Text

Risk Informed Technical Specification Information Only Bases Changes
	ML19178A390
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/27/2019
From:	Gayheart C; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-19-0771
	Download: ML19178A390 (81)
	v • d • e

A Southern Nuclear JUN 2 7 2019 Docket Nos.: 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Regulatory Affairs Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1&2 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 205 992 5000 tel 205 992 7795 fax NL-19-0771 Risk Informed Technical Specification Information Only Bases Changes Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letter dated July 27, 2018, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML18208A619), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR) for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendment requested U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval to modify the Technical Specifications (TS) to permit the use of Risk Informed Completion Times in accordance with NEI 06-09, Revision 0-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines. By letter dated May 3, 2019, SNC provided responses to NRC requests for additional information (RAI). In the May 3rd letter, SNC also noted that the TS Bases changes related to the RAI responses would be provided within 60 days. This letter provides those TS Bases markups in Enclosure 1.

A minor change was needed to address one inconsistency within the TS markups provided on May 3rd. The words "... for this loss of function Condition... " are added to the Note forTS 3.6.3 Condition B. Enclosure 2 contains the markup and clean type page for that minor word change. also contains additional clean type pages. The only changes for pages TS 3.6.3 pages 3.6.3-5, 3.6.3-6, and 3.6.3-7. were renumbering or repagination. Enclosure 2 also contains TS clean type page 5.5-16. The only change to this page was the bottom line was changed from a double to a single line and "(continued)" was added above the single line.

The conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Consideration contained in the original LAR have been reviewed and are unaffected by this supplemental information.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Jamie Coleman at 205.992.6611.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-19-0771 Page2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 21'1!>day of June 2019.

Respectfully submitted, Cheryl y eart Director, Regulatory Affairs Southern Nuclear Operating Company CAG/pdb/scm

Enclosures:

1. Technical Specification Bases Markups (For Information Only)

2. Technical Specification Markup and Clean type Pages cc:

Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager-Farley Senior Resident Inspector-Farley Director, Alabama Office of Radiation Control RTYPE: CFA04.054

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Risk Informed Technical Specification Information Only Bases Changes Technical Specification Bases Markups (For Information Only) 70 Pages

Information Only BASES ACTIONS Bases Insert 2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Farley Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves 8 3.4.10 With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS Overpressure Protection System. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the pressure boundary.

I Bases Insert 1 I 8.1 and 8.2 If the Required Action of A.1 cannot be met within the required Completion Time or if two or more pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperatures s the L TOP System applicability temperature specified in the PTLR within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Wrth any RCS cold leg temperatures at or below the L TOP System applicability temperature specified in the PTLR, overpressure protection is provided by the L TOP System. The change from MODE 1, 2, or 3 to MODE 4 reduces the RCS energy (core power and pressure), lowers the potential for large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by three pressurizer safety valves.

SR 3.4.10.1 Pressurizer safety valves are to be tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME OM Code (Ref. 4), which provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the SRs. No additional requirements are specified.

The pressurizer safety valve setpoint is+/- 1% for OPERABILITY.

B 3.4.10-4 Revision ~

RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves 8 3.4.10

1. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill.

2. FSAR, Chapter 5.2, 5.5, 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4.

3. WCAP-n69, Rev.1, June 1972.

4. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).

5. (Add SE reference here.)

8 3.4.10-5 Revision +2 RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES ACTIONS (continued)

Bases Insert 1 Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 B.1. B.2. and B.3 Pressurizer PORVs 8 3.4.11 If one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cyded, it must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing the power to the associated block valve. The Completion Times of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months are reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is at least one PORV that remains OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is provided to restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE stat If the PORV cannot be restored within this additional ti

, he plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO not apply, as required by Condition D.

If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or place the associated PORV in manual control. The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the Required Action is to place the PORV in manual control to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time period, and provides the operator time to correct the situation. Because at least one PORV remains OPERABLE, the operator is permitted a Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore the inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status. The time allowed to restore the block valve is based upon the Completion Time for restoring an inoperable PORV in Condition B, since the PORVs are not capable of mitigating an overpressure event when placed in manual control If the block valve is restored within the Completion Time of 72 rs, the power will be restored and the PORV restored to OPE LE status. If it cannot be restored within this additional

time, plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not

, as required by Condition D.

(continued)

B 3.4.11-5 Revision Q RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and 0.2 Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 If the Required Action of Condition A. B, or C is not met. then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the PORVs are not required OPERABLE.

E.1. E.2. E.3. and E.4 If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associated block valves. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provides the operator time to correct the situation. If one PORV is restored and one PORV remains inoperable, then the plant will be in Condition B with the time clock started at the original declaration of having two PORVs inoperable. If no PORVs are restored within the Completion Time, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the PORVs are not required OPERABLE.

Bases Insert 3 F.1 and F.2 If two block valves are in erable, it is necessary to restore at least one block valve within t Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , or place the associated PORVs in anual control and restore at least one block valve within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

e Completion Times are reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provide the operator time to correct the situation.

Bases Insert 4 ~

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.11-6 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES SURVEillANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.4.11.2 Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 SR 3.4.11.2 requires a complete cycle of each PORV in MODE 3 or 4.

The PORVs are stroke tested during MODES 3 or 4 with the associated block valves closed in order to limit the uncertainty introduced by testing the PORVs at lesser system temperatures than expected during actual operating conditions. Operating a PORV through one complete cycle ensures that the PORV can be manually actuated for mitigation of an SGTR. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Note modifies this SR to allow entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows the test to be performed in MODE 3 under operating temperature conditions, prior to entering MODE 1 or2.

SR 3.4.11.3 SR 3.4.11.3 requires a complete cycle of each PORV using the backup PORV control system. This surveillance verifies the capability to operate the PORVs using the backup nitrogen supply system.

Additionally, this surveillance ensures the correct function of the associated nitrogen supply system valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.

2. FSAR Sections 5.5 and 15.2.

3. Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability,' and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)," June 25, 1990.

4 (Add SE reference here.)

B 3.4.11-8 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES Accumulators B 3.5.1 ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

Bases Insert 5

]Or SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Farley Units 1 and 2 If one accumulator is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration, the accumulator must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . In this Condition, the required contents of two accumulators cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a LOCA occur in these conditions, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time to open the valve, remove power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or nitrogen cover pressure ensures that prompt action will be taken to return the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time minimizes the potential for exposure of the plant to a LOCA under these conditions. The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed to restore an inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status is justified in WCAP-15049-A, Rev. 1 (Ref. 3).

