NRC-17-0052, High Frequency Seismic Confirmation Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

High Frequency Seismic Confirmation Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

ML17242A213
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/30/2017
From:	Polson K DTE Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-17-0052
Download: ML17242A213 (57)

Text

Keith J. Polson Site Vice President DTE Energy Company 6400 N. Dixie Highway, Newport, MI 48166 Tel: 734.586.6515 Fax: 734.586.4172 Email: keith.polson@dteenergy.com August 30, 2017 10 CFR 50.54(f)

NRC-17-0052 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al.,

Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

3) NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

4) DTE Energy Company Letter NRC-14-0017, DTE Electric Companys Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushimi Dai-ichi Accident, March 31, 2014 (ML14090A326)

5) NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.

October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015)

6) NEI Letter, Request for NRC Endorsement of High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396), dated July 30, 2015 (ML15223A100/ML15223A102)

USNRC NRC-17-0052 Page 2

7) NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer), "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility."' September 17, 2015 (ML15218A569)

Subject:

High Frequency Seismic Confirmation Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 2) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 2 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter. By NRC letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 3), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Fermi 2 submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Reference 4).

The NRC final seismic hazard evaluation screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities including a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by the NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 (Reference 5). The enclosure to this letter provides the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Fermi Unit 2 (Fermi 2) using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," (Reference 6) as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 (Reference 7).

The High Frequency Evaluation performed for Fermi 2 identified a total of 277 components that required evaluation using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396. All of the devices evaluated for the High Frequency Confirmation have adequate seismic capacity.

This letter contains no new Regulatory Commitments and no revision to existing Regulatory Commitments.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Scott A. Maglio, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (734) 586-5076.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 30, 2017 Keith J. Polson Site Vice President

USNRC NRC-17-0052 Page 3

Enclosure:

Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 High Frequency Confirmation Report cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Reactor Projects Chief, Branch 5, Region III Regional Administrator, Region III Michigan Public Service Commission Regulated Energy Division (kindschl@michigan.gov)

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 High Frequency Confirmation Report

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 1 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1],

requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety.

EPRI 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation, [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by the NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for the Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used as needed for the Fermi 2 engineering evaluations described in this report. The following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation Development of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components Summary of subject components high-frequency evaluations

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 2 1 Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety.

EPRI 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation, [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by the NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, Fermi 2 submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Fermi 2 using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation, as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 3 The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 APPROACH EPRI 3002004396 [8] is primarily used for the Fermi 2 engineering evaluations described in this report. The Fermi 2 site has the benefit of a recently peer reviewed Seismic Probability Risk Assessment (SPRA). The site GMRS, horizontal In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS), and vertical ISRS were explicitly calculated during this effort [14]. There is no need to estimate ISRS as described in Reference [8]. This is the same ISRS used in the previous Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) submitted under Reference [15] and accepted under Reference [16].

Section 4.1 of Reference [8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Using the criteria of Reference [8] and the ISRS developed in Reference

[14], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Fermi 2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and GMRS Information Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation Seismic demand for subject components Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components Summary of subject components high-frequency evaluations Summary of Results 1.4 PLANT SCREENING Fermi 2 submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 31, 2014 [4]. In a letter dated October 5, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the Fermi 2 site [12].

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [2] that the Fermi 2 GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [6].

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 4 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference [8] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that the design requirements preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions and that No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary.

2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. For this review, 1 lines or smaller are not considered to contribute to a significant LOCA leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

Reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control system reviews were performed for valves associated with the following functions:

Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff, Reactor Water Clean-Up, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Residual Heat Removal, Core Spray, and High Pressure Core Injection.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 5 Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Valves Reactor Head Vent Valves - B2100F001, B2100F002, and B2100F005 All three valves are manually operated with no electrical interface. Additionally, F001 and F002 are locked closed. The solenoid-operated valves B2100F403 and B2100F404 are similarly de-energized in the closed position and abandoned-in-place.

Safety Relief Valves and Auto Depressurization Valves There are 15 SRVs, 10 of which are manual depressurization valves and 5 of which are auto depressurization valves. For both types, electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged push button. Each of the SRVs has a seal-in circuit that opens the solenoid. These seal-ins can be overridden with the associated Close push button.

Additionally, the following individual circuits are vulnerable to SILO events. Coincidental chatter in the Low-Low Set Relief relays B21-K33A and B21-K33C will allow seal-ins in both of these circuits, which will open B2104F013A. This seal-in can be overridden by push button 1B217. A similar circuit will cause an identical effect in B2104F013G via B21-K33B and B21-K33D, which can be overridden by push button 1B220. For the Auto Depressurization valves, coincidental chatter in high drywell pressure/low RPV level relays K6A and K8A or K6B and K8B causes seal-ins in these circuits that open B2104F013E/H/J/P/R and bypass the normal Close push button override. These can, however, be overridden by a separate push buttons 52A or 52B. Additionally, in the event that the dedicated shutdown panel (H21P623) is in use, K1SRV/K2SRV can seal-in via the T2/M2 K2SRV contact and open the SRV. This seal-in can be broken by the Close push button.

Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) - B2103F022A/B/C/D and B2103F028A/B/C/D There are eight MSIVs in total with four inboard and four outboard. They are solenoid-operated pilot valves electrically controlled via relays, which are slaves to isolation logic relays (B2100M328A/B/C/D (inboard) and B2100M329A/B/C/D (outboard)). The latter relays are energized for at-power operation and de-energized to close the valves. Their configuration by design is likely to seal-in following a seismic event. If the relays do seal-in, they will energize the coils that will close the MSIVs and the Main Steam Line Drain Valves. This is the safe-shutdown position following many types of initiating events. Therefore, this action is a desired response to the seismic event and for this reason chatter is acceptable and no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Line Drain Valves - B2103F016 and B2103F019 The opening of normally-closed motor-operated valves is commanded by rugged push buttons and keylock switches required for any change in state. This valve opening control has a potential seal-in, but it requires A71B-K56 contact 5/6 to be closed. This contact is controlled by A71B-K7A and -K7B, neither of which have a seal-in. Thus, the valve opening control is insensitive to contact chatter and thus the valve will remain closed after the seismic event.

Reactor Water Clean-Up Valves Reactor Water Clean-Up RPV Bottom Head Line Recirculation Valve G3352F101 This normally-open motor-operated valve is controlled by rugged push buttons only. Chatter in the closing circuit, the desired position, will not cause a SILO event. Thus this valve is not affected by seal-in or lock-out.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 6 Reactor Water Clean-Up Pumps A & B Suction Line Isolation Valve G3352F102 This normally-open motor-operated valve is controlled by rugged push buttons. Chatter in the closing circuit, the desired position, will not cause a SILO event.

Additionally, this valve is downstream of G3352F101 and thus is redundant.

Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valves G3352F001 and G3352F004 These are normally-open motor-operated valves which close upon an isolation signal.

G3352F119 could also be included as it can serve the same function, though F001 and F004 are the isolation valves. Only one of the three valves needs to successfully close to isolate flow.

F001 and F004 are operated by a rugged push button, but can also be activated by relays A71B-K26 and A71B-K27. These are seal-in relays that are prevented from sealing-in due to chatter by several normally open contacts while de-energized. In the energized state the relays are sealed in and any chatter in the control logic would break the seal-in and close the valves. This action is a desired response to the seismic event and for this reason chatter is acceptable and no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

In addition, these valves are downstream of G3352F101 and isolation can be achieved by closing that valve regardless of the isolation signal.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valves Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves Normally-open motor-operated valves E5150F007 and E5150F008 are required to remain open to supply steam to the RCIC turbine. The opening circuit is controlled by a rugged pushbutton.

However, seal-in of the RCIC isolation signal (K33/K15) relay could lockout the open relay and chatter or seal-in of the K33/K15 relay in conjunction with chatter in the close relay or the position 16/8 limit switch could seal-in the close circuit. Chatter in the close contactor can seal-itself in during normal operation.

The K33/K15 relay can be sealed-in by chatter in its own circuits, the turbine exhaust diaphragm high pressure K39/K29 relay, the steam line high differential pressure K32/K12 relay, or coincidental chatter in both reactor low pressure relays, K60/K58 and K61/K59. Coincidental chatter in both B21B-S5B/A and B21B-K3B/A is not feasible since S5B/A is a manual switch.

The K39/K29 relay can chatter in its own contacts or by coincidental chatter of both E51K201B/A and E51K201D/C. The K32/K12 relay is a time-delay relay that does not seal-in or interface with a SILO circuit, which prevents momentary chatter in its coil circuits from energizing it. K60/K58 and K61/K59 can chatter due to E51K204B/A and E51K204D/C, respectively. A seal-in on the K33/K15 circuit can be overridden by a keylock reset on H11P601.

Therefore, for these valves the close contactors, the K33/K15 relays, the position 16/8 limit switches, the K39/K29 relays, the K60/K58 relays, the K61/K59 relays, and the E51K201A/B/C/D can cause an undesired event and were analyzed in Table B-1.

