ML12341A363
| ML12341A363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/2012 |
| From: | Harvey W Detroit Edison, Co, DTE Energy |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NRC-12-0075 TMPE-12-0294, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML12341A363 (169) | |
Text
Enclosure 1 NRC-12-0075 Page 1 LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by Detroit Edison in this document.Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.
Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Zackery W. Rad, Manager -Nuclear Licensing, at (734) 586-5076.REGULATORY COMMITMENTS DUE DATE/EVENT Assets, not currently available for inspection, will be RF16 (currently scheduled for the inspected no later than during refueling outage 16 first quarter of 2014)(RF 16), currently scheduled for the first quarter of 2014.These assets are listed in Appendix E of the Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Report.Inspection results for unavailable assets will be submitted 90 days following completion of within 90 days of the refueling outage. RF 16.
Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Fermi'2 NPP Seismic Walkdown Report 10 CFR 50.54(f Section 2.3 Seismic Response Prepared By Reviewed By Pri / / ýignatiuAre Date Print/Signature/
Dt Peer Review: 6 .&V I"'Print/Sig rureDate Approved By:! 0 b 'Iint/A gn atu re Date 710 e7-Date: November 20, 2012 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Contents C o ve r S h e e t ..........................................................................................................
i C o nte nts ............................................................................................................
.. ii L ist o f T a b le s .........................................................................................................
iv Executive Summary ...............................................................................................
v I Introduction
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1-1 1 .1 B a ckg ro u nd ...........................................................................................................
1-1 1.2 Plant Overview ......................................................................................................
1-1 1.3 Approach .........................................................................................................
1-1 2 Seismic Licensing Basis ..........................................................................................
2-1 2 .1 O ve rv ie w ...............................................................................................................
2 -1 2.2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) .........................................................................
2-1 2.3 Design of Seismic Category I Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) ........ 2-1 3 Personnel Qualifications
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3-1 3 .1 O ve rv ie w .............................................................
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3 -1 3.2 W alkdown Personnel
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3-1 4 Selection of SSCs ....................................................................................................
4-1 4 .1 O ve rv ie w ...............................................................................................................
4 -1 4.2 SW EL Development
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4-1 5 Seism ic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys ................................................................
5-1 5 .1 O ve rv ie w ...............................................................................................................
5 -1 5.2 Seismic W alkdowns ...............................................................................................
5-1 5.3 Area W alk-Bys .......................................................................................................
5-5 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations
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6-1 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report ...............................................................
7-1 8 Peer Review ..................................................................................................................
8-1 8.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) ..........................
8-1 8.2 Review of Sample of Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walk-By Checklist (AW C) .............................................................................................................
8-2 8.3 Review the Decisions for Entering Potentially Adverse Conditions into the CAP P ro ce s s ..........................................................................................................................
8 -4 8.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations
..................................................................................
8-4 8.5 Review of Submittal Report ...................................................................................
8-4 Date: November 20, 2012 ii Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Contents 9 References
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9-1 Appendix A SWE Qualification List ........................................................................
A-1 Appendix B Equipment Lists ...................................................................................
B-1 Appendix C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) ...............................................
C-1 Appendix D Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs) .........................................................
D-1 Appendix E Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment
...... E-1 Appendix F Peer Review Report ................................................................................
F-1 Attachment 1 NRC's Revised Position ................................................................
I Date: November 20, 2012 iii Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 List of Tables Table 3-1. Personnel Roles ...................................................................................
3-1 Table 5-1. Anchorage Configuration Confirmation
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5-2 Table 5-2. Issues Identified during Seismic Walkdowns
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5-8 Table 5-3. Issues Identified during Area W alk-Bys ......................................................
5-11 Table 7-1 SSEL categories
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7-2 Table 7-2 List of Maintenance W ork Requests ............................................................
7-3 Table 7-3 Design Changes .....................................................................................
7-4 Appendices T able B -1. B ase List 1 ........................................................................................
B 1-1 Table B-2. SW EL 1 Rev 1 ..................................................................................
B2-1 Table B-3. Base List 2 .......................................................................................
B3-1 Table B-4. SW EL 2 Rev 1 ..................................................................................
B4-1 Table B-5. SW EL List Revision Justification
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B5-1 Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists
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C-1 Table D-1. Summary of Area W alk-By Checklists
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D-1 Table E-I. Inaccessible Assets for RF-16 W alkdown .............................................
E-1 Date: November 20, 2012 iv Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Executive Summary Background Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction.
The NTTF issued a report that made a series of recommendations to the Commission.
The Commission prioritized these recommendations in three tiers. Tier 1 recommendations were to be acted upon "without unnecessary delay." Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) Letter (Reference
- 8) that requests information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by the U.S. nuclear power plants. EPRI prepared Technical Report 1025286, entitled "Seismic Walkdown Guidance" (Reference 1), to provide guidance to conduct Seismic Walkdowns required in the 50.54 (f) Letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns.
Reference 3 is a letter from the NRC endorsing EPRI Technical Report 1025286 as a satisfactory response to the 50.54(f) Letter. Per the NRC, every U.S. nuclear power plant is required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis.Guidance EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Ref. 1) provides guidance and procedures to perform the Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns.
The EPRI Guidance Document 1025286 was used as guidance for selection of a sample of systems and components that represent diversity of component types and assure inclusion of components from critical systems/functions discussed in the NRC letter, selection of personnel, conduct of the Walkdowns, evaluations against the plant seismic licensing basis, and preparation of this report. Walkdown Checklists (Reference
- 13) used by the Seismic Walkdown Engineers were developed from checklists in the EPRI Guidance Document.Purpose The purpose of this document is to report the process, findings, and resolution of issues for the Seismic Walkdowns at Fermi 2. The findings are summarized in the attached Walkdown checklists (Appendices C and D) and identified issues are tracked by 27 Condition Assessment Resolution Documents (CARDs) listed in Tables 5-2 and 5-3.Findings The Seismic Walkdowns and packages for Rev 0 of this report, as defined in EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference 1), are complete and all seismic related findings are reported in 27 CARDs listed in Table 5-2 and 5-3. Appendices C and D provide checklists for 90 Walkdowns and 50 Walk-Bys.
No licensing changes are required as a result of this study.Date: November 20, 2012 V Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Future Work Thirteen (13) assets listed in Table E-1 are not available for inspection during current plant operation, because the assets are either energized electrical panels or inaccessible, located in the Drywell and Steam Tunnel. Divisional outages are required to open the switchgear.
An extended plant outage is required to enter the Drywell or Steam Tunnel. Assets, not currently available for inspection, will be inspected no later than during RF16, currently scheduled for the first quarter of 2014. Results of these inspections will be submitted within 90 days of the refueling outage.Conclusions A Peer Review of the submittal report was performed by the Peer Review Team, and it was found to conform to the objectives and requirements of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter.The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys identified 27 Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions.
All of the issues identified are addressed by the plant CARD system, and none required a licensing basis evaluation.
None of the 27 CARDs generated as a result of these Walkdowns were determined to have an immediate impact to the safe operation of the plant. No Engineering Design Packages were planned as a result of the Seismic Walkdown Program. Two CARDS resulted in Technical Service Requests (TSRs) which resolve field discrepancies.
The plant process improvements that resulted from the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program in 1995 were confirmed to be effective.
No issues were identified with the 20 assets selected from the IPEEE outlier population.
However, several assets, other than the IPEEE outlier population, had conditions such as missing bolts and lighting fixture deficiencies identified during the Walkdowns and Walk-Bys.This issue has been entered into the corrective action program.Date: November 20, 2012 vi Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 I Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND
In response to Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 10CFR50.54(f)
Letter on March 12, 2012 (Reference
- 8) requesting that all licensees perform Seismic Walkdowns to identify and address plant degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions, with respect to the current seismic licensing basis. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), prepared industry guidance to assist licensees in responding to this NRC request. The industry guidance document, EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012 (Reference 3). The Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant and Detroit Edison have committed to using this NRC-endorsed guidance as the basis for these Walkdowns and this report.1.2 PLANT OVERVIEW The Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant consists of an operating Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)generating unit, located in Newport, MI. The operating unit has a GE Mark I containment, is rated at 3430 MWt power (Facility Operating License No. NPF-43), and was built for the Detroit Edison Company. Fermi 2 was completed and received a full power license on July 15, 1985, Fermi 2 Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 1.1 (Reference 2).1.3 APPROACH The EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference
- 1) is used for the Fermi 2 Generating Station Unit engineering Walkdowns and evaluations described in this report.In accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:* Seismic Licensing Basis* Personnel Qualifications
- Selection of SSCs* Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Licensing Basis Evaluations
- IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report* Peer Review Date: November 20, 2012 1-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 2 Seismic Licensing Basis 2.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report summarizes the seismic licensing basis for the Fermi Generation Station Unit 2, as described in detail in Fermi 2 USFAR (Reference
- 2) and other pertinent design documents, Design Basis Document XXX-03 and Design Specification 3071-296 (References 19 and 20). The Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)and a summary of the codes, standards, and methods used in the design of Seismic Category I SSCs are presented.
Regulatory Action and Commitment Tracking Systems (RACTS) was reviewed on October 9, 2012, to ensure that there are no outstanding commitments on seismic issues. The database was searched for system number A3300 (Seismic Design). All commitments had a "one-time
-completed" status. No open commitments on seismic design basis were found. The Licensing database for SERs was reviewed to ensure that all SERs are included in the UFSAR.2.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE)The Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra for the Fermi 2 Generating Station site are anchored at zero period accelerations of 0.15g horizontal ground acceleration and 0.1g vertical acceleration.
The ground response spectra of a SSE are shown in UFSAR Section 3.7.1 and Figure 3.7-3 (Reference 2). Vertical ground motion is taken as 2/3 of the maximum horizontal ground acceleration, UFSAR Section 3.7.1.1. The development of the current licensing basis floor response spectra used for the seismic design/qualification of Fermi 2 Safety Related SSCs, is as described in UFSAR Section 3.7.2.6.2.3 DESIGN OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS (SSCS)2.3.1 Seismic Summary For seismic analysis, design, and qualification purposes, Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) are categorized as Seismic Category I. Plant Structures, Systems, and Components, including their foundations and supports, that are designed to remain functional in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)are described in Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 21), and designated as Seismic Category I. Details of the SSC categorization per Regulatory Guide 1.29 are presented in UFSAR, Section 3.2 and Table 3.2-1 (Reference 2).The Seismic Licensing Basis contained in the Fermi 2 USFAR (Reference
- 2) and other design documents (References 19 and 20) provide protection and mitigation features to assure that Seismic Category I Structures, Systems and Components continue to Date: November 20, 2012 2-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 operate during and after an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and perform their important to safety function during and after aSafe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).Fermi 2 site characteristics, including geology and seismology are, included in USFAR, Section 2 (Reference 2). The Seismic Category I structures of Fermi 2 foundations are built on bedrock. The maximum horizontal ground acceleration for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) ground response spectrum is 0.08g, and the maximum vertical ground acceleration is 0.05g. As mentioned earlier, the maximum horizontal ground acceleration for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake is 0.15g, and the maximum vertical ground acceleration is 0.1g, UFSAR Section 3.7.1.1.The shapes of the OBE and SSE horizontal ground acceleration spectra conform to the 1940 El Centro, California earthquake spectra with minor modifications to accommodate the 1935 Helena, Montana and the 1949 Olympia, Washington earthquakes, UFSAR Section 3.7.1.2.1 and Figures 3.7-2 and 3.7-3.The Reactor/Auxiliary Building is a single structure consisting of two parts identified separately as the Reactor Building, and the Auxiliary Building.The Reactor Building houses the Drywell, suppression chamber, refueling and reactor servicing equipment, biological shield, and the spent fuel storage facilities.
The building consists of reinforced concrete and structural steel supported on the Reactor Building foundation mat. [The Reactor Building is a secondary containment, that minimizes and controls the release of airborne radioactive materials.]
The Auxiliary Building houses several major safety-related systems and components.
The Auxiliary Building consists of reinforced concrete and structural steel supported on a reinforced concrete mat. The building is integrally connected to the Reactor Building, and is separated from the Turbine Building by a four inch seismic rattle space, UFSAR Section 3.8.4.1.1.2.
The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Complex is a reinforced concrete structure, supported on a base mat that serves as the ultimate heat sink for the reactor during normal shutdown and during postulated accident conditions.
The complex is divided into two divisions, each with the capacity to safely shut down the reactor during normal and accident conditions.
Each division of the RHR Complex houses RHR service water, emergency equipment service water, diesel generator service water system, two emergency diesel generators, a mechanical draft cooling tower, and an RHR reservoir, UFSAR Section 3.8.4.1.2.
UFSAR Section 3.7 describes the seismic analyses and design of Seismic Category I structures.
The buildings were modeled as slab-spring systems with lumped masses.The slabs are treated as infinitely rigid in their own planes and are interconnected by weightless, linear elastic springs, used to simulate the stiffness of shear walls within the structural system. These mathematical models were dynamically analyzed using the defined time-histories of acceleration and assigned damping values to determine the seismic response loads on structural components.
The dynamic analyses generated a series of level (floor and wall) response spectra at various damping values of interest.
These level response spectra are used to provide inputs to the analysis/design of piping systems, sub-systems and for seismic Date: November 20, 2012 2-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 qualification of Seismic Category I equipment.
These spectra are contained in Section 3.7 of the UFSAR. The loads, load combinations, and the acceptance criteria used to design structural components are included in UFSAR Section 3.8. UFSAR Tables 3.8-18, 3.8-19 and 3.8-20 provide loads, load combinations and acceptance criteria for structural steel and reinforced concrete structural components.
UFSAR Section 3.9 describes the analysis and design of the Seismic Category I Mechanical Systems and Components.
In addition to a Code required analyses.description, this section also provides a detailed description of the in-situ vibration testing performed on Fermi 2 piping systems.UFSAR Section 3.10 covers qualification of Seismic Category I instrumentation and electrical components.
Seismic qualifications of equipment are performed in accordance with IEEE 344-1971 (Reference
- 22) except components purchased after the issuance of IEEE 344-1975 (Reference
- 23) are specified to be qualified in accordance with that standard.
Appropriate response spectra from the Fermi UFSAR Figures 3.7-32 through 115 are provided by Fermi 2 to equipment vendors for qualification.
Seismic qualifications by means of analyses or testing were performed.
Qualification reports were reviewed and accepted by Fermi 2 Engineering to ensure that acceptable methodology and correct response spectra were used.A listing of applicable codes, standards, and specifications used in the design of the Safety Related Seismic Category I SSCs is contained in UFSAR Table 3.2-1, Section 3.8, Appendix A, and other design documents.
Some major representative standards, codes and specifications (References 2, 19, 20 and 24) used at Fermi 2 are also reiterated herein: 2.3.2 Applicable Codes Code or Edition Specification June 1963 ACI 318-63 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete February 1971 ACI 318-71 Both editions were used.CRSI Manual of Standard Practice 1 9 th Edition UBC Uniform Building Code 1970 AISC-63 Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection 1963 AISC-69 of Structural Steel for Buildings 1969 AISI Specification for the Design of Light Gage Cold- 1968 Formed Steel Structural Members AWS D1.1-72 Structural Welding Code 1972 1971 with ASME ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Subsection Summer of NE of Section III 1972 Addenda Date: November 20, 2012 2-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Material 1972 Specifications, Part A -Ferrous ASTM Annual Books of ASTM Standards 1972 ANSI B31.1.0 Standard Code for Pressure Piping, Power Piping 1967 ANSI B31.7 Nuclear Power Piping 1969 IEEE Criteria for Class 1E Electric System, for 1971 Nuclear Power Generating Station IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in IEEE 317-1971 Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical 1971 Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of 1975 IEEE 344-1975 Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations I _I Date: November 20, 2012 2-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 3 Personnel Qualifications
3.1 OVERVIEW
This section of the report identifies personnel that participated in NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown efforts. A description of the responsibilities of each Seismic Walkdown participant's role(s) is provided in Section 2 of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Relevant biographies are included in Section 3.2 below.3.2 WALKDOWN PERSONNEL Table 3-1 below summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort.Table 3-1 Personnel Roles Equipment Seismic Name Selection Plant Walkdown IPEEE Peer Operations Engineer Reviewer Reviewer Personnel (SWE)Plackeel Eapen x James Boyle x Kirk Snyder x x Gregory Strobel x x Marc Meyer X Rohit Vadhar x Scott Bauer x David Dickinson x Joseph LaVere x Michael Sasso x Enver Odar (note 2) x George Abdallah x (note 1, 2 and 3)Whitney Hemingway x (note 3)Notes: 1.2.3.4.Peer Review Team Leader.EPRI certified SWE.PSE-53 qualified SWE, but did not function as a SWE.Licensing Basis Reviewers were not required.Date: November 20, 2012 3-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 The qualifications and experience of the Equipment Selection Personnel are listed below: Plackeel K. Eapen -Equipment Selection Personnel Dr. Eapen is a Mechanical Engineer in the Nuclear Projects group at Fermi. Dr. Eapen earned his Ph.D (Nuclear Physics & Engineering) from Southern Methodist University.