If the accumulator cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and RCS pressure reduced to

~ 1 000 psig within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

If more than one aGGumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a Gondition outside the aGGident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SR 3.5.1.1 Each accumulator valve should be verified to be fully open. This verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open. If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses assumptions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued) 8 3.5.1-6 Revision ~

RAI Revision: Revised Bases Insert 5 (S)

Information Only

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.5.1.5 (continued)

Accumulators B 3.5.1 Should closure of a valve occur below 2000 psig, the Sl signal provided to the valves would open a closed valve in the event of a LOCA

1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. 10 CFR 50.46

3. WCAP-15049-A, Rev. 1, April1999.

4. NUREG-1366, February 1990.

5 (Add SE reference.)

8 3.5.1-8 Revision ~

RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES ACTIONS Farley Units 1 and 2 ECCS -Operating 83.5.2 With one or more trains inoperable and at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the inoperable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on an NRC reliability evaluation (Ref. 5) and is a reasonable time for repair of many ECCS components.

Bases Insert 1 An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as an RHR crossover valve, can disable both ECCS trains. With one or more component(s) inoperable such that 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered.

(continued)

B 3.5.2-7 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

Information Only BASES REFERENCES (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 ECCS-Operating 83.5.2

3. FSAR, Section 6, *Engineered Safety Features:

4. FSAR, Chapter 15, "Accident Analysis."

5. NRC Memorandum to V. Stella, Jr., from R.L Baer, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

6. IE lnfonnation Notice No. 87-01.

7. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).

8 (Add SE reference here.)

8 3.5.2-12 Revision 72 RAI Revision: No Change Information Only

RWST B 3.5.4 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.5.4-4 Revision 54 BASES APPLICABLE injected water for the small break LOCA and higher containment SAFETY ANALYSES pressures due to reduced containment spray cooling capacity. For (continued) the containment response following an MSLB, the lower limit on boron concentration and the upper assumption on RWST water temperature are used to maximize the total energy release to containment.

The RWST satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment sump to support ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation in the recirculation mode.

To be considered OPERABLE, the RWST must meet the water volume, boron concentration, and temperature limits established in the SRs.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RWST OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the Containment Spray System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RWST must also be OPERABLE to support their operation. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation Low Water Level.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by Notes that allow RWST piping flow paths to be unisolated from non-safety related piping under administrative controls for limited periods of time. The piping may be unisolated from non-safety related piping for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months under administrative controls to perform SR 3.5.4.3 and for 30 days per fuel cycle under administrative controls for filtration or silica removal.

(continued)

Information Only RAI Revision: Deleted last paragraph

RWST B 3.5.4 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.5.4-5 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS These administrative controls consist of (1) Stroking valve (continued)

Q1(2)G31V010 open and then closed prior to circulating the RWST water through the Spent Fuel Pool Purification System (2) establishing a designated operator to control the valve and (3) establishing a preplanned communication method between the operator and Shift Supervisor. In this way, the flow path can be rapidly isolated in the event of a Reactor Trip or at the direction of the Shift Supervisor.

These Notes are to allow recirculation and sampling of the RWST through the Spent Fuel Pool Purification System for filtering as well as operation of the reverse osmosis system to remove silica. These Notes can only be applied during the next two fuel Cycles for each Unit. These Notes cannot be used after Refueling Outages 1R26 (Spring 2015) and 2R24 (Spring 2016).

A.1 With RWST boron concentration or borated water temperature not within limits, they must be returned to within limits within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

Under these conditions neither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit to restore the RWST temperature or boron concentration to within limits was developed considering the time required to change either the boron concentration or temperature and the fact that the contents of the tank are still available for injection.

B.1 With the RWST inoperable for reasons other than Condition A (e.g.,

water volume), it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

In this Condition, neither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE status or to place the plant in a MODE in which the RWST is not required. The short time limit of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to restore the RWST to OPERABLE status is based on this condition simultaneously affecting redundant trains.

C.1 and C.2 If the RWST cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is Bases Insert 6 Bases Insert 7 Information Only RAI Revision: Deleted 1st paragraph

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued}

REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.5.4.2 RWST 83.5.4 The RWST water volume should be verified to be above the required minimum level in order to ensure that a sufficient initial supply is available for injection and to support continued ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation on recirculation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.4.3 The boron concentration of the RWST should be verified to be within the required limits. This SR ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that boron precipitation in the core will not occur and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.

2. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs," June 2010.

3. (Add reference to SE here.)

8 3.5.4-7 Revision 73 RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS C.1. C.2. and C.3 (continued)

Containment Air locks 83.6.2 be initiated immediately to evaluate previous combined leakage rates using current air lock test results. An evaluation is acceptable, since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g.*

only one seal per door has failed), containment remains OPERABLE, yet only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (per LCO 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test. the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air lock must be verified to be closed within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Additionally, the affected air lock(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock.

Bases Insert 1

~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Farley Units 1 and 2 D.1 and D.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SR 3.6.2.1 Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage (continued)

B 3.6.2-6 Revision g RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

Containment Air locks 83.6.2

3. NElletter NEL-02-0144, dated June 25, 2002.

4. (Add reference to SE here.)

8 3.6.2-8 Revision 48 RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Contajnment Isolation Valves 83.6.3 active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with forward flow through the valve secured. For a penetration flow path isolated in accordance with Required Action A. 1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available one to containment Required Action A. 1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition C provides the appropriate actions.

(continued) 8 3.6.3-6 Revision g RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS Bases Insert 1 Bases Insert 8 Farley Units 1 and 2 A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Containment Isolation Valves 8 3.6.3 Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3 In the event the affected penetration is isolated in cordance with Required Action 8.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicatin~ this Condition is only applicable to penetration flo*.v paths with t\\vo containment isolation

o~alves. Condition ft. of this bCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation 'i!alve inoperable in this type of penetration flow

~

C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a (continued) 8 3.6.3-7 Revision G RAI Revision: No Change

Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.3-8 Revision 19 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration flow path. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of maintaining containment integrity during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. The closed system must meet the requirements of Ref. 5. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written to specifically address those penetration flow paths in a closed system. FSAR Table 6.2-31 identifies the following containment isolation valves as being in a Type III penetration (closed system) and having only one containment isolation valve:

Q1/2 B13V026B (Pressurizer pressure generator).

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Deleted Insert 8b and removed other edits in the 2nd paragraph

Information Only BASES REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6 Farley Units 1 and 2 FSAR, Section 15.

