Text

Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
	ML053060352
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/02/2005
From:	Stinson L; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-05-0856
	Download: ML053060352 (105)
	v • d • e

L M. Stinson (Mike) Southern Nuclear Vice President Operating Company. Inc.

40 lnverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.5181 Fax 205.992.0341 SOUTHERN r- 1 November 2 , 2005 COMPANY Energy to Serve Your WorldSM Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-05-0856 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using The Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed changes would revise TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 and various TS requirements that reference L C 0 3.0.4. The proposed changes are based on IndustryITechnical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler TSTF-359, Revision 9, "Increased Flexibility in Mode Restraints."

Changes were also required to TS section 1.4, Frequency, Example 1.4-1 to make the example consistent with the changes to SR 3.0.4. These changes are supported by TSTF 485, Revision 0.

The proposed changes and their basis are described in Enclosure 1. Marked-up TS and Bases pages are provided in Enclosure 2, and clean-typed pages are provided in Enclosure 3.

SNC requests approval of the proposed license amendments by November I 1,2006. The proposed changes would be implemented within 120 days of issuance of the amendment.

(Affirmation and signature are provided on the following page.)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-05-0856 Page 2 Mr. L. M. Stinson states he is a Vice President of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY L. M. Stinson 2 day of fl& , 2005.

My commission expires: F~~~~~

LMS/CHM/~~~

-IWNARY IWLIC mAm

Enclosures:

1. Basis for Proposed Change Enmas: fir AT-OF ALABAMA m u NOTARY PUBLIC -

2. Proposed Technical Specification and Bases Changes

3. Revised Technical Specifications and Bases Pages cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Mr. J. R. Johnson, General Manager -Plant Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054; LC# 14061 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. C. A. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Alabama Department of Public Health Dr. D. E. Williamson, State Health Officer

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using The Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using The Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 1 Basis for Proposed Change The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) requirements for MODE change limitations in Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4. The affected TS and a summary of proposed changes are included in Table 1.

The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved IndustrytTechnical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard TS (STS) change TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified by the notice in the Federal Register published on April 4,2003 (68 FR 16579). That Federal Register Notice (FRN) announced the availability of this TS improvement through the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP).

TSTF-359, Revision 8 was subsequently revised to incorporate the modifications discussed in the April 4,2003, FRN and other minor changes. TSTF-359, Revision 9 was subsequently submitted to the NRC on April 28,2003 and was approved by the NRC on May 9,2003.

2.0 Assessment 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has reviewed the safety evaluation dated April 4, 2003 as part of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staffs evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF-359 Revision 8, and included the updates made in TSTF-359, Revision 9. SNC has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2, and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the TS.

TS 3.0.4 - TSTF 359 NL-05-0856 Enclosure 1 Page 2 of 5 2.2 Optional Changes and Variations SNC is adopting the TS changes described in TSTF-359, Revision 9, and the NRC staffs model safety evaluation published on April 4, 2003, with the following exceptions.

1. TS Section 1.4 Frequency

Description:

Section 1.4, Frequency, Example 1.4-1, is revised to be consistent with the changes to SR 3.0.4. SR 3.0.4 was revised by TSTF-359, Revision 9, and the current example is not consistent with the Technical Specification requirements. The second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 is revised to reflect the changes made to SR 3.0.4.

Justification: The changes made in TSTF 359 to SR 3.0.4 have made certain statements in Example 1.4-1 incorrect. This change is consistent with TSTF-485, Rev. 0.

2. LC0 3.6.9, Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System

Description:

The FNP TS LC0 3.6.9, Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System, differs from the STS. The STS does not include this specific LCO.

SNC has included FNP TS 3.6.9 in the TS mark-ups to remove the note "LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable," from Action A.

Justification: In the TSTF mark-ups, WOG STS 3.6.9, Hydrogen Mixing Systems, the note "LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable," was removed from Action A. The FNP equivalent TS is numbered 3.6.8 and is included in the TS mark-ups. FNP TS LC0 3.6.9 is an FNP specific TS for additional containment atmosphere (hydrogen) mixing capacity. SNC has removed the note from FNP TS 3.6.9, Action A. This is consistent with the TSTF and the removal of the note from FNP TS LC0 3.6.8.

3. LC0 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating

Description:

The FNP TS LC0 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, differs from the STS. Currently, the FNP TS includes a Note in LC0 3.8.1 Condition B, which states that LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable when only one of the three DGs is inoperable. With the revised LC0 3.8.1, SNC proposes to adjust the Note to say LC0 3.0.4~is applicable when only one of the three DGs is inoperable.

Justification: Since the FNP requirements are based on DG "sets," each set required to supply one ESF train, and one of the sets consists of two DGs, the Note provides additional flexibility for the three individual Farley DGs.

The allowance provided by this note, takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources and the fact that operation is ultimately limited by the Condition B Completion Time for the inoperable DG set. The addition of this note maintains the Farley TS allowance previously approved by the NRC.

TS 3.0.4 - TSTF 359 NL-05-0856 Enclosure 1 Page 3 of 5 Due to differences between the FNP TS and TS Bases and their corresponding model STS (NUREG-1431) in several cases variances from the TSTF marked-up changes are made. These variances are discussed below and do not affect the adoption or application of TSTF-359, Revision 9.

1. In the TSTF mark-ups, WOG STS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown, an Actions note is added stating that "LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable to ECCS high head subsystem." The FNP TS equivalent to "ECCS high head subsystem" is "ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem" and is reflected in the attached markups.

2. In the TSTF mark-ups, WOG STS 3.6.8, Hydrogen Recombiners, the note "LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable," was removed from Action A. The FNP equivalent TS is numbered 3.6.7 was deleted per TS Amendment 1671159 (Unit 11Unit 2) issued in NRC letter dated March 3, 2005. Therefore, FNP TS 3.6.7 is not included in this package.

3. In the TSTF mark-ups, WOG STS 3.6.9, Hydrogen Mixing Systems, the note "LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable," was removed from Action A. The FNP equivalent TS is numbered 3.6.8 and is included in the TS mark-ups. The FNP TS also included TS 3.6.9, Reactor Cavity Dilution System.

4. In the TSTF mark-ups, WOG STS 3.7.4, Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) is modified. The equivalent FNP TS 3.7.4 is labeled Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs). This variance is strictly editorial.

3.0 Regulatory Analvsis 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination SNC has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIIP.

SNC has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to FNP and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9 l(a).

3.2 Verification and Commitments As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal Register on April 4,2003 (68 FR 16579) for this TS improvement, plant-specific verifications were performed as follows:

SNC has established TS Bases for LC0 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 which state that use of the TS mode change limitation flexibility established by LC0 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 is not to be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to operable status before entering an associated mode or other specified condition in the TS Applicability.

TS 3.0.4 - TSTF 359 NL-05-0856 Enclosure 1 Page 4 of 5 The proposal also includes changes to the bases for LC0 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 that provide details on how to implement the new requirements. The bases changes provide guidance for changing Modes or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LC0 is not met. The bases changes describe in detail how: L C 0 3.0.4a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; LC0 3.0.4b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; and LC0 3.0.4~

allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met based on a Note in the Specification, which is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., RCS Specific Activity), though it may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval. The bases also state that any risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182. "Assessing and Managing Risks Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants,"

and that the results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. In addition, the bases state that upon entry into a Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met, L C 0 3.0.1 and LC0 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for no more than the duration of the applicable Completion Time, until the L C 0 is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS. The bases also state that SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LC0 not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3. Finally, SNC currently has in place a bases control program consistent with Section 5.5 of the STS, and the equivalent of STS SR 3.0.1 and associated bases.

