60% for evening scenarios (Scenarios 5 and

12) as discussed in Section 6.

3.7 Special Event One special event (Scenario 13) is considered for the ETE study - a NASCAR race at Darlington Raceway. This is by far the special event in the area and is considered by local emergency management personnel to be the most likely to impede an evacuation. The largest event occurs on the second weekend in May. Data was obtained from Darlington County and the raceway. Transient attendance is reported at approximately 60,000 people in 15,000 vehicles.

The website http://www.darlingtonraceway.com/ also provided information for events held at the raceway and traffic patterns.

Public transportation is not provided for this event and was not considered in the special event analysis.

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Table 36. RNP EPZ External Traffic HPMS1 Hourly External Up Node Dn Node Road Name Direction KFactor2 DFactor2 AADT Volume Traffic 8018 18 SR 151 SB 12,698 0.116 0.5 736 1,472 8206 344 SR 151 NB 12,698 0.116 0.5 736 1,472 8087 87 US 1 EB 4,732 0.136 0.5 322 644 8101 101 US 1 WB 4,732 0.136 0.5 322 644 8168 168 I20 EB 25,569 0.107 0.5 1,368 2,736 8184 184 I20 WB 25,569 0.107 0.5 1,368 2,736 8074 74 US 15 WB 6,400 0.118 0.5 378 756 8061 61 US 15 EB 6,400 0.118 0.5 378 756 TOTAL 11,216 1

Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Washington, D.C., 2011 2

HCM 2010 Robinson Nuclear Plant 319 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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3.8 Summary of Demand A summary of population and vehicle demand is provided in Table 37 and Table 38, respectively. This summary includes all population groups described in this section and Section

8. Additional population groups - transitdependent, special facility and school population -

are described in greater detail in Section 8. A total of 53,146 people and 35,954 vehicles are considered in this study.

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Table 37. Summary of Population Demand Transit Special Coker Shadow External Zone Residents Dependent Transients Employees Facilities Schools College* Population Traffic Total A0 2,282 72 289 2,643 A1 670 21 691 A2 1,426 45 1,471 B1 16,584 522 95 1,719 300 6,797 187 26,204 B2 5,645 178 78 70 154 431 6,556 C1 2,578 81 45 214 2,918 C2 1,931 61 20 75 400 2,487 D1 1,114 35 13 1,162 D2 1,196 38 0 1,234 E1 395 0 395 E2 2,106 77 720 876 3,779 Shadow 3,606 3,606 Total 35,927 1,130 193 2,918 454 8,731 187 3,606 0 53,146 NOTE: Shadow Population has been reduced to 20%. Refer to Figure 21 for additional information.

NOTE: Special Facilities include both medical facilities.

NOTE: Transient students only for Coker College are listed separately. The remaining students are all included in the school enrollment numbers.

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Table 38. Summary of Vehicle Demand Transit Special Coker Shadow External Zone Residents Dependent Transients Employees Facilities Schools College* Population Traffic Total A0 1,210 6 275 1,491 A1 353 2 355 A2 759 4 763 B1 8,927 36 70 1,638 84 248 178 11,181 B2 2,992 12 43 67 35 24 3,173 C1 1,366 6 43 18 1,433 C2 1,023 6 10 71 20 1,130 D1 591 4 2 597 D2 642 4 646 E1 208 208 E2 1,118 6 685 34 1,843 Shadow 1,918 11,216 13,134 Total 19,189 86 123 2,779 119 346 178 1,918 11,216 35,954 NOTE: Buses represented as two passenger vehicles. Refer to Section 8 for additional information.

NOTE: Transient students only for Coker College are listed separately. The remaining students are all included in the school enrollment numbers.

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4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY The ability of the road network to service vehicle demand is a major factor in determining how rapidly an evacuation can be completed. The capacity of a road is defined as the maximum hourly rate at which persons or vehicles can reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a lane of roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic and control conditions, as stated in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM 2010).

In discussing capacity, different operating conditions have been assigned alphabetical designations, A through F, to reflect the range of traffic operational characteristics. These designations have been termed "Levels of Service" (LOS). For example, LOS A connotes freeflow and highspeed operating conditions; LOS F represents a forced flow condition. LOS E describes traffic operating at or near capacity.

Another concept, closely associated with capacity, is Service Volume (SV). Service volume is defined as The maximum hourly rate at which vehicles, bicycles or persons reasonably can be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a roadway during an hour under specific assumed conditions while maintaining a designated level of service. This definition is similar to that for capacity. The major distinction is that values of SV vary from one LOS to another, while capacity is the service volume at the upper bound of LOS E, only.

This distinction is illustrated in Exhibit 1117 of the HCM 2010. As indicated there, the SV varies with Free Flow Speed (FFS), and LOS. The SV is calculated by the DYNEV II simulation model, based on the specified link attributes, FFS, capacity, control device and traffic demand.

Other factors also influence capacity. These include, but are not limited to:

Lane width Shoulder width Pavement condition Horizontal and vertical alignment (curvature and grade)

Percent truck traffic Control device (and timing, if it is a signal)

Weather conditions (rain, snow, fog, wind speed, ice)

These factors are considered during the road survey and in the capacity estimation process; some factors have greater influence on capacity than others. For example, lane and shoulder width have only a limited influence on Base Free Flow Speed (BFFS1) according to Exhibit 157 of the HCM. Consequently, lane and shoulder widths at the narrowest points were observed during the road survey and these observations were recorded, but no detailed measurements of lane or shoulder width were taken. Horizontal and vertical alignment can influence both FFS and capacity. The estimated FFS were measured using the survey vehicles speedometer and observing local traffic, under free flow conditions. Capacity is estimated from the procedures of 1

A very rough estimate of BFFS might be taken as the posted speed limit plus 10 mph (HCM 2010 Page 1515)

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the 2010 HCM. For example, HCM Exhibit 71(b) shows the sensitivity of Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS D to grade (capacity is the Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS E).

As discussed in Section 2.3, it is necessary to adjust capacity figures to represent the prevailing conditions during inclement weather. Based on limited empirical data, weather conditions such as rain reduce the values of free speed and of highway capacity by approximately 10 percent. Over the last decade new studies have been made on the effects of rain on traffic capacity. These studies indicate a range of effects between 5 and 20 percent depending on wind speed and precipitation rates. As indicated in Section 2.3, we employ a reduction in free speed and in highway capacity of 10 percent and 20 percent for rain and snow, respectively.

Since congestion arising from evacuation may be significant, estimates of roadway capacity must be determined with great care. Because of its importance, a brief discussion of the major factors that influence highway capacity is presented in this section.

Rural highways generally consist of: (1) one or more uniform sections with limited access (driveways, parking areas) characterized by uninterrupted flow; and (2) approaches to at grade intersections where flow can be interrupted by a control device or by turning or crossing traffic at the intersection. Due to these differences, separate estimates of capacity must be made for each section. Often, the approach to the intersection is widened by the addition of one or more lanes (turn pockets or turn bays), to compensate for the lower capacity of the approach due to the factors there that can interrupt the flow of traffic. These additional lanes are recorded during the field survey and later entered as input to the DYNEV II system.

4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections Atgrade intersections are apt to become the first bottleneck locations under local heavy traffic volume conditions. This characteristic reflects the need to allocate access time to the respective competing traffic streams by exerting some form of control. During evacuation, control at critical intersections will often be provided by traffic control personnel assigned for that purpose, whose directions may supersede traffic control devices. The existing traffic management plans documented in the county emergency plans are extensive and were adopted without change.

The perlane capacity of an approach to a signalized intersection can be expressed (simplistically) in the following form:

3600 3600 where:

Qcap,m = Capacity of a single lane of traffic on an approach, which executes Robinson Nuclear Plant 42 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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movement, m, upon entering the intersection; vehicles per hour (vph) hm = Mean queue discharge headway of vehicles on this lane that are executing movement, m; seconds per vehicle G = Mean duration of GREEN time servicing vehicles that are executing movement, m, for each signal cycle; seconds L = Mean "lost time" for each signal phase servicing movement, m; seconds C = Duration of each signal cycle; seconds Pm = Proportion of GREEN time allocated for vehicles executing movement, m, from this lane. This value is specified as part of the control treatment.

m = The movement executed by vehicles after they enter the intersection: through, leftturn, rightturn, and diagonal.

The turnmovementspecific mean discharge headway hm, depends in a complex way upon many factors: roadway geometrics, turn percentages, the extent of conflicting traffic streams, the control treatment, and others. A primary factor is the value of "saturation queue discharge headway", hsat, which applies to through vehicles that are not impeded by other conflicting traffic streams. This value, itself, depends upon many factors including motorist behavior.

Formally, we can write, where:

hsat = Saturation discharge headway for through vehicles; seconds per vehicle F1,F2 = The various known factors influencing hm fm( ) = Complex function relating hm to the known (or estimated) values of hsat, F1, F2, The estimation of hm for specified values of hsat, F1, F2, ... is undertaken within the DYNEV II simulation model by a mathematical model2. The resulting values for hm always satisfy the condition:

2 Lieberman, E., "Determining Lateral Deployment of Traffic on an Approach to an Intersection", McShane, W. &

Lieberman, E., "Service Rates of Mixed Traffic on the far Left Lane of an Approach". Both papers appear in Transportation Research Record 772, 1980. Lieberman, E., Xin, W., Macroscopic Traffic Modeling For LargeScale Evacuation Planning, presented at the TRB 2012 Annual Meeting, January 2226, 2012 Robinson Nuclear Plant 43 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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That is, the turnmovementspecific discharge headways are always greater than, or equal to the saturation discharge headway for through vehicles. These headways (or its inverse equivalent, saturation flow rate), may be determined by observation or using the procedures of the HCM 2010.

The above discussion is necessarily brief given the scope of this ETE report and the complexity of the subject of intersection capacity. In fact, Chapters 18, 19 and 20 in the HCM 2010 address this topic. The factors, F1, F2,, influencing saturation flow rate are identified in equation (18

5) of the HCM 2010.

The traffic signals within the EPZ and Shadow Region are modeled using representative phasing plans and phase durations obtained as part of the field data collection. Traffic responsive signal installations allow the proportion of green time allocated (Pm) for each approach to each intersection to be determined by the expected traffic volumes on each approach during evacuation circumstances. The amount of green time (G) allocated is subject to maximum and minimum phase duration constraints; 2 seconds of yellow time are indicated for each signal phase and 1 second of allred time is assigned between signal phases, typically. If a signal is pre timed, the yellow and allred times observed during the road survey are used. A lost time (L) of 2.0 seconds is used for each signal phase in the analysis.

4.2 Capacity Estimation along Sections of Highway The capacity of highway sections as distinct from approaches to intersections is a function of roadway geometrics, traffic composition (e.g. percent heavy trucks and buses in the traffic stream) and, of course, motorist behavior. There is a fundamental relationship which relates service volume (i.e. the number of vehicles serviced within a uniform highway section in a given time period) to traffic density. The top curve in Figure 41 illustrates this relationship.

As indicated, there are two flow regimes: (1) Free Flow (left side of curve); and (2) Forced Flow (right side). In the Free Flow regime, the traffic demand is fully serviced; the service volume increases as demand volume and density increase, until the service volume attains its maximum value, which is the capacity of the highway section. As traffic demand and the resulting highway density increase beyond this "critical" value, the rate at which traffic can be serviced (i.e. the service volume) can actually decline below capacity (capacity drop). Therefore, in order to realistically represent traffic performance during congested conditions (i.e. when demand exceeds capacity), it is necessary to estimate the service volume, VF, under congested conditions.

The value of VF can be expressed as:

where:

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We have employed a value of R=0.90. The advisability of such a capacity reduction factor is based upon empirical studies that identified a falloff in the service flow rate when congestion occurs at bottlenecks or choke points on a freeway system. Zhang and Levinson3 describe a research program that collected data from a computerbased surveillance system (loop detectors) installed on the Interstate Highway System, at 27 active bottlenecks in the twin cities metro area in Minnesota over a 7week period. When flow breakdown occurs, queues are formed which discharge at lower flow rates than the maximum capacity prior to observed breakdown. These queue discharge flow (QDF) rates vary from one location to the next and also vary by day of week and time of day based upon local circumstances. The cited reference presents a mean QDF of 2,016 passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl). This figure compares with the nominal capacity estimate of 2,250 pcphpl estimated for the ETE and indicated in Appendix K for freeway links. The ratio of these two numbers is 0.896 which translates into a capacity reduction factor of 0.90.

Since the principal objective of evacuation time estimate analyses is to develop a realistic estimate of evacuation times, use of the representative value for this capacity reduction factor (R=0.90) is justified. This factor is applied only when flow breaks down, as determined by the simulation model.

Rural roads, like freeways, are classified as uninterrupted flow facilities. (This is in contrast with urban street systems which have closely spaced signalized intersections and are classified as interrupted flow facilities.) As such, traffic flow along rural roads is subject to the same effects as freeways in the event traffic demand exceeds the nominal capacity, resulting in queuing and lower QDF rates. As a practical matter, rural roads rarely break down at locations away from intersections. Any breakdowns on rural roads are generally experienced at intersections where other model logic applies, or at lane drops which reduce capacity there.

Therefore, the application of a factor of 0.90 is appropriate on rural roads, but rarely, if ever, activated.

The estimated value of capacity is based primarily upon the type of facility and on roadway geometrics. Sections of roadway with adverse geometrics are characterized by lower freeflow speeds and lane capacity. Exhibit 1530 in the Highway Capacity Manual was referenced to estimate saturation flow rates. The impact of narrow lanes and shoulders on freeflow speed and on capacity is not material, particularly when flow is predominantly in one direction as is the case during an evacuation.

The procedure used here was to estimate "section" capacity, VE, based on observations made traveling over each section of the evacuation network, based on the posted speed limits and travel behavior of other motorists and by reference to the 2010 HCM. The DYNEV II simulation model determines for each highway section, represented as a network link, whether its capacity would be limited by the "sectionspecific" service volume, VE, or by the intersectionspecific capacity. For each link, the model selects the lower value of capacity.

3 Lei Zhang and David Levinson, Some Properties of Flows at Freeway Bottlenecks, Transportation Research Record 1883, 2004.

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4.3 Application to the RNP Study Area As part of the development of the linknode analysis network for the study area, an estimate of roadway capacity is required. The source material for the capacity estimates presented herein is contained in:

2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM)

Transportation Research Board National Research Council Washington, D.C.

The highway system in the study area consists primarily of three categories of roads and, of course, intersections:

TwoLane roads: Local, State MultiLane Highways (atgrade)

Freeways Each of these classifications will be discussed.

4.3.1 TwoLane Roads Ref: HCM Chapter 15 Two lane roads comprise the majority of highways within the EPZ. The perlane capacity of a twolane highway is estimated at 1700 passenger cars per hour (pc/h). This estimate is essentially independent of the directional distribution of traffic volume except that, for extended distances, the twoway capacity will not exceed 3200 pc/h. The HCM procedures then estimate Level of Service (LOS) and Average Travel Speed. The DYNEV II simulation model accepts the specified value of capacity as input and computes average speed based on the timevarying demand: capacity relations.

Based on the field survey and on expected traffic operations associated with evacuation scenarios:

Most sections of twolane roads within the EPZ are classified as Class I, with "level terrain"; some are rolling terrain.

Class II highways are mostly those within urban and suburban centers.