FSAR, Section 6.2.

Not used.

Standard Review Plan 6.2.4.

(Add SE reference here.)

8 3.6.3-14 Containment Isolation Valves 83.6.3 Revision ~

RAI Revision: No Change

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.6-6 Revision 77 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature requiring the operation of the containment spray trains and containment cooling trains.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A.1 With one containment spray train inoperable, the inoperable containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooling trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal and containment cooling functions. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable containment spray train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 7). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Insert 9 down to Condition F and reverted letter order accordingly

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.6-7 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

As stated in Reference 7, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action B.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 4 allows 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore the containment spray train to OPERABLE status in MODE 3. This is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.

C.1 With one of the required containment cooling trains inoperable, the inoperable required containment cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System and the low probability of DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Insert 9 down to Condition F and reverted letter order accordingly

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.6-8 Revision 77 BASES ACTIONS D.1 With two required containment cooling trains inoperable, one of the required containment cooling trains must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System, the iodine removal function of the Containment Spray System, and the low probability of DBA occurring during this period.

E.1 and E.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D of this LCO are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 7). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth. As stated in Reference 7, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

(continued)

Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Insert 9 down to Condition F and reverted letters. Condition D was removed from RICT scope Insert deleted

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.6-9 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

Required Action E.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment (only check valves are inside containment) and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

G Bases Insert 10 Bases Insert 11 Bases Insert 9 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Insert 9 down to Condition F and reverted letter order accordingly

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.6.6.9 (continued}

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 83.6.6 required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABIUTY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABIUTY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41,

GDC 42, and GDC 43.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

3. FSAR, Section 6.2.

4. FSAR, Section 7.3.

5. FSAR, Section 15.

6. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

7. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs," June 2010.

8. (Add SE reference here.)

B 3.6.6-13 Revision +J RAI Revision: No Change

MSIVs B 3.7.2 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.2-4 Revision 88 BASES LCO This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design (continued) safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents such that offsite exposures are less than the 10 CFR 50.67 (Ref. 4) limits.

APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 except when one MSIV in each steam line is closed, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.

In MODE 4, normally most of the MSIVs are closed, and the steam generator energy is low.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of the Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each steam line. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable MSIV Systems will be tracked separately for each steam line starting from the time the Condition was entered for that steam line.

A.1 With one MSIV inoperable in one or more steam lines in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore the inoperable MSIV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit at power. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time that would require the MSIVs to close and the remaining OPERABLE MSIV in the steam line. This Completion Time is also consistent with the Completion Times provided for a single inoperable train in other ESF systems that contain redundant trains of equipment.

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Bases Rev #

revised since last submittal.

Information Only BASES ACTIONS (continued)

MSIVs B 3.7.2

'With two MSIVs inoperable in one or more steam lines in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore one MSIV to OPERABLE status in the affected steam line(s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this Condition, the affected steam line has no OPERABLE automatic isolation capability. The 4-hour Completion Time allows for minor repairs or trouble shooting that may prevent a unit shutdown to MODE 2 and is reasonable considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time that would require the MSIVs to close and the reduced potential for a plant transient (shutdown to MODE 2) provided by the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months allowed for restoration.

Bases Insert 12 L_____,__

L------.J'C.1 Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a Mode in which the ACTIONS provide the option to close the inoperable MSIV and accomplish the required safety function by isolating the affected steam line. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and Condition D or E entered. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

Required Action D.1 is applicable when one or more steam lines have a single inoperable MSIV in MODE 2 or 3. Since the MSIVs are required OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIV(s) may either be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected steam line isolated by closing at least one MSIV in that steam line. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable considering the plant condition, the low probability of an event occurring that would require the MSIV to close, and the remaining OPERABLE redundant MSIV in the affected steam line(s).

For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, and the affected steam line is isolated by a closed MSIV, the MSIV must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions (continued)

B 3.7.2-5 Revision 0 RAI Revision: No Change

MSIVs B 3.7.2 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.2-7 Revision 88 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed while returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.

The Frequency is in accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM, which encompasses the ASME OM Code (Ref. 5).

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed in accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. If desired, this allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated. This surveillance may be performed in lower modes but must be performed prior to entry into MODE 2.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 10.3.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

3. FSAR, Section 15.4.2.

4. 10 CFR 50.67.

5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).

6. (Add SE reference here)

Information Only RAI Revision: Bases Rev #

revised since last submittal.

ARVs B 3.7.4 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.4-3 Revision 33 BASES LCO Failure to meet the LCO can result in the inability to cool the unit to (continued)

RHR entry conditions following an event in which the condenser is unavailable for use with the Steam Dump System.

An ARV is considered OPERABLE (even if isolated) when it is capable of providing controlled relief of the main steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand, either remotely or locally via manual control.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ARVs are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 4, the pressure and temperature limitations are such that the probability of an SGTR event requiring ARV operation is low. In addition, the RHR system is available to provide the decay heat removal function in MODE 4. Therefore, the ARVs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to satisfy the safety analysis assumptions of the DBA. However, the capability to remove decay heat from a SG required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 by LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -

MODE 4" is implicit in the requirement for an OPERABLE SG and may require the associated ARV be capable of removing that heat if the normal decay heat removal system (steam dump) is not available.

In MODE 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event.

ACTIONS A.1 With one required ARV line inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE ARV lines, a nonsafety grade backup in the Steam Dump System, and MSSVs.

B.1 With two or more ARV lines inoperable, action must be taken to restore all but one ARV line to OPERABLE status. Since the manual isolation valves can be closed to isolate an ARV, some repairs may Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Revised last paragraph. Corrected page revision #

ARVs B 3.7.4 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.4-4 Revision 52 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) be possible with the unit at power. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ARV lines, based on the availability of the Steam Dump System and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the ARV lines.

C.1 and C.2 If the ARV lines cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS To perform a controlled cooldown of the RCS, the ARVs must be able to be opened either remotely or locally and throttled through their full range. This SR ensures that the ARVs are tested through a full control cycle at least once per fuel cycle. Performance of inservice testing or use of an ARV during a unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.7.4.2 The function of the manual isolation valve is to isolate a failed open ARV. Cycling the manual isolation valve both closed and open demonstrates its capability to perform this function. Performance of inservice testing or use of the manual isolation valve during unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Bases Insert 13 D

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Removed 1st paragraph deletions. Added Bases Insert 1.