4.0 Environmental Evaluation SNC has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated April 4,2003 (68 FR 16584) as part of the CLIIP. SNC has concluded that the NRC staffs findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to FNP and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.

TS 3.0.4 - TSTF 359 NL-05-0856 Enclosure 1 Page 5 of 5 Table 1 Proposed Technical Specification (TS) Changes Affected TS Description of Change 1.4 USE AND APPLICATION - Revised Example 1.4-1 to be consistent with the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.4 as described in TSTF-485, Rev 0.

LC0 3.0.4 Addition of risk informed evaluation of Mode Changes.

SR 3.0.4 Clarification of relationship to SR 3.0.3.

Additional minor editorial change to correct page header.

3.3.3 PAM Instrumentation Deletion of Note exempting TS from LC0 3.0.4.

3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System Deletion of Note exempting TS from L C 0 3.0.4.

3.4.1 1 Pressurizer PORVs Deletion of Note exempting TS from L C 0 3.0.4.

3.4.12 LTOP System Deletion of Note exempting TS from L C 0 3.0.4 Addition of Note stating that LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable when entering Mode 4.

3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Deletion of Note exempting TS from L C 0 3.0.4.

Instrumentation 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity Deletion of Note exempting Condition A from L C 0 3.0.4.

I Addition of Note stating applicability of LC0 3.0.4~to Condition A.

I ~ d d i t z nof Note stating that LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown

( to ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem.

3.6.7 Hydrogen Recombiners ( No Change in this package.

TS was deleted per TS Amendment 1671159 (Unit 11Unit

2) issued in NRC letter dated March 3,2005.

3.6.8 Hydrogen Mixing System Deletion of Note exempting Condition A from L C 0 3.0.4.

(HMS) - - - - - - - - - - -

3.6.9 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Deletion of Note exempting Condition A from LC0 3.0.4.

Dilution System 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves Deletion of Note exempting Condition A from L C 0 3.0.4.

(ARVs) 3.7.5 AFW System Addition of Note stating that LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable.

3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating Addition of Note stating that L C 0 3.0.4b is not applicable to the diesel generators (DG).

Action B - One DG set Addition of Note stating applicability of LC0 3.0.4~to ho~erable Condition B.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using The Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Enclosure 2 Proposed Technical Specification and Bases Changes

Frequency 1.4 1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.4-1 (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in the Technical Specifications (TS). The Frequency specifies an interval (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) during which the associated Surveillance must be performed at least one time. Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent interval. Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the stated Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is inoperable, a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LCO). If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and applicable. the performance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer to a MODE or other specified condition in

\

or the LC0 is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LC0 3.0.4 becomes applicable (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

LC0 Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LC0 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LC0 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.

LC0 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LC0 3.0.5 and LC0 3.0.6.

If the LC0 is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not reauired unless otherwise stated.

When an LC0 is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LC0 is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LC0 or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LC0 3.0.3 is not required.

LC0 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Insert LC0 3.0.4 see next page)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

Insert LC0 3.0.4 When an LC0 is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time;

b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Spec~fication are stated in the individual Specifications, or

c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Applicability I SF? 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR.

Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the L C 0 except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per. . ."

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LC0 not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the L C 0 must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition@)must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LC0 must immediatelv be declared not met, and the applicable con-dition(s) must be entered. -

1 when 1 SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE o ecified condition in the Applicability of an LC0 lthe LCO1sSurveillances have been met I only 1 withinmcified into MODES or other shall not prevent entry in the Applicability that are required to comply or that are part of a shutdown of 1 the unit I

I (see next page) I Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 153 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 145 (Unit 2)

Insert SR 3.0.4

, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LC0 is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with L C 0 3.0.4.

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation LC0 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,and 3.

ACTIONS I. LC0 3.0.4is not applicable. I Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.l Restore required channel 30 days with one required to OPERABLE status.

channel inoperable.

B. Required Action and B. 1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A Specification 5.6.8.

not met.

C. One or more Functions C.l Restore one channel to 7 days with two required OPERABLE status.

channels inoperable.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 167 (Unit 1 )

Amendment No. 159 (Unit 2)

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System L C 0 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown Systerr~Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS n

1. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable. (

I Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQLllRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A. 1 Restore required Function 30 days Functions inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B ------------NOTE------------ B. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable to Source Range Neutron AND Flux function.

................................ 8.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.1 1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

LC0 3.4.1 1 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORVs A. 1 Close and maintain 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable and capable of power to associated being manually cycled. block valve.

B. One PORV inoperable and B.l Close associated block 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months not capable of being valve.

manually cycled.

AND 8.2 Remove power from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months associated block valve.

AND 8.3 Restore PORV to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System L C 0 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.

a. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves with setpoints 1 450 psig.

b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 2.85 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs is 5 325"F, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.

.......................................... NOTES..............................................

1. The requirement to have only one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS is only applicable when one or more of the RCS cold legs is 2 180°F; however, while in this condition, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non-water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.

2. Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the PTLR.

e

3. LC0 3.0.4 is not appli Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

LTOP System 3.4.1 2 r A.

CONDlTlON Two or more charging A. 1 REQUIRED ACTION

NOTE-----------

COMPLETION 'TIME pumps capable of Two charging pumps injecting into the may be capable of RCS. injecting into the RCS during pump swap operation for 5 15 minutes.

Initiate action to verify a Immediately maximum of one charging pump is capable of injecting into the RCS.

B. An accumulator not B. 1 Isolate affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolated when the accumulator.

accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.

C. Required Action and C.l Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion temperature to > 325°F.

Time of Condition B not -

OR met.

C.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.

L C 0 3.0.4b is not applicable when entering MODE 4.

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2 )

RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation 3.4.15 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation L C 0 3.4.1 5 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. One containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor; and

b. One containment air cooler condensate level monitor or one containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment atmosphere A.l.l Analyze grab samples of Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months particulate radioactivity the containment monitor inoperable. atmosphere.

OR A.1.2 Perform SR 3.4.1 3.1. Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A.2 Restore the containment 30 days atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor to OPERABLE status.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 6 RCS Specific Activity L C 0 3.4.1 6 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg)2 500°F.

ACTIONS LC0 3.0.4~is applicable.

I CONDITION QUIRED ACTION COMPLETION 1 ME

/

A. DOSE EQUIVALENT -----$-------------Note----------------

1-131 > 0.5 pCiIgm.

1-1 . .

A. 1 Verify DOSE Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months EQUIVALENT 1-131 within the acceptable region of Figure 3.4.1 6-1.

A.2 Restore DOSE 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limit.

B. Gross specific activity of I B.l Be in MODE 3 with / 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months the reactor coolant not within limit.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 147 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 138 (Unit 2)

ECCS-Shutdown 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.3 ECCS -Shutdown L C 0 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.

......................................... NOTES...............................................

1. An RHR train may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.

2. Upon entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3, the breaker or disconnect device to the valve operators for MOVs 8706A and 8706B may be closed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to allow for repositioning from MODE 3 requirements.