4.3.2 MultiLane Highway Ref: HCM Chapter 14 Exhibit 142 of the HCM 2010 presents a set of curves that indicate a perlane capacity ranging from approximately 1900 to 2200 pc/h, for freespeeds of 45 to 60 mph, respectively. Based on observation, the multilane highways outside of urban areas within the EPZ service traffic with freespeeds in this range. The actual timevarying speeds computed by the simulation model reflect the demand: capacity relationship and the impact of control at intersections. A Robinson Nuclear Plant 46 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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conservative estimate of perlane capacity of 1900 pc/h is adopted for this study for multilane highways outside of urban areas, as shown in Appendix K.

4.3.3 Freeways Ref: HCM Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 Chapter 10 of the HCM 2010 describes a procedure for integrating the results obtained in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, which compute capacity and LOS for freeway components. Chapter 10 also presents a discussion of simulation models. The DYNEV II simulation model automatically performs this integration process.

Chapter 11 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for Basic Freeway Segments". Exhibit 1117 of the HCM 2010 presents capacity vs. free speed estimates, which are provided below.

Free Speed (mph): 55 60 65 70+

PerLane Capacity (pc/h): 2250 2300 2350 2400 The inputs to the simulation model are highway geometrics, freespeeds and capacity based on field observations. The simulation logic calculates actual timevarying speeds based on demand:

capacity relationships. A conservative estimate of perlane capacity of 2250 pc/h is adopted for this study for freeways, as shown in Appendix K.

Chapter 12 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity, speed, density and LOS for freeway weaving sections. The simulation model contains logic that relates speed to demand volume: capacity ratio. The value of capacity obtained from the computational procedures detailed in Chapter 12 depends on the "Type" and geometrics of the weaving segment and on the "Volume Ratio" (ratio of weaving volume to total volume).

Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacities of ramps and of "merge" areas. There are three significant factors to the determination of capacity of a ramp freeway junction: The capacity of the freeway immediately downstream of an onramp or immediately upstream of an offramp; the capacity of the ramp roadway; and the maximum flow rate entering the ramp influence area. In most cases, the freeway capacity is the controlling factor. Values of this merge area capacity are presented in Exhibit 138 of the HCM 2010, and depend on the number of freeway lanes and on the freeway free speed. Ramp capacity is presented in Exhibit 1310 and is a function of the ramp free flow speed. The DYNEV II simulation model logic simulates the merging operations of the ramp and freeway traffic in accord with the procedures in Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010. If congestion results from an excess of demand relative to capacity, then the model allocates service appropriately to the two entering traffic streams and produces LOS F conditions (The HCM does not address LOS F explicitly).

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4.3.4 Intersections Ref: HCM Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21 Procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for approaches to intersections are presented in Chapter 18 (signalized intersections), Chapters 19, 20 (unsignalized intersections) and Chapter 21 (roundabouts). The complexity of these computations is indicated by the aggregate length of these chapters. The DYNEV II simulation logic is likewise complex.

The simulation model explicitly models intersections: Stop/yield controlled intersections (both 2way and allway) and traffic signal controlled intersections. Where intersections are controlled by fixed time controllers, traffic signal timings are set to reflect average (non evacuation) traffic conditions. Actuated traffic signal settings respond to the timevarying demands of evacuation traffic to adjust the relative capacities of the competing intersection approaches.

The model is also capable of modeling the presence of manned traffic control. At specific locations where it is advisable or where existing plans call for overriding existing traffic control to implement manned control, the model will use actuated signal timings that reflect the presence of traffic guides. At locations where a special traffic control strategy (continuous left turns, contraflow lanes) is used, the strategy is modeled explicitly. Where applicable, the location and type of traffic control for nodes in the evacuation network are noted in Appendix K. The characteristics of the ten highest volume signalized intersections are detailed in Appendix J.

4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation Chapter 6 of the HCM is entitled, HCM and Alternative Analysis Tools. The chapter discusses the use of alternative tools such as simulation modeling to evaluate the operational performance of highway networks. Among the reasons cited in Chapter 6 to consider using simulation as an alternative analysis tool is:

The system under study involves a group of different facilities or travel modes with mutual interactions invoking several procedural chapters of the HCM. Alternative tools are able to analyze these facilities as a single system.

This statement succinctly describes the analyses required to determine traffic operations across an area encompassing an EPZ operating under evacuation conditions. The model utilized for this study, DYNEV II, is further described in Appendix C. It is essential to recognize that simulation models do not replicate the methodology and procedures of the HCM - they replace these procedures by describing the complex interactions of traffic flow and computing Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) detailing the operational performance of traffic over time and by location. The DYNEV II simulation model includes some HCM 2010 procedures only for the purpose of estimating capacity.

All simulation models must be calibrated properly with field observations that quantify the performance parameters applicable to the analysis network. Two of the most important of Robinson Nuclear Plant 48 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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these are: (1) Free flow speed (FFS); and (2) saturation headway, hsat. The first of these is estimated by direct observation during the road survey; the second is estimated using the concepts of the HCM 2010, as described earlier. These parameters are listed in Appendix K, for each network link.

Volume, vph Capacity Drop Qmax R Qmax Qs Density, vpm Flow Regimes Speed, mph Free Forced vf R vc Density, vpm kf kopt kj ks Figure 41. Fundamental Diagrams Robinson Nuclear Plant 49 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME Federal Government guidelines (see NUREG/CR7002) specify that the planner estimate the distributions of elapsed times associated with mobilization activities undertaken by the public to prepare for the evacuation trip. The elapsed time associated with each activity is represented as a statistical distribution reflecting differences between members of the public.

The quantification of these activitybased distributions relies largely on the results of the telephone survey. We define the sum of these distributions of elapsed times as the Trip Generation Time Distribution.

5.1 Background As a Planning Basis, we will adopt a conservative posture, in accordance with Section 1.2 of NUREG/CR7002, that a rapidly escalating event will be considered in calculating the Trip Generation Time assuming that:

1. The Advisory to Evacuate will be announced coincident with the siren notification.

2. Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after the siren notification.

3. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate.

It is emphasized that the adoption of this planning basis is not a representation that these events will occur within the indicated time frame. Rather, these assumptions are necessary in order to:

1. Establish a temporal framework for estimating the Trip Generation distribution in the format recommended in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR6863.

2. Identify temporal points of reference that uniquely define "Clear Time" and ETE.

For example, suppose one hour elapses from the siren alert to the Advisory to Evacuate. In this case, it is reasonable to expect some degree of spontaneous evacuation by the public during this onehour period. As a result, the population within the EPZ will be lower when the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, than at the time of the siren alert. In addition, many will engage in preparation activities to evacuate, in anticipation that an Advisory will be broadcast.

Thus, the time needed to complete the mobilization activities and the number of people remaining to evacuate the EPZ after the Advisory to Evacuate, will both be somewhat less than the estimates presented in this report. Consequently, the ETE presented in this report are likely to be higher than the actual evacuation time, if this hypothetical situation were to take place.

The notification process consists of two events:

1. Transmitting information using the alert notification system available within the EPZ (e.g. sirens, tone alerts, EAS broadcasts, loud speakers).

2. Receiving and correctly interpreting the information that is transmitted.

The population within the EPZ is dispersed over an area of approximately 320 square miles and is engaged in a wide variety of activities. It must be anticipated that some time will elapse Robinson Nuclear Plant 51 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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between the transmission and receipt of the information advising the public of an emergency event.

The amount of elapsed time will vary from one individual to the next depending on where that person is, what that person is doing, and related factors. Furthermore, some persons who will be directly involved with the evacuation process may be outside the EPZ at the time the emergency is declared. These people may be commuters, shoppers and other travelers who reside within the EPZ and who will return to join the other household members upon receiving notification of an emergency.

As indicated in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR6863, the estimated elapsed times for the receipt of notification can be expressed as a distribution reflecting the different notification times for different people within, and outside, the EPZ. By using time distributions, it is also possible to distinguish between different population groups and different dayofweek and timeofday scenarios, so that accurate ETE may be computed.

For example, people at home or at work within the EPZ will be notified by siren, and/or tone alert and/or radio (if available). Those well outside the EPZ will be notified by telephone, radio, TV and wordofmouth, with potentially longer time lags. Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the EPZ population will differ with time of day families will be united in the evenings, but dispersed during the day. In this respect, weekends will differ from weekdays.

As indicated in Section 4.1 of NUREG/CR7002, the information required to compute trip generation times is typically obtained from a telephone survey of EPZ residents. Such a survey was conducted in support of this ETE study. Appendix F presents the survey sampling plan, survey instrument, and raw survey results. It is important to note that the shape and duration of the evacuation trip mobilization distribution is important at sites where traffic congestion is not expected to cause the evacuation time estimate to extend in time well beyond the trip generation period. The remaining discussion will focus on the application of the trip generation data obtained from the telephone survey to the development of the ETE documented in this report.

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5.2 Fundamental Considerations The environment leading up to the time that people begin their evacuation trips consists of a sequence of events and activities. Each event (other than the first) occurs at an instant in time and is the outcome of an activity.

Activities are undertaken over a period of time. Activities may be in "series" (i.e. to undertake an activity implies the completion of all preceding events) or may be in parallel (two or more activities may take place over the same period of time). Activities conducted in series are functionally dependent on the completion of prior activities; activities conducted in parallel are functionally independent of one another. The relevant events associated with the public's preparation for evacuation are:

Event Number Event Description 1 Notification 2 Awareness of Situation 3 Depart Work 4 Arrive Home 5 Depart on Evacuation Trip Associated with each sequence of events are one or more activities, as outlined below:

Table 51. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities Event Sequence Activity Distribution 12 Receive Notification 1 23 Prepare to Leave Work 2 2,3 4 Travel Home 3 2,4 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate 4 N/A Snow Clearance 5 These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 51.

An Event is a state that exists at a point in time (e.g., depart work, arrive home)

An Activity is a process that takes place over some elapsed time (e.g., prepare to leave work, travel home)

As such, a completed Activity changes the state of an individual (e.g. the activity, travel home changes the state from depart work to arrive home). Therefore, an Activity can be described as an Event Sequence; the elapsed times to perform an event sequence vary from one person to the next and are described as statistical distributions on the following pages.

An employee who lives outside the EPZ will follow sequence (c) of Figure 51. A household Robinson Nuclear Plant 53 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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within the EPZ that has one or more commuters at work, and will await their return before beginning the evacuation trip will follow the first sequence of Figure 51(a). A household within the EPZ that has no commuters at work, or that will not await the return of any commuters, will follow the second sequence of Figure 51(a), regardless of day of week or time of day.

Households with no commuters on weekends or in the evening/nighttime, will follow the applicable sequence in Figure 51(b). Transients will always follow one of the sequences of Figure 51(b). Some transients away from their residence could elect to evacuate immediately without returning to the residence, as indicated in the second sequence.

It is seen from Figure 51, that the Trip Generation time (i.e. the total elapsed time from Event 1 to Event 5) depends on the scenario and will vary from one household to the next.

Furthermore, Event 5 depends, in a complicated way, on the time distributions of all activities preceding that event. That is, to estimate the time distribution of Event 5, we must obtain estimates of the time distributions of all preceding events. For this study, we adopt the conservative posture that all activities will occur in sequence.

In some cases, assuming certain events occur strictly sequentially (for instance, commuter returning home before beginning preparation to leave, or removing snow only after the preparation to leave) can result in rather conservative (that is, longer) estimates of mobilization times. It is reasonable to expect that at least some parts of these events will overlap for many households, but that assumption is not made in this study.

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1 2 3 4 5 Residents Households wait 1

for Commuters Households without Residents 1 2 5 Commuters and households who do not wait for Commuters (a) Accident occurs during midweek, at midday; year round Residents, Transients 1 2 4 5 Return to residence, away from then evacuate Residence Residents, 1 2 5 Residents at home; Transients at transients evacuate directly Residence (b) Accident occurs during weekend or during the evening2 1 2 3, 5 (c) Employees who live outside the EPZ ACTIVITIES EVENTS 1 2 Receive Notification 1. Notification 2 3 Prepare to Leave Work 2. Aware of situation 2, 3 4 Travel Home 3. Depart work 2, 4 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate 4. Arrive home

5. Depart on evacuation trip Activities Consume Time 1

Applies for evening and weekends also if commuters are at work.

2 Applies throughout the year for transients.

Figure 51. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip Robinson Nuclear Plant 55 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Activities Preceding Event 5 The time distribution of an event is obtained by "summing" the time distributions of all prior contributing activities. (This "summing" process is quite different than an algebraic sum since it is performed on distributions - not scalar numbers).

Time Distribution No. 1, Notification Process: Activity 1 2 In accordance with the 2012 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, 100% of the population is notified within 45 minutes. It is assumed (based on the presence of sirens within the EPZ) that 87 percent of those within the EPZ will be aware of the event within 30 minutes with the remainder notified within the following 15 minutes. The notification distribution is given below:

Table 52. Time Distribution for Notifying the Public Elapsed Time Percent of (Minutes) Population Notified 0 0%

5 7%

10 13%

15 27%

20 47%

25 66%

30 87%

35 92%

40 97%

45 100%

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Distribution No. 2, Prepare to Leave Work: Activity 2 3 It is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of business enterprises within the EPZ will elect to shut down following notification and most employees would leave work quickly. Commuters, who work outside the EPZ could, in all probability, also leave quickly since facilities outside the EPZ would remain open and other personnel would remain. Personnel or farmers responsible for equipment/livestock would require additional time to secure their facility. The distribution of Activity 2 3 shown in Table 53 reflects data obtained by the telephone survey. This distribution is also applicable for residents who need time to leave stores, restaurants, parks and other locations within the EPZ. This distribution is plotted in Figure 52.

Table 53. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work Cumulative Cumulative Percent Percent Elapsed Time Employees Elapsed Time Employees (Minutes) Leaving Work (Minutes) Leaving Work 0 0% 45 92.9%

5 15.7% 50 94.0%

10 37.6% 55 94.0%

15 52.5% 60 98.4%

20 64.8% 75 99.2%

25 69.2% 90 100.0%

30 82.1%

35 83.5%

40 85.7%

NOTE: The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response. That is, the sample was reduced in size to include only those households who responded to this question. The underlying assumption is that the distribution of this activity for the Dont know responders, if the event takes place, would be the same as those responders who provided estimates.

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Distribution No. 3, Travel Home: Activity 3 4 These data are provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 52 and listed in Table 54.

Table 54. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel Home Cumulative Cumulative Elapsed Time Percent Elapsed Time Percent (Minutes) Returning Home (Minutes) Returning Home 0 0 45 86.7%

5 29.1% 50 87.3%

10 44.6% 55 87.6%

15 55.9% 60 96.0%

20 61.3% 75 96.6%

25 63.0% 90 98.0%

30 80.8% 105 98.6%

35 81.6% 120 100.0%

40 82.5%

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Distribution No. 4, Prepare to Leave Home: Activity 2, 4 5 These data are provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 52 and listed in Table 55.

Table 55. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to Evacuate Cumulative Elapsed Time Percent Ready to (Minutes) Evacuate 0 0%

15 26.6%

30 65.7%

45 73.1%

60 91.9%

75 94.1%

90 95.5%

105 95.7%

120 98.2%

135 100.0%

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Distribution No. 5, Snow Clearance Time Distribution Inclement weather scenarios involving snowfall must address the time lags associated with snow clearance. It is assumed that snow equipment is mobilized and deployed during the snowfall to maintain passable roads. The general consensus is that the snowplowing efforts are generally successful for all but the most extreme blizzards when the rate of snow accumulation exceeds that of snow clearance over a period of many hours.

Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the highway system will remain passable - albeit at a lower capacity - under the vast majority of snow conditions. Nevertheless, for the vehicles to gain access to the highway system, it may be necessary for driveways and employee parking lots to be cleared to the extent needed to permit vehicles to gain access to the roadways.

These clearance activities take time; this time must be incorporated into the trip generation time distributions. These data are provided by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 52 and listed in Table 56.

Note that those respondents (70%) who answered that they would not take time to clear their driveway were assumed to be ready immediately at the start of this activity. Essentially they would drive through the snow on the driveway to access the roadway and begin their evacuation trip.

Table 56. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 23" of Snow Cumulative Percent Elapsed Time Completing (Minutes) Snow Removal 0 70%

15 76.7%

30 87.0%

45 89.7%

60 94.8%

75 95.2%

90 95.7%

105 95.9%

120 97.5%

135 97.9%

150 97.9%

165 97.9%

180 100.0%

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Mobilization Activities 100%

80%

60%

Notification Prepare to Leave Work Travel Home 40%

Prepare Home Time to Clear Snow 20%

Percent of Population Completing Mobilization Activity 0%

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time from Start of Mobilization Activity (min)

Figure 52. Evacuation Mobilization Activities Robinson Nuclear Plant 511 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution The time distributions for each of the mobilization activities presented herein must be combined to form the appropriate Trip Generation Distributions. As discussed above, this study assumes that the stated events take place in sequence such that all preceding events must be completed before the current event can occur. For example, if a household awaits the return of a commuter, the worktohome trip (Activity 3 4) must precede Activity 4 5.

To calculate the time distribution of an event that is dependent on two sequential activities, it is necessary to sum the distributions associated with these prior activities. The distribution summing algorithm is applied repeatedly as shown to form the required distribution. As an outcome of this procedure, new time distributions are formed; we assign letter designations to these intermediate distributions to describe the procedure. Table 57 presents the summing procedure to arrive at each designated distribution.

Table 57. Mapping Distributions to Events Apply Summing Algorithm To: Distribution Obtained Event Defined Distributions 1 and 2 Distribution A Event 3 Distributions A and 3 Distribution B Event 4 Distributions B and 4 Distribution C Event 5 Distributions 1 and 4 Distribution D Event 5 Distributions C and 5 Distribution E Event 5 Distributions D and 5 Distribution F Event 5 Table 58 presents a description of each of the final trip generation distributions achieved after the summing process is completed.

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Table 58. Description of the Distributions Distribution Description Time distribution of commuters departing place of work (Event 3). Also applies A to employees who work within the EPZ who live outside, and to Transients within the EPZ.

B Time distribution of commuters arriving home (Event 4).

Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home C

to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5).

Time distribution of residents without commuters returning home, leaving home D

to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5).

Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home E

to begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5).

Time distribution of residents with no commuters returning home, leaving to F

begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5).

5.4.1 Statistical Outliers As already mentioned, some portion of the survey respondents answer dont know to some questions or choose to not respond to a question. The mobilization activity distributions are based upon actual responses. But, it is the nature of surveys that a few numeric responses are inconsistent with the overall pattern of results. An example would be a case in which for 500 responses, almost all of them estimate less than two hours for a given answer, but 3 say four hours and 4 say six or more hours.

These outliers must be considered: are they valid responses, or so atypical that they should be dropped from the sample?

In assessing outliers, there are three alternates to consider:

1) Some responses with very long times may be valid, but reflect the reality that the respondent really needs to be classified in a different population subgroup, based upon special needs;

2) Other responses may be unrealistic (6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to return home from commuting distance, or 2 days to prepare the home for departure);

3) Some high values are representative and plausible, and one must not cut them as part of the consideration of outliers.

The issue of course is how to make the decision that a given response or set of responses are to be considered outliers for the component mobilization activities, using a method that objectively quantifies the process.

There is considerable statistical literature on the identification and treatment of outliers singly or in groups, much of which assumes the data is normally distributed and some of which uses non Robinson Nuclear Plant 513 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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parametric methods to avoid that assumption. The literature cites that limited work has been done directly on outliers in sample survey responses.

In establishing the overall mobilization time/trip generation distributions, the following principles are used:

1) It is recognized that the overall trip generation distributions are conservative estimates, because they assume a household will do the mobilization activities sequentially, with no overlap of activities;

2) The individual mobilization activities (prepare to leave work, travel home, prepare home, clear snow) are reviewed for outliers, and then the overall trip generation distributions are created (see Figure 51, Table 57, Table 58);

3) Outliers can be eliminated either because the response reflects a special population (e.g.

special needs, transit dependent) or lack of realism, because the purpose is to estimate trip generation patterns for personal vehicles;

4) To eliminate outliers, a) the mean and standard deviation of the specific activity are estimated from the responses, b) the median of the same data is estimated, with its position relative to the mean noted, c) the histogram of the data is inspected, and d) all values greater than 3.5 standard deviations are flagged for attention, taking special note of whether there are gaps (categories with zero entries) in the histogram display.

In general, only flagged values more than 4 standard deviations from the mean are allowed to be considered outliers, with gaps in the histogram expected.

When flagged values are classified as outliers and dropped, steps a to d are repeated.

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5) As a practical matter, even with outliers eliminated by the above, the resultant histogram, viewed as a cumulative distribution, is not a normal distribution. A typical situation that results is shown below in Figure 53.

100.0%

90.0%

80.0%

Cumulative Percentage (%)

70.0%

60.0%

50.0%

40.0%

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%

112.5 2.5 7.5 12.5 17.5 22.5 27.5 32.5 37.5 42.5 47.5 52.5 57.5 67.5 82.5 97.5 Center of Interval (minutes)

Cumulative Data Cumulative Normal Figure 53. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution

6) In particular, the cumulative distribution differs from the normal distribution in two key aspects, both very important in loading a network to estimate evacuation times:

Most of the real data is to the left of the normal curve above, indicating that the network loads faster for the first 8085% of the vehicles, potentially causing more (and earlier) congestion than otherwise modeled; The last 1015% of the real data tails off slower than the comparable normal curve, indicating that there is significant traffic still loading at later times.

Because these two features are important to preserve, it is the histogram of the data that is used to describe the mobilization activities, not a normal curve fit to the data. One could consider other distributions, but using the shape of the actual data curve is unambiguous and preserves these important features;

7) With the mobilization activities each modeled according to Steps 16, including preserving the features cited in Step 6, the overall (or total) mobilization times are constructed.

This is done by using the data sets and distributions under different scenarios (e.g. commuter returning, no commuter returning, no snow or snow in each). In general, these are additive, using Robinson Nuclear Plant 515 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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weighting based upon the probability distributions of each element; Figure 54 presents the combined trip generation distributions designated A, C, D, E and F. These distributions are presented on the same time scale. (As discussed earlier, the use of strictly additive activities is a conservative approach, because it makes all activities sequential - preparation for departure follows the return of the commuter; snow clearance follows the preparation for departure, and so forth. In practice, it is reasonable that some of these activities are done in parallel, at least to some extent - for instance, preparation to depart begins by a household member at home while the commuter is still on the road.)

The mobilization distributions that result are used in their tabular/graphical form as direct inputs to later computations that lead to the ETE.

The DYNEV II simulation model is designed to accept varying rates of vehicle trip generation for each origin centroid, expressed in the form of histograms. These histograms, which represent Distributions A, C, D, E and F, properly displaced with respect to one another, are tabulated in Table 59 (Distribution B, Arrive Home, omitted for clarity).

The final time period (15) is 600 minutes long. This time period is added to allow the analysis network to clear, in the event congestion persists beyond the trip generation period. Note that there are no trips generated during this final time period.

5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation As defined in NUREG/CR7002, staged evacuation consists of the following:

1. Zones comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately

2. Zones comprising regions extending from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter inplace while the 2 mile region is cleared

3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, sheltered people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation

4. The population sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region are advised to begin evacuating when approximately 90% of those originally within the 2 mile region evacuate across the 2 mile region boundary

5. Noncompliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20%

Assumptions

1. The EPZ population in zones beyond 5 miles will react as does the population in the 2 to 5 mile region; that is they will first shelter, then evacuate after the 90th percentile ETE for the 2 mile region

2. The population in the shadow region beyond the EPZ boundary, extending to approximately 15 miles radially from the plant, will react as they do for all nonstaged evacuation scenarios. That is 20% of these households will elect to evacuate with no shelter delay.

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3. The transient population will not be expected to stage their evacuation because of the limited sheltering options available to people who may be at parks, on a beach, or at other venues. Also, notifying the transient population of a staged evacuation would prove difficult.

4. Employees will also be assumed to evacuate without first sheltering.

Procedure

1. Trip generation for population groups in the 2 mile region will be as computed based upon the results of the telephone survey and analysis.

2. Trip generation for the population subject to staged evacuation will be formulated as follows:

a. Identify the 90th percentile evacuation time for the zones comprising the two mile region. This value, TScen*, is obtained from simulation results. It will become the time at which the region being sheltered will be told to evacuate for each scenario.

b. The resultant trip generation curves for staging are then formed as follows:

i. The nonshelter trip generation curve is followed until a maximum of 20%

of the total trips are generated (to account for shelter noncompliance).

ii. No additional trips are generated until time TScen*

iii. Following time TScen*, the balance of trips are generated:

1. by stepping up and then following the nonshelter trip generation curve (if TScen* is < max trip generation time) or

2. by stepping up to 100% (if TScen* is > max trip generation time)

c. Note: This procedure implies that there may be different staged trip generation distributions for different scenarios. NUREG/CR7002 uses the statement approximately 90th percentile as the time to end staging and begin evacuating.

The value of TScen* is 2:00 for nonsnow scenarios and 2:15 for snow scenarios.

3. Staged trip generation distributions are created for the following population groups:

a. Residents with returning commuters

b. Residents without returning commuters

c. Residents with returning commuters and snow conditions

d. Residents without returning commuters and snow conditions Figure 55 presents the staged trip generation distributions for both residents with and without returning commuters; the 90th percentile twomile evacuation time is 120 minutes for good weather or rain and 135 minutes for snow scenarios. At the 90th percentile evacuation time, 20% of the population (who normally would have completed their mobilization activities for an unstaged evacuation) advised to shelter has nevertheless departed the area. These people do not comply with the shelter advisory. Also included on the plot are the trip generation distributions for these groups as applied to the regions advised to evacuate immediately.

Since the 90th percentile evacuation time occurs before the end of the trip generation time, after the sheltered region is advised to evacuate, the shelter trip generation distribution rises to meet the balance of the nonstaged trip generation distribution. Following time TScen*, the Robinson Nuclear Plant 517 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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balance of staged evacuation trips that are ready to depart are released within 15 minutes. After TScen*+15, the remainder of evacuation trips are generated in accordance with the unstaged trip generation distribution.

Table 510 provides the trip generation histograms for staged evacuation.

5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas Annex 1 of the South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan states that South Carolina Department of Natural Resources will alert persons boating or fishing on Lake Robinson.

As indicated in Table 52, this study assumes 100% notification in 45 minutes (which is also in accordance with Darlington County RERP (Appendix A) and the 2012 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual). Table 5 9 indicates that all transients will have mobilized within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . It is assumed that this 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months timeframe is sufficient time for boaters, campers and other transients to return to their vehicles and begin their evacuation trip.

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Table 59. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Unstaged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period Residents Residents With Residents Residents with Without Commuters Without Time Duration Employees Transients Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution A) (Distribution A) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 4% 4% 0% 2% 0% 1%

2 15 23% 23% 0% 13% 0% 10%

3 15 35% 35% 4% 28% 3% 21%

4 15 22% 22% 10% 24% 7% 21%

5 15 10% 10% 15% 14% 13% 15%

6 15 4% 4% 17% 10% 14% 12%

7 15 1% 1% 16% 4% 14% 6%

8 15 1% 1% 12% 1% 13% 3%

9 15 0% 0% 9% 1% 9% 3%

10 30 0% 0% 10% 3% 13% 4%

11 30 0% 0% 5% 0% 7% 1%

12 30 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2%

13 30 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% 1%

14 60 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0%

15 600 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

NOTE:

Shadow vehicles are loaded onto the analysis network (Figure 12) using Distributions C and E for good weather and snow, respectively.

Special event vehicles are loaded using Distribution A.

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Trip Generation Distributions Employees/Transients Residents with Commuters Residents with no Commuters Res with Comm and Snow Res no Comm with Snow 100 80 60 40 20 Percent of Population Beginning Evacuation Trip 0

0 60 120 180 240 300 360 Elapsed Time from Evacuation Advisory (min)

Figure 54. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions Robinson Nuclear Plant 520 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 510. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period*

Residents Residents Residents with Without Residents With Without Time Duration Commuters Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 0% 0% 0% 0%

2 15 0% 3% 0% 2%

3 15 1% 6% 1% 4%

4 15 2% 4% 1% 5%

5 15 3% 3% 3% 3%

6 15 3% 2% 2% 2%

7 15 3% 1% 3% 1%

8 15 3% 0% 3% 1%

9 15 68% 78% 2% 0%

10 30 10% 3% 71% 78%

11 30 5% 0% 7% 1%

12 30 1% 0% 3% 2%

13 30 1% 0% 2% 1%

14 60 0% 0% 2% 0%

15 600 0% 0% 0% 0%

Trip Generation for Employees and Transients (see Table 59) is the same for Unstaged and Staged Evacuation.

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Staged and Unstaged Evacuation Trip Generation Employees / Transients Residents with Commuters Residents with no Commuters Res with Comm and Snow Res no Comm with Snow Staged Residents with Commuters Staged Residents with no Commuters Staged Residents with Commuters (Snow) 100 80 60

% of Population Evacuating 40 20 0

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 Elapsed Time from Evacuation Advisory (min)

Figure 55. Comparison of Staged and Unstaged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region Robinson Nuclear Plant 522 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS An evacuation case defines a combination of Evacuation Region and Evacuation Scenario.

The definitions of Region and Scenario are as follows:

Region A grouping of contiguous evacuating zones that forms either a keyhole sectorbased area, or a circular area within the EPZ, that must be evacuated in response to a radiological emergency.

Scenario A combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, and weather conditions. Scenarios define the number of people in each of the affected population groups and their respective mobilization time distributions.

A description of each scenario is provided below:

1. Summer Midweek Midday (good weather): This scenario represents a typical good weather daytime period when permanent residents are generally dispersed within the EPZ performing daily activities and major work places are at typical summer daytime levels. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; summer school is in session; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average summer levels; and recreational facilities are at average summer daytime levels.

2. Summer Midweek Midday (rain): This scenario represents an adverse weather (rainy) daytime period when permanent residents are generally dispersed within the EPZ performing daily activities and major work places are at typical summer daytime levels. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; summer schools are in session; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average summer levels; and recreational facilities are at average summer daytime levels.

3. Summer Weekend Midday (good weather): This scenario represents a typical good weather weekend period when permanent residents are both at home and dispersed within the EPZ performing typical summer weekend activities. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home or with their families; work places are staffed at typical weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average summer weekend levels; and recreational facilities are at average summer weekend levels.

4. Summer Weekend Midday (rain): This scenario represents a typical adverse weather (rainy) weekend period when permanent residents are both at home and dispersed within the EPZ performing typical summer weekend activities. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home or with their families; work places are staffed at typical weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average Robinson Nuclear Plant 61 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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summer weekend levels.