Information Only BASES REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2

1. FSAR, Section 1 0.3.

2. FSAR, Section 15.4.3.

3. (Add reference to SE here )

B 3.7.4-5 ARVs 8 3.7.4 Revision ()

RAI Revision: No Change

AFW System B 3.7.5 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.5-6 Revision 92 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

a. For the inoperability of the turbine driven AFW pump due to one inoperable steam supply, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable since there is a redundant steam supply line for the turbine driven pump and the turbine driven train is still capable of performing its specified function for most postulated events.

b. For the inoperability of a turbine driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately subsequent to a refueling, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to the minimal decay heat levels in this situation.

c. For both the inoperability of the turbine driven pump due to one inoperable steam supply and an inoperable turbine driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately following a refueling, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to the availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and due to the low probability of an event requiring the use of the turbine driven AFW pump.

Condition A is modified by a Note which limits the applicability of the Condition for an inoperable turbine driven AFW pump in MODE 3 to when the unit has not entered MODE 2 following a refueling.

Condition A allows one AFW train to be inoperable for 7 days vice the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time in Condition B. This longer Completion Time is based on the reduced decay heat following refueling and prior to the reactor being critical.

B.1 With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . A flow path is inoperable if it is blocked such that the required AFW flow cannot be delivered. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, the time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Bases Rev #

revised since last submittal.

AFW System B 3.7.5 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.5-11 Revision 92 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS incapable of automatic initiation without declaring the train(s) inoperable. Since AFW may be used during startup, shutdown, hot standby operations, and hot shutdown operations for steam generator level control, and these manual operations are an accepted function of the AFW system, OPERABILITY (i.e., the intended safety function) continues to be maintained.

SR 3.7.5.5 This SR verifies that the air stored in turbine-driven AFW pump steam admission valve air accumulators is sufficient to open valves Q1(2)N12V001A-A and Q1(2)N12V001B-B. Each steam admission valve has an air accumulator associated with it. The air accumulators provide sufficient air to ensure the operation of the steam admission valves for turbine-driven AFW pump during a loss of power or other failure of the normal air supply. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.5.

2. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).

3. (Add SE reference here)

Information Only RAI Revision: Bases Rev #

revised since last submittal.

CCW System B 3.7.7 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-3 Revision 73 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CCW System is a normally operating system, which must be prepared to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger.

In MODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CCW System are determined by the systems it supports.

ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable CCW train results in an inoperable RHR loop. This note is only applicable in MODE 4. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

If one CCW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCW train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the CCW train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 2). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth. As stated in Reference 2, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert down to Condition C

CCW System B 3.7.7 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.7-4 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Required Action B.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System.

The Note is applicable to CCW loads and does not include components required for CCW OPERABILITY.

Verifying the correct alignment for accessible manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the CCW flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for CCW operation. The accessibility of the CCW valves is evaluated on a case by case basis considering such things as ALARA concerns and personnel safety as well as valve enclosures or barricades blocking access to the valves.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Bases Insert 16 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert down to Condition C

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.7.7.2 CCWSystem 8 3.7.7 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCW valves on an actual or simulated Safety Injection actuation signal. The CCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.7.7.3 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCW pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The CCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. FSAR, Section 9.2.2.

2. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs," June 201 0.

3. (Add SE reference here )

B 3.7.7-5 Revision +3 RAI Revision: No Change

SWS B 3.7.8 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.8-3 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS A.1 If one SWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SWS train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE SWS train could result in loss of SWS function. Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," should be entered if an inoperable SWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable SWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

B.1 With one automatic turbine building isolation valve inoperable in each SWS train, the inoperable valves must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE SWS turbine building isolation valves in each train are adequate to perform the SWS non-essential load isolation function; however, the overall reliability of the function is reduced. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the fact that the remaining OPERABLE automatic turbine building isolation valves in each SWS train ensure the SWS trains remain fully capable of performing the required safety function and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require the isolation function of these valves.

C.1 and C.2 If the SWS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 17 down to Condition D/E. Added missing Bases Insert 1 to Condition B text

SWS B 3.7.8 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.8-4 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 4). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth. As stated in Reference 4, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal. Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the SWS components or systems may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SWS. The Note is applicable to SWS loads and does not include components required for SWS OPERABILITY.

Verifying the correct alignment for accessible manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the SWS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for SWS operation. The accessibility of the SWS valves is evaluated on a case by case basis Bases Insert 17 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 17 down to Condition D/E.

Information Only BASES REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2

1. FSAR, Section 9.2.1.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

3. FSAR, Section 5.1.

sws 83.7.8

4. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, *Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs,* June 2010.

5. (Add reference to SE here) 8 3.7.8-6 Revision 73 RAI Revision: No Change

ESF Room Coolers B 3.7.19 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.19-5 Revision 52 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

If one train of a required ESF Room Cooler subsystem is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the subsystem train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ESF Room Cooler subsystem train is adequate to perform the heat removal function for its associated ESF equipment.

B.1 and B.2 If the ESF Room Cooler subsystem train(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time or two trains of the same ESF Room Cooler subsystem are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Bases Insert 20 C

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Corrected previous Bases page revision error

ESF Room Coolers B 3.7.19 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.19-6 Revision 52 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.19.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves servicing safety-related equipment provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for ESF Room Cooler operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.7.19.2 This SR verifies proper operation of the ESF Room Cooler fans on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Depending on the room cooler, this may be manual, high room temperature, an equipment running signal, or some combination. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Each Room Cooler Fan can be placed in Run mode locally. With the Room Cooler in the Run mode, all automatic functions are being met and the Room Cooler is considered OPERABLE.

REFERENCES

1.

FSAR, Section 9.4.

2.

(Add SE reference here)

Information Only RAI Revision: Corrected previous Bases page revision error

Information Only BASES ACTIONS A.3 (continued}

AC Sources-Operating 83.8.1 this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 The Condition B Required Actions are modified by a Note that is applicable when only one of the three individual DGs is inoperable.

The note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4c. The allowance provided by this note, to enter the MODE of applicability with a single inoperable DG, takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources and the fact that operation is ultimately limited by the Condition B Completion Time for the inoperable DG set.

(continued) 8 3.8.1-8 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change Bases Insert 1

Information Only BASES AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 ACTIONS B.4 (continued)

Operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 10 days.