Residual Heat Removal Valves Testable Check Valves E11-F050A/B These solenoid-operated valves are controlled by rugged, normally open push buttons S15A and S15B. There are no SILO devices that would prevent the normal operation of these check valves.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 7 LPCI Isolation Valves The testable check valves E1100F050A and E1100F050B are not chatter sensitive and can be credited to remain closed, thus these valves do not need to be analyzed.

Drywell Spray Isolation valves These normally-closed motor-operated valves are operated via push buttons and relay permissive.

There is no seal in of the Close circuit via these relays and no lockout of the Open signal. There is the possibility for the Open and Closed contactors themselves to seal-in, but the push buttons will override either of these events.

Core Spray Valves Testable Check Valves These solenoid-operated valves are controlled by a rugged, normally open push buttons E2100M061A and E2100M061B. There are no SILO devices that would prevent the normal operation of these check valves.

Core Spray Outboard Check Valves; Core Spray Inboard Motor Operated Valve The testable check valves E21F006A and E21F006B are not chatter sensitive and can be credited to remain closed, thus these valves do not need to be analyzed.

High Pressure Core Injection Valves High Pressure Core Injection Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves These include normally-open motor-operated valves (MOVs) E4150F002 (main 10 line),

E4150F600 (1 min flow line), and normally-closed MOV E4150F003 (main 10 line). These valves supply steam to the HPCI turbine, which can be isolated by closing either E4150F002 or both E4150F003 and E4150F600. From normal operation, significant inventory loss will occur due to opening of E4150F003. The opening circuit is controlled by a rugged push button and permissive signal from relays. There is one potential seal-in in the opening circuit, relay OCR.

The closing circuit is controlled manually by a rugged push button or automatically via isolation relays. Chatter in the isolation logic along relay K34 for E4150F003 and K44 for E4150F002 will close these valves. These seal-ins can be overridden by keylock resets S35 and S36 respectively.

A direct seal-in of the closing circuits via relay CCR can be overridden by the rugged open push button if a change of state is needed. Since RCIC, not HPCI, is credited for core cooling, these seal-ins causing valve closure are not a selection criterion.

2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices and that no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function.

2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 8 The initial need for decay heat removal and the related scope of consideration varies based on the plants NSSS system. The relay chatter impacts that could affect this function would be those that would cause the flow control valves to close and remain closed.

For BWR plants, the decay heat removal mechanism involves the transfer of mass and energy from the reactor vessel to the suppression pool. This requires the replacement of that mass to the reactor vessel via some core cooling system, e.g., reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC).

Therefore, for this evaluation the following functions need to be checked: (1) steam from the reactor pressure vessel to the RCIC turbine and exhausted to the suppression pool, (2) coolant from the suppression pool to the reactor via the RCIC pump, and (3) steam from the reactor pressure vessel vented to the suppression pool via the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs). The selection of contact devices for the SRVs overlaps with the RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control Category.

The selection of contact devices for RCIC was based on the premise that RCIC operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to RCIC operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection. Only contact devices which could render the RCIC system inoperable were considered.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valves Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves E5150F007 and E5150F008 Section 2.2 identifies issues that could inadvertently close these valves on demand.

Suppression Pool Isolation Valves E5150F029 and E5150F031 Normally-closed motor-operated valves E5150F029 and E5150F031 supply coolant from the suppression pool to the RCIC turbine. There is no lockout of the opening circuit, and opening these valves will override any seal-in in the Close contactor.

RCIC Pump Discharge Isolation Valves E5150F012 and E5150F013 Normally-open motor-operated valve E5150F012 and normally-closed motor-operated valve E5150F013 supply coolant from the RCIC pump to the reactor via check valve, B2100F010B, and locked open valve, B2100F011B. There is no lockout of the opening circuit, but chatter in the closing contactor for E5150F012 can spuriously close this valve. Opening these valves will override any seal-in in the Close contactor.

Safety Relief Valves and Auto Depressurization Valves As noted in section 2.2, there are 15 solenoid-operated SRVs controlled via a rugged push button.

While the Open circuit for these valves has a potential seal-in, there is no SILO event for the Close circuit and the Close push button will override a seal-in in the Open circuit.

2.5 AC/DC POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

Emergency Diesel Generators, Battery Chargers and Inverters, EDG Ancillary Systems, and Switchgear, Load Centers, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 9 Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from the Fermi Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Fermi EDGs provide emergency power for the units. There are 2 divisions of Class 1E loads with two EDGs for each division.

The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available.

The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class 1E control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed.

Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators is broken down into the generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR.

Generator Protective Relaying The protective relaying for the EDG circuit breakers include bus differential lockout (3KP94),

generator differential lockout (4KU94), offsite under frequency relay (1NL94), and the engine shutdown relays (NCX and SDR). The ground trip string can actuate due to chatter in the CV8/64 ground detector relay or 1ND94 (1NE94/1NF94/1NG94 for EDGs 12/13/14) contacts sealing-in the 1ND94 coil and powering the 2ND94 coil. The offsite under frequency relay can close due to concurrent chatter in both devices 81 and 1PA69. Alternatively, if bus 64B pos B6 is closed or chatters, chatter in the 1PA69 contacts will not be necessary to seal-in 1PA69. The generator differential lockout relay may be tripped by chatter in the differential and ground fault protective relays (ICS), via contacts X-87G, Y-87G and Z-87G. In addition, chatter in the safeguards bus differential protective relays (ICS); via contacts X-87B, Y-87B, and Z-87B; or sympathetic chatter in 2KP94 and 4KP94, could lead to the tripping of the bus lockout relay.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 10 The NCX relay is sealed-in either by chatter in its on circuits or by chatter in the contacts or related switches of at least one of the following five relays: jacket coolant low level relay (CLL),

fuel oil low pressure (FPL2), jacket coolant low pressure (CPL), jacket coolant high temperature (CTH), or lube oil high temperature (OTH). However, the NCX relay is isolated by the ESA/ESB contacts and thus will not prevent an auto-start of the EDGs.

The engine trouble shutdown relay SDR is controlled by the engine overspeed switch and relay, the start failure relay, and a set of three switches and relays for lube oil low pressure and crankcase high pressure. Chatter of any of these items will energize relay SDR and cause it to seal-in. This seal-in can be broken by one of two rugged push button resets. Chatter of the contacts of the overspeed relay is blocked by the overspeed switch contacts. Chatter of the overspeed switch could energize the overspeed relay and lead to seal-in of the shutdown relay.

The start failure relay is controlled by the two overcrank timing relays. Chatter in the contacts of either of these timing relays may energize the start failure relay and once energized it will seal in.

The time delay function of these overcrank relays prevents momentary chatter in their coil circuits from energizing them. Coincident chatter (occurring in two out of three of each group) on the relays of the lube oil low pressure and crankcase high pressure faults could lead to seal-in of the shutdown relay. Chatter in the switches could also cause this fault except they are isolated by the 1/2 contact of the engine at low speed and alarm relay (T3), which is not a SILO device.

Diesel Engine Control Start Circuit Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of each EDG. The start circuit is blocked by seal-in of the engine trouble shutdown (SDR), EDG differential trip string relay impacted by coincidental chatter in 1KU94 and 3KU94 (2KU94), the seal-in of the emergency start isolation relay (5EX), lockout of IMB86, or lockout of IMG86.

Chatter of the SILO contacts of these relays or of the relays that are the parent SILO relay may prevent EDG start.

The engine trouble shutdown relay SDR is discussed in the Generator Protective Relaying section and is applicable here.

EDG differential trip string relay 2KU94 can be energized by seal-ins of 1KU94 and 3KU94 (KV94, KW94, and KX94 for EDG 12, 13, and 14 respectively). This can be accomplished either by coincidental chatter of 1KU94 contact 1/2 and 3KU94 contact 1/2 or by chatter in differential relays X-87G, Y-87G, or Z-87G.

The emergency start relay (5EX) is isolated by the emergency stop relay (5E). The 5E relay can be powered by seal-ins of the 1KU94 or SDR relays, but these seal-ins already cause isolation of the EDG start signal, so this circuit contains no unique equipment.

Seal-ins in overcurrent relays for bus 64B can energize lockout relays 1MB86 and 1MG86. The lock-out of the 1MG86 (2KZ94, 2LA94, and 2LB94) relay is via the SI relay (IAC53A) for either X51, Y51, or Z51. The lock-out of the 1MB94 (1KM94, 1KN94 and 1KO94) relay is via the SI relay (IAC66B) for either X50/51, Y50/51, or Z50/51.

Diesel Engine Control Shutdown Circuit The shutdown circuit can be energized by the seal-in of the engine trouble shutdown relay NCX energizing the stopping relay (5) or the 1KU94 or SDR seal-ins energizing the emergency stop relay (5E). The 1KU94 and SDR relays are discussed in the Diesel Engine Control Start Circuit section. The NCX relay is isolated by the emergency start logic via ESA or ESB, however, and thus cannot prevent the start of the EDG.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 11 EDG Ancillary Systems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators, a number of components and systems are required. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition, the passive air reservoirs R3000A009-R3000A016 are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids R30FA04A/B/C/D and R30FA05A/B/C/D, which are covered under the EDG engine control analysis above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems which do not rely on electrical control.

Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System is described in the UFSAR. The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps and DC-powered auxiliary pumps R3001C021-R3001C024 to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks, R3000A017-R3000A020. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps R3000C001-R3000C004 and R3000C009- R3000C012. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered auxiliary and transfer pumps concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is described in the UFSAR. This system consists of two cooling loops, jacket water and air cooler, which are each cooled by Diesel Generator Service Water (DGSW). Engine driven pumps operating in both cooling loops are credited when the engine is operating. These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. The electric jacket water pump is only used during shutdown periods and is thus not included in this analysis.

Four DGSW pumps with inter-divisional cross-tie capabilities, R3001C005-R3001C008, provide cooling water to each of the four heat exchangers, R3001B025-R3001B028 associated with the four EDGs. In automatic mode, these pumps are started via the EDG Start Signal. Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included above, and thus no unique chatter events exist for this system.

Ventilation The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System is described in the UFSAR. Ventilation for each Diesel Generator Enclosure is provided via two supply fans, X4103C001-X4103C008. In automatic mode, these fans are started via the EDG Start Signal.

Chatter analysis of the EDG start signal is included above. Other than SILO devices identified for the EDG start signal, chatter analysis of the control circuits for these fans concluded they do not include SILO devices.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 12 Battery Chargers Chatter analysis was performed for each of the non-BOP 130V DC battery chargers:

R3200S020A/B/C and R3200S021A/B/C, though only A and B of each are required for operation. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. The high voltage shutdown circuit has a latching output relay, CRI, which disconnects the charger. This is a non-vulnerable solid-state relay and thus is not susceptible to chatter. No other vulnerable contact device affects the availability of the battery chargers.

Inverters Analysis of schematics for the 120V AC 2KVA inverters (R31K001, R31K002, R31K004, R31K005), the HPCI inverter (R1100S080), and the 120V Power AC/DC inverters (R1700S011A/B), revealed no vulnerable contact devices and thus chatter analysis is unnecessary.

Cross Tie Breakers Loss of the cross tie breakers 64B-B8, 64C-C8, 65E-E8, and 65F-F8 results in the bus and functional loss of the RHR pumps and the RHRSW pumps. Seal-in of the 1KP94 (1KR94, 1KS94, and 1KT94 for C8, E8, and F8 respectively), 1KL94 (1KM94, 1KN94 and 1KO94) or 2KY94 (2KZ94, 2LA94, and 2LB94) relay coils can prevent these breakers from closing on demand. The 1KP94 (1KR94, 1KS94, and 1KT94) relay can energize due to seal-in of the ICS differential protection relays (87B/65E) for either X87B, Y87B, or Z87B or via sympathetic chatter in 2KP94 and 4KP94 (2KR94/4KR94, 2KS94/4KS94, and 2KT94/4KT94). The seal-in of the 2KY94 (2KZ94, 2LA94, and 2LB94) relay is via the SI relay (IAC53A) for either X51, Y51, or Z51, with initial closure via the SI seal in contact and then via the 1MB94/86 seal in contacts.

The seal in of the 1KL94 (1KM94, 1KN94 and 1KO94) is via the SI relay (IAC66B) for either X50/51, Y50/51, or Z50/51, with initial closure. 64C-C8 can bypass these seal-ins via the local controls. Thus, the ICS differential protection relays 87B/65E, relays 2KP94 and 4KP94 (2KR94/4KR94, 2KS94/4KS94, and 2KT94/4KT94), SI relays IAC53A, and SI relays IAC66B are included in Table B-1.

Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded the EDG circuit breakers, which are covered in above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above. The medium- and low-voltage power circuit breakers in switchgear and load centers supplying power to loads identified in this section are included in this evaluation. The Molded-Case Circuit Breakers used in the Motor Control Centers are seismically rugged. Power distribution to the inverters, fuel oil pumps, and EDG ventilation fans is via non-vulnerable disconnect switches. The only circuit breakers affected by contact devices (not already covered) were those associated with the battery chargers and the cross tie breakers.

2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 13 3 Seismic Evaluation 3.1 HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND After the development of the GMRS presented in Reference [4], the Fermi 2 site elected to develop an additional GMRS for their SPRA using more recent site specific data (Reference

[13]). This GMRS is subsequently used in the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)

(Reference [15]). This GMRS is more conservative and envelopes all frequency ranges greater than 15Hz compared to the one used in Reference [4]. The SPRA GMRS is used in this evaluation as well. Additionally, building in-structure response spectra (ISRS) used from Reference [15] are used here as well. The horizontal GMRS is presented in Figure 3-1.

The Reactor/Auxiliary Building (RBAB) and the RHR Complex are the only two structures needed for the High Frequency evaluation. The RBAB is founded at the control point elevation, so the GMRS serves as the Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) for that structure.

Similarly, it is noted in Reference [8] that a FIRS may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. [8], The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort. This is the case of the RHR Complex. It is founded fourteen feet above the control point, but still in rock. While it would have been acceptable to use the GMRS as the FIRS for the RHR Complex, a specific FIRS was developed anyway for the SPRA effort (Reference [14]).

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As was the case with the horizontal seismic demand, the vertical seismic demand was independently generated from Reference [4] and used in Reference [15]. The vertical GMRS is used along with the horizontal GMRS to develop detailed ISRS from a building analysis of the Fermi 2 site Category I structures. As described in Reference [13], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The sites soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference [13],

Table 5-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 14 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Depth Depth Thickness, Vsi Layer di / Vsi [ di / Vsi ]

(ft) (m) di (ft) (ft/sec) 1 14 4.2672 14.00 1000 0.01400 0.01400 2 84 25.6032 70.00 6500 0.01292 0.026923 3 114 34.7472 30.00 4500 0.02533 0.052256 4 184 56.0832 70.00 3400 0.05411 0.106374 5 224 68.2752 40.00 3900 0.05743 0.163809 6 234 71.3232 10.00 5000 0.04680 0.210609 7

-- -- --- 9300 -- --

(bedrock)

Appropriate V/H ratios are developed for the Fermi 2 site to scale the horizontal GMRS into a vertical GMRS as done on Reference [13]. This is done by combining methodologies from McGuire et al, and Edwards et al, References [17] and [18], respectively. Below 25 Hz, the two methodologies are enveloped. Above 25 Hz, the 25 Hz value from Edwards is combined with the maximum value from McGuire and extrapolated to 100 Hz.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the calculated V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency.

The HGMRS, V/H ratios, and VGMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for Fermi 2.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 15 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra HGMRS VGMRS Frequency (Hz) V/H Ratio (g) (g) 0.100 0.003 0.894 0.003 0.130 0.004 0.893 0.004 0.160 0.006 0.891 0.005 0.200 0.009 0.889 0.008 0.204 0.009 0.889 0.008 0.260 0.012 0.886 0.011 0.302 0.016 0.884 0.014 0.330 0.018 0.883 0.016 0.407 0.024 0.879 0.021 0.420 0.026 0.878 0.022 0.500 0.034 0.874 0.029 0.501 0.034 0.874 0.029 0.530 0.035 0.873 0.030 0.603 0.037 0.869 0.032 0.670 0.040 0.865 0.034 0.708 0.041 0.863 0.035 0.813 0.044 0.858 0.038 0.850 0.046 0.856 0.039 0.912 0.047 0.853 0.040 1.000 0.050 0.848 0.042 1.080 0.055 0.844 0.046 1.370 0.071 0.828 0.058 1.740 0.089 0.808 0.072 2.042 0.111 0.792 0.088 2.210 0.124 0.782 0.097 2.500 0.147 0.766 0.113 2.810 0.182 0.748 0.136 3.020 0.208 0.736 0.153 3.560 0.275 0.706 0.194 4.074 0.316 0.677 0.214 4.520 0.353 0.682 0.240 5.000 0.365 0.687 0.251 5.012 0.365 0.687 0.251 5.740 0.354 0.695 0.246 6.026 0.346 0.699 0.241 7.080 0.314 0.711 0.224 7.280 0.308 0.714 0.220 8.128 0.300 0.724 0.217 9.120 0.291 0.735 0.214 9.240 0.290 0.737 0.213 10.000 0.296 0.745 0.220 11.720 0.316 0.767 0.243 12.023 0.321 0.770 0.247

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 16 HGMRS VGMRS Frequency (Hz) V/H Ratio (g) (g) 14.125 0.352 0.820 0.288 14.870 0.363 0.840 0.305 16.218 0.362 0.878 0.318 18.197 0.361 0.904 0.326 18.870 0.360 0.912 0.328 20.417 0.360 0.929 0.335 23.950 0.360 0.961 0.346 25.000 0.366 0.970 0.355 25.119 0.366 0.971 0.356 30.390 0.386 0.972 0.375 30.903 0.386 0.972 0.375 35.481 0.386 0.972 0.375 38.570 0.386 0.973 0.375 40.738 0.380 0.973 0.370 48.940 0.357 0.974 0.348 50.119 0.352 0.974 0.343 60.256 0.309 0.975 0.301 62.100 0.301 0.975 0.294 70.795 0.264 0.975 0.257 78.800 0.230 0.975 0.224 81.283 0.226 0.975 0.220 91.201 0.209 0.975 0.204 100.000 0.195 0.975 0.190 Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 17 3.3 COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [14] the horizontal seismic demand is developed with a detailed Soil Structure Interaction (SSI) analysis based on the GMRS. For each of the Category I structures, detailed in-structure response spectra exist based on the GMRS at all floor elevations. No devices that require a High Frequency confirmation in this submittal are installed in non-Category I structures.

