ML20237G931
| ML20237G931 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1986 |
| From: | Stier E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., STIER, E.H. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| LRP-A-001A, LRP-A-1A, NUDOCS 8708140259 | |
| Download: ML20237G931 (573) | |
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TMI-2 REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY BALANCE TESTING l
NUCLEAR RECdlATORY COMMIS$100 Docket Me,- lal Exh e.
la the matter of Yb/ MN Staff IDENTIFIED M Applicant // RECilVfD Interrenor REJECTED Cont'g Offt Contractor nAig h"$"((.
Other Witness N Reporter . M f
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l TMI-2 REACT 0R C00LANT INVENT 0RY BALANCE TESTING i
PREPARED FOR GPU NUCLEAR CORP.
BY EDWIN H. STIER INVESTIGATIVE STAFF:
FREDERICK P. DE VESA ROBERT T. WINTER SEPTEMBER 5, 1985 VOLUME VI (E)
WITNESS STATEMENTS:
Harding - Hartman (4/29/80)
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HARDING, LEROY 1 8/1/85 STIER INVESTIGATION 1
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TO: EDWIN H. STIER FROM: FREDERICK P. DE VESA DATE: AUGUST 1, 1985 1
SUBJECT:
LER-78-62 1
I ' interviewed Leroy Harding by telephone today regarding his knowledge of the LER-78-62. Mr. Harding confirmed that he was assigned to the Met Ed Licensing Department in Reading in 1978 where he reported to W. E. Potts, Manager of Licensing.
He indicated that he had no present recollection of the events leading up to the final approval of LER-78-62. He vaguely re- t called that James Stair was the Engineer who was responsible for the leak rate LER but he had no recollection of the discussions that led to the necessary approvals of the final draft.
Specifically, he had no recollection of how the changes to the final draft that was signed by Herbein were made. He said that if he had to speculate he would guess that, given Herbein's personality, that Herbein probably called up Seelinger and dis-cussed the need for additional information with him over the phone. They probably agreed upon the additional language and the final draft was prepared accordingly.
l 1-1 IIARTMAN, II AROLD (various dates)
Excerpts of Results of NRC Interviews Concerning Falsification of Leak Rate Tests
EXCERPTS OF RESULTS OF NRC INTERVIEWS OF HAROLD HARTMAN CONCERN TION OF LEAK RATE TESTS Between June 27, 1983 and July 15, 1983 the results' of the cited NRC inter-views were reviewed in order to extract pertinent information and facts regarding HARTMAN's allegation concerning the falsification of leak rate test data. This review surfaced the following excerpts attributed to HARTMAN concerning the falsification of leak rate test data.
(1) (NRC 1&E TMI Investigation Team Interview Transcript dated May 22,1979)
FASANO: Now, my understanding the electromotive, the electromatic, was the main cause of leakage prior to the event. Now this is a little different 50...
MARSH: Well, this is my understanding.
FASANO: I understand...I just wondered where he gets his information.
CRO: I can look at the computer. They have an analog value of the tempera-ture at the outlets of these valves.
FASANO: These would be the termocouples?
CRO: Right. The thermocouple downstream. The electromatic relief valve was the lowest of the three and it had been for three months. The other two would kind of weep down and they would sometimes maybe every once in a while you'd see them abcve 200 degrees, but most of the time they stayed between 150 and maybe 180 which before they started leaking they were always down around 100, 105. I know for a f act a leak rate is required every 3 days. That leak rate had to be fudged every time we got, just about every time that we got it, we had to do something to make it right. We don't have to maybe go look at something. It was just a bad situation. I didn't like it.
CRESWELL: Let me ask you this. Who did you inform?
l I CRO: This would be Dick Hoyt knew about it. 'I know Bernie Smith knew about it, and every other shif t supervisor and shif t foreman and control room operator that operated the plant in the previous three months had to know about it.
(2) NRC TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP REPORT OF INTERVIEW DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1979. "Hartman doesn't think operators got squeezed frcm above except from supervisor pressure - Let's go we have this plant to startup - let's get moving (supervisor said).
They knew pressurizer code safeties were leaking on the 20th and Hartman doesn't want to say we fudged it or anything like that but we did. We fudged it. You can punch anything in the computer, you can type it out in the same format and you can do a hand calculation you can do anything like that, I can i remember doing it once. I didn't like to do it but you know it was a do or die situation. You get it, we needed it. A lot of times he wculd do it and say he just couldn't get one and for the most part that's the way I handled it, I don't even know if I ever did fudge it for a fact. They came on a computer printout, what you could do and it wasn't in a procedure anywhere and it wasn't necessarily tapping and entering the wrong date, trying to do a particular parameter to be one thing did not purposely put another number in there was things like opening a valve that would admit gas to the makeup tank (putting as on closed tank) should not have any indicatio'n, should change level in the makeup tank but it did all the time getting leak rates (all 5 shif ts) there VC.ves leak bad and they are just ridcir; ever the crie gallen ,
per minute set point and you as a supervisor and a mechanically oriented I person being arcund nuclear power for all these years know that safety leaks Obe; never get better they always get worse and hers !*t series is coming ue you want to go into ccmmercial operation, ycu want to make lots of money for GPU ad Met Ed, why don't you fix them and I've asked this several times and can't remember the specific answer to that fact except it was prcbably angleo ne win; t0 gc C",CtrClal.
Maximum NRC limit on valves was 1 gallon per minute identified. If they didn't get a good one out of the computer they just crumbled that one up and threw it in the waste can and ran another one (if over a gallen) would analyze i l
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the data, this chance maybe we.are a too much a transient, have a good one and
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that'is what they do.
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!(3) .NRC TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT DATED OCTOBER 29, 1 1979.
i Q. Were you, as a reactor operator, familiar with the specs for the plant?
A. I was familiar with them, yes. I could generally tell you if there was a -
tech spec on a certain item. I couldn't recite it word for word, but I know >
where I could go to find that information. ,
Q. Were you fam'111ar with the tech spec or operating procedure associated ,
with the tail pipe from.the PORY and safety valves?
A. Yes.
Q. If you knew that a situation existed where the plant in that area was not within.the tech specs operating procedures, how would you go about apprising management of this er what would you do to get it corrected?
A. Well, what I would do is just I would, talk to my shift foreman, and if I
" didn't really get any satisfaction out of him I would go to the shift super-visor and tell him,'.you know, I think we've got a problem.
i Q. Did you ever do that with regard to that particular temperature?
A. That particular problem I was -
- never wrote any:Mr.g d:wn except ! --
volumes' of water that had to be exchanged, I though that was testimony enough that we did have a problem.
(, ' Well , wer $ ycu --
A. But --
Q. Go ahead.
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..g A .' But I did talk to Bernie Smith and Lick Hoyt about this problem, about the leskage out of the vaWs,'and they just said, "Get a good leak rate." And whenever I did it I;pctised it off as of ten as I could. And I would say, "I couldn'tgetagood[neallnight,"andkeepdoingitthatway. They had I three days to get a goed one, and sometime Guring the day or during the night a good one wculd come up, and then it wculd have to go"for three more days until they would get a good one. l
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Q. Was there anyone else you cculd have gone to with this concern?
i 4 A. I probably didn't go to anybody because I thought that this was such an 0 g } oL9fous problem that the people that I could have gone to were already
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x I4) I&E REGION I STAFF MDIORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OF MARCH 22, 1980 (Information
'i srcerpted from notes of interview The OIE THI Investigation determined the unidentified leak rate as calculated by sthe liceasee frequently approached the I gpm limit. Technical Specifica-
. tions require the Reactor Coolant System water inventory'talance to be run o.deper72 hours,duringsteadystateoperations. The computer could (lalculate a leak rate about once per hour. Normal data scatter might cause seme of the results to exceed the leak rate limit. The CR0 stated calculated values exceeding the limit wr re c considered " bad" data and the computer was just instructed to repeat the ci?culaticn. If a "cccd" leak rate was computed, the clock was re-merced ed they had 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to get another " good" leek rate. ',
The CR0 stated he was never directed to ferge data, but felt he was under a great deal of peer pressure (shif t to shif t competition) to get " good" leak rates.
The C?O stated each shift had its little trick to get gcco results and his shift increased Hakeup Tank pressure. The increased pressure didn.'t change indicated level and the CR0 didn't knew why it sometimes seemed to work, but he tas convinced that it did.
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J The CR0 stated he. knew for a fact that demineralized water was added to the system at least once, to make the leak rate appear acceptable, but was unable ,
to name names or times. I The CR0 interpreted a superviser's statement to "Get a good leak rate," to mean te fudge the test results. He appeared genuinely surprised when it was i suggested another interpretation might have been to make sure the plant was stable and to get an accurate result-(5) I&E REGION I STAFF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT AND SWORN STATEMENT DATED MARCH 26, 1980.
I CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Hal do you personally feel or do you know any of the operators who felt that you were either professionally or through pressure from management being forced to fudge calculations in order to get correct records, do ycu feel that there was upward management pressure in order to obtain these? i HARTMAN: I'm not sure I understand. What level was apper management?
CHRIST 0pHER: Well to me management would be from my Shif t Supervisor on...
i CHRISTOPHER: In other words did Dick Hoyt, did he imply to you or directly say to you if you did not come up with a good reading that you were going to have a problem or did ycu feel that there was sting to be a problem?
HARTMAN: No he knew me better than that, cause he knew. I knew when I was right anc when I was wrcng and so hc rever pressLred me intc anything like that.
CHRISTOPHER: Did you get this kind of pressure from any of the other manage- ;
ment personnei:
HARTMAN: No not reolly, I mean you know there's several times in the leak )
rate procedure where they'd say get a good one, you know, I guess we'll talk about that leak rate later but you know there's one of them, I don't know what l
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- would of happened if I, you know if I wouldn't of gotten a good one but like I said before I didn't like to do them, I'd do them all night and if I got a good one I'd sign it but you know I'd fudge it as seldom as possible, as I didn't like to do .it, I don't know what would of happened if I'd have said Bernie I just can't get another one, I can't a get a good one, he says well I know I don't know, what would of happened if they wculd of ccme down to the line work, you know I wouldn't do it again.
CHRISTOPHER: Hal you just said you fudge it as little as possible, can you give us, be a little more specific in terms of what you mean, in terms of when you fudged it and how you fudged it and what prompted you to fudge it, fudge these records?
HARTPAN: Well I guess it was more, you know peer pressure than anything, you know everybody brags that there shif t gets leak rates all the time, you know well how do they do it and you rack your brains out trying to figure it out, you know, how you can, how they can come up with a leak rate and you can't l
come close and you just, you know, then you start to devious processing, you try your little ways.
CHRISTOPHER: Just to be clear do you differentiate management pressure from peer pressure or to you are they synonymous?
HARTMAN: I think there pretty much synonymous because as far as I can remember all the Shif t Supervisors thought their shif t was the best, you know and it's that way in any power plant and so from the Shift Supervisor down there's, that's the peer grcup that I'm talking abcut really, you know, how come ycu can get a gecd leak rate ard I can't, my guy's are just better than ycurs, you knew but... ,
CHRISTOPHER: Do you think that is a great problem in the operation of the plar.. cr do ycu tnink that it is inherent in any type cf situation where your talking three distant shif ts doing the same jot ?
HARTPAN : I think it's an operations problem, we obviously couldn't get one i
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and somehow we did get them, I don't think there was a leak rate gotten )
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l l D legally in, at least I know prior to three months to the accident, it wasn't a good one I don't think.
CHRISTOPHER: And you based that on what, Hal, pardon me but I'm not a techni-l cal expert so you'll have to give a little more to help me.
l l HARTMAN: Yeah I used, I had a little thing I did was just add a little l nitrogen to the makeup tank or hydrogen to the makeup tank and it was enough to send the level, the level instrument a little screwy and it wculd indicate slightly higher than, slightly higher than, or maybe not indicate on the chart but to the computer it would show that it was a little higher level in there than there was before and then of course if you don't have that makeup tank level lost, then you haven't leaked out as much water and the thing would, might print good.
MARTIN: Hal let's get into the technical area, which leak rate tech spec requirement are we referring to that was difficult to pass?
HARTMAN: That was the 1 gallon per minute unidentified leakage.
MARTIN: Okay, we had talked about the safety valve leakage being bad, how does a safety valve leakage have an effect on this unidentified leakage rate, since, if I remember correctly safety valve leakage would be included in RCDT level changes?
HARTMAN: Well I remember a couple of months before the accident that they had, we had been trying to get a good leak rates from the existing computer pr:grr. They tried making a model of the crain tanir in the computer, taking a voltage from the levei transmitter on the tank itself, they made a model and converted it to a signal usable by the computer, so that now we didn't have to go ccwn and punch in the voltage, normally we'd have to go down and read the vol:5ge coming cut of :nat transmitter, ccme back up pur.cn the leak rate in, punch the voltage in and then wait an hour, when it punched out go dowr and get the voltage again, come back up and then the computer would take it away and that's how the drain tank leak rate was figured by the computer. Then, like I said later they went and they just picked, they made a way to pick
those voltages identically the same time as they pick all the other parameters at the beginning of the hour and that I think they tried and as long as, they still didn't come out because I remember we were having thc problem before, very slightly before the safety valve started to leak bad and we still couldn't get them with that and then I think after we went comercial they tried another particular program, i dcn't know what changes that did, in fact I'm not even sure they really implemented that program, I can't tell you that for a fact, the new program had been implemented. I knew I tried various times doing, doing a leak rate by the hand calculation and I can't remember if it came out or if it didn't, I think it came out but just barely, so it could have been in the computer program, it could have been actual leakage, I don't really know but nonetheless ncbody.did anything to find out. ,
MARTIN: Hal how frequently was the RCS inventory test run?
HARTPAN: Well it was supposed to be run every three days but since the reliability of the computer, in other wordt sometimes it would print good and sometimes it would print bad, they never let you go up to the last hour or last day even to try to get another good one so actually it was part of the control routine, it would just punch a leak rate until you got one and some-times it might run four, five a night, sometimes it wouldn't come out at all, MARTIN: How were the unacceptable result handled, the computer prints out an unacceptable result, what do you do with it?
HARTMAN: Oh you had to throw that away, fi'ae that in file 13 and you just didn't leave those things laying around.
PART!N: File 13 is the trash can?
HART _ MAN : Trash can, right.
MARTIN: Who would do that Hal?
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HARTMAN: Oh I would or I'd just rip it up and say here is another bad one or 31 the second one I'd get just to show that there's what we get, throw it in the Shift Supervisor, Shift Foreman's office and they would do it.
1 MARTIN: What was the rationale for crumbling these things up, it could of J been good leak rate? j MARTMAN: I don't know, I really couldn't tell you except that I thing that they got pinned on'this 1 gallon per minute thing, you know, it just can't be l greater than 1 gallon per minute, if they got anything greater than that, then I they said no that's no good, they can't use it and then they would throw it away and I guess somebody, somebody made mentioned one time that the NRC found an old leak rate that was like, you know,10 gallons per minute unidentified, i found why, you know started asking questions and then so after that they said we got to keep these things, you know, it away, you can't leave these lyiy around...
MARTIN: Hal can you tell me how the data was fudged, now you indicated that one of your tricks that you knew about was to increase the hydrogen over pressure in the makeup tank?
HARTMAN: You could, I remember one way that you could do it would be to increase the voltage reading to the drain tank.
MARTIN: When you say increase the voltage reading this what you tc1d the computer the voltage reading was.
HARTi'AN : Right ycu'a give tne voltage reading just a little bit h1gher, that means you collected a little more water, or the computer thinks it collected a little more water than you actually have and then the other thing was that you would just turn en a charge makeup pump, er not a makeup pump a water waste transfer pump anc jt.st every st of ten you hcio tne makeun valve intt the makeup tank, just hold that cpen for a few seconds, maybe once every five minutes during the test and you leak in just enough water that would kind of hold the makeup tank level up as long as the computer only saw time 0 and l
I times 60 so that you can add water in that time and then we'd 'never tell the computer that we added water.
CHRISTOPHER: Hal these are things that you and other operators would do?
HARTMAN: Yeah I've seen them done.
CHRISTOPHER: Was this done with knowledge of the Supervisors and the Shift Foreman?
i HARTMAN: I don't know if they knew or not, tell you the truth, I really don't know.
MARTIN: Hal can you tell us who actually tried some of these tricks, now you indicated that you did?
HARTMAN: Yeah I did, no I'd rather not say because you know they might still be up there.
MARTIN: Okay, would it be during that last three months before the event, is that.the time period rc're looking at?
HARTMAN: Yeah I'd say because we had an awful time.
MARTIN: If the supervisors were not aware of this and there only pressure was 4 hey we got to get a good one, why did you guys do it?
hARTMA3-I dtn't know, except that if we didn't ge a good one they'd be c:wn i cr. cur backs and they used to tell us get a good one, so to me get a good one means, get a good one, you know, by hook or crook.
ChEISTODMER: Hal, wnc specifically tcid you to ge a gcoc one!
HARTMAN: Well my Shif t Supervisor.
CHRISTOPHER: Which would be?
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l HARTMAN: I think Bernie Smith was the one most of the time.. /
l CHRISTOPHER: Bernie Smith, when he said get a good one, did he say get a good I one at any cost, I don't care what you have to do to get a good one, to me get a," good one" can mean several things, I'm just trying to qualify that phrase,
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get a good one.
HARTNAN: I don't want to say what he meant by that statement but I'll tell you how I took it knowing Bernie Smith, get one by hook or crook. 1 i
CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
I HARTMAN: I know they knew it was going on, I don't know that they thought just on my shift that we were getting them good and legal like but I know they had to know these things were going on, otherwise they wouldn't of been ]
working on the computer programs and stuff like that. !
MARTIN: Hal in reviewing the transcript of Ira Rosen's report, there is a statement he says that you said "I didn't do it very of ten, I did it only when j I was watched very closely and was told I had to have on by 6 in the morning" l when you say I didn't do it very often, what are you referring to? j i
HARTMAN: Did I ever fix the statistics, well that was again, that was in ;
context with this hydrogen into the makeup tank.
MARTIN: And when you say, you know...
HARTMAN: I wasn't watched very closely, what I meur.t was that I'd never do it during the day shift you known when there was a lot of people around, that's it, you knew and I even kind of hide it from Shift Foreman, Shift Super-isor so that they didn't see me, generally that was no problem.
MART *N: What did you feel would happen to you if you hadn't done that?
HARTMAN: I don't know, I just, I guess I would of felt like a dummy because they say well how come all these other guys can get them and you can't, you h
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know, then I would come back and I'd say well. you know I don't want to fudge them and I.'d keep telling them, I says I'm tired of wrestling with these, with these leak rates, I don't want to, we have got a problem here, why don't you do somethinti cbout it.
I CHRISTOPHER: Who did you tell that to-t.
HARTMAN_: Oh Bernie or Dick Hoyt, that's as far as I can go, and even possibly in conversation with the Shift Supervisor, Shift Supervisor of Operations.
CHRISTOPHER: What did they respond to you and what did they say to you when you complained to them about these leak rates?
HARTMAN: Specific coments I can't remember.
CHRISTOPHER: Would you know if any action was taken because of your com-plaints?
HARTMAN: Well I think they did look into the fact that the computer program might be off, you know, I know that they did some work in that area...
MARTIN: What about the leak rate problem, was the communicated to anybody?
HARTMAN: Oh yeah Brian and Dick Hoyt they had to know, I told them you know, how are we going to get cne, it always come out bad.
Subsequent to the completion of the transcribed interview of March 26, 1980, a I
sworn statemer.t was obtained from Hartman concerning several specific aspects of the interview. An excerpt from that statement which is relevant to this investigation is as follows:
Secccc, the repcrter states that I said "That part of this system was deliberately tampered with and I was the one who did it." This statement implies I was in the 'ontrol room and I deliberately tampered with the system. I was not in the control on the night of the accident or in the days preceding the accident and I never deliberately tampered with any
system. Mr. Martin has as'ked me to clarify what I meant when Mr. Rosen asked me if I ever fixed the statistics for the Reactor Coolant System inventory. I was quoted as saying "I didn't do it very often." I did in ;
fact say that,and what I was referring to was the ways to get a good leak rate by adding hydrogen to the makeup tank, mistaking the RCDT milli-volts, and adding water to the makeup tanks. I, as were all operators, under a great strain to get good leak rates. Each operator had his own technique for getting acceptable results. The pressure to get good leak rates was the result of inner shift pressure because each shift thought they were the best and no shift wanted to be the one to force the unit off the line.
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II A R T M A N , ilAROLD 5/22/79 NRC IE i
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- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, . NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCPJ4ISSION l
$ In the Matter of:
2! IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2l l
of Ex-Cdritrol Room Operater CC ) .
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9I Trailer #203
' NRC Investigation Site 1 01 TMI Nuclear Power Plant Middletown, Pennsylvania Lt t
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.av 22, 1979 12!
(Cata or Incarview) 131 July 3, 1979 (Data Transcript Typea) 14l 254, 255 15! (Tape Numcert,5))
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191 201 j'
i 21l NRC PERSONNEL: l 22!
Mr. James S. Creswell 23i Mr. Anthony N. Fasano Mr. Robert Marsh 24 ,
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p MARSH: The date is May 22, 1979. The time is 6: 49 p.m. This is Bob Marsh, MARSH, and I'm and investigator with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission assigned to Region III, Chicago, Illinois. This evening we are located in Room 119, the Red Roof Inn, in Swatara, Pennsylvania. -
That's SWATARA, and we are here to conduct an interview of C,, Q D
, who is an ex-CR0 for Met-Ed.at the Three Mile Island site.
At this time I'd like the other individuals in the room to identify themselves, to spell their last name, and to identify their position. l CRESWELL: This,is James S. Creswell, CRESWELL. I'm a reactor inspector located at Region III. i FASANO: I am Anthony N. Fasano, FASANO. I am an Inspection Specialist out of Region I.
CRESWELL: I'd like to make a reference to C.AO first name being C$0
- MARSH: Thank you. c,,Nyou indicated that you go by c@ even thougn your name is 0%O rignt. j bbD : Right.
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MARSH: C9M,beforeweturnthetapeonwehadsathereanddiscussed this two paged memo and I just want to make a few items in there a a
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2 p ' matter of the taped record. As I indicated the memo does cover the 2l purp se and scope of our investigation and goes to scme degree into 3l the rights of the individual being interviewed. On the last page there's several questions which I just would like to get your response
, 5 to n the tape and that is (1) do you understand the above which ,
Si addresses the two page memo?
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Yes.
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Of MARSH: The second question reads, do we have your permission to tace
{; this interview?
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- Yes.
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. i MARSH: And thirdly, it says do you want a copy of the tape?
L6i L7i ND : Yes.
L8f MARSH: Fine. On the tape I will get you a copy of this tape procaoly l L91 I tomorrow and I will get a copy of the transcript when its availaole 101 i mailed out to you so you have that also. There's a fcurth question
- covered in the body of the text that does not pertain specifically to '
Z2' you, but it addresses the individuals rights. We can abide by it if 131 you so want, and that indicates that for the Met-Ed employees in that if they so desire, they could have a union representative or a Met-Ed
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bpresentativepresent. I think you've indicated that you did not, 2j but can I get your response now?
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bbD: I waive my right have any. . . -
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6 MARSH: Fine. Thank you. f,N, to get going with, we'd appreciata it 7{ very much if you could give us some words regarding your background, 8 y u association wm %e nuclear fieM, and your aperiences wh.5 . Met-g, Ed. I'd also like to include the dates that you went to work for Met-Ed and the date that you separated.
Cb : I started my nuclear career in the United States Navy. I
[ went to basic nuclear power school in Bainbridge, Maryland. I graduated in the top quarter of my class there. I went to West Milton S3G prototype in West Milton, New York. I was then transferred to the Woodrow Wilson. I served aboard her 2 1/2 years. I was transfer ed to the U.S.S. T who was in overhaul in Pearl Haroar Naval Ship
! Yard. I was separated from the navy in November '73. I started work with Met-Ed, January of 1974. I believe it was the 28th. I was hired -
I there as an auxiliary operator. I went through six months of tacnnical l
t training on the operations, systems, and tecnnical training, some l reactor theory about Babcock and Wilcox reactor plants. I spent 2 1/2
! years as an auxiliary operator and was promoted to Unit 2 control rocm cperator in September of 1976. I attended the 8 week cold licensing t
i program at Lynchburg, Virginia, the simulator training. I graduated
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4 1 . ..
j there No.1 out of 6 and in October of 1977 I passed the requirements i
2j for a Nuclear Regulatory Commission operators license. From October q 3l f '77 until April 13 I served in the capacity as a licensed control l 4 room operator in Unit 2 and I resigned my employment as of April 13, 5
1978, 1979. And that's about it. ,
6i 7
CRESWELL: C , I wonder if you could go back to the time of March 28, 8 1979 and tell us briefly when you got on shift and wriat went on as you g
got on shift.
4 L0i j CM,,0 : This is gonna be amusing because I was in Lynchburg, Virginia at the one week reactor operation training course down there. So I
\
was in Lynchburg on the morning of the 28th.
I guess, well I woke up about 7:00 that morning and my shift foreman came over and said that his girl said Unit 2's down. The safety's were blowing for a couole of hours. I thought that was rather odd since they should never blow that long. And through the course of the day we just gathered bits L7l i
and piecas of information as it went by, as they became availacle to us down there. Mostly frem B&W people. In fact, we had a shift L91 supervisor, Bernie Smith, he was there with us at the time my supervisor of operations in Unit 2, Jim Floyd was there, at the time and I guess later in the day when they figured things weren't so hectic, they
! called up and got a little bit more technical information as to what 231
[ happened. And the way I understood it at that time was that they had
!4!
a reactor. . .a loss of feedwater .to both steam generators. . . and for i
l I
3, I
s .
5 some reason they didn' t have auxiliary feed.
Now we didn' t know the real reasons why they didn't have auxiliary feed wnen the pumps failed to start, cr we didn' t really know. So the rest of the day was then '
just spent simulating the accicent, trying to see exactly what happened. -
We had several parameters that we knew happened, the pressure excursion in the primary system. They assumed that they had maybe one tube, had .
1 ruptured, it separated in the tube sheet on the 8 steam generator, '
b:cause that's where the activity came frem, that they knew was released at that time. We just, basically then, well, Jim Floyd and Bernie Smith, they left Thursday in the afternoon. They took a plane out and cams back to the site and they left myself and the two other operators and the shift foreman down there just to continue with the training.
And really the only information we got back' then was either from the news papers, the television, or what we could get from Sabcock and Wilcox and they didn't want to admit too much. Especially about fuel damage and any design deficiencies that may have been present or have thought may have been a cause of the accident. I got back frem Lynchburg on Friday and I didn't really find too much out then. But I did hand in my resignation that day, it was the 31st of March. Or the 20th c.f i
I March, excuse me, it was a Friday. And I went in to work then tne j next Wednesday ard basically the accident was over. They were still in a state of general emergency according to the radiation, emcrgency plans. And my duties there were, I was only there for three days from tha time the accident happened until I resigned. The three days that I spent there were basically a data taker, a log keeper, and such as that. I didn' t really get into the operation of the plant.
[ ' ,
.T -
1 l
l g CRESWELL: Okay,f O.IWho was your shift foreman that was with you up there on the. . .
i 31 C/bC :
It was Dick Hoyt. j 41 l
$l I CRESWELL: Dick Hoyt?
'6l .
i 7'
ObD : Dick Hoyt is my shift foreman, yes.
8!
si
! CRESWELL: Do you recollect who the other CR0s were there?
.01
.l!
! (,bO : Yeah. Ray Boyer and he's a licensed CRO, and John Blessing, 21 .
I he is a trainee.
Uk L41
! CRESWELL: Now you, if I recollect properly, learned of the event L5i through your shif t foreman. . .
L6i bO : Yes, who had learned through a phone cal 1 from his girlfriend.
tat L9!
CRESWELL: His girlfriend where was she locatad?
!Ol CA O : w,ii,1 esen.t really get that personal with oick, but to 22k
- the best of my recollection he was dating a guard. It was a Gregg 231 guard. Or...
24!
25j 1
7 CRESWELL: Gregg's Security?
g D : Gregg Security. And I'm not sure if she was on that evening
~
or what. Her information may have been second hand, I don't know.
, l MARSH: I think that was the point as to whether she just lived in the i'
area or...
o40 yeah.
she lived in sount acetna. As best as I can rememoer sha lived in Mount Gretna which is a small mount community about '
10 miles from the site, I believe.
MARSH: But also employed in and around the site, right.
CN: Yes.
CRESWELL: Okay. Now basically at that point in time was, is it a fair characterization that the information was restricted to the relief, the safety relief valves blowing for a substantial period of time? i C : Yeah. At that time when she said that the safeties had blown for two hours and it raised a question in my mind that the safties, they couldn't have bicwn for two hours unless something was really wrong. The reactor would have had to stay at power in order for those things to blow.
4 l- 8 H
CRESWELL: Okay.. ,.
2'
" ~q
! - c , 9 O ': so there>s no two ways-about it.
31 !
! I ;
. 4; .
. CRESWELL: - So you... l 5 - r
- i 6i -
- 71 i CA0 i so I assumed that they'were the atmospheric relier valves.
Now I, the atmospheric dump valves; ' yeah. I really didn't know the- ,i 8-l circu stances which opened. I knew how they could open, but I really ,' !
didn' t know the ' specifics on ^why they ' opened on" the morningof the ^!:
10{
28th.. '
11! '
I :
12l i CRESWELL: Okay. What happens after, are you at' breakfast eating b
. 131 L
when you found this out or...
14i 15'
-15i
'b : No. We' just got, we were in the motel room. I
,i j
17 Il CRESWELL: Oh, you were in the motel rcom.
181 i.
c,40 :
- u. u.. II
~201
{j 211 l
- CRESWELL: O kay. So then what do you do? You go on into work... l 22 I C
- Yeah. We went in, we went rignt- into the training centar
. 2 41 there.
'25i I ,
9 CRESWELL: On Old Forest Road. Does Jim Floyd try to get in touch with ths plant or anything at that point in time?
' f=*Ihijh> ' I really'can't remember. I know, I think he did. But the
~
t information, yeah, as a matter of fact he did. He called up and he got, he was really interestad in finding out some of the parameters,
~
some of the things, some of the events, the sequences of the ever.t, some of the readings that they were getting on the radiation monitors, and some primary and secondary chemistry analyses so that we could f simulate it, so that we could see if we could simulata it, see some of ;
I tha transients that took place. They had said that the pressurizer l l
want solid. They said that the primary system pressure went up above j tha safety ifmit. At the time we didn't know that the pressurizer )
l relief valve, electromatic, I guess it was, it was stuck. I don't {
even knew at this time, to this date. I just assume that it was the electromatic . relief valve. We didn't know that until I think it was j Thursday. morning we finally simulated that the valve actually failed opzned.
FASANO: This is Fasano speaking. t,i%Syoudidmentiontaat, in tne conversation and the information that came to you on the first day, that you knew that the aux feed was not feeding. Were you told that over the phone?
1
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ ~
l
, l J
l ~
10 I
-)
t CehO Yeah. They had said that the auxiliary feed, they didn't ;
get it into the ' generators.at the initial point. We didn't at that 3,
time, we didn't know how the feed was stooped.
We didn't know whether t~
.it was a malfunction of the pumps, the piping, or valves. We really *i know what the cause was.
51. l i )
si i
- FASANO: Do you know what valves they were talking about?
7l -
I ^
Bl Il CRO: Absolutely. I checked those every time I come on shift.
N FASANO: Why?
A
! C, h O : 'They're important. And 1 is they're always doing surveil-31 lance. They do a monthly surveillance on each one of those three O
- pumps when we' re at power. In fact, they have to do' a once a month in Si 5;.
mode .4 or above and I know that those two valves had to be shut in
- order to do the surveillance so that they didn't feed the water through I II I the air operated regulating valves into the generators. !
It i li CRESWELL: This is Jim Creswell again. Have you ever found those il valves closed before?
p
- hbO
- Yes.
%I 5i f
i 1
_ - - _ _--__----_--A
i
)-
I 11 CRESWELL: How many times?
1
.o O: once, that I can rememeer.
CRESWELL: Why was it, why were they closed?
l ChD: 'I can't recall why they were closed. I asked my foreman, 1 than I found them closed, I asked my foreman if this was a general procedure that I follow, I asked him do you know why the ESV 12 valves ;
are shut. He said no, I-don't. I said okay, Dick, I'm gonna open-them, and then I cpened them and everything lets loose.
CRESWELL: The foreman's name is...
40.: oicx soyt.
CRESWELL: Dick Hoyt. Do your recollect wnen this happened? ;
I l
C 40 : There were so many things that, there were ce many things to {
recollect, I really can't even put a time frame on it. I really don't know.
j CRESWELL: Would it be like weeks before the event?
1 l
.. p 12 y ,bhb .Yes. It would have been weeks. Maybe, perhaps months.
2!
g CRESWELL: Okay.
4' C,,, : Several months, 5,
l 6i 7l
- CRESWELL: Okay. But as far as you know it, there's not a practice of leaving those valves closed for a specific reason? You know of no-81 reason?
j lli C
- No. None whatsoever except that the surveillance procedure calls for them to be shut when the actual test is being conducted. i 12!
131 l l
CRESWELL: Do you know if that was reported to the NRC that those I 141 valves were shut? ) -
LS:
17'
( b k: No, I do not.
L81 CRESWELL: Do you know if the unit was operating at power wnen that i L9i happened? I 201 I
}
C : I can' t recall that either.
22!
?31 CRESWELL: Okay.
2ai 25i
....._..___...._--.m.... _ - .. _
i i
1 13 j
. bh
- But it doesn't make any difference, in Mode 4 they're required.
1 CRESWELL: Okay. Getting back to the sequence of the event, the time f ssquence of that day, you went on into the B&W facility on Old Forest -
Road in Lynchburg and you started simulating the event on the simulator and I guess all of you were in the simulator at that.. .
G40 : weil, it was, they kind of pushed us aside, really. Ane every once in a while if we get a. break, we had some classroom training whan they were running this and the three CRO's, in fact, it was the i l
three CRO's, well myself, and two other guys, and Dick Hoyt, the foreman. We spent most of the morning in class while they ran the tssts...
l CRESWELL: When you say they...
CPo; aim g3cye, sernie smith, enere was one or two other instruc:ces, ! l 1
I know then later there was some of the big wheels down there from S&W I I
that were on the test site, I don't know their names. But I guess i j
they conducted tests from like 10:00 in the morning wnen they got the !
information that they needed until probaoly 2:00 in the afternoon.
j j i
CRE5WELL: Okay. What basically was the information that they were i
using when they started at 10:00 in the morning? Did you run down ,
I through it?
. _ - _ _ _ _ ________-_________-_--_-__A
'! .* )
14 1 .-
- Loss of both feed pumps caused by low suction pressure and thai caused a high pressure reactor trip and they said that 8 minutes 3
- " " "Y 9 "* "9""U ** * * * * "" ** * "" * * "#"I"9 " ~
i the emergency feed pumps. It was 8 minutes into the accident. We 2
also simulated, we also assumed, we didn't get this I don't believe we
.l i
got this from any information that was sent down that morning, but we 7,
knew that the pressurizer was on continuous spray to equalize boron or to keep boron in the pressurizer and the RCS equalized.
b CRESWELL: And that was the because of the leaking valves on the pres-surizer?
L i
bb : The leaking pressurizer code safeties.
Il N
,: CRESWELL: The safety valves.
U ii
- MARSH
- Excuse me. Have you nodded in afirmation to that statment, Il
! right?
11 0: Yes, yes.
h .
J O
- ) FASANO:(e , you knew that the code safeties were leaking, I mean. . .
F i
b : Absolutely. They were leaking, I know for at least 3 months O '
before the accident.
ii l
1 I
B l FASANO: Now, my understanding the electromotive, the electromatic, :
was the main cause of leakage prior to the event. Now this is a little different so... i L
MARSH: Well, this is his understanding. ,
FASANO: I understand. . . I just wondered where he gets his information.
1 bh h: I can look at the computer. They have an analog value of l tha temperatures at the outlets of these valves.
FASANO: Thess would be the thermocouple?
b h Right. The thermocouple downstream. The electromatic relief valve was the lowest of the three and it had been for 3 months.
Tha other two would kind of weep up and down and they would sometimes mIybe every once in a while you'd see them above 200 degrees, but most of the time they stayed between 150 and maybe 180 which before they started leaking they were always down around 100, 105. I know for a {
fact a leak rate is required every 3 days. That leak rate nad to be ,
I fudged every time we got, just about everytime that we got it, we had I 4
to do something to make it right. We as control room operators on my 1 shift, I know, we kept asking what are you gonna do about these valves. lj l
They're leaking. We can't get a leak rate out of the computer. We l
can hardly even do a hand calculation and have it come out right. We l
l
x.
"l' , c .r j 7 l
if 16
,n.
y don'tI1avetomaybegolookatsomething. It was just a~ bad situation.
2 I didri' t like it.
l 3l CRESWELL:- Let me ask you this. Who did you inform?
l 4 51 i
61 I
- s wu e 09 Noyt Mew about R. I bow Bernie Smith j knew about it, and every other shift supervisor and shift foreman and
.g control room operator that' operated the plant in the previous 3 months
.2 .
had tog know about-it.
" 101 ,
CRESWELL: Now you said that you felt that the figures were inaccurate.
11:l
! What other evidence did you have?
12!
l 141 b : I mentioned that when we simulated the accident we simulated it down at the simulator with the spray valve open and the ' pressurizer 15l heaters on. And the reason that I know that this, relief valves, were I leaking was the fact that if you turned the spray valve off and put !
17l ,
the spray system back in its automatic mode that you'd have a continuous
'18j rod motion in which indicated that the plant was deborating. When you 1Si turr the spray back on and recirculated the pressurizer, force tnat 20! l borated water that was in there back into the primary system the rods !
. 21l l would move out.
22I l I l 23l Okay,...
~
l CRESWELL:
24! I i i 25j i
l
x s 4
'p ,
s,0
)
't.
, 17 C40:
3,'foughtt3et,.for3mont3s. r natee it. s.,ery minutu of i it. ,
CMSWELL: So this was a substantial baron change tnat you were getting ~
f in systes , <
3 : Absolutely.
CRESWELL: Due to distillation in the pressurizer. )
K ,
b : Right.
,CnESWELL: Okay. So we should be able to look like at. the power range j charts or the red positions. Probably red positions.
-4 : This was during the early days. You know there's a lot of people up there, a lot of, I consider, top notch operators. But when somatimes it comes down to the basics of knowing what happens, you know, they really, they look for the complicated picture a lot of times. They don't go back to the basics. I picked uo how to coerste
{
l I this system right off the bat. You just put it in automatic and you i
)
leave it taere. If something happens, ...or not in auto I mean you I put it into manual...and you just let it continuously recirc that way I
you have no boren change to worry about except normal leakage, mayce !
i you have to add'some demin water for fuel burnout just to bring the l 6
l l
i
l 1
e I ,
J ' J 13 fj ' rods back in a little bit for control. A lot of the operators didn't f
-i 4 2{
understand that and they'd get themselves in trouble with all the rocs ; ',
out at 98% cower or they get them down in too far so that you get I
close to the red index curves and I don't know. . . 5:
41 1
Sj . .
y CRE5WELL: Let me ask you this, g4P. Regarding the reactor coolant l
drain tank, the leakage from those valves could go into the reactor 7
_ coolant drain tank.
9l Oi b N: That's correct.
i 1: '
i CRE5WELL: Now if there was excess leakage it would require frequent
.2l
! startup of the transfer pumps. Correct?
3l
.5; b : That's correct.
.6i
! CRESWELL: Was that an operation that you customarily go througn?
.7l l
b t- Since the relief valves were leaking I can remember, and
.Sl i there of late we had to pump it at least 4 times a snift. !
.0 ! [
l
.1 CRESWELL: Okay.
'2!
'3 gQ, And that was, I can't even rememcer the numcer. We pumo it 14{
for about 5 minutes and it was probaoly 100 gallons per minute. So 15! ,
probably a total of 500 gallons each time, i l
u
[
CRESWELL: Or 2000' gallons per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift?
L%O. : Right. :n fact. I took a backlook at the logs from.the time that we started to have to add water into the makeup tank to keep RC3
-inventory. And'at one time I can remember they would pump 3000 gallons of demin water a day. Now that is your information. You can get that right out of the control room operators log to verify that. I even, you know, they, the people that I had to report to didn't even understand the seriousness and I believe that that was a serious problem.
CRE5WELL: In what way?
b : Control wise, because everybody had a different way of con-trolling. One time I would come in and' the spray would be on automatic building up boron in the pressurizer. Pretty soon I'd end up witn my rods at the index limit. Ncw, where s my baron in the RCS?
8 I don' know. Now, what do I have to do to get the rods out? Well, I can only assume that the baron is in the pressurizer and manually spray.
How long it was there, the only thing I can do is go back to the log. {
t If the records were kept accurately, tnen I could make a pretty gocc l l
r k jucge of, you know, whether my rods were gonna go out the too or l whether I was gonna have to add seca demin water to keep them in. 1 1
O {
CRE5 KELL: Well, let me ask you this, .
Could ask for a samole :n l 1
the pressuri:er and ask for a sample on letdown, would that nelp? '
1 I
l e
20
{ .
3 b : Yeah. I'm not sure how often those samples were taken. I L l i
know they were taken at some interval and I believe it was once a !
2!
j week. And I can remember at one time a sample came back and it was -
3!
c j 100 and, well to the best of my knowledge, it was around 120. Difference I between pressurizer baron...
Si I
Si CRESWELL: 120 ppm difference between the pressurizer and the reactor?
I 81 91 b : Right, between pressurizer and reactor. And if I rememcer !
correctly, that was with continuous spray. After a while we had gotten to the point where ewrybody was kind of operating the pressuri:er I 1l I
spray system in a, I don't want to say it, a coordinated fashion, 2?
i where everybody kind of did it the same that you could know where you 31 were at, how to operate it.
4l S;
CRESWELL: What brought about this consistency of oceration?
Si
$ C 9 O: wei,, 1 die , 3ot of , creaming.
El l
{
CRESWELL: Do you have any indication that management beyond ocerations -
O' !
was informed or knew acout this problem? l li b : Oh, they had to. My supervisor, Bernie Smith, would, he 31 would make a reminder to all the operators on our snift, the acerator !
Ai !
that had the panel, the console that day, hey, don't forget to scray '
.Si i
l1 r
1-21 )
{ l i
I the pressure and don't forget to recirc the pressurizer for at least a l!
couple of hours. And one of the operators, Ray Boyer, he always just ,I 2!
! if ked, to put it on recire for a couple of hours and then taka it off. l I
I And maybe he'd do that two tienes a shift and everytime he did it he -
would end up with rods out. And, you know, it wasn't really funny but I l
j then again you kind of had to largh at the guy because he wa.1 ignorant. l i l He didn't you know, I don't like to make any bones acout the way a l l
fellow operates but...
I ,
I CRESWELL: Let me ask you this. Why wouldn't management have shut I
down and repaired those leaking u.tives?
4 c,@ O : My impression of Met-Ett management was nummer one, tney put I
the reactor into cor=ercial operation before it was ready. It was so obvious I could run down a list, and maybe I will later, I can't know.
I'll run down a list of problems, cesign deficiencies, that really they should have never gone up with them. They should it even have, i
never have, attempted to up with them, 1
CRESWELL: Let's go into that list, let's go down.
b Right now? Okay.
i l
I CRESWELL: Just take you time and we'll give you plenty of time to j think. i j
l' i
t
.j l 22
, i .
bb: We started power operations .back in, well I won't say power 7 operations, maybe we did too, back about a year, almost a year before, g back in March, I believe we mace initial criticality. We did tre low power physics testing and I believe we escalated to 15 or 20% power.
, No, I'take that back. We got up to 40% when we'had the safety valve 5!
l problems. There was one of the biggest design deficiencies that cost v
them millions of dollars for that job. And to me it was just misdesign.
81 CRESWELL: That was when they replaced the Lonergan valves with the Dresser...
10f O : Oresser...
12!
13:
. CRE5WELL: Dresser valves.
14:
16i Cho: Dresser valves. The condensate polisning systam. It was a nightmare. They didn't have an automatic bypass. If you lost instru-17' ment air, all 8 discharge valves from the polisher vessels would fail l 131 closed. If that happens the booster pumps loses suction pressure, ;
Los they trip, they cause the feed pumos to lose suction pressure anc :ney 1 20:
trip. Seven vessels is normally all we were designed to ocerate with. <
21.
Okay, you could operate with 8 but that's bad engineering practice.
22:
Seven vessels could hardly take the load at 98% power let along 100.
23; The condensate reject valve which was located between the condensata I 20 booster pump suction and the polishers, if it would cycle because of a 25:
5
. I
. I 23 high hotwell level, if we are...or a low hotwell level. ..if it would j l
cycle open because of a low hotwell level, it would starve the boostar i
pumps of water that they desperately needed to pump and a boostar pumo ,
would trip on low suction pressure, taking a feed pump along with it. '-
This really wasn't too evident until we got up to, to higher power .
levels, when two feed pumps were really required to supply all of the fesd flow. Whenever the turbine bypass valves, I can't remember the i numbers.. 23 A & B, 24 A 5 B I believe they are...whenever those valves open on a transient, say we had it in a trip, and the bypass l, valves would open... dump steam into the condenser ...notwell level indication would fail low. It would also cause the controller that controls the normal and the emergency makeup valves to see a low level and those valves would fail open, or they would go open thinking that '
thnre was a low level. Now the operator at this time saw less than 10 inches in the hotwell and I don't know how many of the other operators reali:ed this, but when I see less than I.0 inches in the hotwell and I've got,3 pumps setting there sucking at 1,000 horsepower apiece, I-am very concerned about that-equipment damage. So I would waten the hotwell level, it just would stay low. It was horrible. And I would l I
watch the amps on the on the pump, and waten the discnarge pressure.
That way I could tall if the level was actually low then. That was, '
yeah. Other than I knew the indicator said less than 10, I can only believe my indication, but I also realized the necessity for condensate I
flow during a transient like this. So I was a little hesitant to cut l the pumas off at that particular point.
f
.. [ ,
I r
l 24 l
g CRESWELL: That was the indication you had of hotwell level was the g absence. . . that the condensata pump won' t run. Tura the pump off? If' g you lost the condensata flow,- you would trip the main feed pump?
- k 4r 5
- * *** *' A""A' *" "'" *" * " ' # *
- 1 f, feed pumps.
oi r
l\ '
CRESWELL: So, you got a loss of feedwater event?
8t i
91 l tot D D: Right.
11; FASANO: Hw many of these did you have?
12'. '
I can remember for sure 2 times. I doW t know the exact 14t dates. It was during one of the many trips they had there. Well, I wasn't really on them but I was a bystander. I was on dayshift. I j 16; i
was probably on the lead shift or training shift or something wnen 17' they had a trip and I ran up to the panel to see what I could do.
IS!