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG set and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. The 10 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 C.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required offsite (continued)

B 3.8.1-11 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change

AC Sources Operating B 3.8.1 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-12 Revision 49 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. The redundant required features referred to in this Required Action include the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump as well as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. One motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump does not provide 100% of the auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore, in order to ensure the auxiliary feedwater safety function, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump must be considered a redundant required feature addressed by this Required Action.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

(continued)

Information Only RAI Revision: No change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1

a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and

b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis.

Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

Bases Insert 20

~

0.1 and D.2 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoper~ble, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one DG, without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

Operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Bases Insert 1

)I (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 8 3.8.1-13 Revision g RAI Revision: No Change Bases Insert 21

AC Sources Operating B 3.8.1 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-14 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.1 With all or part of Train A DG set and Train B DG set inoperable, the capacity of the remaining standby AC sources is reduced depending on which combination of individual DGs is affected. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, standby AC sources may be insufficient to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

With all or part of each train of DG sets inoperable, operation may continue for a given unit for different periods of time depending on the combination of individual DGs that are inoperable. The length of time allowed increases with decreasing severity in the combinations of inoperable DGs. One set must be restored to operable status in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if DGs 1-2A, 1C, and 1B on Unit 1 or DGs 1-2A, 1C, and 2B on Unit 2 are inoperable. Operability of one set must be restored in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if DGs 1-2A and 1B on Unit 1 or DGs 1-2A and 2B on Unit 2 are inoperable. Operability of one set must be restored in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months if DGs 1C and 1B on Unit 1 or DGs 1C and 2B on Unit 2 are inoperable.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Bases Insert 21a Information Only RAI Revision: Revised last paragraph and added Bases Insert 21a.

, F.1 and G.1

AC Sources Operating B 3.8.1 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-15 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

Condition F provides the default Required Actions for the Conditions which address two inoperable offsite circuits or two inoperable DG sets. If the inoperable AC Sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the applicable Completion Time, Required Action F.1 specifies that the unit be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Once shut down, the unit is in a more stable condition and the time allowed to remain in MODE 3 is ultimately limited by the Required Actions and Completion Times applicable to a single inoperable AC Source based on the time that an AC Source initially became inoperable. In addition, the Required Actions applicable to one inoperable DG set or offsite circuit would remain applicable until both inoperable DG sets or offsite circuits are restored to OPERABLE status or the unit is placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply (MODE 5). The allowed Completion Times are reasonable to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1 The sequencer(s) B1F, B2F, B1G, and B2G are an essential support system to both the offsite circuit and the DG associated with a given ESF bus. Furthermore, the sequencer is on the primary success path for most major AC electrically powered safety systems powered from the associated ESF bus. Therefore, loss of an ESF bus sequencer affects every major ESF system in the train. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining sequencer OPERABILITY. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring sequencer OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when the sequencer is inoperable is minimal.

H.1 and H.2 If the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 13). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available (continued)

Bases Insert 1 J

H I

Information Only RAI Revision: Revised letters. Moved Bases Insert 22 down to Condition K

AC Sources Operating B 3.8.1 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.1-16 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued) to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth.

As stated in Reference 13, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action H.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I.1 Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. This condition exists when any combination of sources from the categories in LCO 3.8.1 totaling three or more are not OPERABLE. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all REQUIREMENTS important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), as addressed in the FSAR.

J Bases Insert 22 Information Only RAI Revision: Revised letters.

Moved Bases Insert 22 down to Condition K

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This surveillance would also be applicable after any modifications which could affect DG interdependence.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. FSAR, Chapter 8.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 1, 1971.

4. FSAR, Chapter 6.

5. FSAR, Chapter 15.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.

7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977.

1 0. (Not used)

11. IEEE Standard 308-1971.

12. NEMA MG1-1967.

13. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs,n June 2010.

14 (Add reference to SE here.}

8 3.8.1-30 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 Condition A represents one train of Auxiliary Building DC electrical power with a Joss of abirlty to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected train. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC distribution system train.

[For Unit 1 only for cyele 19) The sesond Completion time for Condition A represents the 1B lrain of Auxiliary Build1ng DC eleclrieal po.. wr subsystem due to an inoperable battery. \\J\\Gth the 1 B Awaliary Building battery inoperable. the DC bus is being supplied by lhe OPERABLE battery eharger.,A,ny event that results in a loss of the AC bus supporting the battery oharger.... <'ill also result in tho loss of DC to that train. Reoo*,*ery of the AC bus, espeoially i.f it is due to a loss of effsite power, will be hampered by the fact that many or the eomponents necessary for the recOlo~ery (e.g., diesel generator sontrol and field flash, AC load shed and diesel generator output breakers, etc.) rely upon lhe battery. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months limit allows sufficient time to effeGt restoration of lhe inoperable battery gi¥en that the majority of the eonditions that lead to battery inoperability (e.g., loss of battery eharger, battery eell voltage less than 2.02 '>*olts, etc.) are identified in Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.5, and 3.8.6 together YAth additional specific completion times.

If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure would, however, result in the complete loss of the remaining 125 VDC electrical power subsystems with attendant loss of ESF functions, in the case of the Auxiliary Building DC power subsystem, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the Auxiliary Building DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

Bases Insert 1 (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.4-5 Revision 25 RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS (continued)

Bases Insert 1 Farley Units 1 and 2 8.1 and 0.1 DC Sources-Operating 83.8.4 Conditions B and D represent one Auxiliary Building or SWIS DC elecbical power subsystem with connection resistance not within the specified limit. Consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450, connection resistance not within the limit is an indication that the affected battery requires attention to restore the resistance to within the limit but is not a basis on which to declare the battery inoperable. Therefore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time allowed to restore the battery connection resistance to within the required limit is a reasonable time considering that variations in connection resistance do not mean the battery is incapable of performing its required safety function, but is an indication that the battery requires maintenance.

)r C.1 and C.2 If the inoperable Auxiliary Building DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or the connection resistance restored to within the limit within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced.

To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 {Ref. 11 ). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth.

As stated in Reference 11, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the (continued)

B 3.8.4-6 Revision +3 RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES ACTIONS Bases Insert 23 Bases Insert 24 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Farley Units 1 and 2 C.1 and C.2 (continued)

DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

If a required SWIS DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable or the connection resistance is not restored to within the limit and the associated Completion Time has expired, the Service Water System train supported by the affected SWIS DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. The capability of the affected SWIS DC electrical power subsystem to fully support the associated train of Service Water is not assured. Therefore, consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, the associated train of Service Water must be declared inoperable immediately, thereby limiting operation in this condition to the Completion Time associated with the affected Service Water System train.