From the ISRS level, the in-cabinet demand is derived from the in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc, and is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [11] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [11] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories discussed in Section 4.4 of Reference [8] as follows:

Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width.

Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The in-structure vertical demand is determined using the same SSI analysis used to develop the horizontal ISRS in Reference [14]. Again, this is for all floors in all Category I structures.

The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 18 4 Contact Device Evaluations Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program.

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9] and [10].

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

(d) Through SSE spectra. All Category I components must be qualified to this level by design, so the SSE ISRS can serve as a lower bound capacity if needed.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8].

For most devices, the SSE spectra were used as a capacity out of simplicity. This is lower bound, but demonstrates that devices are adequate for the criteria in Reference [8]. Given that the SSE capacity is taken at the cabinet input level, the associated in-cabinet amplification factor is taken to be 1.0 for both the horizontal and vertical directions.

For components that utilize other capacity spectra, in-cabinet amplification factors are exclusively taken as described in Section 3 for devices mounted in cabinets. Additionally, devices that are not mounted in cabinets utilize conservative amplifications based on a case by case basis.

The evaluation determined that the capacity exceeded the demand in all cases for the Fermi 2 site.

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B. The detail evaluation for all selected components is documented in Reference [19].

Representative sample evaluation is presented in Appendix A for two selected components.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 19 5 Conclusions 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS Fermi 2 has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRCs 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [8].

The evaluation identified a total of 277 components that required evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, and detailed in Reference [19], all of the devices evaluated for the High Frequency Confirmation have a seismic capacity greater than the demand in the frequency range of 15Hz to 40Hz.

5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS No follow up actions are being taken as a result of this High Frequency Confirmation.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 20 6 References 1 NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. October 27, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer), Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility. September 17, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4 DTE Energy Company (DTE) Letter NRC-14-0017, DTE Electric Companys Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushimi Dai-ichi Accident, March 31, 2014, ADAMS Accession Number ML14090A326 5 Not used 6 EPRI 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic. February 2013 7 EPRI 3002002997, High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary.

September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation. July 2015 9 EPRI NP-7147-SL, Seismic Ruggedness of Relays. August 1991 10 EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004-02, Relay GERS Corrections. September 10, 2004 11 Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:1990. NP-7148 12 NRC Letter, Fermi, Unit 2 - Staff Assessment of Information provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC No. MF3861), dated October 5, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15077A028 13 RIZZO Associates, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis and Foundation Input Response Spectra for Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 5, dated April 12, 2016.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 21 14 RIZZO Associates, Building Seismic Analysis Report for Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 3, dated May 26, 2017.

15 DTE Energy Company (DTE) Letter NRC-14-0074, Fermi 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 9, 2014, ADAMS Accession Number ML14345A469 16 NRC Letter, Fermi Unit 2 - Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (TAC No.

MF5241, dated November 6, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15310A197.

17 McGuire, R. K, Silva, W. J., and Costantino, C. J. (2001), Technical basis for revision of regulatory guidance on design ground motions: hazard- and risk-consistent ground motion spectra guidelines, NUREG/CR-6728, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October, 2001.

18 Edwards, B., Poggi, V., and Fah, D., 2011, A predictive Equation for the Vertical-to-Horizontal Ratio of Ground Motion at Rock Sites Based on Shear-Wave Velocity Profiles from Japan and Switzerland, Bulletin of Seismological Society of America, Vol. 101, No. 6, pp. 2998-3019, 2011.

19 RIZZO Associates, Final High Frequency Submittal Calculation Package For Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic For Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 1, dated July 12, 2017.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 22 A Representative Sample Component Evaluations EXAMPLE 1 The first example presents the high frequency evaluation of Allen-Bradley Pressure Switch (Model No.

836-C3) mounted on Relay Panel R30P310. The Relay Panel is located on the first floor of RHR Complex at EL 590. The component ID of the Pressure Switch is R30NA37A.

As per NP-7147 (GERS Addendum 1) Reference [9], the capacity of Allen-Bradley Pressure Switch 836-C3 is 10g for the high frequency range from 15 Hz to 40 Hz.

The seismic demand is obtained from the clipped In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) developed for ISRS node 3060 at Elevation 590' of the RHR Complex (Reference [14]). The spectral acceleration is taken from the 5% ISRS as the greatest spectral acceleration beyond 15 Hz to 40 Hz for the high frequency evaluation:

Sa Horizontal 0.41 g Sa Vertical 0.86 g Vertical ISRS is clipped beyond 15 Hz in accordance with EPRI NP-6041-SL, Revision 1, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin." Figures A.1 and A.2 show the ISRSc (clipped ISRS) for horizontal (envelope of X & Y) and vertical directions. Clipping of the horizontal spectra is not considered since the peak is below 15 Hz.

Demand (RRS) Component: R30P310 Horizontal Direction (5% Damping) 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 Sa [g] 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1 10 100 f [Hz]

RRS RRS (clipped)

Figure A.1: Horizontal ISRS at RHR Node 3060

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 23 Demand (RRS) Component: R30P310 Vertical Direction (5% Damping) 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 Sa [g]

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1 10 100 f [Hz]

RRS RRS (clipped)

Figure A.2: Clipped Vertical ISRS at RHR Node 3060 According to Table Q-1, EPRI NP-6041, and Chapter 4 of EPRI High Frequency Test Report 3002004396, the amplification factor can be conservatively considered to be 4.5 in the horizontal direction. Similarly, in the vertical direction the amplification factor is taken as 4.7.

AF H 4.5 AF V 4.7 The minimum Capacity (TRS) over Required Response Spectra (RRS) ratio is given as below for the frequency range from 15 Hz to 40 Hz. RRS is the clipped ISRS (ISRSc).

Ratio of Horizontal TRS/RRSc 10g TRS_RRSc_H 5.42 AFH SaHorizontal Ratio of Vertical TRS/RRSc 10g TRS_RRSc_V 2.47 AFV SaVertical TRS_RRSc min TRS_RRSc_H TRS_RRSc_V 2.47

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 24 The TRS should be modified in accordance with Eqn. Q-9 of EPRI NP-6041 to obtain a 99% exceedance level, TRSC.

TRS TRSC Fk FMS Single axis correction factor is taken as 1.2 since the panel is cantilevered and vertical motion is well separated from the horizontal motion. (EPRI NP-6041 pg Q-9)

F MS 1.2 Knock down factor for Relays (EPRI NP-6041 Table Q-2, pg Q-10):

F k 1.5 The scaling factor (Fs) which is the minimum TRSc/RRSc ratio is calculated as (EPRI NP-6041 Eqn. Q-1):

FMS FS_F TRS_RRSc Fk FS_F 1.98 Scaling factor, which is defined as the capacity/demand ratio for high frequency motion (15-40 Hz), is greater than 1.0, therefore high frequency capacity of Allen-Bradley Pressure Switch Model No. 836-C3 is confirmed.

EXAMPLE 2 The second example presents the high frequency evaluation of EGPBC2004002 and FGPBC750 model Agastat relays. These Control Relays are mounted in panels H21P080/1/2/3 at elevation 659 of the AB.

Given that these panels are Category I, they are, by definition, qualified to the SSE level. Therefore, the SSE ISRS at elevation 659 can be used as a lower bound capacity curve. As such, capacity vs demand comparison for the High Frequency confirmation of mounted items is performed at the base of the host item, rather than making the comparison at the device level. In addition, the SSE ISRS are clipped to obtain low frequency broadband capacity curves which are extended into the high frequency range (up to 40 Hz) as per EPRI 3002004396.

The seismic demand is obtained from the clipped In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) developed for ISRS node 6021 at Elevation 659.5' of the AB. The spectral acceleration taken from the 5% ISRS as the greatest spectral acceleration beyond 15 Hz to 40 Hz for the high frequency evaluation:

Sa Horizontal 0.59 g Sa Vertical 0.44 g Spectral acceleration demand in horizontal and vertical directions

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 25 Both the SSE and GMRS spectra are clipped in accordance with EPRI NP-6041 Appendix Q.