5. Summer Midweek and Weekend Evening (good): This scenario represents a typical good weather midweek or weekend evening period when permanent residents are generally at home with fewer dispersed within the EPZ performing evening activities.

This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical evening levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average summer evening levels; and recreational facilities are at average summer evening levels. External traffic is reduced.

6. Winter Midweek Midday (good): This scenario represents a typical good weather weekday period during the winter when school is in session and the work force is at a full daytime level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; students will evacuate directly from the schools; work places are fully staffed at typical daytime levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter levels; and recreational facilities are at winter daytime levels.

7. Winter Midweek Midday (rain): This scenario represents an adverse weather (rainy) weekday period during the winter when school is in session and the work force is at a full daytime level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; students will evacuate directly from the schools; work places are fully staffed at typical daytime levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter levels; and recreational facilities are at winter daytime levels.

8. Winter Midweek Midday (snow): This scenario represents an adverse weather (snowy) weekday period during the winter when school is in session and the work force is at a full daytime level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; students will evacuate directly from the schools; work places are fully staffed at typical daytime levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter levels; and recreational facilities are at winter daytime levels.

9. Winter Weekend Midday (good): This scenario reflects a typical good weather winter weekend period when permanent residents are both at home and dispersed within the EPZ, and the work force is at a winter weekend level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter weekend levels and recreational facilities are at winter weekend levels.

10. Winter Weekend Midday (rain): This scenario reflects an adverse weather (rainy) winter weekend period when permanent residents are both at home and dispersed within the EPZ, and the work force is at a winter weekend level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical Robinson Nuclear Plant 62 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter weekend levels and recreational facilities are at winter weekend levels.

11. Winter Weekend Midday (snow): This scenario reflects an adverse weather (snowy) winter weekend period when permanent residents are both at home and dispersed within the EPZ, and the work force is at a winter weekend level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter weekend levels and recreational facilities are at winter weekend levels.

12. Winter Midweek and Weekend Evening (good): This scenario reflects a typical good weather, winter midweek or weekend evening period when permanent residents are home and the work force is at a nighttime level. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical nighttime levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average winter levels; and recreational facilities are at winter evening levels.

13. Special Events (good): This scenario reflects a major NASCAR race weekend (second weekend in May) when there are peak tourist populations present within the EPZ.

Schools are closed and students are at home; work places are staffed at typical weekend levels; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at peak special event levels; and recreational facilities are at appropriate levels based on the time of year.

14. Roadway Impact Midweek Midday (good): This represents a summer scenario when one section of SR 151 is closed in the southbound direction, during a good weather daytime period when permanent residents are generally dispersed within the EPZ performing daily activities and major work places are at typical daytime levels. This scenario includes assumptions that permanent residents will evacuate from their place of residence; summer school is in session; hotel and motel facilities are occupied at average summer levels; and recreational facilities are at average summer daytime levels.

A total of 32 Regions were defined which encompass all the groupings of zones considered.

These Regions are defined in Table 61. The zones configurations are identified in Figure 61.

Each keyhole sectorbased area consists of a central circle centered at the power plant, and three adjoining sectors, each with a central angle of 22.5 degrees, as per NUREG/CR7002 guidance. The central sector coincides with the wind direction. These sectors extend to 5 miles from the plant (Regions R04 through R10) or to the EPZ boundary (Regions R11 through R24).

Regions R01, R02 and R03 represent evacuations of circular areas with radii of 2, 5 and 10 miles, respectively. Regions R02 and R04 through R10 are identical to Regions R32, and R25 through R31, respectively; however, those zones between 2 miles and 5 miles are staged until 90% of the 2mile region (Region R01) has evacuated.

A total of 14 Scenarios were evaluated for all Regions. Thus, there are a total of 32 x 14= 448 evacuation cases. Table 62 provides a description of all Scenarios.

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Each combination of region and scenario implies a specific population to be evacuated. Table 63 presents the percentage of each population group estimated to evacuate for each scenario.

Table 64 presents the vehicle counts for each scenario for an evacuation of Region R03 - the entire EPZ.

The population and vehicle estimates presented in Section 3 are peak values. These peak values are adjusted depending on the scenario and region being considered, using scenario and region specific percentages, such that the average population is considered for each evacuation case.

The scenario percentages are presented in Table 63, while the regional percentages are provided in Table H1. The percentages presented in Table 63 were determined as follows:

The number of residents with commuters during the week (when workforce is at its peak) is equal to the product of 48% (the number of households with at least one commuter) and 55%

(the number of households with a commuter that would await the return of the commuter prior to evacuating). See assumption 3 in Section 2.3. It is estimated for weekend and evening scenarios that 10% of households with returning commuters will have a commuter at work during those times.

Employment is assumed to be at its peak during the winter, midweek, midday scenarios.

Employment is reduced slightly (96%) for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. This is based on the estimation that 50% of the employees commuting into the EPZ will be on vacation for a week during the approximate 12 weeks of summer. It is further estimated that those taking vacation will be uniformly dispersed throughout the summer with approximately 4% of employees vacationing each week. It is further estimated that only 10% of the employees are working in the evenings and during the weekends.

Transient activity is estimated to be at its peak during summer weekends and less (40%) during the week. As shown in Appendix E, lodging is the primary source of transient activity offering overnight accommodations in the EPZ; thus, transient activity is estimated to be high during evening hours - 100% for summer and 50% for winter. Transient activity on winter weekends is estimated to be 40%.

As noted in the shadow footnote to Table 63, the shadow percentages are computed using a base of 20% (see assumption 5 in Section 2.2); to include the employees within the shadow region who may choose to evacuate, the voluntary evacuation is multiplied by a scenario specific proportion of employees to permanent residents in the shadow region. For example, using the values provided in Table 64 for Scenario 1, the shadow percentage is computed as follows:

2,668 20% 1 23%

5,046 14,143 One special event - NASCAR Race at Darlington Raceway - was considered as Scenario 13.

Thus, the special event traffic is 100% evacuated for Scenario 13, and 0% for all other scenarios.

It is estimated that summer school enrollment is approximately 10% of enrollment during the Robinson Nuclear Plant 64 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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regular school year for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. School is not in session during weekends and evenings, thus no buses for school children are needed under those circumstances. As discussed in Section 7, schools are in session during the winter season, midweek, midday and 100% of buses will be needed under those circumstances. Transit buses for the transitdependent population are set to 100% for all scenarios as it is assumed that the transitdependent population is present in the EPZ for all scenarios.

External traffic is estimated to be reduced by 60% during evening scenarios and is 100% for all other scenarios.

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Table 61. Description of Evacuation Regions Zone Wind Direction Region Description From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 R01 2Mile Ring N/A X R02 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X R03 Full EPZ N/A X X X X X X X X X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R04 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R05 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R06 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R07 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R08 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R08) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R09 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R10 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary R11 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X R12 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X R13 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X R14 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X R15 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X (R15) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X R16 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X R17 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X Evacuate 5Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R18 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X X X R19 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X X X R20 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X X X X R21 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X X X R22 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X X X (R22) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X X X R23 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X X X R24 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X X X X Robinson Nuclear Plant 66 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R25 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R26 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R27 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R28 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R29 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R29) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R30 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R31 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X R32 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) Evacuate until 90% ETE for R01, then Evacuate Note: Regions that are repeated for a different wind direction are written in parentheses Robinson Nuclear Plant 67 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 61. RNP Zones Robinson Nuclear Plant 68 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 62. Evacuation Scenario Definitions Day of Time of Scenario Season1 Week Day Weather Special 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None Midweek, 5 Summer Weekend Evening Good None 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None Midweek, 12 Winter Weekend Evening Good None 13 Winter Weekend Midday Good Darlington NASCAR Race Roadway Impact -

Roadway Closure on SR 14 Summer Midweek Midday Good 151 Southbound 1

Winter means that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer means that school is not in session.

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Table 63. Percent of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios Households Households With Without External Returning Returning Special School Transit Through Scenario Commuters Commuters Employees Transients Shadow Events Buses Buses Traffic 1 26% 74% 96% 60% 23% 0% 10% 100% 100%

2 26% 74% 96% 60% 23% 0% 10% 100% 100%

3 3% 97% 10% 70% 20% 0% 0% 100% 100%

4 3% 97% 10% 70% 20% 0% 0% 100% 100%

5 3% 97% 10% 100% 20% 0% 0% 100% 40%

6 26% 74% 100% 20% 23% 0% 100% 100% 100%

7 26% 74% 100% 20% 23% 0% 100% 100% 100%

8 26% 74% 100% 20% 23% 0% 100% 100% 100%

9 3% 97% 10% 40% 20% 0% 0% 100% 100%

10 3% 97% 10% 40% 20% 0% 0% 100% 100%

11 3% 97% 10% 40% 20% 0% 0% 100% 100%

12 3% 97% 10% 50% 20% 0% 0% 100% 40%

13 3% 97% 10% 40% 20% 100% 0% 100% 100%

14 26% 74% 96% 60% 23% 0% 10% 100% 100%

Resident Households with Commuters .......Households of EPZ residents who await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip.

Resident Households with No Commuters ..Households of EPZ residents who do not have commuters or will not await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip.

Employees..................................................EPZ employees who live outside the EPZ Transients ..................................................People who are in the EPZ at the time of an accident for recreational or other (nonemployment) purposes.

Shadow ......................................................Residents and employees in the shadow region (outside of the EPZ) who will spontaneously decide to relocate during the evacuation. The basis for the values shown is a 20% relocation of shadow residents along with a proportional percentage of shadow employees.

Special Events ............................................Additional vehicles in the EPZ due to the identified special event.

School and Transit Buses ............................Vehicleequivalents present on the road during evacuation servicing schools and transitdependent people (1 bus is equivalent to 2 passenger vehicles).

External Through Traffic .............................Traffic on interstates/freeways and major arterial roads at the start of the evacuation. This traffic is stopped by access control approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after the evacuation begins.

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Table 64. Vehicle Estimates by Scenario Households Households With Without Total Returning Returning Special School Transit External Scenario Scenario Commuters Commuters Employees Transients Shadow Events Buses Buses Through Traffic Vehicles 1 5,046 14,143 2,668 74 2,184 52 86 11,216 35,469 2 5,046 14,143 2,668 74 2,184 52 86 11,216 35,469 3 505 18,684 278 86 1,945 86 11,216 32,800 4 505 18,684 278 86 1,945 86 11,216 32,800 5 505 18,684 278 123 1,945 86 4,486 26,107 6 5,046 14,143 2,779 25 2,195 524 86 11,216 36,014 7 5,046 14,143 2,779 25 2,195 524 86 11,216 36,014 8 5,046 14,143 2,779 25 2,195 524 86 11,216 36,014 9 505 18,684 278 49 1,945 86 11,216 32,763 10 505 18,684 278 49 1,945 86 11,216 32,763 11 505 18,684 278 49 1,945 86 11,216 32,763 12 505 18,684 278 62 1,945 86 4,486 26,046 13 505 18,684 278 49 1,945 15,000 86 11,216 47,763 14 5,046 14,143 2,668 74 2,184 52 86 11,216 35,469 Note: Vehicle estimates are for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03)

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7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE)

This section presents the ETE results of the computer analyses using the DYNEV II System described in Appendices B, C and D. These results cover 32 regions within the RNP EPZ and the 14 Evacuation Scenarios discussed in Section 6.

The ETE for all Evacuation Cases are presented in Table 71 and Table 72. These tables present the estimated times to clear the indicated population percentages from the Evacuation Regions for all Evacuation Scenarios. The ETE of the 2mile region in both staged and unstaged regions are presented in Table 73 and Table 74. Table 75 defines the Evacuation Regions considered.

The tabulated values of ETE are obtained from the DYNEV II System outputs which are generated at 5minute intervals.

7.1 Shadow Evacuation Shadow evacuees are people within 15 miles of the RNP for which an Advisory to Evacuate (ATE) has not been issued, yet who elect to evacuate. Shadow evacuation is assumed to take place over the same time frame as the evacuation from within the impacted Evacuation Region.

The ETE for the RNP EPZ addresses the issue of shadow evacuees in the manner shown in Figure

71. Within the EPZ, 20 percent of people located in zones outside of the evacuation region who are not advised to evacuate, are assumed to elect to evacuate. Similarly, it is assumed that 20 percent of those people in the Shadow Region will choose to leave the area.

Figure 72 presents the area identified as the Shadow Region. This region extends radially from the plant to cover a region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles. The population and number of evacuating vehicles in the Shadow Region were estimated using the same methodology that was used for permanent residents within the EPZ (see Section 3.1). As discussed in Section 3.2, it is estimated that a total of 18,030 people reside in the Shadow Region; 20 percent of them would evacuate. See Table 64 for the number of evacuating vehicles from the Shadow Region.

Traffic generated within this Shadow Region (including externalexternal traffic), traveling away from the RNP location, has the potential for impeding evacuating vehicles from within the Evacuation Region. All ETE calculations include this shadow traffic movement.

7.2 Staged Evacuation As defined in NUREG/CR7002, staged evacuation consists of the following:

1. Zones comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately.

2. Zones comprising regions extending from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter inplace while the two mile region is cleared.

3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation while they shelter.

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4. The population sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region is advised to evacuate when approximately 90% of the 2 mile region evacuating traffic crosses the 2 mile region boundary.

5. Noncompliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20%.

See Section 5.4.2 for additional information on staged evacuation.

7.3 Patterns of Traffic Congestion during Evacuation Figure 73 through Figure 77 illustrate the patterns of traffic congestion that arise for the case when the entire EPZ (Region R03) is advised to evacuate during the summer, midweek, midday period under good weather conditions (Scenario 1).

Traffic congestion, as the term is used here, is defined as Level of Service (LOS) F. LOS F is defined as follows (HCM 2010, page 55):

The HCM uses LOS F to define operations that have either broken down (i.e., demand exceeds capacity) or have exceeded a specified service measure value, or combination of service measure values, that most users would consider unsatisfactory. However, particularly for planning applications where different alternatives may be compared, analysts may be interested in knowing just how bad the LOS F condition is. Several measures are available to describe individually, or in combination, the severity of a LOS F condition:

Demandtocapacity ratios describe the extent to which capacity is exceeded during the analysis period (e.g., by 1%, 15%, etc.);

Duration of LOS F describes how long the condition persists (e.g., 15 min, 1 h, 3 h); and

Spatial extent measures describe the areas affected by LOS F conditions. These include measures such as the back of queue, and the identification of the specific intersection approaches or system elements experiencing LOS F conditions.

All highway "links" which experience LOS F are delineated in these figures by a thick red line; all others are lightly indicated. Congestion develops rapidly around concentrations of population and traffic bottlenecks. At 40 minutes after the ATE, Figure 73 displays the developing congestion in and around Hartsville to the southeast of RNP. Vehicles exiting the EPZ via Old Camden Road meet a stop sign at SR 102 (Patrick Highway), hence that approach is LOS F. There are delays caused by turning traffic at the intersections of US 15 business (Hartsville Highway) with US 15 (N. Marquis Highway) and US 15 (Hartsville Highway) with Dovesville Highway.

By 1:00 after the ATE, congestion has intensified, but is still limited to the eastern half of the EPZ (Figure 74); all roadways within the western half are LOS D or better. Congestion is evident on SR 151, especially where other roadways intersect it. There is no congestion within 2 miles of the plant.

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At one hour and 50 minutes after the ATE, there are still some congested roadways at the periphery of the 5mile region, most notably at the intersections of South 4th Street and SR 151.