Then I saw it. But then see, the next problem is with that, I mentioned 1_ c i that the normal and emergency makeup valves saw that low level. They ,
would open and they would dump tons of water in the condensor. Now, 21:
, the actual level is going high. Now, if it gets too high, vacuum 22!' ,
pumps. You also use all that space that normally was vacuum, is new '
22i water, and any steam that you've got coming into the thing, it covers 20 '
tubes, you can't condense the steam as well. So wnat haccens? The l 25 '
vacuum, pow. You lose vaucum, atmospheric dump valves open!
i l.
4 25 i
CRESWELL: What about them?
l
(;,1t, C) !
- If you got OSTG tube leaks, you' re in bad snace. i CRESWELL: Have they operated properly, the atmospheric , dumps?
(lei d' The only time I ever rememoer those things operating, we had just gotten off shift at 3:00. At 3:30, the oncoming shift had a trip and they lost, I don't knew how they lost vacuum. Mayce they lost circ water. I think it was one of the same type transients ! just described with the emergency makeup. They just lost vacuum because of a high level in the hotwell and the at.masoneric dump valves ocened and l I
just if there was anybody down in that room, they would have been PAR '
boiled, they totally wiped out the pressuri:er heater cacinets with steam. Steam was noted to have escaped through the area wnere tney are located. I guess that was called the M20 area. Througn the i
piping holes in the concrete structure down over into the control I building area and it went as high as the control room floor, back into the instrument shop. They had steam from tne bellows ructuring on the .'
)
discharge of that valve. I I.
I FASANO: Both bellows ruptured or one bellow?
O-h v One that I can recall. I know that one cellows cid ructure, i l I I can't recall, I don't think the other one cid, but ney replaced it l 1 with one of the similar design to the other one. I
(
1 I
26 1 .
i .
6 FASANO: Okay. Other equipment problems?
11 OSD: I Main steam line supports. Two years ago I can rememoer II
, somebody coming up to me and saying I don't want to be around wnen 4;
, they trip the turbine from 100% with the restraint system that they
- Si I have on those pipes. You'll have steam, pipes and laggiog everywhere 6i if that turbine trips. I don't really know, I know we went up, we 71
! heated up so we did have saturated steam in those pipes before the 81 restraints were put in. I believe those restraints were put in during 9i
- the relief valve outage when we replaced all the relief valve, they 10t
- redesigned the pipe hangers and snubber arrangement down there on 11!
those. (1) I'm not too hot on Burns and Rowe because they never i
12{ designed a pressurized water reactor plant, they only ever designed 13t
- boiling water reactors which is obvious because of the 5 foot concrete 141
, wall between the turbine building and tne control room. I don't know.
15l Did you ever notice that?
16i 17'
! rASANO: There is a, okay, you're talking about where the fire door is
'8!
~
between the turbine building and the...
19i 20! OM And the control building, yean, where they are.
21!
'2'I! CRESWELL: I've often wondered about that wall that's, not the wall 23 between those two buildings but if you'll notice there's a wall that 20 comes down in that hallway wnere that door opens uo anc its secarated
'S!
from the floor by an inch to 2 incnes. l' I
27 I
b D Yeah, I've 3een that. I never really wondered why that was 1
there but I just kind of chalked it up to the rest of the cr ny things 2:
I saw.
3:
l CRESWELL: Okay. What about the engineered safety features equipment Si itself? The high pressure injection pumps, I where there ever any problems 5i with them?
T CM No. I can't really recall any problems witn those. Unit 9t 2's kind of lucked out. We hadn't burned any up. Unit I went through 10t 4 of them, I guess, before they learned their lesson.
11.
v CRE5WELL: I understand the suction switches, low suction switenes have been taken off those pumas.
l 4
ctO That's correct. They used to have a 3 pound low suction pressure trip on them, I believe. I don't really rememoer too mucn
' \
that far back, but I knew that I didn't like that particular thing because a lot of times you would start the pump up and it would trip I
right away because of the low suction pressure. It also had a icw l
{
distnarge pressure. No, no it didn't. It just had a Icw discharge !
pressure alarm that I can rememoer. No, those punps , everytime I' ve 2.
operated them I never really had any problems with them.
2 L
1 1
L -
i 28 l .
L, FASANO: Sounds like most of your design deficiencies are concentrated t g on the balance of plant on the secondary side at least, were the ~s any on the, I mean about, are there any more you that you have in mino?
m Can you continue on you list? And if indeed on the NSS side?
Si Si C9-.O well, the wnole nuclear steam supply system, in fac tne ll '
, whole plant was designed for a place down in New Jersey. So in arcer 1
to accomodate fuel handling buildings they had to take and rotate the reactor building, the guts of the reactor building, the insice cart, C,
- ;l I
90 degrees. So that you could go into the reactor building and look I LOI l
at the wall and you'd have another 150 foot of pipe running around the !
W
}
outer edge of the walls that should have never been there. It should i L2' have gone straight out but I can't help but think that because of trying to, having a plant on the drawing boarc 15 years ago for Forked River, New Jersey, and then just take and modifing those plans, bringing l-them to Three Mile Island and constructing a power plant of that 16 complexity that things aren't going to be wrong. You know, there are !
definitely going to be design deficiencies. Somebody that designed i!
18: '
the system, somebody else is gonna come along and enange it to fit I 19:
TMI. One thing that I have...that I never really had close :ontact l 20:
with, I know that the auxiliary operators, just because tney 4ere out ,l
- 21. lj i
in the plant, they had a close contact with it, was the fact .nat they '1 22l had extension controls that went through the wall and they had :1utcnes ,
22I t that operated the valve behind a concrete wall for radiation. Those -
I 24: !
l each limit, limiting type thing. And most of tne time tne valves !,
I i
.S..C . !
i l
'l I
~
29 would never operate,-so you'd have to go.through these, back into tne l
L valve alley to operate the valve anyway ar.d you had to scend anywhere !
l from 2 to 3 times as muen. time in the valve alley, crawling over all these extension controls that were in your way that, you know, the poor guy would er1d up getting three times as much radiation than he should have. l CRESWELL: Is this a wide spread problem or an isolated proolem?
c R O.
73,3 ,, ,4e, spre,e. g3pec4,13y at f43 ,7 cccms, en, 3,geu, valve suction alley, the discharge alley and the 305' valve alley. l CRESWELL: Those are only hign radiation areas during operation?
C 9. O Yes. Now I'm- not sure, I know the levels were creeping up there in the later days of power operation. I know they were climoing up there and there were still valves in there that had to be acerated i for surveillance procedures, valve lineups and the like. Filter rooms ! 2 i
is the same way only the filtar rooms, you can't get into them. )
1 CRESWELL: Do you recollect a trip that occurred back in around Novemcer l l l
3rd, Novemcer 4th of 1978, a ' loss of feedwater type of trip? This is where an instrument technician threw the wrong switch and in concensate t
polisning system, all feedwater was lost. Do you rememcer any of the .;
details of that event? ,
1 f
I
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - a
4 l
.l ,.
30 o I 7{ .YARSH: Ycu were nodding in affirmation, were you not?
2 .
OM: Yes, I was. I rememoered. I'm trying to tnink. I nave to y , reprogram myself, here.' I have got to get back into that. I've been
'l through, two total loss of feedwaters.
Si i
6i
. CRESWELL: Here? I I
a!
9!
$ N _: Yes. One was at zero power or very low power and the other )
t one was at '20% power. And I really don't remember too many of the details. I do know that the switch that the guy threw was control 11!
power for all of the-valves in the condensate polishing system that 12!
- made them shut cutting off all condensate flow path. f 131
{
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1 14!
l CRETWELL: Do you remember any operators on shift ciscussing that =aitn l 15; 9 you, hearing anything aceut it? l 16i i e
i j
181 b : Well, I rememcer, they had the LER that was circulating and they had a synopsis of tne event that we read in. We nad to sign and !
131 initial.
20' -
i I
21:
CRE5'WELL: Well, this particular event that I'm sceaking of, I don't i 22! 1
.believe there was an LER generated. !
231 !
24: I I
25i
\ !
l
[ ..
(' l, , l' i 1 j 31 f
! )
D :
~
I see. '
t 1.l .
' a2!
CRESWELL: There was one Novemoer 7th that was a loss of one f=~ l 3l
~' '
pump, but that was with the run back. Okay. At this point in time
)
.q. we' re getting very close to the end of the tape, so we'll . break rignt a l here and- continue with a new tape. i 6i ,
l' '!
l 7l l
MARSH: Time is 7:32. I'm gonna break at this point and turn the tape over. .
91 '
. . . .)
10l
! MARSH:
Resuming at. this time, the time is 7:33.
nl
i u !
, CRESWELL: 'kay.
O What about you training at Three Mile Island Unit 2, ,
l13!
l . how's that been?
!14i -
c40 : I nate to say this but I'm gonna have to. They train, my .l w .
- training I thought was very well done. They put us througn a pretty * -
171
! . comprehensive program, the 8 weeks at Lynchburg, plus we had lots of time to ourselves just constructing the plant wnen things weren't very 191 busy. We could get out into the plant trace systems and alike. We l
101 l went through a mock NRC test that was given by a General Physics, tne ! !
311 i
walk around and the test and then we had the actual test. We had a i
$2'; I lot of relicensing training that I thought was a sig help. Cnshift ,
$31 t !
we had several lectures. They weren't always cone as planned out we
$4: .
did get in some training onshift. The guy would take a system and , I I.5i '
I
! I l;
32 give everybody on 'the shift a lecture about it. .But the licensed i
' ocerators that have come on since the cold licansing groups, since the initial ~ group of operators that went up, t::ose operators are trained to take an NRC examination. They are not trained to operata the g plant. They have copies of NRC tests, the questions, you know.
.. They're...
QI 7!
CRESWELL: 0q$ , let me ask you this. You stated that general pnysics conducted a dry run of the licensees. Do you find that the NRC exams 1, 91 are predictable, the way the test will be conducteo?
10: 1 l
l
' C q,,0 l
- Yeah. I think they are fairly well predictable. TMI has 12: l got an excellent record. I don't know the records of any of tne other 131 i
, operating plants. But I do know that TMI's record is good. I don't -l' 10 think we've 'had but one failure and that was in Unit 1. We've had 15:
several senior operators that went up for's senior's license but did a i
16:
fail the senior part but got a reactor operators license. And, you 17; know, I can just say that I feel that this operating record is inci- }
ISi cative of knowing what to expect. They can build up on;it. If they ;
- l. c i know that a certain examiner is going to come, tney can dig out all 20:
nis'old tests, they can, we have old interviews that somebocy mignt 21 have snuck a little tape recorder in their pocket and taoed the entire -
22!
walk around and you can get the tape conversations of those. I've 231 l I
seen those flying around.
24:
25i
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r 33 I .
MARSH: Have you actually seen a tape or heard a tape before this was ,
I I
done, or just transcripts thereof? g
($rIS- ) : I've just seen transcripts, no tapes. In fact, I don't even know of anybody at Three Mile Island making a tape.
I i
CRESWELL: Oc you know what the source of the tape was?
I l
1 (1, hbe C) : I do know this, I know that it was a Babcock and Wilcox ,
I reactor.
I e
CRE5WELL: Okay.
i
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- And it was a specific examiner. I can't even rememoer nis name. No, I wouldn't even begin to attempt to rememoer nis name. I don' t remember.
i i
CRE5WELL: One interview, it was one interview that you hac hearc of? j i l
(' T2,() :
. I think there was one, one for sure, mayce two.
- l
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CREikELL: Okay. !
! l i
MARSH: Where would I look if I wanted to find a set of those? Who l t
'4ould be my best snot that I could talk to? l t
.i i 34 i -
- & O
- I threw all my old stuff away.
2:
MARSH: You had had a set o'f them?
'31 {
si h : I had a set at one time.
l Si CRESWELL: Did you receive those through your employment at Three Mile i 71
! Island?
Sl a
.10t CM: Yeah. I can't recall who I got them from. I can't rememcer I
if it was the training department, which I don't think it was. I 11; think it was one of the other operators and he might have gotten it l from training.
13l 14:
MARSH: Okay. If you.have any additional recollections on those, I'd f
appreciate you get in touch with me. I'll give you a carc and a pnone 16i
. number and all that where you can reach me. j 17' t 6 : Yes.
Ici
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I 20t l CRESWELL: You mentioned before you'a c::me on shift and found tnose l 21 twelve valves shut before. What about, have you done your lineup on 22!
your panel before and found other valve mislineups?
23i !
2di 25i
h 35 .
b : I came in one day, this is just an example of some of tne things that I've had to come into. Met-Ed was a?way:s famous for per-
, forming an evolution 20 minutas before shift relia f. Turning tne n plant over in total chaos. I hated to turn the plant over that way myself and I more than hated receiving a plant like that. I came in one day to relieve the shift that had had a trip and I can't recall the exact, what happened, but I know that there. was an operator was k trying to control pressurizer level with MUV 168. Now that's a hign b
pressure injection valve on the A loop He was throttling tais valve, j
[ pressurizer level would go up, he would close it, it would come back I down again, and he would just keep doing this. And I asked him, "what I
l are you doing?" He said, "I'm maintaining pressuri er level." I l
} I said, "what happened to the normal?" "I do n ' t know , it just doesn't i work." And he went over to the pneumatic controller for MUV 17 and he !
, showed me, nothing happened. I said "did you cneck MUV 18?" That's i
the manual isolation to 17. 1 i
CRE5WELL: You' re indicating something there. . . t I
D . I'm indicating that I pointad to MUV 18 and tnat valve was in fact shut. And he says, "Ah," and other explicitives. And you l
know, I says you gotta wake up. I said you can't cperata a plant this i l
way. I came in another time. Now, I wasn't really taking over tne i shift out we were walking out the passage way c ming in from Unit 1 ,
which is normally the way we came in and every once in a wnile we'd ,
f I
i i
,f 1
- l '
l 36
( . .
- i
)
L; hear a safety go. And it would go for maybe 30 seconds then it would "
2:
reseat. We'd walk a little further and it, pow, went again. What ara -
)i they doing up there? I was with another CRO, we were just acout reacy ij to take the shift. I don't know. They' re not testing them. I thougnt Si I we were at power. You know, what would they be testing them now for?
6i We got up there and what had happened was they lost feedwater, pressure in the steam generators went down to the point where they actuated in I
the feedwater latching system which ' cuts off all feed to the generators 81 from the normal feecwater pumps, and it also shuts MSV 4A, 8, 7A, and 9t B, which are the main steam isolation valves. The sensing point for I turbine header pressure which controls the turbine bypass valves is ,
11' l downstream of the MSV 4's and 7's. They restored normal feed, but 12!
they forgot to open the MSV 4's and 7's. So that the turbine bypass 11 valves were seeing 750 pounds pressure and tne turbine, the relief valves in the steam generators were seeing 1050, 1060. So everytime 15 they tried to control pressure with the bypass valves, they had those 16i in manual, they would close them down because they'd see pressure was 171 l
starting to decrease, in closing down the pressure would come back up j 181 i
again and poof. It wasn't two minutes into the shift and Ray Boyer, e j 19 '
the guy that was taking the panel said, "what are you trying to do?" !l I 201 II He said, "you're blowing safties out there." "But we can' t control !
21! I pressure enough. And look at header pressure. It's down low." Right !
22!
next to it is OTSG pressure. It was 1050. He says , " Man, what's the 23! l difference here." And he looked up and the MSV 4's and 7's were shut.
4 2 41 ,,
He says, " crack those valves." They cracked One valves, ney closed 25i '
t -
37 fl the turbine bypass valves,- put them in automatic and the 'hing came right on up 532 885. Now these are trained operators. I don't like to say that my- shift was the best but, you know, I think.We were.
0 '
1 CRESWELL: Let me ask you this. What are the diff.iculities that you i encounter in coerating a plant of this design? l LON : Feedwater is very sensitive. It, I don't know. I don't want to say that feecwater is sensitive. 'When you move 11 million l i
~
pounds of water an hour, that, needless to say, is going to be-toueny, l you know, wnatever its just that a slight change in flow'is gonna '
cause a big change in the steam generator, but not only that the l '
primarly system is very sensitive. The pressurizer was totally too j i
small. Any decrease in primary system temperature, which would result from an increase in feedflow, would cause the pressurizer level to go j t
down and the pressurizer pressure to go down. It was really'very hard f
to control in this respect. You know, I, in fact, when we, wnen I '
control the feedwater, the amount of feedwater to know how much to put into the steam generators to keep the reactor basically as stable, as ,
q l
stable as I can keep it in a transient situation. I look at reactor l I
pressure. If pressure goes up I feed a little more. When I start to i
see it come down again, I back it off a little bit. And that's how r l know where to keep feedwater flow.
(
- i s
l i
1
)
l
i 1
38 I i ..
o i l)
_h CRE5WELL: How do you, after a reactor trip,.what are the immeciate .
}
actions that you'take? Could you walk us througb what actually..goes
[i h II on?
31 ij q
11 Si b : Well,. the first thing that you to is jen insure that, you
,! mainly trip the reactor.
or Okay,. that fust insures that, well, I :on't ,
7 know why it would, but the second thing says that you look up on the 1 i
PI panel .and verify that all the rod in-limit lights are on. You check to make sure that the turbine is tripped. That it's auxiliary cil pumos are operating. Make sure that. the turbine bypass system is
lot controlling steam header pressure at 1010. You close MUV 376, wnich
! is a letdown isolation valve. If pressuri:er level gets down below 12' 131 l
100 inches, you're supposed to start a second makeup pumo and just i
keep it ready to go if you need it. If pressurizer level gets ccwn !
14!
below, I think its 20 inches, then you're supposed to coen MUV 168 to 15r.
admit more water. If the makeup tank is low and the pressurizer level 16i is low, then you shut, or you open the DHV 580, which is allows the ,!
17!
ll BWST to come down to the suction of the makeup pumps and then you shut l'
' 181 MUV 12. !. l i
ISi l' 1 20! ll CRESWELL: Is that a valve you have to go out and manioulata manually !I 21-,
or do you...?
22' l
20 C40: Its one you nave walk around 20 feet or panel and occk 20
-feet to ocen.
25i l
t
- h. .,
t f: ; 39 3 .
. l 9 ,[ CRESWELL: What about the feedwater control. . .?
5 1
2 O O: Well, if you have any feecwatar stations in h-nd, you snou!c '
l f verify it, you should run those back consistant to the parametar nat i Si i they should be, in ctaer words just take it and take it all the way
.! down.
j os t
71
! CRESWELL: What if they're in auto?
8! i
$0 h 4 0 .: Well, if they' re in auta you just verify tnat feecwater flow is coming back at a rate consistent with the header pressure.
ll i 12!
I CRESWELL: Now, they' re set, the feedwater is set for 30 inches, 181 .
. right?
&4:
C ~
- On the ' low level limits, right, yeah.
L5i l
L7 CRE5WELL: Has that always been the case? It's always been set at 30 L3!
inches?
L@! I i
b : Well, 30 inches is the nominal, is a nominal numoer. It ll:
could be plus or minus. What they do is they set the levels in the l steam generators at 532 degrees so that they could get 532 degrees SS5 3ll
- psig. If they need a little bit more heat transfer to get that 885, 6!
then they would raise the level slightly, you know, varied mayce plus i 9i !
l
i r
- - 3 l )
I..
. r .
or minus 3 inches from 30 on either generator. .I knew one that was 2 about 32 and the other's '28.
'3r CRESWELL: I guess you've had a chance to talk to tne operators since 5i Y "* * "Y "* * #** * ' **** ' **
_.' the event? Where they had to take special actions and...?
ci 7!
O : I really didn't get that specific with them.
81 The only time g I ever talked was in a bar room. And I, you know, I don't like to repeat what I hear in bar rooms.
ll
, FASANO: You mentioned that you at one time found MUV 18 shut. What reason would anyone have to have that valve in a closed position?
b : To the'best of my knowledge that particular event came wnen 15i somebody tried to change a light bulb in the ICV 5 valve controller.
They removed the lens covers and everything. They pulled tne old light bulb out and they went to stick the new one in and, you know, '
19(
these were those PSB 120's that they're telephone lights. They're 20:
about that long and they have a contact making surfaca on eitner sice I of them about maybe a half inch. And as they slid this thing into tne 21; 22!
socket, it made contact with the hot side and the ground, it blew tne fuse for that indicating circuit. It also took away the indication 231
' l for all the other valves and happened to fail wnen MUV 13 snut, anen ,
2 82 they re-energized that.
25
ti f
41 i u' - CRESWELL: Was it, did maintenance repair it promptly? ,
i b
}
OhD : I really don' t know the time frame. What I saw, I understand it, how it happened. I can't rememoer when the trip hapoened. I knew -
they had a '. rip on that particular instance. I can't. remember wnat the time frame was between the time that the fuse actually blew and l the time they got it fixed. I wasn't on shift at that time. Then I do recall a sign back on that particular operating panel that said operators are not to change light bulbs in this panel, call the elec- l tricians. So we have to call the electricians and have a lignt bulb c !
changed. Another one of Burns and Roe's designs.
O l CRESWELL: Okay. One thing we haven't talked to you acout is wny you l
quit.
] -
b : Why I quit? About a year ago, well, it was even, no, it I
wasn't a year ago. It was a year ago. Back in June I had wanted to
~
leave this racket for a while. I think it can be a gooc career. In fact I enjoyed my work up there. What I did, or what I had to go !
l l through to do what I did, it was nectic. When I left Met-E:: my cloca l pressure was 180 over 110, wnich for a man of 30 years old is outragious.
My blood pressure had been high for over a year. In fact, I nac gone l job hunting back about this time last year and I had gotten a joo but it was a little less money than I really wanted to ta<e and it <as in j S t. Louis, and I didn't want to move. So it wasn't really a scur of I
s .,
42 I .
.j .
.[ ; - the moment type decision, which a lot of people thought it was because g of the accident. I did know that once the accident happened, when I 3l. realized the severity of - the accic/nt, I knew that it was gonna be a long time.
~
4i
, I had just gone througn 21/2 grueling years of bullshit, Si i
which is what it was, with GPU startup, UELC startup, and then Met-Ed.
.6i l And I didn't like being hassled by 3 or 4 different foremen and 2 or 3 different supervisors plus 3 or 4 shift test engineering and various other mechanical and electrical engineers, you know, it was just too' much. I couldn't take it anymore. I thought I was a good... There was shift supervisors that would actually stand over your shoulder and tell you exactly what to do. Raise steam water, you gotta get feedwater up, now check this and check that. -It was, you know, ridiculous. I knew how to operate the plant. He should have been back there taking 131 care of his paper work, but instead, he was right up there in the 14',
front lines, and trying to keep myself oriented in my own head I 15i always had to listen to this guy. And if I wouldn't do something he 1
16i told to do, well, he was right on me. He says why didn't you co that, 171
- why didn' t do that. Well I didn't see any importance to do that right li 181 at that particular time. And most times I was rignt. -
191 i.
2Cr CRE5'* ELL: Well, did they know wnat they were doing? The snift sucer-
21,'
visors?
221 1
23!
(QQ : Yeah, for the most part, but they worried acout the wrong 2M things. You know, they put their priorities a little different than I 25i did.
I l
i I
I:o !
i -
1 43 j ' CRESWELL: What should they've been worrying about?
- C, A O
- The overall picture. They should nave eeen back staying 1 -
taking a big,'a big look at everything that was goi.ng on around them ;
)
and not getting themselves involved in what the control room operator. ,
j or the shift foreman is doing. The shift foreman could direct. Its a :
team effort and I tried to promote that my 21/2 years that I spent on that shift,-I tried to promote team work. And it just didn' t work.
l There were personality conflicts, conflicts of interest, period, you ;
know, the guy just doesn't do it the way I tell him, or the way I 'ask him or the way I.show him that maybe that's the best way of coing...
- l He wouldn't do 'it just plum because I told him, and he would do it just to defy me. Now, this, you can't have team work that way.
i CRESWELL: Let me ask you this. When the supervisor was standing over-you shoulder, was this during a trip condition or during normal operation?
C 0: so, en3s w,3 euring, in fact, 1 rememoer t31s startup really 1 wall. My problem has been ciagnosed as labile hypertension wnicn j
means it goes up and then I'm gradual to bring it back down. I don'.
have a constant high blooc pressure preolem. I keep things bottled up inside of me. This particular night I came in, I had the panel, we I,
.I were ' scheduled to do a startup from 1% shutdown to 15% power. With I all the paper work and everything that's involved in made to moce l checklists and the surveillance tests that bac to be done prior to '
I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ u
1 4
44 1 ., j -
p gohlg critical, getting the operators stationed where they needed, 1 .
fust getting the plant in.a general stable concitton to perform this 3; thing, it takes a lot *of concentration. It takes a lot of effort on the part of the control . room operator to do that. At tnat particular
.5 time there was, in our alarm system is totally ridiculous, there were
~6 .l,' many f them and the system that they have is it fails all ' the
/
time. An alarm card could go bad and it would just send an alarm. It g ~woulci just keep flashing in and out. YouEculdsilenceitandit g would just keep coming in. And that God-awful norn, it would just, j you know, you're trying to concentrate on doing a startup and you got this buz:er going off and I'm particularly conscious of alarms because if you just ignore this stupid thing, what if you get one that's important. If you get one that's important and it goes unrec'-~ 1 red 13l 14l .
because you're ignoring this one over here you might as well not be in t
y .
the control room. My job is to keep the plant safe. If I, you know, J
')f I can't see what's going on around me then I felt apprehensive 16 i about the whole thing. I didn't feel like I can keep as close a l 1T 1 surveillance on the whole thing as I really wanted to. I asked this i 181 supervisor, I'll even mention his name, Brian Menler. I asked, I
{
191 l said, " Brian, could you have an instrument teen take a look at nat 20 l alarm 7" ! said, "its driving me nuts." I said, 'am I gonna nave to 21:
listen to that all night through this startup?" "Well, I guess you're gonna have to." Those were his words pretty close. And with that I 23l .
told him, I ~ said, "I won't do the startup under taose concitions." ! l 24!
said, "eitner get that thing fixed or find me a relief." And he saic, ,
25i l
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45 )
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"you know if you become, if you are relieved you might as well get 1
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your lunchcox and take off " Well, at that particular point I wasn' t !
I g ready to leave my employment there. .'iaybe it was a prayer, I don' .
i 1 j i know what it was. The alarm settled down and I didn't have to listen j
to it at that point.
It did come back later but not unti.1 after the j whole thing was done. They had an ECP there reacy for me. ! looked I
j ft over and I can' genera 17y tell whether the thing is gonna be close by just looking at the numbers. I've done encagn of them, you know.
k And by just looking at the numcers I can tall A ether they're gonna be...
i, FASANO: ECP end concentrator pointer... i -
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J CRESWELL: No, estimated critical position. . S E' -
, i bb : Est1 mated crD ieal position, yeah.
And this or.e, icekt.c good. It was,) I think, somewhere around 60% 'on grout.3 5 and 7.
s 3 i! 3 It 1 '
l s was wt'are they wacted it no, no,'I'm sorr/. It was aucut 62%, its the closestiI cWrememeer, on group 5. No wait, no <'ait, I'm getting' ' ;
screwed up here. I' ve beerd a$ay for a wn h and I ,Si f and it's a 1
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3-CRES$ ELL:
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Well, c i don' t think that this is critical inf,ormation.
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1 : Anyway. Well, just the way they operate. Its, the estimated l
t 2, critical position was something. We have a guideline if you go critical !)
- y before half a percant less than when you' re anticipated to go, you .
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p should shut back down. You should put all the rods in until you get y j the safeties in and then investigate why. So, I wasn't even, I was just getting to the minus .5% position and all of a sudcen I looked up q ' and I had an alarm, it was the startup rate rod withdrawal inhibit
.y circuit. The only thing that throws that into count is 3 dcm in the '
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q source range. And I looked down and I did have 3 dpm in the source f q range. It stopped the rod motion. I put the rod stick in and he says, "no, no, no. Just take it down one." I said, "what do you mean. We just went critical here at 28% on group 5." I said, "the j ECP called for a half a percent above that or better." Now that's alright. That's alright. We'll calculate a new ECP for where we went-critical. Now that's what they did. Now that doesn't show on any log 4
books or anytning like that. But that is a fact...
I QE5WELL: Was Mr. Mehler still a shift supervisor at this point? .
l D: Mr. Mehler is still a shift sucervisor at that plant.
1 l CRESWELL: At that point.
I
- Yes, yes.
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' MARSH: Mehler was the one that was on duty at that time...
l' b D: Yes. He was the one that I kept telling you that he would look over my shoulder. So I told him, I said, "I don' t 'believe that
~
?. hat's right. I'think that that is unsafe. I think that there's i
l something wrong here." Well, we'll recalculate it and make it right.
thich is wnat they did. They redid the numbers and somehow they fudged them, I don't know. They...
CRESWELL: Did they have a nuclear engineer come in?
C* : To the best of my knowledge, no. This was on a midshift.
l This was pretty late at nignt, which normally tnat doesn't hamper them from calling anybody out but I don't recall any nuclear engineer c:: ming in.
MARSH: [, you say they. Who else besides Mehler would be involved in that calculation?
- The shift foreman. !
MARSH: Which would be who? ...
bb : That was. I can't recall. ,
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i CREs q : Okay.
I 2f l
7 b : I don't want to name any names if I can't be sure. Because 4: we were well, Mehler is not my, normal shift supervisor so I'm not sure 5l that I was with my normal foreman at the time.
Ei 73 CRE5WELL: Could you estimate when in time, it would help us to pursue gl this matter if you could give us the approximate date. Was it early g, in the startup test program?
y
'.O r 1 CAD: yeah, I eelieve it was rignt back eefore the relief valves.
2 21 CRESWELL: And that would have been like in April or May in 1978.
.4j b : Right. Yeah, it was about that time.
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CRESWELL: Okay. You mentioned team work before. Are the panel assignments clearly indicated to people wnen they're onshift?
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b Generally on our shift wnat we did was we had a panel operator.
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, He was in charge of taking the, filling out the log book and just generally overseeing the operation of the plant in a wide scope.
Normally we were at steady state. We also had a person that was
..: 1 assigned to what we call the switching and tagging desk, and he would take care of any safety tags that needed to ::e nung. He would also
i s: .
i 49 d y perform the daily logs and the shift and daily surteillances and any g computer information'that had to obtained that day. Then we usually 3; had a third operator that was assigned to surveillance desk and he '
4; would oversee the, take care of coordinating the control rocm and the gf auxiliar/ operators in performing monthly or weekly surveillance Si tests. If anything went wrong generally what would happen tne closest 7 guy to a section of panel, you know, like we used to divide it un into g 3 sections. We had the secondary, we had the reactor plant and we nad gj the nuclear steam supply system which was basically makeuo cumos, low r Oj pressure injection and that sort.cf thing. And then the foreman, he
( would kind of rove around and maybe if he was in the back panel and if
, there was scme valves back there that ne could operate. This is generally the way we worked. If something happened, you kncs, you'd
[ yell out and say. . . analyze the problems as best you could. . . and say,
[ "we lost feed water." And at that time the three ocerators would come o-up and they would key in on a position that wasn't occuoied and then
. , , take over.
J l
CRESWELL: What about shift turnovers? What sort of turnovers cid people ordinarily make to your knowlecge?
0- ;
I b : Well, they varied between snifts. ,It deper~.ed who you turned over to and I always turned over to major stuff, any, I always ,
let them know where they were in rods, wnat tney were coing, nether they were coming in or going out. I let them <' now of any acnor :al f
9 50 3j conditions that existed in the secondary plant, you know, like they g are doing a polisher vessel, regenerating ~ that. Or we throttled this 3! down and put this in autenatic and something, maybe a major change 4! throughout the day. Any jobs that were in progress, I'd go over to -
gl the ccmputer and show him the primary system parameters, pressure, I
Ej baron concentration, reactor power, and such things like that. We 7j generally have a written sheet. Sometimes guys would draw it our for gl 3 or 4 pages and they would put the most miniscule items on there gi that, you know, generally I looked over those. But the major stuff, j Oj. the turn vers, I guess, were generally pretty good and I say that on a steady state basis. Like, I don't know how may times I've taken the j plant over in a transient and it was total chaos. You know, they'd y leave, you know...
4!
x CRESWELL: 'You would have a turnover in the middle of a transient? '
Si 7,i O : Well, maybe nor necessarily in the middle of a transient.
I, let me rephrase that. Let me say after the transient was over, perhaps during the recovery which sometimes took days. But generally, 3 :.
you could get things straightened out in a shift to the point wnere, you know, the major work is done. The big things that have to be done and the small things. Most of the small things are cone. The big
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a things and they can come latar, you know. But its really hard when
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2 41 you have a trip. There's so many things that you might nave seen that 1 i
y'ou took some corrective action for, tnat mayce somecody else mignt j ot 1
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- . . - - - ._. A
l 51
'not have done that or maybe the procedure didn't call for but it was okay to do it. . It was safe, it was conservative. And you forget to l t
mantion that to your relief, and you go this valve open and then you :
k go and try-and do something else and, you know, it just doesn't respond I right and you locking around for a problen-why that dummy left that .
valve open. Why did he do that? You get mad at the guy because he didn't tell you about it but, you know, it was an honest mistake. I very seldom got mad at guys for poor turnovers because I generally made a pretty good tour of the, right after he left I would go around
. tha plant, the panels, and look for abnormalities that I saw. If I had any questions I would ask the foreman.
FASANO: 01d you have a check sheet or did you do this just by knowing the system, its all in your head. i C.4.0 Just by knowing the system, knowing how the board was to look. The positions of valves, you know, its like it almost :ecomes instinctive after a while. 1 FASANO: After a while.
"' ' : Yes. l i
FASANO: You mentioned that you did have design concerns on Octa the '
nuclear and the steam side of the plant. Are tnere any ways otner l
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{ 52 j
L than complaining verbally that you could have reported these to your '
2p management? I mean, are you people...
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6; FASANO: Allowed to report things on paper?
7f gj b : Yeah. We can generally writ.e a little letter to, you know, g, the cognizant engineers of the problem. And generally some of the Oj perating conveniences, they used to take care of but things like, and
. we'd write these or even a verbal comment, they would normally fot it 7 down themselves. They were pretty good. Sometimes they never got g done, but at least they'd listen. But the major things, you know, p like the relief valves, condensate hot well thing. I can' t even know i he nas yet t day, whether that system has been modified. But, 51 g; yeah, you could write him a letter and even a little diagram snowing 7c what you'd like to see, explaining maybe even perhaos how to go acccmo-lishing the change.
Si 36 I. FASANO: How about reporting to say other agencies? I mean can you, I !
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mean talk to other people like ourselves or. . .?
tl b : Well, that is, I forget the part number. 10 CFR 20? I Il can't rememoer the regulation...?
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1 53 l
FASANO: 21? I 1
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('eI "' : Yeah. Its the one where if you see the company doing scmething in violation of any. rules. that you can go to the NRC with the complaint'. '
CRE5WELL: Have you done that?
4i
(;, t2,0 : go, CRESWELL: Why not?
(= l "() : Because I felt that if I had of gone there, to the NRC, then thsy would come down on me. I was a little afraid of that.
MARSH: What makes you think that way? Do you know of other instances where this has happened? Have you been told anything formally or informally?
0:
No. They never really came right out and told us that, you ,
know, that you would be " prosecuted." But I just felt that knowing i
tb way they operated that it would be kind of like being the black shsep now all of a sudden and it was tough enough to get along. I g I
' found it was tough enough trying to get along with the other pecple uo l there. Just, you know, team work type thing. And trying to ceveloo I j
the rapport of the other shift supervisors as well as with my own.
That would just make it totally miserable for nyself.
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54 i
FASANO: You're mainly on Unit 2?
l 25 y b : Unit 2. !
4!
FASANO: Do you have any knowledge that this is similar type of operation S
f Si n Unit 1 or are they different? To your best knowledge. You know, I 7j mean if you don't know, you don't know. If you do...
81 g, bN: The only thing I can make is an assumption. The only thing 1 01 can assume s a .es mpe sors t.5at are at the plant tM ay were either former control room operators in Unit 1 or they were l former shift supervisors in Unit 1. Now I can't help but think that they gained some experi'ence in Unit 1. That's all I'm gonna say.
There's nothing really else I can say about it.
15i CRESWELL: How about the performance of surveillance tests at TMI.
Can you ccmment on that?
181 b :
Surveillance procedures, I guess, sometimes I, well, I did a L9i !
lot of them. In fact, I did the one that caused the first safety 20!
features actuation where I tripped the alternate feed supply to tne inverter and lost a DC supply.
12l I corrected that too, by the way, l
while everybody else stood around, looking around like they didn't know wnat was going on. Now generally, the surveillance procacures, 141 we did them and sometimes they required a change, you know, like well 15i
l l
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i y there was a small procedural deficiency or maybe a valve numcer was !
g wrong or mayce there was a better way of doing it to get the end 3j result. We sculd change those, the TUfs would taka two licansed i
~
4 operators or two senior licensed operators uniess nuclear safety was 5 involved, then it would take PORC approval. We would change those, i
l g make them right. Scmetimes in the performance of a test you couldn't i 7 get the required results and we'd go back out with the shift foreman i l 8l and he would get the proper results. Sometimes we' d. . .
91
'" " " Y"' ' ' ' * "
Oj t
C : Well, an example, the emergency feed pumos, running at 1
surveillance, it was a bear. Every time that we did the surveillance 4:
that they called for a thrust bearing vibration measurement and it
' also called for a temperature reading on the bearing and called for a l i
y o.
certain differenital pressure, suction pressure had to be between a certain amount. We've .;.ever done that test wnere it came out the same ,
way twice. So we tossed up our hands and we say, you know, wnat do we e
do? We can't get the reference values, we can't get the proper data. l i
Okay, well never mind. I'll take this procedure anc ll throw it down at the surveillance... I assign pecple, the inservice inscection ,
type and they would evaluate the data and then they would come up witn a new set of reference data everytime. I l
And of course the surveil',ance j i
that we did would fall right into that. I never did understand tnat. l t
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CRESWELL: Any other systems besides the emergency feecwater system 2
, inv lved?
3!
4 O N I can't recall. I know that a lot of the balance of plant Si surveillance. It wasn't tech specs or balance or anything like that, 6 that would go by the wayside. You know a lot of time it' would call 7 for maybe the secondary service coolers to be backwashed and we don't g have time for that. Then you just sign it, you know, throw it in the g basket not ecmpleted, and it would come back next week to do it, you
- ' know, never get done. There was a lot of things like that on the secondary side. We normally did all the surveillance that was required for tech specs, but there was a lot of times, you know, I can' t really name any specific instances but. . . for specific procedures. . .but I know 14!
that there was exceptions and in the exceptions tney could paper those away somehow. I never did really understand. I don't go in for that kind of thing. I figured if it can't be done by the surveillance procedure, you change it so that it can be done correctly and within the scope of the surveillance requirement or you don't do them, you know, you get the thing right and then do them.
20:
CRESWELL: [,arethereanyotheroperatorslikeyouthatareconcerned '
21 l
about some of these occurrences?
22' 24) o O: yeah, I woule imagine that there.s quite a few tnat are concerned. I'm 90t sure that their attitude is the same as mine. I 25; i
u_________-._____________.--------.--
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l 57 !
e t !
i know that they like money. I mean ooviously I didn't'quite up there
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for a higher paying job and that I know that a lot them stay around t
th:re just because of the money, that taey' re afraid to leave cecause, ,'
you know, they like money so much. P.ut not only that, I guess tney're '
a little bit more, well, they are just cut out of a different mold.
Thny' re not as, they don' t say things the way I say them. They have !
to be concerned. I can't really see where they couldn't be concerned. a I have respect for everyone of the operators up there. I have respect for the supervisors too because well they went through hard times but somethings that they do I really lose respect for. There's a couple I just, you know, I wouldn't work with them for anything and that's one of the reasons I left.
MARSH: We are getting towards the end of the tape. The time being l 8:14, so at this time I'm gonna break for a moment while I put a new tape on.
j l
J MARSH: l The time in 8:15 p.m. , the date is May 22 and we're continuiag with the second cassette on interview of CQ Q , Jim, ycu were asking some questions when we broke to put a new tace on? ;
i I
CRE5 KELL: At this point Hal, I'd like to ask you if you have any comments, any other comments. These are of an open nature, they can be directed toward NRC, Met Ed, whatever you feel like commenting about.
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' I,
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[b : Well first, I don't know...this whole accident seems to me g like a nightmare. When it happened, I didn't really want to dissociate 3f myself completely from the accident, I wanted to be there to take q part. But I realized that my health was endangered at that point, I j knew that I had a problem. They say that high blood pressure has no 5
f
[ symptoms but I could actually feel it. It was so tense inside that it r
was just indescribable. That's why I resigned, on the spot. I was I
7 j 8
1 king, I had said before that I had looked for other ecoloyment and g couldn't find any satisfactory to that point. I figured that by doing 10 Y **" ' ~*" **" "* **
- finally rid of this, this emotional pressure. The emotional pressure-11.
I operated the plant a lot of times, especially during transcients or tests, knowing that the plant was already 40 years old and they weren't even in commercial operation, and the plant was a wreck. It was dirty, there were oil leaks, there were water leaks, there were steam 15i leaks, the design deficiencies that I had mentioned before, pump
}
controllers not functioning, you know, if you want to start the booster pump because you need it, maybe it doesn't start because the auxiliary
-t
. oil system has got so many leaks then it can't build up pressure.
ISI ;
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Just not being able to tell myself tnat wnen I go to co scmetning at ;
i that panel, that what I want to do is going to actually take place.
21:
. You know, I operated it a lot of times up there wnen I had the panel 22!
! and I dreaded it. I really dreaded it. I would go in there and my .
231 stomach would be in knots for eight hours, I woulcn' t eat anytning, and I was on t% verge of becoming an alconolic, I would go out after
(
4 l
.. : I 59 l
a shift and drink and it was terrible because I was becoming a physical I I
and emotional wreck, and it was due to these things-the design of the .
i plant, I knew'how the GPU startup program and the people that :erformed :
those tests were all very smart men, but they had no common sense. --
They would have a test procedure, it would have more E's and D's than it had pages. And you can't conduct a startup program like that.
CRESWELL: What are the E's and O's? .
b : Oh, those are exceptions and deficiencies. Let me say, maybe not deficiencies, I'll say exceptions for sure. But they had many exceptions to the test procedure. When Met Ed took a system and accepted it as operating properly, we still had the oil leaks, we still had the water leaks, we still had impellers in backwards, we still had suction strainers that would clog up every two hours of operation. It was a nightmare to operate the plant. Over a year ago, I told Bob over the phone when he contacted me that I told my wife over a year ago that that plant was an accident waiting to happen.
Like I said, teamwork, interdepartmental teamwork was one of the biggest things that I saw was a detriment to that plant. Cperators ,
were always trying to pin something on maintenance, maintenance was always trying to pin something on the engineers, it was just a constant fight back and forth, the operators would get stuck with this because I
maintenance didn't want to do that. You have the maintenance : ecole from Unit 1 would come over to do maintenance, " Man this place is
{- i j 60 l !
[ fucked up, who'd ever want to work over here?" Now how does that make 2
an operator who has any pride in his work, any pride in his unit, hcw y does that make me feel? After a while, it drags you down. Then l
4 pretty soof), you start taking on the same attitude. Management recognized f-5l the problem but they didn't do anything about it. In fact they procably I 6 did more detrimental to moral than anything else. They bring in a 7j Navy captain to be Unit superintendent just because Jack Herbein, up g there, wants to be a captain in the reserves. I don't know that to be g a fact, but that's the rumors that go around. The administrative y Loi
#" # #'Y 99* " * "A '*"' **"*
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I l
ago, a Navy captain. They had perfect qualified people, with a masters, they had a guy, a master's degree in personnel management, they brougnt
,3 in a Navy captain. I don't care how long you've been in the Navy, I
.4 don't think that Navy people have got an ounce of leadership cacahility.
They don' t know how to lead people. If you' re in the Navy, they tell
,5 you to do something, if you don't you go to the brig or you go on
,7, repo rt. Well, see I'm getting the job done, but they have to do the fob. And it was getting to that point with me that they were talling me I had to do something and I cut them off, I fired him. You're fired. You can't fire me, I'm supposed to fire you. No, I'm firing
- 01 !
you as my employer. You knew, that was the type of atmospnere that was !
generated, I, and I finally had it. I know that with all good conscience all the other operators up there felt, feel the same way as I do, but they're just not willing to get out.
Si !
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_-_----- - - - ~ - - " - - - '~ ~ '
l-
! 61 CRESWELLh I've got one other point that I'd like to cover. You're I
experiences with the alarm computer printer.
l
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- Yeah. I've had several experiences with that :ning. ~
CRESWELL: Can you go into that in a little bit of detail?
I'm intarested in history of that printer and the problems that had been encountered with it.
for$l-"): Well first off, the mid-shift is supposed to gather uo the paper that has been pushed through it during the day and then they make a nice neat package of it and g1se it to the operating engineer.
A lot of times I'll see the printout for the day, I usually go over just to see what happened. But they, you can see where the typer tould stop or the paper would tilt and it would just print a bunch of garbage. The alarm typer itself, it'll back up sometimes for, I've seen it backed up for as far as an hour, wnere it was printing out it was two o' clock in the afternoon 'and it was still printing things from one o' clock. !
.vARSH: Misalignment, and paper feed, paper jams, was that a 'recuent occurrence? I'd say in a weeks time or a months time, wnat would you expect in terms of difficulties?
t r
[ 62 O -
Sometimes we'd go a whole week and not have any problems, 2 but then other times we'de go and again, it was an operating problem, 3; people didn't understand how the roller-feed mechanism worked ano .ney l would take and they would clamp the roller down to the, and make the l 4
5l paper tight in the roller where it shouldn't have been. And then if f
Si there's any misalignment in the back feed, and that roller overcomes f i the force of the little pins that stick out through the holes.
And then that Would Cause it to run off the track and a lot of times g you'de find that to be the problem. We never really had too much g; problems on our shift, but like I said, going back and looking througn
,1 the logs for the day, when I would collect them, I'd say that I'd see maybe three or four times in a week, or on a shift, that we'd have problems like that.
'4!
CRESWELL: Have you ever known of an operator shutting the alarm printer off purposely?
6, y
.8 l b : No that depends for what purpose. Sometimes I've seen people turn it off, but the only time I can ever say that I saw anycody, in fact it was me that turned it off, was the fact that the alarm ,
printer itself has the selectric and there's a little tape in there 11:
that moves the ball back and forth for upper and lower case. Well *.he
! thing got stuck on upper case and it was just printing garcage. So,
!31 at that time, I turned that typewriter off and then the utility typer
!a; is supposed to take over in that case and it didn't. In our case, now
!5i
i 63 j I can't really say. I've have never personally seen anycody intentionally i
turn it off when it was functioning properly. I don't really see any i nsed to do that.
i
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F_ASANO: I have a couple of things I'd.like to ask you. In the training '
l when you were at the B&W simulator, did you go through simulated g
events wnere you actually did some practicing? Where they adequata in ;
{ your opinion?