SR 3.8.4.1 Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is applying a voltage to the battery to maintain it in a fully charged condition during normal operation. The float voltage of 2.2 V per cell or 132 V overall is higher than the nominal design voltage of 125 V and is consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations for maintaining a full charge.

Verifying that terminal voltage is~ 127.8 V provides assurance that the average of all cell voltages is maintained greater than 2.13 V.

Maintaining float voltage at the higher value of 2.2 V per cell prolongs cell life expectancy. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

B 3.8.4-7 Revision +3 RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

DC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.4 of the offsite or onsite system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial Surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the Surveillance are performed in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.

3. IEEE-308-1971.

4. FSAR, Section 8.3.

5. None.

6. FSAR, Chapter 6.

7. FSAR, Chapter 15.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

9. IEEE-450-1980.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1972.

11. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, "Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs," June 2010.

12. (Add reference to SE here.)

8 3.8.4-12 Revision ++

RAI Revision: No Change

Information Only BASES LCO

{continued)

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS Farley Units 1 and 2 Inverters-Operating 8 3.8.7 The intent of this Note is to limit the number of inverters that may be disconnected. Only those inverters associated with the single battery

undergoing an equalizing charge may be disconnected. All other inverters must be aligned to their associated batteries, regardless of the number of inverters or unit design.

The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters-Shutdown."

Wrth a required inverter inoperable, its associated AC vital bus becomes inoperable until it is re-energized from its Class 1 E CVT.

For this reason a Note has been included in Condition A requiring the entry into the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating... This ensures that the vital bus is re-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The associated static transfer switch normally provides a bumpless transfer of power to the alternate AC source (Class 1 E CVT).

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability, This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdo

, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such hutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus Bases Insert 1 (continued) 8 3.8.7-3 Revision Q RAI Revision: No Change

Inverters Operating B 3.8.7 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.7-4 Revision 73 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) is powered from its constant voltage source, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 4). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth.

As stated in Reference 4, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal.

Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action B.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Bases Insert 25 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 25 down the page to Condition C

Information Only BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES Farley Units 1 and 2 SR 3.8.7.1 Inverters-Operating 83.8.7 This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESFAS connected to the AC vital buses. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. FSAR, Chapter 8.

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, *Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs, D June 2010.

5. (Add reference to SE here )

8 3.8.7-5 Revision 73 RAI Revision: No change

Distribution Systems Operating B 3.8.9 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.9-4 Revision 85 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) remain energized via the Unit 1 or Unit 2 4160V H bus to which the 1C DG is aligned during a design basis accident. This will also ensure the 1C DG is unavailable to energize the affected unit. Therefore, consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, the 1C DG must be declared inoperable for the affected unit.

B.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met, the power supply to the Unit 1 Service Water (SW)

System automatic turbine building isolation valves (MOVs 515 and 517) will be unavailable following a design basis accident, so these valves must also be declared inoperable. Required Action A.2 will still apply, so the 1C DG must also be declared inoperable.

C.1 and C.2 With the shared Load Center 1-2R inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or Condition B, the Unit 1 Service Water (SW) System automatic turbine building isolation valves (MOVs 515 and 517) and the 1C DG must be declared inoperable immediately. The load center provides power to Unit 1 MOVs 515 and 517 and the 1C DG auxiliary systems. Therefore, consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, these loads must be declared inoperable immediately.

D.1 With one or more required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels, except AC vital buses, inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, B, or C, and a loss of safety function has not yet occurred, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety function necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 26 down to Condition I

Distribution Systems Operating B 3.8.9 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.9-5 Revision 85 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

Condition D worst scenario is one train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the train and the associated DG inoperable). In this Condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train, to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit; and

b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

E.1 With one or more AC vital buses inoperable, and a loss of safety function has not yet occurred, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by powering the bus from the associated inverter via inverted DC or Class 1E constant voltage transformer.

Condition E represents one or more AC vital buses without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

(continued)

Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 26 down to Condition I

Distribution Systems Operating B 3.8.9 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.9-6 Revision 85 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

This 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

F.1 With Auxiliary Building DC bus(es) in one train inoperable, the remaining Auxiliary Building DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

Condition F represents one train without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, Bases Insert 1 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 26 down to Condition I

Distribution Systems Operating B 3.8.9 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.9-7 Revision 85 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued) therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without power.

Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

G.1 and G.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem(s) addressed by Conditions D, E, or F cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is reduced. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining within the applicability of the LCO is acceptable to accomplish short duration repairs to restore inoperable equipment because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (Ref. 4). In MODE 4 the Steam Generators and Residual Heat Removal System are available to remove decay heat, which provides diversity and defense in depth. As stated in Reference 4, the steam turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump must be available to remain Information Only RAI Revision: Removed changes from this page

Distribution Systems Operating B 3.8.9 Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.8.9-8 Revision 85 BASES ACTIONS G.1 and G.2 (continued) in MODE 4. Should Steam Generator cooling be lost while relying on this Required Action, there are preplanned actions to ensure long-term decay heat removal. Voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also acceptable from a risk perspective.

Required Action G.2 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 4 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 4, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

H.1 With one SWIS DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, the Service Water System train supported by the affected SWIS DC electrical power distribution subsystem must be declared inoperable.

The capability of the affected SWIS DC electrical power distribution subsystem to fully support the associated train of Service Water is not assured. Therefore, consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY, the associated train of Service Water must be declared inoperable immediately, thereby limiting operation in this condition to the Completion Time associated with the affected Service Water System train.

I.1 With two trains with inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of safety function, adequate core cooling, containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions for DBA mitigation would be compromised, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.

Bases Insert 26 Information Only RAI Revision: Moved Bases Insert 26 down to Condition I

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Any change in the components being tested by this SR will require reevaluation of STI Evaluation Number 558904 in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

4. WCAP-16294-NP-A, Rev. 1, Risk-Informed Evaluation of Changes to Technical Specification Required Action Endstates for Westinghouse NSSS PWRs, June 2010.

5. (Add reference to SE here)

Information Only RAI Revision: No change

Bases INSERT 1 Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (Ref. xx).

Bases INSERT 2 Condition A is modified by a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a pressurizer safety valve is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable for a situation where a pressurizer safety valve is found inoperable. The Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a pressurizer safety valve is intentionally made inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes.