Closer to the plant and on the western half of the EPZ, traffic is able to travel at freeflow speed (LOS A). Outside the EPZ there is congestion at the entrances to I20, Lamar Highway and US 52, as shown in Figure 75.

By 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and 45 minutes after the ATE, as shown in Figure 76, there is only one roadway section within the EPZ with LOS F the approach to Patrick Highway from Old Camden Road.

Over the next five minutes, the remaining congestion in the EPZ clears and only the approach to Hartsville Highway from Old Camden Road and roadways in the vicinity of the Darlington raceway are at LOS F. By 3:30 after the ATE, all network links are at LOS A and the people who take the longest to mobilize can evacuate at freeflow speed.

7.4 Evacuation Rates Evacuation is a continuous process, as implied by Figure 78 through Figure 721. These figures illustrate the rate at which traffic flows out of the indicated areas for the case of an evacuation of the full EPZ (Region R03) under the indicated conditions. One figure is presented for each scenario considered.

As shown in Figure 78, there is typically a long "tail" to these distributions. Vehicles begin to evacuate an area slowly at first, as people respond to the ATE at different rates. Then traffic demand builds rapidly (slopes of curves increase). When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ at rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand.

This decline in aggregate flow rate, towards the end of the process, is characterized by these curves flattening and gradually becoming horizontal. Ideally, it would be desirable to fully saturate all evacuation routes equally so that all will service traffic near capacity levels and all will clear at the same time. For this ideal situation, all curves would retain the same slope until the end - thus minimizing evacuation time. In reality, this ideal is generally unattainable reflecting the spatial variation in population density, mobilization rates and in highway capacity over the EPZ.

7.5 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Results Table 71 and Table 72 present the ETE values for all 32 Evacuation Regions and all 14 Evacuation Scenarios. Table 73 and Table 74 present the ETE values for the 2Mile region for both staged and unstaged keyhole regions downwind to 5 miles. The tables are organized as follows:

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Table Contents ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent of the 71 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios.

ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 72 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios.

ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent of the 73 population within the 2mile Region, to evacuate from that Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacuations.

ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 74 population within the 2mile Region, to evacuate from that Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacuations.

The animation snapshots described above reflect the ETE statistics for the concurrent (un staged) evacuation scenarios and regions, which are displayed in Figure 73 through Figure 77.

Most of the congestion is located to the east and southeast of the plant in Zones B1, B2 and C 2; the most intense congestion is beyond the 5mile area. This is reflected in the ETE statistics:

The 90th percentile ETE for Regions R01 and R02 (2 and 5mile areas) are comparable and generally range between 1:55 (hr:min) and 2:10 for good weather cases and between 2:00 and 2:35 for adverse weather cases.

The 90th percentile ETE for Regions R03 (full EPZ) and keyhole regions that extend to the EPZ boundary are noticeably longer for those regions including both B1 and B2 because of the number of evacuees that originate from Hartsville and converge onto the major evacuation routes.

The 100th percentile ETE for all Regions and for all Scenarios are close to the mobilization times.

This fact implies that the congestion within the EPZ dissipates prior to the end of mobilization, as is displayed in Figure 77.

The 100th percentile ETE for snow cases are generally one hour longer than that for good weather; at the 90th percentile level the difference is closer to 20 minutes. Almost all this increase is due to the longer mobilization time for residents when it is snowing (see Section 5, Figure 54).

Comparison of Scenarios 9 and 13 in Table 71 indicates that the Special Event - a NASCAR Race at Darlington Raceway - has a small impact on the ETE for the 90th percentile. There is a consistent increase in ETE for regions including both Zone B1 and Zone B2 (R03, R11, R15, R16, R17, R18, R22, R23, and R24), but this trend is also seen in the other scenarios, as noted above and therefore cannot be attributed to the special event. Although the race weekend draws a large number of transients into the area and the evacuation of the additional 15,000 vehicles increases congestion around the raceway and along SR 151, vehicles exiting the EPZ are not delayed sufficiently to impact the 90th and 100th percentile ETE. Also note that the trip Robinson Nuclear Plant 74 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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generation time for transients is shorter than that of residents. However, when considering the network as a whole, the impact of this event is very significant; the combination of the evacuee and special event vehicles causes congestion in the network for approximately six and a half hours.

Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 71 indicates that the roadway closure - closure of the section of SR 151 southbound between Bethel Road and Faith Road - can increase the 90th percentile ETE by up to 15 minutes for evacuation of the more populous regions. For most regions, however, there is sufficient capacity on neighboring routes to accommodate the evacuating flow.

NUREG/CR7002 recommends that the ETE study consider potential enhancements that could improve ETE. According to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) timeline for the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station, nearly 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months elapsed between the loss of power at the site and the first release to the atmosphere. The 90th percentile ETE for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R02) is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months for all scenarios. The possible countermeasures to reduce ETE are:

Reduce the number of vehicles on the road by educating the public to use fewer vehicles to evacuate. This is very difficult to implement as evacuees are unlikely to leave a significant economic asset such as a personal vehicle behind.

Use contraflow or reverselaning. This technique is so manpower and equipment intensive, 90 percent of evacuees will have already left the EPZ by the time contraflow is established. As such, ETE benefits would be minimal. Also, contraflow is a significant liability in that vehicles are traveling the wrong way on a road. Most offsite agencies are hesitant to use contraflow for this reason alone.

Identify special treatments at critical intersections - i.e. if northbound and eastbound are both viable evacuation directions from the plant, cones and barricades could be used to channelize the intersection such that one traffic stream is directed northbound and the other eastbound to eliminate any vehicle conflict at the intersection and keep the intersection flowing continuously. This is also manpower and equipment dependent and will have little impact on ETE.

No enhancements are recommended for this site. The 90th percentile ETE are significantly less than the elapsed time before a release during the recent nuclear accident in Japan. Significant manpower and equipment would be needed to implement potential enhancements. The time needed to secure needed personnel and equipment would offset any potential ETE benefits.

7.6 Staged Evacuation Results Table 73 and Table 74 present a comparison of the ETE compiled for the concurrent (un staged) and staged evacuation studies. Note that Regions R25 through R32 are the same geographic areas as Regions R04 through R10 and R02, respectively.

To determine whether the staged evacuation strategy is worthy of consideration, one must show that the ETE for the 2 Mile region can be reduced without significantly affecting the Robinson Nuclear Plant 75 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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region between 2 miles and 5 miles. In all cases, as shown in these tables, the 90th percentile ETE for the 2 mile region is unchanged or longer when a staged evacuation is implemented. The reason for this is that the congestion within the 5mile area does not extend upstream to the extent that it penetrates to within 2 miles of the RNP; in fact any congestion within the 5mile region (comprising of A0, A1, B1, C1, D1 and E1) is limited to the extremities.

Consequently, there is no impedance to evacuees from within the 2mile area. Therefore, staging the evacuation provides no benefits to evacuees from within the 2 mile region and unnecessarily delays the evacuation of those beyond 2 miles.

While failing to provide assistance to evacuees from within 2 miles of the RNP, staging has a significant negative impact on the ETE for those evacuating from within the 5mile area. A comparison of ETE between R25 through R31 with R04 through R10 and R32 with R02 reveals that staging retards the 90th percentile ETE for those in the 2 to 5mile area by up to 45 minutes (see Table 71). This extending of ETE is due to delaying the beginning of the evacuation trip of those who shelter.

Since the 100% mobilization time is considerably longer than the staging time, the 100th percentile ETE is not impacted by staging (see Table 72).

In summary, the staged evacuation protective action strategy provides no benefits and adversely impacts many evacuees located beyond 2 miles from the RNP.

7.7 Guidance on Using ETE Tables The user first determines the percentile of population for which the ETE is sought (The NRC guidance calls for the 90th percentile). The applicable value of ETE within the chosen Table may then be identified using the following procedure:

1. Identify the applicable Scenario:

Season Summer Winter (also Autumn and Spring)

Day of Week Midweek Weekend

Time of Day Midday Evening

Weather Condition Good Weather Rain Snow

Special Event Darlington NASCAR Race Road Closure (A section of SR 151 SB is closed)

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No, Staged Evacuation is not considered Yes, Staged Evacuation is considered While these Scenarios are designed, in aggregate, to represent conditions throughout the year, some further clarification is warranted:

The conditions of a summer evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (2) and (4) apply.

The conditions of a winter evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (7) and (10) for rain apply.

The conditions of a winter evening (either midweek or weekend) and snow are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (8) and (11) for snow apply.

The seasons are defined as follows:

Summer assumes that public schools are not in session.

Winter (includes Spring and Autumn) considers that public schools are in session.

Time of Day: Midday implies the time over which most commuters are at work or are travelling to/from work.

2. With the desired percentile ETE and Scenario identified, now identify the Evacuation Region:

Determine the projected azimuth direction of the plume (coincident with the wind direction). This direction is expressed in terms of compass orientation: from N, NNE, NE,

Determine the distance that the Evacuation Region will extend from the nuclear power plant. The applicable distances and their associated candidate Regions are given below:

2 Miles (Region R01)

To 5 Miles (Region R02, R04 through R10)

To EPZ Boundary (Regions R03, R11 through R24)

Enter Table 75 and identify the applicable group of candidate Regions based on the distance that the selected Region extends from the RNP. Select the Evacuation Region identifier in that row, based on the azimuth direction of the plume, from the first column of the Table.

3. Determine the ETE Table based on the percentile selected. Then, for the Scenario identified in Step 1 and the Region identified in Step 2, proceed as follows:

The columns of Table 71 are labeled with the Scenario numbers. Identify the proper column in the selected Table using the Scenario number defined in Step 1.

Identify the row in this table that provides ETE values for the Region identified in Step 2.

The unique data cell defined by the column and row so determined contains the desired value of ETE expressed in Hours:Minutes.

Example It is desired to identify the ETE for the following conditions:

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Sunday, August 10th at 4:00 AM.

It is raining.

Wind direction is from the northeast (NE).

Wind speed is such that the distance to be evacuated is judged to be a 5mile radius and downwind to 10 miles (to EPZ boundary).

The desired ETE is that value needed to evacuate 90 percent of the population from within the impacted Region.

A staged evacuation is not desired.

Table 71 is applicable because the 90th percentile ETE is desired. Proceed as follows:

1. Identify the Scenario as summer, weekend, evening and raining. Entering Table 71, it is seen that there is no match for these descriptors. However, the clarification given above assigns this combination of circumstances to Scenario 4.

2. Enter Table 75 and locate the Region described as Evacuate 5Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary for wind direction from the NE (towards the SW) and read Region R19 in the first column of that row.

3. Enter Table 71 to locate the data cell containing the value of ETE for Scenario 4 and Region R19. This data cell is in column (4) and in the row for Region R19; it contains the ETE value of 2:05.

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Table 71. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2Mile Region, 5Mile Region, and EPZ R01 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R02 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R03 2:30 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:15 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:30 2:30 2:50 2:15 2:35 2:45 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R05 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:50 2:00 2:05 R06 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R07 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:50 2:00 2:05 R08 2:10 2:15 2:00 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 2:00 2:00 2:20 1:50 2:00 2:10 R09 2:10 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:10 R10 2:05 2:15 1:55 2:00 1:50 2:10 2:15 2:35 1:55 2:00 2:20 1:50 1:55 2:05 2Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R11 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:15 2:35 2:45 R12 2:10 2:10 2:05 2:05 1:55 2:10 2:10 2:25 2:05 2:05 2:20 1:55 2:05 2:20 R13 2:10 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:10 2:10 2:20 2:05 2:05 2:20 2:00 2:05 2:15 R14 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:10 2:20 2:00 2:05 2:15 1:55 2:00 2:05 R15 2:30 2:40 2:20 2:25 2:10 2:30 2:40 3:05 2:20 2:25 2:45 2:10 2:55 2:40 R16 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:50 2:10 2:30 2:45 R17 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:15 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:15 2:35 2:45 5Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R18 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:10 2:30 2:45 R19 2:10 2:20 2:00 2:05 1:50 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:00 2:05 2:25 1:50 2:00 2:30 R20 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 1:55 2:10 2:20 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:30 1:55 2:05 2:20 R21 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:10 2:20 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:25 2:00 2:05 2:15 R22 2:30 2:40 2:20 2:25 2:10 2:30 2:40 3:05 2:20 2:25 2:45 2:10 2:45 2:40 Robinson Nuclear Plant 79 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact R23 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:50 2:10 2:30 2:45 R24 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:30 2:10 2:35 2:45 3:10 2:25 2:30 2:55 2:10 2:30 2:45 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R25 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:45 2:45 R26 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:20 R27 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:35 2:15 2:15 2:35 2:20 2:15 2:15 R28 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:15 R29 2:45 2:50 2:45 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:50 3:10 2:45 2:50 3:10 2:45 2:45 2:45 R30 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 2:45 R31 2:45 2:50 2:50 2:50 2:45 2:45 2:55 3:15 2:50 2:50 3:15 2:45 2:50 2:45 R32 2:40 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:40 2:45 3:00 2:45 2:45 3:00 2:45 2:45 2:40 Robinson Nuclear Plant 710 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 72. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2Mile Region, 5Mile Region, and EPZ R01 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 R02 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R03 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:35 4:50 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R05 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R06 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R07 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R08 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R09 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R10 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 2Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R11 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:45 R12 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R13 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R14 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:35 4:30 R16 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 R17 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 5Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary (10 miles)

R18 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 R19 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R20 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R21 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 R22 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 Robinson Nuclear Plant 711 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact R23 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:45 R24 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 5:25 4:25 4:25 4:50 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R25 4:25 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 4:25 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 R26 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R27 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R28 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R29 4:25 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:25 R30 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 R31 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 R32 4:30 4:30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 4:30 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:30 Robinson Nuclear Plant 712 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 73. Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region 5Mile Region R01 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R02 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R04 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R05 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R06 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R07 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:05 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:05 2:10 1:55 2:00 2:05 R08 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R09 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 R10 2:05 2:05 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:00 2:00 2:10 1:55 1:55 2:05 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R25 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R26 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R27 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R28 2:05 2:10 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:10 2:15 2:05 2:05 2:15 2:05 2:00 2:05 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R30 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R31 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 R32 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:15 2:30 2:15 2:10 2:15 Robinson Nuclear Plant 713 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 74. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Winter Summer Midweek Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)

Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Region Good Good Good Good Good Good Special Roadway Rain Rain Rain Snow Rain Snow Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region 5Mile Region R01 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 5:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 R02 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Unstaged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R04 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R05 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R06 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R07 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:15 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R08 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R09 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R10 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Region and Keyhole to 5Miles R25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R26 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R27 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R28 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R29 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R30 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R31 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 R32 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 5:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Robinson Nuclear Plant 714 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 75. Description of Evacuation Regions Wind Direction Zone Region Description From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 R01 2Mile Ring N/A X R02 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X R03 Full EPZ N/A X X X X X X X X X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R04 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R05 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R06 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R07 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R08 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R08) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R09 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R10 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X Evacuate 2Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary R11 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X R12 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X R13 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X R14 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X R15 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X (R15) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X R16 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X R17 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X Evacuate 5Mile Radius and Downwind to the EPZ Boundary Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R18 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X X X X X X R19 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X X X X X X R20 East > 078 <= 112 X X X X X X X X R21 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X X X X X R22 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X X X X X X (R22) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X X X X X X R23 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X X X X X X R24 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X X X X X X X Robinson Nuclear Plant 715 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Wind Direction Zone Region Description From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 Staged Evacuation 2Mile Radius Evacuates, then Evacuate Downwind to 5 Miles Wind Zone Wind Direction Region Direction From: (Degrees) A0 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 From:

R25 North > 328 <= 015 X X X X R26 Northeast > 015 <= 078 X X X X R27 East > 078 <= 112 X X X R28 Southeast > 112 <=157 X X X X R29 South > 157 <= 202 X X X X (R29) Southwest > 202 <= 247 X X X X R30 West > 247 <= 292 X X X X R31 Northwest > 292 <= 328 X X X R32 5Mile Ring N/A X X X X X X Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) ShelterinPlace Zone(s) Evacuate until 90% ETE for R01, then Evacuate Note: Regions that are repeated for a different wind direction are written in parentheses Robinson Nuclear Plant 716 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 71. Shadow Evacuation Methodology Robinson Nuclear Plant 717 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 72. RNP Shadow Region Robinson Nuclear Plant 718 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 73. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate Robinson Nuclear Plant 719 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 74. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour after the Advisory to Evacuate Robinson Nuclear Plant 720 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 75. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour and 50 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate Robinson Nuclear Plant 721 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 76. Congestion Patterns at 2 Hours and 45 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate Robinson Nuclear Plant 722 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 77. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours after the Advisory to Evacuate Robinson Nuclear Plant 723 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 1) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 78. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 1 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 79. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 2 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 724 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 3) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 710. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 3 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 711. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 4 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 725 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 5) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 712. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 5 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 6) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 713. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 6 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 726 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 714. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 7 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 715. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 8 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 727 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 9) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 716. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 9 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 717. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 10 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 728 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

30 25 Vehicles Evacuating 20 15 (Thousands) 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 718. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 11 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 12) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

30 25 Vehicles Evacuating 20 15 (Thousands) 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 719. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 12 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 729 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good, Special Event (Scenario 13) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 720. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 13 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) 2Mile Region 5Mile Region Entire EPZ 90% 100%

35 30 Vehicles Evacuating 25 20 (Thousands) 15 10 5

0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min)

Figure 721. Evacuation Time Estimates Scenario 14 for Region R03 Robinson Nuclear Plant 730 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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8 TRANSITDEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES This section details the analyses applied and the results obtained in the form of evacuation time estimates for transit vehicles (buses, vans, ambulances and wheelchair transport vehicles). The demand for transit service reflects the needs of four population groups: (1) residents with no vehicles available; (2) students attending schools; (3) residents of medical facilities; and (4) homebound special needs population.

These transit vehicles mix with the general evacuation traffic that is comprised mostly of passenger cars (pcs). The presence of each transit vehicle in the evacuating traffic stream is represented within the modeling paradigm described in Appendix D as equivalent to two pcs.

This equivalence factor represents the longer size and more sluggish operating characteristics of a transit vehicle, relative to those of a pc.

Transit vehicles must be mobilized in preparation for their respective evacuation missions.

Specifically:

Bus drivers must be alerted

They must travel to the bus depot

They must be briefed there and assigned to a route or facility These activities consume time. Based on discussion with the offsite agencies, it is estimated that bus mobilization time will average approximately 90 minutes extending from the Advisory to Evacuate, to the time when buses first arrive at the facility to be evacuated. The location of bus depots impacts the time to travel from the bus depots to the facilities being evacuated.

Locations of bus depots were not identified in this study. Rather, the offsite agencies were asked to factor the location of the depots and the distance to the EPZ into the estimate of mobilization time.

The current public information disseminated to residents of the Robinson Nuclear Plant EPZ indicates that schoolchildren will be evacuated to relocation centers at emergency classifications of Site Area Emergency or higher, and that parents should pick schoolchildren up at school relocation centers. As discussed in Section 2, this study assumes a rapidly escalating event at the plant wherein evacuation is ordered promptly and no early protective actions have been implemented. Therefore, children are evacuated to relocation centers. Picking up children at school could add to traffic congestion at the schools, delaying the departure of the buses evacuating schoolchildren, which may have to return in a subsequent wave to the EPZ to evacuate the transitdependent population. This report provides estimates of buses under the assumption that no children will be picked up by their parents (in accordance with NUREG/CR 7002), to present an upper bound estimate of buses required. It is assumed that children at daycare centers are picked up by parents or guardians and that the time to perform this activity is included in the trip generation times discussed in Section 5.

The procedure for computing transitdependent ETE is to:

Estimate demand for transit service Robinson Nuclear Plant 81 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Estimate time to perform all transit functions

Estimate route travel times to the EPZ boundary and to the relocation centers 8.1 Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate The telephone survey (see Appendix F) results were used to estimate the portion of the population requiring transit service:

Those persons in households that do not have a vehicle available.

Those persons in households that do have vehicle(s) that would not be available at the time the evacuation is advised.

In the latter group, the vehicle(s) may be used by a commuter(s) who does not return (or is not expected to return) home to evacuate the household.

Table 81 presents estimates of transitdependent people. Note:

Estimates of persons requiring transit vehicles include schoolchildren. For those evacuation scenarios where children are at school when an evacuation is ordered, separate transportation is provided for the schoolchildren. The actual need for transit vehicles by residents is thereby less than the given estimates. However, estimates of transit vehicles are not reduced when schools are in session.

It is reasonable and appropriate to consider that many transitdependent persons will evacuate by ridesharing with neighbors, friends or family. For example, nearly 80 percent of those who evacuated from Mississauga, Ontario who did not use their own cars, shared a ride with neighbors or friends. Other documents report that approximately 70 percent of transit dependent persons were evacuated via ride sharing. We will adopt a conservative estimate that 50 percent of transit dependent persons will ride share, in accordance with NUREG/CR7002.

The estimated number of bus trips needed to service transitdependent persons is based on an estimate of average bus occupancy of 30 persons at the conclusion of the bus run. Transit vehicle seating capacities typically equal or exceed 60 children on average (roughly equivalent to 40 adults). If transit vehicle evacuees are two thirds adults and one third children, then the number of adult seats taken by 30 persons is 20 + (2/3 x10) = 27. On this basis, the average load factor anticipated is (27/40) x 100 = 68 percent. Thus, if the actual demand for service exceeds the estimates of Table 81 by 50 percent, the demand for service can still be accommodated by the available bus seating capacity.

2 20 10 40 1.5 1.00 3

Table 81 indicates that transportation must be provided for 1, 130 people. Therefore, a total of at least 38 bus runs are required to transport this population to relocation centers.

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To illustrate this estimation procedure, we calculate the number of persons, P, requiring public transit or rideshare, and the number of buses, B, required for the RNP EPZ:

Where, A = Percent of households with commuters C = Percent of households who will not await the return of a commuter 15,827 0.071 1.37 0.263 1.72 1 0.48 0.45 0.41 2.24 2 0.48 0.45 15,827 0.1428 2,260 0.5 30 38 These calculations are explained as follows:

All members (1.37 avg.) of households (HH) with no vehicles (7.1%) will evacuate by public transit or rideshare. The term 15,827 (number of households) x 0.071 x 1.37 accounts for these people.

The members of HH with 1 vehicle away (26.3%), who are at home, equal (1.721).

The number of HH where the commuter will not return home is equal to (15,827 x 0.263 x 0.48 x 0.45), as 48% of EPZ households have a commuter, 45% of which would not return home in the event of an emergency. The number of persons who will evacuate by public transit or rideshare is equal to the product of these two terms.

The members of HH with 2 vehicles that are away (41.0%), who are at home, equal (2.24 - 2). The number of HH where neither commuter will return home is equal to 15,827 x 0.41 x (0.48 x 0.45)2. The number of persons who will evacuate by public transit or rideshare is equal to the product of these two terms (the last term is squared to represent the probability that neither commuter will return).

Households with 3 or more vehicles are assumed to have no need for transit vehicles.

The total number of persons requiring public transit is the sum of such people in HH with no vehicles, or with 1 or 2 vehicles that are away from home.

The estimate of transitdependent population in Table 81 far exceeds the number of registered transitdependent persons in the EPZ as provided by the counties (discussed below in Section 8.5). This is consistent with the findings of NUREG/CR6953, Volume 2, in that a large majority of the transitdependent population within the EPZs of U.S. nuclear plants does not register with their local emergency response agency.

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8.2 School Population - Transit Demand Table 82 presents the school population and transportation requirements for the direct evacuation of all schools within the EPZ for the 20112012 school year. This information was provided by the local county emergency management agencies. The column in Table 82 entitled Buses Required specifies the number of buses required for each school under the following set of assumptions and estimates:

No students will be picked up by their parents prior to the arrival of the buses.

While many high school students commute to school using private automobiles (as discussed in Section 2.4 of NUREG/CR7002), the estimate of buses required for school evacuation does not consider the use of these private vehicles.

Bus capacity, expressed in students per bus, is set to 70 for primary schools and 50 for middle and high schools.

Those staff members who do not accompany the students will evacuate in their private vehicles.

No allowance is made for student absenteeism, typically 3 percent daily.

Implementation of a process to confirm individual school transportation needs prior to bus dispatch may improve bus utilization. In this way, the number of buses dispatched to the schools will reflect the actual number needed. The need for buses would be reduced by any high school students who have evacuated using private automobiles (if permitted by school authorities). Those buses originally allocated to evacuate school children that are not needed due to children being picked up by their parents, can be gainfully assigned to service other facilities or those persons who do not have access to private vehicles or to ridesharing.

Table 83 presents a list of the school relocation centers for each school in the EPZ. Students will be transported to these centers where they will be subsequently retrieved by their respective families.

8.3 Medical Facility Demand Table 84 presents the census of medical facilities in the EPZ. 300 people have been identified as living in, or being treated in, these facilities. The capacity and current census for each facility were provided by the county emergency management agencies. This data includes the number of ambulatory, wheelchairbound and bedridden patients at each facility.

The transportation requirements for the medical facility population are also presented in Table

84. The number of ambulance runs is determined by assuming that 1 patient can be accommodated per ambulance trip for critical patients and 2 people for noncritical; the number of wheelchair van runs assumes 4 wheelchairs per trip and the number of bus runs estimated assumes 30 ambulatory patients per trip.

8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People EPZ bus resources are assigned to evacuating schoolchildren (if school is in session at the time Robinson Nuclear Plant 84 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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of the ATE) as the first priority in the event of an emergency. In the event that the allocation of buses dispatched from the depots to the various facilities and to the bus routes is somewhat inefficient, or if there is a shortfall of available drivers, then there may be a need for some buses to return to the EPZ from the relocation center after completing their first evacuation trip, to complete a second wave of providing transport service to evacuees. For this reason, the ETE for the transitdependent population was calculated for both a one wave transit evacuation and for two waves. Of course, if the impacted Evacuation Region is other than R03 (the entire EPZ), then there will likely be ample transit resources relative to demand in the impacted Region and this discussion of a second wave would likely not apply.

When school evacuation needs are satisfied, subsequent assignments of buses to service the transitdependent should be sensitive to their mobilization time. Clearly, the buses should be dispatched after people have completed their mobilization activities and are in a position to board the buses when they arrive at the pickup points.

Evacuation Time Estimates for transit trips were developed using both good weather and adverse weather conditions. Figure 81 presents the chronology of events relevant to transit operations. The elapsed time for each activity will now be discussed with reference to Figure 81.

Activity: Mobilize Drivers (ABC)

Mobilization is the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the time the buses arrive at the facility to be evacuated. It is assumed that for a rapidly escalating radiological emergency with no observable indication before the fact, school bus drivers would likely require 90 minutes to be contacted, to travel to the depot, be briefed, and to travel to the transit dependent facilities. Mobilization time is slightly longer in adverse weather - 100 minutes when raining, 110 minutes when snowing.

Activity: Board Passengers (CD)

Based on discussions with offsite agencies, a loading time of 15 minutes (20 minutes for rain and 25 minutes for snow) for school buses is used.

For multiple stops along a pickup route (transitdependent bus routes) estimation of travel time must allow for the delay associated with stopping and starting at each pickup point. The time, t, required for a bus to decelerate at a rate, a, expressed in ft/sec/sec, from a speed, v, expressed in ft/sec, to a stop, is t = v/a. Assuming the same acceleration rate and final speed following the stop yields a total time, T, to service boarding passengers:

2 ,

Where B = Dwell time to service passengers. The total distance, s in feet, travelled during the deceleration and acceleration activities is: s = v2/a. If the bus had not stopped to service passengers, but had continued to travel at speed, v, then its travel time over the distance, s, would be: s/v = v/a. Then the total delay (i.e. pickup time, P) to service passengers is:

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Assigning reasonable estimates:

B = 50 seconds: a generous value for a single passenger, carrying personal items, to board per stop

v = 25 mph = 37 ft/sec

a = 4 ft/sec/sec, a moderate rate Then, P 1 minute per stop. Allowing 30 minutes pickup time per bus run implies 30 stops per run, for good weather. It is assumed that bus acceleration and speed will be less in rain; total loading time is 40 minutes per bus in rain, 50 minutes in snow.

Activity: Travel to EPZ Boundary (DE)

School Evacuation Transportation resources available were provided by the EPZ county emergency management agencies and are summarized in Table 85. Also included in the table are the number of buses needed to evacuate schools, medical facilities, transitdependent population, homebound special needs (discussed below in Section 8.5). These numbers indicate there are insufficient resources available to evacuate transit dependent populations in a single wave. The South Carolina Emergency Plans, SCORERP, in Section III specifies the counties may request back up support from the state if unable to provide adequate transportation resources. Details were not provided on the number and type of vehicles that would be available from the State; therefore those vehicles are not included in Table 85. The number of buses required to evacuate the schools listed in Tables 87 - 89 is 127; providing transportation to all daycares and schools listed in Table 82 requires 172 buses. Using only county resources, there are sufficient resources to evacuate all schools in a single wave, but not to evacuate both daycares and schools in a single wave.

The buses servicing the schools are ready to begin their evacuation trips at 105 minutes after the advisory to evacuate - 90 minutes mobilization time plus 15 minutes loading time - in good weather. The UNITES software discussed in Section 1.3 was used to define bus routes along the most likely path from a school being evacuated to the EPZ boundary, traveling toward the appropriate school relocation center. This is done in UNITES by interactively selecting the series of nodes from the school to the EPZ boundary. Each bus route is given an identification number and is written to the DYNEV II input stream. DYNEV II computes the route length and outputs the average speed for each 5 minute interval, for each bus route. The specified bus routes are documented in Table 86 (refer to the maps of the linknode analysis network in Appendix K for node locations). Data provided by DYNEV during the appropriate timeframe depending on the mobilization and loading times (i.e., 100 to 105 minutes after the advisory to evacuate for good weather) were used to compute the average speed for each route, as follows:

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60 .

1 .

. 60 .

. . 1 .

The average speed computed (using this methodology) for the buses servicing each of the schools in the EPZ is shown in Table 87 through Table 89 for school evacuation, and in Table 811 through Table 813 for the transit vehicles evacuating transitdependent persons, which are discussed later. The travel time to the EPZ boundary was computed for each bus using the computed average speed and the distance to the EPZ boundary along the most likely route out of the EPZ. The travel time from the EPZ boundary to the relocation center was computed assuming an average speed of 45 mph, 40 mph, and 35 mph for good weather, rain and snow, respectively. Speeds used in Table 87 through Table 89 and in Table 811 through Table 813 to compute travel time were also 45 mph (40 mph for rain - 10% decrease - and 35 mph for snow - 20% decrease) for those calculated bus speeds which exceed 45 mph, as the school bus speed limit for state routes in South Carolina is 45 mph.

