NRC-14-0061, Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation

Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation

ML14220A303
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/07/2014
From:	Kaminskas V DTE Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-14-0061
Download: ML14220A303 (5)

Text

Vito Kaminskas Site Vice President DTE Energy Company 6400 N. Dixie Highway, Newport, MI 48166 Tel: 734.586.6515 Fax: 734.586.4172 Email: kaminskasv@dteenergy.com DTE Energy-TS 5.6.7 August 7, 2014 NRC-14-0061 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-001

References:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation As required by Fermi 2 Technical Specifications (TS), DTE Electric Company hereby submits a Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report for a PAM instrumentation function with one required channel inoperable.

Fermi 2 TS 5.6.7 requires submittal of a PAM Report within 14 days after entry into Condition B of TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation." Condition B of TS LCO 3.3.3.1 was entered on August 2, 2014.

The PAM Report for this condition is provided in the enclosure to this letter.

No commitments are being made in this letter.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr.

Zackary W. Rad of my staff at (734) 586-5076.

Sincerely,

USNRC NRC-14-0061 Page 2

Enclosure:

Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Reactor Projects Chief, Branch 5, Region III Regional Administrator, Region III Michigan Public Service Commission Regulated Energy Division (kindschl@michigan.gov)

Enclosure to NRC-14-0061 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation

Enclosure to NRC-14-0061 Page 1 Post Accident Monitoring Report Regarding Inoperable Instrumentation Fermi 2 Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation," requires one channel of Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) position indication in the control room to be operable for each Regulatory Guide 1.97 active PCIV in a containment penetration flow path, i.e., two total channels of PCIV position indication for a penetration flow path with two active valves. The PCIV position indication Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation consists of valve mounted limit switches, wiring, cabling, and control room indicating lamps.

Fermi 2 TS 5.6.7 requires submittal of a PAM Report within 14 days after entry into Condition B of TS LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation." Condition B of TS LCO 3.3.3.1 was entered on August 2, 2014.

This condition was entered due to the discovery that the PCIV position indication limit switch for the inboard Reactor Recirculation Water Sample System valve, B3100-F019, was not correctly indicating the closed position. The inboard PCIV position indication was declared inoperable on July 3, 2014 after the closed position indication light did not illuminate during stroke testing. The closed position light remained off when the valve was fully closed. This inoperability resulted in entering Condition A of TS 3.3.3.1 for one PCIV position out of two required channels per penetration flow path inoperable, which required restoration of the inoperable PAM instrumentation channel to operable within 30 days; then, Condition B was entered.

The 3/4 inch B3100-F019 PCIV provides inboard isolation for the Reactor Water Sample System small bore sample line. The outboard PCIV for this penetration, B3100-F020, remains operable and continues to provide position indication and isolation capability. Both the B3100-F019 and B3100-F020 are normally closed valves and receive isolation signals on low reactor water level, high drywell pressure and high main steam line radiation. Therefore, continued operation with this condition does not impose additional significant risk to the health and safety of the public.

Cause of the Inoperabilty After troubleshooting the Isolation Valve B3100F019 it was determined that the inoperability of the position indication is due to either a malfunctioning limit switch, or the cabling associated with the limit switch. Final determination of the cause will occur when Drywell access is permitted during the next Refueling Outage.

Enclosure to NRC-14-0061 Page 2 Action Taken The limit switch assembly failure was entered into the corrective action program and a work order has been created to schedule repairs when plant conditions allow access to the switch assemblies in the primary containment.

Plans and Schedule Repairs or replacement of the switch assembly is planned for the seventeenth refueling outage (RF 17), currently scheduled for the third quarter of 2015.