A LC0 3.0.4b i s not applicable t o ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem.

I I APPLICABILITY:

\ACTIONS MODE 4.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required ECCS residual A. 1 Initiate action to restore Immediately heat removal (RHR) required ECCS RHR subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required ECCS centrifugal B.l Restore required ECCS 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months charging subsystem centrifugal charging inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

HMS 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.8 Hydrogen Mixing System (HMS)

LC0 3.6.8 Two HMS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One HMS train inoperable.

Restore HMS train to 30 days OPERABLE status.

B. Two HMS trains B. 1 Verify by administrative 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. means that the hydrogen control function is AND maintained.

Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter AND B.2 Restore one HMS train to 7 days OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.9 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System LC0 3.6.9 Two Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDlTlOlV REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution train inoperable.

Restore the train to 30 days OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.9.1 Operate each Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution train 92 days for 2 15 minutes.

SR 3.6.9.2 Verify each Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution train 18 months starts on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

ARVs 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs)

LC0 3.7.4 Three ARV lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ARV line inoperable.

Restore required ARV line 7 days to OPERABLE status.

B. Two or more required B. 1 Restore all but one ARV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ARV lines inoperable. line to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

AND I C.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment IVo. 137 (Unit 2)

AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater ( A M ) System LC0 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

r ACT'oNS CONDlTlON A. One steam supply to A.l REQUIRED ACTION Restore steam supply to COMPLETION TIME 7 days turbine driven AFW OPERABLE status.

pump inoperable.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 B. One AFW train B.l Restore AFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.

other than Condition A. -

AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the L C 0 C. Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition A or B AnlD not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Two AFW trains inoperable.

\ I LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable.

NOTE---

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

AC Sources- Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources -Operating LC0 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and

b. Two diesel generator (DG) sets capable of supplying the onsite Class 1 E power distribution subsystem(s); and

c. Automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train 6.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,and 4.

2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit A.l Perform SR 3.8.1.I for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months inoperable. required OPERABLE offsite circuit. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite offsite power available power to one train inoperable when its concurrent with redundant required inoperability of feature(s) is inoperable. redundant required feature(s)

(continued)

I NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.

Farley Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLE-rION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Restore required offsite 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months circuit to OPERABLE status.

13 days from discovery of failure to meet L C 0 B. One DG set inoperable.

1-1only one. .of the three applicable when DGs is inoperable.

B. 1 Perform SR 3.8.1 .Ifor 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the required offsite circuit(s).

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from feature(s) supported by discovery of the inoperable DG set Condition B inoperable when its concurrent with required redundant inoperability of feature(s) is inoperable. redundant required feature(s)

B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months DG set is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LC0 would not be LC0 Applicability met, in accordance with LC0 3.0.4a, LC0 3.0.4b, or LC0 3.0.4~.

BASES LC0 3.0.4 LC0 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other 1

LC0 3.0.4a allows entry into a MODE or \compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the other specified unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition condition in the provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is Applicability with the without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change.

LCO not met when the Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition associated ACTIONS in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the to be entered permit Required Actions.

continued operation interpreted as end in the MODE or other restoring systems specified condition in 1- lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (2) the Applicability for an unlimited period of The provisions of time. other specified conditions in the Applicab~litythat are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LC0 3.0.4 shall not prevent chauges in r other specified conditions in the ~ p p l i c a b i lthat i~

result from unit shutdown. any lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (3)

>Edepti

/for 1' s to $0 3 . 0 i are s ted in t indivi ual spYdificati$k. Thyi dcept' ns a r en$

App~iability, hen t asso ~atedA V ~ I O N S ~be ntinufd oper tionTn fE

ydiy:fo an unli ted pertod ap,Qlyto 911 the A TlON or to a s ecific equire#~ction qbecifiqition. / ,/ 1 of

/

i " ?

O e ered d not pr ti e. oEx ; ptions J

~ ' ~ ay

/

~ ~ ~ , ,

I (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-5 Revision 0

Insert B LC0 3.0.4 (1) n LC0 3.0.4b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the purposes of LC0 3.0.4b, must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants."

These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LC0 would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.

LC0 3.0.4b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LC0 3.0.4b risk assessments do not have to be documented.

The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the

lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (1) (continued) use of the L C 0 3.0.4b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LC0 3.0.4b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these systems and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of L C 0 3.0.4b by stating that LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable.

LC0 3.0.4~allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LC0 3.0.4~is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LC0 3.0.4b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LC0 3.0.4~is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., Containment Air Temperature, Containment Pressure, Moderator Temperature Coefficient), and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval.

n lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (2) entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (3) 11 In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

lnsert B LC0 3.0.4 (4)

Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met, LC0 3.0.1 and LC0 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LC0 is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.

LC0 Applicability not been BASES

\ \

LC0 3.0.4 is not a viol ion of SR 3.0.1 r (continued) Bav&berformedLl

~~. ~~~ - - . However. SRs must be met to

'-BI~ITY~~ i o declaring the assbciated equi~ment OPERABLE (or variable affected LCO.

LC0 3.0.5 LC0 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LC0 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to cormply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABII-ITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision 0

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.3 If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then (continued) the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable L C 0 Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable L C 0 Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY

- requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or A

", .3.0.4 lnser. B SR Insert .,..,.- (1),

\,

other s~ecifiedconditions in the A~~licabilihr f ~ which r these systems and 7 (see see next page) components ensure safe operation of the unit.'rhis unit.'\rhis Specification applies 1to changes in MODES or other specified sp conditions in the Applicability I associated with unit shutdown as well as startup. I However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change.

When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed.

Therefore, failing perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified

- to .

Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES in or other specified conditiom the Applicability. However, since the LC0 IS not met ~nthis instance. L C 0 3.0.4 will aovern anv restrictions that mav ACTIONS.

I Insert B SR 3.0.4 (3)/ - I 1 entering into ----I (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-15 Revision 12 1

lnsert B SR 3.0.4 (1)

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an L C 0 is not met due to Surveillance not being met in accordance with LC0 3.0.4.

lnsert B SR 3.0.4 (2)

SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LC0 not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

lnsert B SR 3.0.4 (3)

In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.4 The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that (continued) exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LC0 prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after enterin- Applicability, would have its Frequency I LCO's I specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision 12 (

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre-planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, unit conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS A Note l ~ h a been s added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.3-1. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

Condition A applies when one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable. Required Action A.l requires restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel (or in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-12 Revision 0

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES LC0 The remote shutdown instrument and control circuits covered by this (continued) LC0 do not need to be energized to be considered OPERABLE. This L C 0 is intended to ensure the instruments and control circuits will be OPERABLE if unit conditions require that the Remote Shutdown System be placed in operation.

APPLlCABl LlTY The Remote Shutdown System LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. This is required so that the unit can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 for an extended period of time from a location other than the control room.

This LC0 is not applicable in MODE 4, 5, or 6. In these MODES, the facility is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced RCS energy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available to restore necessary instrument control functions if control room instruments or controls become unavailable.