Figures A.3 and A.4 show a comparison of ISRSc (clipped ISRS) for horizontal (envelope of X & Y) and vertical directions with the Capacity Spectra, respectively. The extension of low frequency capacity into the high frequency range is also shown on the plots.

Figure A.3: Comparison of clipped Horizontal ISRS vs Capacity Spectra for High Frequency Confirmation

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 26 Figure A.4: Comparison of Vertical ISRS vs Capacity Spectra for High Frequency Confirmation The minimum Capacity (TRS) over Required Response Spectra (RRS) ratio is given as below for the frequency range from 15 Hz to 40 Hz. RRS is the clipped ISRS (ISRSc).

_ _ 2.14 Ratio of Horizontal TRS/RRSc

_ _ 1.25 Ratio of Vertical TRS/RRSc

_ min _ _ , _ _ 1.25 The TRS should be modified in accordance with Eqn. Q-9 of Reference [4] to obtain a 99% exceedance level, TRSC.

TRS TRSC Fk FMS 1.0 Single axis to Multiaxial factor taken as 1.0 (Reference [4], pg Q-9)

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 27 1.2 Knock down factor of Component Specific Testing (Reference [4], Table Q-2, pg Q-10)

The scaling factor (Fs) which is the minimum TRSc/RRSc ratio is calculated as (Reference [4], Eqn. Q-1):

FMS FS_F TRS_RRSc FS_F 1.04 Scaling factor Fk FS_F 1.04 is greater than 1.0, therefore high frequency capacity of 12 devices mounted on the equipment is confirmed.

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 28 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 29 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

1 R30P311 CC1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

2 R30P311 CC2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

3 R30P311 CC3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

4 R30P311 OP1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

5 R30P311 OP2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

6 R30P311 OP3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Control ENGINE Relay SSE Capacity >

7 R30P311 EOR ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay OVERSPEED Cabinet Spectra Demand Limit ENGINE EPRI HF Capacity >

8 R3001S001 EOS MICR BZE6-2RN R3001S001 EDG RHR 595 Switch OVERSPEED Test Demand ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

9 R30P311 SDR TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN Control START Relay SSE Capacity >

10 R30P311 SFR ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay FAILURE Cabinet Spectra Demand Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

11 R30P311 T2A Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P311 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

12 R30P311 T2B Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P311 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

13 R14P001A X-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EA3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 30 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

14 R14P001A Y-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EA3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

15 R14P001A Z-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EA3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

16 R3000S005 1KU94 Relay WEST R3000S005 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

17 R3000S005 2KU94 Relay GE R3000S005 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

18 R3000S005 3KU94 Relay GE R3000S005 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

19 R30P311 NCX TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN JACKET Control Relay SSE Capacity >

20 R30P311 CLL COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW FUEL OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

21 R30P311 FPL2 PRESSURE- ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW JACKET Control COOLANT Relay SSE Capacity >

22 R30P311 CPL ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay PRESSURE- Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Time JACKET Relay SSE Capacity >

23 R30P311 CTH Delay COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay TEMP-HIGH Time LUBE OIL Relay SSE Capacity >

24 R30P311 OTH Delay TEMPERAT AGAS E7022PD004 R30P311 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay URE-HIGH

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 31 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result JACKET Level EDG SSE Capacity >

25 R30N558A R30N558A COOLANT MCDO E-8 R3000A005 RHR 603 Switch TANK Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW EDG FUEL OIL ENGIN Pressure Capacity >

26 R30NA37A FPLS PRESSURE- ALLB 836-C3 R30P310 E RHR 590 GERS Switch Demand LOW GAUGE PNL EDG JACKET ENGIN Pressure COOLANT Capacity >

27 R30NA02A CPLA ALLB 836-C3 R30P310 E RHR 590 GERS Switch PRESSURE- Demand GAUGE LOW PNL Tempera JACKET EPRI HF Capacity >

28 R30NA01A CTHA ture COOLANT ALLB 837-A6JX715 R3001S001 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch TEMP-HIGH Tempera LUBE OIL EPRI HF Capacity >

29 R30NA15A OTHA ture TEMPERAT ALLB 837-A6JX712 R3001S001 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch URE-HIGH ENGINE AT Control Relay SSE Capacity >

30 R30P311 T3 LOW SPD & ITEG J13P3012 R30P311 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand ALM Time DELAY Relay SSE Capacity >

31 R30P311 T3A Delay AGAS E7012PC004 R30P311 RHR 617 TDPU Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay JACKET Pressure Capacity >

32 R30NA16A CPS COOLANT ALLB 836-C3 R3001S001 EDG RHR 595 GERS Switch Demand PRESSURE CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

33 R30P321 CC1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

34 R30P321 CC2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

35 R30P321 CC3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

36 R30P321 OP1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 32 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

37 R30P321 OP2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

38 R30P321 OP3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Control ENGINE Relay SSE Capacity >

39 R30P321 EOR ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay OVERSPEED Cabinet Spectra Demand Limit ENGINE EPRI HF Capacity >

40 R3001S002 EOS MICR BZE6-2RN R3001S002 EDG RHR 595 Switch OVERSPEED Test Demand ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

41 R30P321 SDR TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN Control START Relay SSE Capacity >

42 R30P321 SFR ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay FAILURE Cabinet Spectra Demand Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

43 R30P321 T2A Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P321 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

44 R30P321 T2B Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P321 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

45 R14P001B X-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EB3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

46 R14P001B Y-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EB3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

47 R14P001B Z-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EB3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

48 R3000S006 1KV94 Relay GE R3000S006 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 33 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

49 R3000S006 2KV94 Relay GE R3000S006 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

50 R3000S006 3KV94 Relay GE R3000S006 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

51 R30P321 NCX TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN JACKET Control Relay SSE Capacity >

52 R30P321 CLL COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW FUEL OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

53 R30P321 FPL2 PRESSURE- ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW JACKET Control COOLANT Relay SSE Capacity >

54 R30P321 CPL ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay PRESSURE- Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Time JACKET Relay SSE Capacity >

55 R30P321 CTH Delay COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay TEMP-HIGH Time LUBE OIL Relay SSE Capacity >

56 R30P321 OTH Delay TEMPERAT AGAS E7022PD004 R30P321 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay URE-HIGH JACKET Level EDG SSE Capacity >

57 R30N558B R30N558B COOLANT MCDO E-8 R3000A006 RHR 603 Switch TANK Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW EDG FUEL OIL ENGIN Pressure Capacity >

58 R30NA37B FPLS PRESSURE- ALLB 836-C3 R30P330 E RHR 590 GERS Switch Demand LOW GAUGE PNL EDG JACKET ENGIN Pressure COOLANT Capacity >

59 R30NA02B CPLA ALLB 836-C3 R30P330 E RHR 590 GERS Switch PRESSURE- Demand GAUGE LOW PNL

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 34 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Tempera JACKET EPRI HF Capacity >

60 R30NA01B CTHA ture COOLANT ALLB 837-A6JX715 R3001S003 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch TEMP-HIGH Tempera LUBE OIL EPRI HF Capacity >

61 R30NA15B OTHA ture TEMPERAT ALLB 837-A6JX712 R3001S003 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch URE-HIGH ENGINE AT Control Relay SSE Capacity >

62 R30P321 T3 LOW SPD & ITEG J13P3012 R30P321 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand ALM Time DELAY Relay SSE Capacity >

63 R30P321 T3A Delay AGAS E7012PC004 R30P321 RHR 617 TDPU Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay JACKET Pressure Capacity >

64 R30NA16B CPL COOLANT ALLB 836-C3 R3001S003 EDG RHR 595 GERS Switch Demand PRESSURE CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

65 R30P331 CC1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

66 R30P331 CC2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

67 R30P331 CC3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

68 R30P331 OP1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

69 R30P331 OP2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

70 R30P331 OP3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Control ENGINE Relay SSE Capacity >

71 R30P331 EOR ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay OVERSPEED Cabinet Spectra Demand Limit ENGINE EPRI HF Capacity >

72 R3001S003 EOS MICR BZE6-2RN R3001S003 EDG RHR 595 Switch OVERSPEED Test Demand

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 35 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

73 R30P331 SDR TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN Control START Relay SSE Capacity >

74 R30P331 SFR ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay FAILURE Cabinet Spectra Demand Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

75 R30P331 T2A Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P331 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

76 R30P331 T2B Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P331 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

77 R14P001C X-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EC3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

78 R14P001C Y-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EC3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

79 R14P001C Z-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP EC3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

80 R3000S007 1KW94 Relay GE R3000S007 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

81 R3000S007 2KW94 Relay GE R3000S007 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

82 R3000S007 3KW94 Relay GE R3000S007 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

83 R30P331 NCX TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 36 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result JACKET Control Relay SSE Capacity >

84 R30P331 CLL COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW FUEL OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

85 R30P331 FPL2 PRESSURE- ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW JACKET Control COOLANT Relay SSE Capacity >