Table 87 (good weather), Table 88 (rain) and Table 89 (snow) present the following evacuation time estimates (rounded up to the nearest 5 minutes) for schools in the EPZ: (1) The elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the bus exits the EPZ; and (2) The elapsed time until the bus reaches the school relocation center. The evacuation time out of the EPZ can be computed as the sum of times associated with Activities ABC, CD, and DE (For example: 90 min. + 15 + 5 = 1:50 for McBee Elementary School, with good weather). The evacuation time to the School relocation center is determined by adding the time associated with Activity EF (discussed below), to this EPZ evacua on me.

Evacuation of TransitDependent Population The buses dispatched from the depots to service the transitdependent evacuees will be scheduled so that they arrive at their respective routes after their passengers have completed their mobilization. As shown in Figure 54 (Residents with no Commuters), 91 percent of the evacuees will complete their mobilization when the buses will begin their routes, approximately 90 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. Zones B1 and B2 have high transitdependent populations and require more buses than any other Zone (Table 810). As such, two separate routes have been identified for each of these zones. The start of service on these routes is separated by 15 minute headways, as shown in Table 811 through Table 813. The use of bus headways ensures that those people who take longer to mobilize will be picked up.

Mobilization time is 10 minutes longer in rain and 20 minutes in snow to account for slower travel speeds and reduced roadway capacity.

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Those buses servicing the transitdependent evacuees will first travel along their pickup routes, then proceed out of the EPZ. The county emergency plans do not define bus routes to service these pickup locations. The 12 bus routes shown graphically in Figure 82 and described in Table 810 were designed as part of this study to service the major routes through each zone with significant population. It is assumed that residents will walk to and congregate at these predesignated pickup locations, and that they can arrive at the stops within the 90 minute bus mobilization time (good weather).

As previously discussed, a pickup time of 30 minutes (good weather) is estimated for 30 individual stops to pick up passengers, with an average of one minute of delay associated with each stop. Longer pickup times of 40 minutes and 50 minutes are used for rain and snow, respectively.

The travel distance along the respective pickup routes within the EPZ is estimated using the UNITES software. Bus travel times within the EPZ are computed using average speeds computed by DYNEV, using the aforementioned methodology that was used for school evacuation.

Table 811 through Table 813 present the transitdependent population evacuation time estimates for each bus route calculated using the above procedures for good weather, rain and snow, respectively.

For example, the ETE for the bus route servicing Zone B1 is computed as 90 + 36 + 30 = 2:40 for good weather (rounded up to nearest 5 minutes). Here, 33 minutes is the time to travel 10.4 miles at 17.4 mph, the average speed output by the model for this route starting at 90 minutes.

The ETE for a second wave (discussed below) is presented in the event there is a shortfall of available buses or bus drivers, as previously discussed.

As stated in Section 8.1, the minimum need for transit dependent buses is 38 based on population divided by 30 persons per bus. However, in order to service all the zones adequately based on population proportionally divided amongst the zones, 43 buses would be required to service all zones.

Activity: Travel to Relocation Centers (EF)

The distances from the EPZ boundary to the relocation centers are measured using GIS software along the most likely route from the EPZ exit point to the relocation center. The relocation centers are mapped in Figure 101. For a onewave evacuation, this travel time outside the EPZ does not contribute to the ETE. For a twowave evacuation, the ETE for buses must be considered separately, since it could exceed the ETE for the general public. Assumed bus speeds of 45 mph, 40 mph, and 35 mph for good weather, rain, and snow, respectively, will be applied for this activity for buses servicing the transitdependent population.

Activity: Passengers Leave Bus (FG)

A bus can empty within 5 minutes. The driver takes a 10 minute break.

Activity: Bus Returns to Route for Second Wave Evacuation (GC)

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The buses assigned to return to the EPZ to perform a second wave evacuation of transit dependent evacuees will be those that have already evacuated transitdependent people who mobilized more quickly. The first wave of transitdependent people depart the bus, and the bus then returns to the EPZ, travels to its route and proceeds to pick up more transit dependent evacuees along the route. The travel time back to the EPZ is equal to the travel time to the relocation center.

The secondwave ETE for the bus route servicing Zone B1 is computed as follows for good weather:

Bus arrives at relocation center at 3:00 in good weather (2:40 to exit EPZ + 20 minute travel time to relocation center).

Bus discharges passengers (5 minutes) and driver takes a 10minute rest: 15 minutes.

Bus returns to EPZ and completes second route: 20 minutes (equal to travel time to relocation center) + 27 minutes (10.4 miles @ 45 mph + 10.4 @ 45 mph) = 47 minutes

Bus completes pickups along route: 30 minutes.

Bus exits EPZ at time 2:40 + 0:20 + 0:15 + 0:47 + 0:30 = 4:35 (rounded to nearest 5 minutes) after the Advisory to Evacuate.

The ETE for the completion of the second wave for all transitdependent bus routes are provided in Table 811 through Table 813. The average ETE for a twowave evacuation of transitdependent people exceeds the ETE for the general population at the 90th percentile.

The relocation of transitdependent evacuees from the relocations centers to congregate care centers, if the counties decide to do so, is not considered in this study.

Evacuation of Medical Facilities The evacuation of these facilities is similar to school evacuation except:

Buses are assigned on the basis of 30 patients to allow for staff to accompany the patients. Wheelchair vans can accommodate 4 patients, and ambulances can accommodate 2 patients or 1 patient depending on either critical or noncritical classification.

Loading times of 1 minute, 5 minutes, and 25 minutes per patient are assumed for ambulatory patients, wheelchair bound patients, and bedridden patients, respectively.

Table 84 indicates that 8 bus runs, 2 wheelchair van runs and 66 ambulance runs are needed to service all of the medical facilities in the EPZ. According to Table 85, the counties can collectively provide 153 buses, 12 vans, 5 wheelchair vans, 36 ambulances. There are insufficient resources to evacuate the ambulatory and wheelchair bound persons from the medical facilities in a single wave, a twowave evacuation is needed for ambulances evacuating bedridden patients.

As is done for the schools, it is estimated that mobilization time averages 90 minutes. Specially Robinson Nuclear Plant 89 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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trained medical support staff (working their regular shift) will be on site to assist in the evacuation of patients. Additional staff (if needed) could be mobilized over this same 90 minute timeframe.

Table 814 through Table 816 summarize the ETE for medical facilities within the EPZ for good weather, rain, and snow. Average speeds output by the model for Scenario 6 (Scenario 7 for rain and Scenario 8 for snow) Region 3, capped at 45 mph (40 mph for rain and 35 mph for snow), are used to compute travel time to EPZ boundary. The travel time to the EPZ boundary is computed by dividing the distance to the EPZ boundary by the average travel speed. The ETE is the sum of the mobilization time, total passenger loading time, and travel time out of the EPZ. Concurrent loading on multiple buses, wheelchair vans, and ambulances at capacity is assumed such that the maximum loading times for buses, wheelchair vans and ambulances are 30, 75 and 30 minutes, respectively. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. For example, the calculation of ETE for the Carriage House of Hartsville:

ETE: 90 + 1 x 30 + 15 = 135 min. or 2:15 It is assumed that medical facility population is directly evacuated to appropriate host medical facilities. Relocation of this population to permanent facilities and/or passing through the relocation center before arriving at the host facility are not considered in this analysis.

8.5 Special Needs Population The county emergency management agencies have a combined registration for transit dependent and homebound special needs persons. Based on data provided by the counties, there are an estimated 59 homebound special needs people within the Darlington County portion of the EPZ who require transportation assistance to evacuate. The most recent data provided from Darlington County did not specify how many people need which type of transportation. Previous county data provided showed on average 15% of people need ambulances and 85% of people would need a bus service. These percentages were applied to the 59 people and results in 51 ambulatory persons, 8 persons needing ambulances.

It is assumed latchkey children are considered within the homebound functional needs population. Latchkey children are defined by NUREG/CR7002 as children within households that are unsupervised and will need transportation. No data was received on the number of latchkey children within the EPZ. If transportation was required to pick up these children, they would receive an ETE comparable to that of the ETE for homebound functional needs persons.

ETE for Homebound Special Needs Persons Table 817 summarizes the ETE for homebound special needs people. The table is categorized by type of vehicle required and then broken down by weather condition. The table takes into consideration the deployment of multiple vehicles to reduce the number of stops per vehicle.

These people will need to be picked up from their homes. It is conservatively assumed that ambulatory and wheelchair bound special needs households are spaced 3 miles apart and bedridden households are spaced 5 miles apart. Van and bus speeds approximate 20 mph between households and ambulance speeds approximate 30 mph in good weather (10% slower Robinson Nuclear Plant 810 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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in rain, 20% slower in snow). Mobilization times of 90 minutes were used (100 minutes for rain, and 110 minutes for snow). The last HH is assumed to be 5 miles from the EPZ boundary, and the networkwide average speed, capped at 45 mph (40 mph for rain and 35 mph for snow),

after the last pickup is used to compute travel time. ETE is computed by summing mobilization time, loading time at first household, travel to subsequent households, loading time at subsequent households, and travel time to EPZ boundary. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes.

For example, assuming no more than one special needs person per HH implies that 51 ambulatory households need to be serviced. While only 2 buses are needed from a capacity perspective, if 8 buses are deployed to service these special needs HH, then each would require about 7 stops. The following outlines the ETE calculations:

1. Assume 8 buses are deployed, each with about 7 stops, to service a total of 51 HH.

2. The ETE is calculated as follows:

a. Buses arrive at the first pickup location: 90 minutes

b. Load HH members at first pickup: 5 minutes

c. Travel to subsequent pickup locations: 6 @ 9 minutes = 54 minutes

d. Load HH members at subsequent pickup locations: 6 @ 5 minutes = 30 minutes

e. Travel to EPZ boundary: 9 minutes (5 miles @ 33.5 mph).

ETE: 90 + 5 + 54 + 30 + 9 = 3:10 rounded to the nearest 5 minutes The following outlines the ETE calculations if a second wave is needed using school buses after the schools have been evacuated (see Table 818):

a. School buses arrive at R.C. (average value from Table 87): 2:25

b. Unload students at relocation center: 5 minutes.

c. Driver takes 10 minute rest: 10 minutes.

d. Travel time back to EPZ: 24 minutes (average time of Travel Time from EPZ Bdry to H.S. from Table 87)

e. Bus travels to all stops: 6 stops @ 9 minutes = 54 minutes

f. Loading time at all stops: 6 stops @ 5 minutes = 30 minutes

g. Travel time to EPZ boundary: 9 minutes (5 miles @ 33.5 mph)

ETE: 2:25 + 5 + 10 + 24 + 54 + 30 + 9 = 4:40 Robinson Nuclear Plant 811 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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(Subsequent Wave)

A B C D E F G Time Event A Advisory to Evacuate B Bus Dispatched from Depot C Bus Arrives at Facility/Pickup Route D Bus Departs for Relocation Center E Bus Exits Region F Bus Arrives at Relocation Center/Host Facility G Bus Available for Second Wave Evacuation Service Activity AB Driver Mobilization BC Travel to Facility or to Pickup Route CD Passengers Board the Bus DE Bus Travels Towards Region Boundary EF Bus Travels Towards Relocation Center Outside the EPZ FG Passengers Leave Bus; Driver Takes a Break Figure 81. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations Robinson Nuclear Plant 812 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Figure 82. TransitDependent Bus Routes Robinson Nuclear Plant 813 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 81. TransitDependent Population Estimates Survey Average HH Survey Percent Size Survey Percent HH Survey Percent HH Total People Population with Indicated No. Estimated with Indicated No. of Percent HH with Non People Estimated Requiring Requiring 2010 EPZ of Vehicles No. of Vehicles with Returning Requiring Ridesharing Public Public Population 0 1 2 Households 0 1 2 Commuters Commuters Transport Percentage Transit Transit 35,927 1.37 1.72 2.24 15,827 7.1% 26.3% 41.0% 48% 45% 2,260 50% 1,130 3.1%

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Table 82. School and Daycare Population Demand Estimates Buses Zone School Name Enrollment Required B1 1st Baptist Church Preschool 83 2 B1 A Kidz Place I 33 1 B1 A Kidz Place II 62 1 B1 Agnes Scurry 6 1 B1 Barbara Tyner's Daycare 35 1 B1 Butler Head Start Center 120 2 B1 Carolina Elementary School 278 4 Carolina Girls & Barfoot Boys Daycare B1 36 1 Center B1 Children's Corner 100 2 B1 Coker College2 875 1 B1 Eastside Christian Academy 35 1 B1 Evelyn J. Purvis 6 1 B1 First Baptist Weekday Preschool 97 2 B1 First Presbyterian Church School 10 1 B1 Ginger A Shoemake 6 1 B1 Governor's School for Science & Math 175 4 B1 Hartsville Middle School 1,123 23 B1 Hartsville Senior High School 1,350 27 B1 Jill Beckham 6 1 B1 Kid'N Around 29 1 B1 Kids N Me 35 1 B1 Kings Kids Children's Center 55 1 B1 Lakeview Baptist Church School 61 1 B1 Mary Jean Young 6 1 B1 New Vision CDC Magnolia Child Care 56 1 B1 North Hartsville Elementary School 678 10 B1 Peggy Fairland Bridges 12 1 B1 Pure Word Ministries NDA* 1 B1 Sandra Cook 6 1 B1 Southside Early Childhood Center 410 6 B1 St Luke United Methodist Preschool 44 1 B1 St. Joseph Head Start 212 4 B1 Thompson Children Learning Center 19 1 B1 Thompson's Unique Learning Center NDA* 1 B1 Thornwell School for the Arts 400 6 Robinson Nuclear Plant 815 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Buses Zone School Name Enrollment Required B1 True Saints Church of God in Christ 40 1 B1 Washington Street Elementary School 325 5 B1 YMCA Day Care 160 3 B2 Calvary Christian School 22 1 B2 Emmanuel Christian School 363 8 B2 Jeanette Pendergrass 12 1 B2 Nazareth Day Care & 28 1 B2 Tracy Goodman 6 1 C1 Dale Arthur 6 1 C1 Forest Hills Academy 12 1 C1 Kelleytown Baptist Church NDA* 1 C1 Linda Kelley 6 1 C1 Shelby Perdue 6 1 C1 Susan Watkins 12 1 C1 West Hartsville Elementary School 172 3 C2 Jermika Couplin 6 1 C2 Luann Johnson 6 1 C2 St. John Head Start Center 248 4 C2 Thomas Hart Academy 140 4 D1 Patricia Phillips Daycare 13 1 E2 McBee Elementary School 385 6 E2 McBee Headstart NDA1 1 E2 McBee High School 491 10 TOTAL: 8,918 173 1

No data was available for these schools; one school bus was counted for each school regardless to account for potential needs.

2 Details for transit dependent students calculated can be found in Section 3.3 3

The YMCA After School Program is not a licensed daycare and is exempt from South Carolina DSS licensing requirements.

Daycares will provide their own transportation or parents will pick up. If the facility needs resources, this table calculates daycare needs based on 70 children per bus as per assumptions memo.