ACTIONS I -

I A Note ~Ne&&lhas been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each unction listed on Table 3.3.4-1. The completion Time(@ of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required Functions of the Remote Shutdown System are inoperable. This includes any Function listed in Table 3.3.4-1, as well as the control and transfer switches.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.4-3 Revision 0

Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.1 1 BASES APPLICABILITY valves or an RCS vent of 1 2.85 inches squared is used for (continued) overpressure protection in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place. LC0 3.4.12 addresses the overpressure protection requirements in these MODES.

ACTIONS has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are as separate entities, each with separate Com Com~letionTime is on a component basis).

A Note for LC0 3.0.4, Note 2, permits entry into MODES l , 2 , and 3 when Actions Condition(s) are applicable. A With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems related to remote manual operation of the PORVs, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. This Condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be corrected or closure accorr~plishedin this time period.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.1 1-4 Revision 0

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABILITY LC0 3.4.3 provides the operational P K limits for all MODES.

(continued) L C 0 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1,2, and 3, and MODE 4 above 325°F.

Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure with little or no time allowed for operator action to mitigate the event.

I two I I

The Applicability is modified by L e s . Note 1 states that the' requirement to have only one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS is only applicable when one or more of the RCS cold legs is 5 180°F. This Note permits more than one charging pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS in MODE 4 at temperatures > 180°F and specifies that the charging pump surveillance requirement need only be performed at temperatures S 180°F. In addition, this Note allows for two charging pumps to be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations, when one or more of the RCS cold legs is S 180°F, for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non-water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves. This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseat when pressure is reapplied. Note 2 states that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the P K limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision 0

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS

/

A Note prohibits the application of LC0 3.0.4b With two or more charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, and the Temperature of one or more RCS cold legs I180°F, RCS overpressurization is possible.

To immediately initiate action to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from to an inoperable LTOP this condition.

system when entering MODE 4. There is an Required Action A.l is modified by a Note that permits two charging increased risk pumps capable of RCS injection for I 15 minutes to allow for pump associated with entering swaps.

MODE 4 from MODE 5 with LTOP inoperable B.l, C.1, and C.2 and the provisions of L C 0 3.0.4b, which allow An unisolated accumulator requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . This is entry into a MODE or only required when the accumulator pressure is at or more than the other specified condition maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed by the in the Applicability with P/T limit curves.

the LC0 not met after performance of a risk If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required assessment addressing Action C.l and Required Action C.2 provide two options, either of inoperable systems and which must be performed in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . By increasing the components, should not RCS temperature to > 325OF, an accumulator pressure of 600-be applied in this 650 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if the accumulators are fully circumstance. injected. Depressurizing the accumulators below the LTOP limit from the PTLR also gives this protection.

The Completion Times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods and on engineering evaluations indicatirrg that an event requiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed times.

D.1. D.2, and D.3 In MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is I325OF, with one required RHR relief valve inoperable, the pressurizer level must be reduced to I 30% (cold calibrated) and a dedicated operator must be assigned for RCS pressure monitoring and control within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

These actions provide additional assurance that an RCS pressure transient will be rapidly identified and operator action taken to limit the (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-8 Revision 0

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.15 BASES One method of protecting against large RCS leakage derives from the ability of instruments to rapidly detect extremely small leaks. 'This L C 0 requires instruments of diverse monitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe condition, when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB degradation.

The L C 0 is satisfied when monitors of diverse measurement means are available. Thus, the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor (R-I I ) in combination with a gaseous radioactivity monitor (R-12) or a containment air cooler condensate level monitor provides an acceptable minimum.

APPLICABILITY Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RCS leakage detection instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the temperature is to be 5200°F and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation are much smaller.

'Therefore, the requirements of this LC0 are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A.l.l, A.1.2, and A.2 With the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.15-3 Revision 0

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 BASES LC0 on gross specific activity ensures the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months whole body dose to an (continued) individual at the site boundary during the DBA will be a small fraction of the allowed whole body dose. The SGTR (Ref. 2) and MSLB accident analyses show that the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months site boundary dose levels are within acceptable limits. Violation of the L C 0 may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of an SGTR or MSLB, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the dose guideline limits.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature 1 500°F, operation within the L C 0 limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain the potential consequences of an SGTR or MSLB to within the acceptable site boundary dose values.

For operation in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature < 500°F, and in MODES 4 and 5, the release of radioactivity in the event of a SGTR is unlikely since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety valves.

ACTIONS A.l and A.2 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 greater than the L C 0 limit, A Note permits the samples at intervals of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months must be taken to demonstrate that the use of the limits of Figure 3.4.1 6-1 are not exceeded. The Completion Time of provisions of L C 0 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is required to obtain and analyze a sample. Sampling is done 3.0.4~. This to continue to provide a trend.

allowance permits entry into the The DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 must be restored to within limits applicable MODE(S) within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is required, if the while relying o n the limit violation resulted from normal iodine spiking.

ACTIONS.

A Note to the Required Action of Condition A excludes the MODE change restriction of L C 0 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE(S) while relying on the ACTIONS even though the II ACTIONS may eventually require plant shutdown. 1-rhis acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorpor specific activity limit, due to exceeding activity operation.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.16-4 Revision 15 1

ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES ACTIONS A Note prohibits the 1 With no ECCS RHR subsystem OPERABLE, the plant is not prepared application of LC0 to respond to a loss of coolant accident or to continue a cooldown 3.0.4b to an inoperable using the RHR pumps and heat exchangers. The Completion Time of ECCS centrifugal immediately to initiate actions that would restore at least one ECCS charging subsystem RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is when entering MODE 4. taken to restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, There is an increased reactor decay heat is removed ,from the RCS by an RHR loop. If no risk associated with RHR loop is OPERABLE for this function, reactor decay heat must be entering MODE 4 from removed by some alternate method, such as use of the steam MODE 5 with an generators. The alternate means of heat removal must continue until inoperable ECCS the inoperable RHR loop components can be restored to operation so centrifugal charging that decay heat removal is continuous.

subsystem and the provisions of LC0 With both RHR pumps and heat exchangers inoperable, it would be 3.0.4b, which allow entry unwise to require the plant to go to MODE 5, where the only available into a MODE or other heat removal system is the RHR. Therefore, the appropriate action is specified condition i n to initiate measures to restore one ECCS RHR subsystem and to the Applicability with the continue the actions until the subsystem is restored to OPERABLE LC0 not met after status.

performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not With the required ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem inoperable, be applied i n this and at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single circumstance. OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is acceptable when the unit is in MODES 1, 2, and 3 (Ref. 5). Since MODE 4 represents less severe conditions for the initiation of a LOCA, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is also acceptable for MODE 4. An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single operable ECCS train remains available.

This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in the required subsystem may be inoperable, but the ECCS remains capable of delivering 100% of the required flow equivalent.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.5.3-3 Revision 0

HMS B 3.6.8 BASES ACTIONS 6.1 and 8.2 With two HMS trains inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The alternate hydrogen control capability is provided by the containment Post Accident Hydrogen Purge System. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. Both the initial verification and all subsequent verifications may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two HMS trains inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two HMS trains to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in the amounts capable of exceedirrg the flammability limit.

If an inoperable HMS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision 29

Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System B 3.6.9 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODE 3 or 4, both the hydrogen production rate and the total (continued) hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the RCHDS is low.

Therefore, the RCHDS is not required in MODE 3 or 4.

In MODE 5 or 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA or steam line break (SLB) are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RCHDS is not required in these MODES.