He has over 40 years of experience in the design, construction, testing and operation of Nuclear Power Plants in the US and overseas.
Dr. Eapen was the seismic coordinator for D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant and he successfully managed seismic reviews and design efforts with consultation from Dr. John Stevenson.
Dr. Eapen was a construction Inspector of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and was responsible for overseeing Engineering activities at Region I plants. Throughout his career, Dr. Eapen was responsible for verifying conformance of field conditions of nuclear power plant systems, structures and components to the applicable design documents and records.James T. Boyle -Equipment Selection Personnel Mr. Boyle is a Mechanical Engineer in the Nuclear Projects group at Fermi. Mr. Boyle received a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland in College Park, Maryland.
He has over 38 years of experience in the design, construction and testing of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and Canada. Throughout most of his career he was involved in start-up testing of both fossil and nuclear power plants. Mr. Boyle has' been involved with field walk downs during all phases of his career.Mr. Boyle's field testing, including installation testing, is extensive and covers mechanical, I&C and electrical testing. Mr. Boyle wrote and conducted Loss of Off Site Power tests at Waterford (PWR) and Clinton (BWR) Nuclear Power Plants.Kirk Snyder -Equipment Selection Personnel and Plant Operations Mr. Snyder is a Nuclear Engineering Manager at Fermi. Mr. Snyder has over 38 years of experience in the nuclear field including 29 years at Fermi. Mr. Snyder received his Reactor Operator License in 1987 and his Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) License in 1990. Mr. Snyder was a Shift Manager at Fermi for over 11 years ending in 2006. In 2006 he assumed the position of System Engineering Manager where he continued to work closely with Operations on improving plant performance.
Mr. Snyder has been an Engineering Manager since 2006, except for a temporary assignment as Training Manager in 2009. Mr. Snyder worked closely with the Operations Manager in the approval of the SWEL list.Greg Strobel -Equipment Selection Personnel and Plant Operations Mr. Strobel is the Operations Manager at Fermi. He was a licensed SRO for 11 years.Mr. Strobel has worked at Fermi 2 for 23 years and he is familiar with all aspects of the station operating procedures.
The Operations Manager provided final approval of the SWEL lists.The list of Personnel Qualified by the Fermi Training Program Standard PSE-53 Seismic Engineer Walkdown is in Appendix A. Standard PSE-53 is based on the Date: November 20, 2012 3-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 training materials provided as part of the June 27, 2012 NTTF Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by EPRI training.
The qualifications and experience of the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) are listed below.Marc Meyer -Seismic Walkdown Engineer Mr. Meyer is a Civil-Stuctural Engineer in the Nuclear Projects group at Fermi. Mr.Meyer received a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where his major was structural engineering.
He has over 40 years'experience in a broad range of engineering and related technical activities associated with civilian nuclear power plants and government nuclear facilities.
For the past 14 years, he has been performing seismic analyses of safety related systems, structures, and components.
Among seismic calculations performed were analyses using methodology described in the Seismic Qualification Utility Group's (SQUG) Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Qualification of Nuclear Plant Equipment.
Mr. Meyer was trained, certified, and qualified to implement GIP methodology in October of 2001. Following receipt of his SQUG certification, Mr. Meyer revised the UFSAR for the Prairie Island nuclear station to permit the use of GIP methodology to seismically analyze and qualify safety related equipment including their supports.
During his tenure at Prairie Island, he used GIP methodology to seismically evaluate anchor bolts, tanks, cable tray supports, motor control centers, and instrument racks. At the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant, he originated, revised, and reviewed numerous calculations requiring seismic analysis.
Mr. Meyer completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.Rohit Vadhar -Seismic Walkdown Engineer.Mr. Vadhar is a Civil-Structural Engineer.
Mr. Vadhar received a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
He has over 30 years of experience in the design of the pipe support structures for U.S. nuclear power plants.He has been involved in refueling outages for Salem Units 1 and 2 and the Hope Creek Station.Mr. Vadhar was a Lead Pipe Support Engineer on major projects such as the Service Water replacement for the Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2, which was a multi-year program. He was involved with all design phases, including construction support and craft interface.
Mr. Vadhar is certified as Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) for Seismic Qualification Utility Group, SQUG. He has performed SQUG Walkdown for existing cable tray/supports at Salem Units 1 and 2. He has worked on GTSTRUDL, FAPPS (ME-150), MAPPS (ME-153), SMAPPS (ME-152) BASEPLATE (ME-035), MathCad, Smartsketch and BAP programs.
Mr. Vadhar completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.Scott Bauer -Seismic Walkdown Engineer Mr. Bauer is a Structural Engineer.
Mr. Bauer received a Master of Science in Structural Engineering and Mechanics of Materials from University of California Berkeley and a Bachelor of Science from University of California, Los Angeles. He has over 7 years of Date: November 20, 2012.3-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 experience in the design and analysis of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear power plants throughout the USA, as well as other structures at a variety of industrial facilities.
Throughout his career, he has designed numerous reinforced concrete and steel structures for use in industrial facilities and nuclear power plants located in high seismic zones. Mr. Bauer has assisted numerous industrial facilities address the walkdown and analytical requirements set forth in the CalARP Seismic program, a state program involving the inspection and evaluation of industrial SSCs for their resistance to accidental release of regulated substances due to (primarily) seismic events. This involved conducting walkdowns and post-walkdown analyses of the facilities' SSCs, identifying assets that could potentially be deficient for a postulated seismic event, and recommending specific repairs. As a member of a field team, he has identified deficiencies in electrical equipment, piping, vessels required for safe shutdown at industrial facilities, and their supporting structures.
He has further performed detailed analyses of SSCs at industrial facilities and nuclear power plants to quantify the risk of items identified as potentially deficient in performing their functions during and after a postulated seismic event.Mr. Bauer is a member of AISC and a longtime member of ASCE. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the State of California.
Mr. Bauer completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.David G Dickinson
-Seismic Walkdown Engineer Mr. Dickinson is a Civil-Structural Engineering Manager in the URS Warrenville Office.Mr. Dickinson received a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from Sheffield University in Sheffield, UK. He has over 25 years of experience in the design and maintenance of the Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) for Nuclear Power Plants in the US, and over 20 years' experience in construction and general engineering of Heavy Industrial buildings.
Throughout his career in the Nuclear Industry he was involved with the Seismic design and analysis for Safety Related SSCs including the modeling and dynamic seismic analyses of structures, and review and acceptance of Vendor equipment qualification documents based on analysis or shake table test results.Mr. Dickinson is a Licensed Structural Engineer (SE) in the State of Illinois, and a Licensed Professional Engineer (PE) in the States of Delaware, Michigan, Iowa, Maryland and Kentucky.
He is also a Chartered Engineer (CEng) in the UK, and a member of the Institution of Structural Engineers (MIStructE) in the UK. Mr. Dickinson has completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.Joseph LaVere -Seismic Walkdown Engineer Mr. LaVere is a Structural Design Engineer.
Mr. LaVere received a Master of Science in Civil Engineering from Wayne State University in Detroit, MI. Mr. LaVere's coursework at Wayne State University included structural dynamics for building structures.
Mr. LaVere has 8 years of structural design and consulting experience.
He has experience at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant in the evaluation and modification of Q1 Safety Related cable tray support structures, the evaluation of building floor slabs and other components in the reactor building, and design of Non-Safety Related HVAC support structures.
Mr. LaVere completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.Date: November 20, 2012 3-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Michael P. Sasso -Seismic Walkdown Engineer Mr. Sasso is a Civil Engineer in the Nuclear Projects group at Fermi. Mr. Sasso received a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Akron, in Akron, Ohio. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of Ohio.Mr. Sasso has over 18 years of experience in Structural Engineering with the last 4 years of experience in the design and maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs). He has performed numerous walkdowns inspecting scaffolds for potential seismic and thermal interactions with equipment to ensure that they are properly restrained.
He has been involved with the seismic evaluations of various for Safety Related SSCs and has been responsible for the modeling and dynamic seismic analyses of structural components.
In addition, Mr. Sasso attended several structural courses that are relevant to seismic dynamics and response behavior of components.
Mr. Sasso also served on the Akron District Society of Professional Engineers, Board of Directors
& Treasurer.
Mr. Sasso completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.No Licensing Basis issues were identified; therefore, no Licensing Basis reviewers were required.
All concerns were addressed with CARDs.The qualifications and experience of the IPEEE Reviewer is listed below: Enver Odar -IPEEE Reviewer Mr. Odar is the Civil/Structural Supervisor in the Nuclear Projects group at Fermi. Mr.Odar received a Master of Science in Civil Engineering from Lehigh University in Bethlehem, PA. He has over 40 years of experience in the design and maintenance of the Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) for nuclear power plants in the U.S.and abroad. Throughout his career he was involved with the Seismic Considerations for Safety Related SSCs and was responsible for the modeling and dynamic seismic analyses of structures, development of Floor Response Spectra and review and acceptance of vendor equipment qualification documents based on analysis or shake table test results. Mr. Odar has witnessed numerous shake table tests at various labs and facilities.
Mr. Odar was a working group member to revise ASCE 4-98 "Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary", and he was on a Task Force to initiate IEEE 344 and ASME-QME revisions to include seismic experience based approach for equipment seismic qualification.
Mr. Odar is a Fellow of ASCE, and a longtime member of the Seismological Society of America and the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.
He is a registered Professional Engineer in a number of states including Michigan.Mr. Odar attended June 27, 2012 NTTF Recommendation 2.3-Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by EPRI training and completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and was certified by EPRI as a SWE. Mr. Odar assisted with the Fermi PSE-53 Course Instruction.
Date: November 20, 2012 3-5 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 The qualifications and experience of the Peer Reviewers are listed below: George Abdallah -Seismic Walkdown Peer Reviewer Team Lead Mr. Abdallah is currently the Civil/Structural Lead Engineer in the Plant Support Engineering group at Fermi. Mr. Abdallah received a Master of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has over 32 years of experience in the design of the Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) for Nuclear Power Plants, with Architect Engineers and Utilities.
Throughout his career he was involved with the Seismic Considerations for Safety Related SSCs and was responsible for the modeling and analyses of structures, review and acceptance of vendor seismic equipment qualification based on analysis or shake table test results.Mr. Abdallah has previously witnessed shake table tests.Mr. Abdallah completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course held June 22-26, 1992. Also, Mr. Abdallah completed the EPRI Seismic IPE Add-On Training Course held July 27-29, 1992.Mr. Abdallah attended June 27, 2012 NTTF Recommendation 2.3-Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by EPRI training and completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and was certified by EPRI as a SWE. Mr Abdallah was the Fermi PSE-53 Course Instructor and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE at Fermi.Whitney Hemingway
-Seismic Walkdown Peer Reviewer Mr. Hemingway is currently an Associate Nuclear Engineer in the Mechanical/Civil Plant Support Engineering group at Fermi. Mr. Hemingway received a Bachelor of Engineering in Civil Engineering from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, with a concentration in structural engineering in May 2011. His coursework included Design of Steel Structures, Reinforced Concrete Design, Structural Analysis, and Structural Dynamics.Mr. Hemingway has worked at Fermi 2 in the Plant Support Engineering Mechanical/Civil department since June of 2011. He routinely participates in inspecting scaffolds that violate seismic rattlespace requirements and require approval from Plant Support Engineering.
He has helped review several seismic qualification reports for equipment in the plant.Before working at Fermi 2, Mr. Hemingway worked as an intern at Century Southern Engineers, a structural engineering firm in Spartanburg, South Carolina.
Mr. Hemingway completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course, and received the PSE-53 Qualification as a SWE.Date: November 20, 2012 3-6 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 4 Selection of SSCs 4.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report describes the process used to select structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that were included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The actual equipment lists that were developed in this process are found in Appendix B 4.2 SWEL DEVELOPMENT The selection process of SSCs described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was utilized to develop the SWEL for Fermi 2.The SWEL is comprised of two groups of assets:* SWEL 1 is a sample of assets whose function is to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity" SWEL 2 is a sample of spent fuel pool related assets Revision 1 of SWEL 1 and 2 are included in Tables B-2 and B-4 of this report, which include columns to identify the attributes used in selection of the assets discussed below.4.2.1 SWEL 1 -Sample of Required Assets for the Five Safety Functions SWEL 1 (Table B-2) was developed by screening the selection of the SSCs to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity, using the following four (4)screening criteria in accordance with Reference 1, Figure 1-1.* Seismic Category I* Equipment or Systems* Support for the 5 Safety Functions* Sample Considerations Screen 1 -Seismic Category I Only Seismic Category I SSCs were considered for SWEL 1. Seismic Category I components have a defined seismic licensing basis that can be evaluated against the plant as-built configuration.
Screen 2 -Equipment or Systems SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm their configuration is consistent with the design basis were excluded from SWEL 1. SSCs excluded are Seismic Category I Date: November 20, 2012 4-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Structures, Containment Penetrations and Seismic Category I Piping and Support Systems.0 Seismic Category I Structures Seismic Category I Structures were exempted from SWEL 1. However, structural spatial interactions were considered during Walkdowns and Walk-Bys as specified in Appendix D of EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference 1).0 Containment Penetrations Components required to isolate containment were considered for SWEL 1; however, all containment penetrations were excluded per the EPRI Technical Report 1025286 Section 3 Screen 2.* Seismic Category I Piping and Support Systems Piping Systems are exempted from SWEL 1 since they are periodically walked down by plant engineers and their licensing basis is managed by the In-Service Inspection (ISI)program.Screen 3 -Support for the five (5) Safety Functions SSCs which are associated with the following five safety functions were included in SWEL 1 selection.
The first four functions are associated with bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition and the fifth is associated with maintaining containment integrity:
- Reactor Reactivity Control (61 assets)* Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (70 assets)* Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (89 assets)* Decay Heat Removal Control (63 assets)* Containment Function (56 assets)SSCs associated with these five safety functions were selected using previous equipment lists evaluated in the Individual Plant Examination for External Event (IPEEE)(Reference
- 4) Table 3-3 and from EPRI Seismic Margins Assessment (SMA) such as Appendix B of EPRI NP-6041 (Reference 6).Previously, Fermi 2 conducted an evaluation of SSCs for the IPEEE program which provided a list (Reference 4, Table 3-3) of safety related equipment and components.
This evaluation used IPEEE Program guidance and EPRI SMA guidance which resulted in a list of Safety Related Systems and Components that support the first four safety functions.
Containment Function was not evaluated by the IPEEE program; therefore, components associated with Containment Function were added. The components are listed in Table B-1 (Base List 1) which was used as the base list for SWEL 1 selection.
Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) equipment located inside containment, and Date: November 20, 2012 4-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 supports for the equipment and components mounted on or in NSSS equipment are excluded from the program.Screen 4 -Sample Considerations Once SSCs had been condensed by the first three screens, a broad population of SSCs was used to select the final sample SWEL 1. The sample SWEL 1 assets were selected using the following general guidance attributes:
- A variety of types of systems (24 Systems).* Major new and replacement equipment since IPEEE (41 assets).* A variety of types of equipment (21 equipment groups identified in Appendix B of Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document).
- A variety of environments (Wet-14, Hot-12, Harsh-1 0, Outside-i).
- Equipment enhanced due to outliers identified during the IPEEE program (20 assets).The objective was to obtain a sufficient sample size that included a variety of assets identified above. Each general guidance attribute was implemented by also taking into account the following considerations.
- 1) Various Types of Systems Equipment was selected from a variety of 24 systems represented by the five functional categories.
Types of systems included were primary and support systems identified during IPEEE and SMA evaluations.
- 2) Major new and replacement equipment SWEL 1 includes both major new and replaced equipment installed within the past 15 years. This was achieved by reviewing Fermi 2 Equivalent Replacement Evaluation (ERE) documents and Engineering Design Package (EDP) documents issued since the completion of IPEEE evaluations (Reference 4). 41 assets from EREs and EDPs meeting this criterion were included in SWEL 1 selection.
The SWEL and Baseline lists include a column identifying the EDP or ERE number and a Y or N to signify that new equipment was or was not installed.
Additionally, plant personnel including Systems Engineers, Operators, and Maintenance were consulted to identify additional SSCs that have had multiple operational and maintenance issues, which were included in the SWEL 1 selection process.3) Various types of equipment A variety of equipment was selected to form a sufficient sample size for SWEL 1. The goal was to select at least one asset from each of the twenty two classes of equipment identified in Appendix B of EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference 1). The final list included at least one asset from every equipment class, except Class 13, Motor Date: November 20, 2012 4-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Generators.
Motor Generators at Fermi 2 are not classified as Safety-Related; and therefore, do not need to be added to the SWEL.4) Various environments Equipment selected included a representative cross-section of environmental conditions experienced at Fermi 2. These conditions include environments that are dry and wet, hot and cold, mild and harsh, and inside and outside buildings, including assets inside the Drywell. (Wet-14, Hot-12, Harsh-10, Outside-I)
- 5) Equipment enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program A review of potentially adverse seismic conditions, referred to as outliers in the IPEEE program (Reference 4), was performed by the IPEEE Reviewer.
A population of 20 assets was added to the SWEL.Contribution to risk was considered in the selection of assets. Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual MMR04, Revision 3 (Reference
- 31) defines the Fermi 2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) process for determining significant contributors to using Fussell-Vesely Measure and Risk Achievement Worth Measure. MMR Appendix G Revision 0 (Reference
- 29) lists the Fermi 2 risk significant systems. MMR Appendix E, Revision 14 (Reference
- 28) lists the risk significant components.
Work Control Conduct Manual MWC13 Revision 9 Enclosure H, titled "Valves with Potential to Reduce Reactor Coolant Inventory" (Reference
- 30) was also used to develop SWEL 1. SWEL 1 (Table B-2)includes a Risk MWC13/MMR column identifying 75 selected assets from MMR Appendix E, four of which are also assets from MWC13 Enclosure H. The assets selected for 5 safety functions were prioritized using MMR Appendix E, Revision 14, which denotes system functions along with the applicable safety functions.
SWEL 1 includes 64 assets from 18 of 34 systems listed in MMR Appendix G.Final screening was performed by Operations personnel and the Peer Reviewers.
Consideration was given to maintenance issues, accessibility, environment, location diversity, redundancy, ALARA, and impact on plant operation.
4.2.2 SWEL 2 -Spent Fuel Pool Related Assets The process for selecting a sample of SSCs associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)began with a review of the station design and licensing basis documentation including UFSAR Sections 3.8.4, 9.1.2, and 9.1.3 (Reference 2), and drawing M-2048 revision Al, for the SFP and the SFP cooling system. The following four screens narrowed the scope of SSCs to be included on the second Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL 2):* Seismic Category I* Equipment or Systems* Sample Considerations Rapid Drain-Down Date: November 20, 2012 4-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 1. Screen 1 -Seismic Category 1 All exclusions listed in SWEL 1 for Seismic Category I are applicable to SWEL 2, with the additional exemption that only Seismic Category I SSCs associated with the SFP be captured in SWEL 2, except for the rapid drain-down case.1. Screen 2 -Equipment or Systems All exclusions listed in SWEL 1 for equipment and systems are applicable to SWEL 2, with the additional exemption that only SSCs associated with the SFP be captured in SWEL 2.2. Screen 3 -Sample Considerations
- 3. The same sample considerations are applied to SWEL 2 as discussed in SWEL 1, with the additional exemption that only SSCs associated with the SFP be captured in SWEL 2.Screen 4 -Rapid Drain-Down Assets, that can allow the Spent Fuel Pool to drain rapidly (either Seismic Category I or non-seismic) such as hydraulic lines and associated equipment connected to the SFP, were considered.
Per the definition in EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference 1), rapid drain-down is defined as lowering the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after an earthquake or other seismic event.SFP drawings were reviewed to identify all penetrations less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
The Spent Fuel Pool is described in Drawings C-2420 revision J, C-2421 revision J, and C-2419 revision L. The Spent Fuel Pool liner elevation is 645'-9". The HOLTEC fuel racks are 15 feet tall. The fuel racks sit on the pool liner, placing the top of the fuel storage rack at El 660'-9. Besides the scuppers (which are located at water level), the only penetrations into the pool are two 6" FPCU discharge lines terminating at Elevation 676'-0 (see Drawings M-2048 revision Al, M-3356-1 revision W, and M-3357-1 revision Q) which show 15'-3" of water above the fuel storage racks.Vacuum breakers were installed on two 6" FPCU lines (drawing R6-517 revision 6).The top of the vacuum breakers is at El 683'-6, which is the mean pool water elevation.
Therefore, these two assets do not meet the criteria for visual verification.
No penetrations exist less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies; therefore, no Rapid Drain-down assets were added to SWEL 2.4.2.3 Conclusion to SWEL I and 2 Development Process* Base List 1 containing 2055 assets is in Table B-I.SWEL 1 containing 101 assets is in Table B-2, which was created from the Base List 1.Base List 2 containing 59 assets is in Table B-3.The Rapid Drain-Down list does not have any assets. No assets met the criteria described in Screen 4 -Rapid Drain Down.SWEL 2 with two assets is in Table B-4, which was created from Base List 2.Date: November 20, 2012 4-5 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 After the original SWEL lists were completed replacements were required because some assets could not be adequately accessed for inspection.
Ten (10) assets were replaced on the SWEL 1 list after it was concluded that assets or associated anchors were either not fully accessible or visible including one that was replaced twice. Five (5) of the assets were replaced because cabinet anchors are hidden under fire barrier mastic material molded into the bottom of cabinets.
The mastic was not visible until cabinets were opened during the walkdown.
Four (4) assets were replaced because not all of the anchors were visible. One asset was replaced because the panel is energized and not accessible during normal operation or the forthcoming refueling outage, RF16. The replaced assets are lined out on the SWEL lists (Table B-2 and B-4). Table B-5 is the justification to replace assets in SWEL 1 and 2.During the Walkdowns it was determined that two (2) of the four (4) SWEL 2 assets did not meet the criteria for visual inspection because they are underwater and were lined out on the list. As discussed in Section 4.2.1 these assets have no effect on drain-down.
4.2.4 Inaccessible
SWEL Assets A follow up list of assets not accessible during the 180 day period of initial review is in Table E-1. These assets will be walked down no later than during the Fermi 2 Refuel Outage 16.Date: November 20, 2012 4-6 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 5 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys 5.1 OVERVIEW A Walkdown Guideline, DTE file NJPR-12-0043 (Reference 13), was prepared to define and guide the Walkdown process. The guideline was developed from EPRI Technical Report 1025286 entitled "Seismic Walkdown Guidance" (Reference 1).Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted by 2-person teams of trained and qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers listed in Table 3-1, in accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference
- 1) during August of 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are discussed in more detail in the following sections.The teams prepared Walkdown and Walk-By checklists taken from the EPRI Guidance checklists in NJPR-12-0043 (Reference 13). The Walkdown checklists are included in Appendix C and the Walk-By checklists are included in Appendix D of this report.Pictures are attached to the checklists for clarification and to visually depict significant issues as necessary.
5.2 SEISMIC
WALKDOWNS Work Orders (WOs) 34753020 and 34753040 were prepared to define and manage the Walkdowns.
Work Order 34753020 was for Division 1 equipment, and Work Order 34753040 was for Division II equipment.
The Work Orders required support by Operations and Electricians to access areas not normally accessible or visible. All walkdowns that required opening panels to view anchors or equipment required both Operations' and Electricians' support. All measurements and pictures, which required breaking the plane of an energized cabinet, were performed by qualified Electricians per Fermi Procedure MMA-18 with the SWE directly observing.
After the Walkdowns were complete, the NRC issued a Revised Position on September 18, 2012 (Reference 18 and Attachment
- 1) to address the question "Do cabinets with external anchors have to be opened during the Walkdowns?" Prior to the Revised Position, panels with external anchors were not opened to view the internal components.
The Revised Position requires visual inspection of internal components, whether anchors are internal or external to the cabinet, if access does not require extensive disassembly.
Walkdown checklists were reviewed to identify assets with exterior anchors and internal components, and assets that were accessible without significant disassembly were opened and interiors inspected.
Assets requiring significant disassembly were not opened, and an explanation of difficulties in opening the assets was added to the checklists.
No assets were deferred for this reason. The Revised Position did not affect the Walk-Bys.Components included in Seismic Walkdowns are listed on SWEL 1 in Table B-2.Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) were completed for the 90 accessible assets on Date: November 20, 2012 5-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 the SWEL and included in Appendix C of this report. Pictures are included with most SWCs to provide a visual record of the asset, and capture walkdown comments by the SWE Teams. Anchorage information that was obtained from the previously performed IPEEE walkdowns was provided to the SWEs and used during anchorage verification.
Seismic Walkdowns were completed for 88 of 101 assets on SWEL 1 and 2 assets on SWEL 2. Nine supplemental SWCs were completed per the NRC Revised Position (Reference
- 18) discussed above. Thirteen (13) assets are inaccessible during plant operation and are not included.
A summary of the SWCs (Table C-1) and a copy of the checklists are in Appendix C.The 13 inaccessible assets in Table E-1 will be inspected during RF16, and this report will be updated within 90 days of the end of RF16. Note: changes in the RF16 schedule may affect the timing to complete walkdowns and reissuance of this report.5.2.1 Anchorage Configuration Confirmation As required by the EPRI Guidance Document (page 4-3) (Reference 1), 50% of assets were confirmed to be anchored consistent with plant documentation.
Table C-1 of Appendix C indicates the extent of required anchorage verification using the following symbols.Y: components requiring anchorage condition and configuration verification N: components only requiring anchorage condition verification See Table 5-1 below for an accounting of 50% anchorage configuration confirmations.
See the individual SWC forms in Appendix C for plant documentation supporting this confirmation.
Table 5-1 Anchorage Configuration Confirmation No. of SWEL Required to Assets SWEL Assets Confirm? C Issues Identified
______________
() (A12)Confirmed (A) (A)/2)Total 103 52 65 4*(*)CARDs 12-26837, 12-26590, 12-27504, and 12-28245 were generated to document inconsistencies between plant documentation and component anchorage.
CARD 12-26837 identified an error in drawing E-2998-05, Revision B, which will be corrected with a revision.
Panel H21P628 has four legs and the Southwest leg is mounted per Section G-G of the drawing to an embedded baseplate.
The Southeast Leg is mounted per Section D-D of the drawing. After reviewing Calculation DC-5165 Vol I, Revision 0 and Drawing E-2998-05, Revision B, the reviewer concluded that the existing drawing incorrectly shows both legs mounted per Section G-G. The drawing has been revised to correctly identify the as-built and as-designed configuration.
CARD 12-26590 was generated while reviewing design documents for heat exchanger P4400B001 B. An error was identified on drawing C-4889, Revision 0. Detail K specifies Date: November 20, 2012 5-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 that the heat exchanger be anchored to the Reactor Building structure using A-197 Grade B7 bolt material.
There is no ASME SA-197 bolt designation, and ASTM Standard A-1 97 does not have different grade designations.
According to vendor calculation T N 990901 2, Revision 1, pages 16 & 22, the bolt material should be ASME SA-193, Grade B7. Subsequently, two Fermi SWEs examined the bolts in question and found they were marked with a "B7" grade symbol as required by the SA-193 standard.This was a drafting error which has been corrected with a drawing change.CARD 12-27504 was generated after Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed that Hilti Kwik Bolt 3 anchors at the bottom of panel H 11 P903 were 1/4" instead of 1/2" dia. as required by Fermi Electrical Specification 3071-128-ED, Revision AO, Standard ST-ED-S7-2. Hilti Kwik Bolt 3 anchors at the top of the panel are the correct size. The Walkdown Engineers then evaluated 1/4" diameter anchors and concluded that loads on the anchors during a safe shutdown earthquake would not exceed their design capacity.A calculation will be prepared to accept the plant configuration.
CARD 12-28245 was generated after a missing spring isolator bolt was discovered on the CCHVAC North Div. 1 A/C Chiller. The missing bolt was determined not to have an adverse impact on CCHVAC chiller design functions.
A Work Order has been generated to install the missing bolt (See Table 5-2).5.2.2 Issue Identification during Seismic Walkdowns"Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions" were identified by the SWEs during the Seismic Walkdowns; however, in all cases, it was concluded that the anomaly or issue would not prevent the equipment from performing its safety-related function during or after a seismic event. A list of CARDs initiated during the Seismic Walkdowns appears in Table 5-2, along with an initial evaluation as noted in the CARDs. The Table also categorizes the CARDs as either Corrective Maintenance or Engineering Document.Corrective Maintenance issues will be addressed by Work Orders to correct the condition.
Engineering Document issues will be addressed by revising drawings and/or calculations.
No Licensing Basis Evaluations were required and all issues/anomalies are addressed in CARDs.Several CARDs were created as a result of the Walkdowns, but they relate strictly to plant housekeeping/maintenance and have no seismic impact. They are not listed or discussed in this report.CARDs generated as part of the Seismic Walkdowns are categorized as degraded anchorage, degraded support, spatial interaction, flex conduit spacing, and configuration control and are discussed further below.Degraded Anchors CARDs 12-27504, 12-27702, 12-28245, 12-28246 and 12-28393 identify concerns raised with anchors.CARD 12-27504 is an anchorage issue discussed above in the anchorage Section 5.2.1.Date: November 20, 2012 5-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 CARD 12-27702 identified a concern with anchor washers and thread engagement on Instrument Racks H21 P081, 083, 085 & 087. Of the 32 anchors inside the cabinets, 22 had less than one(l) full thread showing above the nut. Fermi Specification 3071-226 Revision K, section 3.3.5.4(a) requires one (1) full thread above the nut. Of the 32 washers on the anchors, 29 are beveled to match the profile on the mounting surface;however, three (3) washers are standard flat, round washers.Seismic Walkdown Engineers reviewed the anchor bolt analysis, Calculation DC-1 073, Revision A, and preliminarily determined the anchors have adequate design margin in the as-found condition.
They also performed a preliminary analysis to determine how many threads needed to be engaged to develop full anchor capacity.
The preliminary analysis, using worst case thread engagement, determined some anchors lacking full thread engagement would suffer a slight margin loss; however acceptable margin would still exist.The principal concern with not using beveled washers is bending of the anchor bolt under design loading conditions until the nut bears against the sloping bottom flange of the structural channel. However, since the load on anchor bolts during installation torquing did not bend any of the 32 anchors, bending under worst case design loads is not a concern.Preliminary analyses are included in the CARD summary of inspection results.Calculations will be revised to justify and document the as-found condition.