86 R30P331 CPL ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay PRESSURE- Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Time JACKET Relay SSE Capacity >

87 R30P331 CTH Delay COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay TEMP-HIGH Time LUBE OIL Relay SSE Capacity >

88 R30P331 OTH Delay TEMPERAT AGAS E7022PD004 R30P331 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay URE-HIGH JACKET Level EDG SSE Capacity >

89 R30N558C R30N558C COOLANT MCDO E-8 R3000A007 RHR 603 Switch TANK Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW EDG FUEL OIL ENGIN Pressure Capacity >

90 R30NA37C FPLS PRESSURE- ALLB 836-C3 R30P320 E RHR 590 GERS Switch Demand LOW GAUGE PNL EDG JACKET ENGIN Pressure COOLANT Capacity >

91 R30NA02C CPLA ALLB 836-C3 R30P320 E RHR 590 GERS Switch PRESSURE- Demand GAUGE LOW PNL Tempera JACKET EPRI HF Capacity >

92 R30NA01C CTHA ture COOLANT ALLB 837-A6JX715 R3001S002 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch TEMP-HIGH Tempera LUBE OIL EPRI HF Capacity >

93 R30NA15C OTHA ture TEMPERAT ALLB 837-A6JX712 R3001S002 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch URE-HIGH ENGINE AT Control Relay SSE Capacity >

94 R30P331 T3 LOW SPD & ITEG J13P3012 R30P331 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand ALM

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 37 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Time DELAY Relay SSE Capacity >

95 R30P331 T3A Delay AGAS E7012PC004 R30P331 RHR 617 TDPU Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay JACKET Pressure Capacity >

96 R30NA16C CPL COOLANT ALLB 836-C3 R3001S002 EDG RHR 595 GERS Switch Demand PRESSURE CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

97 R30P341 CC1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

98 R30P341 CC2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH CRANCASE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

99 R30P341 CC3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand HIGH LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

100 R30P341 OP1 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

101 R30P341 OP2 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW LUBE OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

102 R30P341 OP3 PRESSURE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Control ENGINE Relay SSE Capacity >

103 R30P341 EOR ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay OVERSPEED Cabinet Spectra Demand Limit ENGINE EPRI HF Capacity >

104 R3001S004 EOS MICR BZE6-2RN R3001S004 EDG RHR 595 Switch OVERSPEED Test Demand ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

105 R30P341 SDR TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN Control START Relay SSE Capacity >

106 R30P341 SFR ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay FAILURE Cabinet Spectra Demand Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

107 R30P341 T2A Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P341 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL Time CRANKING Relay SSE Capacity >

108 R30P341 T2B Delay TIME AGAS E7012PC004 R30P341 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay CONTROL

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 38 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

109 R14P001D X-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP ED3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

110 R14P001D Y-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP ED3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG Differen DIFFERENTI R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

111 R14P001D Z-87G tial WEST CA BUS RHR 617 AL TRIP ED3 Spectra Demand Relay STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

112 R3000S008 1KX94 Relay GE R3000S008 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

113 R3000S008 2KX94 Relay GE R3000S008 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING EDG DIFFERENTI 12HFA151A7 Control SSE Capacity >

114 R3000S008 3KX94 Relay GE R3000S008 RHR 617 AL TRIP H Panel Spectra Demand STRING AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

115 H11P628 B21CK27A AGAS FGPDC750 H11P628 AB 613.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

116 H11P628 B21CK27B 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

117 B2104M084 B21CK427C AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

118 B2104M085 B21CK427D AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 39 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

119 H11P628 B21CK27E 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

120 B2104M086 B21CK427F AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

121 B2104M087 B21CK427G AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

122 H11P628 B21CK27H 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

123 H11P628 B21CK27J 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

124 B2104M088 B21CK427K AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

125 B2104M097 B21CK427L AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT B21CK427 Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

126 B2104M098 AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 M Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

127 B2104M099 B21CK427N AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

128 H11P628 B21CK27P 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY G.E. TYPE Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

129 H11P628 B21CK27R 'HGA' GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand RELAY

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 40 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result LLS LOW PRESSURE Control EGPBC200400 Instrume SSE Capacity >

130 H21P082 B21-K253A AND AGAS H21P082 AB 659.5 Relay 2 nt Rack Spectra Demand SCRAM SEALED IN LLS LOW PRESSURE Control EGPBC200400 Instrume SSE Capacity >

131 H21P083 B21-K253B AND SRV AGAS H21P083 AB 659.5 Relay 2 nt Rack Spectra Demand OPEN PERMISSIVE LLS HIGH PRESSURE Control EGPBC200400 Instrume SSE Capacity >

132 H21P082 B21-K253E AND AGAS H21P082 AB 659.5 Relay 2 nt Rack Spectra Demand SCRAM SEALED IN LLS HIGH PRESSURE Control EGPBC200400 Instrume SSE Capacity >

133 H21P083 B21-K253F AND SRV AGAS H21P083 AB 659.5 Relay 2 nt Rack Spectra Demand OPEN PERMISSIVE HIGH Auxiliar Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

134 H11P628 K6A DRYWELL GE 12HFA151A2F H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay Cabinet Test Demand PRESSURE Auxiliar RPV LOW Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

135 H11P628 K7A GE 12HFA151A2F H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay LEVEL Cabinet Test Demand Auxiliar RPV LOW 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

136 H11P628 K8A GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay LEVEL F Cabinet Test Demand HIGH Auxiliar Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

137 H11P628 K6B DRYWELL GE 12HFA151A2F H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay Cabinet Test Demand PRESSURE Auxiliar RPV LOW Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

138 H11P628 K7B GE 12HFA151A2F H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay LEVEL Cabinet Test Demand Auxiliar RPV LOW 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

139 H11P628 K8B GE H11P628 AB 613.5 y Relay LEVEL F Cabinet Test Demand ENGINE Control Relay SSE Capacity >

140 R30P341 NCX TROUBLE ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand SHUTDOWN

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 41 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result JACKET Control Relay SSE Capacity >

141 R30P341 CLL COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW FUEL OIL Control Relay SSE Capacity >

142 R30P341 FPL2 PRESSURE- ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW JACKET Control COOLANT Relay SSE Capacity >

143 R30P341 CPL ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay PRESSURE- Cabinet Spectra Demand LOW Time JACKET Relay SSE Capacity >

144 R30P341 CTH Delay COOLANT ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay TEMP-HIGH Time LUBE OIL Relay SSE Capacity >

145 R30P341 OTH Delay TEMPERAT AGAS E7022PD004 R30P341 RHR 617 Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay URE-HIGH JACKET Level EDG SSE Capacity >

146 R30N558D R30N558D COOLANT MCDO E-8 R3000A008 RHR 603 Switch TANK Spectra Demand LEVEL-LOW EDG FUEL OIL ENGIN Pressure Capacity >

147 R30NA37D FPLS PRESSURE- ALLB 836-C3 R30P340 E RHR 590 GERS Switch Demand LOW GAUGE PNL EDG JACKET ENGIN Pressure COOLANT Capacity >

148 R30NA02D CPLA ALLB 836-C3 R30P340 E RHR 590 GERS Switch PRESSURE- Demand GAUGE LOW PNL Tempera JACKET EPRI HF Capacity >

149 R30NA01D CTHA ture COOLANT ALLB 837-A6JX715 R3001S004 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch TEMP-HIGH Tempera LUBE OIL EPRI HF Capacity >

150 R30NA15D OTHA ture TEMPERAT ALLB 837-A6JX712 R3001S004 EDG RHR 595 Test Demand Switch URE-HIGH ENGINE AT Control Relay SSE Capacity >

151 R30P341 T3 LOW SPD & ITEG J13P3012 R30P341 RHR 617 Relay Cabinet Spectra Demand ALM

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 42 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Time DELAY Relay SSE Capacity >

152 R30P341 T3A Delay AGAS E7012PC004 R30P341 RHR 617 TDPU Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay JACKET Pressure Capacity >

153 R30NA16D CPL COOLANT ALLB 836-C3 R30NA16D EDG RHR 593 GERS Switch Demand PRESSURE R3200S020A Battery Fermi 2 R3200S020A- Charger High R3200S020A- Plant Capacity >

154 CRI Relay BUS AB 643.5 3D Voltage 3D Specific Demand Lockout Report Relay R3200S020B Battery Fermi 2 R3200S020A- Charger High R3200S020A- Plant Capacity >

155 CRI Relay BUS AB 643.5 10E Voltage 10E Specific Demand Lockout Report Relay R3200S021A Battery Fermi 2 R3200S021A- Charger High R3200S021A- Plant Capacity >

156 CRI Relay BUS AB 643.5 5B Voltage 5B Specific Demand Lockout Report Relay R3200S021B Battery Fermi 2 R3200S021A- Charger High R3200S021A- Plant Capacity >

157 CRI Relay BUS AB 643.5 3D Voltage 3D Specific Demand Lockout Report Relay RCIC Auxiliar Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