?
l m ON: Yeah, we went through reactor trips, we went througn turoine l
j i
trips, they had individual instrument failures that we had to respond !
to with various stations at hand. It, for me, it helped me a lot. In the Navy reactor program, everything was done just manually, ever/ thing, there was no computer involved. It was such a simple system, it worked so well and then you come up here to a complicated mess like that is up there. In fact, I want to make that, I think the place is i complicated beyond.any technical ability to operate it. And maintain it. But I feel that the training that I got down at Old Forest Road down there was some of the best training that I ever got, in plant l l operation.
- 'i l
9 FASANO: Was the simulation pretty much what you :an anticioata at THI-2? 1 d
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i I j 1
1 I
4
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( 64
- - I used the control reactor pressure the same way.
l 2!
3j FASANO:- Yes?
41 5 g C/ : Yes, it was very close. The only thing that wasn't really I class was the size of the control room. The Old Forest Road simulator 6 .
g panel would fit inside this motel room, where you might be able to get -
~
gl panel 6-A of Unit 2's in here. - It was a lot closer and working with g it for 8 weeks, like we did,'you became very familiar, it was very g easy to have a reading become instinct to you where you can just scan the panel and see something, that was abnormal, it was good training that's really what I kind of worked on myself.
}
i i FASANO: Then, in vour comments I gather, could you elaborate on now
- you would like to see a control room and-what would you have different !
L51 in this control room that could help the industry, for nuclear power .
import, for nuclear safety, and ease of operation to keep it safe.
i L91 b hO: Unit 2, the general comment that I have is that there is too much, well the panel, the front console is just entirely too cig. And there's too many components that have to be operated from the back.
Like, if you want to open a feed-water valve to recycle feed-water for i clean up, it takes two people to do it, sometimes three. One guy to !
!31 l watch the pump, the other guy to jog the valve open from the back of
'.4!
the panel and another guy over at the comouter to read the flow. Just 15i l
. I L
L 65 l
l for a simple, ordinary manipulation, the whole control room could be a lot smaller, they~could have less indication there. That Tiay seem - !
kind of dumb, but in Unit 2 they have so much need' ass information, like manel 6-A. I -still don't know 'what those things were, those -
matars. I couldn't instinctively look at a meter and say that that is bus 26 volts, I couldn't do that, in fact, I just put it' totally out of my mind, except for the ones for the generator and then I could look at those and say that's close,' it's what it should be. And the \
other ones, it was a very hard control. room to become instinctively i
familiar with, just due to the nature that you had so many gages that were not necessary, or if they were necessary, they could be located maybe somewhere of f to the side, where you look at them every. now and then.
i 1
i CRESWELL: Could you comment on the location of the leakage recovery system panel.
ChQ Y4s, you can't see it from wnere you have to operate. So, if you're the only one in the control room, and the drain tank needs pumced down, you can go back there according to the procedure for :
routine operations, or to investigate alarm and correct tnat alarm, in !
which case you would, but you would have to leave the main operating console, with nobody there, which is entirely within the scoce of the ,
I procedure. There's supposed to be at least one licensed operator in i the control room at all times, and the procedure, operator at tne B) l 1
t I
[ 66
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t controls, it shows a shaded area wnere you can go, it shows during :
1 2; normal operations and normally it was witnin the confines of straight i I
fj lines back to the wall to the shift supervisor's offica there from the ;
computer to panel 6, the electrical panel. If you had an alarm condition l 4
Si y u e uld leave that area and go back along the side panels to the 5
leakage recovery system, the ventilation control panel and then back p to the RPS cabinets and some of the electrical relays back there, you 8 e uld g back there to investigate an alarm. Which if you got a high g drain tank or a low drain tank level you would have to go back there, g if you were the only one in. In panel 25, the annunciator system g there doesn't give you a flash on the front panel that you have an l y, alarm back there. So, again if you're only one there and you push the 9.
button, it doesn't silence any alarms on panel 25, you have to run l
I 14[i back, around the back of the panel, and push the annunciator silencer
, button on the panel 25.
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15!
16:
l i,ls' CRESWELL: Previously you mentioned that you were having to pump down '
the RCOT about 4 times during a shift. Could you tell us wnat impact 131 l
that would have if you were the only operator in the control room? l 191 i
b D 1 Well generally if I was the only one in there and I had to 21 pump the drain tank down, what I would do i-s, it's one of those instinct things again, or not an instinct, but it's kind of like an operating method, so to speak. I would see the high drain tank level. What I would do is I'd go over and push the valve tnat admits the water to l 25; j
i 67 i
the bleed tank from the drain tank at maybe 50 gallons a minute. And I l
! would just let it pump. And then I would get the low level alarm I l
- and I find it, or I'd get an alarm, Id find I couldn't silence i-l-
from uo on the console itself and I would walk back and then secure '
the pump down at that time. A lot of guys would stand back there and weit, they'll just push the valve and stand and wait for it to pumo out 10 or 15 inches of water.
[ CRESWELL: I've got three questions to ask and they may seem a little L
.l bit silly to even bring them uo, but I do want to cover it and I would I like to get any knowledge you've. got personal, heresay, or even borrowing i knowledge on any of these matters because they are relatively serious.
First of all, would you know of any information regarding personal action by anyone that would have brougnt this event acout or increased the severity of it? Anyone who would have had an axe to grind that in i any way could of kicked this thing off? {
t {I i 1 b __ Absolutely. I don't know.
l I've never heard anything to that nature. '
i CRE5WELL: Then you are indicating in ne negative?
b -
That's correct. I don' t know of anything like that.
j q
{ 68
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y CRESWELL: Secondly, frem your experience, your work axperience with g TMI, what are the demeanor of the work crews when they are on duty?
$ I'm specifically addressing getting lost, sleeping on duty type of 4: thing. Do you have any comment on that? Any knowledge of people that Si g ing ut and taking a nap when things are running in a good steady 1
6j state?
71 gj b : On our shift we were pretty good, but we did have our sleepers, g, now the auxiliary operators, I know they used to sneak off for mayce 10; an hour, two hours, something like that. To my knowledge, the plant was covered in his absence, that somebody else was if he was supposed to be someplace at a panel, he was covered. The only thing I quess g really detrimental to the plant's safety would be if he was a fire brigade and didn't hear the fire alarm go off, or if we had a small break loca and he was the respondee and he wouldn't be able to take 15i his action.
17 CRESWELL: Could you go into that a little bit, the small break loca respondee?
Igi l t
b -
Well, we had two, one was a control rocm operator who nad so I 21:
many minutes... A month ago I could have spit these things out, no sweat. The control room operator would have like two minutes to recognize that you did have a problem. A loss of coolant accicent, with the failure of a diesel on the side of the break, or tne side of 25i
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- f I 69
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d the makeup pump didn't start. The control room operator would then go 2 down to the, whichever affected valv'es, whichever valves did not have 3; power and he would get on the phones and throttle open those valves 4 two turns. And then at that time he would be in communication witn Sj the control room operator at the panel. The auxiliary operator, at 6 that time, was to go down and open up the one remaining shut suction !
cross connect valve, so that all three makeup pumps suction valves, or suction lines would be tied to one common source, dhich would be from g the borated water storage tank outlet valve to the decay heat suction 10i header on the unaffected side. All this had to take place within ten la,.
minutes after the discovery.
12!
CRESWELL: Do you have any comments on that?
131 14; b : Well, we were supposed to check the communication headsets 15:
l once a shift, and I'm just as guilty as everybody else. It wat just U1 one of of those things that if the guy called you up and said, yean,
, lets check the loca headset, we did it. I guess generally the feeling was that it was being done and i'. was being done at an adequate interval.
I don't really think that there was any safety lost. I den't !;elieve that it did that, but we didn't do, we had drills every unth tnat we !
were supposed to run and generally those were run v ith a great deal of
- consciousness. I know that that one valve down there that they had to 231 open was a bear, it was a bear to get open. But, I think that tne requirement was for if ke 2 or 3 turns ocen and tne requirement, it '
Si didn't have to be fully open.
. 1 1
70 I
y CRESWELL: Do you feel that it was in your capability to respond as 2, required...as control room operator for a small break loca?
31 :
4i
- Yes. Unless...they had scaffolding down there...if they 5'
aver took the scaffolding away, it would be tough. It would be tough g on both sets of valves, the A and the S valve. There's no permanent ;
, a 7j scaffolding leading up to those valves. We've been lucky so far that g it has been there, and you climb up and get it. As of today, I don' t g
know if it's still there.
101 FASANO: This wasn't there purposely for the purpose of doing this?
It just happened to be there?
]
131
] bN It was there. I don't know if it was there for that reason or not, I really don't know.
16i FASANO: It might have been there for that purpose?
1$
19!
bM: It might have been there for that purpose.
20!
FASANO: In your opinion is it? I 231
! Ob: Yes, but then again, it may not have been.
l 24: 2 25i
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! 71 h
MARSH: I have one last question addressing those areas that I wanted to cover. That's the fact that this event occurred on March 2Sth, which happens to be an anniversary of the plant. Do you have any I information, or have you heard anything at all regarding the possibility ~
of a party going on, concurrent with this or any type of celebration that may have been planned or taken place?
b : No. I have no knowledge of that. I haven't even heard anything about that. ,
i i
MARSH: That's all I've got. Do either of you have additional questions? l:
l'll open it you one more time, Hal if you have anything else, more !
you'd like to put on tape? #
[e b I don't think I should. No, I'm about drained. I really am.
I MARSH: I would also indicate that if more comes to mind, or in cleaning I your stuff up and moving around, you come across something you think would be of value to us, you have a phone numcer, you have my address, , .
1 you have several phone numoers where you can get hold of me anc I'de l very much acpreciate anything tnat you do come across accitionally.
j i
Likewise, if in going over the tape, we do have some interests we l
would like to pursue a little deeper, do not be concerned if I get i back to you again and would like to talk to you again. It does not -
indicate proclems, it just indicates that we've found something of ;
I
s .hq 72
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i
'nterest that we'de lika to pursue in a little more detail, so I'm 2j going to hold on to your local number and don't get concerned if I try l 1
.to get hold of you.
3: i 41 i
St : Okay, fine.
I 6i j CRESWELL: We would like to say, very much thank you coming in on your g own time. I' know you've got to travel a ways to get here, and we've j g, taken up most of your evening, we very mucn appreciate it. You've
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.10l given us some good meat to consider and get into. We'd just like to f g say thank you for all of NRC. g 12' j MARSH _: The time being 8:41 p.m. , at this time we are going to terminate y the interview of C A O , the meter reacing on the secone cassette ui is at 466, so I'm ending at this time.
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ll ARTM A N , IIAROLD I
9/12/79 NRC Transcript of Special Inquiry Group laterview
A -3 t s
Regulatory Commission on or ab out September 12, 1979, Misters E v an s and Vandenberg from the NRC Three M13e
~
Island Special Inquiry group? q l
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THE WITNESS: Yes. - . 1 i
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BY MR. ORNSTEIN:
Q Do you have a copy of the tape that was made --
j at that particular meeting that you had?
' '~ l A. . Yes. I have half. I have half a tapa. 2. 2_ i The other side didn't ecme out. I. 1 1
do have a copy o f a t r an s c rip t which was made frem the i
notes and t h at tape. l 4 Was that a transcript that they made or a - ,
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transcript that you made? -
T_". ~ _ .
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A 4o, this was a transcript t h ai~ ~t h e y' p r o vid e d -
=e. It wasn't verbatim. It*was more or ic:s sat up in questiens and answer type outline .
MR. CRNSTEIN: I w o u ld li'.c a 5 0 c .i--t ':
this as Exhibit 12 0 3 an d h av e you identify th'at.
I i
(Whereupon, Exhibit 1203, a docunent, as arked for i de n t i fi cati on . )
THE WIT:!ESS : This appes.rs to be thS
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[J .: c _ . s n t . _ _ _
)
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4 61d you examine a facsimile of this exhibit .
and re view it in any dapth?
A. I reviewed it. Not to any ;;re at depth, Ju: t I wanted to make sure that the general content of =y answers and the way an answer could be misconstru:d, l I w ant e d t o make sure that it wasn't, in face, a l .: .: c - . ,
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i st rued during the t ranslation , and I d i d n '.t.. find any o f .
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t h at to ~ occur:
- - j q If I understand ' correctly the vorsion of --
these three exhibits, 1202 an d 120 3 that. y ou have seen l 1
are correet from the s t an dp oint of the statenents that -
~
i were made, kn d if w e refer to the:s -- St r1%e that , please.
. Now, you =entioned the fact that ynu ,
had spent several years in the Navy prosram. 'Jh at wts you/ particular designation ?
A. I was an e12ctronics technicia.n an d lat2r .
qualified as a reactor operator.
4 For hcw lens were you an electronics t::hni:ian? <
A. I was an e12 ct ronics t e chni ci an for five l p a .* s .d a re act or operat or for ab out two and-a-half. ll 4 Durin g th at pe: icd o f time y cu .e::t ion ad that you wera as::1gne d on shipboard duty?
A Th:t's correct.
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4 And du. ring those two and-a-half ye ars. as-reactor operator yout were on a Nuclear Subnarine? .
'd k Th at 's correct.
)
4= 'And'.the work that you !aad done for the Navy
-and your training program you had c e rt ain formal class- t '
1 room-training, is'that corre ct ?
]l u ..
A That 's correct'. ,
. 1 4 Could you reflect b a_ck _an.d t e ll =c. yh at - y ou- 4
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not1c'ed that was out st andin g in~Ibbe#11avy trai ing and t he- :
Navy ' training program relative' t o 'that of' which. you re- .
1 ceived lfrom Metropolitan Edison in your verk with Met Ed-as training for Aux 11111ary Op e rat o r as'vall as that of
. <. . : 9-a Cont'rol'Hoo.m- Operator?.
_ .A _ Tsere is a lot to put t'caether hire. I dian , t realise _-- I'could have don some preparation, but I d i dn ' t . -
I kncu that the lavy P r o gr am .ia s ! .e i
1, b7 top-notch people.
I I mean the Admiral had to handpick all of his ins t ructors . He met each ena persen211y, and if he didn't --
Like anything he s a.I abcut the person, he just ousted the=, They couldn't be instructces.
They had a regular sy-tir.ntic aphrcach. It was more or less program-d al cat .h t o
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p .- 1 i
.g1!r.
i b ((
. l I, your progres sion' through your training . ,
You ne ve r le arne d too much' t'co fast, .
and you ' als o un.ders t ood concept s before another cno was j- !
t introduced .that sould later re fle ct back to that c c-. c e .c 3. . [>
So it taught you to think sad 53 .!
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analytical to that standpoint. t a
Met Ed, the Aux 11111ry Cperator ,
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training really didn't -4 We d5.dh ' t h av3. _ uhat I Tould. .
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kall t op-not ch instructoi s . They we re .... Eriowis dse ab. la , .
'I l 4 .. I i I,but , as far as their ability to put todether.a program
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43 is-my opinion that they'couldn't do c.s-profascional 4 j ob as a Navy Program would be put together.
j:
g . . m i So , '..t h e re f org, it was haphazard, '--
, i e.-, . 1 4.nd -
the learning I don't5belia se was aa. thorough. .
2
\,I do'n't believe that we got as nu :t ,
gout of training as we could ilave had it bcon = ora ;;o- ;
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gramod. .
'It is also "17 opinion that I thin 2 ;
Est.Ed did a fine jcb o f C r?.inin g us with what e they s hd, 2nd people, mat o ri al-wis e , I t hink t h e y -di(,1,, fin a ,
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'jcb.
-i As far as the C ont rol .E c cm C,. nat e:=
trainins, I had eight teaks of intensiv3 t r ain in :I d:wn en the Sinulator, 3Cocs:k an d k'11 c o x .
f, l
That was eight weeks of classrcom j covering in s t rument aiten , controls, various things li%c I that, and then actually applying the classroom knowledss 4
in the Simulat or with casualty actions, s i=ulat e d casut 1* '. :I ties.
- That to me was invaluabla, and I kr ow {
itq w as invaluable, to. ,a lot ',of the o t h a r " f a 17.
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ve nt 4
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b_ ,otin there with me because, a. lot o f t h e m n--e v.3 'r si..o. .ed
. _a det ch" on ' a p a.nci '11ka th at, b c fore . Op.27 ucra out in the
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igngine room turning valves and things lika th",_,~ au hare G had s o=e hands-on e xperience wit h casualties. from a
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I knov it helped
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them a let' bein.3 ,
able td recogdise and an alyt e ' prob le=s real quickly! I
. . ,3 thought th at that program was well coordinated, and I I
,/
think everybody came out of there .t a a at that ;cint a/ .
j competent operator just on th at parti:ular ~. ,tey hevelop2d skills there, hcVever, th at they b 0 0 : ~. : '.e i
scinet af ter awhile , so no matter where you go ycu can o
use these instincts that you have learned thera and apply t h e:2 to the re al= of a cont rol roon the :1: 3 of Unit 2 Af ter the trainins that *e
. :t C o in in Lyn :hb arg uo had s e ve r s1 s ct icn.s i c ar.- i n - . 2t
-.____.____,____.-__.____________m
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individual components. Reactor cooling pumps is.cne I c an re c all .
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It was just basically review-type, keeping us refreshed on certain ideas and concepts.
We had a two-week cras course so-to-spe ak right be fore we had a simulated'NRC e:anina.
tion that was given by I can't rememb e r -- Gon aral Physics. They gave the simulat ed walk-throush , and I
~
took that. __.. _
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I*didn't make it but, you know, they all do that. , l 4 I don't un de rst and .
A - _ Well,' I di dn ' t_ p as s that' e xaminatien. '
. 1' 3 ,
q _' Simulat ed .v alk-through? --
.,wM F "-I didn't phssithe si.ulated one. l l
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l 4 However, later on you d.id pc.cs a.; atu21 w alk -th rou gh ?
A Yes, that's corrcct.
4 'Jas t h at due to the fact that ycu trained
- ore, or was it that the NRC talk-througN was 6 ciar?
A, ( ..._.No, a_m N R C . e: amin- at
i on _ t o = e '.,_ s n c'_v e'p i ?.::
. . .t h, o r . 7 c u .2 ._, Ou S .t:h97 1.h et he r- y ou, . in ow th e- an s w e r, .t. he J
f.re.--going.to Os,k 7ci. .
7E... 9 v,a O b '57 .hE,5.bfr.y,c.;C 2.1-~7d
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O r" they-are going'to ask.you. They are going to ask you 'l [
some questions about the react or.
r I il Thay are going.to r' R ask you- s ome questions. ab out the turbine. They ars 5j t U going to ask you to go out in the plant and find conpo -
ne nt a .'
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. . . .sd ird ~. T hrn$ Ic they ?,
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den ' t, c ove r th'at ,they b ayen ' t really -- The N3C hasn 't
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done their . .:
job, I th i nY. ..: .
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. y My ~basic i= pres sicn of an NKC walk - l i
aro un d , and examination is thorough ' knowin dge , b e. sic !
I l '2nowledge, and also the walk-around part. of itTI'i:hWe - - - - - - _ -
- e j h ould- .5'e. t o._i: e s t e7.e composure of.the e:amrnsaT.
- 4
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h- .'other voids, h ow w e qll d o e' s ' .t h[;;.* a
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.i (2xt=inee stand up under a stress ful ten-hour ,ex.anincti:n i
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jwith questions from anywhere. #f! ;
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- a i This was my 11: a o f an NRC t o t se, ;):
. . . 4 therefore, I conducted mysoif during tha exaninstica ,
with a. irect deal of calm, thinking the answera cut 1
E I
I before I gate them. ,
, 4 Soce g'.iya were petrified. Y u kne1, !
et ^
they would just s t an d t h e ra cor tun hours, but ! 1 n'- ,
s '; ;
like that just because that's the way I thought an .1 l
examination should be. :
And it's 10possible for a.nybody th.t's . .k:,
} il
w not associated with the plant to a s k e ve rythin g ,. and everybody can't know everything. You know. So --
4 You mentioned the fact that you had difficulty -
with the General Physics Corporation a alk-through . I assume that w as several weeks prior to the other walk-l through for your license? l A I belloye it was a month or a neath ' -. d - a . .
half be fore the actual. , _
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4 ' Do you t hink- it was because ycu i.2r2 ora
.,. .;._.a . .
up -t i ght as opposed to not knowing as much, or . ras it a combination 'of both? -
A ' dell (, at that p articula , poin{ 1h' t the I OL
. . - . . _. ~ .. -.
ist re s s ed in anot he r' w ay "not". in volvin g ny j ob '.. -and o I t,hink that that p' rob"a'b l'y h ad ~ a. b i g b e arin g ' on 1- a':I _h e ll' 5 as I didn 'tr think the guy that'~was g?ving ne my"uTik-T.around knJw as Each as I 'd1( and_hi'; conce,qs t.o t eemplotely in le f t -field , and he ba d ny a:- - . a : 2 c. n - --
Or the grading of my answers en th at he thou ht it ch 211 be, f
Q Did you discuss your ob s c r v r:i cn e w1:h an y : .10 ,
frcm the t aining department at 1% t Ed subsequ?nt to t;at p articular tralk-t hrough ? ,
A Ch, yes, yes, and, you knew, t h a ;- all :ay t h a.t this 13 just scnaral -- :s ew , I'm not q . : t in.;
-..~.. _.._-___...._ _.,__ ;_ ____ ._ . ._ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ . , _ _ . _ _
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anybody, but the,genersi concensus of the training de p art e.e nt was, yes, they are alw ay s . t ough . They 11 ant I
i to -- I don't know if it is to instill a fe eling of fcir i
into the examinee or what.
I think it's sort of that type of thing, perhaps to make you feel not quito so r2 dy; a dubble buster so t 'c speak.
End the'n we did have , I knew, tuo weeks'more o f re f re s her t'r ain.ing --
af t e r the walk-around ,
j the acek walk-around- be fore we took the test.
- Classroom, and we brushed up around ,
i the plant and everything like that.
- q. In the ' interview that you had with tha iRC !
y Spe cial Inquiry group peopla you =ent10 nod tha f;ct l
that there were some typewritten copics of sc 2 :i alk..
through exams thst*were haid at o t har facilit _ J a OJ I believe there may have also becn some at Ihrc; ::17. ; ,
Island.
I would like to eat.2r thi; .3 Exhibit 1204
('.lh e r c up n , I.th i b i t 12:4, a de:*a-
=ent c o r.t ainin g a nu.-a a r of e x =in'a: i cn c , -.* a s mark:d for id.en:if'.2f;i n.)
emee e--* *ese.e e- < ame eem em .eese.,em w. es e **.no e me.e _w_
- - - --- -w esmamew ._
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ay :tR. ORN STEIN :
q Have you looked at that?
g A I didn 't think I gave you so many. -
Ye s',
these are the docussnts. "'hoy appear so. They appear to be all there .
q Okay, did you'use these documents in tny vay 1
shape, or'. form . .
_. to as sist , you in preparing for any o c t.g3 1
~~~
.NRC enamin at ions ?. .
~
A.
Knowing by philosophy which I just told you
.previously, no. I didn 't use them. I 'had no need to, 4 Do you recall when you first received thosa documents?
I
_ ' A.
-No, there would be a time Name up to a year prob ably that I could have gotten them. I know I had them in my locker for quite some time.
4 '4as that before hou bocare a c anriid at e fer a Reactor Operator subsequen to your t e in:; an Auxilliary 1
i Operator? ,
A Yes. -
l-Q .'
'das it before you passed y our Aux 1111ary :
\
Cperator examination?
- A.
My Control Room Operator 3 5 l
4 I'm sorry, that's correct: Centrol Roc 7 ,
lC;e rat or E;;;m.
- 4 o
. -- 1
_ , _ _ ,_ _ _ . - - - - - - - - ^^^^^
, . I i ,
. i I
A I can't recall. q 4 l Do you recall what the source of this set ol i 1
documents was?
- 1 d,
L A I wouldn't -- I know somebody gave them to ,I me, but I can't remember who it was.
,. You know, 1f I could kind of visus] e .
ise whe'n.I got them I could erobably visualize the face ,
but I den't really know. .
_ .4 ( 'Je re there a lar g e'.n"umb e r. . f. .p
.o e c o l...e. - l_i.. k e,
/ours e l't "sha 'Iiad ,bhis. , ie t of docu=ents ?
A Yes'. ,
4 It was commonplace among the --
A ___[I would say so, yes.,
4i~ Was- it ever, . mentioned to' you bow the- docume.n t s.
w.'.. ..
fren St, Lucie walkiEhrough exams. .round up at different
\,
\ utilities? .
A Yes, but I really just assumed that it's lika, f
you know,I nukes are one big family, you knew, and ono sets .
a pat on the back from anothe r, a.nd the other wants to !
.* 1 respond. It's just that way. '
I sear look at the insurance policy that Met Ed has, five hundred milli,cn dollars. Who p ay s for it? All of the other utilities.
It 's j us t like St. Lucia says sand e mc, . .
- c. .n m.m. . -v-3 i
copies of this out. I would assume that's how they do it.
q Would you know if this was something dene b; - _
the training departments or the individual coerators a:-
the plant superintendents or --
A I have -- No, I wouldn't have any ide s . I have never seen, any of this 50 on, so how would I kncv 1
- 1 how it's done?
If I wanted to sit down in front c: '
- a tape recorder for ten hours and talk about what I talked with my examiner about I could do that, and thes 1
they could t rans cribe t o whate ve r they w an t , but ! l really don't know how it i s done.
4 Do you know if Babcock and Wilco an d the training department were involved in this at all?
A No, I do not. f ,
4 Do you know if these w a lk - t h r o u gh e .i am s ore t r an s c rib e d from tapes that were held on the candidates' 1
person as they vare acPu.lly walking throush ,
he plant ,-
as opposed to a deb rie fin g s ub s e c,u en t to the exam?
A No, I don't know that either. l 4 '@ e .) jeu ha1 jour valh .throu;h ex .1 for the Three lle Is 1_ :d Cont.;l 9oom C;crator 11 ; c .. . e w e .- o you l
de bri e ' ed after the ex.n was ov r?
- A l
~Q A.
No, not by anybody other than myself. I de --
briefed.
Everybody wanted to knov . hat -- Yc u 4 know, just among my peers. None higher up.
4 Was a transcript or recording made of these observations that you made?-
Not to my knowled.e.
A.
.- --u- ~ - - , - 1 Jdst .-.-to put .it .. I
.:n t h e re c ta rd,. 2 Ta> e
{
rno knowledge that-da t c d e va r 'had ..
s .- . . . . . - any.hing 3
':o do with l s
transcribing walk-throughs, and I c c.n ' t help but think i that you are diving fo r s ome thin 6 h c rey 'a:id ',,hl,1,[I ,p re dejnt e d ,
ou with'was a set'of d.ocument n ..
m hich I ree<21..vi..d.
~ --.. .. .
1--. r-~
~
Qitinin53 I reali: you a.? intere n ' > d in the se documents but, you know, I, like I 311d beft/7, I don't know where th27 come f om. . '
'I don't know who ukes thct.
Mat Ed dcann't ca' e then aat I knca of so -~ .
"o
- 4 You said you received them from tr 'ning. ,
- !ow -, dcas that = c an :caebody like '"2. s h 3eeru, :'e ls on 2revn, or Dick Z e c hm :.n ? , ,
~.
A" It's posstble that they .0 T!1d.
4 As opposeri t o s e:-; on e lika Caller._ r o r s c r.t :r.e like th at 7
1 j
lI i
I
$)
N U
A No, I don't think it would come from anybody .
h}
like' Cellenge r. It would probably be maybe Unit 1 Control ?.com Operat or had had a copy an d , you know, he -
1 gave it to someone else who was studying for a Unit 2
- j!
license and, hey, these ara pretty neat. I m13ht nake [
some copies of these and see if anybody else . rants the: .
And he might go about dis t rib u 31n g i '
it that way. That it happened that w ay I don't know, but it was just one of the me ch ani s ns that was frequently used for other things. .-
a Tes, but I got the ingression from what you [
just mentioned a few minutes ago that it <as coming from ;{
i$
't training as opposed to operations. Is that correco? ;
A\. , ..I assumed that.3 hey _came r?6Y Trai,n3ng . ,
4 No cne actually put a s t a.~.p on then saying, !
)
hera for your pcrusal, or to help you for next men 3h's exam u se this but don't tell any o n e uhero 1 :ane l con:
3 A No. It wasn't like that. j 1
Q Getting b..ek to c omp ari s o:.s with the :ic v7 .
Training _n d the Met Ed Training, did the 'favy te: h s
[.
8 i
you or have courses or lectures en thermed7namics ad .E a pha;e c h c: uj e in the primary :ystem.as well as chat) chaade in 'eneral J and the ?77 re lat i on s hi p s and su;h?
I d
p A Yes, they did. ,j i
t i
r!
1 q And did the Met Ed Training star after the i i
same? :
f A, I can vaguely remember a lectura on that e
subject,*but I think as I recall it was only taught enc {
i time, and that was it. i And it wasn't all in really t h *.t !!
[L much depth. I'
~ I q Did --
?
A I think you might -- Are you re f arring to the .
Zirconium Hydriding? .
4 No, I was re f e rrin g to s at uratica senditiens, .
two-phase phenomena not necessarily associ.ited with .
hydriding, generation of steam voiding s at u r at i on .
A Tes, they did t alk about t h at . T'.: o y tal?ad about heat fluz ve rs us tr .te r tampe ra' cure in ::atu rnt: 1 .
s y a t e :n s , what happens, nuc1'e'at a b o111.13, b ul:: b o ilic. ; , .
film boiling.
. They talked quite a bit . bout 10, ,
~
d e p a e i ally 't h'e 7i Tam _.gd.l(3ja}0 y 5, .
b; <
q g They biting --
A The t; ainin g de p art.r.ent at --
q Met El an d t' o N avy ?
, 4 A Yes,';;h. .
I q Was t'. fre ar. 7 c p h e , i s in . 7 u r !'. O Ed t ing 1 -~~. - .
i
-.. ~ ._ . .
en the possibility of boiling in the core?
A. Yes, but as long as we didn 't exceed a safety .
limit there should be no 'c oiling.
q Q 'the MTt!'Ed S t af r iis~t ill '<i t h f t j ou a3 Indo rs t andingm e shqCs at hratt en-t emp e ratu .v. . *. rro s s u- e 6t i on s hip s ~rhiob -wa r.a . .beh A -.35e --a.a_GSR 7gs a
[t h e y .3 u a e a ay., ".H 2.7 , t b is. i s t E~e___',1gi: , 2a ci
~ ~ ~ ~ - -
~.il i-~~cs7gt~ ,
(f~'byea ave . f.. o. . ~mak d -'s ur.o'ero u d o o_rtaw 's ,.. ... <1t'ain
- 7' A. Well, there were se veral different curres that we operated by based on how many reactor c oolan t p u:: p s we had operating, and they were the flu: flow in- g i
balance curves.
T f'{~fd. t h e y _alwcy s- t M I'v3 E u .: a : , - ~
_ as Top {
as J on s t aye dirithin line s .tho- de p artu're fr6m ~ :t!
. .. ..y boiling ratio was always going to be greater th:n 1.03 <
4 1.307 -
A. Yes, 1.30, an d that boiling wen 't occur. ,'
N,/ > c m i' And then also they di d .di.mer.7E'o' n i DNER, what it was, how we got it. Ecw we 50,0 tho term things like that.
- f. '.
% \ D1ci,_t h e y 1:L::.r2t.2,_ ycp, g.b c,t1 e o'I.h e a ;.' 'A f,;1.' _
l c". ' I s N ',[ **J J 7_ E 7 s t O d %
? h* * * *
End t h a.t was ~~ That's tr/ extent. That's si they s ai l .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ ---_-__ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ ~ - - - ~
r q Did.they e ver instruct you ' ab out p r e s s uri:s d - l I
level'and the fact that high pres sure inf ection was to beikept on as3 1ong as the primar'/ system pres sure was 1 l
l below a certain point regardless of what. the level was 1
.j i
or was it a matter of looking at the l' vel instead of e
i the pressure or both pre s sure _ and levo 17 i
, A.
Okay, to the best of my recollection'wa wero
, told that we should follow our indic ation. an,d -h155 -
~
> kr avin'g "it_'f
's . ~~
d as h e re s y t o let -
-Yo u wers commit trin g 'a-
_ . ~
$ rem.~c'a' haist 1 --~t'o.'..le. t.. . t h e '. p 1. a.n. t ~ii6'sT'L1 h .
j C f I s_ a.,w , a p re s s uri=a do .le ve.l. Join;;
1 gr6at..e r Yh..an 400
- in..h...
c esf w. hic.h is top., scale. I_would
~ -
( t'u rn t h e . p u.mp s _ jmyself. I would do that probably 4.%
1 I checked all the, cther three -- Or all the othar two !
channels, the o t h e r . t wo r'e d. u.n d.an. .t che.nnels*T ..
would check
\
to =ake sure that those other two are r2.: p o ndin g tha
% same way.
4 Did the Navy Training dif fer7 A. This is taking me back he re .
, k (Vharsupon, a t e chn t .: :11 di s c u s s ion followed, off the re co rd . )
' l 1
i .
Q Can we go back on the record. '
i l
_n .
t Training that hinted or indicated that one should i .
l1 throttia back the high pressure injection on certain ff I? transient s in orde r to prevent a SCRAM and allow a ICS h
runback?
- A i I don't think I unders t ood there . I ' ,n ' t f-1 think it's possible what you just said.
I
[ q Well, the high pressur i injaction can be
}
_ init'iat e d 'aut omat i cally . However, the operator hcs tha j
capability of thrott1* ng back the number of gallens i
per minute that the system is delivering, an d t h e ques <:1cn I had is do you re c all anywhere in your training the sugge stien that you throttle back the high pressura i
inj e ct ion at any point in ordor to prev 2nt a SCRAH7 A I ne ve r been t old that by Mc': Ed.
ik f i C an I s ay that if h'.;h pr:ssur ;
injection has occurred, au t o'ma ';i c a l ly ti. : re r.c t o r .
should already b2 tri, ped. i I
i, 4
Well, en a turbine trip you dcn't .ecesaarily '
trip the reactor. . f i ;
i e A
i e
!!o , but if you do get hi;h pr sur2 inj . tion 7 7 'l 4
.f s
7 T1 will have a turbine trip autcmabically at Iow d" f-' 7 I t
t p r : s s ure o r vari .e.b le p re s citre tamper 1tura.
2 I
a l,
'{ 4 Sut y:u vill nc t necessarily : .ve a SCR/.M. !
I Q
A L l Sane thing. All the rods d e en.. rgi z e and j i
L i
i,
- l l .
go in the holes. . .
g Well, the idea of the ICS'needs to allow the plant to remain.at some hotel load or house load while
. s you: try to fix the problem' with your t'urbine or ' the initiating event and not actually SCRAM per se..
Let's proceed on to other pointa.
'4 hen you .wa ve with Met .Ed you mentioned the fact that you were initially an Auxillikry Ope rator. I assume ycu came in on the Aux 1111ary Operator A-level?
A That 's correct.
4 That was because you had additional training compared to one who would be coming in at the Au21111ar y.
Operat or ' C-le vel?
A That's eerreet. ,
4 And as time went on you applied for the l position of Control Room Operator, is that corre ct ? {
i L' That's correct.
4 Wh at was the incentive available to people s l
like yourself to become a Re act or Ope rat or as opposed ;
, t o an Aux 1111ary Ope rat or ? ,
l A Well, for one thing it was over a dollar an g
[ hour raise just to start, and then; of course, arts r j I
you progressed through the training period it got 5 P progressively more until you got full rate for CRO.
(
i I
/
'dhen you obt aine d your NRC license you got at the time it was $21,00 a weak i l
P
~
extra license bonus, and for my own personal reasons l for taking control room operator, I wouldn't go any further if you, don't take what's a:1 e a d of you.
I didn ' t want to be an aux illi.iry operator the rest of my life.
4 Did you find that there were any drawbacks associated with being a control room operator?
A Any -~
q Drawb acks ?
A Ch, drawbacks.C.I guess the re al drr.< tack ,
hbat I could see was being in. close_ c on t ac t , wi,:h , c o -
ts mahy ~ p'e ople 'Ef oni' t iSe", especidlly'during the hot.
~
~
fun ctic'nal t s s tin g 5n[~5h5 st ar't -uk te s tin; pr :grt.7
~
. There wdre engineers and c>ople just congre5ated in the control rooms i c ok ' .ig .' o r information, tryin g to run tests, and, o f cc ,rse ,
any tects that are ;oing on in the p l a.1 : h . te to co a
through tha con trol roes operator er t:.rou;5 t .: 2 a:11f t foreman via the coatrol roem operator.
b
- O f cour
- e , he has to *:eep all s
t '
these things in his mind semehow and k2ep them with t
.!, a fair degr:e of a r ran co ne r. t . Ch at , plus all th) e t --. . . . . . . . - . . . _ . __
l
\
. .. . . _~
l .
c-l 1
L constant hounding. by pe ople othe r than the ceople run-ning the' tests.like can I get this valve closed and opened, it was ,1ust a constant harassment for eish hours.
g Was the Auxilliary Operator free of this kind at harassment?
A Yes. =Dasically the only harassment ha got was from us, the Control Room Operators .
q Now, did you find a requalification p.'ogram to be a burden on you as opposed to having s t a *i e d an Aux *.111 ary O p e ra t o r ?
A. No, I don't think so. This is my own per. '
~
n cn a1. ---
i .
Q Well, when you studied- for your requalifica- ...
tion did you study on your own time or was it e x a 1. u s i t a ly on company time?
t A.
Well, as I recal1 we had three o p :t r a t o .'s , :
i I
three Control Rcom Operators at the time. j i I. One suy wa s_ d e s i s.n ate d ~a.; s ur /J'_'1 ;
) ,
1 t
}
1 1ance c oordinah or., j ind th*at j ob" n or=..117 took maybe an -- . - . _
4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> into the d.,.y .unt.11 j eu could get all the pape s i, . 1. -
_ . . . - ~ 3, e h u f f13d.. r,u:: . 2a t hc .-a.p p r.:p r.GCoTo'p,lo , - -
en d t
.. h e_n -i f. . j
- Q t h e r e: ,. . .. ia s ,y.n 7......f o r t~i e",gu y t o -d o ;- t h e n- he - w o ul d do it.
l n
L
_- -_ _ _ . _~ -- - - -
I c ; Julda '.t t' dea ..t 6 o i o n g *?. a.r.i.G. .'.I W ~ + - . w w. .-e. =n ,a e
- ~ ~ . . .
, \
I-- . ... -. ,
wo uld us e &t dAL: 5 0 -s.a_in. . t.h.e_~_ b~iat ck ..
w awh e re s '.,a 1:&:
- la'"qiri..e_t .an...d .. --
M vie ~w my n o e s an d thin gs ".12s t h a t ,
I got to see my wife yet alone taking home little enough -
a pile of books to study till Q 1
%En_e yally smWd~~gn" com.p any_f,,;3.g.s, i
g
'das that the norm? Did most operators do is that way?
\
~
A.
I really don't know.
guys took them home. I don't kn ow -~ Some \
Other guys didn't.
q Did Met Ed give you specific home'tork assig: -
ments when you were in the training crogram for your .
initiai ,
P.eactor Operator license? That is would you sc over material in class and then be expected to produce t(.
u2 ertain problems or feedback a n xt day, or was it certain information the 1 f
secething that they did not expec* 1
}
you to do anything at home and it was mainly while you iwere on'whatever cite or classroom 7 l
A.
Okay, I think I'm oi: king up v h' a t program
.ycu're talking about, and i t 's the one that's ccnducted b y .'te t Edis training through the '
li c e n s in g ye '- . . ' i In other words we have -- Je h ad '
m Various jctays of trainin ('.h *:o u15 - .
[.
ea'ning ._._..._...___... _ g. co det.cn-to- the g -.-.-
q b ui 1 d,i ng_e_n d_ d t . . anj _i!q._f.f.o u 1 d. - - - -
a
. ~ ~ .
~...._ s udy u .y _ f11a 4: r %n. c y. p r e ce d u re s ' _n d -t h eu"3~ y *.'. t'_1.:1._gi.y.e s
.- OT D'hF.frb ,
.- ~ a 1
- .- l I
_ _ _ _ , _ _ _ - - - - " - - ' - _ _ _ - . . ._ _ . _ _ - - - ~ - - _ _ _ - _ - - ~ - -
r
, a
.)2 fp~. -ee hours.tc. study them.. .
'f e,.,.my wa uid3 ve , s.3_,ir..s. ir_u etcr .t o ..go .
' Kva z. _t h e m wi t h_, u s ... an.. .d.,a.4J hp en.d _ o,fJ_ _ .at se.sg y6n w e .-
1 -. ,
Vould: have an,. ex am.ina .-
- s ..
...ti,on CanA.,jhey,_,wguld..ha_ grada d . i.
i:
, If we got less than an 80 en it U Sf they would send it up to us in an envelope , and Wa would . y have to. complete it by such and such a -date to get-cred!t for it.
\ ~
Skat. . n o n e 6f.'. t.'.h at. ge~n e}alI 7 ' "h. _h_d._t o .
. c 4 5 _ . .. .taken home. 'I don 't think anybody e v p r.. t.c o}{,,.,_anyi o f. 1
.f g enat h o. .me . , . :
q- Now, did it work the s ame way in your initial. .
- wl license studying"or preparation? That is not tha-i.
P:
.-squ'altrication program, but the cold t raining as vou- k had or the hot training as it may have been?
A.- Yes, we had basi $ ally it vas what we ec11 the
~~
'tJT book , an d it was -- They . had'all the s y .s t e ms listed,
.;t d a general study guide for each system.
- 'g.ind we h ad_ t o c t udy t ho, a t udy -lgu i'de ,,
}
2
- 1r tho' s y s t c 5,' Ed 'Eis n "wi e .o. d.1...d, :; o t o ' a :.: hit _t~ f'c N m 2.n
~ ~ ~" ;
- e. i 7e a shift sap'$~rv i s o r ,' ~an d h c wo uld .~61.'Fe . u.s..'.'_a..~.ch e ct 6 u. t g
i C. , . a~~.~ : it 4 ,
I might say at this point I was a Jart of the first group of operators to be licensed at 1
m i the initial -- The initial batch, f The people that were licensed afte r e .
i the initial group of Oct ober 20, '77 they started in l on the company program which was another program thing..
t
) '
You know, they asked them a lot of k
j questions about the feed pumps , and then they would 5 have a test, things like that.
q But it was mostly .
a I ;
studying while on the CJT 1
ii pro 5 ram or something which did not really involve a lot l of outside study where you weren 't really expected to take all the s tuf f home with you and spend hours on end ? I l
i
{
i A If you had to do that to got the license I i
.e they expe cted you t o take things home, l ;
a 4 (
Now, did the Navy. operate the sama w: .y r I s
A I guess in a b aa ic s o rt of way. 1
- I
$ They wont let you go ho e. If te i needed an extra two hours of t raining at nig:. b::ause we didn 't do so hot durin g the dan they said, "You just (
- ~ ( e tn ' t so home un til 6 :0 0 c ' c 1'c .: k .
- 1
.i That's ju t a little push, but t::at 's 5 P.
What they do. r
.i 4 !Ie w , I have been made e, tare of some n u :l e r.r f,
P1'00s in *.hich I'= not sure if it's AO 's or CRO 's have 4 s te , stoppee at the g,tes t, u,1cn se,.,.res e., d ,41e t o i
L .h -
. * .q' leave
' their books at the plan t , th 1the work home i
f with them,
'dene at that it w.
the plant I own time. on utility time M
( ,
l
, Do you s
t recall se j occur A at Three Mile Isla n ? d Not to q
. 4 my recollection.
'da s there tbe conduct very heavy union an d Control Room of businest Operat for the Au ;
ors?
1 minute, MR, SMITH:
Off thd o ( Wh ere up on ,
ff the' record.) there'Ng B Y .'4R . i ORNSTEIN: .
4' Back on the record, Yhen new p.'sition, a person like yci \
1 1 - take for was t :. a basis example the CRO pot r . .
. . . . upon which you =.
i salariad, 1sht . h,p_ f e,_ b 1 ch an se d uput.edel o r -4 eten -
t.
itr r d s...?
mined if I got I f ,Is', Fen {crity ,
\
_ Company 1
the j ob , t. e n t ej 4 \
a If there us.s i
- 13openingd
\
= _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
g
. t i
____ C . , ;
E k
t
' t.
the 111th in seniority I wouldnft get the job.
other 13 would.
The
] .
q Okay, once you got the job what about incre .
- i monts in your salary ) 'e and reviews or annual reviews ?
ti jj What kind of measure was there in determining your t:
i ',
par forman ce and your_ eligibility for raises 7 i I; 8
- : i!
A, Okay, we ha'd periodic reports. .I can't ift i
'rocall if they were tfi;s monthly or every six =cnths. I I belleve they were monthi.y or 90 days.
[gf, Every 30 days we would get a report, .' i and it was a standard Met Ed fdr:s t h at his attitude, E
.f.
,t I his work attitude, is he picking up the concepts of .
1
\the new job; you kno't, . ....
-}
1 questiens like this, perfor= nce '
t
' and then they would be 'i rated by the supervisor. o T
.m 4.
i "Jere there any specific thinds listed? .r ;
exampls tu ned IF vavles so nahy tines, did so .any thir.js to cause so many reac';171ty I
- i. changes, pushed *: h e vrons J buttons so many t imes ?:.
- 0 Was there aty s u.ch estessnent !
.nade of the. o pe r e.t e rs ? _- .. .
A.
( IIc .,
, {
Basically that ue do there was it we E o
had C person that was in trsining for a lice.:se a .d '
I L
l he needed to do five F r.: s c t i vi t y :,anip u lat i on s we t s u l-
[
a-tually _ _. :.: e w o uld c '; an d by a li c e n s a d operator and s I i Ko thrcush overything ':orora he I
w.. .etually did it, cad E
{
l.
=&.
I l
1 F
., 4 he would make.the reactivity manipulations, and then
.\
we would log it into the main on los'as so'hnd so P, .
performed reactor. start-up under direction of licensed - h
' operator Hal Hartman,
({(
a a
. ~ . . . - , . , . , . _ _ - -
t; o q- !=,
- c 61s 'wcul,.1,.; b e primars.ly]ha.t,g3;,3 gag j 0~. p[i 4 sac requ . - .
_ . irementa rer. the lieense , a. ..uxer.it was;_ue,3,on,p _
j;)j
[q. 3 .
4 thins.for;a Mat.Ed assessment havin's anything to do wish-d
. . .. . . - I f the employee,'s salary 7 '." '
I j,: ' ;
A. No. -
- i l
y, 4 Now, getting back to - i I
I A.-
Okay, the former question, I think-I'under- i.
{ 1 stand that. -
f 4
- o ~ Yes, that's what I was going t o get be.ck to ,
.3 4
I .think what I am t rying to gat at a m ,, was if there is an y. real record mad 2 of having a man
) s t an.,
i d back 'and say, "Okay, h's pushed the wrong button .
that tit:2 ^ Mark it dcun." Things like that, there
! was n othing. like that? i l
f Tha p3rforma.nce of a.n operator f
'.t a s s
(based on bir**ki n
-- You-till in the b l .2.:c ,
A.