CARDs 12-28245, 12-28246 and 12-28393 identify concerns with anchor supports on the CCHVAC Division 1 chiller. The CARDs, respectively, identify a missing bolt on a spring isolator plate, rust on an isolator plate, and a concern with clearance provided for isolation.
The missing bolt does not jeopardize the structural capability of the support, because the remaining supports are adequate.
The rust is not significant.
Clearance is available for the isolators to absorb mechanical vibrations.
Degraded Support CARDs 12-27360, 12-27469, and 12-27475 identify missing fasteners.
CARD 12-27360 identified a grate inside a cabinet that was not secured per design.CARDs 12-27469 and 12-27475 identify missing fasteners on cover plates. Each CARD includes an evaluation of the structural adequacy of the as-found condition.
None of the missing fasteners jeopardize the seismic adequacy of the cabinets.
WOs have been prepared to install the proper fasteners.
CARDs 12-26852 and 12-26633 identify issues with supports on small, non-safety related items over the asset. CARD 12-26852 identifies a lighting conduit mounted on the ceiling with supports spaced further than the 8 foot maximum requirement in drawing E-2996-05A, Revision K, Specification Section 2.2.1. CARD 12-26633 identifies un-restrained heat tracing pull boxes on a safety related pump. In both cases, the item in question is non-safety related, and the item's mass is not significant enough to damage the protected asset. WOs have been created to correct the conditions (see Table 5-2).Date: November 20, 2012 5-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Spatial Interaction CARD 12-26921 identified a piece of Unistrut close to an EECW valve. The CARD determined that the Unistrut would not damage the valve. A WO was created to remove the Unistrut (see Table 5-2).Flex Conduit Spacing CARD 12-27131 identified a flex conduit that appeared to have little space for movement.
The flex conduit attached to the top of the Division 1 2A1 -2 130V Spare Battery Charger does not satisfy the nine (9) inches of length per one (1) inch of conduit diameter required by Conduit Specification 3071-128-EC, Revision AM, STD-EC-3-1, Section 3.5. The length of flex conduit is 14 inches, the specification requires 18 inches.Flex conduits are installed on equipment to allow movement or facilitate fit up. In the case identified, the flex conduit is installed at the top of the battery charger to facilitate fit up. The battery charger is rigidly mounted to the floor near the wall. Since movement between this portion of the floor and the wall during a seismic event is not possible, the flex conduit is adequate, as installed.
This condition does not prevent the battery charger from performing its design function.
A TSR is to be issued to add a note to as-build the drawing documenting the deviation.
Configuration Control CARDs 12-26590, 12-26837, 12-26977, 12-26990, 12-27114, and 12-27134 identify differences between plant configuration and drawings, but none of the differences raise seismic issues. CARDs 12-26837 and 12-26590 address anchor configuration issues discussed above in Section 5.2.1.NRC Revised Position Results No issues were found and no CARDs were initiated as a result of the nine (9) assets opened to satisfy the NRC's September 18, 2012 Revised Position (Reference 18 and Attachment 1). See Table C-1 for the 9 supplemental assets.5.3 AREA WALK-BYS In accordance with Reference 1, Area Walk-Bys were performed in each room or area (35 foot radius) containing one or more assets on the SWEL. Table C-1 of Appendix C identifies the Area Walk-By associated with each component.
Table D-1 of Appendix D provides a description of the Area Walk-Bys and components located in each area.Completed Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs) are included in Appendix D. Assets in close proximity were grouped resulting in 50 Area Walk-Bys.In some cases, masonry block walls are in close proximity to safety related components reviewed during Walk-Bys.
Masonry block walls were evaluated (Calculations DC-0841, Reference 26 and DC-4479, Reference
- 27) in response to issues identified in NRC IE Bulletin 80-11 (Reference 25). All masonry walls whose failure could cause Seismic II over I concerns were evaluated to demonstrate their structural adequacy, and where necessary, reinforced with steel framing. Masonry block walls whose failure would not cause Seismic II over I issues were left as is. Masonry block walls were identified in the Area Walk-Bys and Seismic II over I status noted. Therefore, proximity of block walls to components identified during these Area Walk-Bys was not considered a "potential adverse seismic condition".
Date: November 20, 2012 5-5 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 5.3.1 Issue Identification during Area Walk-Bys"Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions" were identified by SWEs during the Area Walk-Bys; however, in all cases it was concluded that the anomaly or issue would not prevent equipment from performing its safety-related function during or after a seismic event. A list of CARDs initiated during the Area Walk-Bys is in Table 5-3, including an initial evaluation of conditions reported in CARDs. Table 5-3 categorizes CARDs as Corrective Maintenance or Engineering Document.
Corrective Maintenance issues will be addressed by Work Orders to correct the condition.
Engineering Document issues will be addressed by revising drawings or calculations.
Several CARDs created as a result of the Walkdowns relate strictly to plant housekeeping/maintenance and have no seismic impact; therefore, they are not discussed in this text. The CARDs discussed below are categorized as degraded support, spatial interaction, and configuration control.Degraded Support CARDs 12-26588, 12-26630, and 12-26957 identified issues with supports on small, non-safety related items positioned over or near a SWEL asset.CARD 12-26588 identifies a damaged lighting support over a Motor Control Center.Because the light is small and it could fall only a few inches, the MCC would not be damaged if the light were to fall. A WO will correct this issue. CARD 12-26630 identified a GAI-TRONICS speaker mounted over a safety related panel, which does not appear to be seismically mounted. The CARD includes an analysis which concludes the mounting is adequate.
A calculation will be created to close the issue. CARD 12-26957 identified a missing nut on a fire hose reel. The CARD includes an analysis which concludes allowable stresses are acceptable for seismic II over I. A WO will correct the issue. The mass of all these items is too small to damage the protected asset. WOs have been created to correct the conditions.
See Table 5-3 for WO numbers.Spatial Interaction CARDs 12-26586, 12-26985, 12-26861, 12-27959, and 12-27093 identify spatial interaction concerns.CARD 12-26586 identifies contact between a handrail and a Core Spray Pipe. The 3" pipe is much heavier and stronger than the handrail; therefore, the handrail is not a hazard to the pipe. The CARD concludes that the handrail is not necessary for personal protection.
A WO was created to remove the handrail.
CARD 12-26985 identified light fixtures above switchgear in contact with a cable tray. The CARD concludes that the weight of the light fixture could not damage the switchgear.
A WO was created to move the light. CARD 12-26861 identified a light fixture contacting an 8 inch diesel service water piping. The CARD concludes that the weight of the light fixture could not damage the pipe. A WO was generated to move the light fixture away from the pipe. CARD 12-27959 identified a 4 inch clearance between an HVAC duct and switchgear panel, R1400S001C.
Since the panel is more rigid and heavier than the duct, its natural frequency will be different than that of the duct. As such, during a safe shut-down earthquake (SSE), the duct could sway toward the panel at the same time the panel is swaying toward the duct. A preliminary seismic evaluation determined that the current 4" of clearance between the duct and panel is sufficient to prevent any adverse seismic interaction.
CARD 12-27093 identified a light fixture resting against a stiffener on an HVAC duct. The chain support was wrapped around the HVAC duct stiffener.
The Date: November 20, 2012 5-6 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 chain was unwrapped and found to be the proper length. No further work was needed.See Table 5-3 for WO numbers.Configuration Control CARD 12-27556 identified a difference between plant configuration and drawings, but the difference is not a seismic issue.Date: November 20, 2012 5-7 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 5-2: Issues Identified During Seismic Walkdowns CARD Corrective Maintenance Engineering Corrective Actions Solution Corrective Walkdown Maintenance Order WO Follow-up Checklist CARD CARD Descriptlon/Title Seismicsue?
Initial Evaluation (M) Or Numberto Schedule Corrective Completone Reference Engineering Fix Start Action Doc. (El CARD to Fukushima Seismic generate Wo Walkdown NTTF 2.3 -geraeW C413COOA1 Loos tTF -Pull Boxes are non-seismic.
Their weight is insignificant; therefore, the Remove Pull& RB4-1 -oose ea Tep pullboxes will not damage the Standby Liquid Control Pump, C4103CO01A.
Boxes and Boxes on Pump document in C4103CO01A TSR Walkdown Engineers reviewed the analysis (Calculation DC-5634, pp. E.6 & E.9)supporting Specification 3071-128-ED Std. ST-ED-S7-2 to determine if it Undersized Anchors in evaluated use of Kwik Bolt 3 anchors smaller than 1/2" dia. The analysis did not Provide Hf11P°903 12-27504 Yes ENo 12/30/2012 Electrical Panel evaluate anything as small as 1/2". The Walkdown Engineers evaluated 1/4' Calculation dia. anchors and concluded that loads on the anchors during a design basis earthquake would not exceed their design capacity.Seismic Walkdown Engineers reviewed the anchor bolt analysis (Calculation DC-1073) for Instrument Racks H21P081, 083, 085 & 087 and determined the anchors have adequate design margin. They also performed a preliminary analysis to determine the number of threads needed to be engaged to develop Inadequate Kwlk Bolt full anchor capacity.
The preliminary analysis, using worst case thread engagement, determined some anchors lacking full thread engagement would suffer a slight margin loss, however acceptable margin would still exist.H21P081, Engagement.
22 of 32 H21P083, 12-27702 anchors had less than one Yes Flat washers could cause bending of the anchor bolt under design loading E No Provide 11/30/2012 H21PO85, thread showing. Three conditions until the nut bears against the sloping bottom flange of the Calculation H21P087 anchors have flat washers, structural channel. However, since the load on anchor bolts during installation the rest have beveled wsherest htorquing did not bend any of the 32 anchors, bending under worst case design washers. loads is not a concern.Based on the preliminary engineering evaluation, the beveled washer concern and the anchor thread concern do not impact functionality of the Instrument racks.This overspan condition exists on the second floor. The 8 ft. standard span is based on seismic qualification using the 5th floor response spectra, which is LightingConduitnot much higher than the second floor response spectra. Therefore, byengineering M 35274767 12/13/2012 H21P448 12-26852 Correctly Supported per Yes judgment, this over-span can be easily qualified, and it will be shown that the Drawing conduit will perform its intended function to support the cables during a seismic event.Page 1 of 3 Date: November 20, 2012 5-8 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 5-2: Issues Identified During Seismic Walkdowns CARD SAtD Corrective Maintenance Engineering Corrective Actions Solution Corrective Work Walkdown Maintenance WO Follow-up Completion Checklist CARD CARD Description/Title Seismie Initial Evaluation (M) Or Order Schedule Corrective Date issue? Number to Dt Reference Engineering Fe Start Action Doc. E) Fi As stated in the CARD this Unistrut Is not shown on the isometric for the valve.Unistrut found to be in This Unistrut is most likely abandoned in place and fits the description of a P44F402A 12-26921 possible contact %vith Yes hanger normally used for tubing supports.
If it is indeed touching the valve, it M 35326711 12/14/2012 EECW Valve will assist in supporting the valve In the vertical direction.
Therefore, this condition is not detrimental to the valve design or performance.
The missing bolt is not an immediate concern. Based on the panel cover R1BOQSO19A 12-27475 Missing Bolt on Panel ,e weight, remaining three bolts' design capacity, the bolts in the panel's other 3529783S 12/3/2012 R26005019A es three corners would be fully capable of supporting the panel during and after a design basis seismic event.The panel is a Seismic Category I, welded and high strength bolted steel frame structure per Spec. 3071-296.
An evaluation in the CARD applied a loading Missing hardware to using the worst case of the highest Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA).R3015343D 12-27360 secure grate in panel Yes M 35290634 1/281/2013 R3eP343D Considering a coefficient of static friction, the grate will not require screws to resist sliding during a seismic event. In addition to the sliding resistance, the walls of the Instrument panel hold the grate in place. Moving the grate would require a force in exactly the East-West direction.
This plate Is for the SE spring isolator of the four isolators under the Plate for Div- 1 CCHVAC compressor motor for the Div. 1 CCHVAC cooler. There are 3 other bolts T4100B009 12-28245 Chiller Spring Isolator Yes restraining the movement of this plate, and the absence of the bolt will not M 354784 3/19/2013a Missing Bolt allow for any amount of significant movement of the plate that would make the bolt attached to the spritig lose contact with the plate. See CARD 12-28393[below.The chiller assembly must be plumb in the horizontal and vertical plane to avoid mechanical vibrations and to prevent unanalyzed loads on rotating parts.The variable clearance under the isolators has no adverse impact on the chiller Investigate and CCHVAC Chiller Isolator since CCHVAC Div-1 chiller is running free of vibrations or any mechanical re-establish T4100B009 12-28393 Yes noises. Therefore, based on inspection of Div-1 and 2 chillers and review of E No misgTBD Clearance not Specified design documents, it is concluded that missing isolator tolerance, a missing bolt missing at the isolator assembly and minor surface rust have no adverse impact for this parameters.
equipment to meet its design functions as described in UFSAR Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. The missing data is a configuration control deficiency.
Page 2 of 3 Date: November 20, 2012 5-9 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 5-2: Issues Identified During Seismic Walkdowns CARD soluon Corrective Maintenance Engineering Corrective Actions Solution Corrective Work Walkdown Sim Maintenance order Wo Follow-up Checklist CARD CARD Description/Title isnitial Evaluation (M) Or er Schedue Corrective Completion Reference Engineering Nme Start Action oc. (E Fix A preliminary evaluation by two Seismic Walkdown Engineers concluded that the sensor cover in the EDG 14 Switchgear Room could not fall off during a seismic event. Since covers are small and light, one screw is enough to hold Missing/Damaged Screws them in place. If the sensor cover in the EDOG 13 Switchgear Room fell off, due 35297711 12/24/2012 X41NO56D 12-27469 ing/Dmage Screws Yes to its configuration, it would fail away from the sensor without touching its M and 1/20 in Temperature Sensors (oh contents.
Since the cover's sole purpose is to keep dust from collecting inside 35297790 the sensor and plant personnel from brushing against its internals, during a seismic event and the first few days thereafter, a cover is not required for the function or seismic capability of the sensor.Rust Found On Div. 1 and 35458784 3/19/2013 T4100B1009 12-28246 Div. 2 CCHVAC Chiller No Minor rust on the support does not affect the chiller operability.
See CARD 12- M and and 28393 above.Isolators 35459321 4/02/2013 Flex conduits are installed for equipment to allow movement or fit up. In the case identified in this CARD, the flex conduit is installed at the top of the Document R1Flea Conduit Appears to be battery charger to allow for fit up. The battery charger is rigidly mounted to R3200502DC 12-27131 No the floor near the wall. Therefore, there is no movement between this portion E No adequate 11/30/2012 too Rigid of the floor and the wall during a seismic event. This portion of the floor and movement in the wall move together during a seismic event. Therefore, the flex conduit is TSR adequate, as Installed.