ACTIONS inoperable With one RCHDS train inoperable, the train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RCHDS train is adequate to perform the hydrogen mixing function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE train could result in reduced hydrogen mixing capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of the other RCHDS train, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability limit), the amount of time available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit, and the availability of the Containment Spray System and the Post Accident Venting System.

I If an inoperable RCHDS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.9-3 Revision 29

ARVs B 3.7.4 BASES LC0 Failure to meet the LC0 can result in the inability to cool the unit to (continued) RHR entry conditions following an event in which the condenser is unavailable for use with the Steam Dump System.

An ARV is considered OPERABLE (even if isolated) when it is capable of providing controlled relief of the main steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand, either remotely or locally via manual control.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, the ARVs are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 4, the pressure and temperature limitations are such that the probability of an SGTR event requiring ARV operation is low. In addition, the RHR system is available to provide the decay heat removal function in MODE 4. Therefore, the ARVs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to satisfy the safety analysis assumptions of the DBA. However, the capability to remove decay heat from a SG required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 by LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -

MODE 4" is implicit in the requirement for an OPERABLE SG and may require the associated ARV be capable of removing that heat if the normal decay heat removal system (steam dump) is not available.

In MODE 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event.

ACTIONS With one required ARV line inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE ARV line . a nonsafetv arade backuo in the Steam Dumo Svstem, and MSSVs. Required Action A.l is modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.4 does not apply.

With two or more ARV lines inoperable, action must be taken to restore all but one ARV line to OPERABLE status. Since the manual isolation valves can be closed to isolate an ARV, some repairs may (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.4-3 Revision 0

AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES generators are OPERABLE. This requires that the two motor-driven

~ntinued) AFW pump trains be OPERABLE with one shared flow path, each supplying AFW to all steam generators. In addition, the turbine driven AFW pump train is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steam supplies from each of two main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steam generators via its associated flow path. The control room manual actuation switches for each AFW pump shall also be OPERABLE.

The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE. A flow path is operable when it is capable of supporting the required AFW flow.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators. However, the OPERABILITY of the AFW system in MODE 4 is not assumed in the safety analysis and this LC0 does not require the AFW system OPERABLE in MODE 4.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:

a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump;

b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision 0

Insert B 3.7.5 A Note prohibits the application of LC0 3.0.4b to an inoperable AFW train. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an AFW train inoperable and the provisions of LC0 3.0.4b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

AC Sources- Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABILITY The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in (continued) LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources- Shutdown."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LC0 3.0.4b to an inoperable PA To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the DG. There is an Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 increased risk acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met.

associated with However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1 . l , the second entering a MODE or offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits other specified inoperable, is entered.

condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LC0 Required Action A.2, which only applies if the train cannot be 3.0.4b, which allow powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that entry into a MODE or an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not other specified result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant condition in the required features. These features are powered from the redundant Applicability with the AC electrical power train. The redundant required features referred to LC0 not met after in this Required Action include the motor driven auxiliary feedwater performance of a risk pump as well as the turbine driven aux~liaryfeedwater pump. One assessment motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump does not provide 100% of the addressing inoperable auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore, systems and in order to ensure the auxiliary feedwater safety function, the turbine components, should driven auxiliary feedwater pump must be considered a redundant not be applied in this required feature addressed by this Required Action.

circumstance.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. The train has no offsite power supplying it loads; and

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1 -6 Revision 0

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS -

A.3 (continued) occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 10 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 10 days (for a total of 23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 13 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

The Condition B Required Actions are modified by a Note that is with a single inoperable DG, takes into account the capacity and -

capability of the remaining AC sources and the fact that operation is ultimately limited by the Condition B Completion Time for the inoperable DG set.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable DG set, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only speci,fies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1 .I, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-8 Revision 0

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using The Consolidated Line Item Imvrovement Process Enclosure 3 Revised Technical Specifications and Bases Pages Affected Pages TS Pages TS Bases Pages 1.4-2 3.5.3-1 B 3.0-5 B 3.4.15-3 3.0-1 3.6.8-1 B 3.0-6 B 3.4.16-4 3.0-2 3.6.9-1 B 3.0-7 B 3.5.3-3 3.0-3 3.7.4-1 B 3.0-8 B 3.5.3-4 3.O-4 3.7.5-1 B 3.0-9 B 3.5.3-5 3.3.3-1 3.8.1-1 B 3.0-10 B 3.6.8-4 3.3.4-1 3.8.1-2 B 3.0-1 1 B 3.6.9-3 3.4.11-1 B 3.0-12 B 3.7.4-3 3.4.12-1 B 3.0-13 B 3.7.5-5 3.4.12-2 B 3.0-14 B 3.7.5-6 3.4.15-1 B 3.0-15 B 3.7.5-7 3.4.16-1 B 3.0-16 B 3.8.1-6 B 3.0-17 B 3.8.1-7 B 3.3.3-12 B 3.8.1-8 B 3.3.4-3 B 3.8.1-9 B 3.4.1 1-4 B 3.8.1-10 B 3.4.12-7 B 3.4.12-8 B 3.4.12-9

Frequency 1.4 1.4 Freauencv EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.4-1 (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in the Technical Specifications (TS). The Frequency specifies an interval (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) during which the associated Surveillance must be performed at least one time. Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent interval. Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the stated Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is inoperable, a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LCO). If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and the performance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer to Example 1-4-3), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable.

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LC0 for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition or the LC0 is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LC0 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

LC0 Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LC0 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LC0 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.

LC0 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LC0 3.0.5 and LC0 3.0.6.

If the LC0 is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time@),completion of the Required Action(@ is not required unless othewise stated.

LC0 3.0.3 When an LC0 is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the L C 0 is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LC0 or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LC0 3.0.3 is not required.

LC0 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2 , 3, and 4.

LC0 3.0.4 When an LC0 is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2 )

LC0 Applicability 3.0 3.0 LC0 APPLICABII-ITY LC0 3.0.4 b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable (continued) systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, or

c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

LC0 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LC0 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

3.0.6 When a supported system LC0 is not met solely due to a support system LC0 not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered.

Only the support system LC0 ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LC0 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, an evaluation shall be performed in accordance with specification 5.5.15, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LC0 3.0.2.

Test Exception LC0 3.1.8 allows specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. When a Test Exception LC0 is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Test Exception LC0 shall be met. When a Test Exception LC0 is not desired to be met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall be made in accordance with the other applicable Specifications.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

SR Applicability 1 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless othetwise stated in the SR.

Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the L C 0 except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ."

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LC0 not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LC0 must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LC0 must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LC0 shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an L C 0 is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with L C 0 3.0.4.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.4 This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified (continued) conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. I Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

PAM lnstrumentation 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation LC0 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentationfor each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

........................................................... NOTE........................................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

channel inoperable.

associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A Specification 5.6.8.

not met.

channels inoperable.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System L C 0 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

........................................................... NOTE........................................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

B. ------------ NOTE------------ Be in MODE 3.

Not applicable to

................................ Be in MODE 4.

Required Action and associated Completion Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.1 1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

L C 0 3.4.1 1 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

.......................................................... NOTE.........................................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.

inoperable and capable of power to associated not capable of being manually cycled.