\ Th a t is . a ..t e b ah"'q.u. c.a.t.i e..n ".'..i. I re. a lly .d e.+n. .' t -
g t
1a yn o wwh at' th e y b a s e' it. 'bn- q i
. .I. d cin. ..'.t. :.. >.all y . b
,m ...
I.Maybe the shift' supervisor likc3 -. _-- .
' 14.! .'s u_y,_. J o. _u .. ._ P.n.e - ...
g,. ,,.. ..,: . P. 'g. ~7.
.... o e a l l /- 1s cpe ....d M ~e;
just beams out all over as being good, and they knew i t, i g I get the impression that you are saying it i 13 sort of a s,ubj ective-type thing by the supervisor _
cs opposed to a quantifiable thing? ,
A 'de ll , first le t me s ay . t hat during our train-1
! ing .- Now, you can talk two dif ferent groups.
g Okay, tr aining an d operating. "-
- A: ' Training and operating. . 'Te ll , during'the .
trainin6 period precriticality. Okay, we had cold license. Our training differed af ter we went critical. i
} Then there was a s e p arat e ,
f -
i They do walk-arounds that they took l .-_ .- .- .
t overy so oftan.
The candidate s had walk-arounds 'that they would take, I don't know, every couple of weeks or every couple o f s e g:nant s . The'y would have a walk-i
. around with one, a nember of'the t rainin g departnent, ,
y ..
'would ccae'up an d walk around the control room tith l
- him, an d they would go over those syutens. O k r.y ?
I And then he eculd nake an . 7 21'i n ti o n a
based on that w alk - ar e 'in d , and they .*c u l d do b231ctlly what an N RC examinor would do, start this pump ind ther ,
you vero supposed to gat the proce, dure and lin -up :he l Correct alves and so on. You know.
1 This was a folic'.ing for I h o '. .ht O 7 *i es- ;
L it w r,$ an extensive set of questions that were given to you on specific systems that you had to answer subjectively. .
They were graded and returned to the candidate b e f ore his walk-around , and this was pro gre:i s ,
l and generally it t ook. ,' a c andid at e nine =cnths , and they l
would give him a mock'NRCjest' of their cun, a written or oral. ..
l And from their day would determine l
i whether they would send him up.
4 Okay, th at was one where the Met Ed require - .:
ments was you had to pass a certain exam within a certain' period of time or you went back t o where you.
l we re b e f ore , I believe ?
~
A Right.
4 Okay, but let's t' ak 2 the c ;u e , the other case. That is yo'u new have the licansa.
A Yes.
- ,f as one of are there any 4 The qu e s t i on
/
quan ti fiab is things upon which the a d v an = 3 n e n - c1 the ,
individual as far as pcy step and such so or is this nerely a =ctter of seniori'y and n,ot r.aking .ny waves?
A Cnce you got to be control ?.oc= C;erstor with a license your pay went no higher, cnd you were
_.~~.-- . _
one
E fi t
. _ - . . V k~
. _ . . . . . _ a
_ _ . - i
% . k, b
just stuck'unless you got
- m. B p
promoted to shift fore nan, .
and that was the discretion of generally the shift t[
supervisor and the plant i superintendent. -
\
u 4
, Did'you not need k a senior operator's licens6 4 for that? -
>. .." ~, -
.. 1 I:
A.
t's correct.
Tha.~.v.
c c
y
'(..Well,
~
. b r.
th e y w o uld p rom ot e y ou , "an~d"
.., . . - E
' thsn they, would p.u.t. '.you', on a s enior ope rato .
~
g
.t._ha_.in1Y pregramT'but you w. .
I ouldn 8 t fulfill th at - -
.~.
capacity un t 11-
. 6,.
\.you had a SRO.. license. 7
.t I.
The other thing that ,
.r a
~
. c. we had just th is maintain the proficiency was once .
.. a year we had'to do~ .. l I
ce rtain th'ings ,[oie rat e ' the plant s
~
and any =afor evolu- !
tions which we performed Wero !
documented undar I f argeIt -
the column, but this was just }
f did.
general things thst ::e t
. i Then we had .
re activit y manipulaticas , 1 i
and we had to do five of these with ;
grea':ar than ena t porcent chansa or scncthing. i that exactly.
I can't e ve n reme=bor o t
-Q m I This is basically the N F.C operator 11can~
sin g requirenants for i requalifying, I guess, that de:br- j a
sin?d this kfnd of thias? i g y.3, g4 y. . .
. . . , e - -- < i
.~. ^
1 l.
3 4 You mantioned the .f act that you did have I
{
simulated training at Lynchburg. \
I believe you said i was 0 an. eight-afeek program in obt aining your Reactor Operator 11cen.se.
A That's. correct.-
. . ,_ . f. . 4 h
4 I Now, had you had subsequ.ent simulated training .0 after October '77 now at Lyn c h b'urg ?. )
A {
Yes. - I h 4 d. one week at
.j ap p roximat ely the ll last ' week in June of '78, and another week approximate: ,y l the week of the 28th, March 28, 1979. l
!)
4- Okay, and that was a p redet e rmined program. l' that it ' Ed had many operat ors going down in ordar to '
k i
stay currant and be in fulfillment of the manipulation:
re q'uirenant s for licence renewal?
A I'm not suro I know what you mecn. I q
This training thak: you had at B&W on their !
facility, the simulator, that involved manipulations l of the si.-.ulat or c on t rols 7 ,
.t (Indicates yes.)
% e And I as sume in your case you mu:t have bee.m ,i.
i nvolted with numerous r. manipulations so t h a :' y e !1 did t i j
's ithout t h.i t simulat ed t raining actu.1117 meet ths H .'. C Nquir0=cnts for renewin; your 11cen:: 2 in 1079? .
A -"s e ' s e r. - - o e n e- **s ' '
_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - ^ - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
I l m
. 1 I
4 \
Right. I A
(Indi cat e s yes . ) _
4 And the thing that it must assist have done was to you in ' understanding certain transients whic h you did not actually i experience during the year?
A.
That 's correct.
4 .
.: And-I assume that also it vaa pe' ople who vera not seared so that at the controls per se like t
operator would have an opportunity a seni.r to the actually =anipulate controls, is that corre ct ?
i A.
That 's c orre ct .
4: Tow ,
_ ahain i I'.ll ask 'you t o try and ~ge b ac% ' !
a bit in' time.'
(
I assune that in your Navy pr ogren '
7ou used or had boon e:: posed to tha simulator tha?, th)!
Navy may have had in ycur tiaining?
A.
'We didn 't have simulators 4 in the Mc77.
You did not have l '
A.
any Navy s i .u l .t c r .: at all ,
We had prot otype training act ual.' re ac t ors .
centers which ver7 They were operating. f I 4
on those Navy Ij prctotypes did you undergo 01:11ar casualty events :uch es yo,u had at L; n ch bur ;, i or la rc they mor? conple.x7 A. I:'s r aally di f f t < 1 ' n i
____.,_-s- " ' ' - " " ^ ' _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - -
h
_ . . . . . . e m
1 ',
1
.l_-:
I because of the nature of the two plants. One is 3ry l aimple plant . k TtjiA ao_st abla.-it.'i~ ridiculousMa :ni# I
.... l ou.do 1s. pull 3eds . . .
2.nd_th at 's,9 g 4, __ E ycir.y th.1.na ela iiF~4 e .
]o_se1f-regulatingthat[it.gies.,;,agr af}t,sa d G l'c]g, i
.. The. Babcock, .and . . . ,Wilcox.
. ,.. is quite a bit more , complicated to operate'. By failing a TH ins-
-i
'j tru=ent' high . on .one plant.it would do,a multituda or -
~
. :; . ~
things where it had 'an.. automatic centrol system that
. -.. . .~
c, .
C-looked at that parameter.' '
If you failed TH high in the !Tavy plant you would look up and s ay , "It's high. Wh a t 's -
i the other one read?" Which was right below it, and it .- 4 reads.okay.
1.
"Oh, I must have had an instru.7ent '~
~t problem back thers," and you kncu that -- To kind af say the casualtics were as c c m p l .1 2 , I d m 't kn o .r . I {
have a hard' time answering t hat .
4 okay, the simulator in Lynchburg, v ::. 2 that f
of a reactor, ancther facility? That 's the S MU D .t -: WT~~
flu c./v *
.: M ' S E C O simulator?
A That's correct.
4 Did you find that t his ,de t ract e d s otaevhat
!a'on the training with recard to Thrco M13e Island, j er was it Tono thi: .- th .t y ou 30t used to fairly qui .':lf? ; ,
_. . ~ . . _
A R .
A.
Yes,- I got used to it fairly quickly so it didn't .~ I t didn't really like that though, -~ I'm very easy to recrienk
- a
,nd
. . , ,I,, , . adapted
- t. . .- .o- dewn . there within hours.
.' ) And scine g;uys bothered.
., ;;. .-\ . ,-
I' guess it still 1 I don'tknow.. '
' . . . ' :;}_ *
] .,' .
, ' S u....-: t. m y s e l f,~ ;[ 'didn>t find it .
ing or anything like ,that .t. .s . . - - . --
annoy - -
It "didn 't ,
deter from my training. '
~
- i ,
4 I'd like ii to go back to a statement that you ik ^
'\ said which was ,rather interesting, an d that is I got the impression that
- .- in - . the Navy planta it was f ai rN i easy to detect an' instru=ent - . _.
i that. wasn 't working r*, gn t /
l A.
That is correct, !
~~/
l 4
'And I gather that '
s at Three Milo ?
it is not quite tha sc:a i j
t i
A.
! 1It's a night =are.' !
' You know. 1 1
I had =entioned before in so=e of ,
(
these things that certain operators should develop a 1
j sonce of, you kn ow, wh1n they secticaalize f 2e panel f 1
- ragardless of that kind of indication it is . s t yl e -wi c o),
bn. . . op e r at t e s h 3uTr:i d e
- . .n. -- i e to ~1sek at .
..a secti_c n o f_t h l
...---. n . ,
- e. .
w
'n e l ' 6.n d ~~J'i5 t'~ E c f..o a~n::.a."_ 1m T. *..e'o. c. d.
- O..c.
$ ** ", .e 4" h j e g ee M 1**-**
.a. n d r2 a. l.1: e. i. r;
_ __ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~
. -- Zh.
I e
1 Now, a lot of guys wouldn't do that, and thay would become locked in en just ce rt ain gauges, you know, , an d that's really a bad cart.
The gau g e L', .t h e ms e*178 s.,_ve re h a'rh
~
- h. 3g. read bec.ause.they we re. .verti. c ..
- al.. They were only ab'ou t a
,n '
, inch w'id$ by I'd say ten inches high. ,
The:n'sedie
-~ m - ~
Tis *- ver~ j* s m al li, and
.4. .
t h e s e l.we re .
. m .- -- the.ches'on the main console and in back; fo r' in s t an c e ', ex t; r a c t;,1on , . steam pressures, and temperatures were gaugad on a meter with a face an inch wide by say t h re's inches tall.
And to view those gaugas you could ,-
probably'get'as_ clos;e as. twelve feet to them,
- #. - which requires fairly good' eyesight to be able to read the .
exact values. .
But you.could scan it, and you can see l'f your parameters are about where you ': h ink they should be.
4 Did you ever have an opportunity or e
confrontation with anyon. at the p l an t wh2re you /
expressed your observations on se=o of this e c, u i p = c n t
A Ch, yea, but I really don't knew who I uculd have said it to.
If I : aid it to tnybody it w:u2d
- .... }
i
.. - . .. . _ .. . A t i
i r
r i
have been'somebody that Iwas working with at the i time._ You know,/ probably a shift foreman or a shift -
E
, t*
. s up e rvi s or . - .
I
~ T. . . ...
As. f ar..as.. ..n ame s , I-don't re ally y
know,-but I did. mention the fact that 'I think' there h, is toc much, E_think SYe'tn
- 18 a '_l o t ' ' o f__ e :t'r an k, 23 J.
- h. 1 garb ar.;e in that c ontx_ -
rol . ro o m'. t?!"at' c ould, . . . . .
b e . t ake n _ e.'ig k ,
o and compre s s ed. int o a w orkable '.. . size L . . :.. n . m whe're 'one =c.h
' - - - - - ' ^
y'
,'e~o u. .ld,acan t!.e p an e.l .an~d.. kn ow (.e. .x.a.c t ly .w._h._a_t ' s .> o in >-
(~ ~ -- - '
on, make.it".easie.r to read, sectional 1:e it a littl,e l l t
ibit-better. I t
L The'y have things all over the
. I
- i .
{
.. ;.C* ;
p la ce . ' -
. .- r >
4 - ' Do? you. eve r actually say to'someono: Hey, @
?
this is like this, and it really ought to be like that; or is it just a matter of simole dis cu s si.:n j u i
withou. any change e /er being expc eted to take p '. a c e ? i L
I
'.f e ll , let =c back off and as:c . ,
you in a slightly different way. p a s, p:j!.r. y_ pn 7t hi .4 h
- v. ~ ~
'in ~ j o ur =anu.a.L c.f p.r.)e e d ur[e s,_d~,bTigg-'1E c pg:} o7 *
~ f,,w h. i_e h w e u.. i.d. 211 e tr y.c/ t J o . r.ai s.e. t o .: n a. ; S = c.n.E~~~h~5.5
- ~
Ep_p e ar 3 d to 7.cu. .3 1 a 1 ui fj. e an ; or q gn pc s.--TIj' .r ~l b 1._.....- -
s, $~[e /. c c .c.c.r.+--#c r :L, I a.) t an d it .a athe-i.-of :;0r.'.t.1..-J .- . _ , . . .
- d. sg
$ ** t **j A .. f 4 4,. .'q i of *t 4 *
- t$ g * * "" * - [h, **
- C '} ** '[
., - . .C*L l
- L
. 1
. . I t I
- )
1 A. ~ We ll', . Sene rally if we f ust had a simale l
1 problem like a meter was inecrrect we would go to the shift foremen and say, "This thing isn't operatina properly. Shall we turn in a work ' -
reque st ? "
- ., . .s And he would say yes or know, ,
I and the course would proceed from there. And eitha. .e i
. the instrument man fixed it or the work, request was j dis appr. ove ,-d along the line or s ome thirigT
- '.. : ~ -
. _- - ..- . . . . . . ~
I.think if I was operating the - .
o plant and I saw something that was re all;r serious rI'd
\ mention it to,the s hi ft supervisor. -. .. .
. A t
You know, maybe we have a battar ;i
~
. way o f d oin g thi's . -- Mayb'e we shou.1d take a 1oold at -
that.' I 4 Did such a situation'ever occur?
A. Yes, I mentioned to him about the pclicher i system,' which was terrible. You know, tha situatica was-just terrible. They c i dn ' t have any aut o mat ie bypssa around the vessel so tha5!in case a vesse? '
i i- , 1 Vould.go.on a high differential pressure, that is wo 1
9 k cit-flow off to the booster. pumps and s ub s e que nt l7 ': h a .
t .
f3ed pucps.
And il they had an au t ::..a': i : ' C.
in there t h r.t was air oper.ted that would Jad t:2 1 1
I
A .
l l
Y l
I high DP in the s y s t e::t that couldgo open just ri;;ht r
- aw ay an d . k e e p this and condensate b oost e r pumps with - I some water; everything would have been all right.
at..l.e,2,L. ,a.sb ,. . . . .ix month.
sit was ,
s .Fe.f.orei
. . . . . .. r
( t.h e..- .re ci da n t----- - . . i .f not l..enser that t h i s."...q u e s t i c~2.. . .h ad b e m
- - - i, q
r ai s e d--b y et h
. .e. r., .m..e =. .b.s. .rs ,-
- .".o f.- t h,:" e control ro.ca st.iff tS
. - c .. .
- q - t heir s hi f t, ". . supe rvis ors , _.'and I k. n o'w I an d '.t h e .-other$
Ic p e.. .rator. that I worked with,.: I kn.o w-, h e , h"as.' mo n t i'on e d' ,
. .. .. m. .
would... be ...
}
(too, that an. automatic valve there, it 3daal "because we had experienced these problema'wibE'thj y p . _ _ . . . .-- g ]
Tolishers before. J q ,
This was all oral. requests or suggestions? -
9as.there anything in writing that was put d c W n o r3
(
! that ?
A. *No, not that I c :.n recall.
4- Were you, as a reactor oparator, ,f ' 7 1 *.i s r I
with the specs for the plant? ;
1 A I was familiar with them, yes, I cculd i u
generally tell you if there was a t3ch spc0 on a '! ;
- /
certain itam. 4 I couldn't recite it . c ed for
. A werd, but I know where I could go to find that in f or=atic't .
Q V*ra y c't f.milia.r with the toch s cc or l
l I
m j
' i
. . , 1 I,
i 3
m operating procedure associated with the t ail pipb 1
~
O from the Poav and safety valvesp A. Yes.
~
4 .If you knew that a situation existed where the plant in that area was not within the tech specs or operatin6 procedures , how would you go about
. 3-1 apprising man agement ' o f '~this, c.r, wh at would you do to
. .( .,,
.l~. ... ..,,.,. f*; -
get it corrected?.. _ , .
- i 2~ .. -
- _ _ . . ..~....: ^~~.'.
A. . tie lli ~ wh a.t- r
- if cul.d . .dc .o__is j u s t I iould!. ._ .
... 1 -: - + . . . . .s...- .
-t alk to my shift foreman , and if I.didn't really getg l any s atis f action out of him I would so to the_ shift) i
.supervis or and t oll .hin. , you know, . I th. ink we'vo} .
r- '
got a problem.) . . .
l
%< 's
. l
'q' ' c -
Did yiou ever do that ,with regard to that
.}
'particular t empe rature ? .
5
~
A. \That particular problem I.was -- I never
'itret e any t hin g down
~ .. ... , a e x c e p t I -- volutas.of .!atar 4 that had t o be e'x c h an g e d , I thought that was tasti-meny enough that se did have a problem.
q Well, . tere ycu -- ,
A. But -~ .
4 Go ah e a d .
8 But I did t alk to Bernie Smith' and Dick Hoyt about this problem, about the l e r.k a g e out of the p:tst " G e t ..n . o e d._l Y v.17 0 s ,___.___ p i X";,n, ..
s11d .3 . _ , _ ~ m _. . _ m oa _ - jc . , ;._.. __ at J . _ _ ,
l
-_______-_-_a
- s. - R
-. m 9-I
. s' I
[-
3 5,
' 'And whenever I did it I pt di t off as often as.I could. 'd g
n b
I would just say, "I could,n'y,g .
-p' good one all ni'ght,"
- and keep doing it that way. {k L'_ They had thre. ...e . d a 7.5
. i
- t. o s'2 t a good '
dn,.
- e, . .. .and sometime during the day .o r durin s tha.
n.'. ghj lw 1
a' good one'would - come-up,
} ?
.and then it would hava to e
[
go for three m :.ore days until th'ey would get a good
- on e ,- --
- ~- -
- d. , : . ~
{-
.. . s. ' . .. ...?" .
[
t, .,. . . -
4 \ Vas there"anyone else you could ~ - . .
have gens ..
g S to-with this concern?
A. I probably didn't go to anybody because .'
(
I' thought that this was such an obvious probles that f i
t
- the, pe ople that I could have gone te were alre ad7-g notified.
5 l
I think you're setting at that I
. \
I could have gone to the NRC.
4 Well, I'm not g>tting to that. :*o w : v e r ,
that is an ultimata avanue that cne could take, (bi.t l
\I was concerned with- finding out what
,, . s p e c t fi c'. ;;ui .Ie l
? l'ines~there ar. e wi t hi. n t h e .'4e t.Ed Crg.nizatiEnT: hat . .... _, ..... . ..
i wo uld .all ow. an "in.di . .vi du 1' 'li.k.e...rJ o ur s e _l _f_ 't- -5~n'~o
__ tT3's
}that.ycu were bein . -.. ..g stified by t h's n e ..t icyor of c an :. e =. n t an d -t ry t o r .1._ sa. , o. t h.e s ur f a c. .. -. ..e _ a _ c_ o". c e r n
. ~ . , . , .
i
. - . - - - ~ ~ ^ ^^
~~~
S ' .'.*
... .. i.. .t h otrt r o c *(in g t h e
- dn t i r'e.', b'o e. ' 11 P e v! e t yon'j"st 1
i-I .,
~
n..
[
- ~;
. N k.'
e A. )!
Yes, I really don't think l
I was kind of. .
afraid of rocking .the big boat up there. '
i p
' It seemed to me like they were 'I' totally unpredictable. Ll
. , .~.
I knew they' ware a:f are o f t he -
I" proble:n, and their, minds .
are gre at e r t h an mine.
.. Th2y t
s f .
/
1, could do things with their s- -
heads t h at I could never 1magine.
. . r, .
['
9
. :, .5 s i, 1<
. 4 ' ' , , Was there some quality-l assurance function . or I,
'some quality assuranc'e group tiiat was depended upon r r
6 "by Nt Ed to make sure that this kind of thing would t-r
- be resolved?
.t y
. A- Wellf as far as I kncv they had -- We had l
surveillan ce procedure forms , and ths' surveillance {
group would' send any sheets that come back cc.pleted, [
r, they would go to ISI, In Service In s p e ct,;i on , a.id an enginaer would look at the data and s valust a it .
What he g e t s is just the minimum information, you know. And -- That's all. As far a.s the QA is concerned, that's all I k n r.( about.
4 Was there _n ar:a that was lo rt cut from ?
~
y ,u r t r ainin g in t h e ." ; t Z d p .' ~ 3 gr c::2 en Aux 1111ar7 i, i
0 e .rator and Control 5ccs Oper.: tor, o r 6t a.3 a- .
.t h.-a' fo~::s
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A th '.n g 7.1. : c.ac. a s e d s l a t g ' We :i lin e fs of r0portin g -
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A. N o 's I never -- We neve r were told to fix ;
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anything up ,%AA:hdy t ol,d ,tli'to ist on e'anysi' y otiyi, i{ ~
.- ~: . . .
Q '(You get one _ms ajn r38 wh at ? ,
A (Me anig g , a_13,akjr at e .\
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4 Okay. Are you aware of the recent I think .
l n
it was Friday Press' Conference that the Director of tho $
~.-
L Div[ision of Inspection Enforcement held Friday in which
. - 1,.
9 i 155 thous and- dollars . in fine s we re levied against ?
m
. . . . - i 1 Ms t rdp o. lit an Edis on ?' -
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- +
A , Uh-huh. 5 Q
Were you aware of the fine that the NRC .[
li would have levied on Met Ed with regard t o that c arti- !!
e r.
cular tailpipe 7 - ,e l
.f ii I would like-to introduce as -
i[
Exhibit 1205 a letter written by vict or stello to Zeb :(1 Arnold, Mc b ropolitan Edison f on th21r findi.. ;s , and I [g F
would like to dra.i your attenti:n to the i t o = o f 1 : .1k a. : ) F T
fron the safety valves and the tailpipa t anp a rat ura . y c
civil. penalt7 f or ,,
. The cumulative that ene it em alone woul.d h ave been 630 thousand'dolla.s, !,!j )
which a= cunt ed to a penalty of five t h :u s :.n d dollars !!
. 5 s ri a day for every day that they'wcre not in' e c.:p li an c e ,
on that itcm. .
This is Mhe letter, a.~. .! ,t h i s is th.2 i
I .
item ove r here . .
('Jh e r e u p o n , ..h'x h ib i t 1205, a letter, was marked for identification.)
A. This is quite'stunnin6
~
4 I don't know if there ls more that can be said, but appar'ently the NRC has e.% pressed thei.' thoughts
.. .i.
about this p articular 1:icident , an d w e feo2. it to be an extremely serious, event, but,.I't,hink you hav3 sort of
_' explained the way in which 'mady pe ople. at" Me t Ed night have viewed this tech ' spec violation,. or is it an operating procedure violation as opposed to a tech spe<:
violation? .
A It is an operatin6 procccure violation, I
"#~Q
'iih.. [ ale, 'r at h e r t h an a tech spec vi o '. at i o n . -
MR. O nflS TEI!! : May we tak3 ti b re ak for a few minutes?
('thereupon, there .v a s a briar recess in the proceedings.)
o
('Jh e r > up o n , the proceedings sentinled as follows :)
SY MR. O R!!STEI}i : l i
4 Back en the record acain. .
-- 66-*'**^ w mity.pe g sup h 69u=w= ed ens ..e... m%, . ,,4 m , , , ,
"^' - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - . ~ _ _ _ , _ _ _
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. 1 You had mentioned the fact that you j were at the Lynchburg simulator at the time of the Three Mile Island accident on March 23, and I gather that was part of your requalification training.
Now, were you slated to have your license reviewed fairly shortly?
A Yes.
- a p articular subg1 dat e . that NYW
. . 4 Was there . -- . . _
comes t o mind?- ,
A No, that's usually handled by tha training s vw &
de p art me nt as far as the s p . d 1 date. I know that ny license would have expired the 19th of Fabruary or the 19th of October o f this 'je ar .
q Were you doing satisf actorily well in the ,
reo. qualification training, or ware you having problens with it which might hava ir.p'ai r e d y o'.tr re ce iving ;ha l l
renewal? , l l
. l iR , SMITH: I have. , '*-*'s tecuti:
with that . Off the .oeard.
( 'dh e re u p o n , there was a di::cu : sion .
off the record.) ,
3? MR.. O F.N S T3 IN : ,
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. 4 Can you' repeat the'last: question, piense? .-
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( Wh e re up on:, the Co rt F.3 porter reaf Tq IF -
tiack a's' follows : "We re you' doing' s atis f act orily well' k li'n thel requ'all'fication: t rainin g , or'were you having -[
proble'ma with it which mi6ht have' impaired your receiv t.n g
[;
- the renewal?")- t bI gl
.~
pl SY MR .4 ORNSTEIN : .
E
~
~~
4:
- - F 4'" Let me qualify 'th'ah Pricr to March 23, -
[i.
'*u% - .1 19'79'.- - '
'T i 1 i i 1
A No. I thought I was progre ssing s atis f act or Lly.
l 4
You were not in a cat e gory , in a training pro.
-.. gra:n whers' you --
wers ' deficient ~1n areas and had to
.Ct make- u.p .c'ertain 1e ctures ? .
IE:
- i<
A. 'i.
Not t at I know of.
- i i.I.
i
'r..
Off the record. !}.,
. j*
, .(.'4h e re up on , there via a di s c '.: s s i on l c; ' the record.) , , !j 9
Fir. CRNSTEIM : Let's go b e.::k en tha
)
record. I havo no further questions st. the pre:ent tiu3.
Does your attorney, Mr. S=ith , h av:r an y q .:s s t i onJ 7 .
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MR. SMITH:
!T o , . I don't think so.
f g.
MR. ORNSTEIN: In conclusion I ucu2 d fp-r-
like to say that this is an en-g oin t; invest 1Eation, ancl l t
although .I have completed the questions that I have Y
. ?
for today'we may nded to bring you back for further
- i depositions. s .. F
[
"We will, however, make every affort
~
F2
-. . . . - - . _.. l.
to avoid having to do so,'so ,I will now recess this - ; i
.- t deposition rathor than t e rmin a.t e it an d -J us t want.to !,
V th ank you for your i time that you apent with us teday, t
t t
t (Whereupon, at or about 8:53 o' clock ! l I
p . m . ,' t h e deposition was concluded.)
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_______-___________N
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II A RTM A N , HAROLD 10/29/79 NRC Special Inquiry Deposition l
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i a ...2. _.. _m__ _ . _ _ _ _ - __ _ ______._._.m ___-_____.._. __.______ __.-._- _ __-__.. _ _ _ .___ __
U:! T '
D .S T A '/ E S .!U CTM AR R.': U U L A T O R Y CO"!H S S I O'!
' t'i _ P. ' '. F. I:I t:? I S T, A N D S P '-: C I A L I:!QU ( P Y JW.0 0S l? 10:1 The deposition of 11 AROLD WAYNL H ART!! AN , J R . ,
t al: e n at the Yorkshire Roon of tho' Qual $ty Inn, 500 Ccaterville Road, Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17.301 en Icnday, October 29, 1979 cormencing at or about 7: 00 o ' c] ock a.m. .
A P P E A I. /. .J O E S : ii ARO LD L. O R N SE I !J Ta;:i n g t he Decosition en behalf of the USNRC Special Inquiry Group J OH11 fl . S!'ITH , ESOU19E 21 North Dul:e Street L F.n c a s t e r , Pennsylvania (717-394--3704)
A pp e a ri n t; on behalf o:' the Deponent ,
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.I.j !.D E_X. .T.O..' .M 1. T l E S. .S. E S-i-
W I TJlijftS, L
H!s ROLD W AYNE :I ART;i AN , JR.
E, y :.i R . OR:; STEIN 4 a
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I C Hnve you r:ad this .i c c u::s n t in full? ;
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A. Yes, I have, i.
C Do you nderstand that h e i ^or: nti on set , .
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the h' .5. C "' .' ' I Scccial Inquiry, your right to hafe n
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st:mj , resent t c uy : .e as e : u ., . . . ; . 2 . .: , . t . t > z e ,
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diplona, sone college, and technical t r a i n i n r; ti.rouch w,..
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. f.
hi-Q Okay, was that Bainbridge o t' --
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'd i A. Yes, Bainbridge, "aryland <as the ?!uc} car l
Po.er School with prototype training as S33 'n 'est .
k g !
'ilton,
. :ew York. ,
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Q I' ? you rene-ber giving a st at e ent t o the )i
- d uc2 ear 2.e r.u l a t c r y Cermissica Of'!ce of ~.spection i En. r c e r.e r,t on or about "ay 22 of I '.) ? ^ ? h i 4 f t Yes.
C. Did you receive a copy of the transe-!pt that
.as ade f r o m. the taping? f
- f. Yes, I received a ecpy of the *ranscript, but a
I didn't receive the tape. I had asked 'cr a tace also,
. hi ch 'i n s n ' t received, s
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. C ? : F T E I :! : Off :".e .ecord.
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( '.Jh c r e u p on , i b .e re -: a s a dircuss'c 1
of f the record.)
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i Q Back on the record. j l
Did ~ou v crovide the C o r r. i s s i o n wit >
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l corrections t o t c, e t rans cript frca vour re co3 2 e ction of &
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Q Did you read the transcript and find ~ that l '.:
,t a s . f r e e of errors, or was it a situation where-you 1 I
l o oi: e d at it but d i d n '. t exatir.e it in any great detail
'or '.aj or or nince c h r. n ne s ?
2 'T h e cnly t h i n ;; t h st I s a '.. th2re was name
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.4,,+.. u, n e. u,,..,.. . . , . . .
C I have here an itur t h ::.t I .:ould 3 1 ',. e to ent'r as h h i 't i t 3202. I beideve this.ds the t r a r. s c r d o t of-1 that discussion that .: A s head hac': $n "a v , 19'79. ,
(W52reupcn, E .v h d b i t 3202, a d o c i., . e r t ,
rss narked for identification and s h 01: n to the witners.I) t,. Yes, this is a docur.Ent, i
J
.i P. . 5"1TH' T ar the record, I
- hasen't seen it. He has, but I tcu2d 3'ke to nut screq l
t h i n ;; on the record here.
Has this teen identified yet? First of all, could e identify it by n '2 r. b e r , or are cou nct coin;;, t o d o t h at ?
- - - - - _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ ~ ' - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - . _ _ , _ , _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' - ' - ' " - - - - ~ - -- - . . , , _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __
.. . ) ;
I '. R . O R' S T E J ?! : I beli e /e 1 ' n t c o : u ..
transcr' .; l c c- 3 this as docunent 3202, and it :as the I : !",
1 l
of the .c e ting th at was held between !!arold Hartnsn and ,
t I
several r?rters of the "uclear "ecu3atory C o r.m i s :s i on .
That neeting was held on c y 22, 1979 at tne Red Ecof Inn at Sw at ara , ?cnnsv1vania.
- ti t I ec,
' '. R . "'I."
. All c i .fi t , 1 l
11.: e to sa", f or the record at le hst , is t ". a t this dor;- I l'
E.hitit IPJ2,
..s" sh e. n to "r. ' t r t :- '. n .ho b e. d ,
.t, !,
deter 1
.n crportunity to at laast b r'. 0 ' 3 y 3cok c. t it to l,
tine .;h e t h e r it .as, in fact, the ss e do U. ment n c t i c i n ;;
hou various pares 2nd cits and nieces enn, of e c:; r s e ,
at tines be misolaced or Nhat have you.
To the extent that he 3 od ed at it,
.c o u l d agree that it is,the e n .e decurent.
50 3r durinr_ this deocsition s r. c c i f i c I
c istions are ested, of c ? .: r r e , ': e can ve ei fy .
th E t it is, but to the extent that he did lock at it, it wouldjh
~c' '
I think .. e sho"'d appeEr to te the sane d o e u r.c n t . !
I t r. a t clear.
MR. OR:: ST E I N : Understood.
t . k i
- ow , do you recall a st ate 'e nt you provided t o two other r.enbers of tne ?? u c 3 e ar
- - ~ ' ~ - - - _ __ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _
1 1
Re gu l at ory Ccr.nission on or about Septenber 12, 1979, Misters Evans and Vandenberg Tecm the h'RC Th re e U,1 ] e Island Special I r.q u i ry grcup?
,.t ,,v , -
2..s ..2 .~~ eS., v. e s .
SY !!.R . O P.l1 S T E I '1 :
Q Do you have a copy of the tape that . : ', s ' 12 '
Et that particular 7.cetir.g that you had?
- e. Yes. I have half. I hase half a tsce.
T E. e other side d i dn ' t ccre ut. I do 5.a'e a copy of a transcript which was r.a d e from the i
.'r. c t e s and that tace.
t -
1 I
Q 'la s that a t rans cript that they nade or a
' transcript that you made?
l !. !J o , this 'as a transcript that they provided l ,e.
It wasn't verbatim. It was rcre or less set up in
.; u e s t i on s and ans.:er type outline. !
'/ R . O?.'! S EI:1 : I would Jike to enter l l
'this as Exhibit 1203 and have you identiry that.
]1 1
( ',!h e r e u p o n , Exhibit 1203, a docur.ent,
.: e s rarked for $ denti fi cati on . ) 1 TF.E U 17.N E C 5 : This appears to be the
l
! 1 j l }
BY M ?. . OP!! STEI N :
Q Did you exanine a facsimile of this exhibit l e
and review it in any depth?
f J' dt I
.i c t to any great depth.
2 I reviewed it.
i I c a n t e d t o r.ak e sure that the general content of r.y an s'.: e r s and the way an ansuer could be ndsconstrued, in fict, i _ c c .: 1 1
-.ted t o r, a :.. e sure t '. 2 t it .asn't, I
st r :e d during the t rans: ati n , and I didn't find any l
t a t o occur.
0, If I unde rs t a nd cerce:tly the version of
+hree exhibits, 1202 and 1203 hat.vou have seen, ;
+%c=
a-e ccrrect fron the stand:cint cf the staterents that
.:c ce made, and if we r.?fer to ther - - - St rike that, p ' 2 Now, you mentioned the fact that jcu Uhat w s. 5 ,
had nent several years in the :,avy p r o g r a T..
s your part icular designation? .
t I tr a s an ele ct roni cs t e ch ni ci an and later luali'ied as a reactor operator.
O For how lenc 'xere ,ou an e3ectrcnics t e c h n f O i a r.
l i
- t. I vas an e2eetrenies technician for f i .' e l ye ars and a re act or cpe rat or for about two and-a-half.
Q Durin g that period of ti e you r..e n t i o n e d t " u. t vou .. e r e a t s i gr.e d on rhipboard d u t :/ ^
- f. Th at 's ectrect.
4 And during those two r.n d -a -h a l f y e a r s p. s rea ct or operat or you were on a h*uclear Submarine?
A. That's correct.
Q And the vork that you had done for the '! a vy and your training program you had certain fornal c3 ass-room training, is that correct?
.t. That's correct.
C Cou3d ycu refleet back and tell te what you noticad that was outstanding in the '!avy training and the
': a. v j.' t raining prccram re3 ati c e t o t hat of which you re-l ceived f rom P.e t ropolit an Edison in your word with ';e t Ed l
as training for Auxiilliary Crerator as well as that of l
a Control .,oon :
perator? l A. There is a lot to put t o;;e t h e r he re . I didn' t renlize - I could have done scce preparation, but I s
didn't.
i.
I know that the Navy Prorrrm was d: ,e by t op-not ch people .
I mean the Ad-iral had to handpick all of his instructors. He ret cach one cerscnally, F. n f if he didn't -- Like anything he saw about the person, he just ousted then. They couldn't be instructors.
l They bad a regular systete. tic appecach. It was rao r e or less programed airost as to
3
. . _ _ _ . . .. .. ... _. I hh !
y our pro rcssion through y our t raining.
You never le nrned too much too fast, and you als o understood concept s be fore ancther cne w a s' intreduced t h at would later reficct back to that cenecpt. '
So it taught ;,' o u t o t h i n k and "" ;
l enalytical t o that standpoint. 4 "et Ed, the ' u .s:i l 1 a r y Cperator 1 e
- c :3 d tra".ning r: ally Gidn't. - 'le d'en't hava .:b a t I T:' O y ': e r e k n c u l e d r e a'.,l e ,
call tc -r.ctch instructors. I i
n't t o g e 's n e r a m r e . c . ~. ,-
'un 2s f'r as their abilit y t o it is my cpinion that they couldn't do as p r o f e s t i e r. a 1
.)
a j ob as a "Evy-Procram 'sould be out together.
So, therefore, it uns h a p h e r. a r d . 1 and the 3 earning I don't believe was as thorough. f'::. '
NJ I don't believe that we got as t u c 'r ,
1
- r. or e pro- ga out of t raining as we coufd hace had it been 60 a
g r a r.e d . t 1 It is a3so n. cpinicn that : t h i r.k , .
Iie t Ed did a fine job of training us with what they m
had, and peop3e, r.at e ri al-wi s e , I think they did a fi .e k j ob .
- 1 As far as the Control :com OperatorI . j training, I had eight weeks of int er.sive t raini 1g dc.n} R-
','13 c o y. .
en the Simulator, Sabcock at e d ___...J f i
l- i
)
i T.h a t was eight weeks of classroom cove ring in st runent ait on , controls, various th$nts like that, and then actually applying the c 3 a s s r o o m k n c .. l e r!: e in the Sinulator with casualty a: tic.ns, sinulated casual-tics.
That to ne was invaluable, and I cw it ': n. s ' i n v a 3 u a b 7. e to a lot o f t 'a c other f c 11 c '.: s t . . $. t .. n t det n there tith t e c.- :S e a 1.ct of thc- never etted a te at ch on a panel like that before. They :ere cut in t"e th2re en.;ine rcem t u rn f r. g .alves and tS'1 7, s like this I had some hands-en e r.p e r i e n c e .ith casualties frca a panel.
I P.n cw it '; e l .n e d them a lot being able to recognize and analyze problems real quickly. I l thought th at that program was well coordinat ed , and I s
think everybody came out of there :as at that point a competent ope rat or just on that particular -- They deve3cced skills the re , howe cer, th at they b c- c o' e in-st inct art e r a .1 h i l e , s o n o mat t e r v:he re you go "ou can ,
I i
use these instinct s that you have learneu 'here and ,
apply them to the realm of a control room the size of !
Unit 2. 1 a
After the training tnat :e r,o t d o. n l
[ !
in 1.ynchburg we had several sections learning ab out 1
--- -___- _- _ - - i
} Individual components. F.e a c t o r cool'.ng pumps is one I can recall.
It was just basically r e v i e vt -t :/ p e ,
keeping us refreshed on certain ideas and concepts.
. We had a two. . eek cran course so- j to-speak right before ce had a sir.ulated HP.C exar.ina-tion that was given by I can't r e r.c : .b e r .- General l l
Physics. They gave tne s i r.u l a t e d ta lk -throu gh , and I took that.
I didn't r. a k e it but, you k ; o.' , L ? .t y all do that.
Q I don't understand.
f e ll , I didn't pass that e > an' n ati on .
Q Simulated w alk -t h rou gh ?
A. I didn't pass the s inul at e d one.
s 0 Hoeever, later on you did pass an actual to lEh$
1:a l k -t h r o u gh ?
!. Yes, that's correct.
Q Eas that due to the fact that you t raine d
.sre , or .:a s it that the :: ? C 1: a l k - t h r c u c h .:as easier?
M#
A. No, an NRC e x a r. i n a t i o n to me is never eas.y f
whether you know the answer, whether you know 1:b at th;V ,,
are c o i r. g to ask you.
And everybody has a basic i d e a s:". h t
_ . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . .._ _. _ _. _ _ _ . p
I i
they' ara coing to ask you. They are going'to ask you s c r.e . q u e s t i on s about the reactor. They are goinr, to ask you sone questions about the turbine. They are r,cing to ask you to go out in the plant and find c o r.n c -
n,c n t s . l
\
)1 It's a standard thing. If they I l
I dca't covar that they haven't cc.s11y -- The '~hC hasn't .
i d c r. a their job, I think, i My basic i r.o :'e s s i on of anSt.: alk .
I around, and examination is t h e: c . g.h : r. cw l e d g e , t r. s i c k:, owl e Ed ;c , and also the .: a 2 k - a r o u n d part.of it I think should-be to test the conpesure of the exaninee.
In other words, h o.: well dces the e.v.aninee stand up under a stressful ten-hour exaninatien with qu:sticns from anywhere, s
This was my idea of an !1 R C : e s t so, therefore, I conducted myself during the eraninition with a great deal of csim, think.ing the a n s .e e r s cut before I cave the . I Sone guys te re petrified. ":u 'ntr, I
they would just stand there f or twn hours, but I wasn't l
like that just because that's the way I thoucht an e x at i t.ati on should be.
And it's incossible for anybody thpt 's f
l c
- _ _ _ - _ _---_-______n
i
)
i i
. i not .:: c oci at e d with the p l ?. n t to ask everything, and i 1
l ever/bcdy can't know everything. You know. So --
Q You nentioned the fact that y o u h a d d i f f i c u '_ t v -
?
- tit h the General Thysics Corporation w a 1{. -t h r o u gh . I i
1 arsane that was several weeks prior t o the other walk- h.z';
]
I thrcuch for your license? i A I belteve it ': a s a ncnth or a nonth ard a- ..
T
<3-8 h a .l f be ^ ore the actual.
0 Do you think it . as because you were nore 0-tight is oppcaed to not ':n c. in g as .uch, or .t a s it h' l i
- e nt i r. a t i on o f b ot h ? j j
L '* ell, at that particular point in tine I eat l l i
st:essed in an othe r 't ay not involving my j ob , and so I y W-think that that probably had a big bearing on it as .. ell '
es I didn't think the guy that was civing me ny walk- b d
arc _nd knew as r.ach as I'did, and his concepts ere L{,
ccnpletely in left-fie}d, 7.n d he based my a n s '.. a r s en --
i ,
1
' Cr the crading of my answers cn what he t h ou ght it thctic .
I te. li
[
4 Did ycu discuss your observations with F.n :. c r e 7 I E d
from the t raining departnent at e t Ed subsequent to t '. c t p art i c u l a. w alk -t h rou gh ?
i L Ch , jes, yes, and, you 'nou, : they all say j _
l l'N.
that this is just general -- How, I'm not q u ot in g f
3, r.n y b o d y , but the concral concensus of the t r a i n '. n g -
6 0; ' a r t r. S n t uas, yes, they are alusys. touch. They : a a il l
l 1
to --I don't know if it is to instill a feeling of T -r int o the exanince or: what. f I think it's sort of that type of thing, perhaps to nake you feel not quite so ready; a i
- ubble buster so to s p e P. k . l
?. n d th2n we .14.3
- 3. v e , I P,cw,
. t .. o . -
l
.< ;- e k s core of refres'.er training af ter the .:a l::-a: c t: - 4, , ;
i the ' ock u s.1P - n r ou n d before we tcck the test. j l,
Classroom, and te brushed up a r c u r. d the plant and everything like that. !
Q In the interview that you had w'th the ?i AC l Special Inouiry group people you nentioned the fact that there were sone t v pe ~:rit t e n cories of scne walk- .
s thrcush exans that were held at other fac131 ties as I e i
i believe there nay have also been so..e at Three ile Island.
I would lire to enter this 25 1
)
Exhibit 1204 (Whereupon, Exhibit 1204, a docu-l
- e nt containing a nunber of exar.inations, was .arred for identification.)
b l
DY MR. C?N STF:IN :
J lJ Q )!a ve you looked at that? q k
- f. I didn 't think I save you so rian y .
1 Yes, these are the docunants. "' h c :- 1 i
s 4
g 2 . r. ear so. Thcy apocar to be all thoce. L Q Okay, did cou use these documents in 6ny-u.-, a I
sicce, or fern to assist you in pr:< ring for any of ; '? i i
3 o.
l '
20 c .x s . _ n a t i o r. s ? i
- t. Knowing y chiloscphy s :i c h I just told cou (
t 4.
lr r v 4 Ls2y, no. I didn't use t':. I had no ac 2d to. l 3 i
l .
Q Do you recall when vou first receiled t h e r e ,' I i
i ,
- G O C L :~. C' n t S 9 g A. No, there Uculd te a ti.e !"A"e up to a year.
6 p r ob ab ly that I could have cotten ther. I know I had i ttem in - :- 2ocker for cuite scme t i: .e . 1 l
Q k' a s that t e f e r e* y c. u kece e a candidate for a l l
' cactor C1perEtor s u b s t e. u o n t to your being an Auxilitary C;eratcr? ,
/. Yes. < ,
l I
r, Uns it tefore you t. : s s e d your xilliary l
. 1 l'
C;eratcr examination? j 1
I l
. /. My Control :com Cnerator.
i C I'm sorry, that's correct C o r.t r c l tco: l 1
l t ;
Operator Exam. !
J l l
l L
L I 'can't recall.
Q Do you reEall what the source of this s2t cd documents sias?
l A I wouldn't -- I know somebody gave then to J me, but I can't remer.ber who it was.
. e You know, if I could kind of-v,irua;-
l .
ice when I got them I could orob2bly visualize the f =. 3 !
i tut I don't really know. ,
Q 'la re there a large nur.ber of ceccle like
-<0urself ';ho had this set of docu.ents?
1 A Yes.
4 Q It was cornonplace among the -- '!
L I would say so, yes. I l
4 Uas it e v e r r.e n t i on e d ta you how the d o c u ". e n t s f r c r. St. Lucie walk-through exams wound up at d i f f e r c n t' utilitics?
A Yes, but I really just assuned that it's like, i l
i cou know, nukes are one big family, you knew, shd cr. e :..ft!'
a r, a t on the back fron another, and the .ot he r w ant s to respond. It 's j ust that *av. .
4 I r.e a n look at the insurance coli:V l that "et Ld has, five hundred million dollars. Uho ca";s for it? All of the other utilities.
It's just like St. Lucie s a ,' s send I
1
)
i C o.ai e s' o f shis out.
' I uould assume that's hou they do it,.
Would you know if this was something done by O
{
the training departments or the individual operators or the plant superintendents or -- :
'o, I wouldn't have any idea. .I -l A I have -
. r. ' c never seen any of this co on, so how would I knew 11 0 .. it's d e r. e ?