158 E5100M033 K33 ISOLATION GE 12HFA151A2F H11P618 AB 613.5 y Relay Cabinet Test Demand SIGNAL TURBINE EXHAUST Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

159 E5100M039 K39 DIAPHRAG GE H11P618 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand M HIGH PRESSURE

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 43 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result STEAM LINE Control ETR14D3BC2 Relay Capacity >

160 E5100M032 K32 DIFFERENTI AGAS H11P618 AB 613.5 GERS Relay 004002 Cabinet Demand AL PRESSURE REACTOR Control Relay Capacity >

161 E5100M060 K60 PRESSURE GE 12HMA24A2F H11P618 AB 613.5 GERS Relay Cabinet Demand LOW REACTOR Control Relay Capacity >

162 E5100M061 K61 PRESSURE GE 12HMA24A2F H11P618 AB 613.5 GERS Relay Cabinet Demand LOW TURBINE EXHAUST Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

163 H21P081 E51K201B DIAPHRAG AGAS FGPBC750 H21P081 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand M HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE EXHAUST Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

164 H21P081 E51K201D DIAPHRAG AGAS FGPBC750 H21P081 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand M HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

165 H21P081 E51K204B PRESSURE AGAS FGPBC750 H21P081 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand LOW REACTOR Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

166 H21P081 E51K204D PRESSURE AGAS FGPBC750 H21P081 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand LOW Fermi 2 NON-Limit 586'10 Plant Capacity >

167 E5150F007 16 RECYCLE E5150F007 MOV DW Switch Specific Demand (F007 ONLY)

Report Fermi 2 E5150F007 Contacto 586'10 Plant Capacity >

168 E5150F007 CLOSE Close E5150F007 MOV DW r Specific Demand Contactor Report RCIC Auxiliar Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

169 E5100M015 K15 ISOLATION GE 12HFA151A2F H11P621 AB 613.5 y Relay Cabinet Test Demand SIGNAL

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 44 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result TURBINE EXHAUST Auxiliar 12HGA11A52 Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

170 E5100M029 K29 DIAPHRAG GE H11P621 AB 613.5 y Relay F Cabinet Test Demand M HIGH PRESSURE STEAM LINE Control ETR14D3BC2 Relay Capacity >

171 E5100M012 K12 DIFFERENTI AGAS H11P621 AB 613.5 GERS Relay 004 Cabinet Demand AL PRESSURE REACTOR Control Relay Capacity >

172 E5100M058 K58 PRESSURE GE 12HMA24A2 H11P621 AB 613.5 GERS Relay Cabinet Demand LOW REACTOR Control Relay Capacity >

173 E5100M059 K59 PRESSURE GE 12HMA24A2 H11P621 AB 613.5 GERS Relay Cabinet Demand LOW TURBINE EXHAUST Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

174 H21P080 E51K201A DIAPHRAG AGAS FGPBC750 H21P080 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand M HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE EXHAUST Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

175 H21P080 E51K201C DIAPHRAG AGAS FGPBC750 H21P080 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand M HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

176 H21P080 E51K204A PRESSURE AGAS FGPBC750 H21P080 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand LOW REACTOR Control Instrume SSE Capacity >

177 H21P080 E51K204C PRESSURE AGAS FGPBC750 H21P080 AB 659.5 Relay nt Rack Spectra Demand LOW Fermi 2 NON-Limit 586'10 Plant Capacity >

178 E5150F007 8 RECYCLE E5150F007 MOV DW Switch Specific Demand (F007 ONLY)

Report Fermi 2 E5150F008 Contacto 586'10 Plant Capacity >

179 E5150F008 CLOSE Close E5150F008 MOV RB r Specific Demand Contactor Report

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 45 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Fermi 2 E5150F012 Contacto Plant Capacity >

180 E5150F012 CLOSE Close E5150F012 MOV RB 578.5 r Specific Demand Contactor Report BUS 11EA Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

181 R1400S002A 3KP94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002A RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING GENERATO Control R 4160V SSE Capacity >

182 R1400S002A 4KU94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002A RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING Control OVERVOLT Control SSE Capacity >

183 R3000S005 59SX ITEE J13P30 R3000S005 RHR 617 Relay AGE Panel Spectra Demand Time SPEED Relay SSE Capacity >

184 R30P311 T3A1 Delay AGAS E7012PB004 R30P311 RHR 617 PERMISSIVE Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay BUS 11EA Differen R1400S002A- OVERALL R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

185 X-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EA4 DIFFERENTI EA4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 11EA Differen R1400S002A- OVERALL R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

186 Y-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EA4 DIFFERENTI EA4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 11EA Differen R1400S002A- OVERALL R1400S002A- SSE Capacity >

187 Z-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EA4 DIFFERENTI EA4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 11EA Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

188 R1400S002A 2KP94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002A RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING BUS 11EA Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

189 R1400S002A 4KP94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002A RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING OVERVOLT 1338D83A01 Control SSE Capacity >

190 R3000S005 59S Relay ABBP R3000S005 RHR 617 AGE TYPE SSV-T Panel Spectra Demand

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 46 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result BUS 12EB Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

191 R1400S002B 3KR94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002B RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING GENERATO Control R 4160V SSE Capacity >

192 R1400S002B 4KU94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002B RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING Control OVERVOLT Control SSE Capacity >

193 R3000S006 59SX ITEE J13P30 R3000S006 RHR 617 Relay AGE Panel Spectra Demand Time SPEED Relay SSE Capacity >

194 R30P321 T3A1 Delay AGAS E7012PB004 R30P321 RHR 617 PERMISSIVE Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay BUS 12EB Differen R1400S002B- OVERALL R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

195 X-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EB4 DIFFERENTI EB4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 12EB Differen R1400S002B- OVERALL R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

196 Y-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EB4 DIFFERENTI EB4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 12EB Differen R1400S002B- OVERALL R1400S002B- SSE Capacity >

197 Z-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EB4 DIFFERENTI EB4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 12EB Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

198 R1400S002B 2KR94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002B RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING BUS 12EB Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

199 R1400S002B 4KR94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002B RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING OVERVOLT 1338D83A01 Control SSE Capacity >

200 R3000S006 59S Relay ABBP R3000S006 RHR 617 AGE TYPE SSV-T Panel Spectra Demand BUS 13EC Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

201 R1400S002C 3KS94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002C RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 47 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result GENERATO Control R 4160V SSE Capacity >

202 R1400S002C 4KU94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002C RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING Control OVERVOLT Control SSE Capacity >

203 R3000S007 59SX ITEE J13P30 R3000S007 RHR 617 Relay AGE Panel Spectra Demand Time SPEED Relay SSE Capacity >

204 R30P331 T3A1 Delay AGAS E7012PB004 R30P331 RHR 617 PERMISSIVE Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay BUS 13EC Differen R1400S002C- OVERALL R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

205 X-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EC4 DIFFERENTI EC4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 13EC Differen R1400S002C- OVERALL R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

206 Y-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EC4 DIFFERENTI EC4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 13EC Differen R1400S002C- OVERALL R1400S002C- SSE Capacity >

207 Z-87B tial BUS RHR 617 EC4 DIFFERENTI EC4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 13EC Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

208 R1400S002C 2KS94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002C RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING BUS 13EC Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

209 R1400S002C 4KS94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002C RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING OVERVOLT 1338D83A01 Control SSE Capacity >

210 R3000S007 59S Relay ABBP R3000S007 RHR 617 AGE TYPE SSV-T Panel Spectra Demand BUS 14ED Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

211 R1400S002D 3KT94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002D RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING GENERATO Control R 4160V SSE Capacity >

212 R1400S002D 4KU94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002D RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 48 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Control OVERVOLT Control SSE Capacity >

213 R3000S008 59SX ITEE J13P3012 R3000S008 RHR 617 Relay AGE Panel Spectra Demand Time SPEED Relay SSE Capacity >

214 R30P341 T3A1 Delay AGAS E7012PB004 R30P341 RHR 617 PERMISSIVE Cabinet Spectra Demand Relay BUS 14ED Differen R1400S002D- OVERALL R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

215 X-87B tial BUS RHR 617 ED4 DIFFERENTI ED4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 14ED Differen R1400S002D- OVERALL R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

216 Y-87B tial BUS RHR 617 ED4 DIFFERENTI ED4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 14ED Differen R1400S002D- OVERALL R1400S002D- SSE Capacity >

217 Z-87B tial BUS RHR 617 ED4 DIFFERENTI ED4 Spectra Demand Relay AL STRING BUS 14ED Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

218 R1400S002D 2KT94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002D RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING BUS 14ED Control OVERALL 4160V SSE Capacity >

219 R1400S002D 4KT94 GE 12HMA24A4F R1400S002D RHR 617 Relay DIFFERENTI BUS Spectra Demand AL STRING OVERVOLT 1338D83A01 Control SSE Capacity >

220 R3000S008 59S Relay ABBP R3000S008 RHR 617 AGE TYPE SSV-T Panel Spectra Demand BATTE Fermi 2 Circuit BATTERY R3200S020A- RY Plant Capacity >

