PNO-V-87-025, on 870321,facility Experienced Safety Injection,Reactor Trip & Unit Trip.Caused by Coincidence of High Steam Flow & Low Steam Generator Pressure Signals Due to Closure of MSIV FCV 41.Piping & Valve Switches Inspected

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PNO-V-87-025:on 870321,facility Experienced Safety Injection,Reactor Trip & Unit Trip.Caused by Coincidence of High Steam Flow & Low Steam Generator Pressure Signals Due to Closure of MSIV FCV 41.Piping & Valve Switches Inspected
ML20205G695
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/23/1987
From: Mendonca M, Narbut P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
References
PNO-V-87-025, PNO-V-87-25, NUDOCS 8703310520
Download: ML20205G695 (1)


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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-V-87-25 Date 03/23/87 h This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by Region V staff on this date.

FACILITY: PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY Emergency Classification DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 X Notification of Unusual Event DOCKET NO. 50-323 Alert SAN LUIS OBISP0 COUNTY, CA Site Area Emergency General Emergency Not Applicable

SUBJECT:

REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION On 3/21/87 at 7:43 am (PST), while at 100% power, Unit 2 experienced a safety injection, reactor trip and unit trip. The safety injection signal was caused by the coincidence high steam flow and low steam generator pressure signals. The signals were generated when a Main Steam Isolation valve FCY 41 went shut causing high steam flow and low pressure in the remaining three steam generators. All safety systems operated normally. The licensee terminated the unusual event at 8:04 am in Mode 3. There were no offsite releases as a result of the event. Licensee investigative actions included determining the cause of the isolation valve closure, walkdown inspection of the piping affected by the sudden valve closure, and radiography of the valve itself to verify internal integrity. As of 8:00 am 3/23/87, the licensee's preliminary conclusions are that the valve closure was caused by a short in the valve's closed position limit switch (POS 821). The involved electrical circuitry is such that a short in the valve position limit switch causes the solenoid valve (SV 298) to energize and open, bleeding air from the MSIV air operator, allowing the valve to go shut. Examination of the disassembled position switch shows water intrusion and corrosion in the internals. The valve, its operator and limit switches are located outdoors but the limit switch is gasketed and designed to be weather tight. The piping inspection was completed and showed no damage except for three pipe snubbers which require further testing to verify operability. The radiography of the MSIV showed no damage to valve internals.

The licensee is considering the options of going into the planned refueling outage (scheduled April 6,1987) early or returning to power and delaying the outage. The licensee is considering further investigative actions for other limit switches which might be similarly affected.

There has been regional media interest.

This information is current as of 8:00 am 3/23/87.

CONTACT: M. Mendonca, RV P. Narbut FTS 463-3720 805-595-2354 DISTRIBUTION H St. MNBB Phillips E/W Willste Air Rights Mail:

Chairman Zech ED0 NRR IE NMSS ADM:DMB Comm. Roberts PA OIA RES DOT:Trans Only Conn. Asselstine MPA AE0D Comm. Bernthal 0GC Conin. Carr Regions:

SECV INP0 NSAC ACRS Licensee:

CA (Reactor Licensees) REGION V: FORM 211 PDR Resident Inspector (Revised 3/14/83)

D 8703310520 870323 PDR ISE '](-

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PND-V-87-025 PDR

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