If I wanted to sit d c '<: n in front c P a 1 :c e /ecorder 'or tin hours and talk about what I talked .:it h my examiner about I could do that, and then they could t rans cribe to :hatever they want, but I hk' really don't know how it's done. J I
Q Do you know if Sabcock and Wilcox and the tre:ning departrent were involved in this at a31?
s <
A No, I do not. ..
(
Q Do you know if these ual%-through e..ams were ?
l J transerfbed f ron t apes that ';e r e held on the c e n d i d a t e r. '
nernon as they were a ct ually * : a l k i n g t h r o u r.h the plant cpposed to a debriefing subseouent to the exam?
'S Et A No, I don't know '"at either.
1 0 'd h e n you had .our :all:-throu gh e r am for the T. . - c e :ile Island Control :com Dr e rat or li cense were cou debriefed after the exam was over?
{ !
I L. No, not b .y a n . b o d .y . other than ninelf. I d3J briefed.
a Everybody ' anted'to know what -- Yclu know, just among ny peers, ::cn e higher up.
O, V!a s a transcript or recording nade of these ob s e rvati on s that you nade?
.t. Mot to ny n o c'i c i c e . .
l Just to ou' it on the 'eccrd, I h 'a l
i
- r. o ' n owl e d ge that
'e t d ever had anything to do .ith I l
t ran s cri bini; .t a l k - t h :' o t. j h r , nd I c a. n ' t he10 but t i' i r. ', l
- I I
that you are d i v i n i; for so.ething nere, and al] ! o -r e s*d jou ith .:a s a set of docurerts thich I received fror training.
I rea3ite ecu are interested in these coeu- ent s but, vou k n o '. , I, li::e I said before, I dcn't s
.: n o w where they c o r.e fron. I don't know who makes the.. i
'h t Ed dcesn't make then t h at I 1: n cl' '
of so --
l C You said you rc:cived them frcr t r a i r. i n g .
{
- ow, does that me
- :n s c .e b o a :. iil e "arsh ' ears, ': e l s o r. .
Eroun, or Dick Z e c h r. a n ?
L It's pctsib]e that thev ccu3d.
Q As opposed to sc eent l i'. e C e 31 c n r: e .- or so- -.e like that?
(. _. .__________ ----- - - - -
1 i A
.o.
I don't think it uould cor,e frca a n, y t o d .y 31ke Ce31cnter. It 'ould probably be r.aybe Unit 1 Control com Cperator had had a copy and, you knov, he gave it to s c r.e e n e else uho las studying f cr a Unit 2 l
.ake license and, hey, these are pretty ne at . I nicht sone ccpies cf these and see if anybody else *: ant s the-And he r ! l;h t c. o about distributing >
That it hancined that :sy I don't knew,
. that 'y.
4 c req';en 1v
't a s tut it as just one of the r.e c h a n i s r.s that used for etner thin;3.
kI 0 Yes, but I got the i r.c - e s s i e n # r c ~' vhat ycu l
just r. 3 n t i c r. e d a feu ~inutes aco that it as cominr f rc ,
h t r a i n i n c, a s c; posed t o operaticns. Is that correct?
L4 L I assuned that they care from training, fo;
.;c :ne ac*.ually
.ut a stanp on then saving, g; Q
here f c r y o u r p e r u t, a l , or'to ".e3p you for next conth's. ..
c r. a m 'J se this but don't tell an v o r,e ' .ere it cane fren? I e
I I a A. 'l o . It .asn't like that. i 1
Q Gettinn tack to conoarisons with the *:avy !,
i i
T r a! n i n ;; and the "et Ed Training, did the ':avv teach 1
i vou or have coJrzes cr lectures o r- thernodenanics and
\
i phase c h a.a ce in the prinary s " v i e ;.1 c. s well as chare ch:nce in c e r. e r a l and the F/ ~' r e l a t '. c n s h i p s a r. d ruch? i i A Yes, they did.
p
- _- - _ _ ' - - ~ ^ - - ~ - - - - - _ . _ _
And did the "et Ed Training 3tay after the Q
s ar.e ?
A I can vaguely remember a ' l e 'c t u r e on that subject, but I think as I recall it was only taught one tire, and that was it. .
And it ':a
. sn ' t all in re ally that u ch f. 2r. t h .
Q Did -
A I think ecu m$ght -- Are you referrin,7 t o 1:e i
". i c c c n i ; r Hydriding? :
I
. i Q No, I .as referrin; to saturation ccnditicns, t.c-phase phencr. na n ot necessar ly essociated .;i t h d
'edriding, gene rsti on of stcam void'.nc 02turaticn.
L Yes, they did talk about that. They talked a: cut heat fluy versus water te nerature in saturated s; st ens , what happens, n at l e at e boiling, bulk boiling, f i l m b o ! 3 '. n g .
They talked r;uitc a bit a b t .it it, especid21y the stean te ne rat ors .
C They being -
l l
i L Tne training departnent at --
Q ! *. e t Ed and the "avy?
L #e s , both.
C
' .' a s there any er.phasis in your !*e t Ed t r a i r. '. ' -
l l
i.
on the possibility of boiling in the core? ,
j A. Yes, but as long as we didnt exceed a safety li:it there shou 3d be no boiling.
Q Did the '*e t Ed Staff instill within you an underst.anding of the saturation temperature and cres.ura c f
relrticnships which were behind the safety 11 nits, o r :ti d they just say,- "i? a y , this is the ' i -- i t , and this !s v5at i yeu r,3ve to c y: e sure you do or s t a '! uithin"?
s
- t. Uc11, there ere seteral different curves i
thit :e c;erated by based on how cr.y re act or c o o '. .; n t .
r- ,
pur s we had o p e r a t $ n g , ' a r.d they ':2re the flux flew in-bc2:nce cerves.
And they always t old y ou that as lanc as you stcyed within lines the departure from nucicate d boiling "etio was n itt a y s going to be gre ate r than 1.03.
g C 1.30? .
- t. Yes, 1,30, and that boiling .. o n ' t occur.
And then a3so they did dimension re Mcw ue got the term g; ,
c N b ?. , what it v as , h ow i: e Ect it.
1 things l i': < e that.
Q Did they instruct you about goinC solid in
< the prinary systen?
/. h e y said you don't ever Nant to do that,
-- That's ny extent. That's all they said.
and that was Il 1
l-Q Did they ever i,n s t r u c t you about p r e s s ' . 'i : O d '
l 'leval and the fact that hich pressure inj e ction was t o te kept on as lcng as the primary systen pressure las belov a certhin point regardless of ' hat the le ve l : stas or was it a natter of looking at the level instead of the pressure er both pressure and level?
-Okay, t o the best o f r.y rscollccticn ee :: ca A
f
)
told that we should follou cur indication.a.nd also !
. k n o'.:i n g i t .'tas heresy to let -- You ware c c'i m i t t i n g a q:retical act to let the plant ;o s .S l i d .
If I saw a pressurized level coini i 1
- hich is top scale, I uouac up greateb than 400 inches, i
turn the pu.mps on ray self . I would do that pronably after I checked all the other thre e -- Or all the other two cna.ne3s, the other tuo redundant c h a n r.e l s I would ch?:%
to ake sure that those olh e r t w o a re respcnding the sine uay.
Q Did tbe !.' a v y Training di f'e r ?
A This is taking e b a c'r*. here.
(Whereupen, a technical discussions fo]Iowed, of f the record.)
M R . G T :.' S'I E I N :
Q Can ue to back on the record. j
. , .. . ,*b3 r, r - 'r ? 'r i - ' ' < *c d I
8
' Train in g t h at hinted or indicated that one should throttle back the high pressure injection on certain transients in order to prevent a SCR/Ji and allou a ICS runback?
A. I don't think I underst ood there. I don't think it's possible what you just said.
4 Uell, the high prassu/e injection can be ,
initiated a ut or.a t i c a 21y . "c.:e ve r , the operator has t >. c.
l .'
capability of throttling back the n .. ".b e r of gallcns I r
per rinute that the systcm is dclitoring, and the qcc..;' .
I had is do you recall a n ,u 15 e r e in ,our trainir.g the succestion that you throttle back the h i gh pressure injection at any point, in order t o p. event a SCRAM?
/. I ne ve r been t old that b y .':e t Ed.
Can I say thF. i f h i gh pretsure f
s inj e cti on has occurred, au t cr.a t i c a lly the reactor should elready be tripped.
- r. e c e s c a r ' l y N
F l
l C Uell, en a turbir.e t ri p you don't l
trip the reactor,
- t. No, but if you do get h 1.: h r.ressure inject!cn ,
you will have a turbine t rip aute atically at low . "
' Dressure or variable pressure t e: .p e rat u re .
But you vill n ot
- r. e c e : s a r i ly have a S C ?. A !' . l i O 1 S a rne thing. All the rods de ene rgi c e and
/.
fl 4 l
l
i j
- o in the holc s .
O ' ' 211, the id?a of the !C3 needs to al l cit t .: a plant t o renain at s om.c hotel load or house Icad while the
,1 c u try to fix the erob lon *.iit h y ou r t urbine cr initiatin; event and not actually S C . A .1 por se. '
Let's proceed on to cthe r point s . .
IJ ' .o n ,cu re ':ith "et 7. 4 cu 'n':ic:.2d the fact that
?re initially an Aux 1311ery 0,:cator, t I a ss'.. 2 v jc1 I I l
' c r. - 3 in on the luxilliarv " rator f -l e v e l ? ,
I
!. That 's correet.
Q That was becaur,e jou had additional t r a i n i r. :, :
i i
ec :E:'ed to one who ould be co",inc $n at the Auxil2iacy 3
)
l Cperator C-level? .
i A. Th at 's eorreet.
Q And as t i:ne s.e n t on you applied for the I-s position of Control Ecom Operator, is that corre ct ? l A. That's correct. I 1
Q L'h at :as the inc?ntive a.a12able t o pe o. 2 e r l
I!ke v o u r s e l f t o b e c er.e a cenctor C r> e r a t o r as opposed I
l I
t o an Auxilliary C:,e r at c r ? I
\
f A. Well, for one thing it .: a s over a dollar an I !
l
,' . c u r raise just to start, and then, of course, after j
you pror.ressed t r. r o u g h the t rai nin r t.e ri od it tot
--r-c' i cniv n r. r n u r , +.
- 3 vou . c. ot full rate for C P. O . I,
- - - - - _ - _ - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -------------,____s__ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. . . 3 hcq you obtainad jour NT40 i li.c nce you L;ot at the t i r.e it 't a s t 1.00 a :teek extra license bcnus, and for r.y own personal reasons for takin$ control rocn cocrator, ,
I touldn't r, o any further if you don't t r '.: e w h a t ' s . a h e a d o f y ou .
I dicn't .: 7. n t to be an a':xilitary
...,-.,0.-
.m t.
.. .. ., c.
. . , . e cs.+. c.r ..,.,
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O Did jou fi 15 t -t t'ers . 'r? any d r. :L - C:s ,
t.c r e c i a t e d with t s i r. r, a ; c n.t r o l rcom crerator?
1a
. s, I
- f. Any .-
( '
- 1 O D r a .: b c c 'e s ?
' t 05, d r a . h a c:. s . I cu2Es the real drauback i that I ccold see ., a s bc'ng in close ccntact w '. t h so
- n. a n y ceople at cne time, especially during the hot f . : t ! c r. a 1 testinr, and t ;, e star:_uc tcsting progran. i
'~ h e r e' w e r e e n .' i n c e r s and neople
,i : E t c c n r_ r e g a t e d in the centrol r o o r.s 3 c oi:' n g for
(
, y.r_ .. . asn,
' . .. * ' . ' '.3 'o
., .n'.-_,'e
=. r d , o .' C 0 "- .- -" '.. , I 1
any tests that are coing on in the nlant have to ;.: o ,
p.,,;;;
i t h r o .:: h the ccntrol c;- oct stcr or t 'r -' c u r h the shift I
f c " e r. a n via the c o r. t r c i r o c. cperator. !
Of t cu r:e , 'e
. has to 1: e c o all i .e a e things in his rind 5c .hou and k c e ', then zi t n i
'_(
I I '
a fair decree of ar.an,c.ent. -
' hat,
. plus all the l
S
Ocastant h e un d i n g; by people other th3n ;ne r:cople r r. -
': '. n ;; ;ha tests like can I cet this alve c3csed and ,
l 1
openea, it .t a s jurt a constant harassrent for et,,ht ,
]
1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, Q h' a s the A u y.1111 a ry Operat or free of this k i ' ,i .
i 1
I of harassment? 1 l
- t. Yes. Basically the only he.raesrent he ;-;o t !
I 1
as from es, the Control Taon Cpeca*c;s.
Q ':cw , did you find a requalificaticn p r e !; - -
to te a burden on 'cu as epposed to ;aving s '. a " 7 d an i
An illiary 0;erator? ,
I I
A. No, I don't .hink so. This is ny o '< n per-scnal -- ,,
Q 1 ell, when you studied f o r y o u r r e n, u a l i f i c a ',i I.
- ion did you study on your c .
- n ti.e or st a s it exc3usiv:2v A
on c c. r .p any tine?
?. 1'e 31, as I recall '.e had three" operators, i
th"2e Ccntrol Recm Ope rat ors at the ti.e. -
l i
I One cuy ': a s desitncted as surveil ,
4 lance coordirstor, and that job n o r .T.a l l y took nm.ybe . n nour into the day until you cou3d get all the c a.p e r s shuffled *ut to the nocropriate people, and then if there was any for the r,u y todo, t h e n 't. e *:ould de it. .
It wouldn't take t o o l o n r., , and I
i I
T
';ould *: s e that day to go in the bach where it uns a litt'e quiet an d re vi c w :..y n ot e s T. n d t h i n r,s like thst.
I got to see ny wife little encuch yet alone taking hone a pile o f boo': s to study till I Generally studied on conpany t i r.c .
Q Uas that the norn? Did most operators do it that .; a .v ? .
j I
I really den't k r. o u . I don't Pncw -- Sc: e i l
Cuys tcok t h e rn h or.e . Other guys didn't.
Q Did "et Ed cive you speci'ic h ec o .. c rk a s s ? r .1 - -
6 i
i
- r. e r. t s when you were in the training orcgran f or your ;
I i initial "eactor Operater license? That is could you c, o' i
l over naterial in cless and then be e :: c e c t e d to o$ reduce l ,
I certain problems or feedback certain information the 1
next day, or uds it s or:et hi n g t h at they did not excect j l
ycu to de anything at hed and it was nainly whi3e you were cn *.hatever cite or c2issroom?
/, Okay, I t h i r. k I'r p i t :: i n c, up uhat rrbcran
/cu're talking about, and it's the one that's ecnducted
{
I
! by "et Ed's training throuth the licensine aAr. l CWA In other nords we have -- 'le h a d i WM j ,
I 1
various stays of training. 'le .o u l d go down to the I h i
t rai nin g bui 2 din g sr.d sit, a r. d .e :ould study say "ive 1
4 e r.e r g e n c y procedures, and they would cive us t uo hou rs ,!
-l
___._______..___m_ _ - . . _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - -
l
. .. rt 2 h o t.r s t o' s . u d -j ther.
"' : y :culd .sve an inst;uctor 'o . a ,
I i
over then with us, and at the end of t hat session ': e
\
would have an etsmination, and they u>uld be graded. j l
If .: e tot less taan an 80 on it j thcy would send it up to us in an en' elope, and we .cu'd .
l rh??? to cornlete it by such 0.n d s u c't .t date to get c r e <:' t
. c. n 2, >+
But n c .; e of thet gener131y had to
.b e 01%en S c .e . I don't t '- : . h A n ' a n '! e c e r t o c '- Eny of.
I I i
t h c. t hC: e .
Q !; c w , did it o r P. the s a c.e way in your initial 3 1 :r. n s e ctudying or p re p s. r a t i c n ? o
" hat is not the requalification t,rogram, but the co]d training as vou had or the hot training as it r. a :, ha ce been?
A., Yes, ue had bydrolly it :a s what .i e call the OJ T book, and it was -- They had all the systens l i s t e d',
' 2 *: i t. ; e r. e- r e l study cuide for s;ch s. stem.
And ue had to study the study guide fcr the r, stem, and then :e cou3d to t o a chi f t 'oran=n I or a shi f t superviror, and he would r;i v e us a checkcJS cn J 2
6 I r.i r h t sav at this point I t::D o' clock." l
' f.
T. . a. : ' s just a l'ttle nush, but t..sr 4
I sch at they do. I 4 ': ow , I have been r.ede aware of some nucle;rl I
1 plants in which I'r not sure if it's ?O's or C?O's h.e a
been stopped at the gates oy unicn stewards and told t g ;
I
_- p i
1 i
I e z.
? c a ve th ei r. b ook s at the plant, that they couldn't tah.2 j
tho ton. hcne .ith then, t h e.t it ans sonething_to c.c ,
I done at the plant on utility time as opposed t o t h r: t r - f 1
I o '. n .1; a . ,
Do you recall seeing any such th'n3 occur at Three ?'ile Island?
A ? lot to .y : e c olle ction .
Q Was'there very heavy union invol.c;Ont in the conduct of business for the /.u x i l l i a ry Cre: 2 tors and Centrol Roon Cperators?
MR. S ' '. I T ." . Off the record for a minute. .
(Whereupcn, there was a discussion of f the .ccord.)
BY ",R. O R'J STE I N : .
Q Eack on t .; e record. >
i 4
'ihen a person 31ke your:2: P
- r. a
- i I
u' . s t j neu position, take for exar.rle the CEO position, 1 I
- as the t ar is up on .hich : ou nicht have be?n P.t e d and salaried, chanr,ed upwards or do.;nuards? l A It ras seniority. C o : .n an y seniori,y deter-i rined if I ;;ct the j ob .
l 1 r t h t r r- was 33 openinr: , and I 0. 5 1
i -
3 1
The the .l k t h in s e n '. o r i t y I .:nuldn ' t get the job.
e t h a r' 13 .:culd.
Q Okay, once you Got the job what about incre -
rents in your salary and re vi e'es or annual revie.s? .
g
' t
(
4 -
'lh a t kind of measure tas there in de t e rriq in g :: cu r cerfornance and veur eligibility for raiscs? i Ck .v , .: 3 '- = 1 -e:toiic renorts. I c s. n ' t L
.,n ; '. s .
I r : c a '.,1 i' they .e.e nth 2y or c.?r; rix c' u j s . g%'
telieve th :y .e re .or.thly or 90 i
'.72ry 33 d s ? 5Culd [et a reph L ,
F. d fczn that his attitude, a r. d it il e s a standard "t ne concepts of his v or ,: att$tude, is Se pi c i: i n r, u p
~
g the new J cb ; jou 'nou, questirns like this, ocrrorr'.nce, 8 ;
and then t ':, e y wou}d be rated by the supervisor. l i
l P o r' Q ers t 'r r e e r.y S eci'ic th!ncs 21sted?
r s Y.'
i i
exarple turned vav3cs ro nany t i r.e s , did to n :- n y thin:5 .
- - 2 0 t i v i t c h n n e; a s , pushed the . 'c nE
.y to cause nc - c. !
. c. r. y t i: s? l P. s there any such arr ss"ent tuttons so f nede of tne c;eretcrs'
.h a t te do there las if te i. 4,
- r. ': o . Easically l l I l
' had a person that was in t r a i ni n t; for a license ano l *
.e he needed to do five reactivity min i r.u l a t i cn s we would s
- r. t a n d by a ]icenced c r. e r a t o r and a ct ;5 31y -- '*e -
- ould go through e v e ry t hi n g; t e f or e he actually did it, and I, 1
l l
4
. i I
'l I '
he culd ;r.cke the reactivity mani pul at i en s , nnd then !
l wa tould log it int o the :.a4 n OF, log as so e.nd so i
perferred re act or . st art -up under direction of licensed ope r3t or '5al Martran . i Q This :ould be primarily for satisfying =; o r.c
': 5. C reoutrerents for the license, but it was not s o;.e -
.ih thing for a "et Ed a.s s e s s t.e n t havinc F.nyth'.nz to'do the ' p l o ;t e e .' s salary?
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t,. Okay, the former question, I think I under-c t e. ,.1- a... u.
Q Yes, thap's what I uas coing t o tet 'b a ck to, i 1 I think what I am trying t o Eet at
.s a s ff there $s any real record race of having a .an !
Stand back and say, "Ckay*, he pushed the wrong butt on
" ark it down." Things like'that, there ;
that tine.
as nothing like that?
i The performance of an or.e rat or : a s 't
\
l based en blank? You fill in the bl ank .
1 I
'Ih a t ' s a t o u r,h question. I really don't I d on ' t really.
know uhat they utse it on.
"a*vre the shift r u r. e .r v ' t. o r lik25 .l l
Ee L.
this guy. You know. :'a y b e he really is good.
.. .a i
i
_______a_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _
just b.e :t ~: s out all over as being good, and they knew 4. t- .
i Q I get the i pression that you are saying it is sort of a s ubj e ctive -t ype thing by the supervisor i
as opposed to a cuantifiable thing?
t b' e l l , first let e say that du rin g our t rain --
ing -- c 'e , you can talk two di f fe re nt groucs.
li 0 Okay, t r a i n i n ;; and operating,
- f. Tra d '. i n g and operating. '!e l l , durir.g the treininG ncried c : e c riticalit y . Dhay, 'e had cold j j i
', '. c a n s e . Our t: sining di f f e red after we tent c r i t '. c a l .
Then there .t a s a reparate.
They do walk-arounds that they t o o /,
every so often. Thelcandidates had walk-arounds that they vould take, I don't know, every couple of wceks ,
or cvery couple of s e E r.e n t s . They would have a ualk-around with one, a menber of the t raining deoartr ent , e 4
,could c c::.e up and walk arcund the control room uitn I
l him, and they *:ou2 d to over those systers.
Chay?
i And t hen he ':ould nahe an evaluatico based on that .: a l k - aroun d , and they ould d o b a s i c a l '. y '
.. h a t an :;RC e x a;r.i n e r w o u 2 d do, s t a rt this puno and then you vere :upposed to Get the procedure and line-up the correct valves and so on. You know. l This was a following for I thought
1 1
1 it was nn e :.: t e n s i v e set of questions that i:ere given 1 1
i to you on specific systens that you h ad to cn s .:c r , )
subjectively, i r e t u r r. e d t o t' e f They were graded an. I candidate before his walk -around , and this was pro re<s, ;
and generaily it took a candidate nine 9onths, and th:y E' /c him a rock ' RC test of their c '. : n , a .: r i t t e n ' j 1:cuid cr cral.
And from. their day ecu3d d e t e c r>' n ?
v ". ? t h e r t h r.: y .: ou l d s'nc hin up.
- 9. s c r. e .here the et I' d r,c a n i : e -
O Ok a;' , that l
i e r, t c uns'you had to ass a certain e.va, iithin a o
certain period of time or ycu uent back to ubere you i
4 ucre befare, I believe?
x ->y.
r-u Q 0;;ay , but let F s take the case, the other case. That is you now have the license.
,. :es. i 1
j C The question ': a s one of a.e there anv f l I q .: E r. t i 'i a b l e t h i n g. s uten which the a d v a . c e . e r. t o f t e i Individual as far as pay sten end such go or is this !
1 n.erely a .atter of seniority and not r.aking any 'ra ve s ? ,
- t. C r. c e you got to be :cntrol Eocr C- -ator i ujth a Jicense your pay .:e n t no higher, and you ':e re
i j ': rt stuch .nless you got p re: ote d 'c shift f o .' 2 : . ': n ,
I "nd t :- ' . t
- t r. s the diicret$cn of t : ' . . - $. l l y t' c ebift svervin ce and the plant S L..e rin t e- i c nt .
Q Did you not need a renior operator's 'ic>nce .
for that?
A 'T'.a t ' s c crract . l l ell, .acy ec- d. ; - . c t e: "*u, . ad
.c. '. v r
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ytu '-d : a .':. ;O 1 i c e ~. e .
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- 6 %- 4 .1 ., $ .c
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3 .s uw 6. a. r4a , . . . ,
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-.a i n t a i n t'.e: c r o ."i c i e r : ' :-c cnce = 'chr : 2 had tc :o j Ev' i
l c e r ; c. i n thincs, orerete ' ': e - 13. . : .
n/ ; .3,' c. r 2 clu '
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1 tions i:hich we o. c r f o : . r d .: re dc~'J- nted und?r I 'or..t
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'*"r. e n ;e had r ^ . c t 4. . i t.;- r eiru'iti..s,
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c hic i s t> a s i c a 3 2 y the c-c cc<;.ator 31 c :- r. - -
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sin 6 ~. ~.4
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y,ee
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Q ~ You r.entioned the fact thht you did have 4.
- 1.:' u 3 a t J d training at Lynchburg. I believc you naid id las an eicht-week progran in obt aining your Reactor i
j Cperat or 11 cense.
A That's correct. ,
Q Now, had you had subsequent si: ulated t rail g
-l 4fter Octcber '77 now at Ly n ch b u r g ?
l l
Yes.
l L I had one teck at a; p rox 4 natelv t', ?
I ,
I llast ucek in June of '78, and another rock a r ^c; ! 3 '. - '"
i the .eck of the 28th, " arch 28, l'J/9.
i .
t l Q Okay, and that uns a predeter".ined r": ran !
I i
that ;'e t Ed had sny o p e ." a; o r s F. o i n G down in crder to stay' current and be'in fulfill:ent of the nanipul at i en-l 1
r e q ui re r.c n t s for license renewal? '
A I'm not sure I know .:h a t you ean.
Q This training that you had at E & h' on their .
l
- facility, the simul at or , that involved -Intrulatirns ,
i 1 l .
i
' of the sinu 3 at cr ccnt rols ? e i
f j
1
, L (Indicetes yes.) l 1
l Q fnd I assune in your casa you .u c t have :: e c n l
l l
' involved with n c.erous .ani nul a t i on s so that you did l uithout t !. a t s i nu 'l a t e d training actually .eet the :; R C i
requirc ents for renewing your 31 ce :se in 1979? l L That's correct, at the pinnt.
1
4 Tii c h t .
/- (Indicates yes.)
Q /, n d the thin g that it rust have done was to isr.irt ycu in underst anding certain transients whlch
/ou did nct actually experience during the year?
L That's correct.
'o i' O i: n d I n a s a r. 3 t h at also it .: 2 5 Ceared so are nct at tPe controls er se like a s e : i v.-
peer:0 .50 I
cne-ator :ould have an opport u .it y to actually . a n
- r. ': 2 s '. e
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4,
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I
- f. That's cer"ect.
't e e k G c .: , acain I']I a r jou t o tr" a r. d go ;
a bit in tir.e.
I ar s u: e that in your Navy prorrnm e
ecu : sad cr had teen empcsed to the sinu 2 ator that the c lavy ay hace had in v c m t raining? n,s. . .
.avy.
I,-
L 'le didn't haie s i r11at ers in the r.
Ycu did 7: ct h s 'c e a n:. ': 1 J y si .uls.tC;'s at 231' L e had erotctype training c e r.t e r s uhien .:e re actuEl r: actors. They t:ere cperating.
O Cn those ':avy p rot ot y r,e s did "ou underro h sirilar c o.s u a l t y events ruch as you had at Ly n c h b u r r, ,
or .: s : e thsy .cre c c: .p 3 e x ? . ,
lt's rea31y di f ficult to ansuer the questien f
l L
f
' l b e c c. u s e of the nature of the t .t o p i r.n t s . One is a very s i .ple p ' '. n t . It is so stable it's ridiculous, and all
-9 vou do is pu)1 rods, and t h at 's it. Every'.hing else is j so self regulating that it takes care of itself basical1y. ,
The Babcock and ;,'i l c o x is r; u i t e a bit :.t o r e cor. plicated t o ope rat e . By failing a TH 1 :e -
l ec i nt h i ch en cne -lant it culd do a . 21t it :ie of 1, ,
4 +. .- : n, ,="'.o~'..- . .' 'rol e s'6. . ~ ' .'. .-
. . n. . . s :.'. a.
l o c '.e d at that pa ra": t e r ,
lf you failed 'i nica in the :; . /
c.u l d ionk up r.nd say, "It's hi ch . 'hst's r l c .t yea
'in i ch was right 'c e i o w it, and it the other cne read?"
reais clay. 6 i
"Oh, I nust have had an instre entl .
l I
":bic- bcek t ':, e r e , " a r. d you ' n c .- that - To Pind of co plex, I d c.n ' t 'r. n e w . I cay the c a s .; alt ' e s . :- r e a .s h a '/ e a hard time ant . e rin g th at . '
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c' a .eactor, ancther faci 3 sty' That 's the E'.:D branch i
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L That's ccrrect.
l i I 0 Did you find that this detracted s c r. 2 .s h a t ,
' I'
'i i e I s '. . : . d , j f ro.m the traininc ith rerard to T.ce
- r. u i c k ' .y
o r ..' a s it so:ethir.3 that ycu got used to fairly
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l A, Yes, I got used to it fairly ou$ekly so it ,
f I P j didn't -- It didn't really -- I'm cary easy to reori .3 t j I l like t h at though, and I adapted d o .! n there within hourr.
I And sone guys I guess it still p I t ot he re d . I don't k n o t' .
3ut :sy r e l f , I didn't find it anacy- j iing o .' a n y t h i r. g like L ;. at . It didn't deter f r c:- y i
.treininr. '
l l
, 4 Q I'd like to go t ack to a s t E t c r. r . t tiat c u ', (
1 c a '. d .s h i c h st a s .ather int 2restinc, and (: at is ! get
' i g
L.
the i r.r r o s s i c n that in the ':a v: p '. a n t s it .. a s 'sirly I
~
1 '
I cary to detect an instrurent that t ar n 't ':or :in e ri htP
)
I I a That is correct. []
(
l C And I gather that it is not quite the s a r.e l
+ 1 t: j l'
r at T '- e e i l e ? ,
1
- t. It's a nicht-ire. Y ou , r , o '.t . $i Q
J hnd - e nt $ c-- d seTc;e .n r c: e of l i I
t b :. : t h $ :. r s t 'r. =. : certa *n o .c r .t a: s chcu'd a.v'-' a fI
- i hen thav s:eti mali;e a s:nse of, cou i n o. , n s .- e '_
f 1 I
Iregard3ess of + at 1:ind of 'rdication it is st;'e e,
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an o p e r e.t o r shou 3d .> e able to lock at a ; e : t $ '. n cf 2 ,
l I '
I panel and just scan it for a second :e n d reali;e if l s- euang is not r e a 3 3 :. k or .e ,
- e. . d t r. :- r , cu --
s c h.n anotne r section, do the s a r. ? t h i n r..
I .
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0
?;cw , a. lot of cuys uculdn't do
.t h a t , nnd they vould becone: locked in on just c e r t s 'i n E P.u c e s , you know, and that's r e a ll'y . a b a d cart.
The gauges, thenselves, ' tere hard tere v e rt i c a l ." They :ere'only to read because they about an inch utde by I'd say ten inches high. i The needle was very srall, an'd ]
adn c o r. s o l e and in b ?.c k ;
these were the caos on the !
for fnst'nce, e ). t r s c t i on , steen n: e ss ures , and l 3
' ith a face an ,
t o: .p e r at a.'e s P e re gaured on a reter ;
l
$nch wide by say three inches tall, j
- t. n d to vicw those gauges you could ubich prebably cat as close as twelve feet to them, req u' re s fairly Food eyesight to be able to road the l i
e>act v21ues.
But syou cou3d scan it, and vou ,
i
)
can see if your parameters are about where you thinh ;
t ' . s ;: s ': c. u l d b e .
4 Did you e ve r have an oppcrtunit.y cr I
I i
confrontation uith anyone at the plant er,c re .ou l l
2 l
es. re: sed your obse r vations on some of this e n u i r. . . t !l 1
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A Oh, yes, but I really don't know who I .
'ould ,,3 c e Onid it to. 5 If I said it to a . . :, : o . y it 'cu2d
- d .
i
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't o r k i n r; with at t5e i hAve 'ocan s o r.e b o d y that I va: i 1
t i:t e . You know, probably a s h i t f o r e r.a n or a c h i 't ,
r sur2rvisor, f As far es r.a es, I d.cn't r e ?. : 1v i i n o i, but 1 did r,? n t i on t '. e fset t ': a t I thfnk t ' .' r e 1 is too ruch, I think there is a lot o f e ) t r a r. e c u s .
rartare in that control roon that ^;uld te trken cut
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Do you ever actu'.11y sav to s c r e o r: e I
this i s like this> and it really oucht to be '. d k e .
I
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a 4. y . m.. e.. c<c.. ..
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s O'sce' w i t h ou t 2ny chance e .' e r b e i n .r, ex.Dected to t2'<e s,
- s. .. n2 s,. 3 ,_. v . . ,
s.,_.. c r e. ., .. q. s c.e,,
n a 53'.chtly diff+ rent
_. ' 's s re F~. ' i '. r: -
cou i in your hnual of L .' o c e d u r e s of Deinc en 0; e rt:t o r .
1 3.E e'ent ' h ': t 1.'.'. c h euid a l] o't /cu to raise to 5.
r, eared to you as a s1 >,ni fi c ant or even octs'olv 2 .
e t 'r o d of 0 e a' ' .~.
'a'ety conce-n for a plan, and i ts 2 " r.1 l o b : a to cu as 7 o-'
or ' ,fe rr.at i en that
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- t. Well, cine rally if we j u s t ha d a sien)e ,
nrobica like a meter :as incorrect ,v e itould c2 to the shift forenan and say, "This t h i n .; isn't e no : at in,' r
.oroperly. Shall ue turn in a work recuest?" .
h And he wculd say :i c s or - 'cw, I
A ,5 :- 1 9 h c .-
and th'e course would croceed from there. 1 I
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r.c a t i on it t o the shi f t srecvisor.
i l ic u 'r n e w , " a ?! : e 'e . * . ave a better i i
1 ny of doing this . ".a y b e *:0 shou 3d t .e ' e a 1cck A. t i i.
. . ..aw .
Did such a situation 2"?r occur' C.
I J
r f
- t. Yes' I r.e n t i .pn e d to him about the reli s' ,
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i
, i f new, the tituaticr ; i s y s t e r. , which u as t c rrible . You I
. r. s l':st terrib3e T r. e y d i d r. ' t Snve any suic ' tic !
I t.
b ; c a r. s around the verse 3 50 that in case a s :- s s e } ,
f
.e would r.o on a h i g.h d i f f e r e r.t i al pressure, i n at is cut f}cw of f t o the boost e r Ou .os and suasec.uently t - t. .
i l,
reed p u rm s . I i
And if t'.ey had an it.t O m s t 1 e i..
. I l
- cuid send the in tnere that .: A s air one rated that ,
1 W
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high D? in the s:' stem that could to ocen just r i :' h t away and keep this and condensate booster pu.,cs w4;h everything could have been all r i r,h t .
l Il l s o: .e water; It .ia s at least six nonths l e Tc re h I
the accidant if not 3 enre r that this question b .5. d :1 4 raiced by 'othe r tenbe rs of the control roon staff to th2ir shi f t supervisors, end I rnou I .: n d the ct'er ,
l
- * ' 3 cpc . at or that I . o r '.: e d with, I .cu ic had .
i i too, t h s. t an a u t or.a t i c val. t h e 's , it .. c u 2 d be 4
. 2)l l i se had ?>:erienc3d ;.2e r ' n la .s it. t: ?
'r a r a .. t e .
polish?"s hefcre. g This was all cral reqcesis cr sug t2 r t i ns"'
O
'c a s th?re anything i n '.: r i t i n r, t h at :a s cut dc :n en that ?
h A Mo, not that I can recall.
l.
- 'e re you, nq a sector cr e r at or , fi-i r 0 ..
o a.
with the specs for the pl nt? .
- f. I as f .ili ar :' t h t h i ~: , ces.
I .:uid j g.
i M
.as a tech s; e c cn a ;
genera}1y tell you if the re certain iter. i I couldn't recite it .o rd for g
.. o r d , but I know where : could ;;o to find t *. e t i inforr; tion >
Q e r a
, you #a11)iEr v';th the tOCh SieC OT y9
n' r e o, t rat in :; p ro c e d u re associated with the tail from the PORY end safety valves? ,
- f. es. l I
4 Jr you i. n e w th at a s i t u at i on existed u ere the c3 ant in that area la s n ot within the tech l,
cu3d you co c b o .2 t :
seves or ope rat in g procedures, hcu
-' at would you do t o ap p ri s i:.;; .p n e t e n e r. t of t'is or .
f i
I
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o; 'd
' , , , at I 't e ild do is just I
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u.
I ycu know, I t h i n): ' : e ' '/ e !
I su:ervisor a r. d :e'l hin, I i
I 000 a nroblen. f I Q Did you e ver do that w '. ', h regard to t '; a t
! rarticular temperat.re?
i j That pa rt i c u 2 3r p " c b l e r. I as -- I r.e v e r l ( j l s !
.. .' o t o n.r. y t h i n g d o'.. n e>c20t I -- v o 3 n r.e s of veter
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tut h a e t o t. e c .s. c r. a n : c e , I t h ou cht that :e-i t
b
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se C.s
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,le 31, s. e r e you -
I Q
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i
- . But -- $
l I Q Go ahead.
l
- f. But I d$d ialk t.o 3ernde S .i t h and Dick i oyt
-t out thic problem, neout the 2 e a r. F.;~. e cut cf*
-a*wv .s u s t said, "7et a rood 2cak rate."
- - - _ - - ~ - ' - " - - - - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _,_ --~---'"^^--._.m_ _ _ _ _
l 9
L:
. - . . . p
- f. n d vbenever I did it I ..
'- -d d t
off as often as I could.
I Tould just ray, "I cou:dn't -'t .
I a good one all n i r;h t , " and keep doing it t h at .s v '
They r. a d three. days to r :- t a ..
one, and s o rr.e t i s.e during the day or d u r i n g t h e . r. ' at ;
a good one would c o r.e up, and then it weuld hsve *o .
1 co o r three r. o r e days until t h e ', muld Jet : i l one. !
I l
Q 'l2 s th,e E n;' r . e c';e "cu ceuid .e '
2 l
to :l t h this c on c e: n ? ,
A I probably diin't go to snybody : ;; .u c o I thcucnt that t:. i s ':a s such an c r .>i c u s r ' e r '. c . t , :t I,
the reople that I could have ccne to were .=1.endy I l i notified.
I t h i n '- cou're gettinr at that i
h W
l cou}d have (Jone to tnc .N ? C .
C .le 3 1 , :'r not ,:itfnc to t'-;t. ": :"?r, I
that is an u:tirate a . O r. u e t .at > .e cou d t- e, .t i
I .as concerned with "$nding cut :st sreci'io u'l'-
i Jines th're are ':i t h i n .t h e 'et Td C ; c-n : ' i - . t -t I
would a13cw an individua) like . c' rs e l f t o r.c t i c e l i
that cu .; e re being sti' led by t',e n?>t 'ccr of
- r. anate ent and try to raise to t '. e sur'E:e E O c . c '. n l
.ithout rocking the entire bcst like what ycu l :st -
l
, i
('. . i I. 1 1
1 1 l
I really don't think - I was kind of i, A Yes s .
afrsid 'of rocking the tiig t oat up the:e. l t
It seer.ed to me.11'ke t h e y u r.t r e i*
s
':new they 'ic r e awcre of t.
t ot a13 y unpredictable. I -
.y ;
pr o b l e :r. , and their'r.inds a: 2 ar e nt e r t h an t-i r.e . I could do th'ngs with their heads that I could nev:r i r k c i r.e . ..
.i
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c,, w ...i.
- ss 6:pcnnad uten scne quslity acc:rnnce gro'z th.;
- v.. ..
d . o . .. . , ., t. s... . .. .2.. . .
....s e.,
- r. .a- o .e .a.w s .- .- ..a v .:. .,
be e s o l'v e d ?
j A Vell, as far as : /nov t a c y h a d ' .- - 'lc had f surva131nnce procedure f o r .s , nnd the surveill.nce croup would send any shectn that c or:e b a c k cermleted, t f-
-they would Go t o 1S1, in Service Inspection, and an cr.cineer uculd 3cok at the d.$ta 9nd urd uate it.
'..'.at he c '2 t s is just.the r. i n ' ; . -
Ind -- Tha.'s a31. '. c "r * '
jarcr.atien, you know. > \
I ;
the CA is cc.ncerned, that's all I .: n ow about. I Q
':a s there an area th at u.s le f t c :t f . c ;-
your training in the l' e t d trogram on Aux 113iary i i
Ope r at or and Control P.c or O p e r at o:- or uns there *: o ? -
-int dincunced a3cnc th:se ' t .e s of re c o r t i r. r or i f!xing up things which apocared to 'c e incorre ct ? I t
gis
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= * * * > +
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+
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- f. No, I never -- '.l e never ware told t. o r i ). I I
anything up, but they to3d us to get one an,. ay v ., u - . ,
Q You get one meaning <: hat?
L " caning a 3 c .5 k rate. l t
Q Okay. Are y ou a.are of the rec:nt I b ' i ,.
it .: n s Friday Press C o n f e :' a n c e that the D i. r e c t o r of
?
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l a day foi - .-sry da-/ thet t .'. e v
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? t-yod You had nentioned the fact that l cre at the LynchburE cinulator at the t i r.e of the V. i l e Island accident on " arch 2 8 ', and I gather Three that was part of y ou r re r;ualt ri c ati on training, Nr
!! ow , were you slated to have license reviewed fairly shortly?
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the 19th of October of this year. .
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. g re qu ali fi c a t i on training, or .ere . ou h a v i n g r :'o b 2 c r. s with $t which r.i t;h t have Iraaired your receivinr the renewal?
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(Whercucon, the Court Eeporter read j l
back.as follows : "Were you doing s atis f a ct orily well j i
in the requalification t r a i n i n g: , cr were you hav$ng. l 1
1 problems with it .th i c h r.i s h t have i r.c ai r e d y ou r r e c a i ' ' 1.-
the rencual?")
BY " ?. . , C F.',' S TE I N :
O Let me qualify that. Prior to t' arch 26, 1979 I. :2 0 . I thoucht I as p r c c .' a s s i n g satisf cLo.'!2". .
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You vere not in a estecory, in a training prc[; ram whe re you were deficient in areas and had to 1
.ak e up certain lectures?
A. ?;ot that I 'r n o w of.
1 J '. P. , CF: STEIN: Of f the record.
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off the -ecord.)
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e record. I have no further que stions at the crecent tire. i Eces icar atter.ty, "r. f.11 t h , have I
any q;;stjons?
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l 31ke to say that this is an on ':oing i n v e s t $ r F. ', '. o n , ': >
l h although I have completed the q u ? s t i or. s that I hnv? l f or today we r.ay need to brint; vou back for f u : t 'ic r depositions.
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II ARTH AN , HAROLD 3/24/80 Transcript of TV Program, "What's Happening America"
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March 28,1980 -
Shana Alexander - Two sanier operators working inside the Unit 2 control room at Three Mile Island suddenly saw the central control panel Within a few hours, a series of mechanical failures and human ,
light up.
errors had led to the, worst accident in the history of nuclear power, That was a year ago. Reporter Ira Rosen began his investigation the He discovered that safety requirements at Three Mile very next day.
- Tonight, one Island had been altered to keep up production and profits.
of the men who ran'the reactnr tells us how that was accomplished.
Hal Hartman.- I wanted to make sure that the plant would respond the way I was taught and that the way that my understanding of things
- would allow it to, uh, but everyday I went in it just got worse and worse.
Uh, I told my wife over a year ago I thought it.was an accident waiting to happen. *
.. Kale Voice - That opinion doesn' t come f rom any back-of-the-shop apprentice but from a senior control room operator here at Three Mile In the first televised interview with one of those who operated Island.
i the control panels, Hal Hartman said that 6 months before the acc dent he had been warning his supervisors that pipes would break, operating procecures were being vic'ated ard essential safety ecuipment would fail, and the plant went through a sudden change in voltage output known as a transient, and, for his safety concerns, Hartman was harrassed an told that he had better snat up or be fired.
It was a lemon. Unit 2 Hal Hartman - Everything went wrong.
was a lemon.
Male Voice - Did you ever have any fear in operating the plant?
O I was very apprehen-Hal Hartman - Everyday I went in I was afraid.
Ub, later ive about operating the plant, especially in the later' days. ,
f Just didn't know what was going to '
ays I mean the last' year or so.
~
Unit 1, it's a Mercedes Benz. That unit
) happen while I was on shift.'
It was just, you know, two was, is fantastic. Unit 2 is a '59 Rambler.
Unit 2 is the tail, sides of the coin. .
hale Voice - Just how important are these safety systems that In the movie "The China Syndrome," Jack Hartman is concerned with?
Lemmon plays a role similar in responsibility to Hartman's, and he explains. ,
Lemon - In anything that man ever does there's an element of risk, Now, right?
Well, that's why we have what we call " defense-in-depth."
You were that means backup systems to backup systems to backup systems.
Even with a faulty relay, even with a stuck valve, that system there.
works.
Male Voice - Sounds good in the movies, but these safety systems l
could have prevented the accident -- had they been functioning proper y.
Hartman says a part of this system .
- was deliberately tampered with, an he also says he was the one who did it.
Hal Hartman - The primary leak rate was every three cays we had to .
determine RCS inventory, basically, and we'd determine it for a one period:
hew much water we put into the system versus how much water we If the difference was more than a gallon per detected coming out. ification minute, uh, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a technical spec h leakage that said that greater than one gallon per minute unidentified During the later days, we had leaking safety valves, was unacceptable.
and we had a tough time getting a leak rate.. We had a tough time getting We had a tough he computer to print out less than one gallon a minute.
time getting' a hand calculation to come out less than orie gallon a There were.certain things we could do to make it less than one .
minute.
ga11on per minute.
What did you do?
Male Voice Hal Hartman - Um, there are certain things like something simple It's a gas that prevents like adding hydrogen to the make-up tank.
oxydation in the coolant pipes.
Male Voice - Did you ever fix the statistics?
I did it only if I was Hal Hartman - I didn't do it very often.
h watched very closely and was told that I had to have one by six in t e Normally, when I was morning. It was a dire situ -- 4 avoided it.
assigned the task of getting a leak rate, I would just say I couldn't get a good one, you know, I'll try again later.
- Male Voice - Why did you do it?
I was told to do it. Get a Hal Hartman - We had to get it done.
good ene, And you knew it was a violation of the.NRC regulation.
Male Voice Mal Martman - Uh huh.
Male Voice - Did you ever have discussions with cther people at .-
the plant about this?
Hal Mar: .an - Yeh, my shif t su;ervisor, Bernie Smith.
Male Voice - We spoke to Smith outside a Middletown restaurant and asked him if Hartman had told him about the plant design and operat probl ems.
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Male Voice .Did he ever express'these to you.
8, Smith Yes, he.did, yes, uh huh.
' Male Voice - And were they justified?
B. Smith - Yes, they were.-uh huh. .
Male Voice - How come nothing.ever got done on those? i i
That's' not really true, B. 5mith' - Well, you say nothing got'done.
okay.- In other words, you're always working on better design, you know,
. and fix design . deficiencies you have' Male Voice - Hartman's complaints. are not just with the' design He claims that at the most critical period of the deficiencies there.
reactor's life, when it reaches its heat producing strength, operators inside the control room tampered with that data.