Bases INSERT 3 For Required Action F.2, a Completion Time could also be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

Bases INSERT 4 Condition F is modified by a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a second block valve is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable for a situation where the second block valve is found inoperable or two block valves are found inoperable at the same time. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second block valves is intentionally made inoperable, at least one block valve must be restored within the F.2 Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Information Only RAI Revision: All Bases Inserts except Insert 1 were revised

Bases INSERT 5 C.1 If two or more accumulators are inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, at least one accumulator must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 5).

Condition C is modified by a Note. The Note states that RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when two or more ECCS accumulators are intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable for a situation where a second accumulator is found to be inoperable or two or more accumulators are found to be inoperable at the same time. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If two or more accumulators are intentionally made inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, at least one accumulator must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Bases INSERT 6 Alternatively, a Completion Time may be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (Ref. 3). However, a Risk Informed Completion Time may not be used for an inadequate water volume.

Bases INSERT 7 Condition B is modified by a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when the RWST is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when the RWST is found to be inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If the RWST is intentionally made inoperable, the RWST must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Bases INSERT 8 Condition B is modified by two Notes. The first Note states the Condition is only applicable to penetrations with two containment isolation valves. The second Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when the second containment isolation valve is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. RICT entry is only permitted for situations where a second containment isolation valve is found inoperable or when both isolation valves are simultaneously found inoperable, in a single penetration flow path. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second containment isolation valve, in a single penetration flow path, is intentionally made inoperable, at least one containment isolation valve must be restored to Operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Information Only

Bases INSERT 9 F.1 With two containment spray trains inoperable, one containment spray train must be returned to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 8). Condition F is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a second containment spray train is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second containment spray train is found inoperable or when both trains are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second train is intentionally made inoperable, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Bases INSERT 10 one containment spray or cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT)

Program (Ref. 8). The Condition is modified by a Note. The Note states that RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a third train is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is applicable when a third containment cooling or spray train is found inoperable, and two other cooling or spray trains were inoperable for any reason. The RICT program is also applicable when any combination of three containment cooling or spray trains are found inoperable at the same time. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a third train is intentionally made inoperable, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Bases INSERT 11 H.1 and H.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition F or G are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Bases INSERT 12 Condition B is modified by a Note. The Note states that RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a second MSIV, in one or more steam lines, is intentionally made inoperable.

The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second MSIV, in a steam line, is found inoperable or when both MSIV, in the same steam line, are simultaneously found to be inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second MSIV in one or more steam lines is intentionally made inoperable, at least one MSIV in each line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Information Only

Bases INSERT 13 C.1 With all three ARV lines inoperable at least one ARV line must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ARV lines, based on the availability of the Steam Dump System and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the ARV lines.

Bases INSERT 14 Deleted Bases INSERT 15 Deleted Bases INSERT 16 C.1 With both trains of CCW inoperable, the heat load capacity of the CCW system is seriously degraded such that the system may be incapable of providing an adequate heat sink for normal and accident conditions.

Consequently, one hour is provided to restore the CCW trains to OPERABLE status. Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 3).

Condition C is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when the second CCW is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second CCW train is found inoperable or when both trains are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second CCW train is intentionally made inoperable, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

D.1 and D.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Information Only

BasesINSERT17

D.1

WithbothSWStrainsinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionB,theSWSmaybeincapableof providinganadequateheatsinkforsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringdesignbasisaccidentsand transients.Consequently,onehourisprovidedtorestoretheSWStraintoOPERABLEstatus.

Alternatively,aCompletionTimecanbedeterminedinaccordancewiththeRiskInformed CompletionTime(RICT)Program(Ref.5).

ConditionDismodifiedaNote.TheNotestatesRICTentryisnotpermittedforthislossoffunction ConditionwhenthesecondSWSisintentionallymadeinoperable.TheRICTprogramcannotbeusedfor thevoluntaryremovalofsystemsorcomponentswhichwouldresultinalossofsafetyfunction.The RICTprogramisonlyapplicablewhenasecondSWStrainisfoundinoperableorwhenbothtrainsare simultaneouslyfoundinoperable.Whenapplicable,theRiskInformedCompletionTimeforthis Conditioncannotexceed24hours.

IfasecondSWStrainisintentionallymadeinoperable,atleastonetrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLE statuswithin1hour.

E.1andE.2

IfoneoftheSWStrainscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime, theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplant mustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.Theallowed CompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditions fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.

BasesINSERT18

Deleted

BasesINSERT19

Deleted

Information Only Information Only

Bases INSERT 20 B.1 With two trains of the same ESF Room Cooler subsystems inoperable, the ability to cool the room housing ESF equipment sufficiently is jeopardized. The system may be rendered incapable of performing its accident mitigation function. Consequently, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is provided to restore one cooler to OPERABLE status. Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined using the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program. (Ref. 2).

Condition B is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a second train of the same ESF room cooler subsystem is intentionally made inoperable.

The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second train of the same ESF room cooler subsystem train is found inoperable or when both trains are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second train of the same ESF room cooler subsystem is intentionally made inoperable, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Bases INSERT 21 Alternatively, for Condition C.2, a Completion Time may be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 14).

Information Only

BasesINSERT21a

ForConditionF,onedieselgeneratorsetmustberestoredin8hoursifDGs12Aand1BonUnit1orDGs 12Aand2BonUnit2areinoperable.Alternatively,aCompletionTimemaybedeterminedinaccordance withtheRiskInformedCompletionTime(RICT)Program(Ref.14).

ConditionFismodifiedaNote.TheNotestatesRICTentryisnotpermittedforthislossoffunction Conditionwhenaseconddieselgeneratorsetisintentionallymadeinoperable.TheRICTprogram cannotbeusedforthevoluntaryremovalofsystemsorcomponentswhichwouldresultinalossof safetyfunction.TheRICTprogramisonlyapplicablewhenaseconddieselgeneratorsetisfound inoperableorwhenbothdieselgeneratorsetaresimultaneouslyfoundinoperable.Whenapplicable, theRiskInformedCompletionTimeforthisConditioncannotexceed24hours.

ForConditionF,ifaseconddieselgeneratorsetisintentionallymadeinoperable,atleastonesetmust berestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.

ForConditionG,onedieselgeneratorsetmustberestoredtooperablestatusin2hoursifDGs12A,1C, and1BonUnit1orDGs12A,1C,and2BonUnit2areinoperable.Alternatively,aCompletionTime maybedeterminedinaccordancewiththeRICTProgram.