CLOSED -H21P628 12-26837 Drafting Error on Drawing No N/A E No Drawing 10/11/2012 E- 2998-05 Revised B21NI16B 12-27134 Discrepancy between Label No N/A No CLOSED -CECO 10/12/2012 (RF1G Asset) and CECO Description 1co2e2ed Braces on EDGSW R3001CDO6 Pump/Motor R3001COOS CLOSED -No and RHRI-7 and C006 are not Identified No N/A No change needed 9/17/2012 on vendor drawings DCN not fully incorporated CLOSED -H21P296A 12-26990 onto Panel Mounting No N/A E No Drawing 10/2/2012 Drawing Revised Error was identified on CLOSED-P4400BOO1B 12-26590 Drawing C-4889 No N/A E No Drawing 9/6/2012 Revised CLOSED -R30005006 12-27114.Drawing M-N-2028 shows CLOSED -(RF1g Asset)No N/A E No Drawing 9/25/2012 1i Aset inorc P1 Number1 Revised I_____18 TOTAL CARDS Page 3 of 3 Date: November 20, 2012 5-10 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 5-3: Issues Identified During Area Walk-Bys CARD Corrective Maintenance Engineering Corrective Solution Actions Corrective Walkdown Seismic Maintenance Order WO Follow-up Comptetion Checklist CARD CARD Descriptionftitle is Initial Evaluation (M) Or umer Schedule Corrective Date Issue? j Number to Dt Reference Engineering
$lI Start Action-Dc. (El the mountinl f(r the GAI-1IRONICS speaker Identified In this CARl) Is shown Fukushima Seismic n vendordrawing DECO File Nn A2-S35. thespeaker is similar in mass and Wallosvn NtI I F 23 -mounting to detail 14 on drawing -?-2'3'6-OSA.
this equipment Is classified GAI-fronic above Panel as seismic I1/I. 1he speaker was found to be installed per drawing SS 1826. Issue Design AB2-I 12-215t630 H 1111901 drres not Yes CARD t2-26630 includes an evaluation which concludes that the speaker Is FN and ISR 71/211201 adequately mounted for seismic Il/I.appear tube seismically CARD 12-26630 will drive a formal calculatlion to document that the mounting and conduit that the speaker are seismically qualified as seismic Ill/I.Since the panel is mote rigid and heavier than the duct, its nat ural frequency will be different than that of the duct. As such, during a safe shut-down Complete Seismic Clearance ye earthquake (SSE), the duct could sway toward the panel at the same time accepoan e of AB?-? I2-2759 Between Panel& HVAC s the panel is swaying toward the duct. A preliminary seismic evaluation No condition and of /17 Duct determined that the current clearance between the duct and panel should As-Build be sufficient to prevent any adverse seismi, interaction.
Based on a preliminary evaluation by two Seismic Walkdown Engineers, this condition would not result in damage to t he MCC during a seismic event.Ihis is because the tbnk of lighting is supported at midspan by the structural Broken Support Cable on member and at its east and west ends by other means- Therefore, It is RHI-iI 1?-265119 Structural Membpr Yes uncertain whether it would simply sag at rrrirsparn, if the cable failed, M .35131737 11/78/017 abx)ve MCC 12F-5A or would actually make contact with the top of the MCC. If contact occurred, it would nut damage the MCC because the srructural member would sag.and then fall at short distance and strike the cabinret at a relatively low velocity.
impact forces would be negligible.
Based on a pelinminary evaluation by twit Seismic Walkdowrt Enrgineers, this crnditorn would not result in dansage in the pipe during a seismic event. Cl 0iS5Fb -Wo-12-26516 :ore 5pray i.ne in yes I his Is because (he pipe In the Core Spray i.Ine is larger Ihar the pipe in the F/M 353S!) 704 21612033 Generated Contact with Handrail handrail and because tire distance between Ihetwro pipes is not enough to and config.permit the development of any significant velocity and impact forces during ITSR Issued a hypothetical earthquake.
Page 1 of 2 Date: November 20, 2012 5-11 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 5-3: Issues Identified During Area Walk-Bys CARD Corrective Maintenance Engineering Corrective Solution Actions Corrective Work Walkdown Seismic Maintenance Order WO Follow-up Completion Checklist CARD CARD Description/Title issue? Initial Evaluation (M) Or Numberto Schedule Corrective Date Reference Engineering Fix Start Action Doc. IE)This fire hose support is a standard design per calculation DC-2477. In this calculation, the support is designed for the enveloping earthquake 12 7oslun Misugort Y accelerations at the reactor building 5th floor. The deficient support is RBSB-2 12-26957 Column Missing Anchor Yes M !35214809 12/27/2012 located in the reactor building sub-basement.
Preliminary analysis determined the support mounting will perform its seismic il/I function of supporting the fire hose, without impacting adjacent QA1 equipment.
The g inch pipe a very sturdy. It has two supports in the vicinity of the rattle ht 12268 Die ervie igatr Ye space violation (drawing M-N-2177-2).
The glass from the light fixture will RHII1-9 12-26861 Diesel Service Water Yes M 35198392 11/26/2012 break and it cannot damage the pipe, as a result of a seismic event.Therefore, the service water pipe will not be impacted by the lighting fixture.A preliminary evaluation by two Seismic Walkdown Engineers concluded Light Fixtures above that the current condition of the light fixtures does not pose a threat to the RHR2.2 12-26985 Switchgear in Contact Yes switchgear cabinet or cable tray. if the chain broke and the fixture fell, it M 35214980 12/3/2012 would not impact the cabinet or cable tray. Because the light fixture is much lighter than the cable tray and is resting against its side, during a seismic event it would not impact the tray with enough force to cause any damage, Per engineering judgment, because the weight of the light fixture Is low and is resting against the stiffener of the HVAC duct, it will not damage the AB2-2 12-27093 Repair Light Fisture in No seismically supported ductwork during a seismic event. The chain support M NA Closed Div. I Switchgear Room was wrapped around the HVAC duct stiffener.
The chain was unwrapped and found to be the proper length. No WO or further work was needed.t 1 tCLOSED -Floor Drain does not COE AB5-1 12-27556 No N/A No Drawing 10/24/2012 match drawing M-2221 NRevised 9 TOTAL CARDs Page 2 of 2 Date: November 20, 2012 5-12 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations As noted previously in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and in each individual CARD, review of all Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys concluded that, in all cases, the anomaly or issue would not prevent the equipment from performing its safety-related function during and after the postulated seismic events. All anomalies/issues are addressed by the 27 CARDs discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and listed in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 and the resulting corrective actions are tracked by the Fermi CARD process. As required by the CARD program, all CARDs were initially reviewed for plant impact, reportability and operability, as well as impact on the Licensing Basis. Action items were generated to either prepare calculations and drawing changes or to create a Work Order to perform maintenance.
CARDs generated to prepare Work Orders will be closed when the Work Order is scheduled.
CARD closure is not tied to issuance of this report.Since Licensing Basis Evaluations, as discussed in the EPRI Guidance Document, were intended as a tool to review issues prior to entry into the Corrective Action Program, independent Licensing Basis Evaluations were not needed as the evaluations were performed under the CARD process. No issues were found that would prevent the equipment from performing according its Licensing Basis.Date: November 20, 2012 6-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report In response to the USNRC's Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events, (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, 10CFR50.54 (f)", Fermi 2 performed an individual plant examination of external events for severe accident vulnerabilities.
The methodology that Fermi 2 selected for completing the seismic IPEEE was the EPRI developed Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) method outlined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference
- 6) and described in Fermi report NRC-96-0037 Section 1.3 (Reference 4). Seismic design margins were based on a conservatively severe earthquake referred to as the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) with a median ground spectrum anchored at 0.3g maximum ground acceleration.
Assets selected for the IPEEE seismic evaluations were selected from systems that support the following safety functions:
- Reactor reactivity control" Reactor coolant pressure control" Reactor coolant inventory control* Decay heat removal Also included were assets from systems that support containment integrity and isolation.
All twenty one classes of equipment, plus additional classes in "other" categories were selected for evaluations, and included in the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL).Outliers, identified during IPEEE seismic walkdowns were recorded in Screening and Evaluation Worksheets (SEWS). Individual descriptions of the identified outliers are provided in Section 3.1.5 of the Fermi 2 IPEEE report (Reference 4). In addition, insights gained from the IPEEE, which were not directly associated with the walkdowns, resulted in recommendations for maintenance and operator training.
Outlier resolutions and modifications were tracked by Deviation Event Reports. DERs were the predecessor to the current Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) system.DERs tracked outliers listed in Table 7-1 were resolved in three groups: 1. Maintenance items resolved by Work Requests (WRs). See Table 7-2.2. Items resolved by document changes (i.e. configuration control TSRs). See Table 7-3 3. Items requiring modification using Engineering Design Packages (EDPs). See Table 7-3.IPEEE seismic evaluation results were summarized in a comprehensive report (NRC-96-0037, Reference 4), which was reviewed by Senior Consultants, Drs. John Stevenson and Robert Kennedy, and issued in March of 1996.Date: November 20, 2012 7-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Summary Table 7-1 (From Table 3-6 of Reference
- 4) lists the number of IPEEE Safe Shutdown Equipment List assets evaluated in each equipment category and the number of "outliers" for each category to demonstrate the breadth and distribution of the study.Table 7-1 SSEL Categories Category # Description SSEL Assets Outliers 1 Motor control centers 15 6 2 Low voltage switchgear 8 4 3 Medium voltage switchgear 8 3 4 Transformers and regulators 12 3 5 Horizontal pumps 21 3 6 Vertical pumps 16 1 7 Fluid-operated valves 281 14 8 Motor-operated valves 89 12 9 Fans 26 0 10 Air handlers 16 3 11 Chillers 2 1 12 Air compressors 6 0 13 Motor generators 0 0 14 Distribution panels 20 3 15 Batteries and racks 2 1 16 Battery chargers 6 2 17 Engine generators 4 0 18 Automatic transfer switches 0 0 19 Instrument racks 50 8 20 Local instruments/temperature sensors 38 1 21 Control and instrumentation cabinets 83 18 22A Other valves 1119 2 22B Tanks 413 '3 22C Heat exchangers 20 4 22D Steam-driven turbines 2 0 Maintenance Work Requests, corresponding SEWS, description of outlier, and the closure date/status of each resolution appears in the following summary Table 7-2. (From Table 3-7 of Reference 4).Date: November 20, 2012 7-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 7-2 List of Maintenance Work Requests WR No Date Initiated Description Status/ schedule SEWS No 000Z947541 11/3/94 Mounting bolt missing on HCU Complete 12/9/94 RB1-12 000Z947542 11/3/94 HCU N2 tank support rod bent Complete 12/20/94 RB1-12 000Z947543 11/3/94 Missing/loose hardware and straps on HCUs Complete 12/9/94 RB1-12 000Z947544 11/3/94 Missing safety cables for lights- RB1 Complete 11/19/94 RBl-15/18 000Z948669 12/6/94 Missing hardware-H21 P021 Complete 12/9/94 RBB-02 000Z951276 1/27/95 Missing hardware-H21P017 Complete 6/8/95 RCIC-15 000Z951277 1/27/95 T4100B018 anchor nut may be missing Complete 8/12/96 RBSB-02 (Per DER 96-0644)000Z951289 2/24/95 Missing bolts- HPCI main oil pump Complete 3/29/95 HPCI-23 000Z951305 4/3/95 Missing bolts- calvert bus box support Complete 5/18/95 SGR1-05 000Z951311 4/27/95 Missing screws on H11P614 insert Complete 9/12/96 RR-18 000Z951312 4/27/95 Missing overhead light safety cables- AB3 Complete 3/21/96 BAT-06 000Z951313 4/27/95 Missing emergency battery hooks Complete 8/19/96 RB2-22 000Z951314 4/27/95 Missing bolts between MCC R3200S016 sections Complete 7/24/95 BAT-03 000Z951315 4/27/95 Switchgear door bolts not engaged/ stripped Canceled, split into 5 SGR2-03 000Z954328 000Z954329 000Z954330 000Z954331 000Z954332 000Z951324 5/15/95 GEMAC modules not inserted in Hi 1P612 Complete 4/5/96 RR-03 000Z951325 5/16/95 Missing overhead lights safety cables- AB2 Complete 4/13/96 SGR1-01 000Z952656 5/17/95 GEMAC modules not inserted in H11 P613 Complete 4/9/96 RR-03 000Z953607 5/31/95 Mounting screws for Dwyer switch in H21 P296B Complete 7/25/95 AB5-02 000Z953608 5/31/95 Safety cables on overhead lights- AB5 Complete 3/21/96 AB5-02 000Z953614 6/22/95 Mounting screw missing on R30NA09D switch Complete 2/27/96 RHR1-08 000Z953615 6/22/95 Actuator lid loose on R3000F023D, EDG 14 Complete 2/29/96 RHRl-10 000Z953616 6/22/95 Emergency lighting battery hook bolts R3600S199 Complete 8/19/96 RHR1-08 (Worked With OOOZ951313) 000Z953617 6/27/95 EDG gauge panel mounting nut torque Canceled, split into 4 RHR1-02 000Z953622 000Z953623 000Z953624 000Z953625 000Z953621 7/5/95 MCC R1600S003D rattlespace w/ water shield Complete 9/26/95 RB2-22 000Z953622 7/5/95 Torque jam nuts on gauge panel R30P310 Complete 8/15/95 RHR1-02 000Z953623 7/5/95 Torque jam nuts on gauge panel R30P320 Complete 8/21/95 RHR1-02 000Z953624 7/5/95 Torque jam nuts on gauge panel R30P330 Complete 8/29/95 RHR1-02 000Z953625 7/5/95 Torque jam nuts on gauge panel R30P340 Complete 9/6/95 RHR1-02 000Z954328 7/11/95 Switchgear door bolts not engaged R1400SO01B Complete 7/27/95 SGR2-03 000Z954329 7/11/95 Switchgear door bolts not engaged R1400SO01B Complete 7/27/95 SGR2-03 Date: November 20, 2012 7-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Table 7-2 List of Maintenance Work Requests WR No Date Initiated Description Status/ schedule SEWS No 000Z954330 7/11/95 Switchgear door bolts not engaged R1400SO01C Complete 7/27/95 SGR2-03 000Z954331 7/11/95 Switchgear door bolts not engaged R1400S001E Complete 7/27/95 SGR2-03 000Z954332 7/11/95 Swltchgear door bolts not engaged R1400S021B Complete 7/27/95 SGR2-03 000Z952645 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S002A Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-06 000Z952646 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S002B Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-06 000Z952647 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S002C Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-06 000Z952648 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S002D Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-06 000Z952649 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S038 Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-04 000Z952650 8/2/95 RHR switchgear bolts not engaged R1400S039 Complete 8/8/95 RHR2-04 000Z955153 8/2/95 Relay mounting screws missing -H21P350 Complete 10/3/95 RHR2-07 000Z955154 8/2/95 Relay mounting screws missing -H21P351 Complete 2/12/96 RHR2-07 000Z955432 11/28/95 Anchor nut missing for Distrib. Pnl. H21P561 Complete 8/5/96 RBB-06 000Z957665 12/11/95 Missing hardware for sig. conditioners, H 11 P612 Complete 8/19/96 RR-03 000Z957666 12/11/95 Recorder hardware deficiencies in H11 P601 Complete 2/15/96 CR-02 000Z957668 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S022 Complete 2/20/96 SGR1-06 000Z957669 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S023 Complete 2/20/96 SGR1-06 000Z957670 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S020 Complete 2/26/96 SGR2-04 000Z957671 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S021 Complete 2/26/96 SGR2-04 000Z957672 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S036 Complete 2/19/96 RHR2-04 000Z957673 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S037 Complete 2/19/96 RHR2-04 000Z957674 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S038 Complete 2/26/96 RHR2-04 000Z957675 12/18/95 Trolleys on top of 480V switchgears R1400S039 Complete 2/26/96 RHR2-04.000Z957680 12/20/95 Mounting screw missing for PCV T41 F114B Complete 8/12/96 AB5-02 000Z957681 12/20/95 Mntg. hardware deficiencies for T41N132B & 134B Complete 5/31/96 AB5-02 000Z957682 12/22/95 Tighten transformer mounting bolt -T41N456B (this Complete 5/30/96 AB5-25 was done under 000Z9619651)
Configuration changes enhancing the seismic ruggedness of components were performed using the engineered change process, Engineering Design Packages (EDPs), driven by Technical Services Requests (TSRs). Design changes and implementation completion dates are summarized in Table 7-3.Table 7-3 Design Changes DSN Status at Completion Date TSR 28195 For-Information-Only 06/25/2001 EDP 28195 is As Built in ARMs 07/22/2002 EDP 27108 As-Built (Closed) 11/15/1995 For Information Only 10/09/1995 EDP 27566 is As Built in ARMs 12/11/1997 TSR 27264 As-Built (Closed) -Drawing Change 07/01/1996 Date: November 20, 2012 7-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Due to the relatively large number of outliers such as loose, missing, or damaged hardware pertaining to plant maintenance practices, Training Work Request 96-0161 was issued to increase maintenance awareness of the importance of attention to detail in installation and restoration of mounting hardware during maintenance activities.