Hal Hartman - I remember this one particular incident, uh, I was making the startup and I went critical less than a half a percent from I imediately.
where we should have gone, and, when we went critical took the rods and inserted the rods.. As sooit as I inserted the rods, T said we went the shift s.;ervisor told me, "What are you doing?"
My estimated critical position was 68, my minus a half critical at 28%.
I went critical 4% too early, and, to me, percent position was 32%.
there's something wrong.
Male voice - In testimony given to the Nuclear Regulatory Comis-sion investigators, Hartman stated that he was told to continue the He told planc starcup, even though this would violate the procedures.
the NRC investigators, "They redid the numbers and somehow they fudged them." .
And why did they do it?
They had to get that ",
Hal Hartman - They wanted to make money.
Sant to 15% power, and they couldn't do it with the rods at 1% shutdown position. .
Male Voice '- How important is that? Nuclear critic Bob Pollard .
of.the Union of Concerned Scientists explains.
Bob Pollar'd - I think those are further examples of the practice They will that's prevalent in many utilities operating nuclear plants.
ignore problems to the point where the operators become accustomed to them.
In the case of estimated critical positions, this is an important - .
aspect of operating the plant safely to try and predict exactly when the reactor will go critical. If they are then falsifying those records, it reflects an attitude of being more interested in operating the plant, rather than being interested in the safety of the public.
Male Voice - Dudley Thompson of the Inspection and Enforcement Division of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said that if Hartman's Already story is true it could mean heavy fines on Metropolitan Edision.
the company has been fined $155,000 for safety violations found after But Smith said Hartman's design concerns weren't serious, the accident.
and a company vice president, pictured here, with Presicent Carter during last year's accident, agrees.
GPU V.P. - I would say that the TMI Unit 2, uh, has cesign concen:s :
that are some.vhat in advance of the design of Unit 1 in terms of the TMI Unit
- ntrol roc = and in terms of the secondary plant installation.
i has operated very well for us. I think if we're able to recover TMI Unit 2 we'll find that it has the capability to operate in a similar vein.
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Male Voice - Why didn't the Inspection and' Enforcement Division D -
discover some of the findings that we have found?
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GPU V.N. - I don't know the answer to that without knowing those I just don't .
findings, those people, whether they were interviewed. .
kn,ow.
Male Voice - One reason Bradford doesn't An know was that the
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findings In the investigators' report never reached his office.
As a result of investigator told us it seemed to have disappeared.
other similar cases, federal comittees have questioned whether the NRC can effectively regulate nuclear energy, and Bradford even wonders whether nuclear energy is safe. .
Bradford - Well, that always comes down to the question of what you mean by safe. If your, uh, standard is compared to driving a car, yes.
Uh, if your standard is can I give you absolute assurance that an acc as serious as Three Mile Island won't happen someplace in the count the next year, the answer is no.
Male Voice - Six federal and state comittees have studied accident at Three Mile Island, and they all have agreed that the plants d
need to be redesigned and operated more safely, but the changes propose by these committees raise serious issues which are very sensitive to preventatives of the nuclear industry.
Male Voice - The Xemeny Commission also raised a number of Uh, they cited such questions relating to the design of the plant.
EPRI, in fact, has things as confusing panels on the control room.
Uh, they also cited a number of difficulties printed a report on this.
with the polisher machine.
Oh, are these justified? And are these indigenous in the whole industry?
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Male Voice - Can we stop please. ,
Male Voice - No, just, you know, answer the question.
That Male Voice - I'm sorry, I'm not going to answer that.
question... (fade out).
Male Voice ,When he calmed down, here was his explanation.
Male Voice - Industry is studying modifications to control rooms.
The results of those studies have not yet been completed, and
- some modifications might, in fact, be made.
Male Voice - I see. And how much would those cost?
Male Voice - The, uh, NRC has estimated that if all the changes to power plants that necessitated from the Three Mile Island Accident .
would run approximately 525 million per power plant.
Male voice - To save m:ney, the plant supervisors ignored Hartman's safety concerns. Ironically, others say justifiably the utility now has But the highest repair bill in the history of the nuclear program.
' rather than being heralded as a prophet, things went bad for Hartman l He was forced to resign, according to reliable l
after the accident.
sources, when a company psychologist said he was too high strung to work in a security area, even though he had been working in one for six years.
Hal Hartman - I later called Dr. Cohen and asked him, I said "I .
thought that you said that I was okay when I left your office, that you would recomend me for a position," and he said he would recommend me for a position as long as it didn't involve a security area, and I said something to the effect "Then you think I'm psychotic," and he said, "I "So then you are not think that you can't work in a security area."
He said, "That's true."
sure what I am going to do in a security area?"
I said, Why1" He said, "Because you expressed symptoms of hypertension and stressful behavior, and you were very critical of your employer."
Male Voice - But Hartman had Navy documents from when he worked as a nuclear submarine operator that showed he performed well under stress. We tried cont, acting Dr. Choen, but he refused to coment.
Had Metropolitan Edison also refused to coment on the Hartman case.
Martman's concerns been heeded, the accident might have been avoided.
And besides the monetary loss to the company and the public, there was personal anguish emerienced by the workers who absorbed the radiation.
One such person is Tem Kaufmann, an auxiliary control room operator at the plant. The amount of radiation he has absorbed since the accident .
I has scared him.
Tom Kau/mann - I know it is a physical possibility that a photon at the right place at the right time could cause genetic ' changes, and that could cause changes in future generations.
Male Voice - Kaufmann's remark has special significance for Ed Hauser received the highest Hauser, the chemistry foreman on the island.
radia:icn cose from the accident, nearly reaching the NRC yearly limit, Today, Hauser receives in a job he perfor ned in less than one minyte.
regular mecical cneckuos, but he was, and be still is, scared.
Ed Hauser - I was sort of scared and rjad, really, because it's my And I should have job partially to know better than what I dkd, okay.
7 taken more precautions, but I was, I guess, just tcc involved in getting 1 .
e thR sampi e to, and, when I fou[d out, we had taken cur dosimetry out and hac it rcao, and they brought'it back and they told me it was 4.1 R'em, and I thought, gees, you know, I've done it, you know, I've, I knew I'd violated our procedures and everything like that, but I mean it was an
I emergen'cy, and everything, but I just sort of felt, you know, that was quite a bit to pick up at one time.
Male Voice - How long was your hair contaminated for? . l Ed Hauser - Well, from March Zgth on, it was sort of a funny thing {
because my hair was the last thing to become clean or uncontaminated, You and I was waiting for that to happen so that I could get a haircut.
1 know, my hair was getting quite 1,ong, and I imagine it was probably ,
around 6 weeks until it was completely back to normal and background.
Male Voice - Your hair was contaminated for 6 weeks?
Ed Hauser - About 6 weeks.
Male Voice - Besides his hair, he tried various soaps to get the ,
radiation off his fingers, but the detergents failed, and he was desperate.
Male Voice - Did you try any other way of getting the radiation off your finger?
Ed Hauser - Well, that night at the 500 KV substation, before I went home the first time, there was some small pieces of sandpaper there, and I had been rubbing them on my fingertip and trying to get the dose rate down on it.
Male Voice - You were trying to sandpaper your skin'off?
Ed Hauser - Yeh, I -as sandpapering.just the pac off my finger.
Male Voice - And that worked?
Ed Hauser - Well, it worked, but it also, I think, it took away my fingerprint.
Male Voice Well, new, nearly a year later from all of this, have you had time to reflect on it a bit?
Ed Hauser - Yes, I.'ve looked back on it probably just about every day, and there is always things you would do differently.
I Male Voice - The potential danger hasn't ended. Radioactive gas )
trapped inside the containment building is being vented.into the atmos-phere, despite strong community protests. Unit 1, the undamaged reactor, is now being prepared for restart sometime later this year, but, according to one control room operator we spoke with, he told us that some of the safety equipment being installed in that reactor is of poor quality.
When we told this to an NRC safety expert, he said, "It is unreliable, but the industry just hasn't desig'ned anything better y9t." This is Ira i -
Rosen reporting.
Shana Alexander - Do you wonder why Hal Hartman's testimony was not tully explored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Well, so does Connecticut Congressman Toby Moffett, and Moffett is Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Environment Energy and Natural Resources. As a direct result of reporter Rosen's investigation, the House Committee will' hold new hearings soon, and we will keep you posted.
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ilARTMAN, liAROLD 3/26/80 NRC IE 1
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, NUC! JAR REGULATORY C::FMI55!cN - -
d .In the Matt.ar of:
1 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW q 3 of 41 Harold Hartman Ex-Control' Room Operator
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,J AoH 1 15, 1980 g (Dat.a Transc 1;:- Typac; i
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l NRC PERSCNNE!.:
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Keith ChHstopher, Investigator 23! Thomas Martin, Section Chief, Reactor Project Section 3 l
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,.'g I II i CHRISTOPHER: Today is March 26,.1980, the time is 8:08 p.m.,.tnis is 2!
! Keith Christopher and I am Investigator with U. 5. Nuclear Regu1' tory 31 i Commission assigned to Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, this -
f
-evening we are located at RDI Columbia, Pennsylvania which is the 5 -
residence of Harold Hartman. We are here to conduct an interview 'of
, 6i Mr. Hartman who is an Ex-Control Room Operator for Metrocalitan Edison 7j j
at the Three Mile Island Site, at this time I would like to identify
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one other individual in the room who is present for the interview.
91 10i MARTIN: Tim Martin, NRC Region I, Sec* ion Chief, Reactor Projects 11!
Section 3, Reactor Operations Nuclear Support Branch, Region I. ,
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13i CHRISTOPHER: Before turning on the tape, we discussed with Mr. Hartman !
14: '
this two page memo and there are several items which we would like to 15i ,
sake a matter of official record. This memorandum covers the scoce and j i
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purpose of our investigation and goes into the degree of rignts the '
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! individual has who is being interviewed. On the last page tnere are 18i several questions which I would like to get your response to on the ,
1si i tape, that is number 1. Do you understand the above wnicn addresses i i
the two page memo?
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HARTMAN: Yes I do.
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, CHRISTOPHER: Okay the second questions reads, do we have permission to 2:
tape this interview?
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( HARTMAN: Yes.
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- CHRISTOPHER: And third 1'y, do you desire a copy of the interview?
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81 HARTMAN: Yes I do.
91 101 CHRISTOPHER: Okay, let it be noted that we will attempt to get your 11; transcript of the tape as soon as practically available and we will 12!
also provide you with a copy of the tape when it is made. Finally, sy-131 question to you is, do you desire that any other individuals be present 14!
during the course of this interview?
151 16i HARTNAN: No I don't. i 17i ISI MARTIN: Harold the first thing I'd like to look into is the estimated 191 Critical Position of concern relative to being critical below the 0.5% l a K/X. estimate. First I'd like to clarify if we can the approximate f
21l- t date that is occurred, 22l i
21 HARTMAN: To the nearest my recollection, it was probably somewhere 2
between October and November of 1978.
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1 MARTTN: Okay do you remember what shift that might be on?
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3l HARTMAN: Yeah, I believe it was on the mid ' shift, so we were ready to 4! -
do the startup when I came on shift and the time frame would be anywhere Si l from midnight until 2 or 3 in the morning, the 'startup could occurred."
Si 71
- MARTIN: How can you describe your actions during this startup?
81 HARTMAN: Well I got the ECP following the first Criticality procedure 10!
to the letter and I had my two numbers in mind, I think icwer delta-K LL position was 32% on group, group 6-7, the upper limit was somewhere ,
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12]i around criticality, I forget where it was, it slips me I believe it was '
131 around 52% and then the upper limit was 68% on that same group of rods, 14i I was making the startup and commenced pulling out group 5, pulling the 15i' one over M and as I recall I do remember seeing the one over M plotted, 16i 1 it started coming down like, you know you can, the one over M plotted l 17't tells what's going on inside the core, and normally during startups lat of this type we don't really stop and wait for the neutron levels to 191 equalize before we get our neutron counted at various points but it 20! l j just seemed to me the points that we were getting througn the red j
! 21I withdraw indicated criticality quite a bit lower than predicated posi-2'V tion, this was after the fact by the way, I didn't look at the one over 23 M's, another person would stand back and he would plot the one over M 24i 25i .
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j and if he saw any trouble then he'd generally alert the operator that 2!
- was on the rods and I continued pulling rods and I was watching for 3t i
gro;p 5 to get to the top, the group 5 rods were at 100% withdrawn 4!
! position when group 6 and 7 are at 25%. So I was withdrawing the rods ],
Si l and I was waiting to insure that all' ithe group 5 rods had in fact hit '
Si the out limit and stopped and it was about that quick that I got a
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l startup rata inhibit alarm on the diamcnd control panel and also up on 8l
' the main annunciator panel and I looked at my rod position, I had a 3 9t dpa startup rate and I think it was 3, we would have been in a source 10i
- rate and I can't rememoer if that set points 3 or 2 but any rate I was 11!
over the alarm point to the point where I was and I immediately took the r'od and placed the switch to insert and I was . going to, I was ready 131 to drive the rods down to the all safety rods out position, in other 145 words all the regular rods were inserted into the core which insured by 15i a former calculation that the reactor was at least 1% shutdown. I ISi started to do that and my, the Shift Supervisor was Brian Mohler at the 17!
time, came up to me and said what are you doing, you know this isn't a 134 quoto from our contaxt or anything what his exact words were but he ISI told me basically to stop rod motion, go critical, take it to 10 of the I' 20 t J
minus 8 amps and then we'd redo the ECP and he had two other guys '
working on it, I think Ray Bocher was one of them and I think Dick Hoyt j 22 was the other that recalculated the ECP and we procaeded from, the best 23 of my recollection we proceeded up to 15% power and then we got relieved, 2
I'm not sure if we' took the turbine on the night or not but I know we 25 got to 15% power.
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QRISTOPHER: Did you say that Ray Booher and Dick Hoyt recalculated 1
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HARTMAN: I assumed that, okay I was really concerned with the monitoring l
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of the panel, I'm assuming that they were the ones that did the recalculation! j because Ray Booher was the other Control Room Operator in the room at
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b the time and Dick Hoyt was a Shift Foreman and only the two licensee's !
l will get together and perfora, I can't remember if we had a trainee in ,
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the Control Room at that time or not that might of helped.'
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CHRISTOPHER: Did you discuss the incident with either Dick Hoyt or
>{ Ray Bocher in which you felt that the precedure was wrong that was done?
't HARTMAN: Again I can't really rememoer talking to them specifically but I know I questioned , Brian Mehler, I questioned him, I said look this is wrong, I said I'm suoposed to be doing this right now and we' re supposed to be looking for the trouble, what's going on, why we went critical to soon and I can't remember his e; :ct words again but generally, j i
"well we'll just recalculate."
l yRTIN: Would you repeat for us the specific direction that you were l
given by Brian Mehler when you were inserting the rods to shut down the i
< reactor?
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HARTMAN:
No, no, stop, that's his closest quote I could get, no, no, 2
f stop, take it 10 to the minus 8. I, don't want to say that that is a 31 direct quote but that is the essence of wnat he told me to do.
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) MARTIN: Subsequent to that you stayed out at 10 to the minus 8 and at Gi :I ;
that point you would log things in your log. !
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81' i HARTMAN:
Yeah, according to our procedure we have to log the time we j 9(
l went critical, the rod position in all the groues, the baron concentra- '
lui
, tion and I don't knew if xenon is in there or not. !
li E MARTIN: It doesn't matter, did you log those in your log?
13!
14!
HARTMAN: Yes I did.
15i 16i MARTIN:
. Subsequent to that the ECP was recalculated I believe, do you know what thing was found in the error that the ECP was off? l 18f ) 4
]
19f HARTMAN: i !
Well I can't remember specifically, but being deducive acout ' '
20i the whole thing, the only thing that can enange, cecause I know we
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calculated good ECPs with the curves, rod curves that we had and baron curves we had were adequate, in fact, the curves that we had f ri the 22l' 23! back we calculated ECP, no problem, we had come up with one that was 4j good, the only thing that I know of is that during this time we had 25i
_ _ _ _ -_ A
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, been having this safety valve leaking problem and we were distilling
. 2' :
I the water inside the pressurizer so that boron was always constantly in '
3! ,
- ! transit in the RCS system so I just assumed that they, that we came up l-41 l
.; with a dilutad, a diluted reactor core cause all the baron was now in 91 j
! the pressurizer, so I Assumed that that's what happened. and I .can'tl 6i remember if I went and rec'irculated the pressurizer to equalize the '
E
- baron again or not, I don't really know, but I believe it was the boron 81 that they changed.
91 ;
LOI MARTIN _: How can we identify the records for that particular startup, DJ was there anything in the records that I could say Ha Ha that's it, hTl when I reviewed the Control Rocm Operator's Log or any other log that might be available?
L41 1
65I .HARTMAN: Vell the fact that I remembered what the critical position W ' was in that I was the only one I think, that was the only startup I 7j believe that I had made myself in the Control Roem. I had been involved in others during the low power physics program and stuff li'ke that but that woul'd have been to soon in the time fra.ae, if this would have been ,
- on actual startup taking it probably during the pcwer escalation, k somewhere between 15 and 90%, I don't think we w n commercial at that time.
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r MARTIN: Why woulan't the error appear in the records?
. 2; .
! 4 3! I
- HARTMAN
- Well I'm not sure why it doesn't appear in the records, I j 41 l j think there might be, I can't remember now, some shifts log wnen chemistry Cl ~
j department was requested to do a baron concentration for us, they would i 6i 'I normally phone it up and it would enter the number on our status board. i 7
I don't know if I did it all the time but I tried to make it a practice h 81 l
to record that baron sample in the R0 log whenever it came up, you know j 91 i
sample says RCS boron such and such. I may have made such an entry j lot i i that evening, they would have chemistry logs that would log the time l n j the sample and the results, I'm not sure, do you have a copy here of r that procedure for the Approach to Precriticality and ECP procacure?
131 14; MARTIN: Yes I do and let me get a copy of it here, this is the Acproach 15 to Precriticality and this is a reactivity balance which has an ECP 15i
- l calculation procedure added.
{'
171 13 HART?4AN: What I am trying. to find is a time period.
19t b
MARTIN: I think you'll find that there has to be 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, it's only ll U{ good for four hours and it has to be recomputed.
- u 231 i
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7 I HARTMAN: Another way we might be able to find this, as I remember now, I 2' '
j okay we used to bleed and feed to the proper baron concentration we !
31 would have a baron number now and where we wanted to be at criticality I-41 and then we would debarate to that value and once we got to that value Si !
then the startup could continue, now if we were suppose to go critical 6i at 52% and we went critichl at 28% that on the rod curves is quita alot j 7} l 1 f of reactivity which would correspond to a large rod change, at least i 8!
100 dpm, and if somebody put the pressurizer on recirculation to get j 91 ' !
the boron back into the RCS, it was just kinda recirculated back, then l 10i that would tend to bring all the rods out and if you could look at rod motion verses time and compare it to what you would have that there is ,
l
@l very little significant xenon buildup between 0 and 15% power in an hour or an hour, two hours, so.that what I'm saying is that you should L41 l
, have a large out: notion of rods at some time after that startup that '
would show that the boron concentration was different and that they did >
6!
something to rearrange it, because once the core is in a conditior and i I you don't do anything to change that condition, this reactivity balance k .
is going to tell you what is going to go on in there, if it's worked {
t M before it is going to tell you and you know jou can kinda fool them on {
i'M paper but you can't fool the reactor, the reactor is going to do wnat k is knows it has to do, the reactivity balance is kinda its backup. I l
@l t always kinda thought of it has having some positive weignts over here, trying to start the plant up and you have negative weights over here, I y -
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don't know they just had a misbalance, I mean they had the weights 2:
there but they had a little more rods than you had baron in this hand i 3I holding it down, so I think perhaps that might be a way to approach 4: {
, would be the...
5
. l 6i MARTIN: Hal you mention' e d two of the names that were in the Control 71
! Room at the time that this occurred, was there anyone else present?
81 91 HARTMAN: I think I mentioned Of ck Hoyt and Fay Bocher and the other 10i l man was, he was a Shift Supervisor Brian Mehler.
11:
u 12!
MARTIN: Were you under any pressure to change the information that 13i you recorded in your log?
141 15j HARTMAN:
Well what I recorded in my log was what we actually figured 15i
- the second ECP from.
17i i
18t MARTIN: Okay you saj you recorded what you had computed in ECP or did 19l you record what you actually got?
201 2 N HARTMAN: What we actually got.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ - ' ' ~ ~
u E
CHRISTOPHER: Hal as a point of clarification for me, I'm reading from ;
I the transcript of the Ira Rosen interview and Mr. Rosen indicate.s that i 94 !
you were told to start the plant up even though this would violate the ; .,.
procedures, did you, did you mean to say that Brian Mehler said it, recognized that it was in violation of the procedures and told you to i
do it anyway or is this Mr. Rosen interpretation of wnat you said?
.l HARTMAN: Well sometimes he does say things that you know I t-vouldn't j
)
stata in that fashion. I l
) >
j CHRISTOPHER: This is Mr. Rosen?
,HARTMAN: Yeah, I could take it for different meaning <nowing my back-ground and I think what he tries to do is put it from my level to the general public. Now what was his states:ent again?
il l
f CHRISTOPHER: If you look on the bottom of page 3.
HARTMAN: Yeah, he stated that he was told t' continue the plant startuo l
even though this would violate the procedures, yes.
CHRISTOPHER: My question to you is, is this what Brian Mehler said to l
you, continue the startup even though this would violate. the procedures? 1 I
12 I 4
_ 1 1 1
1 I HARTHAN: Yen.
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! CHRISTOPHER: In other words it was clear to you at the time and to i S
i i Mr. Mehler'he knew at the time he was violating the procedures. '
5' 6i l HARTMAN: Yes, I'm sure he knew that, he was a Senior Operator.
71 8
.; CHRISTOPHER: I understand, but is this what he said.?
91 101 HARTMAN: Oh in this, on this thing here, that's what I, I would interpret
.g
, that as' stating as' the way you expressed it to me, that Brian Mehler
.12!
j told me to start up the plant even though he knew and I knew that we <
were in violation.
141 1si 'l CHRISTOPHER: You have no question in your sind that you can recall 9~ 61 5
his saying something to that effect?
17' .
- i HARTMAN: No question.
191 20 CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
21!
i 22' MARTIN: Who did you inform about this procedure violation besides k talking it over with Mr. Mehler? ,
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1 Well I probably talked about in the initial, would have been
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HARTMAN:
an issue with Bob Marsh I had mentioned it and of course Ira and I }
l suppose Ray and I discussed it and Dick Hoyt you know I just mentioned j l
I said you know I don't like to do business that way, you know I am sure I expressed my displeasure 'to both Ray and Dick Hoyt.
t i
CHRISTOPHER: Do you recall what their response was to you, either Ray !
l Bacher or Dick Hoyt in regards to this procedure that had been completed? l l
i HARTMAN: No, I can't remember. I MARTIN: Xai tt. , I have no further questions on the criticality unless you have some.
CHRISTOPHER: Not at this point, I don't think so.
MARTIN: Okay, Hal I'd like to move on to the emergency feedwater surveillance, and first I've shown you copies of the procedures for the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump ocermbility test and for the i motor driven emergency feedwater pump test and just for our clarification l that it's my understanding that it was the motor driven emergency feedwater pump surveillance that was causing the prob,em.
l HARTMAN: That's as I can recall.
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. 14 L :1
[; , MARTIN:. Now in that particular procedure it is the reference val.ues 2! 7
-l ' and the acceptable values for the sunction and discharge' and flows for .j.
31
- the pumps that the reference values were enanged frequently to make the b 41 ~
tast come out' acceptable, is that correct?
5 ,
6i HARTMAN: Uha uhm. (Yes).
I: 7' 3-i MARTIN: Okay, was the problem experinced early in the plants life or 9i
- such later in the plants life?
10
- 11]' HARTMAN: I think as I recall we generally had alot of problems with it 1 28' from the time we started to do the test and that would have been ch I 13 guess even prior to the safety valve problem-in April, we started
-14i doing, I guess once we started hot functional tasting.
15f MARTIN _: _ Alright, this particular surveillance tast is run once a month, were we still experiencing problems with this reference value as E late as 19797 19l
' 20! HARTMAN:
As I can recall, yeah we just had problems with it you knew 21I and I know that alot of times we'd come up with data at night, we used 22l
} to try to do them on the mid-shift because nothing was going on, you 23f didn't nave many people around and we'd do it at night and come up with 24 unacceptable values and I think to the best of my knowledge the Shift 1st o, .
i l
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- Foreman would go down with him and try to get the reference values and 8
1 l they couldn't meet the acceptance criteria or the flow would be wrong, '
8I d
so he'd bring it back up and set it on the desk and says hey look you
- i know this is what we got, I don't know what we could, you guy's try and
'l run it and then the day shift would take it and they would see what '
j Ei they could do with it and'after a few days it would disappear and then pj i i
l apparently you'd just assume that it was done and then it would surface ;
I h I a
up somewhere in the completed surveillance files as being completed and ;
'! within, the next procedure would always have a little TCN stating the y
5 :
new reference values.
U p'
MARTIN: Hal for clarification the TCN is a Temporary Change Notice '
d for procedure which would actually change the reference values?
h HARTMAN: Yes.
g l
l MARTIN: Alright Hal lets continue, what was your opinion why this test woulan't come out the same twice since we'd indicated or you indicated in earlier interviews?
\
HARTMAN: I don' t know really I was baffled, I just didn't know, you can only speculate on stuff like that, I'd hate to enn make a' speculation except the fact that maybe one time the tank would be half full and I
they could meet this one particular thing but then it would throw some h
- ( .
l 16 i
=
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t other parameter off or I don't know just the way perhaps a guy would 2!
r throb a valve to get it to come in, little tricks of the trade so to 31 -
! speak but not everybody has the adeptness to come up with. :l 41 1
5 MARTIN: Again your indicating though that you don't know for a fact f 6i '
that this is the reason. ;
7!
8!
I don' t know, I don' t really know why that, I don' t really HARTMAN:
d 9t i
know why it didn't pass.
r' 101 LL
- CHRISTOPHER
- Did you He.1 discuss this problem with any other operators 12
on your shift in al effort to find the solution and if so what was, 13 were there any cameon grounds that you found for this haopening or any 14l' common way that you as operators for that shift determine that you i 15:
would use a method that you would use to come with appropriate figures?
15;
)
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1h HARTMAN: No not really we did some discussions with it but you know 1SI generally we'd just come up with a dead end, we just couldn't do it, we 1
19! Just settled with data that we had collected and you know someone else 20I would try it and apparently they would get some good data or get it so 2If i that the engineers had to look at it and reevaluate it.
221 23 i
MARTIN: Who changed the referenced values and what explanation were 2
you provided for those changes?
l 25; 1 <
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17
- I ;
HARTMAN: I think it was the ISI group, I think Diane Shamus was one of ;
I them, I don't really know for sure and there was another guy but they .
would look over this stuff and reevaluate it, come up with another set -
i i i of numbers and then they would just say, I don't even remember what the ! !
- i reasons were but we would always end up with some new reference values '
and I didn' t know why really. t CHRISTOPHER: Do you have any reason to believe that they were mani-f I
pulating the figures just to get accurate reference values or do you !
i h:ve any bases to believe that they were doing anything wrong, that I they were, so called fudging the statistics?
HARTMAN: No I don't have any bases for that.
f CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Hal do you personally feel or, do you know any of ' ;
i .
the operators who felt that you were either professionally or through I
pressure from management being forced to fudge calculations in order to gat correct records, doryou feel that there was upward management pressure in order to o$tain these?
HARTMAN: I'm not sure I understand. What. level wcs upper managemont? '
I CHRISTOPHER: Well tm me management would be frem my Shift Supervisor on...
(
18 1J
- CHRISTOPHER
- In other words,did Dick Hoyt, did he imply to you or 2'
j directly say to you that if you did not come up with a good reading 31 j that you were going to have a problem or did you feel that there was -
4l
. going to be a problem?
5 l
HARTMAN: No he knew me better than that, cause he knew, I knew when I 7'
was right and when I was wrong and so he never pressured me into anything 0, like that.
9!
.0 CHRISTOPHER: Did you get this kind of pressure from any of the other E^ 1 management personnel?
b A HARTMAN: No not really, I mean you know there's several times in the f leak rate procedure where they'd say get a good one, you know, I guess 3! we'll talk about that leak rate later but you know there's one of them, Si I don't know what would of happened if I, you know if I wouldn't of
[ gotten a good one but like I said before I did'nt like to do them, I'd 31 do them all night and if I got a good one I'd sign it but you know I'd 9 fudge it 'as seldom as possible, as seldom as possible I did'nt like to O' do it, I don't know what would of happened if I'd have sa.id Bernie I 1{ just can't get another one, I can't get a good one, he says well I 2 know, I don't know what would of happened if they would of come down to 3 the line work, you know I wouldn't do it again.
4l
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A.
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l 11 3
CHRISTOPHER: Hal you just said you fudged it as little as possible, 2l can you give us, be a little more soecific in terms of wnat you mean, 31 it terms of when you fudged it and how you fudged it and what prompted -
l 4{
you to fudge it, fudge these records?
\ 5; 61 HARTMAN: Well I guess it 'was more, you know more peer pressure than 7i anything, you know everybody brags that there shift gets leak rates all 8l r
the time, you know well how do they do it and you rack your brains out trying to figure out, you know, how how you can, how they can ecme up lui with a leak rate and you can't come close and you just, you know, then 11 f you start to devious processing, you try your little ways.
12' CHRISTOPHER: Just to be clear do you differentiate management pressure 141
, from peer pressure or to you are they synonymous?
15i 15i '
HARTMAN: I think there pretty much synonymous because as far as I can 17f remember all the Shif t Supervisors thought their shift was the best, D '
you know and it's that way in any power plant and so frem the Shift ,
Supervisor down there's, that's the peer groep that I'm talking acout !
Ol really,~you know, how ccme you can get a good leak rata and I can't, my 1
] guy's are just better than yours, you know but..
I l
31 41 -
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - ~ ~- ~
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1! (
, CHRISTOPHER: Do you think that is a great problem in the operation of !
2!
the plant or do you think that it is inherent in any type of situation :
31 '
where your talking three distinct shifts doing the same job?
41 .
l l ..
51
! HARTMAN: I think it's an operational problem, we obviously couldn't .
El
, get one and somehow we did get them, I don't think there was a leak
.7}
rate gotten legally in, at least I know prior to three months to the 81 accident, it wasn't a good one I don't think-91 101 CHRISTOPHER: And you based that on what, Hal, pardon me but I':n not a 11'i technical 3xpert so you'll have to give a little more to help me.
u\
131 g HARTMAN: Yeah I used, I had a Tittle thing I did was just add a little
' 141 nitrogen to the makeup tank or hydrogen to the' makeup ' tank 'and it was
~
15i enough to send the level, the level instranent a little screwy and it 15i would indicata slightly higher than, slightly higher than, or maybe not 171
- indicate on the chart but to the comp' uter it would show that it was a little higher level in there than there was before and then of course if you don't have that makeup tank level lost, then you haven't leaked 2
out as much water and the thing would, might print good.
21l i
22, MARTIN: Hal let's get into the technical area, which leak rate tech 23 spec requirement are we referring to that was difficult to pass?
241 i
25i l'
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1 l HARTMAN: That was the 1 gallon per minute unidentified leakage.
2!
3 MARTIN: Okay, we had talked about the safety valve leakage being bad, -
l 4{ !
how does a safety valve leakage have an effect on this unidentified 5
leakage rate, since, if I remember correctly safety val.ve leakage would I 61 be included in RCDT leve1~ changes?
7 8
HARTMAN: Well I remember a couple of months before the accident that 91 i l they had, we had oeen trying to get good leak rates from the existing '
10i computer program. They tried making a model of the drain tank in the 11l l computer, taking a voltage from the level transmitter on the tank itself, they made a model and converted it to a signal usable by the computer, so that now we didn't have to go down and punca in the voltage, normally we'd have to go down and read the voltage coming out of that transmitter, come back up punch the leak rate in, punch the voltage in 16 and then wait an hour, when it punched out go down and get the voltage again, come back up and then the computer would take it away and that's 10f how the drain tank leak rate was figured by the computer. Then, like I said later they went and they just picked, Rey made a way to pick '
i 2
those voltages identically the same time as they pick all tne other 21!
i parameters at the beginning of the hour and that I think they tried and 22' as long as, they still didn't come out because I remember we were 3
having the problem before, very slightly before the safety valve started 4!
1 25!
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22 If l to leak bad.and we still couldn't get them with that and then I think 2l l after we went commercial they tried unother particular program, I don't 31
! know what changes that did, in fact I'm not even sure they really 41 l implemented that program, I can't tell you that for a fact, the new Si .
l program had been implemented. I know I tried various times doing, 61 .
l doing a leak rata by the hand calculation and I can't remember if it 71 l came out or it didn't, I think it came out but just barely, so it could a! have been in the computer program, it could have been actual leakage, I 9i 1 don't Itally know but nonetheless nobody did anything to find out why.
10!
i 11!
l MARTIN: Hal how frequently was the RCS inventory test run? ,
11l l
HARTMAN: Well it was supposed to be run every three days but since the 14i reliability of the computer, in other words sometimes it would print l 15i i good and sometimes it would print bad, they never let you go up to the '
16!
- last hour or last day even to try to get another good one so actually ,
171 it was part of the control routine, it would just punch a leak rate i
ISI until you got a good one and sometimes it might run four, five a night, ISi sometimes it wouldn't come out at all. l 20 I 21, MARTIN: How were the unacceptable result handled, the computer prints 22 out an unacceptable result, what to you do with it?
23 ,
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2 41 25i i
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23 1: I e i II
- HARTMAN
- Oh you had to throw that away, file that in file 13 and you 2
l just didn't leave those things laying around.
3l 41 j MARTIN: File 13 is the trash can?
5 61 HARTMAN: Trash can, right.
71 8
MARTIN: Who would do that Hal?
9l 101 HARTMAN: Oh I would or I'd just rip it up and say here is another bad 11;' one or the second one I'd get just to show them that there's what we get, throw it in the Shift Supervisor, Shift Foreman's office and they 131 would do it.
14!
MARTIN: What was there rationale for crumbling these things uo, it Si could of been goed leak rate?
17 i
HARTMAN: I don't know, I really couldn't tell you except that I think that they got pinned on this 1 gallon per minute thing, you know, it 201 just can't be greater than 1 gallon per minute, if tney got anytning 21 greater than that, then they said no that's no yd, they can't use it 22I and then they would throw it away and I guess somebecy, somebody made 23 mentioned one time that the NRC found an old leak rate that was like, 2 41 25i i.
______m _ m_ __--------a- - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - " " - - - - - - - " - - - - " - - - - - " - --^ -
l y
.l ,
i 11 l you know.10 gallons per minuta unidentified, found why, you know 2!
! started asking questions and then so after that they said we got to 31
- keep these things, you know, throw it away, you can't leave these lying 41 around.
6i MARTIN: Hal when would' hand calculation be done, what keyed you guys 7'
into doing hand calculations?
8 I
I 91 '
. HARTMAN: I don't know, saybe it was just, I don't know the real reason, !
101 if I have to remember back I would say it would just be for something ,
different, for something different to do, just to try and to get one to 12;' come out right and you know sometimes they would, sometimes they wouldn't 1 31 but normally, alot of times they might go in to a, in to a barrage, or 14i not a barrage it would be like a, it would be the ' fad.of the . week is to 15i get an RCS inventory by hand but that would involve going out and
'Si collecting little cylinders of water to determine the leakage out of 171 j
individual valves ,and things lika that, in fact we did that and as I .
recall I think once we startad to do that then we would get them every 13 once in a while, we'd get good ones but then we'd could add that in on 201 the typer itself as unidentified or identified leakage and normally 21 sometimes it would come back down again, it did not always came down below.
22{
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241 25i i
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MARTIN:
So basically once we started identifing some of these leakages ;
2! ,
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- and demonstrated that they were from components that would not effect 31 l i
the leak detection system and the safe or Shift Supervisor has to make l s
4l a determination that they are not unsafe, that you could subtract these Si off and in that way you were starting to get good leak . rates.
6- j l
3 7
- HARTMAN
- Uhm uhm, yeah, as I recall.
8!
si i MARTIN: Hal when they finally, when they got an unacceptable leak 101
.i rate either by hand or from the computer did that kick them into an
'111 5
action statement or did they simply throw it away and say we still got 12' the rest of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to get a good one?
13 i
14 HARTMAN:
It's from what I understand it didn't kick them into an E
action statement at least they didn't treat it that way.
15i 1
CHRISTOPHER:
When you refer to they Hal, who are you referring to,
% using we and they?
19I 20! HARTMAN:
Well we operators in general and they meaning because I u.ie 21! to work with them, I've come to...
22 81 CHRISTOPHER:
L Okay, I just what to clarify what we' re talking about.
$4!,
,M'=*
26 MARTIN:
Hal can you tell me how the data was fudged, now you indicated that one of your tricks that you knew about was to increase the hydrogen 31 1
i over pressure in the makeup tank?
4l <
5 HARTMAN:
You could, I remember one way that you could do it would be 6i to increasa the voltage reading to the drain tank.
7 8
MARTIN:
When you say increase the voltage reading this what you told the computer the voltage reading was.
10j HARTMAN:
Right you'd give the voltage reading just a little bit higner, E I ,
that means you collected a little more water, or the computer thinks it I 13 collected a_little more water then you actually have and then the other 14 thing was that.you, would just turn on a charge makeup pump, or not a 15 makeup pump a water waste transfer pump and just every so often you 16l hold the makeup valve into the makeup tank, just hold that ocen for a i few seconds, maybe once every five minutes curing the test and you leak 18 in just enough water that would kind of hold the makeup tank level up 19I and as long as the computer only saw time 0 and times 60 so that you i 20 i can add water in that time and then we'd never tell the computer stat
~21f we added the water.
22 1 23 }
CHRISTOPHER:
t Hal these are things that you and the other operators 24 would do?
25I t
i l
Y.
, 27
'! 1
! HARTMAN: Yeah I've seen them done.
2l, 31
- CHRISTOPHER: Was snis done with knowledge of.the Supervisors and the
' 41 Shift Foreman?
5\ -
- 6i HARTMAN: I don't know if they knew or not, tell you the truth, I
'71 -
i realid don't know.
81 9f MARTIN: Hal can you tell us who actually tried some of these tricks,
@l now you indicated that you did?
1 g' .
HARTMAN: Yeah I did, no I'd rather not say because you know they might hil still be up there.
L41 b MARTIN: Okay, would it be during that last three months before the event, is that the time period we're looking at?
L7!
S HARTMAN: Yeah I'd say because we had an awful time.
M l0[ MARTIN: If the supervisors were not aware of this and there only
$ pressure was hey we got to get a good one, why did you guys do it?
N' .'
i
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] 28 I
. i II HARTMAN:
I don't know,.except that if we didn't get a good one'they'd i 2]' be down on our backs and they used to tell us get a good one, so to me I
1 31
! get a good one means, get a good one, you know, by hook or crook. y 4l
' l Si i* -
CHRISTOPHER: Hal, who specifically told you to get a good one?
Si ,
N i HARTMAN: Well my Shift Supervisor.
0l CHRISTOPHER: Which would be?
101 I
11.'
HARTMAN: -I think Bernie Smith was the one most of the time.
12!
i CHRISTOPHER: Bernie Smith, when he said get a good one, did he say 14 get-a good one at any cost, I don't care'w'ha't'you'have-to-do to get a 15i !
good one, to me get a " good one can mean several things, I'm just
'S' trying to qualify that phrase, get a good one.
U! -l D HARTMAN: I don't want to say what he meant by that statement but I'11 3
tell you~ how I took it knowing Bernie Smith, get one by hook or crook.
20!
21I CHRISTOPHER: Okay. I 22! -
23 ,
2 41 l
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HARWAN: I know they knew it was going on, I don't know that they -
p
' ~
thought just on my shift that we were getting them good and legal _like ,
.but I know they had to know these things were going on, otherwise they i wouldn't of been working on the computer programs. and stuff like that.
I '
MARTIN: Hal in reviewing the transcript of Ira Rosen's report, there is a statement he says that you said "I didn't do it very often, I did it only when I was watched very closely and was told I had to have one j
by 6 in the morning" when you say I didn't do it very often, what are you referring to?
J
) i i
] HARTMAN: Did I ever fix the statistics, well that was again, that was
]
in contaxt with this hydrogen into the makeup tank.
i MARTIN: And when you say, you know... I i
\
HARTMAN: I wasn't watched very closely, wnat I meant was that I'd
'l' never do it during a day shift you know when there was alot of people j around, 'that's it, you know and I even kind of hide it from Shift 6
Foreman, Shift Supervisor so that they didn't see me, generally that '
l was no problem.
i MARTIN: What did you feel would happen to you if you hadn't done 9 hat?
i l
j
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30 i
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11 HARTMAN:
2!
I don't know, I just, I guess I would of felt like a dummy i
3r because they say well how come all these other guys can get them and 41 you can't, you know, then I would come back and I'd say well you know I Si .
don't want to fudge them and I'd keep telling them, I says I'm tired of I
wrestling with these, with these leak ratas, I don't want to, we have 6i go? 4 problem here, why don't you do scmething about it.
7 81 1
, CHRISTOPHER: Who did you tell that to?
i 91 i
lui HARTMAN: Oh Bernie or Dick Hoyt, that's as far as I can go, and even ,
1 11 possibly in conversation with the Shift Supervisor, Shift Supervisor of 12:
- Operations.
131 1 41 '
CHRISTOPHER: What .did they respond 'to you and what did they say to 1s!
you when you complained to them about these leak rates?
16i 171 j HARTMAN: Specific comments I can't remember.
13I f
IS{ i' C}lRISTOPHER: Would you know if any action was taken because of your -
,H complaints? l 21!
. i HARTMAN: Well I think they did look into the fact that the computer 23 program might be off, you know, I know that they did some work in that i
area.
f I
1
f I
. p# 1 31' 11 -
That would of been who Hal?
CHRISTOPHER: 1 i
2!
I 31 1 i i HARTMAN: Well that would have gone from the Shift Supervisors up and -
4! ]
then down to the computer department.
5 1 61 CHRISTOPHER: Let's paus's for a second while I check this tape, okay, i
y 7 i
I want to see exactly where we are.
8I i
91 'I i
MARTIN: We just turned the tape over, the time is 9:00. Hal, we're L0l j reviewing the transcript of the T.V. reporters comments here, he's j talking about defense in depth an top of page 2 and he says, sounds Ltj
] good in the movies, he's talking.about John, Jack Lemmons response, but 131 these safety systems could have prevented the accident had. they been functioning properly, Hartman says that part of the system was deli-k 'berately tampered with and he also says he was the one who did it, what L6 is he referring to there?
L7i O HARTMAN: No, I didn't say anything like that.
M k MARTIN: I think if you go onto the next paragraph, I think you'll see k what he actually hooked it in with, was leak rai.e test.
2 CHRISTOPHER: Hal if you would take a minute and just read to that i
@ i section of the transcript and then be able to make a ccmment on it.
hi e
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ o
l
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1 HARTMAN: I. don't know how he could have said I tampered with it and I 21
.; was the one who did it.
3:
4.
MARTIN: So right now you don't understand his statement, is that it?
5 i
Si HARTMAN: That's a fact I' don' t understand it. l 7'
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8 MARTIN: Let me ask you a question, did you tamper with the safety .
91 '
. systems?.
t 10j g Il
! HARTMAN: No.
I 12l E MARTIN: Okay, that is what is implied there and I wantad to made sure 14l g,g , ,
15i l
E HARTMAN: I didn't tamper with any safety systems that I didn't untammer, what I mean, by surveillance procedures and things like that, that we 1
1Ef had to run, I always made sure that I lined up the systems the way they D were supposed to be, in fact I used to find alot of stuff that was, 20!
that was, when I come on shift that was wrong and I would. straigntan it 21I out or I'd go to the Foreman and see if there was, no this, Hartman i 22 says that part of this system was deliberately tampered with and he 23 also says that he was the one who did it.
2 41 '
2Si
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33 1
CHRISTOPHER: That is the transcript of what the reporter has said and 2
'it'is your comment that that is not what you said.
31
'l4 i HARTMAN: Yeah, I didn' t say that, I did't say that I' tampered with any ,
5
. safety systam.
6i ,
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CHRISTOPHER: Do you feel that you said something else that he misquoted .
i G '
i you in? .
9I .,
.t L0l I HARTMAN: Yeah that's wnat I'd say.
'l
@ MARTIN: Keith you have any more on this area?
@l L41 '
CHRISTOPHER: None.
@i
$ HARTNAN: I think ha's got, I think he's just misconstrued it you know !
I b7I ; that, for some reason, you know reporters glorify things and I think he l glorified that this leak rate was something to behold safety, you know.
@I ,
!01 CHRISTOPHER: Hal, there is no question in your mind that you did not b tell him that you deliberately tampered with the cafety system? i l
?2' S3 .HARTMAN: No way, no way.
!4l 85i i i l
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1
! CHRISTOPHER: Okay. t i
2:
3(
! MARTIN: Okay let's leave that area and I'd like to next go to safety i
{
concerns and how they were handled, first I'd like to know what concerns 5
do you remember communicating to your supervisors and management?
61 i
HARTMAN: Probably the foremost would be the polisher valves, the 8
polisher bypass, I know we have been screaming for months and months i
H and months, years you know, when the' system was first installed, why 10 don't they have an automatic valve like Unit 1 has and I don't know how h >
many times the valve in Unit I has saved them, it's just beyond me and !
~I know suggestions were made to them and they just didn't do any thi ng about them, we had to put the polishers on the same dumb way each time.
14i 15i CHRISTOPHER: Who were the individuals Hal that you told about these 15i problems?
17! k 18l HARTMAN: Bernie Smith would be one and I know Dick Hoyt I talked to 19! him about. it, probably numerous other people.
20j i
21l CHRISTOPHER: As a result of you telling him of these various problems 2
be they safety or operational problems did you see any attempt to maka 23 any corrective action in any of the areas that you talked about or 24 would you say that the things that you told them were completely ignored?
25i l
I 35 l
HARTMAN:
Well I don't want to say they were completely ignored, maybe l
1 perhaps they just weren't moving fast enough for me, but I did during l l
several shutdowns see excellent opportunities for the modifications j that we wanted. t~
MARTIN:
Okay before we get to far in, I think we're getting a little l ahead of ourselves, we talked about the polisher bypasses, that was one thing that you communicated to your supervisors, what I'd like to do is I kind of generate a list of the concerns which you communicated to your Supervision.
Polisher Bypasses was one of them, we talked previously about the ECP, that was communicated at least to Brian Mehler and you ,
think maybe Dick Hoyt, who else might that have been communicated to?
HARTMAN,: _
That's about it.
- RTIN: What about the leak rate problem, was that communicated to f
anybody?
HARTMAN: Oh yeah, Brian and Dick Hoyt they had to know, I told them you know, how are we going to get one, it always come out bad.