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Table 83. School Relocation Centers School Relocation center Bible Baptist School A Kidz Place I A Kidz Place II Barbara Tyner's Daycare Butler Head Start Center Carolina Elementary School Carolina Girls & Barefoot Boys Daycare Center Children's Corner Evelyn J. Purvis First Baptist Weekday Preschool First Presbyterian Church School Ginger A Shoemake Hartsville Middle School Hartsville Senior High School Jill Beckham Kids N Me Kings Kids Childrens Center Lakeview Baptist Church School Mary Jean Young Florence City County Civic Center New Vision CDC Magnolia Child Care North Hartsville Elementary School Peggy Fairland Bridges Sandra Cook Southside Early Childhood Center St Luke United Methodist Preschool St. Joseph Head Start Thompson Children Learning Center True Saints Church of God in Christ Washington Street Elementary School YMCA After School Program 1st Baptist Church Preschool Agnes Scurry Calvary Christian School Coker College Eastside Christian Academy Emmanuel Christian School Governor's School for Science & Math Jeanette Pendergrass Robinson Nuclear Plant 817 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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School Relocation center Kid'N Around Nazareth Day Care &

Pure Word Ministries Thompson's Unique Learning Center Thornwell School for the Arts Tracy Goodman Dale Arthur Forest Hills Academy Kelleytown Baptist Church Linda Kelley Shelby Perdue Susan Watkins West Hartsville Elementary School Jermika Couplin Luann Johnson St. John Head Start Center Thomas Hart Academy Patricia Phillips Daycare McBee Elementary School McBee Headstart Chesterfield Senior High School McBee High School

Daycares will provide their own transportation or parents will pick up.

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Table 84. Medical Facility Transit Demand Wheel Wheel chair Current Ambu chair Bed Bus Vans Zone Facility Name Municipality Census latory Bound ridden Runs Runs Ambulance Darlington County Carolina Pines Regional Medical B1 Hartsville 116 81 0 35 3 0 26 Center B1 Morningside of Hartsville Hartsville 39 34 5 0 2 2 0 B1 Thad E. Saleeby Development Center Hartsville 85 5 0 80 1 0 40 B1 Carriage House of Hartsville Hartsville 60 60 0 0 2 0 0 Morrell Memorial Convalescent Care B2 Hartsville 154 34 113 7 1 29 4 Center Darlington Subtotal: 454 214 118 122 9 31 70 TOTAL: 454 214 118 122 9 31 70 Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center uses a capacity of 1 person per ambulance for critical patients and 2 people per ambulance for noncritical patience. The patients listed for wheelchair bound have a breakdown of 17 critical and 18 noncritical.

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Table 85. Summary of Transportation Resources Transportation Wheelchair Resource Buses Vans Vans Ambulances Lee County EMS 7 McBee EMS (Chesterfield County) 5 Sandhills Ambulance 5 5 First Health Ambulance 5 Darlington County 135 Darlington County EMS 9 Volunteer Rescue Squads (Darlington County) 5 Governor's School for Math & Science 1 5 McBee School District 17 Coker College1 7 TOTAL: 153 12 5 36 Schools (Table 82): 173 Medical Facilities (Table 84): 9 31 70 TransitDependent Population (Table 810): 43 Homebound Special Needs (Section 8.5): 8 4 TOTAL TRANSPORTATION NEEDS: 233 0 31 74 1

Coker College reports 2 small vans and 4 15 passenger vans Robinson Nuclear Plant 820 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 86. Bus Route Descriptions Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed from Route Start to EPZ Boundary Forest Hills Academy, West Hartsville 3 24, 314, 25, 27, 28, 196, 53, 65, 190 Elementary School 5 Carolina Elementary School 37, 260, 261, 38, 150, 40, 41, 43, 29, 30, 31, 32 6 1st Baptist Church Preschool 39, 264, 38, 151, 50, 28, 196, 53, 65, 190 8 Governor's School for Science & Math 40, 41, 42, 50, 28, 196, 53, 65, 190 North Hartsville Elementary School, 9 102, 231, 39, 264, 38, 151, 50, 28, 196, 53, 65, 190 Lakeview Baptist Church School 14 McBee Schools 82, 1, 88, 92 Hartsville Middle School, First Presbyterian 16 260, 261, 38, 151, 50, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32 School Eastside Christian Academy, Coker College, 17 45, 46, 328, 233, 42, 50, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32 Thornwell School for the Arts 18 Thomas Hart Academy 29, 30, 31, 32 20 Calvary Christian Academy 30, 31, 32 22 Emmanuel Christian School 46, 328, 233, 42, 50, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32 23 Morningside of Hartsville 23, 35, 36, 39, 45, 46, 47, 2, 69, 70, 71 24 Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center 314, 25, 27, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 25 Thad E. Saleeby Development Center 271, 151, 50, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 26 Carriage House of Hartsville 45, 46, 47, 2, 69, 70, 71 27 Morrell Memorial Convalescent Center 47, 2, 69, 70, 71 4, 21, 309, 23, 24, 314, 25, 27, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32, 28 Transit Dependent Route A0 33 29 Transit Dependent Route A1 218, 306, 217, 216, 215, 207, 208, 209 30 Transit Dependent Route A2 216, 215, 207, 208, 209 31 Transit Dependent Route B1, 1 of 2 23, 24, 314, 25, 27, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 139, 220, 221, 222, 102, 231, 39, 264, 38, 150, 40, 41, 32 Transit Dependent Route B1, 2 of 2 43, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 104, 103, 102, 231, 39, 264, 38, 150, 40, 41, 43, 29, 33 Transit Dependent Route B2, 1 of 2 30, 31, 32, 33 35 Transit Dependent Route, C1 23, 24, 314, 25, 27, 28, 313, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 36 Transit Dependent Route, C2 196, 53, 65, 190, 66 38 Transit Dependent Route, D2 55, 56, 57, 292, 293, 58, 343, 254 40 Transit Dependent Route, E2 83, 82, 1, 88, 92 41 Transit Dependent Route B2, 2 of 2 232, 2, 69, 70, 152 Robinson Nuclear Plant 821 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 87. School Evacuation Time Estimates Good Weather Travel Time Travel Dist. from Dist. To Time to EPZ EPZ Driver Loading EPZ Average EPZ Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time Bdry Speed Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 90 15 3.9 45.0 5 1:50 19.2 26 2:20 McBee High School 90 15 3.4 45.0 5 1:50 19.2 26 2:20 McBee Headstart 90 15 7.4 45.0 10 1:55 19.2 26 2:25 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 90 15 15.5 39.5 24 2:10 18.2 24 2:35 Carolina Elementary School 90 15 9.9 39.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 North Hartsville Elementary School 90 15 10.2 39.0 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 First Presbyterian Church School 90 15 9.2 38.2 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Hartsville Middle School 90 15 9.5 38.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Hartsville Senior High School 90 15 9.3 38.6 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Washington Street Elementary School 90 15 8.5 38.6 13 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Southside Early Childhood Center 90 15 7.0 15.5 27 2:15 18.2 24 2:40 1st Baptist Church Preschool 90 15 9.1 37.9 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Coker College 90 15 9.4 41.1 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Thornwell School for the Arts 90 15 11.4 42.1 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Governor's School for Science & Math 90 15 9.5 40.3 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Eastside Christian Academy 90 15 11.1 42.1 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Emmanuel Christian School 90 15 11.5 42.0 16 2:05 18.2 24 2:30 Calvary Christian School 90 15 1.9 45.0 3 1:50 14.7 20 2:10 Forest Hills Academy 90 15 10.2 43.2 14 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 West Hartsville Elementary School 90 15 10.8 43.2 15 2:00 18.2 24 2:25 Thomas Hart Academy 90 15 5.1 43.2 7 1:55 18.2 24 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 2:15 Maximum: 2:40 Average for EPZ: 2:00 Average: 2:25 Robinson Nuclear Plant 822 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 88. School Evacuation Time Estimates Rain Travel Time Travel Dist. from Dist. To Time to EPZ EPZ Driver Loading EPZ Average EPZ Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time Bdry Speed Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 100 20 3.9 40.0 6 2:10 19.2 29 2:40 McBee High School 100 20 3.4 40.0 5 2:05 19.2 29 2:35 McBee Headstart 100 20 7.4 40.0 11 2:15 19.2 29 2:45 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 100 20 15.5 36.0 26 2:30 18.2 27 3:00 Carolina Elementary School 100 20 9.9 34.8 17 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 North Hartsville Elementary School 100 20 10.2 34.9 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 First Presbyterian Church School 100 20 9.2 35.1 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Hartsville Middle School 100 20 9.5 35.1 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Hartsville Senior High School 100 20 9.3 35.4 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Washington Street Elementary School 100 20 8.5 34.2 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Southside Early Childhood Center 100 20 7.0 12.8 33 2:35 18.2 27 3:05 1st Baptist Church Preschool 100 20 9.1 34.9 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Coker College 100 20 9.4 38.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Thornwell School for the Arts 100 20 11.4 38.5 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Governor's School for Science & Math 100 20 9.5 38.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 Eastside Christian Academy 100 20 11.1 38.5 17 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Emmanuel Christian School 100 20 11.5 38.3 18 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Calvary Christian School 100 20 1.9 40.0 3 2:05 14.7 22 2:30 Forest Hills Academy 100 20 10.2 40.0 15 2:15 18.2 27 2:45 West Hartsville Elementary School 100 20 10.8 40.0 16 2:20 18.2 27 2:50 Thomas Hart Academy 100 20 5.1 40.0 8 2:10 18.2 27 2:40 Maximum for EPZ: 2:35 Maximum: 3:05 Average for EPZ: 2:20 Average: 2:50 Robinson Nuclear Plant 823 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 89. School Evacuation Time Estimates Snow Travel Time Travel Dist. from Dist. To Time to EPZ EPZ Driver Loading EPZ Average EPZ Bdry to Bdry to ETE to Mobilization Time Bdry Speed Bdry ETE R.C. H.S. R.C.

School Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min)

Chesterfield Schools McBee Elementary School 110 25 3.9 33.1 7 2:25 19.2 33 3:00 McBee High School 110 25 3.4 33.1 6 2:25 19.2 33 3:00 McBee Headstart 110 25 7.4 31.7 14 2:30 19.2 33 3:05 Darlington Schools Lakeview Baptist Church School 110 25 15.5 32.7 28 2:45 18.2 31 3:20 Carolina Elementary School 110 25 9.9 31.5 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 North Hartsville Elementary School 110 25 10.2 31.6 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 First Presbyterian Church School 110 25 9.2 31.6 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Hartsville Middle School 110 25 9.5 31.6 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Hartsville Senior High School 110 25 9.3 31.8 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Washington Street Elementary School 110 25 8.5 31.8 16 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Southside Early Childhood Center 110 25 7.0 10.9 38 2:55 18.2 31 3:30 1st Baptist Church Preschool 110 25 9.1 31.5 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Coker College 110 25 9.4 33.4 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Thornwell School for the Arts 110 25 11.4 33.7 20 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Governor's School for Science & Math 110 25 9.5 33.3 17 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Eastside Christian Academy 110 25 11.1 33.4 20 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Emmanuel Christian School 110 25 11.5 33.5 21 2:40 18.2 31 3:15 Calvary Christian School 110 25 1.9 35.0 3 2:20 14.7 25 2:45 Forest Hills Academy 110 25 10.2 34.9 18 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 West Hartsville Elementary School 110 25 10.8 34.9 19 2:35 18.2 31 3:10 Thomas Hart Academy 110 25 5.1 35.0 9 2:25 18.2 31 3:00 Maximum for EPZ: 2:55 Maximum: 3:30 Average for EPZ: 2:35 Average: 3:10 Robinson Nuclear Plant 824 KLD Engineering, P.C.

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Table 810. Summary of TransitDependent Bus Routes No. of Length Route Buses Route Description (mi.)

Bus route servicing the City of Hartsville along Bo Bo Newsome Hwy south 1 7 10.4 towards the EPZ boundary.

2 5 Bus route servicing communities along Patrick Hwy south to N. Fifth Street to Bo 13.7 Bo Newsome Hwy.

Bus Route servicing the community of Kellytown along Kellytown Rd to Bo Bo 3 3 12.8 Newsome Hwy.

Bus Route servicing the areas of Lee's Crossroads, Registrar Crossroads and 4 3 5.5 portions of Lydia along US 15.

Bus Route servicing the areas of Ashland, Stokes Bridge and Turkey Creek 5 2 6.5 communities along SC341 south towards Bishopville.

Bus Route servicing the areas of Leland and portions of McBee along US 1 north 6 3 7.2 towards SC145 and the EPZ Boundary.

Servicing communities along SC145 towards Chesterfield from the intersection 7 2 4.3 of Holiday Rd.

Servicing communities along SC145 towards Chesterfield from the intersection 8 1 7.9 with County Line Rd / W. L. Johnson Rd.

Servicing communities along Hwy 151 and Bo Bo Newsome Hwy from Clyde and 9 5 13.0 New Market south towards the eastern portion of Hartsville.

Bus route servicing the City of Hartsville along Lakeview Blvd, N 5th St., and Bo 10 7 14.3 Bo Newsome Hwy.

11 5 Servicing communities along W 5th Street US 15 East towards the EPZ boundary. 5.8 Total: 43 Section 8.1 calculates that 38 transit dependent buses are required to evacuate. There are higher proportions of population in some zones that require more buses than the minimum. This table in addition to Table 3.8 in Section 3, show the total number of buses needed to service the transit dependent population of all zones.

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Table 811. TransitDependent Evacuation Time Estimates Good Weather OneWave TwoWave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 4 90 10.4 17.4 36 30 2:40 14.7 20 5 10 49 30 4:35 1

3 105 10.4 18.1 34 30 2:50 14.7 20 5 10 49 30 4:45 3 90 13.7 16.7 49 30 2:50 14.7 20 5 10 58 30 4:55 2

2 105 13.7 17.6 47 30 3:05 14.7 20 5 10 58 30 5:10 2 90 12.8 17.7 43 30 2:45 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 4:50 3

1 105 12.8 18.4 42 30 3:00 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 5:05 2 90 5.5 40.0 8 30 2:10 14.7 20 5 10 35 30 3:50 4

1 105 5.5 40.0 8 30 2:25 14.7 20 5 10 35 30 4:05 1 90 6.5 40.0 10 30 2:10 14.7 20 5 10 38 30 3:55 5

1 105 6.5 40.0 10 30 2:25 14.7 20 5 10 38 30 4:10 2 90 7.2 40.0 11 30 2:15 14.7 20 5 10 40 30 4:00 6

1 105 7.2 40.0 11 30 2:30 14.7 20 5 10 41 30 4:20 1 90 4.3 5.8 44 30 2:45 14.3 19 5 10 31 30 4:25 7

1 105 4.3 7.5 34 30 2:50 14.3 19 5 10 31 30 4:30 8 1 90 7.9 9.8 49 30 2:50 14.3 19 5 10 41 30 4:40 3 90 13.0 20.0 39 30 2:40 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 4:45 9

2 105 13.0 20.9 37 30 2:55 14.7 20 5 10 56 30 5:00 4 90 14.3 15.8 54 30 2:55 14.7 20 5 10 60 30 5:00 10 3 105 14.3 16.2 53 30 3:10 14.7 20 5 10 60 30 5:15 3 90 5.8 20.4 17 30 2:20 14.7 20 5 10 36 30 4:05 11 2 105 5.8 23.2 15 30 2:30 14.7 20 5 10 36 30 4:15 Maximum ETE: 3:10 Maximum ETE: 5:15 Average ETE: 2:40 Average ETE: 4:35 Robinson Nuclear Plant 826 KLD Engineering, P.C.