Remove power from associated block valve.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.

a. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves with setpoints S 450 psig.

b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 2.85 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs is 5 325"F, MODE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.

.......................................... NOTES..............................................

I. The requirement to have only one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS is only applicable when one or more of the RCS cold legs is 5 180°F; however, while in this condition, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non-water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.

2. Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the PTT limit curves provided in the PTLR.

I Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

LTOP System 3.4.12 ACTIONS

................................................................. NOTE....................................................

LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable when entering MODE 4.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or more charging A. 1 ----------- NOTE-----------

pumps capable of Two charging pumps injecting into the may be capable of RCS. injecting into the RCS during pump swap operation for S 15 minutes.

Initiate action to verify a Immediately maximum of one charging pump is capable of injecting into the RCS.

B. An accumulator not B. 1 Isolate affected 'I hour isolated when the accumulator.

accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.

C. Required Action and C. 1 Increase RCS cold leg 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion temperature to > 325°F.

Time of Condition B not -

OR met.

C.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation 3.4.15 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation L C 0 3.4.15 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. One containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor; and

b. One containment air cooler condensate level monitor or one containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor.

APPI-ICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS I

particulate radioactivity the containment monitor inoperable.

A. 1.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1. Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity LC0 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg)2 500°F.

ACTIONS Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months within the acceptable Figure 3.4.16-1.

Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ECCS -Shutdown 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.3 ECCS -Shutdown L C 0 3.5.3 One ECCS train shall be OPERABLE.

......................................... NOTES...............................................

1. An RHR train may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.

2. Upon entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3, the breaker or disconnect device to the valve operators for MOVs 8706A and 87068 may be closed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to allow for repositioning from MODE 3 requirements.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

............................................................... NOTE......................................................

L C 0 3.0.4b is not applicable to ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem.

At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

HMS 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.8 Hydrogen Mixing System (HMS)

LC0 3.6.8 Two HMS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS inoperable. OPERABLE status.

control function is maintained.

Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System 3.6.9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.9 Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System L C 0 3.6.9 Two Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPI-ICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS I

inoperable.

6. Required Action and B. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.9.1 Operate each Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution train 92 days for 1 15 minutes.

SR 3.6.9.2 Verify each Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution train 18 months starts on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ARVs 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs)

LC0 3.7.4 Three ARV lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME A. One required ARV line inoperable.

A. 1 Restore required ARV line to OPERABLE status.

7 days I B. Two or more required Restore all but one ARV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ARV lines inoperable. line to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

AND C.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LC0 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

.............................................................. NOTE.......................................................

LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable.

pump inoperable.

B. One AFW train B.l Restore AFW train to inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.

other than Condition A.

discovery of failure to not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4.

OR Two AFW trains Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources -Operating LC0 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and

b. Two diesel generator (DG) sets capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s); and

c. Automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

........................................................... NOTE..........................................................

LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.

offsite circuit.

Declare required feature(s) with no inoperable when its redundant required Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

AC Sources -Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A. 3 Restore required offsite 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months circuit to OPERABLE status.

13 days from discovery of failure to meet LC0 B. One DG set inoperable. ------------------NOTE-------------------

LC0 3 . 0 . 4 ~ is applicable when only one of the three DGs is inoperable.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the required offsite circuit(s).

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 8.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from feature(s) supported by discovery of the inoperable DG set Condition B inoperable when its concurrent with required redundant inoperability of feature(s) is inoperable. redundant required feature(s)

B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months DG set is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

LC0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES LC0 3.0.4 LC0 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an L C 0 is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LC0 would not be met, in accordance with L C 0 3.0.4a, LC0 3.0.4b, or L C 0 3.0.4~.

L C 0 3.0.4a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change.

Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. LC0 3.0.4b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the purposes of LC0 3.0.4b, must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NLlMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants."

These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 6 3.0-5 Revision

LC0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES LC0 3.0.4 personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to (continued) minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the L C 0 would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.

LC0 3.0.4b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LC0 3.0.4b risk assessments do not have to be documented.

The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitionirrg into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LC0 3.0.4b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LC0 3.0.4b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these systems and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of LC0 3.0.4b by stating that LC0 3.0.4b is not applicable.

LC0 3 . 0 . 4 ~allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LC0 3 . 0 . 4 ~is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LC0 3.0.4b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LC0 3 . 0 . 4 ~is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., Containment Air Temperature, Containment Pressure, Moderator Temperature (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-6 Revision

L C 0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES L C 0 3.0.4 (continued)

Coefficient), and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval. I The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

The provisions of L C 0 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of L C 0 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. I In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met, L C 0 3.0.1 and L C 0 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the L C 0 is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing L C 0 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

L C 0 3.0.5 L C 0 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to L C 0 3.0.2 (e.g., to not corr~ply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-7 Revision

LC0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES L C 0 3.0.5 The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to (continued) service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

L C 0 3.0.6 establishes an exception to L C 0 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LC0 specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because L C 0 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system L C 0 be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.

When a support system is inoperable and there is an LC0 specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-8 Revision

L C 0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES L C 0 3.0.6 However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action (continued) may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system.

This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is irr~mediateor after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LC0 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.15, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP),"

ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LC0 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LC0 3.0.6.

Cross train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support multiple and redundant safety systems are required.

The cross train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. The following examples are provided for illustration:

a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or (EXAMPLE 83.0.6-1).

b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or (EXAMPLE B3.0.6-2).

c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

(EXAMPLE B3.0.6-3)

EXAMPLE B3.0.6-1 If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 5 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in supported System 5.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-9 Revision

L C 0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES L C 0 3.0.6 EXAMPLE B3.0.6-2 (continued) If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 11 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in System 11 which is in turn supported by System 5.

EXAMPLE B3.0.6-3 If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 1 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in Systems 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the L C 0 in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

EXAMPLES TRAIN A TRAIN B r System 8 I

rrSystem 8 System 10 h e m 5 b t e m l l System 1 System 1 System 3 System 13 System 13

( System 14 r System System 14 S y s t e m IS S y s t e m 15 L C 0 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception L C 0 3.1.8 allows specified Technical (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-10 Revision

L C 0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES L C 0 3.0.7 Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of (continued) these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS.

Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of a Test Exception L C 0 represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS.

Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception L C 0 or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception L C 0 shall be followed.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision

SR Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY BASES SRs SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.

SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LC0 apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.

Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when:

a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or

b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known not to be met between required Surveillance performances.

Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LC0 are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a test exception are only applicable when the test exception is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.

Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given SR. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the SR. This allowance includes those SRs whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-12 Revision

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.1 Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do (continued) not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.

SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . . ." interval.

SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.

These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-13 Revision I

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.2 (continued) As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per ..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the completion of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-14 Revision I

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.3 When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but (continued) upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of, Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals. While up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or the limit of the specified Frequency is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity. The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the Surveillance. This risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managirrg Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants."

The Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown. The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods. The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the licensee's Corrective Action Program.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-15 Revision

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.3 If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then (continued) the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LC0 Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LC0 Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an L C 0 is not met due to Surveillance not being met in accordance with L C 0 3.0.4.

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change.

When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed.

Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability. However, since the L C 0 1 is not met in this instance, L C 0 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.0-16 Revision

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions (continued) of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the L C 0 not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent entering into MODES or I other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2,MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated L C 0 prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCO1sApplicability, would have its Frequency I specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation L C 0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre-planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, unit conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of 1 Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.3-1. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

Condition A applies when one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable. Required Action A . l requires restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel (or in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-12 Revision

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES LC0 The remote shutdown instrument and control circuits covered by this (continued) L C 0 do not need to be energized to be considered OPERABLE. This L C 0 is intended to ensure the instruments and control circuits will be OPERABLE if unit conditions require that the Remote Shutdown System be placed in operation.

APPLlCABl LlTY The Remote Shutdown System L C 0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. This is required so that the unit can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 for an extended period of time from a location other than the control room.

This L C 0 is not applicable in MODE 4, 5, or 6. In these MODES, the facility is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced RCS energy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available to restore necessary instrument control functions if control room instruments or controls become unavailable.

AC-TIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function listed on Table 3.3.4-1. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel(s)/train(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required Functions of the Remote Shutdown System are inoperable. This includes any Function listed in Table 3.3.4-1, as well as the control and transfer switches.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.4-3 Revision

Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES APPI-ICABILITY valves or an RCS vent of 2 2.85 inches squared is used for (continued) overpressure protection in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place. LC0 3.4.12 addresses the overpressure protection requirements in these MODES.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are I treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis). I With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valves should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems related to remote manual operation of the PORVs, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. This Condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition.

Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.11-4 Revision

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES APPLICABILITY LC0 3.4.3 provides the operationall /P limits for all MODES.

(continued) LC0 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the OPERABII-ITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3, and MODE 4 above 325°F.

Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure with little or no time allowed for operator action to mitigate the event.

The Applicability is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that the I requirement to have only one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS is only applicable when one or more of the RCS cold legs is I 180°F. This Note permits more than one charging pump to be capable of injecting into the RCS in MODE 4 at temperatures > 180°F and specifies that the charging pump surveillance requirement need only be performed at temperatures 5 180°F. In addition, this Note allows for two charging pumps to be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations, when one or more of the RCS cold legs is 5 180°F, for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non-water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves. This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseat when pressure is reapplied. Note 2 states that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by thel /P limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-7 Revision

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACI-IONS A Note prohibits the application of L C 0 3.0.4b to an inoperable LTOP system when entering MODE 4. There is an increased risk associated with entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 with LTOP inoperable and the provisions of LC0 3.0.4b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

With two or more charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, and the Temperature of one or more RCS cold legs I 18O0F,RCS overpressurization is possible.

To immediately initiate action to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from this condition.

Required Action A . l is modified by a Note that permits two charging pumps capable of RCS injection for I 15 minutes to allow for pump swaps.

B.1. C . l , and C.2 An unisolated accumulator requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . This is only required when the accumulator pressure is at or more than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed by the l /P limit curves.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action C . l and Required Action C.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . By increasing the RCS temperature to > 325"F, an accumulator pressure of 600-650 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if the accumulators are fully injected. Depressurizing the accumulators below the LTOP limit from the PTLR also gives this protection.

The Completion Times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods and on engineering evaluations indicating that an event requiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed times.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.12-8 Revision

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES ACTIONS D.l, D.2, and D.3 (continued)

In MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is ~ 3 2 5 ° F with

~ one required RHR relief valve inoperable, the pressurizer level must be reduced to I30% (cold calibrated) and a dedicated operator must be assigned for RCS pressure monitoring and control within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

These actions provide additional assurance that an RCS pressure transient will be rapidly identified and operator action taken to limit the transient. The RHR relief valve must be restored to OPERABLE status within a Completion Time of 7 days. Two RHR relief valves are required to provide low temperature overpressure mitigation while withstanding a single failure of an active component.

The 7 day Completion Time considers the facts that only one of the RHR relief valves is required to mitigate an overpressure transient, the actions taken to reduce pressurizer level and monitor RCS pressure, and that the likelihood of an active failure of the remaining valve path during this time period is very low.

The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months when:

a. Both required RHR relief valves are inoperable; or

b. A Required Action and associated Corr~pletionTime of Condition A, C, or D is not met; or

c. The LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, or D.

The vent must be sized 2 2.85 square inches to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.

The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.

Farley Units 1 and 2 6 3.4.12-9 Revision I

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.15 BASES One method of protecting against large RCS leakage derives from the ability of instruments to rapidly detect extremely small leaks. This L C 0 requires instruments of diverse monitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe condition, when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB degradation.

The L C 0 is satisfied when monitors of diverse measurement means are available. Thus, the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor (R-11) in combination with a gaseous radioactivity monitor (R-12) or a containment air cooler condensate level monitor provides an acceptable minimum.

APPLICABILITY Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RCS leakage detection instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the temperature is to be I 200°F and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation are much smaller.

Therefore, the requirements of this L C 0 are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

I ACTIONS A . l . l , A.1.2, and A.2 With the required containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.15-3 Revision

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 BASES LC0 on gross specific activity ensures the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months whole body dose to an (continued) individual at the site boundary during the DBA will be a small fraction of the allowed whole body dose. The SGTR (Ref. 2) and MSLB accident analyses show that the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months site boundary dose levels are within acceptable limits. Violation of the L C 0 may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of an SGTR or MSLB, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the dose guideline limits.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature 2 500°F, operation within the L C 0 limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain the potential consequences of an SGTR or MSLB to within the acceptable site boundary dose values.

For operation in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature < 500°F, and in MODES 4 and 5, the release of radioactivity in the event of a SGTR is unlikely since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety valves.

ACTIONS A . l and A.2 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 greater than the L C 0 limit, samples at intervals of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months must be taken to demonstrate that the limits of Figure 3.4.16-1 are not exceeded. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is required to obtain and analyze a sample. Sampling is done to continue to provide a trend.

The DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 must be restored to within limits within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is required, if the limit violation resulted from normal iodine spiking.

A Note permits the use of the provisions of L C 0 3.0.4~.This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S) while relying on the ACTIONS. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit, the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision

ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of L C 0 3.0.4b to an inoperable ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem when entering MODE 4. There is an increased risk associated with entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 with an inoperable ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem and the provisions of L C 0 3.0.4b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

With no ECCS RHR subsystem OPERABLE, the plant is not prepared to respond to a loss of coolant accident or to continue a cooldown using the RHR pumps and heat exchangers. The Completion Time of immediately to initiate actions that would restore at least one ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to restore the required cooling capacity. Normally, in MODE 4, reactor decay heat is removed from the RCS by an RHR loop. If no RHR loop is OPERABLE for this function, reactor decay heat must be removed by some alternate method, such as use of the steam generators. The alternate means of heat removal must continue until the inoperable RHR loop components can be restored to operation so that decay heat removal is continuous.

With both RHR pumps and heat exchangers inoperable, it would be unwise to require the plant to go to MODE 5, where the only available heat removal system is the RHR. Therefore, the appropriate action is to initiate measures to restore one ECCS RHR subsystem and to continue the actions until the subsystem is restored to OPERABLE status.

With the required ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem inoperable, and at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is acceptable when the unit is in MODES 1, 2, and 3 (Ref. 5). Since MODE 4 represents less severe conditions for the initiation of a LOCA, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is also acceptable for MODE 4. An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available. The intent of this Condition is (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.5.3-3 Revision

ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES ACTIONS -

B. 1 (continued) to maintain a combination of equipment such that 100% of the ECCS

,Flow equivalent to a single operable ECCS train remains available.