MARTIN: What about the emergency feedwater surveillance procedure problems?
t,
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1 l 5
HARTMAN:' Well I didn't really feel that I had to communicate, well -
2 j communicate, yeah I guess I did by just giving the procedure to Dick 31 l Hoyt and saying this all that it can do and it comes up that way all ;
4!
the time, I know' that the other operators expressed the same concern, "l
] the auxiliary operators when they run the tast that they would..
- 61 i
71 MARTIN:
Okay, what form did you use for communicating this information, 8
was it, did you write it or.. .? '
I 91 D t HARTMAN: , It was all verbal. .
I MARTIN: In other words you were just talking to the individus'..
131 14 HARTMAN: Yeah.
15i
- i 16i MARTIN: Does the company have any mechanism for you to communicate
% safety concerns other than orally to your supervisors?
10!
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IS HARTMAN: I can't remember.
20:
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CHRISTOPHER: Hal, are personnel as a policy, are they encouraged to 22l report deficiencies if they are not satisfied with any corrective I ,
231 action that's been done beyond their immediate supervisory level?
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j _HARTMAN: No cause. generally we didn't have. much to do with the people -i 21 6
up above the Shift Supervisor, every once in a while 'we see the Super-31 visor of Operations, he'd come in and shoot the breeze with us but as -
far, and we'd even maka some of our problems known to him and he'd 5, ,
actually ask for them but I mean guys lika Gary ltfiler you know you 6i '
hardly even saw them in the Control Room. - 1 T l 8
1-CHRISTOPHER: -Did you feel that you had an avenue to go beyond your j
9\
- imediate supervisors being that you were not satisfied with corrective I p
10l action being t.aken? !
51 HARTMAN:
I Yeah I thought I could go but you know I figured that if ary concern is.his concern then he'll go to back for me, which-is what he-(4l should of done really, I took it for granted that he would do-that.
L 3
L6 .
MARTTN: Hal, what was your relationship to Bernie Smith?
i L7 I,
O HARTMAN: He was Shift Supervisor
$5
!O MARTIN: This is your nonnal Shift Supervisor?
w -
l s' HARTMAN: Yeah right.
s -
t
. 1 MARTIN: Dick Hoyt?
si i
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) HARTMAN: He was normal Shift Foreman.
\
2; 3i
. MARTIN: Brian Mehler?
l 41 5
HARTMAN: He was just, he was an off, he's a Shift Supervisor but I l
think was covering for somebody, I think he was covering for Bernie for 71 l
l some reason and I think maybe, I know what it was, no maybe it wasn't, 8i I was thinking perhaps it was during the refueling of Unit 1 that they H might of shifted his schedule.
10f CHRISTOPHER: This was for an entire shift not for a brief interlude, in and out of the Control Room?
13k i :
14t HARTMAN: No this was, no this in fact we had him for the whole week.-
15i 1Si i
CHRISTOPHER: Is that the only time that you had worked for Brian 17 Mehler?
13 HARTMAN: That I can recall.
20f 21I CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
I 22 23l r .
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11 MARTIN: Hal when you communicated these concerns to the supervisors, ;
2' :
J was it done while you were at the plant, while you were working there l 31
> or was it done in a more informal environment?
4; ~
Si l HARTMAN: Well I think we did it at the plant pretty much and of course 6i you go to the bars in the' morning after getting off and you'd ti.')
7k j about it, you know, but there's nothing that was, there was nothir 9
, 81 that was discussed outside the plant that we didn't discuss inside, 9! really.
10i
'k MARTIN: Okay we were talking about actions taken relative to these w;
concerns, relative to leak rate it appears that they did modify some computar programs because it didn' t seem to be working. Did you see 14:
any changes relative to the emergency feedwater surveillance procedure
' 13 that, relative to your concerns?
16; ;
E HARTNAN: No not really, I just, I just saw the TCNs come up.
1St 131 MARTIN: What about the...
20:
2 11 i
HARTMAN: I think they tried to recalibrates the eagle eyes too, it's a I I
22l little differential pressure gages and I don't recall that they did i
! )
23! anything, that they had always indicated correct.
24i 2si j
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I I 1 il
~MARTIN:' What about the ECP problem, the fact that they failed to *
' 2l follow procedure there, was there any response to that in terms of
-1 31 l later... ')
,i 4 h HARTMAN: Later having the same situation arise?
6i ,
.f ,
MARTIN: Yes.
l aj ,
)
i 9
HARTMAN: I don't no that, I don't really know how the other shifts ,!
10 would of handled that.
11:
12' MARTIN: Why weren't some of these concerns passed to the NRC, Hal?
- 13) ,
14! HARTMAN: Well I don't know, I guess I just thought that, you know I, I q
=E know that some people don't like that, you knew I just didn't want to i 16l be harrassed on the job, not necessarily harrassed but you know perhaps '
h be given a. dirty job over somebody el'se because I was going to the NRC 18i as a rat, so to speak, you know that's what we were, it was almost in red that,you know, you guys were the bad guys and it's a hard thing to, 20t it's a hard thing to get over, you know.
al i 22 1
23 1 24, {
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___-_--_-_____m
-r 41 2 I ,\
l!
s 1 CHRISTOPHER: .Hal 'are you saying .that if you -did come to the NRC were 2! -
1 you. worried about loosing your job or were you' worried about just, or 31 ~
l were you worried about being demoted, were you worried about just. _
41
. getting a bad reputatation. .
5 Si HARTNAN:- I don't know'if it happened in the past' but being the way I 7
am, I felt' that if I went to the NRC that you know, that they would 81
- take it personnal on me and then I would suffer the. consequences.
91 i
i ,
101 l CHRISTOPHER: Do you mean that in terms of your Shift Supervisor, your
' ll!a i
Shift Foreman would take it personally and that you would suffer the
-gi' s
consequences or your peers would be upset that you came to NRC7 u!
-HARTMAN: I guess it's just kind of everything, a combination 'of every-thing, what did that idiot do that for, what did he go and- to that for.
'1Si CHRISTOPHER: Did anyone in the management ever, this is ooviously a heavy question, did anyone in the management ever threaten you with the 18 lose of your job or the lose of pay or lose of status if you did come
'20)
~
to NRC with any type of ccmplaint?
21! ,
I
' _ 22 HARTMAN: No.
231 l l
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42 6
1
! CHRISTOPHER: . Was that area even: intimated indirectly by a- Supervisor 2! .
l- that if you'did come to NRC you would:have a problem?
31 4.
- HARTMAN: No.
$l -
61 CHRISTOPHER: Okay. "
8 MARTIN: 'Hal did you feel that if you expressed, if you continued to q 9l
- express your concerns to your supervisors that might of jeopardized-101 your job?
11; 12]' HARTMAN: Well, I don't know maybe indirectly it did, cause I guess I 131 could be considered a trouble maker because _I usually stood up for what i 14k I thought was right, I know I made a lot of -noise:sometimes and probably-15i branded in a hard head or a het head I mean. I always operated.in a
- 6i
' common sense type manner and I think I had an uncanny sense of the i
plant, you know what to look at, in o'ther words as far as how to interpet what everything is doing,' scanning the panel and stuff like that and people would come up to me, I don't know tens of times each day asking 201 se stupid questions. I ~had a startup test engineer come up to me, it i
was right before shift and he was getting his turnover ready and we had 12 been doing some test, moving water from the pressurizer to the makeup 23 tank, in other words raising and lowering the level of the pressurizer, 24 what we were doing and he came over to me and says where did all the 25i I
.43 1
water in the makeup tank come from,. I said it came from the pressurizer, I snapped at him, that is obvious if he'd seen makeup tank how is it I
going to come in there but one of three ways, that or the pressurizer {
1 thich the chart was sticking out of was a big drop in it and he says f
i well gee I'm sorry you know, he didn't believe me, he actually did' not ; j believe me, that it came from the pressurizer because I got it later f
i f
g
. that he.and his relief stood out there for two hours trying to figure j l
it out. That's the kinda stupid stuff that I would just fly off the i l 1 \
handle at, I mean that is obvious, 1 I j j l l l l CHRISTOPHER: Hal I just want to drop back a little bit, we're getting I a little bit off this one track of this issue, we have been talking about your concerns for the security of your job being harrassed, those type of things for either reporting problems in the plant or coming to NRC and with that in mind I would like to specifically...
l HARTMAN: And for his safety of concerns Hartman was harrassed and told 1 that he'd better shut up or be fired.
i l
CHRISTOPHER: That's right I am referring to the first page on the tape, that obviously concerns me, it does not seem to be in line with what you just finished telling us. I realize this is Mr. Rosen saying this and that's why I am asking you this question.
.- 1 ...
~
44
- 1 HARTMAN:
b 2!
I know exactly what he meant and I knew that he would do this
! and that's why he'didn't, I'm sure' that's why he didn't let me see that 31
-4 show to begin with cause I would of picked this stuff up. - This stats nent, _
5 and for his safety concerns Hartman was harrassed and told that he'd 6,
better. shut up or be fired, ~I can remember the night very well. I i
7
~ don't know if you've done'any investigation into the alarm system, 'the.
overhead alarms, the constant, every once in a while you'd get one and-8 it would be constant and you couldn't get it to reset.- ..
98
,l l 1
10 CHRISTOPHER:- I think you mentioned that to us before about the-alarm j lli j problem.
12' ,
131
-l HARTMAN: 'In here I think.
1 41 [
! 4 15i
. CHRISTOPHER:
. Yeah I think you also mentioned it to us last Saturday.-
161 i
17l1 HARTMAN: I think .I.even mentioned in:there about, no mayce I didn't about Mehler.
19l CHRISTOPHER: I let it be noted that Hal is referring to his original 1
interview transcript from May 22, 1979.
225 23 HARTMAN: Okay, so I don't know if I really...
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l MARTIN: Halyoudidment'in:;thatyoudiscusseditwithMr.Mehlerknd 21 > <
l I remember nis respanse. z 31 i - -
7
- i 41 u
.[
j i CHRISTOPHER: You.did, ;-
5 Si HARTMAN: ' Are you going t6 fix this alarn, am I gonna have to go through ,
7.
the startup with this alarm in my ear and I've got this to operate, 20
'9 1 i
hundred. 7 hundred and 72 megawatts of nuclear power and I've gotta '
H 4 Ifsten to that, I want relieved and he said alright I'll get your 0l relief but you my as well take your lunch .bex and go out the gate, now S1 i
do you want that or are you going to calm down, I says are you going to a
h i get that alarm fixed and I don't know what powers tnat may be.but that
,s L9;
- d. aslarm/ stopped; you know.
Al <
b I CHRISTOPHER: I recall you saying last time.
L5i .
HARTMAN: That is what he is talking 'about right there.
M M ',
CHRISTOPHE3: I guess my point is, what I'm tr/i ng to clarify that to N me, my interpretation is quite a bit different than wnat is written here b and I would like to make sure that we're clear *. hat you were harrassed i
E '
and told you better shut up or be fired, n that an accurate statement?
!3 $
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HARTMAN: It's an accurate statement but he never mentioned the real ;
2!
l crux of the reason.
31 L
l s 41 .
I CHRISTOPHER: It was about one individual isolatad concern.
5 . .
I 6h HARTMAN: And he didn't sicplain that one individual isolated concern, 7t' l he just made that statement.
81 9l
-CHRISTOPHER: Do you believe that under the circumstances that you lui i related where this incident occurred, was the wording used, pardon me 11] fnr being spe'cific but I'd prefer it put away once ard for all, were 12!
you told by Mr. Mehler, was it Mr. Mehler, were you told shut up or 13
- your going to be fired or were you pold if you want to do that you may as well take you lunch box and'go?
15i HARTMAN: Yeah and that usually met being fired, it wasn't being fired 171
[ but that's the way it is once you walk off the job, you know you may as 18! well forget it.
19}
r 20! CHRISTOPHER: I understand, I think I cankunderstand the context in k which somebody would say that tn you in t!u Control Roca.under a stress 22 situation, do you really believi? Afd you really believe a't that time 23 or do you believe now that it was actually the supervisors intention 24 '
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47 l t
that you should quit or that you should be fired or do you believe that 2'
j this is a statelsent made through a Control Room that is quickly gone, quickly forgotten but was it a serious statement?
4j 5-HARTMAN: I wish I had gone through with it, then I could of told you, ;
I don't know, I think it was very serious at the time.
71 I '
aj CHRISTOPHER: Hal on terms of this you'd better shut up or be fired as Si you recorded in the tape, your referring to one particular instance as 10i you have just described.
HARTMAN: Absolutely, yeah. That's was just one flareup in the Control Room, that wasn't a combination of all these things.
141 CHRISTOPHER: And it also was not used in the terminology as recorted in the transcript of the tape.
17!
3 HARTMAN: No right, that is not a quote.
191 '
20' CHRISTOPHER: You'd better shut up or be fired.
1l i
2! HARTMAN: That is not a quote.
3 4
Si ,
l i
- - l
- a 4
i l MARTIN: Mr. Mehler was' not your normal supervisor, Bernie Smith and
- 2' Dick Hoyt were, did they ever intimate or give you a similar . impression
' ~
about your expressing your concerns, that if you continue to express y 4-your concerns your job was in jeopardy? j.
1 5 0 h
HARTMAN: No because Bernie was a pretty diplomatic person, you know he 7 o can, he knew me pretty well and he could give me an answer that would j 0
satisfy me, you know like yeah we got something in the mill. down there .
I and there working on it and you know he could generally keep me calm, I 101 don't think I could of worked for any of the other because you know I ;
U was so outgoing and I don't know. l' There was another instance that I ,'
12!
almost quit, no I don't want to get into that, I already went over that 13 I think. .
14!
N MARTIN: Hal we appear to have and I'll be quite blunt right now, Mr.
16 Mehler's name comes up a couple times here in the area of concerns, do i we have the potential of saybe Mr. Mehler and you having a personality conflict?
191 201 HARTMAN: No I don't think so, I think it was just, I think it was N! just, he was there and it was, it might be a personality conflict, the i
22 way he handled himself.
23 MARTIN: His modus operandi was not like what your used to or something.
24}
25l 1
1 i
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l 49 1
- HARTMAN
- Yeah. I 2l l
! I 31 i CHRISTOPHER: You only worked for Brian Mehler for a one week period, 41 I'
- is that right? i S' ;
Si HARTNAN: Well I don't know, it was one week, it was brief periods, I .
I !
7l can only remember yeah it was like maybe in a week.
8l !
I CHRISTOPHER: Okay. !
10i l
MARTIN: Keith do you have any further things in this particular area? i 12!
t CHRISTOPHER: I don't think so.
14 E MARTIN: Okay the follow one that I would like to refer to is your 15! termination of employement with Met Ed. I'd like to go into some -
17 detail, when you returned from Lynchburg where did you come back to,
@ did you come to your home or did you go to the...
13l 20i HARTMAN: I went to the observation center.
21 22 MARTIN: To the observation center, and that would ce when?
23 24 25i
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4 L 50
. t 1 .
- MARTIN
- Probably around 5:30 or 6:00 on Friday afternoon.
~21 {
\
l 31 l CHRISTOPHER: That would of been the 30th, is that right?
4l l
5 HARTMAN: Right. '
6
)
.. i MARTIN: Okay, what was going on there?
8 9l HARTMAN:
I Well they had alot of, what I can rememcer they had alot of 10 people just trying to transmit data from one spot to the next and I, u! you know I just kinda went around trying to pick up. bits and pieces of 12'I
, what was going on you know.
13.
141
, MARTIN: Hal did you get in any arguments with people there at the 10 observation center at that time?
16i .
I HARTNAN: No I don't think there was" any argument, I did make mention I i to Greg Hitz, I said I don' t think I. could', I said I don't think I'm 18 going to.be in and that was it.
20l CHRISTOPHER: This was who you made this comment to, Greg...
22I 23 HARTMAN: Greg Hitz.
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! CHRISTOPHER: That's H I T Z. )
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! HARTMAN: Yeah. !
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CHRISTOPHER: Is he another operator? j ,
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j HARTMAN: He was a Shift Supervisor.
81 9i MARTIN: Okay, when you mentioned that you might not be in, were you I
supposed to be in that day or the next?
lli l
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, HARTMAN: No we're supposed to be on a four day weekend and so as far 13i as I knew the next time I was to come in was Wednesday and so I stayed 14i home the whole weekend, in fact I went home that Friday night and 15i mulled this thing over and you know just with the events and the previous 16i year and six months I just knew I was right up to there, so I called 171 .
i Jim Floyd and told him that I resigned.
131 ISI CHRI g PHER: Did you call him Friday night?
201 HARTMAN: Yeah.
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23f CHRISTOPHER: Do you know what time that was, roughly?
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_; HARTMAN: : Roughly'8:00..
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CHRISTOPHER: And what, you just told him that you resigned, did you ,
tall' h'is why, .did you' tall him why you were resigning?.
S' .
61 HARTMAN:' I can't recall,'no I think, I'm 'just gonna' have. to resign, J i f that's all.
8 91
- CHRISTOPHER
- .What did he say to 'you Hal when you told him this? ;
10l
.nj 'HARTMAN:" Well from what I can remember I think.ha expressed his. sorrow, 12;' that he was sorry to see me.do this, he didn't want to see me, see me uf .go.
1 41 CHRISTOPHER: Okay, did, were you required to formally do anything to effect resignation or did you just call and say I'm not gonna c::me in E anymore, give your, two week notice, a're you required to give a written notice of' termination?
19i 20I HARTMAN: Oh yeah I did tell him that I would have something a little M more formal on Wednesday when I came in.
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2h CHRISTOPHER: You meant by a written termination?
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- HARTMAN
- Yeah. l j
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l i 3; i MARTIN: I When did you first put your resignation in writing? .
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5 i HARTMAN: I forget what the date was but I know they post dated it to l 6
l the 30th of March, it would of been Thrusday, Thrusday the. . .
7' 8
MARTIN: The 30th would of been Friday.
Si I
Ol i HARTMAN: The 4th I think, the 4th of April.
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CHRISTOPHER: Did you write up your notice of termination yourself or I
did somebody write it up and you sign it?
l .
HARTMAN: I wrote it up myself.
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CHRISTOPHER: What are you required to do, just write them a note?
l HARTMAN: Yeah I just wrote on there, terminate hereby, terminating ;
I effective, they wanted me to put down March 30.'
CHRIST 0_PHER: When did you actually write that out?
f HARTMAN: That was the 4th of April.
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54 1 l
- CHRISTOPHER
- The morning of the fourth? l 2!
i 31 HARTHAN: No it would be in the afternoon.
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CHRISTOPHER: And who instructed you to date it the 30th?
Si .
l HARTMAN: Gary Miller, 8i
- CHRISTOPHER
- Gary Miller, okay.
10i k HARD4AN: And Tom Hombach was there to. ,
IN I j l 13I CHRISTOPHER: Okay, did they say why you should write it for the 30th?
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15 HARTMAN: Well they said because that was the original time that I 16i talked to Jim Floyd, prior to this 4th I think on Wednesday I went in with a meeting with Jim Floyd and the union people and Gary Miller I 18{ think, before we went over to that one he says, he called me into the 19f Shift Supervisors office there and said Hal I'm sorry to see this l
20! happening, you know, but it's not finished yet, you knew, I didn't know 21 what that meant and then he went off and then we had this meeting out 22 in the, I forget where it was but Jim Floyd was there ar.d a unfon rep 23 was there and I cari't remember who else, I think Tom Hombach was there, 24 wanting to know some of the details like I just explained to you and 25!
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N, 55 j-t after.that meeting was over Jim Floyd patted me on the.back.he says.
don't . sweat, you know cause-I told them when I got back there .I was a little rash and maybe a little hasty in my decision and I.'d like to withdraw that, 'sy resignation.
1
. i.
l CHRISTOPHER: 'When was that, that you did that Hal?.
HARTMAN: It would of been Wednesday'.
) CHRISTOPHER Which would of been the 4th?
. HARTMAN: That was the 4th. '
CHRISTOPHER: Was that after you had written up your resignation or L
befors?
l u
HARTMAN: Wait did,I say the 4th?
\ CHRISTOPHER: The 4th would of been Wednesday, which would of been the J.
\ first day that you were due back to work.
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.; CHRISTOPHER: Okay, when did you tell them that you would like to 2
withdraw your resignation?
31 LI .
HARTMAN: That would of been the 3rd.
.5 CHRISTOPHER: The 3rd, that would of been Monday?
7 HARTMAN: .No Tuesday, Wednesday, Wednesday. :
96
101 CHRISTOPHER: That would of been the 4th. ,
u: '
HARTNAN: Yeah the 4ch.
13l 14 And who did you tell that to Hal?..
CHRISTOPHER:
ui di HARTMAN: Pardon?
17l 18l CHRISTOPHER: Who did you tall that you wanted to withdraw?
19l 201 '.i HARTMAN: I think it was Jim Floyd, I-can't really be sure. '
21!
22 CHRISTOPHER: Do you recall what he said to you when you told him you 23 wanted to withdraw?
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l j HARTMAN: Well ~like I said I can't even remember when I said it but I 21 l know I said it, .it was probably in that meeting and after the meeting '
31 was all over somebody said we'll get back to you in the morning or
-! p we'll 'get back to you this afternoon and we walked out of the meeting 5-and Jim put his hand on my shoulder, gave me a pat on the back, he says
'61 don't sweat Hal, no sweat; 7"
8' CHRISTOPHER: And what was he referring to?
9l O! HARTMAN: Well he was referring to, you know I'd be aloud to rescind my 7 resignation and then that afternoon I got a call from somebody in personnel, I trying to think of his name now.
(
CHRISTOPHER: That afternoon being the 4th? '
I I HARTMAN: Yeah that Wednesday. I can't remember who it was down there !
I but it was somebody from the personnel office called me up and said
$ that you know your ok, don't sweat anything, you know, and then Thursday M I came into work and I guess in the afternoon they said go down to Gary 10{ Miller's office, so I went down to Gary Miller's office and I was in S1 there, Tom Hombach was there and my union representative was there and )
I s8! they asked me for my resignation.
I 33
$4 CHRISTOPHER: This was the 5th?
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1 HARTMAN: The 5th and that was it, I wrote it out and I was. told to'go
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.'j on sick leave. '
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. CHRISTOPHER: . Was this something that you were adverse to .doing or did- '
- 5.
you want; to go ahead and submit your resignation at that time? Ob'vioi[ sly .
6 you had changed your mind'back and forth a little bit as to whether you 7 '
actually. wanted to leave or did not want to leave at that time when he 8'
asked you to go ahead. . . .
Il .
I 10I j HARTMAN: Okay what I-did was just make it formal because I think I-lll
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l would of, they said that they could have, they could take my word for, i 1 21 for my resignation, in other words the initial word I gave to Jim Floyd 13
- was.enough but that they just wanted to make it fomal so it was either 141 -
I, this was the impression I got is that they could~either make it is!
formal with a .lettar or you know bang me off with what I said to Jim 16i Floyd on the 30th. .
17f
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CHRISTOPHER: What did you want at that point, did you want to resign?
191 201 HARTMAN: No I still didn't want to resign and I said, I asked them if 21! 1 there was other jobs, I sa.' that I could revert back to Aux 1111ary 22!
Operator and he says no because .you still have to react under stress, 23 at this time they felt I could not operate under stress. I 2 41
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i CHRISTOPHER: Why, what was that based on, do you know?
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' 31 HARTMAN: I guess it was because my blood pressure was so, you know i I
just because of the incident and it was high because of this, I am 5
going to loose my job and if I do why, you know.
61 i
7' CHRISTOPHER:
How would they have known about your blood pressure, did 8t
- you see a doctor that weekend?
3l 10 HARTMAN:
I saw a doctor on Monday, this was Monday the 30, 31, the 2nd of April I saw a doctor.
ui CHRISTOPHER:
Was this a company doctor or is this your own private 1 41
, physician?
15l 16' HARTMAN: My own physician.
18! CHRISTOPHER: Was this because you were feeling badly?
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20f HARTMAN: Yeah because I was just feeling bad.
21 CHRISTOPHER: Okay what were the results of that?
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- HARTMAN: Well he just told me that I was over anxious and he said not 2!
l to worry about anything and he gave me some pills for' anxiety you know,
'3 so I was on that and I asked him, do you think I could go back to work d 4 '
and I got the impression that he said yeah you could go back Wedsneday, 1 5 b whenever you wanted but he did say that I should of stayed off a week ?
68 7l i anyway, but I came back under the, impression that, and apparently they N
. ij called up my doc and found out that I shouldn't have been at work and I lh think that that's where this thing got misconstrued '
9) l CHRISTOPHER: Did the doctor tell... .
111 '
I HARTMAN: They told,'well yeah I think I told them that I was on this medication but it shouldn't affect my, it's not a drug or anything you 14 know, upper librium or anything like that and that it was just for.
E anxiety. They said are you supposed to be back to work and I said yeah i 1
16i as far as I know. Ii 17I ,
! l 18f CHRISTOPHER: It sounds like maybe your doctor told them something );q 19 di ffererit. The way your talking it sounds like the doctor said something l 20i different to the company when they asked him. Do you know what the 21 doctor said to them? !
l 22 '
23 HARTMAN: He said to them that I should have been off a week.
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11 l CHRISTOPHER: Did you confirm that with the doctor that he had told 2!
l them that?
31 1
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- HARTMAN
- Yeah and he confirmed that that's what he told me also. :
l Si i i
Gi CHRISTOPHER: Who was your doctor?
l 71 1
8! HARTMAN: Doctor Caranzy in Palmira, j i 91 CHRISTOPHER: That's your family physician? i ui HARTMAN: Yeah.
u, 14 CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
15i 16i HARTMAN: So anyway then after this wnole thing got started or I signed 17 by resignation I was escorted off the' Island. They told me I couldn't 18I have an Auxilliary Operator job and they told me that I couldn't, I 13 don't know if there was any other jobs available at that time.
20l 21f CHRISTOPHER: By they you mean...
l 22' 23 HARTMAN: Tom Hombach.
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62-11 CHRISTOPHER: ; Tom Hombach that is the Personne1' Manager?
2; 31 HARTMAN: . He was the: Personnel Director, yeah for division. 'At this 41 point-I think Gary Miller had left after'he told me that I couldn't.be
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an Aux 1111ary Operator and-.that they were pulling by license as a .
65 Reactor Operator. He'1 eft and then Tom Hombach.took over.
17!
CHRISTOPHER:
.I'm a little confused'in terms of how the psychological 9I stress evaluation got into this situation, it would appear that you had -
101 resigned and you were gone and subsequent to that you had this stress 11:
evaluation, could you explain that? '
12l HARTMAN: Okay this is what happened. I was, I' told them that I be 1 41 willing to take. a. job in another- part of the plant but that'I would have to submit to a psychological evaluation given to all new employees.
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CHRISTOPHER: This was told to you by...
131 HARTMAN:- Tom Hombach.
201 CHRISTOPHER: Tom Hombach okay.
22!
231' HARTMAN:
No this was related from Toe Hombach to my Union President to
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me.
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- CHRISTOPHER: What was the reason for taat? :
21 '
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HARTMAN: Well that's just union company report. f, 41 Si t CHRISTOPHER: I mean what was the reason for. . .
Si 71 HARTMAN: Oh for the psychological exam.
81 91 CHRISTOPHER: Taking the psychological. . .
LOI HARTMAN: I don' t know, apparently, I don't know why. Apparently they w
~ I must of thought that this, maybe my irrational behavior, you know, was enough to, I mean by saying irrational you know, going, resigning at L4!
the split of a crisis and then wanting to come back and you know that I might add enough signal.
L6,
[ CHRISTOPHER: Wel1 you' re saying that the evaluation was a contigency S that if, that you, if you got a clean bill of health that you could O come back, is that what it was designed to be? ;
l0)
HARTMAN: Well they said that they would find sc.,ething for me other E than the Control Room or Auxilliary Operator, so I figured I'd go to 33 the Utility gang or something, so I wouldn't, I wouldn't come back in k the same capacity as I left. j
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l CHRISTOPHER: But that was based on the requirement for you .to. . .
21
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- HARTMAN
- I had to pass this, pass this psychological evaluation.
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Si i CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Did you agree to take this psychological evalu-6I ation? '
' 7{
l HARTMAN:
I told them I.would agree to take it if I was provided with a 91 neutral psychologist.
10i 11 CHRISTOPHER: Okay and there response to that was what?
' 12!
13!
HARTMAN:
There response to that was that they have a- neutral psychologist.
.14!
CHRISTOPHER: A contract firm?
16!
E HARTMAN: A contract firm, who since, I found out later he has been D ;
doing business with Met Ed for 10 years.
131 l I
20t CHRISTOPHER: In this type of affair?
21i Nf HARTMAN: Yeah.
-- - 23
, J 24 CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
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- HARTMAN
- He told me when I left the, when I left the, his office I was 2!
[ under the impression that I was ok. I might of had some irrational 31 ideas about the company and stuff like that but to me it didn't signal
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41 that I would be irrational doing my job. He told them, I guess my impression of what he told them was, he said to me that I was okay to '
Si j work at the Island provided I didn't have to work in any security areas 7
and since they had no joos up there for me, that required me not to go 8-i into a security area that they had no employment for me. j 9j 10f CHRISTOPHER: Now I's, let me threw this out because I'm familiar with ll'i those type of things in the sense that I've had those in previous y'
employment. My understanding of the way that worked is using a contract ul stress evaluation for people, that after you took their examination 141 '
we'll call it, if you were not satisified with their findings that you u!
had the opportunity to have an independent neutral analyst, whether 15i he's a psychologist or whatever the term may be, of your own encosing 17!
analyze the data and confirm with the other psychologist or stress ul evaluator for a second opinion. Did you have the opportunity to do that?
20!
l HARTMAN: No.
2f CHRISTOPHER: Were you told that you could have a independent counselor l 2 l of your own encice compare the data with this documented stress analyses?
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- HARTMAN
- Not that'I can recall. '
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, CHRISTOPHER: Okay.
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HARTMAN: Because I think I would of done it. ~
Gi 71 i CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Hal would have stayed with the Company if 'they 8l' had offered you a new job?
9l 101
- HARWAN: I probably would have stayed with them long enough to find
~ 11}
, another job, really, cause at that point with the events that had gone 12;' up prior .to that. It probably wouldn't have been to much fun anymore.
14 ',' CHRISTOPHER: Hal along this line let me go back to the transcript of 15i Ira Rosen, I'd like to get these specifics. Again, this is scmething 15l' that Mr. Rosen, this is the terminology he uses and I'd like you to 17 i tell me how it compares to hew you feel. This is on page 5 at the i l
bottom, "but rather than being heralded at as a prophet things went bad for Hartman after the accident, he was forced to resign according to 2
reliable sources when a company psychologist said he was to high strung Ell to work in a security area, even though he had been working in one for k 22l six years".
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11 HARTMAN: I don't know what his reif able sources are and he used the 2! '
term " company psychologist" you know these are all things I pointed out 31 to him to, you know I corrected him on, I said he's not a company
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- psychologist he's part of Stress Control.
5! .
t 6i CHRISTOPHER: Which is an independent.
I 81 HARTMAN: Which is an independent examining firm. l 95 l
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CHRISTOPHER: Well this is why I want to bring these specific points 11!
to you because I have the impression that maybe what is said here is l 12:
not exactly what you said and I would prefer you to clarify it rather 131 than go on what's in this transcript. Force to me kind of takes a 14 pretty volatile act.
15i ISi
, HARTFAN: Well that's the way reporters are too.
17!
181 CHRISTOPHER: I agree, I guess my question to you is, is this an 191 accurata statement?
20t 21' HARTMAN: No.
22' I
asi j CHRISTOPHER: I'm sorry, you said no.
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l HARTMAN: No 'it's not accurate to the point that I was forced to resign
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-j according to reliable' sources, I don't know what his reliable sources 31
-l are.
5 t
' CHRISTOPHER: ' Yeah I was hoping you could tell me because I don't know: I_
I' either. -
l- 7 HARTMAN: And when a company psychologist and I've told him before that g.
the company psychologist was not a company psychologist but a psychologist '
10 who was contracted by Stress Control ta do the test, and he said I was to high strung, that.was true, even though.he had been working in.oce U for six years and there's more glorification.
i Basically I'just, I just 13f reiterate what I just said.
141 MARTIN: Hal there's one other area I'd like to clarify. - What was 15 your ' status with your requalification program? Were you down there for
~17 special training in Lynchburg or was 'that your nor:nal cycle to go dcwn 18l there?
196 201 HARTNAN: This was just a normal cycle to go down.
1 21! ' !
- 22 MARTIN: Were you passing all your sections of your requalification !
23 program?
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.HARTMAN:- Oh'sure.
P 9
MARTIN: Would 'you repeat for.me the reasons why~you initially resigned -
from..the job on March 30th?
HARTMAN: LI guess the real reason I, I just kept working over in my I 'sind that you know this accident was very serious and I knew it was I serious .and that it would take a long time to get things under control.
' I also knew the problems that I experienced in the previous two years u
1 with the testing program 'and the startup and hot functionals, power
)
escalation, tit was no ' fun, it was just no fun it was really, it really caused me alot of, alot of anxiety because you know I just couldn't go i i
,in on a Wednesday if they had one particular test scheduled for Wednesday,
-I couldn't leave Tuesday and sentally prepare for this test,'in other j
't words, go over it in my mind, you know not necessarily sit down with -
- i l the print books and the procedures 'and things like that but just' go {
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a over it in ey mind,. perhaps some trouble. spots, some areas that I might '
be able to concentrate on, just you know get yourself psycned up for a
. ball. game and. I would go in and do this and they were still doing what
, they were doing yesterday.
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C}iRISTOPHER: We came to an end of the first tape at 9:48 P.M. We are going to tape #2 and continuing.
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l -HARTMAN: Okay. So anyway you know just all of these things that I f
' 21 .
l couldn't go into. work and e.xpect the equipment to work right. I just I 31
! got so anxious and so apprehensive. My stomach would just be in_ knots ' j
'4! .
1
.; the whole time that I had the panel. You know it just got to be such C
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an, you know really. a drudge to go in because I saw that things weren't Gi J really being done. I- didn't really foresee any change and then when
. 7i i i
the accident, I was considering quitting you know like oh. a year or two 8f i
ago or a year or two before. And I had a job offer, it wasn't up to my gj k monetary expectations so I turned. it down, that was in St. Louis. too by lui i
the way but I had been looking from that time. So when the accident 11!
i happened, it was something I don't know why I'm not a perfectionist 12'l guru or anything I don't really perfess to see in the future but all 131 the events I've seen in the previous two years just told me that some-14!
-l thing big was going to happen. The constant up.and down for just the 15{
little things, some time-I made it up in my own mind that you 'know 16i
, several small things were going to happen and it's going to be-big. '
17i
! And I just didn't want to part of it. There was just no way. I don't know. That's just basically my feelings and when I came home frem the accident.and I saw all those people,.I mean. In the Control Room ,.
during a normal testing day was constant frca 10 or 20 people all the I
time, phone calls, radios, handling the page, constant people asking 22 the question, why are you doing this, why are you that. Hey what if, what are you doing now you know. This was just nerve racking to the 23f.
24f point that a lot of it could be prevented from you know not allowing ;
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li l extraneous people above the lines. Every once in awhile I just get so 2
l frustrated and say "allright everybody back behind the lines" and in a 3!
i half hour later, you know everybody would mingle up again. And I don't 41
- know it's just a combintaion of all these little things that finally 5' . :
broke my back. And that's all. l 6i .
T MARTIN: I have no further questions.
8l '
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CHRISTOPHER: Nor do I. i t 10i !
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! CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Ha1. I just want to say I thank you a lot, we _
1 l
12l spent a lot of time here with this and we'll probably spend a little bit before we get out of here. I have no further questions. Again I 14i will see that you get a copy of the tapes as soon as we can get them 15l nade per your request, okay. I would assume we would mail to you by 16l
, registered mail or pick them will be a simple arrangement like that.
17!
MARTIN: We may still be out here.
19l O! CHRISTOPHER: We may. At this point, do you have anything else Hal at h this time that you would like to tell us something that maybe we have not covered, something that it is germaine to this issue or something 2k that is not geramine to this issue but that you think we should know 24 about with regards to Three Mile Island or the industry at this point.
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. HARTMAN: No I don't think so. 4 2; :1 .?'
- g 3I j MARTIN
- ' Okay. The time is 9:54 and we'll terminate this tape at this {
4' time.
5 6; .
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f 141 16 171 '
l 1SI 19l 201 21!
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n R.. Keith Christopher has identified himself to me as an investigator of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an' agency of the United States, which is performing an ' investigation ' authorized by' the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is. .
i as amen'ded. I understand that any false statement made by me during this investigation may subject me to criminal ' prosecution under 18 USC 1001. .
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//f 3~)S ~ Y (interviewee signature) ^
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t th irn ir t' 18 USC.1001
,, . ] ' 4 ,y p , v 5 rC V' } ., c (
Fraud and False Statements fgg . g 1001. Statements or entries general'j <
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers 1
-up by any trick, scheme, or device N1 rnaterial fact,-or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 749.
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,, ilARTMAN, ilAROLD 3/26/80 Statement before Hartman Allegations Investigation Team N.,
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. U.S. NUCLLAR REGULATChY COMM1551CN OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
/f
, REGION I CATE 26-80 TIME - 10:25 P.M.
I- Harold Hartman do hereby make the following free and voluntary statement to Mr. R. K. Christopher, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I understand this statement is being made in connection with an official NRC Investigation and may, if necessary, be used in judicial or administrative action. I make this statement with no threats having been made against me or promises extended to me. .
I would like to take this opportunity to clarify several statements made during my interview uith Mr. Ira Rosen. First, Mr. Rosen quotes me as saying "and for his safety concerns Hartman was harassed and told that he'd better shut up or be firec." His statement in this context implies constant harassment when in fact tnis was an isolated case during plant startup on one occassion when alarms we e going off that were irrelevant to the operation of the plant.
I had been ass'gned a control panel'on this occasion and nad many things to do. I was con 1tantly being bothered by these alarms. I asked the shift supervisor Brian Mehler if he could do scmething about the alarms because I cculdn't put up with the alarms and do a startup. I asked Mehler if I was going to have to put up with this all night. He said I guess you're going to have to, and I said "get me a relief," and Mehler said something to the effect, "Well if I get you a relief you may as well get your lunch box and head out the North gate." I was not constantly harassed and threatened about losing my job for expressing my concerns as was implied by Mr. Rosen.
Second, the reporter states that I said "That part of this system was deliberately tampered with and I was the one who did it." This statement implies I was in the control room and I deliberately tampered with the system. I was not in the control on the night of the accident or in the days preceding the accident and I .
never deliberately tampered with any system. Mr. Martin has asked me to clarify what I meant when Mr. Rosen asked me if I ever fixed the statistics for the Reactor Coolant System inventory. I was quoted as saying "I didn't do it very often." I did in fact say that and what I was referring to was the ways to get a good leak rate by adding hydrogen to the makeup tank, mistaking the RCDT millivolts, and adding water to the makeup tanks. I, as were all operators, under a great strain to get good leak rates. Each operator had his own technique for getting acceptable results. The pressure to get good leak rates was the result of inner shift pressure because each shift thought they were the best and no shift wanted to be the one to force the unit off the line.
I have been asked to relate the criticality event that occurred when I was working a shift under Brian Mehler. I can't recall specifically when this happened but during a startup the plant went critical below the half percent under Es. Plant procedures require that I insert the control rods until only the safety rods remain out. I started to do that when I was told by the shift supervisor, Brian .
Mehler, scmething to the effect, that I was to stop driving the rods in and continue the startup. The critical data shcwed 28% on a Group 6 and 7 and that was belcw the lower limit for going critical. I reminded Mehler that by procedure we should go to 1% shutdown and he said to continue to startup. He had the other operators in the control room calculate a new ECP based on where we went critical. I believe these individuals were RayBooker and Rich Hoyt. The new ECP showed
PagG 2 of 2 Harold Hartman's statement- \
a new baron concentration and the critical positian was now within allcwable J limits. This is what I was referring to when I said they; redid the numbers.
-I would also like to address another issue from the TV transcript. References by Mr. Rosen state that I was forced to resign when a company psychologist saic
, I was .too high strung to work in a secure area. In reference to the company psychologist the psychologist was a contracted psychologist and not a Met-Ed ~
employee. I feel I was forced to resign but not.because of safety issue I hao raised-but I feel it was because of my hypertension, j
T havo read, initialed all corrections and understand the above five page statement-which was written by Mr. Christopher of the NRC at my request and in my presence.
lit is true and accurate to the best of my ability.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of March 1980 at 11:35.P.M.
9
U.S. .wLt.LAR M.GULATCRY LCXMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION I DATE "3 - 3. C - 27 TIME / 0. 35 r:M I (26/ y A.) do hereby make the following ,
free and voluntary statement to Mr. R. K. Christopher, who has identified himself to me as an Investigator for the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I understand this statement is being made in connection with an official NRC Investigation and may, if necessary, be used in judicial or administrative action. I make this statement with no threints having been made against me or premises extended to me.
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HARTMAN, llAROLD 4/27/80 and 4/29/80 F & B Interview
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l-r VOLUNTARY STATEliENT OF l llAROLD h' . HARTMAN l
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$ 1 8 Sunday, April 27, 1980 6 : 3 0 P .l.l.
233 East High Street Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania
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13ENJ A.N11N llEl'OllTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS VIVI: DECKM AN MTitE!:T snw youn xnw voitn 10038
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APPEARANCES i
{
JOHN M. SMITH, ESQ. j' 3 Attorney for Harold W. Hartman 133 East High Street 4 Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania 5
6 FAEGRE 6 BENSON, ESQS.
1300 Northwest Bank Building 7 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 8 WINTHROP A. ROCKWELL, ESQ.
BY:
-and-9 JAMES FITZMAURICE, ESQ.
of Counsel 10 11 12 13 000 14 MR. ROCKWELL:
We are here in the offices 15 of Mr. John Smith, 133 East High Street, 16- ;
Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania, to take a voluntary 17 18 statement from Harold W. Hartman in connection l 19 with the matters referred to in Mr. Hartman's as I under-comments on WOR-TV show, broadcast, 20 stand it, in late March 1980, 21
- f. My name is Winthrop A. Rockwell, and I am 22 We are both from here with James Fitzmaurice.
23 h t the law firm of Faegre 6 Benson, 1300 Nort wes 24
] Bank Building, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402.
25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 3
'l 2 Our purpose in being here is to make an 3 inquiry, an independent factual investigation, 4 into the statement that Mr. Hartman has made, 5 and we have been asked to do that by Metropolitan 6 Edison Company.
7 h'e have been retained by Metropolitan 8 Edison for the explicit purpose of making an 9 independent investigation.
10 You should know that their indication to 11 us was that they wanted to understand what 12 underlay Mr. Hartman's comments, to understand 13 its implications for the plant to be in a position 14 to respond to them, depending on what we find in 15 looking into them, g 16 We are here today to try to engage in, l 17 I guess, what we talked about the other night, 1
18 as basically a dialogue with you, Mr. Hartman, 19 to try to understand what, number one, you said, 20 and number two, what it means. t 21 The record should reflect that we contacted 22 you, I guess, four or five days ago now.
23 MR. HARTMAN : Right.
24 MR. ROCKWELL: And asked if we could stop
)
25 by and introduce ourselves because we were BCNJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E 1
l l
i 4 !
t 1 interested in talking to you.
2 We did meet with you, and in our initial 3
4 phone conversation, you indicated you were repre-sented by counsel.
5 MR. HARTMAN: Yes.
6 MR. ROCKWELL:
We said, by all means 7
y.
L g contact him and tell him that we want to talk -
to you, and that you indicated when we met the 9
other night that you had conferred with your 10
)j counsel before we met, and that it was with !
12 his approval.
Subsequently, we made arrangements to come 13 here today to discuss the substance of your 14 15 concerns. Is that a fair statement of our contacts up to now?
16 MR. HARTMAN: Yes, I believe so.
17 MR. SMITH: May we have, for the record, l 18 jp the name of the person or persons with whom 20 you are dealing at Metropolitan Edison?
MR. ROCKKELL:
The Metropolitan counsel 21 on-site is John Wilson, and Mr. Wilson is the 22 23 man to whom we addressed our letter of retainer.
l 24 Mr. Arnold was involved in the decision to retain and us because he is responsibic for the plant, 25 B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE 4
5 1
2 naturally, ultimately charged with responding and with acting to the extent that is required 3
in light of Mr. Hartman's statement. Is that 4
5 sufficient?
MR. SMITH: Yes. There is one other 6
7 thing I would like to have for the record.
8 (Discussion held of f the record.)
MR. ROCKWELL: Back on the record.
9 10 The record should also reflect the fact that from May of 1979 until November of 1979, 11 12 I served as Associate Chief Counsel to the j3 President's Commission en the Accident at
)
14 Three Mile Island.
15 In that capacity, I was responsible for 16 .
investigating Met Edison, and subsequently was 17 the chief author of one of the staff reports 18 supporting the Commission's overall report.
As we have discussed before, that staff 19 20 report was critical of Metropolitan Edison.
21 It is my understanding one of the reasons they contacted me for this inquiry was because they 22 wanted someone who would make an impartial 23 24 evaluation of Mr. Hartman's statements and the 25 facts surrounding them because they want to know BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
--' --- -----_-~__m_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l Hartman 6 the facts.
2 l Good. I MR. SMITH:
3 MR ROCKWELL: Is there anything else you 4
5 want on the record?
6 MR. SMITH: No, I believe that is fine.
7 8
HAR0LD W. HARTMAN testified 9
as follows:
10 EXAMINATION ji BY MR. ROCKWELL:
Q Before we start, Mr. Hartman, I don't know 12 whether you have ever given a statement with a court
- 13 14 reporter present, but let me give you a couple of guide-15 lines that will be helpful both to you and to me.
16 First of all, if I ask you a question which you 17 don't understand or which is uncicar to you, or if 18 your attention is distracted in any way, or you just 39 want me to repeat it for whatever reason, please say 20 so, and I would be glad to repeat or rephrase it, so i
21 that you are not in a position of trying to answer a ,
22 question that you don't know or don't understand. Okay? !
23 A Okay.
24 Q Secondly, it is best if you answer out
) loud rather than nod your head because the court 25 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERvict
} Hartman 7
) 2 reporter takes down what we say. With those ground 3
rules, why don't you state your full name and your 4 current address for the record.
5 A Okay. Harold W. Hartnan, Jr., RD#1, Box 193 CC, 6 Columbia, Pennsylvania 17512.
7 Q Mr. Hartman, when did you first go to work 8 for Metropolitan Edison?
9 A It was about the end of the month in January 10 Of 1974-11 Q And how long did you work for Met Edison?
13 A Until April 13, 1979.
13 Q What I would like to do with you at this 34 point is to go through with you, if we could,some of 15 the statements you made earlier to make sure I under-16 stand them correctly. I am referring to a copy of 17 the transcript of the interview with the Rogovin 18 Commission, specifically Harold Ornstein, who took 19 your deposition. That was on October 29, 1979, It 20 should also reflect that the copy we are referring to 21 has just my underlining, so it is not a cican copy.