ConditionGismodifiedaNote.TheNotestatesRICTentryisnotpermittedforthislossoffunction ConditionwhenasecondDieselgeneratorsetisintentionallymadeinoperable.TheRICTprogram cannotbeusedforthevoluntaryremovalofsystemsorcomponentswhichwouldresultinalossof safetyfunction.TheRICTprogramisonlyapplicablewhenasecondDieselgeneratorsetisfound inoperableorwhenbothDieselgeneratorsetaresimultaneouslyfoundinoperable.Whenapplicable, theRiskInformedCompletionTimeforthisConditioncannotexceed24hours.

ForConditionG,ifaseconddieselgeneratorsetisintentionallymadeinoperable,atleastonesetmust berestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.

Information Only Information Only

Bases INSERT 22 K.1 Condition K corresponds to a level of degradation in which most redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. This Condition exists when any combination of sources from the categories in LCO 3.8.1 totaling three or more are not OPERABLE. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a total loss of function. Therefore, at least one AC source must be returned to Operable status within one hour. Alternatively, a Completion Time may be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 14).

Condition K is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a third AC source is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a third required AC source is found inoperable or when three or more required AC sources are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a third or more required AC sources are intentionally made inoperable, at least one must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

L.1 and L.2 If the required AC sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Bases INSERT 23 F.1 With two or more DC electrical subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function, the Required Action is to restore the required DC electrical subsystems to OPERABLE status within one hour. The one hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the required DC subsystem(s). Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 12).

Condition F is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when a second DC power electrical subsystem is intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second DC electrical subsystem is found inoperable or when multiple DC electrical subsystems are simultaneously found inoperable.

When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second DC electrical subsystem is intentionally made inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Information Only

Bases INSERT 24 G.1 If one DC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of Condition F, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Bases INSERT 25 C.1 With two or more inverters inoperable the Required Action is to restore the required inverters to OPERABLE status within one hour. The one hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the required inverters. Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 5).

Condition C is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when two or more required inverters are intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second required inverter is found inoperable or when multiple required inverters are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second required inverter is intentionally made inoperable, at least one inverter must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

D.1 and D.2 If one inverter cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of Condition C, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Information Only

Bases INSERT 26 I.1 With two trains with electrical distribution subsystems, that result in a loss of function, inoperable, the Required Action is to restore one train to OPERABLE status within one hour to restore safety function.

The one hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of one train. Alternatively, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program (Ref. 5).

Condition I is modified a Note. The Note states RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function condition when two or more electrical power distribution trains are intentionally made inoperable. The RICT program cannot be used for the voluntary removal of systems or components which would result in a loss of safety function. The RICT program is only applicable when a second electrical power distribution train is found inoperable or two trains are simultaneously found inoperable. When applicable, the Risk Informed Completion Time for this Condition cannot exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a second electrical power distribution subsystem is intentionally made inoperable, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

J.1 and J.2 If one train of electrical distribution subsystems cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time of Condition I, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Information Only

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Risk Informed Technical Specification Information Only Bases Changes Technical Specification Markup and Clean type Pages 7 Pages

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.3-3 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

NOTE-----------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves.

One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve penetration leakage not within limit.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C.

NOTE------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system.

One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable.

C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND C.2

NOTE------------

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Once per 31 days Insert 3 Insert 7

INSERT 7

NOTES------------------------

1. Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves.

2. RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when the second containment isolation valve is intentionally made inoperable.

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.3-3 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

NOTE-----------

1. Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves.

2. RICT entry is not permitted for this loss of function Condition when the second containment isolation valve is intentionally made inoperable.

One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge valve penetration leakage not within limit.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.3-5 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more penetration flow paths containing containment purge valves, with penetration leakage such that the sum of the leakage for all Type B and C tests is not within limits.

D.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND D.2

NOTE-------------

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

AND D.3 Perform SR 3.6.3.5 for the penetrations containing resilient seal purge valves closed to comply with Required Action D.1.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment Once per 92 days

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.3-6 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

F.

One or more penetration flow paths containing containment purge valves, with penetration leakage not within the penetration limits.

E.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND E.2 Be in MODE 5.

F.1 Reduce leakage to within limit.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if the existing leakage is determined during quarterly testing per SR 3.6.3.5 OR Prior to entering MODE 4 if excess leakage is determined during MODE 5 per SR 3.6.3.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each 48 inch purge valve is sealed closed, except for one purge valve in a penetration flow path while in Condition D of this LCO.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.3.2

NOTE----------------------------------

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.

Verify each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 Farley Units 1 and 2 3.6.3-7 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.3

NOTES--------------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

The blind flange on the fuel transfer canal flange is only required to be verified closed after each draining of the canal.

Verify each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located inside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.

Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.3.4 Verify the isolation time of each automatic power operated containment isolation valve in the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is within limits.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.3.5 Perform leakage rate testing for containment penetrations containing containment purge valves with resilient seals.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND Within 92 days after opening the valve SR 3.6.3.6 Verify each automatic containment isolation valve that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

Programs and Manuals 5.5 Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-16 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2) 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.18 Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) (continued)

c.

Maintain a CRE configuration control and a design and licensing bases control program and a preventative maintenance program. As a minimum, the CRE configuration control program will determine whether the i) CRE differential pressure relative to adjacent areas and ii) the control room ventilation system flow rates, as determined in accordance with ASME N510-1989 or ASTM E2029-99, are consistent with the values measured at the time the ASTM E741 test was performed. If item i or ii has changed, determine how this change has affected the inleakage characteristics of the CRE. If there has been degradation in the inleakage characteristics of the CRE since the E741 test, then a determination should be made whether the licensing basis analyses remain valid. If the licensing basis analyses remain valid, the CRE remains OPERABLE.

d.

Test the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the frequencies specified in RG 1.197, Revision 0, May 2003.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the control room inleakage testing frequencies.

5.5.19 Surveillance Frequency Control Program This program provides controls for Surveillance Frequencies. The program shall ensure that Surveillance Requirements specified in the Technical Specifications are performed at intervals sufficient to assure the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation are met.

a.

The Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall contain a list of Frequencies of those Surveillance Requirements for which the Frequency is controlled by the program.

b.

Changes to the Frequencies listed in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program shall be made in accordance with NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," Revision 1.

c.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are applicable to the Frequencies established in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

v t e Letter Sequence Request
EPID:L-2018-LLA-0210, TSTF-500, TSTF-505, TSTF-412 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance Administration Meeting, Meeting Questions Answers 3 May 2019 17 May 2019 Results Approval, Approval Other: ML18338A005, ML19042A108, ML19072A027
MONTHYEAR2019-03-12 [Table View]

NL-19-0771, Risk Informed Technical Specification Information Only Bases Changes

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