221 R3200S020A DCB SE&A QJ22B225 AB 643.5 Breaker CHARGER 3D CHARG Specific Demand ER Report BATTE Fermi 2 Circuit BATTERY R3200S020B- RY Plant Capacity >

222 R3200S020B DCB SE&A QJ22B225 AB 643.5 Breaker CHARGER 10E CHARG Specific Demand ER Report BATTE Fermi 2 Circuit BATTERY R3200S021A- RY Plant Capacity >

223 R3200S021A DCB SE&A QJ22B225 AB 643.5 Breaker CHARGER 5B CHARG Specific Demand ER Report

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result BATTE Fermi 2 Circuit BATTERY R3200S021B- RY Plant Capacity >

224 R3200S021B DCB SE&A QJ22B225 AB 643.5 Breaker CHARGER 3D CHARG Specific Demand ER Report AGASTAT Control TYPE EGPD Relay EPRI HF Capacity >

225 B2104M082 K2SRV AGAS EGPD004 B21P401 AB 643.5 Relay CONTROL Cabinet Test Demand RELAY NB DIV1 SRV LO-LO Control Assembl EPRI HF Capacity >

226 B2100M312A K33A SET LOGIC AGAS FGPDC750 H11P628 AB 613.5 Relay y Panel Test Demand HI PRESS SCRAM NB DIV2 SRV LO-LO Control EPRI HF Capacity >

227 B2100M312B K33B SET LOGIC AGAS EGPD002 B21P401 Cabinet AB 643.5 Relay Test Demand HI PRESS SCRAM NB DIV2 Control SRV LO-LO Assembl EPRI HF Capacity >

228 B2100M312C K33C AGAS FGPDC750 H11P628 AB 613.5 Relay SET LOGIC y Panel Test Demand SRV OPEN NB DIV2 Control SRV LO-LO EPRI HF Capacity >

229 B2100M312D K33D AGAS EGPD002 B21P401 Cabinet AB 643.5 Relay SET LOGIC Test Demand SRV OPEN Ground EDG 11 CONTR SSE Capacity >

230 R3000S005 CV8/64 Detector GROUND R3000S005 OL RHR 617 Spectra Demand Relay TRIP PANEL EDG 11 CONTR 12HFA151A7 SSE Capacity >

231 R3000S005 1ND94 Relay GROUND GE R3000S005 OL RHR 617 H Spectra Demand TRIP PANEL EDG 11 Control SWITC SSE Capacity >

232 R1400S002A 2ND94 GROUND GE 12HMA24A4 BUS 11EA-3 RHR 617 Relay HGEAR Spectra Demand TRIP Ground EDG 12 CONTR SSE Capacity >

233 R3000S006 CV8/64 Detector GROUND R3000S006 OL RHR 617 Spectra Demand Relay TRIP PANEL

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 50 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result EDG 12 CONTR 12HFA151A7 SSE Capacity >

234 R3000S006 1NE94 Relay GROUND GE R3000S006 OL RHR 617 H Spectra Demand TRIP PANEL EDG 12 Control SWITC SSE Capacity >

235 R1400S002B 2NE94 GROUND GE 12HMA24A4F BUS 12EB-3 RHR 617 Relay HGEAR Spectra Demand TRIP Ground EDG 13 CONTR SSE Capacity >

236 R3000S007 CV8/64 Detector GROUND R3000S007 OL RHR 617 Spectra Demand Relay TRIP PANEL EDG 13 CONTR 12HFA151A7 SSE Capacity >

237 R3000S007 1NF94 Relay GROUND GE R3000S007 OL RHR 617 H Spectra Demand TRIP PANEL EDG 13 Control SWITC SSE Capacity >

238 R1400S002A 2NF94 GROUND GE 12HMA24A4F BUS 13EC-3 RHR 617 Relay HGEAR Spectra Demand TRIP Ground EDG 14 CONTR SSE Capacity >

239 R3000S008 CV8/64 Detector GROUND R3000S008 OL RHR 617 Spectra Demand Relay TRIP PANEL EDG 14 CONTR 12HFA151A7 SSE Capacity >

240 R3000S008 1NG94 Relay GROUND GE R3000S008 OL RHR 617 H Spectra Demand TRIP PANEL EDG 14 Control SWITC SSE Capacity >

241 R1400S002A 2NG94 GROUND GE 12HMA24A4 BUS 14ED-3 RHR 617 Relay HGEAR Spectra Demand TRIP EDG 11 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

242 R1400S002A 1NL94 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 11EA-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY EDG 11 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

243 R1400S002A 1PA69 GE 12HMA24A2 BUS 11EA-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY Fermi 2 Circuit 4160V BUS SWITC Plant Capacity >

244 R1400S001B Pos. B6 ITEG HK R1400S001B AB 613.5 Breaker 64B HGEAR Specific Demand Report EDG 12 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

245 R1400S002B 1NM94 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 12EB-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 51 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result EDG Control 12OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

246 R1400S002B 1PB69 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 12EB-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY Fermi 2 Circuit 4160V BUS SWITC Plant Capacity >

247 R1400S001C Pos. C6 ITEG HK R1400S001C AB 613.5 Breaker 64C HGEAR Specific Demand Report EDG 13 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

248 R1400S002C 1NN94 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 13EC-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY EDG 13 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

249 R1400S002C 1PC69 GE 12HMA24A2 BUS 13EC-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY Fermi 2 Circuit 4160V BUS SWITC Plant Capacity >

250 R1400S001E Pos. E6 ITEG HK R1400S001E AB 643.5 Breaker 65E HGEAR Specific Demand Report EDG 14 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

251 R1400S002D 1N094 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 14ED-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY EDG 14 Control OFFSITE SWITC SSE Capacity >

252 R1400S002D 1PD69 GE 12HMA24A2F BUS 14ED-3 RHR 617 Relay UNDERFRE HGEAR Spectra Demand QUENCY Fermi 2 Circuit 4160V BUS SWITC Plant Capacity >

253 R1400S001F Pos. F6 ITEG HK R1400S001F AB 643.5 Breaker 65F HGEAR Specific Demand Report Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

254 R1400S001B ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 613.5 GERS X51 Protection POS B9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

255 R1400S001B ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 613.5 GERS Y51 Protection POS B9 HGEAR Demand Relay

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 52 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

256 R1400S001B ent GE 12IAC53101A AB 613.5 GERS Z51 Protection POS B9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

257 R1400S001B ent GE 12IAC66B6A AB 613.5 GERS X50/51 Protection POS B6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

258 R1400S001B ent GE 12IAC66B1A AB 613.5 GERS Y50/51 Protection POS B6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker 12IAC53B104 BUS 64B SWITC Capacity >

259 R1400S001B ent GE AB 613.5 GERS Z50/51 Protection A POS B6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

260 R1400S001C ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 613.5 GERS X51 Protection POS C9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

261 R1400S001C ent GE 12IAC53A3A AB 613.5 GERS Y51 Protection POS C9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

262 R1400S001C ent GE 12IAC53101A AB 613.5 GERS Z51 Protection POS C9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

263 R1400S001C ent GE 12IAC66B6A AB 613.5 GERS X50/51 Protection POS C6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

264 R1400S001C ent GE 12IAC66B1A AB 613.5 GERS Y50/51 Protection POS C6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker 12IAC53B104 BUS 64C SWITC Capacity >

265 R1400S001C ent GE AB 613.5 GERS Z50/51 Protection A POS C6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

266 R1400S001E ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS X51 Protection POS E9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

267 R1400S001E ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS Y51 Protection POS E9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

268 R1400S001E ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS Z51 Protection POS E9 HGEAR Demand Relay

Enclosure to NRC-17-0052 Page 53 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor System Manufact Build Elev. Basis for Evaluation No. ID Alt ID Type Function urer Model No. ID Type ing (ft) Capacity Result Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

269 R1400S001E ent GE 12IAC66B6A AB 643.5 GERS X50/51 Protection POS E6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

270 R1400S001E ent GE 12IAC66B1A AB 643.5 GERS Y50/51 Protection POS E6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker 12IAC53B104 BUS 65E SWITC Capacity >

271 R1400S001E ent GE AB 643.5 GERS Z50/51 Protection A POS E6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

272 R1400S001F ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS X51 Protection E9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

273 R1400S001F ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS Y51 Protection E9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

274 R1400S001F ent GE 12IAC53A2A AB 643.5 GERS Z51 Protection E9 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

275 R1400S001F ent GE 12IAC66B6A AB 643.5 GERS X50/51 Protection E6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC66B- Breaker BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

276 R1400S001F ent GE 12IAC66B1A AB 643.5 GERS Y50/51 Protection E6 HGEAR Demand Relay Overcurr IAC53A- Breaker 12IAC53B104 BUS 65F POS SWITC Capacity >

277 R1400S001F ent GE AB 643.5 GERS Z50/51 Protection A E6 HGEAR Demand Relay