This training, using lesson plans LP-EM-242-9602 for Electrical, LP-MM-223-3962 for Mechanical, and LP-IC-336-9602 for I&C, was completed during the second quarter of 1996.Several assets in this report, other than the outlier population, had conditions such as missing bolts and lighting fixture deficiencies identified during the Walkdowns and Walk-Bys.
In light of the time period since the original IPEEE training activities and in view of the recent findings from this walkdown program, a PILAR (Performance Improvement and Learning Action Request) was initiated by CARD 12-28821 to provide recommendations for any necessary further improvements.
As a result of the IPEEE report, Operations were trained to recognize a seismic accident scenario, where the plant is required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a seismic event using the EDG as the only source of power. To preclude confusion in the Control Room, training included how to respond to multiple alarms resulting from chatter of"bad-actor" relays during an earthquake.
This training was accomplished in 1997 as follows: During Cycle 1 1997 Scenario SS-OP-904-0144, entitled "Seismic Event With a Loss of all Offsite Power/Failure of Blackstart CTG with EDG 11 Out Of Service/ a Medium Break LOCA/and the Receipt of Multiple Bad Actor Annunciators" was performed by all Licensed Operator Shift and Admin teams as the cycle assessment scenario.
The scenario was developed at the request of the PSA group to determine the response of operations personnel to invalid annunciators during a complex seismic event scenario.As part of the current NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort, each of the above documents were retrieved and reviewed confirming that the actions were implemented and documents closed.From the outlier population identified by IPEEE, a sample of twenty assets was selected, and added to the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort SWEL (discussed previously in Section 4.2.1 of this report). Available Screening and Evaluation Worksheets (SEWS) generated during the IPEEE Walkdowns were included in the NTTF 2.3 Walkdown packages to allow SWEs to confirm the completion of the outlier corrective actions. The selected twenty assets are listed below C1103D128 H11P628 H11P915 *R1400S023 E4101CO01C H11P857 H21P296A R1400S039B E41K805 H11P870 *R1400S001C R3000F023D H11P612 H11P898A *R1400S001E R30P320 H11P613 H11P898B *R1400S002C T49P400A*These four assets are not accessible during the initial NTTF 2.3 Walkdown effort and will be walked down during RF16.No potential adverse seismic conditions were identified on these assets Date: November 20, 2012 7-5 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 8 Peer Review 8.1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SWEL)The Peer Review team attended meetings during the development of the SWEL and provided feedback to the development team. During these meetings, the SWEL was checked against the Peer Review Checklist from Appendix F of EPRI Technical Report 1025286 to verify that all requirements had been addressed.
Operations, System Engineering, and Maintenance Organizations were consulted and requested to provide input to the SWEL selections.
8.1.1 IPEEE
Vulnerabilities and Major New and Replacement Equipment The SWEL development team provided selections to the Peer Review Team for its review.Using this process, a large pool of equipment was narrowed down following the guidelines in the EPRI Guidance Document.
The Fermi Central Component Data Base (CECO) was used to find all major modifications since the 1995 IPEEE evaluation.
Engineering Design Packages (EDPs)and Equivalent Replacement Evaluations (EREs) were examined to find major equipment changes that involved SSCs eligible for SWEL selection.
Vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE evaluation were also screened for SWEL selection as shown in Tables B-2 and B-4.8.1.2 Five Safety Functions The Peer Reviewers interviewed personnel on how equipment representing the five (5) safety functions described in the EPRI Guidance Document were classified.
The SWEL Development Team used its selection matrix to demonstrate how the selected SSCs represent multiple safety functions and how all of the five (5) safety functions were adequately represented as shown in Tables B-2 and B-4..8.1.3 Variety of Equipment The SWEL List represented all classes of equipment in Appendix B of the EPRI Guidance Document (Reference
- 1) except for Class 13, motor generators.
Motor generators at Fermi are classified non-Q, and are outside of the scope of SWEL requirements.
8.1.4 Variety
of Environments One of the Review Team's main areas of interest was capturing a variety of environments in the SWEL and dealing with items that can only be accessed during a Refueling Outage. It was decided that it was necessary to include items in the Drywell, as it is a uniquely harsh environment that could not exist elsewhere in the plant.8.1.5 Risk Significance Another concern brought up by the Peer Review Team was how to consider risk significance during the selection of SSCs for the SWEL. The SWEL Development Team successfully used Date: November 20, 2012 8-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 MWC13, Outage Nuclear Safety, and the Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual to identify risk significant systems.8.1.6 Changes Made to SWEL During Walkdowns During the Seismic Walkdowns it was discovered that several cabinets had a fire protection coating that did not allow visual confirmation of anchorage configurations.
As a result, new cabinets were chosen and Operations was consulted to verify the cabinets would be safe to inspect during normal plant operation.
The finalized SWEL was found to conform to the requirements of EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Section 3, "Selection of SSC," and the Peer Review Checklist.
8.1.7 SWEL 2 The list of potential SSCs for SWEL 2 selection was very small. Since the spent fuel pool has no penetrations less than 10 feet above the top of fuel assemblies, there were no rapid drain-down items to select. One item, the gate between the spent fuel pool and reactor cavity used during refueling outages to transfer fuel from the reactor to the spent fuel pool, was initially selected, but was taken off the SWEL 2 list because it would not be possible to inspect.8.2 REVIEW OF SAMPLE OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLIST (SWC) AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLIST (AWC)8.2.1 Review of Checklists The Peer Review Team reviewed and provided feedback on 28% (25 out of 90) of SWCs and the associated 14 AWCs. There are a total of 50 AWCs so that 28% (39 of 140) of the total number of SWCs and AWCs were reviewed.
Clarification statements were added to checklists as needed. Justification of engineering judgment was added at the request of Peer Reviewers.
For example, SWEs inserted references to design documents in SWCs to justify conclusions.
Discussions with SWEs validated that EPRI guidance was followed and proper documentation and justifications were provided.8.2.2 Review of Packages When reviewing SWCs and AWCs, the Peer Review Team inspected the entire documentation package for the SWEL item, including anchorage drawings, CECO printouts showing documents relevant to the SWEL item, and pictures.
The investigation of the packages found that there was an adequate amount of documentation to verify anchorage conditions.
8.2.3 Interview
of SWEs Periodically, the Peer Review Team accompanied SWEs in order to observe pre-job briefs and walkdowns and to ensure SWEs understood and properly executed the EPRI guidance.Walkdowns observed by Peer Reviewers included a variety of equipment types (especially equipment that the Peer Review Team had feedback on after reviewing SWCs and AWCs) and different SWE teams. The Peer Reviewers interviewed SWEs after they had filled out checklists to ensure that they identified all potentially adverse conditions and followed EPRI guidelines, and found their responses to be adequate.Date: November 20, 2012 8-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 8.2.4 Issues Identified During Walkdowns CARDs 12-27069, 12-27068, 12-27480, and 12-27952 (Items 1 -4 below) identify concerns raised by the NRC during the Walkdowns.
Cards 12-27069, 12-27480 and 12-27952 (Items 1, 2 and 4 below) raised concerns with the walkdown process and scope, not equipment or structure.
Since the concerns were not raised by SWEs, they are not included in Appendices C or D. CARDs discussed below in Item 5 were initiated by the Peer Reviewer and are included in Appendix C.1) The NRC Resident Inspector accompanied a team of SWEs on one of its first Walkdowns (Testability Panel H21 P085) and raised concerns over the adequacy of preparation.
CARD 12-27069 was initiated and a Stand-Down with all SWEs and the Peer Review Team was held to address this issue. The Stand-Down reinforced the need to make certain that all necessary tools for performing the Walkdowns be discussed during the Pre-Job Brief. It was stressed that the SWE teams should have the appropriate drawings with them, and that drawings should be consulted prior to and during the Walkdown.
The Peer Review Team as well as Engineering Managers attended Pre-Job Briefs and Walkdowns following the Stand-down to reinforce these expectations.
The Walkdown was repeated after the Stand-down and lessons learned were discussed.
The Peer Review Team followed up by verifying appropriate drawings and tools were being used during Walkdowns and Walk-Bys.2) CARD 12-27068 was initiated because a SWE team performed a Walkdown without the NRC Resident, despite a prior agreement to perform a joint Walkdown.3) The NRC Resident Inspector performed an independent Walkdown of the HPCI Turbine Driven Oil Pump E4101CO01C and questioned the statement in the SWC that attached lines had adequate flexibility.
CARD 12-27480 was initiated to address the question.
The stress analysis showed the lines had been analyzed and found to have adequate flexibility.
The Peer Review Team performed a review of other Walkdown packages for similar considerations.
The concern was found to be limited to the E4101C001C and HPCI system.4) In response to the NRC Revised Position (Reference 18 and Attachment 1), CARD 12-27952 was initiated.
An extent of condition investigation was performed to identify cabinets with external anchorage that had not been opened during inspections.
Walkdowns were supplemented and doors were opened to verify anchorage inside cabinets.
Table C-1 identifies the supplemental assets. The Peer Review Team accompanied SWEs during the follow up inspections in the Switchgear Room, Relay Room and RHR Complex.5) During a review of CCHVAC Chiller T4100B009, SWEs noted that although there was little clearance between isolation plates, this was seismically acceptable because the isolators are for mechanical vibration and that seismic restraints carry seismic loads. The Peer Review Team requested that SWEs provide further justification of this conclusion.
The seismic design calculation (Deco File B9-653) and the vendor manual (VMS25-39) were reviewed, but no clearances were specified.
A member of the Peer Review Team and a PSE engineer familiar with HVAC systems in the plant and seismic qualification performed an independent walkdown of isolators on both Div. 1 and Div. 2 CCHVAC Chillers.
Clearances were checked and pictures taken. CARDs 12-28245 and 12-28246 were generated to document a missing isolator bolt and rust found during the walkdown.
The vendor (Trane Company) was contacted and provided pictures taken during the walkdown.
The vendor stated that due to the age of the equipment, additional time would be needed to locate information about the isolators and clearances Date: November 20, 2012 8-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 between the isolation plates. CARD 12-28393 was generated to track resolution and adjustment of the isolators.
8.3 REVIEW
THE DECISIONS FOR ENTERING POTENTIALLY ADVERSE CONDITIONS INTO THE CAP PROCESS CARDs generated from Walkdowns are discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. It was found that the threshold for entering potentially adverse seismic conditions into the CAP process was low enough to ensure that any potential licensing basis issue was documented and reviewed by appropriate Engineering and Operations personnel.
8.4 LICENSING
BASIS EVALUATIONS All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during Walkdowns, that could not be justified by examining appropriate Design Documents, were documented using the CAP. No Licensing Basis Evaluations as defined per the EPRI report were performed outside the CAP.8.5 REVIEW OF SUBMITTAL REPORT For a discussion of the Peer Review of the Submittal Report, see Appendix F.Date: November 20, 2012 8-4 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 9 References Reference drawings related to SWEL assets are provided in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists and if applicable, in the Area Walk-By Checklists.
- 1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic", dated June 2012.2. Fermi 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 17a, dated June 22,2011.3. NRC Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance", dated May 31, 2012.4. NRC-96-0037, "Detroit Edison, Fermi 2, Individual Plant Examination (External Events)", dated March 29, 1996.5. Not used 6. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL Revision 1, "Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin", dated August 1991.7. NRC Inspection Manual, "Inspection of Near Term Task Force Recommendation
2.3 Seismic
Walkdowns", dated July 6, 2012.8. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to all power reactor Licensees et al.,"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident", dated March 12, 2012.9. EPRI Report 1023422, "EPRI Fukushima Daini Independent Review and Walkdown", dated August 2001.10. Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
-- 1OCFR50.54(f)", dated June 28, 1991.11. Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, "Revision to NRC Inspection manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance", dated September 26, 2005.12. Not used.13. NJPR-1 2-0043, "Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Guideline in Support of NTTF 2.3 Section 4", dated August 16, 2012.Date: November 20, 2012 9-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 14. NJPR-12-0053, "Selection of Assets for Seismic Walkdown SWEL 1 and SWEL 2", dated August 27, 2012.15. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 50.54(f).16. NUREG-1742 Vol. I, "Perspectives Gained from Individual Plant Examinations of External Events (IPEEE) Program", dated April 2002.17. NUREG-1407, "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities", dated June 1991.18. NRC's Revised Position -Provided to Inspection Branch on September 18, 2012 (Document is included as Attachment 1 to this report).19. Design Basis Document XXX-03, Revision A, "Seismic Design and Qualification", dated December 27, 1994.20. Design Specification 3071-296, Revision B, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment", dated January 23, 1995.21. Reg. Guide 1.29, Revision 3, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Seismic Design Classification", dated September 1978.22. IEEE 344-1971, "Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations".
- 23. IEEE 344-1975, "Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", dated November 1977.24. Design Specification 3071-031 Revision S, "Pipe Erection", dated June 17, 2002.25. IE Bulletin 80-11, "Masonry Block Walls", dated May 8, 1980.26. Fermi Design Calculation DC-0841 Vol I, Revision K, "Seismic Analysis of Block Walls in Reactor/Auxiliary Buildings", dated January 30, 1996.27. Fermi Design Calculation DC-4479 Vol I, Revision B, "Evaluation of Masonry Walls for DER 86-167", dated September 1, 1987.28. MMR App E, "Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix E -Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions", Revision 14.29. MMR App G, "Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix G -Risk Significant List", Revision 0.30. MWC13, "Work Control Conduct Manual, Outage Nuclear Safety", Revision 9.31. MMR04, "Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual -Determination of Risk Significance", Revision 3.Date: November 20, 2012 9-2 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Appendix A SWE Qualification List Personnel Qualifications for PSE-53 Seismic Engineer Walkdown QG, 42004975, during September 2012 Name Maximo ID Date of Qualification George Abdallah 00052146 8/10/2012 Scott Bauer 00114276 8/10/2012 Whitney Hemingway 00116987 8/10/2012 Timothy Hoffman 00116988 8/10/2012 Andrew Kulikowski 00117118 8/10/2012 Marc Meyer 00106713 8/10/2012 Michael Sasso 00110094 8/10/2012 Mark Simpson 00116446 8/10/2012 Joseph LaVere 00117490 8/10/2012 David Dickinson 00120473 8/10/2012 Rohit Vadhar 00120474 8/10/2012 Date: November 20, 2012 A-1 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Appendix B Equipment Lists Appendix B contains the equipment lists that were developed during SWEL development.
Note that because no Rapid Drain-Down asset exists for Fermi 2, there is no Rapid Drain-Down Equipment List.The following contents are found in Appendix B: T able B -i, B ase List 1 ...............................................................................
B 1-1 Table B-2, SW EL 1 Revision 1 ....................................................................
B2-1 Table B-3, Base List 2 ..............................................................................
B 3-1 Table B-4, SW EL 2 Revision 1 ..................................................................
B4-1 Table B-5, SW EL List Revision Justification
...................................................
B5-1 Date: November 20, 2012 B-1
Table B-5: SWEL List Revision Justification The original SWEL list was developed using the guidance from EPRI Technical Report "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic".
The field installed configuration of some of the assets does not allow the access required to view all of the anchors and in some cases no anchors could be viewed. Replacement assets are selected to meet the requirements of the SWEL list and have been verified to be adequately accessible.
Original SWEL Asset not fully Explanation why asset is Replacement Asset Justification for revised asset accessible replaced.C4103CO01B Insulation prevents full view C4103CO01A The A Pump configuration allows full Standby Liquid Control Pump B of anchor bolts for the B Standby Liquid Control Pump A view of the anchors. The[Equip Classification
= 5-horizontal Pump. [Equip Classification
= 5 -replacement is the other train of pump] horizontal pump] C4103C001B.