This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in the required subsystem may be inoperable, but the ECCS remains capable of delivering 100% of the required flow equivalent.

With no ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem OPERABLE, due to the inoperability of the centrifugal charging pump or flow path from the RWST, the plant is not prepared to provide high pressure response to Design Basis Events requiring SI. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to restore at least one ECCS centrifugal charging subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in MODE 5, where an ECCS train is not required.

When the Required Actions of Condition B or C cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, a controlled shutdown should be initiated provided that adequate RHR cooling capacity exists to support reaching and maintaining MODE 5 conditions safely. With both RHR subsystems inoperable, it would be unwise to require the plant to go to MODE 5, where the only available heat removal system is the RHR. Therefore, the appropriate action is to initiate measures to restore at least one ECCS RHR subsystem and to continue the actions until the subsystem is restored to OPERABLE status. Only then would it be safe to go to MODE 5. Twenty-four hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 5 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems or operators.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.1 REQUIREMENTS The applicable Surveillance descriptions from Bases 3.5.2 apply.

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.5.3-4 Revision I

ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification of proper valve alignment ensures that the flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render the required ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in position by removal of power by locking open the breaker or disconnect device for the valve operator ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertantly misaligned. A 31 day frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that will ensure a mispositioned valve is unlikely and this frequency has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

REFERENCES The applicable references from Bases 3.5.2 apply.

Farley Units 1 and 2 Revision I

HMS B 3.6.8 BASES I

ACTIONS B . l and B.2 I (continued)

With two HMS trains inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The alternate hydrogen control capability is provided by the containment Post Accident Hydrogen Purge System. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. Both the initial verification and all subsequent verifications may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two HMS trains inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two HMS trains to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in the amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.

If an inoperable HMS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the L C 0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.8-4 Revision

Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System B 3.6.9 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODE 3 or 4,both the hydrogen production rate and the total (continued) hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident requiring the RCHDS is low.

Therefore, the RCHDS is not required in MODE 3 or 4.

In MODE 5 or 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA or steam line break (SLB) are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RCHDS is not required in these MODES.

ACI-IONS A.1 With one RCHDS train inoperable, the inoperable train must be I restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RCHDS train is adequate to perform the hydrogen mixing function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE train could result in reduced hydrogen mixing capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of the other RCHDS train, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability limit), the amount of time available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit, and the availability of the Containment Spray System and the Post Accident Venting System.

I If an inoperable RCHDS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.9-3 Revision

ARVs B 3.7.4 BASES LC0 Failure to meet the L C 0 can result in the inability to cool the unit to (continued) RHR entry conditions following an event in which the condenser is unavailable for use with the Steam Dump System.

An ARV is considered OPERABLE (even if isolated) when it is capable of providing controlled relief of the main steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand, either remotely or locally via manual control.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ARVs are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 4, the pressure and temperature limitations are such that the probability of an SGTR event requiring ARV operation is low. In addition, the RHR system is available to provide the decay heat removal function in MODE 4. Therefore, the ARVs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to satisfy the safety analysis assumptions of the DBA. However, the capability to remove decay heat from a SG required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 by L C 0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -

MODE 4" is implicit in the requirement for an OPERABLE SG and may require the associated ARV be capable of removing that heat if the normal decay heat removal system (steam dump) is not available.

In MODE 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event.

ACTIONS With one required ARV line inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE ARV lines, a nonsafety grade backup in the Steam Dump System, and MSSVs. I With two or more ARV lines inoperable, action must be taken to restore all but one ARV line to OPERABLE status. Since the manual isolation valves can be closed to isolate an ARV, some repairs may (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.4-3 Revision

AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES LC0 generators are OPERABLE. This requires that the two motor-driven (continued) AFW pump trains be OPERABLE with one shared flow path, each supplying AFW to all steam generators. In addition, the turbine driven AFW pump train is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steam supplies from each of two main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steam generators via its associated flow path. The control room manual actuation switches for each AFW pump shall also be OPERABLE.

The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE. A flow path is operable when it is capable of supporting the required AFW flow.

APPI-ICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators. However, the OPERABII-ITY of the AFW system in MODE 4 is not assumed in the safety analysis and this L C 0 does not require the AFW system OPERABLE in MODE 4.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of L C 0 3.0.4b to an inoperable AFW train. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an AFW train inoperable and the provisions of L C 0 3.0.4b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the L C 0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.5-5 Revision

AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS JA (continued)

a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump;

b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and

c. The low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A . l establishes a lirr~iton the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The A m connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . A flow path is inoperable if it is blocked such that the required AFW flow cannot be delivered. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B . l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The A m connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.5-6 Revision I

AFW System B 3.7.5 ACTIONS C . l and C.2 (continued)

When Required Action A . l or B.l cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, or if two AFW trains are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the L C 0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4, AFW is not required since the RHR system is available.

If all three AFW trains are inoperable, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety related equipment. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, L C 0 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into a less safe condition.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the AFW System water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for AFW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.5-7 Revision

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABILITY The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in (continued) LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources- Shutdown."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LC0 3.0.4b to an inoperable DG.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LC0 3.0.4b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LC0 not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met.

However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

Required Action A.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features. These features are powered from the redundant AC electrical power train. The redundant required features referred to in this Required Action include the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump as well as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. One motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump does not provide 100% of the auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore, in order to ensure the auxiliary feedwater safety function, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump must be considered a redundant required feature addressed by this Required Action.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-6 Revision

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A 2 (continued)

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. The train has no offsite power supplying it loads; and

b. A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition A (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-7 Revision

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS >A (continued)

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 10 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 10 days (for a total of 23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. 'This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 13 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

The Condition B Required Actions are modified by a Note that is applicable when only one of the three individual DGs is inoperable.

The note permits the use of the provisions of LC0 3.0.4~.The I allowance provided by this note, to enter the MODE of applicability with a single inoperable DG, takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources and the fact that operation is ultimately limited by the Condition B Completion Time for the inoperable DG set.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable DG set, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-8 Revision

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS -

B.1 (continued) in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1. I , it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG set is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. The redundant required features referred to in this Required Action include the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump as well as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. One motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump does not provide 100% of the auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore, in order to ensure the auxiliary feedwater safety function, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump must be considered a redundant required feature addressed by this Required Action. Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG set.

The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. An inoperable DG set exists; and

b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG set inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG set inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DG set, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-9 Revision

AC Sources -Operating B 3.8.1 ACTIONS B.2 (continued) discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DG set and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, sirrgle failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.3.1 and B.3.2 Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG set does not exist on the OPERABLE DG set, SR 3.8.1.6 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG set would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LC0 3.8.1 would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG set cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG set, performance of SR 3.8.1.6 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG set.

In the event the inoperable DG set is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the plant corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months constraint imposed while in Condition B.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG set is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG set.

Operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 10 days.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-10 Revision I

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:MC8923, Increase Flexibility in Mode Restraints (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML060310207, ML060620215, NL-05-0856, Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
MONTHYEAR2005-11-02 [Table View]

NL-05-0856, Request to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

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