H11P606 H11P606 anchors are R3200SO61A Anchors for R3200S061A are CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) SRM covered with black mastic DC RR 130V DIST CABINET viewable.
Wall mounted panel INST RACK fire seal material which 2PA2-5 supported by wall anchors.[Equip Classification
= 18 -prevents visual inspection.
[Equip Classification
= 14 -Instrument Racks] Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches]H11P609 H11P609 anchors are R3200S061B Anchors for R3200S061B are-CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) RPS covered with black mastic DC RR 130V DIST CABINET viewable.
Wall mounted panel TRIP CAB DIV1 INST RACK fire seal material which 2PA2-6 supported by wall anchors.[Equip Classification
= 20- prevents visual inspection.
[Equip Classification
= 14 -Instrumentation and Control Panels] Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches]H11P820 H11P820 anchors are H21P624 Anchors for H21P624 are viewable.CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) covered with black mastic LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) DSD Column mounted box on unistrut.TERM CAB DIV2 INST RACK fire seal material which 4160V BUS 64C LOCAL CTRL[Equip Classification
= 20 -prevents visual inspection.
PANEL LOCAL PNL & RACKS Instrumentation and Control Panels] [Equip Classification
= 18 -Instrument Racks]H11P821 H11P821 anchors are H21P614B NOTE: H21P531 was considered as a CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) covered with black mastic LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) replacement asset for H11P821, TERM CAB DIV2 INST RACK fire seal material which TORUS MON SYS however it was not used. Preliminary
[Equip Classification
= 20 prevents visual inspection.
[Equipment Classification
= 18 walkdowns found this asset to be Instrumentation and Control Panels] inaccessible.
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix B Page 135-1 Table B-5: SWEL List Revision Justification Original SWEL Asset not fully Explanation why asset is Replacement Asset Justification for revised asset accessible replaced.H11P856 H11P856 anchors are R1400S050 R1400S050.
Rack mounted panel.RTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) TERM covered with black mastic SWGR AE DIVi 480V MCC 72C- Rack is mounted to floor.VACUUM PUMPS, CIRC PUMPS & SPR fire seal material which F ISOLATING CONTACTOR CAB INST RACK prevents visual inspection.
[Equip Classification
= 1 -[Equip Classification
= 20 Motor Control Centers and Instrumentation and Control Panels] Wall Mounted Contactors]
R1400SO38A R1400SO38A anchors are H11P923 H11P923 All anchors are visible and SWGR 480V UNIT SUBSTATION XFMR inaccessible and/or are not CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR available for inspection.
Wall NO 72EC DIV 2 (DG 13) visible. ONLY) RCIC TURB CTRL PANEL mounted box on unistrut.[Equip Classification
= 4 -INST RACK Transformers]
[Equip Classification
= 18 -Instrument Racks]R1400S039 R1400S039 anchors are R1400S038 R1400S038 anchors are visible and SWGR 480V INDOOR UNIT inaccessible and/or are not SWGR 480V INDOOR UNIT available for inspection.
Cabinet is SUBSTATIONS BUS NO 72ED [Equip visible. SUBSTATIONS BUS NO 72EC floor mounted. Classification is the Classification
= 2 -Low Voltage [Equip Classification
= 2 -Low same as R1400S039.
Switchgear and Breaker Panels] Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels]R3000S006 R3000S006 anchors are H11P857 H11P857 anchors are visible and EDG 12 LOCAL CTRL PNL inside the panel and CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR available for inspection.
[Equip Classification
= 20 inaccessible while the panel ONLY) MISC DC RELAY DIV1 Classification is the same as Instrumentation and Control Panels] is energized.
INST RACK R3000S006.
[Equip Classification
= 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels]T4100FO31A Only one side of the P44F402B P44FO42B is viewable.
Classification RBHVAC RTRN AIR DIV1 DAMPER actuator for T4100F031A EECW M/U TANK A002 DIV2 is the same as T4100FO31A.(A.O.) could be viewed without V8-2362 LVL CRTL AOV[Equip Classification
= 7 -Pneumatic climbing or having [Equip Classification
= 7 Operated Valves] scaffolding installed.
Pneumatic Operated Valves]TMPE-12-0294 Appendix B Page 135-2 Table B-5: SWEL List Revision Justification Original SWEL Asset not fully Explanation why asset is Replacement Asset Justification for revised asset accessible replaced.Added H21P632 LOCAL PNL & RACKS DSD MCC 72F-4A LOCAL[Equip Classification
= 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels]Added H21P081 NRC request to inspect as associated LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) with asset H21P085. 4 panels are LOCAL PNL AND RACKS DIV2 connected structurally and could ECCS TRIP UNIT INST RACK impose loads on each other in an[Equipment Classification 18 -earthquake.
Instrument Racks]Added H21P083 NRC request to inspect as associated LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) ECCS with asset H21P085. 4 panels are TRIP UNIT CAB DIV2 INST RACK connected structurally and could[Equipment Classification 18 -impose loads on each other in an Instrument Racks] earthquake.
Added H21P087 NRC request to inspect as associated LOCAL PNL AND RACKS RPS with asset H21P085. 4 panels are TRIP UNIT CAB B2 connected structurally and could[Equipment Classification 18 -impose loads on each other in an Instrument Racks] earthquake.
Anti Siphon Vent Lines The assets are submerged in None water with top of the vacuum breaker at the mean fuel pool water elevation of 683'6". At this location the assets are not in the area of vulnerability for fuel pool drain-down which is 10' above the top of fuel per Section 3-9 of EPRI Guidance 1025286.TMPE-12-0294 Appendix B Page 135-3 Detroit Edison, Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant TMPE-12-0294, Revision 0 Appendix C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists Date: November 20, 2012 C-1 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWEL 50% Status of Eqi.I I I AWC Lis Anchor SW IA~ sse eak PIS # Equip. Component Description Bldg. Floor Rf List A SWC CARDs Issued (1 ,)eerence ( Y ,N (Y,N,U)C1103D128 21 CRD NUMBER 34-27 HYD CTRL UNIT RB 1 RB1-1 1 Y V None N/A CllF160B 8 CRD DIV2 SOV RB 1 RB1-2 1 V V None N/A C11F163A 8 CRDSOV RB 1 RB1-3 1 V Y None N/A CRD SCRAM DISCH VOL VENT &ClF182A 8 DRAIN VLV F180 & F181 PILOT AIR RB 1 RB1-3 1 V V None N/A'A' SOV C4103CO01A 5 SLC NORTH REACTOR PUMP RB 4 RB4-1 1 V N 12-26633 Loose Heat Trace Pull-Boxes on Pump C4103CO01A.
C4104FO04A 8 SLC EXPLOSIVE (SQUIB) VLV RB 2 RB2-1 1 N V None N/A RHR DIV1 PUMP "C" SUPR POOL E1150F004C 8 RB SB RBSB-1 1 N V None N/A SUCT ISO MOV RHR DIV1 DRYWELL SPRAY OTBD ISO E1150FOl6A BRB 1 RB1-4 1 NVNone N/A MOV RHR DIVi HX "A" SERVICE WATER E11SOFO68A 8 ULTIOMVRB 2 RB2-2 1 NVNone N/A OUTLET ISO MOV E1151COO1C 6 RHRSW SOUTH PUMP ROOM SOUTH RHR 1 RHR1-1 1 V V None N/A SERVICE WATER "C" PUMP E1156C001C 9 RHR SW MDCT FAN RHR 2 RHR2-1 1 V V None N/A E2101CO01C 5 CS DIVi "C" PUMP RB SB RBSB-2 1 N V None N/A E215OF031A 8 CS DIVI MIN FLOW/RECIRC ISO MOV RB B RBB-1 1 N V None N/A E4101CO01C S HPCI TURB DRIVEN OIL PUMP RB SB RBSB-3 1 N V 12-26642 Broken/Missing labels (Housekeeping Issue, Not Seismic Issue).E4150FO01 8 HPCI TURB STM SPLY ISO MOV RB SB RBSB-3 1 N V None N/A HPCI BOOSTER PUMP SUCT FROM E4150O04 8 CRB SB RBSB-3 None N/A TME ST-29 Appndx PgeCV TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-2 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWEL 5% Status of PIS # Class Component Description Bldg. Floor AWC List Aer SWC CARDs Issued Remarks Cluip Bl ]Reference (1,2) Verif.j (tatus HPCI PUMP FLOW RATE E41K805 0 MODULATOR/ISOLATOR FLOW SIG AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y Y None N/A CND E5150F045 8 RCICTURB STM INLET ISO MOV RB SB RBSB-2 1 N Y None N/A G4100F016 0 FPCC SKIMMER SURGE TNK TO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL ISO VLV FPCC FUEL STRG POOL DIFFUSER "A" G4100F045A 0 ISO VLV RB 5 RB5-1 None N/A CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY)H11P612 20 NSSS PROCESS INST CAB DIV2 INST AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y Y None N/A RACK CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY)HlP613 20 NSSS PROCESS INST CAB DIV1 INST AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y V None N/A RACK HlIP628 20 CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) SRV AB 2 A82-1 None N/A H2 IV1 ADS RELAY CAB H11P857 20 CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) AB 2 AB2-1 1 V Y None N/A MISC DC RELAY DIVI INST RACK CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY)H11P870 20 MISC DC RELAY PANEL DIV2 INST AB 2 AB2-1 1 V Y None N/A RACK CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY)H11P898A 20 AUTO DIGITAL LOAD SEQ CAB DIV1 AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y Y None N/A INST RACK CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY)H11P898B 20 AUTO DIGITAL LOAD SEQ CAB DIV2 AB 2 AB2-1 1 V Y None N/A INST RACK H11P903 14 CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) 120 AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y N 12-27504 Undersized Anchors in Electrical Panel.VAC DIST PANEL -DIV2 INST RACK CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) PC HllP915 20 MON EQUIP & MISC RELAY DIV2 AB 2 AB2-1 1 Y Y None N/A INST RACK H11P923 20 CRTL & AUX RM PNL (MR ONLY) RCIC AB AB2-1 " None N/A TURB CTRL PANEL INST RACK H21P010 18 LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) JET PUMP RB RBI-1 None N/A RACK B DIV2 INST RACK H21P080 20 LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) ECCS TRIP AB AB4-1 Y None N/A UNIT CAB DIV1 INST RACK TMVPE 12-0294 Appendix C Page C-3 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWEL Status of PIS # Equip.class Component Description Bldg. Floor Rec List Venri Class Referenc C(1,2) VYNf (Y,N,U)LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) LOCAL H21PO81 18 PNL AND RACKS DIV2 ECCS TRIP AB 4 AB4-2 1 Y N 12-27702 Inadequate Kwik Bolt Anchor Washers & Thread Engagement.
UNIT INST RACK H21PO83 18 LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) ECCS TRIP AB 4 AB4-2 1 Y N 12-27702 Inadequate Kwik Bolt Anchor Washers & Thread Engagement.
UNIT CAB DIV2 INST RACK LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) RPS TRIP H21P085 18 UNIT CAB A2 DIV2 INST RACK AB 4 AB4-2 1 Y N 12-27702 Inadequate Kwik Bolt Anchor Washers & Thread Engagement.
LOCAL PNL AND RACKS RPS TRIP H21PO87 18 UNIT CAB 82 DIV2 INST RACK AB 4 AB4-2 1 V N 12-27702 Inadequate Kwik Bolt Anchor Washers & Thread Engagement.
LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) REMOTE H21P100 18 RX SHUTDOWN PANEL DIV1 INST AB 2 AB2-2 1 Y Y None N/A RACK LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) CCHVAC H21P296A 20 AB 5 AB5-1 1 N V 12-26990 DCN not fully incorporated onto Panel Mounting Drawing.DIV1 INST RACK H21P420 18 LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) HPCI DIV2 RB SB RBSB-3 None N/A TURB AND PILOT VLV INST RACK H21P448Loc PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) EECW H21P448 18 RACK RB 2 RB2-3 1 V N 12-26852 Lighting Conduit not Correctly Supported per Drawing.DIV2 INST RACK H21P614B 18 LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) TORUS RB SB RBSB-4 1 V Y None N/A MON SYS INST RACK LOC PNL/RACK (MR ONLY) DSD A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of H21P624 20 4160V BUS 64C LOCAL CTRL PANEL AB 2 AB2-2 1 Y V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response LOCAL PNL & RACKS to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
Drafting Error on Drawing E-2998-05.
20 7213-ALOC A PRCKRL OANEL) D CA AA supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of H21P628 20 72B-2A LOCAL CTRL PANEL LOCAL ASB AB2-2 1 Y N 12-26837 tepnli de oadesteNIFcsGoprsos PNL &RACKSthe panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response PNL & RACKS to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
LOCAL PNL & RACKS DSD MCC 72F- A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of H21P632 .20 RB 2 RB2-1 1 V Y None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
P4400B001B 21 EECW DIV2 PLATE FRAME HX RB 2 RB2-4 1 V N 12-26590 Error was identified on Drawing C-4889.EECW DIV1 PLATE FRAME BACKUP P440DBOO1C 21 X.RB 2 RB2-S None N/A HX.P4400C001A 5 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING RB RB2-6 None N/A WATER DIV1 PUMP TMVPE 12-0294 Appendix C Page C-4 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists 1Equip.SWEL
[ Status of PIS Cl Component Description Bldg. #Floor AWC List Anchor SWC CARDs Issued Remarks ass Reference (1, Verif. (YNU f P4400F601B 8 RBCCW DIV2 RTRN ISO MOV RB 1 RB1-5 1 N Y None N/A P4400F603B 8 RBCCW DIV2 SPLY ISO MOV RB 1 RB1-5 1 N Y None N/A EECW DlVi HX B001A/BO01C SW P44F400A 7 OUTLET TEMP CTRL AOV TEMP CRTL RB 2 RB2-5 I N Y None N/A VLV P44F402A EECW M/U TANK A001 DIV V8- RB 2 RB2-6 1 N N 12-26921 Unistrut found to be in possible contact with EECW Valve.P44F402A2364 LVL CRTL AOV EECW M/U TANK A002 DIV2 V8-P4-4F402B 26LVCTAVRB 2 RB2-7 1 NVNone N/A 2362 LVIL CRTL AOV EECW DIV2 ELECTRIC TO P44K400B 0 PNEUMATIC CONVERTER FOR TEMP RB 2 RB2-3 1 N N 12-26852 Lighting Conduit not Correctly Supported per Drawing.CRTL VLV F400B P44N401A 19 EECW HX B001A / B00iC RTRN T/C RB 2 RB2-5 1 N V None N/A P44P403A 0 EECW DIVi N2 GAS SPLY TO M/U RB 2 RB2-6 1 Y V None N/A TANK STORAGE RACK P4500C002B 6 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT SERVICE RHR 1 RHRI-2 1 V V None N/A WATER NORTH PUMP P5002D001 12 CA NORTH COMPRESSOR AB B ABB-1 1 V V None N/A CA DRYER RELAY PANEL A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of P50P402B 18 CASDRYER RAY RB B RBB-2 1 V V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response IN R to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
SWGR DIV2 480V ESS BUS 72ED V R14005039B 4 REG RHR 2 RHR2-2 1 V V None N/A A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of SWGR AE DIVi 480V MCC 72C-F R14005050 1 ISOLATING CONTACTOR AB 2 AB2-2 1 V V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
R1600SO19A 1 MCC/DIST CAB 480V MCC NO 72ED- RHR 2 RHR2-2 1 V N 12-27475 Missing Bolt on Panel R1600S019A.
2D (EDG 14)R300OA011 21 EDG 11 W STARTING AIR RECEIVER RHR 1 RHR1-3 1 Y V None N/A TMPE 12-0294 Appendix C Page C-5 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWEL 50. Status of PS # Ei Component Description Bldg. oor List Anchor SWC CARDs Issued Remarks Class Refer e (1,2) VerYN (Y,N,U)R3000D002 12 EDG 12 STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR RHR 1 RHR1-4 1 Y Y None N/A R3000F023D 7 EDG 14 ACS 3-WAY TEMP CTRL VLV RHR 1 RHR1-5 1 N Y None N/A R3001B004 21 EDG 14 LUBE OIL HX RHR 1 RHR1-6 1 Y V None N/A Braces on EDGSW Pump/Motor R3001C005 and CO06 are not R3001C006 6 EDG 12 SERVICE WATER PUMP RHR 1 RHR1-7 1 Y N 12-26977 Bden on edor drawings.identified on vendor drawings.R3001S001 17 EDG 11 4160V RHR 1 RHR1-8 1 g Y None N/A EGG 13 THREE WAY AIR START CYL 1-R30FAOSB 8 RHR 1 RHR1-9 1 N Y None N/A 6 SOLENOID VLV R30NA17A 0 EDG 11 MAGNETIC PICKUP SPEED R3MTR7ARHR 1 RHRI-1O 1 VYNone N/A XMTR A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of R30P320 20 EDG ENGINE GAUGE PNL RHR 1 RHR1-11 1 V V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
EGG 14 DIV2 SERIES BOOST R30P343D 20 EXCIV REG PNL RHR 1 RHR1-12 1 N V 12-27360 Missing hardware for panel R30P343D.EXClTER/V REG PNL R31KO05 16 VITAL PWR DIST 120 VAC DIV2 2KVA R3NVERTER AB 2 A82-1 1 VVNone N/A INVERTERI R3200SO04 15 DC 260/130V DUAL BATT (2PB) AB 3 AB3-1 1 V V None N/A R3200S016 1 DC 260V DC MCC (2PB-1) AB 3 AB3-2 1 V Y None N/A R3200S020C 16 DC DIVI 2A 1-2 130V BATT CHGR AB 3 AB3-3 1 V N 12-27131 NRC Identified Flex Conduit Appears to be too Rigid.A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of R3200SO61A 14 DC RR 130V DIST CABINET 2PA2-5 AB 2 AB2-1 1 V V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
TMPE 12-0294 Appendix C Page C-6 Table C-1 -Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWEL 5 Status of PIS # Class Component Description Bldg. Floor AWC List Anchor SWC CARDs Issued Remarks Cls efrn (1.2) Vei. (Y,N,U)(YN1 GAI-Tronic above Panel H11P901 does not appear to be seismically supported.
R3200S061B 14 DC RR 130V DIST CABINET 2PA2-6 AB 2 AB2-1 1 V N 12-26630 A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
DC SWGR ROOM 130V DIST CABINET A supplemental SWC to document the internal inspection of R3200SD62 S4 ROOM AB 2 AB2-2 1 V V None the panel is added to address the NEI Focus Group response IPAI-I4to FAQ dated 9/18/2012.
CCHVAC NORTH DIVI AIR 12-28245 Missing bolt on Spring Isolator plate.T4100BO09 11 CONDITIONER CH AB 5 AB5-1 1 Y N 12-28246 Rust found on Chiller Isolator.12-28393 Minimum clearances not specified for Chiller Isolators.
T4100B035 10 RBHVACEECWPUMPRMCOOL RB 2 RB2-7 1 Y Y None N/A UNIT RBHVAC DIV2 BATT CHARGER RM T4100B044 10 FA OLUISAB 3 AB3-4 1 YVNone N/A FAN COIL UNITS RBHVAC WEST BATT RM EAST T4100C009 ESNILEHFNAB 3 AB3-4 1 VVNone N/A ESSENTIAL EXH FAN CCHVAC NORMAL INTAKE AIR DIV1 T4100F041
~ S APRlO)AB 4 AB4-3 1 VVNone N/A ISO DAMPER (A.D.)CCHVAC OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER T41F101A B F3ATRDIiovAB S ABS-i1 None N/A F033A CTRL DIV1 SOV T4600F407 7 SGTS FROM RB EXH SYS ISO AOV RB 3 RB3-1 1 N V None N/A T49P400A 18 PC PNEU DIV1 SPLY INST RACK RB 1 RB1-4 1 V V None N/A PCAM PC RAD MON SYS INLET ISO T50F450 B VVV303SVRB 2 RB2-B8 None N/A VLV V5-3083 SOV X4103C001 9 RHRHVAC EDG 11 RM E VENT FAN RHR 2 RHR2-3 1 V V None N/A X4103C007 9 RHRHVAC EDG 14 RM E VENT FAN RHR 2 RHR2-4 1 V Y None N/A HVAC RHR EDG SWGR RM RTRN AIR X41NO56D 19 RHR 2 RHR2-2 1 V N 12-27469 Missing/Damaged Screws in Temperature Sensors.DMPRS X4103CO15
& C016 DIV2 RTD Total SWC checklists:
99 (Includes 9 Supplemental SWCs to Open Panels/Cabinet)
TMPE 12-0294 Appendix C Page C-7 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR- 12-0043 Sheet I of 3 Status: N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C1103D128 Equip. Class' 21, Tanks and Heat Exchange Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank Location:
Bldg. RB Floor El. 583 '-6" Room, Area A-12, Col. D-10 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
General Electric Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Anchorage is in very good condition.
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
Anchorage is free of corrosion.
See attachedphoto DSC 00171.4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?No cracks are visible. See attachedphoto DSC 00171.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Anchorage size, type and location are consistent with Dwg. 1-6025-03, Rev A. (oo ps'sTriws)
.1,l121,-6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
No concerns identified YX NEI Y NIEI U-] N/At]YX NO- Urn N/At]Y] NO U0 N/At]YN NEI UE- N/At]Yo NEI Ur 1 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-8 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist Sheet 2 of 3 Status: (D N U NJPR- 12-0043 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C1 103D128 Equip. Class' 21, Tanks and Heat Exchange Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
No nearby equipment or structures.
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
No nearby block walls or ceiling tiles. Lighting is well-secured.
See attached photo DSC 00175.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Lines have adequate flexibility.
See attached photo DSC 00176.10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?No concerns identified Yt ND UEI N/AD YX NO UD- N/AD Y" NEI UD N/AL]Y) NED UE Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
No adverse conditions were identified.
YX4NEIUO TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-9 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR- 12-0043 Shet3of3 Status: 0 N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. Cl103D128 Equip. Class' 21, Tanks and Heat Exchange Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
See attachedphotos DSC 00171, 175 & 176.Eaatr# j:ic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator 41 )L Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator
- 2: Date: Date: gj 6 IZ2 TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-10 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C1103D128 Equipment Class: 21, Tanks and Heat Exchangers Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank (DSCO0171)
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-I11 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. Cl103D128 Equipment Class: 21, Tanks and Heat Exchangers Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank (DSCOO175)
TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-1 2 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C1103D128 Equipment Class: 21, Tanks and Heat Exchangers Equipment Description Hydraulic Control Unit, Tank"Looking Up" (DSC00176)
TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-13 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 Shta I of 3 Status: U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C 11F160B Equip. Class' 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2, Solenoid Valve (wall mounted)Location:
Bldg. RB Floor El. 583 '-6" Room, Area A-12/CoL G-11 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
VALE- VALCOR ENG'G Corp, V7090043 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchoraze 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Anchorage is in good condition and is not bent, broken or missing hardware.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
No visible corrosion, see photo DSC 00191 & DSC 00192.4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?No nearby cracks in wall, see photo DSC 00191.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation.
Ref Dwg. 1-2116-02, Rev B (No Postings).
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
No adverse conditions identified I NEI Yr NEI UD N/AD YPf NEI UD N/AD YXNIND UD N/AD YO ND UED N/A[]Y I ND UD 1Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-14 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: (9 N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. Cl1F160B Equip. Class' 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2, Solenoid Valve (wall mounted)Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
No nearby equipment could impact valve.YMx NE3 UE N/AEI 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YI( N[: U[] N/Al]and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
No overhead ceiling tiles, lighting and no block walls nearby.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Piping rigidly mounted. Cable/conduit has adequate flexibility to SOV operator.
See photo DSC 00191.10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?No adverse conditions were identifiedNEI Ul] N/AEI YNNEI UE]Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YX NEI U-]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Other adverse conditions were not identified.
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-15 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist Shet3 of3 NJPR-12-0043 Status: N N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. Cl1F160B Equip. Class' 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2, Solenoid Valve (wall mounted)Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
YS 's 1ic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator 41: go d v I -lw----A Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator
- 2: Date: 1/_Date: TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-1 6 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF160B Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2 Solenoid Valve (Wall Mounted)(DSCO0191)
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-17 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF160B Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2 Solenoid Valve (Wall Mounted)(DSC00192)
TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-1 8 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF160B Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CRD DIV 2 Solenoid Valve (Wall Mounted)(DSCOO193)
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-19 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 St Status: Z,5 N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C11F163A Equip. Class 1 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Div.I Alt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve Location:
Bldg. RB Floor El. 583 '-6" Room, Area A-12, Col. C-13 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Valcor Engineering Corp. V7090046 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchoraae 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?All anchorage is present and securely tightened.
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
Anchorage is free of corrosion.
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?There are no cracks in the concrete.YX NEI Y9 NEI UE- N/AEl YN'NE] UEl N/AL!Y1 NEI Ur N/AM 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
YL$ NEI UL1 N/AL!(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Drawing 1-2116-2 (Section A-A and the mounting detailfor C11F 163A& B) wasfield verified, and therefore anchorage is consistent.
See p ictures 5 and ]]. vo ,--rv 4 si- D w,. --Z 2i io 2 aZ 1 07 , 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
YONEI UO MPS /0/.3/1-.)
1 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-20 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist Sheet 2 of 3 Status:(Q N U NJPR-12-0043 Seismic W ralkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. CJIFJ63A4 Equip. Class' 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Div.IAlt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
There is no observed seismic proximity interaction or danger offalling overhead hazards. (SE6 PIL1-UtAt I) V- tý.4 1ct117..8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There are no observed overhead hazards.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?There are no observed lines with insufficient flexibility or straight line connections (see picture 6 and 11).10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Y19 NEI UD N/All YJ9 NEI UOi N/AO Yjgr NLZ UD N/AD Yr NEI UUI Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YX NEI UEI adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
No adverse seismic conditions were identified.
TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-21 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist.Sheet 3 of 3 Status: nV N U NJPR-12-0043 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 0 lFI(43A Equip. Class' IVNI ,,l-nr/oIo, , -4 ,O,.e .l aIc k. J V Equipment Description Div .+ I a]7serfiovo S-Oerto~d VaIve.Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53Qualified Evaluator
- 1:;I 2 P. 1ý[ Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53Qualified Evaluator
- 2: lCA- &L A k-6,1 Date: " I (/ .Date: R/ 15/12 v TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-22 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF163A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description DIV 1 Alt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve (Picture 1)TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-23 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF163A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description DIV 1 Alt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve (Picture 5)TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-24 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF163A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description DIV 1 Alt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve (Picture 6)TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-25 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF163A Equipment Class: 8, Mor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description DIV 1 Alt Rod Insertion Solenoid Valve (Picture 11)TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-26 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist Sheet I of 3 Status:ON U NJPR-12-0043 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C11F182A Equip. Class' 8-Motor Operated and Solenoid Operated Valves Equipment Description F180 & F181 Pilot Air A SOV Location:
Bldg. RB Floor El. 583 '-6" Room, Area A-12, Col. C-13 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Automatic Switch Co NPK8316A54V Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?All anchorage is present and securely tightened.
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
Anchorage is not corroded.YNE Yf NEI U0i N/AO YX NO U- N/AQ 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y19 There are no cracks in the concrete.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
YX (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Drawing 1-2112-5 including Detail 4, elevation CllP401 and Section 2 was field verified, and therefore anchorage is consistent. (See pictures 2 and3.) Po poi-r,.4cjs A4,4ne,-r -T-zz-os, Rev. F "ik 10tii2 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YX potentially adverse seismic conditions?
iEnter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment NEI U0 N/A-NE UE N/A0 NEI UEt TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-27 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist2of3 Status: 85 N U NJPR-12-0043 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. CIIF182A Equip. Class' 8-Motor Operated and Solenoid Operated Valves Equipment Description F180 & F181 Pilot Air A SOV Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
There are no observed seismic proximity interaction or danger of falling overhead hazards.8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
There are no observed overhead hazards. (See pictures 7 & 10.)9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?There are no observed lines with insufficient flexibility or straight line connections. (See picture 1.)10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yl'NEI UEJ N/ADUEI N/ALNDI UD N/ADl YXND UD Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yp< NDI Ur1 adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
No other adverse seismic conditions identified.
MPs TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-28 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043.Sheet 3 of 3 Status:0 N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)38-Ma4-or 0pe ra4-eA 0-YA ~li Equipment ID No. Cl Fl UA Equip. Class'
ýg \v-- 4 EquipmentDescription
_F O ý & F 11 (NloJ Air A SOV Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
K' Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53Qualified Evaluator
- 1: -A t P 4-6-I9 Seismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53Qualified Evaluator
- 2: , O-AA Date: i/; ,2 Date:-- -- ._ .. ....TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-29 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF182A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Vent and Drain FI80 and F181 Pilot Air SOV (Picture 1)TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-30 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllFI82A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Vent and Drain F180 and F181 Pilot Air SOV (Picture 2)TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-31 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF182A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Vent and Drain F180 and F181 Pilot Air SOV (Picture 3)TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-32 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF182A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Vent and Drain F180 and F181 Pilot Air SOV (Picture 7)TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-33 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. CllF182A Equipment Class: 8, Motor/Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment Description Vent and Drain F180 and F181 Pilot Air SOV (Picture 10)TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-34 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 Sheet I of 3 Status: Y 0 U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equip. Class 1 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump Location:
Bldg. RB Floor El. 659'-6" Room, Area A-33, Col. F-JO Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Union Pump Model 2X3TD-60 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings.
Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?No bent, broken, missing or loose hardware.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
No corrosion, anchor bolts are painted 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?No visible cracks in concrete pan or concrete floor.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
Bolt configuration is consistent with Dwg. M-3029, Rev F and DCR M-0129, dated 8/15/79. See Photos DSCO114 and DSCO115.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Anchor bolts are in good condition and as-built condition is consistent with design documents.
YM NEI Yh'NE[ UE] N/A[]Y)6 NEI UL] N/All Yý( NEI ULI N/AU Yj NE-I UL N/A[Z YV N-I UE-' Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-35 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: Y e U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equip. Class'5, HorizontalPumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
Nearby equipment and conduits are adequately supported so as to prevent impacting the pumps soft targets.Y* NE ULI N/AU 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y NEI UDI N/AU and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
YX No ceiling tiles or masonry block walls in the area. No light fixtures over the equipment.
Conduit/raceways are adequately supported.
See Photo DSC00247.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Attached lines have adequate flexibility to the pump components.
See Photo DSC00239.10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Y NEI UD N/AU SNEI UUU Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Poorly supported heat trace pull box -initiated CARD 12-26633, see Photo DSCO0238.YU NUU TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-36 Fermi 2 Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document Seismic Walkdown Checklist NJPR-12-0043 Sheet 3/Qf 3 Status: Y .,U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equip. Class 1 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
None.kSeismic Engineer Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator
- 1 :Rohit VadharSeismic Eng~i r Walkdown PSE-53 Qualified Evaluator
- 2 :Marc Meyer Date: 43 11, Date: ( 1 TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-37 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equipment Class: 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump (DSCO0114)"Bolt Configuration" TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-38 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C4103COOJA Equipment Class: 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump (DSCQO115)"Bolt Configuration" TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-39 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equipment Class: 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump DSC00238"Poorly Supported Heat Trace Pullbox" TMPE-12-0294 Appendix C Page C-40 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equipment Class: 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump (DSC00239)"Near Vicinity of Pump" TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-41 Seismic Walkdown Pictures Equipment ID No. C4103COOA Equipment Class: 5, Horizontal Pumps Equipment Description Standby Liquid Control North Reactor Pump (DSC00247)"Looking up to ceiling" TMPE-1 2-0294 Appendix C Page C-42