22 1 don't have a clean copy with me. If you wish, we 23 can mark one later and attach it to the statement.
24 MR. SMITH: The specific reference to that
)
25 deposition would be satisfactory because I know BENJAMIN RCPORTING S ERVICE
l L
L Hartman 8 3
) 2 there are copies, of course, with the Commission and with the NRC,.so I wouldn't think it actually 3 I 4
necessary to make that a part of this record. !
MR. ROCKWELL: We will refer to psges as 5
6 we go on, so you will know.
7 MR. SMITH: Fine.
8 Q Page 49 of the statement that I just re-9 ferred to -- Ict me quote from the transcript at that 10 page:
33 "I did talk to Bernie Smith and Dick 12 Hoyt about this problem, about the leakage out of the valves, and they just said, 'Get a
) 13 14 good leak rate.' Whenever I did it, I passed 15 it off as often as I could -- I would just say 16 I couldn't get a good one all night, and keep 17 doing it that way. They had three days to 18 get a good one."
19 I assume there you mean a good leak rate, 20 is that correct?
21 A Right.
Q And continuing:
22 "And sometime during the day or during (
23 (
24 the night, a good one would come up. Then
)
25 it would have to go for three more days until
< 1 4
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERvicE i
I
3 Hartman 9 2 they could get a good one.
3 " Question: Was there anything else you "
4 could have done, anyone else you could have gone 5 to with this concern?
6 " Answer: I probably didn't go to anybody 7
because I thought that this was such an obvious '
8 problem that the people that I could have gone 9 to were already notified."
10 What I would like to do is ask this:
- 3) Number one, is that an accurate reading of the 12 transcript?
13 A Yes, it is.
)
14 Q Number two, is that an accurate reflection 15 of your concern?
16 A Yes, it is.
17 Q One of the things I would like to go into 18 is why was it so difficult to get a good leak rate.
19 That is one of the things I looked through the 20 f.ranscript for, and I am not clear why it was so
,. 21 di f fi cult . Can you offer us any guidance in that s
22 area 7 23 A We really started having bad problems having 24 leak rates to come out -- I am not really refreshed 25 on the time frame -- but I do know that at one point B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
--- ~
l 4
i y Hartman 10 !
2 in time, the computer program to print out the leak 3
rate had an input that the operator had to make, and-4 it was a reading of reactor coolant drain tank voltage.
5 This was taken from a patch panel, a digital 6 y Itmeter on a patch panel, down in the room below the i
7 control room, 8
You would enter that number at the beginning, 9
and then that would be the signal for the computer 10 to start the computation.
13 An hour later, the computer would finish its 12 internal monitoring, and it would ask you again for 13 this voltage. Then based on the difference in voltage, h
14 the computer would do what it had to do and come up 15 with a list of leaks, the end result being net 16 unidentified Jeakage.
17 h'e started having problems then getting them 18 to come out, I guess, really in a non-erratic type way.
19 As I remember, the results were quite erratic.
20 Even though you had a steady plant condition, they 21 would be very erratic. By that I mean one time it ,
22 might be two and a half gallons a minute; the next 23 time it might be a half gallon per minute. I remember 24 at some points they were even coming out negative.
25 I think after they recognized this problem, that we were B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Hartman 11 2 Betting these erratic leak rates, they went and 3 they changed the program of the computer, so that you 4 no longer had to enter the reactor coolant drain
/'
5 tank voltage. As I recall, that settled the results 6 down pretty much, and we didn't have a problem there 7 for a while.
8 But then the safety valves on top of the 9 pressurizer, the three code safety valves, or the 10 two code safety valves --
I'm sorry -- started to
}) develop leaks.
12 Their leakage, their distillate, went into this 13 reactor coolant drain tank. We started getting high
)
14 leak rates again that we.couldn't -- we had an awful 15 time getting leak rates to come -- unidentified leak 16 rates -- within one gallon per minute.
17 I guess, after thinking about this for a while 18 and trying to come up with a logical reason, that 19 perhaps maybe the computer really wasn't messing things 20 up; maybe it was the way the program was written:
21 there was a glitch in the program that perhaps was 22 making things erratic. I don't know. It was just 23 a thought.
24 Q' Let me go back. I have some questions.
I 25 A Okay.
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
12 "2 - 1 Hartman 2 Q Is what you told me your own perspective i
3 on what the problem was or does that reflect, as far 4 as you can recall, a sense among control room operators 5 generally as to what the prob]cm was?
6 A I think it was generally a sense, you know. I 7 feel that all the operators there knew there was a i
8 problen, and we really never discussed it among our-9 selves as to, well, how do you get a good one to come 10 out.
11 Maybe on one occasion you heard somebody, 12 and they would just take you in the corner and say, y 13 "You know, this is how we do it, you know," but as i 14 a general statement I would say that the operators l
l 15 knew about the problem.
16 Q. This'is your description of why you think 17 the problem was occurring in your own analysis or l
18 do you think that was kind of common to t,he control 19 room operators generally, or don't you know?
20 A I don't know. I would say it was probably a 21 combination of both, my own opinion and the other 22 operators.
23 Q This was a matter of at least some dis- .
p 25 a problem?
1 BENJAMIN R E PO RTIN G S E RVIC E
) -
i
Ab I flartman i
2 A Oh, yes.
3 Q Let us go back now to some of the points l 4 you made and look at those. You indicated that at 5 one point the computer program had an input which was l 6 the RCDT voltage.
1 7 A Yes.
8 Q And that in order to get that input you l
9 had to go to the patch panel on the floor below the l
10 Unit.2 control room, is that correct?
l 11 A That is correct.
l 12 Q You have to go down to the patch panel 13 to read the voltage?
14 A That is correct.
15 Q And you would go down at the beginning of 16 this test?
17 A Right.
18 To read it?
Q ,
19 A Right.
20 Q Then you would go down again at the end 21 of the test?
22 A Right.
23 Q You would try to read it as close to the 24 time you started the test as possible?
)
25 A You see, what we did was go down and read it at B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVIC E
~ --- - - ~ - _ - - - _ . - - - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _ , ._ , . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
14 1
Hartman i didn't 2 the beginning, and the actual start of the test occur until that voltage was typed in. As soon as it 3
Time Zero, 4 was typed in, the voltage, that was the start, 5
Then we would look up at the clock, and in 6
an hour we would go down and read the voltage again 7 and come back up and type it in.
8 Q How much of a delay would there be from 9 the time you read the voltage in the patch panel down-into the computer, 10 stairs until the time you inputted it 11 thereby starting the test? ,
12 A I would say if you read the voltage ri gh t on the 13 hour it would be a delay of maybe two minutes or so.
14 Q- And so the test would start at two minutes 35 after the hour when you punched it in?
16 A Right.
17 Q 13 that correct?
18 A Right.
39 Q You indicated that you thought that may 20 have been somehow related to the difficulty in getting 21 a good leak rate. Do you know why?
No, I don't know why. The computer I guess ,
22 A looks at a graph as a function of voltage, as a function 23 this is my 24 of volume , and perhaps -- I d on' t know --
25 own feeling again -- the computer was looking at a B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
15 4 1 Hartman j
) 2 wrong graph, voltage versus voltage,.so that the dif-3 3' ference in~ voltage may be seen as either a larger 4 amount of' volume or a smaller amount. In this case j e i 5 it wouldn't be seeing enough of leakage into that par- l 6 ticular tank and would therefore show up as a net un-7 identified Icahage.
8 Q Does that relate to the fact that you 9 physically had to go downstairs and read it or because 10 what you were reading may have been either somehow 11 incorrect or the way the computer interpreted what you 12 gave it was incorrect? !
13 A I think it was the way the computer interpreted
)
14 it which was incorrect.
15 Q So, if I understand -- and let me say one 16 of the ways it is helpful to clarify things for me is 17 to restate then to see if I restate them correctly, j
18 and if I am wrong, you tell me. , j 19 A Okay.
20 Q I am not trying to put words in your mouth, i
21 but to see if I understand it. h' hat I understand then i 22 is that what your sense is that it wasn't the necessity 23 of making the trip downstairs to read the voltage, l j
24 but it was simply that reading that you took, when 25 you plugged it into that program,.may not have given l
B ENJ AMIN R E PO RTING SERVICE l l L___ - . - - - - l
15
}
Hartman
[ *, 2 an accurate reading of the actual RCDT level?
3 A Yes. '
4 Q And it is your impression or do you know 5
that the change in the conputer program may have 6
corrected the way the computer interpreted that 7
information?
A I don't know.
8 9 Q Is it your impression?
A My impression is that they thought there was 10 yy a problem with it and, therefore, they corrected it.
12 Q And you weren't sure when that was occurring?
13 Let me ask. Do you think it might have been occurring
)
14 after the plant went back on line? Do you recall it !
was down for quite a number of months during the spring, I 15 16 summer and fall of '78? !
A Yes, In fact, it went down on the 18th of April 17 18 f r that long period of time.
f 4 19 ,
Q It blew those valves?
i 20 A Yes. They had to replace the.safetys. The 21 nearest I can recall, the new computer program was i
22 w rked on during that time. It went into the computer, 1
23 went through its testing, and if'I remember, right 24 after we got started back up, that is when we started 25 using the new program, where we didn't have to go BENJAMIN REPORTING S E RVIC E
6 1 Hartman ;;
37 y 2
downstairs to get the voltage from the patch panel.
3' 3
- Q That would probably be sometime in the 4-l=
fall of '78? '
5 A That is correct.
6 Q You indicated that during that period
?
that you were using the manual reading of the voltage 8
from the patch panel that you were having erratic 9
results when the plant was not itself erratic?
10 A That is correct. In other words, if we wouldn't Il get a good leak rate the fi rs t time, we would take 12 that sheet and throw it away and then punch out a new 13 one and try to get another one. As I can recall,
) 14 there were different copies of leak rates. WeII, it 15 wouldn2 t really show it anyway.
16 Q Ne do have copies of leak rates during 17 that period.
18 A
The ones that were turned in, even t, hough that 19 might show the erraticism of the whole thing --
20 Q But your recollection is that it ranged 21 t in a spectrum of h to 2 gpm unidentified?
22 A Right. You know, that is plus or minus. There 23 might have been one at 6, 24 Q But the majority of them fell within that 25
) band, with some going higher and some going lower?
B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
,..TbMW ~~~' ' ' "
l 18 1
Hartman
) 2 A- Again, I can't recall the period of time we 3.
were getting negative values as to unidentified leak- f 4
age.
I renember I asked where I got one that 5
6 was negative, and I said, "Is this okay to turn in?"
7 And they said, "No, try and get another one." And I don't know the time frame, but they came to me and 8
9 said negatives ones were okay to put in. So I don't 10 know i.f there are any negative values in there for I don't even know the period of time, 11 _ leak rates.
}3 but I know that at one time they were accepting negative values.
- 13 14 Q Did you have any explanation when you got 15 a negative value as to how you could possibly get a 16 negative on an unidentified leak rate?
17 .A It was explained to me, but I really don't remember what they said. You know, I don't really 18 19 know what to say.
20 Q Do you know who would have explained it?
p 21 Would it have been your foreman or the supervisors?
22 A It would probably be my supervisor.
23 Q But you don't recall what explanation he.
24 gave?
25 A No.
). -
B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SCRvicE
s(-
3 Hartman 19 I
2 Q Y ur recollection is that the erratic 3 nature of the leak rate test results diminished fol-4 3cwing the change in the conputer program?
A They did for a whi3e, 5 Then they started having -
6 leaking code safety valves.
7 Q And that would have been what, in the g latter part of the fall of '787 L-A P,eally just shortly after we started up from the 9
10 safety valve outage. I remember operating in
{
13 November of '78, operating with pressurizer code L___ .
i 12 safetics leakirg, and I think -- I can't recall whet _her
(
) 13 they got worse or whether they just kind of wen t up and 14 stayed the same, but I don't know. I really don't know.
15 Q You indicated that in your answer to the 16 first question you thought maybe the computer wasn't L- -
17 really messing things up; naybe there was a glitch
]
18 in the computer program. Setting aside for the 19 moment the voltage reading on the reactor coolant drain tank as a possible~ glitch in the computer program, 20 21 setting that aside, do you have Eny information about 22 what wher glitches there may have been in the enmputer 1 23 program? Did anyone ever say to you, "You know, there
- 24 is something wrong. h'e know there is something wrong 25 with the computer program. It is not working"? --]
e-~ -- s-
+,
s ,Us
. -- m. .,
20 1 Hartman.
h.
) 2 Or wa</ this just a sense that you had or just reaching 3 for some explanation?
s 3
4 A I guess I was really ju' trying to ratiorslize 5 in my mind. I guess my rationa'ization came frpm 6 the fact that t51ey were doing a lot of vnk orj'their 7 computer prograra, and it seemed to me it was kind of 8 fishy, if it was working okay here, why all this work.
p 9 It was while they were down that this new program was ,
10 written, and I assumed that they had it all taken )
11 care of when we came back up.
12 (Continued on the following page.)
13.
14 x
j 15 i ',
16 .s
. I 17 , ,
l 18 .
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20 ;
i 21 l
22 I l l
23 )
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25 1
i B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE l
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1 Hartman 21
) 3.lew 2 Q
Let me go back to my original question.
3 Do you know of anything else which may have 4
given rise to either the erratic nature .of the leakage I 5
rate test results or the difficulty in getting a good 6
leak rate test result?
I understand that when we talk 7
about a good one we are talking about one that is less 8
than one gallon per minute.
9 A
Less than one gallon per minute, right.
10 Q
What we are trying to do is to understand 11 what may have possibly been wrong that made it so 12 difficult to get a good leak rate. Do you have anything 13 else that you can help us with in that area?
14 A Gee, I don't really know. The plant itself --
15 I am going to make a comparison here between Unit 1, 16 and from what I tmderstand they never had any problems 17 with leak rates, getting theirs fairly accurate. Their 18 plant operated very smooth, you know. The reactor 19 power, the feedwater flow, the pressurizer level and 20 all of these reactor pressure -- their parameters were 21 very, very stable compared to Unit 2.
22 Unit 2 was what I call an oscillating plant.
23 perhaps some of the parameters that the computer looks 24 at may have been at an ebb when it looked at its 25 initial set of data, and then when it went to check at B CNJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
_ _ _ ______-t- - - " " -
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l Hartman 22
~) 2 time 60, they may have been at the peak, and it was 3 erratic in that way.
4 Q So that you might in a sense luck into a 5 good Jeak rate by hitting the oscillation.right?
6 A Right.
7 Q You might luck into a bad' rate if you hit 8 the oscillation wrong?
9 A That is correct.
10 Q What are we talking about that is oscil-11 lating?
12 A Let me see. We would p obably have reactor
)
13 cbolant pressure, pressurizer IcVel, makeup tank level, 14 reactor power maybe, feedwater flow which affected 15 the primary loops. It was very erratic. Then there 16 was turbine heade'r pressure, which would affect it also.
17 Those aren ' t things that the leak rate, you know, the 18 parameters --
there is some in there that are mentioned 19 here that the computer looks at. But these are all 20 normal plant operating parameters that aren't neces- ,
l 21 sarily looked at by the computer, but would be an '
I l
22 indication of having the plant in an oscillation.
I 23 Q Can you think of any others? How about the 24 RCDT level?
l 25 A Yes. Well, that was on a very slow esci11ation.
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S E R\ 'IC E
T.ed
' :s-1 Hartman 23 [I.
2 6
-)3 I can't recall how many times at night we would pump, d 3
but I can remember doing it at least twice, and I don't ff 4
even know what kind of volunes I would be talking 5 about. It is so far gone out of my memory, i 6 I think in the Ornstein report I did make a 7
mention to, not a test, but a little data gathering 8
expedition that I took, just to show them that we did 9
have a problem with the plant, and that this could be F c-10 a part of our problem that we have been experiencing. ,_
11 It was where I took the control room log book, 12 m_
and from the leaking safety va]ves , themselves, you ?
13 can expect to j ust have to add demineralized water, y 14 water that had no chemical poison in it. -
15 If you had to make up to the reactor plant with __
16 water for identified leakage, that would have Boron u-17 leak out with it, so you would have to replace the IB Boron. So that the pressurizer was acting. as a -
19 distilling plant. -
20 '
Do you have a copy of a cont rol room log from, 21 I would say, February of 1979 back?
22
. MR. ROCKWELL: Yes. -
23 ~
(The re was di s cus sion of f the recor'd. ) _
24 A Right here is a good example. -
)
25 Q You are now referring to a page from the -
BENJAMIN R E PO RTIN G S ERVICE ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - ^ - ~ - ' - --'------
Hartman 24 1
2 control room log which is marked Page 61 with the date, 3 March 16, 1979, is that correct?
I 4 A That is correct. This would indicate that he 5
was on shift from 1500 that particular day until 2300, 6 and you notice that the only thing that he did all 7 shift, he added 400 gallons of demin water at 1606, f
8 At 1700, that is less than an hour later, he l- 9 added 200 more gallons of demin water. At 1830 he i 10 added 400 gallons. At 1915,. excuse me, he added 100 11 gallons. At 1930 he added 106 gallons. At 2050 he l 12 added 200 gallons. At 2130 he added 200 and then 13 another 200. That is 1800 gallons of water in one 14 shift. Multiply this times three and you have got 5400 15 gallons of demin water a day that they were using.
16 Q This'was as a result of having to make up 1
17 for the losses through the code safeties?
18 A The code safetics , I guess normal le,akage. There 19 are instances in here when they added water from a ;
20 re,ctor coolant bleed tank, which contains Boron, to f
l 21 make up for the Boren that is lost from the leaks, other ]
22 than the code safeties, because it doesn't have any 23 Boron in it.
f I can't remember when I made the evaluation, but 24
')
I 25 I took it back for like a month. and wrote down every i
B CNJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE L . . ..
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l' Hartman 25
.) 2 shift, how much water and what kind of water was being 3 added. I handed it to, I ferget whom. It was a foreman, f
4 And, you know, it was my impression that it was just a 5 big deal and we know, we have the Icak. '
6 I tried to do something about i t'.
7 Q Did you tell them what you thought it meant 8 or why you thought it was important? t 9 A Well, the leaking safety valves to me were an i 10 important part oftheoperationbeckuseyouhad 11 constant dilution or, not dilution, you had a constant 12 increase in Boron concentration, that as long as you i 13
) weren't re ci rcula tin g , the pressurizer was never ending, 14 so that'means that your rods are constantly moving in.
15 So you get into a test procedure, something like i 16 that, you are not'able to pay as much attention to the 17 overall operation of the plant as you wished you could, 18 and you forgot about that. ,
19 Q Let .me ask you, when you have the rods 20 constantly moving in, is that automatic?
21 A Yes, that is automatic.
22
, Q It senses the Boron level and the RCS water 23 inventory adjusts the rod position accordingly?
24
, A It senses neutron power T.F. , and as Boron coi cen-
) 25 tration increases, it tends to slow down the nuclear BENJAMIN REPORTING SERvlCE
1 Hartman 26 2 reaction or tends to speed it up -- I'm sorry. As the 3.6 3 Poron decreases, the concentration in the pressurizer 4 decreases it in the reactor coolant system itself, so 5 that you have to make up for that decrease in poison !
6 or negative reactivity by inserting control rods. l 7
Q That is automatic?
l 8 A That is an automatic function.
9 (There was discussion off the record.)
10 Q Eack on the record.
11 We were just showing you, Mr. Hartman, 12 Page 19 of the transcript of the IEE interview in May 13 1979. I gather there is a reference there on Page 19 I4 of that interview to your going back through the logs 15 and trying to reestablish how much water had been 16 added over a period of time?
17 That is correct.
A 18 Q
In which you are indicating that having 19 done that calculation you came up with the numbers and 20 you took that to one of your foremen or your supervisors 21 and showed it to him?
22 A Yes, that is correct.
23 And his response was, "That is no news. I Q
24 already know it", essentially?
'5 A Yes. That is basically what I got. It is not a B ENJ AMIN R E PO RTIN G S E RVICE
)
i 1 Hartman 27
- 3. 2 quote or anything, but that is what I got out of the
)
3 whole thing. j
_4 I took the paper and went sheepishly back to the 5 desk and continued my daily routine.
- 4 6 Q Do you remember who that fo re nt.n or s upe r-
\
7 visor was? i 8 A No, I really can ' t re me mbe r .
9 Q Do you think it was probably after the )
10 1st of the year of 19797 11 A Yes, it probably was. [
12 Let us go back.
Q You indicated that you 13 were comparing Unit 1 to Unit 2, and you indicated 14 Unit I was a very stable plant and Unit 2 was an oscil-15 lating plant. You mentioned a fair number of factors, 16 of things in Unit" 2 that oscillated. As far as you knew, i
17 were those true oscillations?
18 A I think they were true oscillations,. I don't think 19 that the instrument would oscillate like that. You can 20 even see like on feed flow, you can see the valves 21 outside at the manifold itself actually oscillating. l 22 If you get a valve to oscillate, that is an actual flow 23 oscillation.
24 Q Do you have a recollection of the range, 25 the band within which any of these factors oscillated?
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Ha rtman 28
) Do you have a g 2 For instance, take pressurizer level.
3 recollection of the number of . inches through which it 4 would oscillate?
5 A Pressuri zer level - I recall that didn't o s r. il l a t e 6 too much, maybe plus or minus a couple. The makeup 7 tank level, that was,maybe plus or minus three maybe.
8 Q RC pressure in pounds?
9 A That would swing probably sometimes about 50.
10 Q Plus or minus 50 pounds?
11 A -Yes. -Reactor power, that generally stayed. You 12 could see every time the rods would r.ove, you could see
)- 13 it go up, but' that was just in response to like it is 14 seeing a neutron, because of the Boron leaving the 15 core, and it would bump the rods out to compensate for 16 it.
17 Q How about the reactor coolant drain tank 18 level; you indicated that it was a slow oscillation.
19 h'ere you re ferring to the fact that it would fill up I l
i 20 because of the leaking valves and then you would pump L 21 it down? That was the oscillation you were referring to?
l 22 A Yes.
23 Q Not some jiggling?
24 A Right. There was some recording instrument for 25 that. It was just a meter on a panel that you read.
B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE ,
m 1 Hartman 29
]9 2 Q You indicated that you were getting uniden-3 tified leak ' rates in the band of a half to two and a 4
half, recognizing that it went outside that band from 5 time to time? ,
6 A Yes.
7 Q Let me put the question this way, and you 8 may want to answer it a different way.
9 When you and other control room operators 10 saw the oscillations within that band, one -hal f to 11 two and a half spm unidentified leakage, what was your 12 belief as to the validity of that number? Did you 13 believe that that represented a true unidentified 14 leakage or did you believe that there was something 15 else going on, -that the true unidentified leakage was 16 s ome thing dif fe re'n t , higher or lower?
17 A I don't know what the other fellows thought, but 18 I really didn't have very much faith in what I was 19 reading. I don't know. I can't recall.
20 I think at one point we had taken the data from 21 a leak rate that we had gotten. I don't even want to 22 mention it because I am not sure of what happened. I t 23 k don't even know if we finished the experiment , so I 24 won't even mention it.
25 Q Well, do you want to just go off the record B ENJAMlN REPORTING S ERVICE c s
1
\
30 Hartman 1
2 and supply it to us and see if it is worth pursuing?
3 A Sure.
4 (There was discussion off the record.)
5 Q Let me ask you this question on the record.
doing Do you ever recall you or anyone else 6
7 the hand calculation to a conclusion provided in the 8 procedure?
9 A No, I can't recall.
Q h'ould it be fair to say that if it was done 10 it was very rare, in your experience?
11 12 A Yes.
You said you didn't have much faith in what 13 Q referring to 14 you were getting, and I assume you are 15 th'ese leak rates that were varying up and down through 16 this spectrum of'a half to two and a half gallons that 17 you have described?
Yes.
18 A Are there any other reasons that you didn't 19 Q 20 have faith in that, other than what you have already 21 told us?
That is just the erratic-22 A No, I don't think so.
I couldn't see how one day the plant could have 23 ness.
24 a leak of two and a half gallons a minute, and the next day have six, and 25 day have a half gallon, and the next
]
BENJAMIN R E PO RTIN G SERVICE
l l- Hartman 31 l 2 the next--- I'm saying like within a matter of hours.
} L.11 3 We used to run these things constantly during the 4 midnight shift in which we didn't get a good one. We e
5 would have another one in right away, and they would 6 always cone out. You would never get the first one to 7 be 2.5 and the next'one come out 2.4 and the next one 8 maybe 2.5 again.
9 It was 2.5, 2.2, 2.7. It was always a significant 10- amount as I.can recall. You.know, that is why my faith 11 was not there in what we got as results.
12 Q What about the other control room operators?
13 Do you have any sense of what faith they were putting 14 in or what confidence they had in the results?
15 A No, I don't think I will make a statement on that 16 because that woufd be just conjecture. I coul dn ' t 17 really speak for them.
18 Q For instance, did any of them,ever tell you ]
19 that they just didn't believe what they were seeing?
20 A No, not that I remember.
21 Q Did you have a belief as to what the actual 22 unidentified leak rate was, if you start with the 23 assumption that , " Gee, I don't believe what I'm seeing l 24 here," did you have some sense as to what you thought J-25 it really was?
I
! BENJAMIN REPORTING SERvict t
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1 Hartman 32
).
!) 2 A No, I didn't have enough information to really f 3 make an intelligent guess.
4 Q You have indicated, and you indicated in j 5 some of your statements, that the practice was to run I
\
1 l
6 them repeatedly? {
(4 7 A Yes. ;
1 8 Q What was the reason for that?
9 A Well, it was again hitting the peaks right.
10 Maybe one would fall in, we would get a good one that ;
i 11 we could send to the surveillance data people.
12 Q Is it possible for you to tell me how often l) 13 on the average you would run a Jeak rate test on your 14 shift?
l 15 A I would say on an average we would run it three l 16 or four times. I'm talking about midnight shift.
l? During the daytime we generally couldn't get the 18 computer because they were always doing work with that, 19 that involved the programming.
20 Q This would be on the midnight shift?
21 A Midnight or 3:00 to 11:00 shift, generally most of 22 the leak rates were run.
23 Q Is the midnight shift also referred to as 24 the "mid shift"? !
25 A Right, mid shift.
BCNJAMIN R CPO RTIN G 5tRvlCE f
7 l 1 L
p l 1 *Hartman 33 .;
). . 2 Q So on an average three or four times perhaps 3 during each of those shifts?
4 A Yes, on an average, I would say. l 1
5 Q We are just trying to get a handle on h'ow '
6 many times it may have been run. I Kould you say on a 7
daily basis that you might be looking at, say, 8 to 10
{
8 a day, ball park?
9 A Th at is ball park, probably. That.vould be if it !
10 is our shift. I really don't know how many times the 11 other shif ts did it , but I would assume that they did 12 the same thing.
)
13 Q When you didn't get a good one, what would 14 you do with the printout?
15 A Well, generally I would just show it to the
~
16 foreman and he would crumple it up and throw it in 17 " File 13."
18 Q " File 13" meaning the wastepap.er basket?
19 A Right.
20 Q Was that pretty much the standard practice ,
21 when you did not get a good one, that you would take 22 it to your foreman?
23 A Yes. Well, yes, unless -- we didn't always take 24 it to them. Every once in awhile I took it to him just 25 to make my point again, "You know, look at what we are B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S E RVICE l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
l 1 Hartman 34 2 dealing with here." l 3 "Well, t.ry again. Try again. We have got to 4 have one." That is what I got.
5 You know, I think I remember making or having 6 someone make a comment, "Make sure you destroy those 7 sheets. We don't want them lying around."
8 Q Why would they have said that?
9 A I think they were probably scared that the NRC
.10 would get ahold of them and look at them and they would 11 start asking questions.
12 MR. SMITH: Did anybody ever tell you that
) 13 or is that just your opinion?
14 THE WITNESS: I recall Bernie Smith, 15 he said something to that effect , yes.
16 Q Without going into names at this point, 17 what would be the specific concern if someone in terms 18 of the NRC had seen the bad leak rate test.results? If 19 the NRC saw them, what action might follow that they 20 woul d be concerned about?
21 A Well, if the NRC determined that this leak rate 22 was unacceptable and that the tech spec, I believe, 23 states that if you get an unidentified leak rate greater
} 24 than one gallon per minute that you have to be in hot l 25 shutdown within six hours and cold shutdown within the G E NJ AMIN R E PO RTIN G S E RVICE
1 Hartman 35
) 2 following 36, I believe, which meant that they had to 3 go off the line or progress on down the line in plant
~
4 status, which was that much further away from closing 5 the breakers, so to speak.
6 Q 'So you are saying to us that the concern 7
was that if the bad leak rate test results were made 8
Part of the record and came to the attention of the NRC 9 and they saw it, they would then say, "Why didn't you 10 go into the technical specification and start shutting 11 down because ycu are now outside the tech spec"?
12 A That is cor rect.
13 FfR. ROCKWELL: Let us mark this as Hartman
)
14 Statement Exhibit No. 1.
15 (Document described below was marked 16 Hartman Stitement Exhibit I for identification, 3 17 this date.)
i 18- (Continued on Page 36.)
19 20 21 22 23 I l
24
) 25 l BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE I I
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l 36 1 Hartman
) 2 Referring to what the court reporter has Q
3 marked as Hartman Statement Exhibit 1, do I correctly 4 identify it as the technical specification, TMI Unit 2, 5 reactor coolant system operational, 3.4.6.2 and 6 Associated Surveillance Requirements 4.4.6.2?
I A That is correct.
8 Q You were referring a moment ago to the 9
concern that if a Icak rate test result --
and I assume .
10 we are talking about the computerized printout that 11 you and I are both familiar with, is that correct?
l
A Yes.
13 Q
-- were retained in the file that the NRC, 14 if it came in and reviewed the file, would pick it 15 up and say, "Why didn' t you start closing down the 16 plant?" Is that correct?
II A That is correct.
18 Q Can you show me where in the technical 19 specification that requirement is?
'O A Well, the action statement shows here that --
- l 1et me first show that. There are several leakage 22 criteria that you are not allowed to have any pressure 23 boundary leakage. One gallon per minute is permitted
)
04
~
of identified leakage, which we are dealing with on 5
the computer thing. We have one gallon per minute.
B ENJ AMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
l~
2 1 Hartman 37 2 The total primary and secondary leakage l 3 through the steam Benerator is ten gallons per minute, 4
4 -identified leakage from the reactor coolant system.
.5 Eight gallons per minutes controlled leakage at a 6 reactor coolant system pressure of 2155. The action 7
statement for these requirements says with any pres-8 sure boundary leakage, be in at least hot standby 9 in six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 10 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. So that is any pressure boundary leakage.
11 Let me stop you there for a minute.
Q What 12 is your understanding of the philosophy of the action 13 statement A relating to pressure boundary leakage?
14 I take it they don't permit any?
15 A That is right.
16 Q What ' is the underlying philosophy of that, 17 to your understanding?
18 A Well, to my understanding if you have any 19 pressure boundary leakage -- do you have the defini-20 tions?
21 Q No, I am sorry. We don't.
22 A It is very specific as to what pressure boundary 23 leakage is, and I can't quote it, but-basically it is 24 from first boundary valves back. So, in other words,
)
25 the pressure boundary leakage could be a weld leak.
BcNJAMIN R E PO RTIN G S E RviC E
38 1 Hartman
)'
2 It could be a leakage of a valve packing that goes to 3- a catch tank. Maybe that is'not right.
4 Eut basically it is leakage that cannot 5 be isolated or measured in any way.
6 Q Why is there the concern that there 7 not be any of that?
8 A I don't know, It would be my opinion that you 9 didn't want pressure boundary leakage because you have 10 a fracture, you have something in +5ere that could 11 possibly give way and result an, you know, a pipe 12 failure, which could end up with thousands and thousands
) 13 of gallons being emptied into the reactor building.
14 That is my interpretation of it, that it 15 puts you into the situation that if you do have pres-16 sure boundary leakage, you have got to fix it or you-17 can't operate.
18 Q Okay. Let us go to the B part of the 19 action statement.
20 A With any reactor coolant system leakage greater 21 than any one of the above limits, excluding pressure 22 boundary leaks, and reduced leakage rates within limits l
23 within four hours or be in at least hot standby
) 24 condition within the next six hours and in cold I
25 shutdown within the following 30. So this leakage i BENJAMIN REPORTING S E RVIC E l
1 l' Hartman 39 i
L) 2 rate to within limits, identified leakage, you go 3 down to the makeup valve alley and find a valve packing f
4 that is leaking, and get a mechanic in there. He 5 will tighten down the valve packing and the Icak stops.
6 He will go to another valve and he will do the same 7 thing.
8 I recall them doing that at various times.
9 It wasn't like we went around and left leaks go just i 10 for the sake of leaving them go. We did take care 11 of them when we found them.
12 Q Taking B as a reference point, let us take !
13 the following hypothetical. You have just run a
) !
l 14 leak rate test?
15 A Right.
16 Q You come back with a 2gpm unidentified 17 leakage, which is within the range of results that 18 you have described. What is your understanding as i 19 to what you would do next in light of that technical 20 specification requirement?
21 A Provided that the Jeak rate that I have got was '
22 done per the procedure, my impression is that within 23 four hours you either have to reduce leakage rate 24 within four hours, so that would be the first thing 25 to do, and go out and find the leaks and repair them B ENJAMIN REPORTING S E RVIC E
_.__m _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .
1 11a rtman 40 2 and'come in, calculate another leak rate, and if this 3 came out greater than one gallon per minute, then 4
you would have to be in hot standby within the next i
5 six hcurs.
6 And that time clock would start running Q
7 from the time that you received your unidentified 8
leak rate, the hypothetical 2 gpm?
9 This was always a confusing thing to me, time A
10 I don't know what the interpretation is. I clocks.
II I have heard so many that I don't know. I don't really I
12 know when it would start.
13 Q If I was to look at it and interpret it, 14 I would say that you have a total of ten hours to 15 fix the leaks, and if you couldn't fix them, then you 16 p
would have to be in hot standby. If you were in 17 hot standby within six hours, then you have 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> 18 f to get in cold shutdown. .
19 Q To your knowledge, how often, when your 20 shift or any other shift got an unidentified leak
l '
above 1 gpm, would somebody be sent out to look for !
29 an unidentified leak and try to identify it, in order 23 to reduce it? Kas that a matter of routine?
24 A No, not that I can recall. It might have been o
~
done by the foreman, you know, because he didn't tell B E NJ AMIN R E PO RTIN G SERVICE J
i Hartman 41
) 2 me verything. He may have gone out to an operator 3 and said, "Come with me and let us to look for leaks." (
)
4 I d n't know that.
5 TVhat I do know though is that every once 6 in a while it went in spurts. Like I remember one spurt 7 where they would have a pile of sheets where there 8 were identified leaks, and there were various valves, 9 MUV-17, for example, leaking at approximately .6 gallons 10 per minute as determined by a stop watch and a gradu-
); ated flask, and then that leakage from all the sheets 12 w uld be added up and subtracted or added in as identi-13 fied leakage, in which normally the identified leakage 14 w uld be the reactor coolant drain tank level change.
15 That was every once in a while, not very often, that 16 we w uld do that.
17 Q Can you give me any feel? Obviously you 18 are speaking from your own experience here. Would 19 it have been done 10 percent of the time, more or 20 less?
21 A Yes, I guess 10 percent.
22 Q I have no idea. I just picked that 23 number out of the air.
24 A I don't know. I don't know what you could 25 base the 10 percent on.
GENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVIC E
1 Hartman 42
). 2 Q Of the total number of leak rate results 3 that were above 1 gpm, would it be your sense from 4 your' experience that somebody was actually sent out 5 to look for unidentified leaks, and therefore, identify j i
6 them one time out of ten, five times out of ten?
7 Do yc,u have any sense of that or you don't know?
8 A I don't have any sense for it.
9 Q But your sense is that it was not a matter 10 of routine?
i 11 A Right. I 12 MR. FITZMAURICE: Off the record.
)
13 (Discussion held off the record.)
14 Q Let us go back on the record.
15 Mr. Hartman, when you had these unidentified 16 leak rates, ontbeonehand,thatwereabove1gpm, 17 and, on the other hand, you weren't entirely trustful, 18 and maybe you were completely distrustful.of the 19 results, what was your understanding as to how you 20 could make an intelligent decision, and that is a 21 collective "you" -- I don't mean you necessarily 22 personally -- as to whether or not to shut the plant 23 down?
24 A Well, that was a decision that didn't rest with
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25 me. It rested with the supervisors, and then the BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERvict
1 Hartman k 43 1
} 2 supervisor, of course, had to take it further on up 1 3
to the supervisor of operations, and I assume to the ;
4 plant superintendent.
- I guess they had big caucuses 5 every once in a while in their little ccnfererra 6
room, and then that would be where the decision was 7
to be made, I guess.
8 Q Did they have caucuses about this problem, 9 to your knowledge?
10 A I can only conjecture and say that they did.
11 Q But you don't know?
12 A I don't know for sure.
13 Q h'as there a cicar cut understanding or 14 policy as to who had authority to shut the plant down 15 and whose decision it was?
16 A I think the ultimate responsibility lay with 17 the shift supervisor. He was the one that was basically 18 in charge of the plant at all times, and he was the 19 one that was responsible for the safety of the plant.
20 He was responsible for maintenance. He was responsible 21 for everything that was involved in the plant, security, 22 work by contractors.
So I would say that the ultimate 23 responsibility would be the shift supervisor's. He i
24 would have to answer to someone above.
) 25 f
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
E i
1 Hartman 44
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6-1 2 Q Did you ever have any discussion with any 3 of your foremen and shift supervisors about this 4 particular problem and what to do about it -- on the 5 one hand, you have these rates that are above the 6 tech spec limits, that you are getting bad rates, and .)
7 on the other hand, you have got this tech spec require-8 ment that requires you to shut down, and how to handle 9 that? Did you ever have any discussion about that?
)
10 A Sure. b'e used to, whenever I would get a bad 1 11 leak rate, you know, I would show it to him and say, l
12 "h'e have got problems. I ran three of them tonight, l
) 13 and three of them came out bad. So what should I do?" )
l 14 One supervisor told me, "I f you have to , . type it 15 out, you know," and maybe he was joking, maybe he 16 said that in a joking manner. But, you know, it is a 17 serious problem, and you know, being an operator and 18 conscientious, I don't want to make any waves. So i
19 that is what happened. l 20 You know, I didn't do that, but anyway you can--
l 21 we found that by adding a little hydrogen to the
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22 makeup tank during the computer data collection, that i 23 you could get a good one, h'h y , I don't know, but that ,
l 24 was one of the tricks that was used. }
)
25 Q Okay.
B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S E Rv6 C E l
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w '
'Ns g Hartman 45 UIh
^1 62 A 2 I just assumed you do these things on the sly, {
s 3 it is not obvious, but that everyone knew we were g
'y 4 doing this to get good ones. "
5 Q Let us talk about the hydrogen. How did 6 you discover that hydrog'en had an effect on the leak 7 rate results?
A 8 I think I found out from the other shift operator.
9 I couldn't tell you who it was., but I think we were 10 discussing the problem and, you know, how do you get jj good ones, and he said, "Well, we add a little hydrogen 12 to the makeup tank, and it generally comes out."
13 Q Did he indicate to you, whoever that was,
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14 that he understood why adding hydrogen had an effect?
15 A No, not that I can recall, 16 Q Did you know of any other techniques for 17 helping bring the unidentified leakage rate down?
18 A Well, we added water to the makeup tank, 19 Q Adding water?
20 A That was fairly easy to do.
21 Q Were there any others that you knew of? ,
22 A There was another way of doing it, and that 23 would have been prior to April 18, when we had to 24 shut down -- I should say, let me rephrase it --
) 25 prior to the computer change, where we had to go down B ENJAMIN REPORTING S ERvict
46 1
Hartman h 2 and get the voltages, you could enter a larger dif-3 ferential voltage that would show more identified 4
leakage to be subtracted from total Icakage. I don't 5
know if for a fact it was done. I have never done i t, 6
but it seems to me that would be a way.
7 Q Since that was a number which you read ;
8 manually, someone could just adjust the number?
9 A Yes, to reflect not a number that is being 10 read, but some slightly different number.
Q And affect the results that way?
11 12 A Yes.
) 13 Q Do you think that is a potential way it 14 could have been done?
15 A Potentially, yes.
16 Q Do y6u know of any other ways whereby the 17 results of the unidentified leak rate test would be 18 affected?
[
19 A No, not really, except what I indicated earlier, 20 when he said, "Why don't you type up a good one."
2] Q h' hat did he mean by " type up a good one"? ,
[.
22 Basically, make it up?
f* 23 A Yes, just use this format. That is all I assumed,
]
24 and I can only assume he was being facetious. I don't j
25 think he was really said when he said to actually B E NJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
___m____m___ __. ____m____ _ _ _ _ ____ ._ _ J
j Hartman 47 6.4 2 do that.
)
3 Q Let us go'back to the hydrogen. Maybe it 4 would be good to pull out the procedure here.
5 (Document described below was marked 6 Hartman Statement Exhibit.2.)
7 Q As I indicated before we took a break, let 8, us go to the hydrogen question. You have indicated 9 that you were told that adding hydrogen would affect 10 the results. Did you crer do that and verify that 33 that was the case?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Was that a common practice among all CR0s
)- 14 as far as you knew?
15 A As far as I knew, yes, it was fairly common.
16 Q And it was at least common on your shift?
17 A Yes.
18 Q What was the practice with respect to 19 logging' additions of hydrogen? Were you required to 20 log in a control room log hydrogen additions?
21 A Yes, I think we were. I don't know if it was 22 required or not. I really don't know.
23 Q Was there any particular time during the 24 test that it was better to add the hydrogen?
25 A No. We used to do it toward the end, about ten
)
BENJAMIN R C PO RTIN G S CRvict
48 Hartman
/5 2 minutes before.
Q And again, that was just a matter of 3
4 experience?
A Sure.
5 Q
Were you able to determine how much 6
For instance, would 7
effect it had on the 2ca'k rate?
8 you ever get a negative number after you added hydrogen?
9 A That I can't recall. No, I can't recall whether In fact, sometimes when you added 10 we did or not.
hydrogen, they wouldn't always come out, but you had 3) a better chance of getting a good one if you added it.
. 12 Q
Was there any speculation in the control 13 room or among any of the control room operators as to 14 15 why adding hydrogen had a result?
16 A Apparently; it is my opinion that there is a difference in the pressure on top of the hydrogen and 37 the way pressure inside the tank affected the IcVel 13 circuit.
Somehow, by putting more pressure on top of 39 the water inside the makeup tank, it would cause the 20 to sce a higher level, and if it saw a ,
21 instrument 22 higher level, that meant thiat not as much water left
. )
23 that tank. l 24 Q Was there one level indicator in the tank?
A There was two, as I recall.
25
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B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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1 Hartman 49 1 i
6/6 2 Q And would it have an effect on both of them <
)' r one of them, do you know?
3 4 A Well, they had a recorder, and the'other: channel 5 went to the computer. The non-selected' channel went to 6 the computer, and it would affect, as far as I know, 7 both the same.
8 Q You didn't have to select one particular 9 channel in order to get the results, as far as you knew?
10 A. No, In fact, I remember -- that might have been another trick we used. 12 Q What was that? 13 A That I heard about, I should say.
..) 14 Q Okay.
15 A If there is a difference of, say, a couple of 16 inches, which was within tolerance, between Level 17 Circuit I and Level Circuit 2, you could select the 18 lowest reading at the onset of the test, and then at
.19 some time after the computer gathers its Time Zero 20 data, switch over to the higher indication. If it was 21 two inches different, that was about 60 gallons of 22 coolant that the computer wouldn't see as being gone.
23 Q In fact, it would see it as being present 24 when in fact it was not present?
,) ' 25 A Yes.
B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
h I Hartman 50 I h' 2 Q Thereby reducing your unidentified leakage? 3 A Yes, j 4 Q If y u.had as much as 60, that would reduce , 5 it by I? 3 6 A One gallon per minute, q 7 Q Did you ever try that to see if it worked? 8 A Not that I can remember. I may have, but I don't 9 remember. In fact, I remember, I guess, both of the 10 levels were pretty much, pretty close most of the time, 31 so that if it entered into my mind to try it to check 12 it out and it was negligible, that it probably would L)' 13 not have any effect on the end results. 14 Q In your experience, did the differential 15 between the two level indicators from the makeup tank 16 and the addition of hydrogen have any correlation? 17 Did the differential increase or decrease with the 18 addition of hydrogen? 19 A The differential between the two? 20 Q The level indicators. 21 A No. , 22 Q Let us go to the procedure which we have 23 now marked as Exhibit 2. Let me identify it correctly 24 for the record, h'e are referring to TMI Unit 2, 25 Surveillance Procedure 301-3DI, that happens to be BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICC
( l' y, 3 Hartman 51 ~ 2 dated January 14, 1980, Revision 4, which obviously was
-)6/8 3.
n t the one in use at the time, but I believe that 4 the actual. narrative part of the procedure is pretty l 5 much the s ame. There are Revisions 0, 1, 2, and 3, 6 and this is Revision 3, which was implemented ; 7 February 5, 1979. We will take the narrative part of 8 the procedure,which reflects only through Revision 3, 9 as the procedure that we are referring to here, okay? 10 A Okay. 13 Q Was there, to your knowledge, any prohi-12 bition in that procedure on adding hydrogen during 13 the leak rate test?
') 14 A No, you could do that.
15 Q Were you required to record it in any way? 16 With respect to the test, was there any entry in 17 terms of putting it into the computer, where you had 18 -to record it? 19 A Record what? 20 Q The addition of hydreogen. 21 A No, I don't think so. 22 Q So when you were running the leak rate 23 test, if you added hydrogen, your understanding was 24 there was no requirement anywhere in the procedure
) 25 that.you had to make a record of the addition or had BENJAMIN R EPO RTh J G SERVICE
1 Hartman 52-f 2 to account for it in the running of the test? 3 A Right. 4 Q You indicated earlier that you don't recall 5 whether you were required to record it in the CR0 log? 6 A That is correct. I don't think that was really 7 necessary to record. I think it was just a convenience 8 thing. In fact, there is a lot of stuff here that they 9 never have to record or enter into the log. 10- Q Let us refer to Part 3 of the procedure, 11
- " Limits and Precautions," and subsection 3.1, which 12 reads,." Avoid addition or removal of water from the 13 reactor coolant and makeup system during this test.
) 14 The following operations should not be conducted 15 during this test: (a) makeup or chemical addition 16 to the makeup syttem." 17 To your understanding, would hydrogen have been 18 classified as e chemical? . 19 A No. I 1 (Continued on Page 53.) 20
- 21 22
) - ) 23 24
. 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Hartman 53
).lew 2 Q What about to:the understanding of other u
3 control room operators, as far as you know? . 4 A As far as I know, no, they didn't think it was a t_ e 5 chemical. I think when they refer to " chemical '~~ b= 6 addition" here, there is a system that has tanks, and r 7 you can add caustic, hydroxide, lithium bydroxide or =- E
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8 boric acid, and that is what the " chemical addition" L_ 9 re fe rs to. _ _ 10 Q Was there ever any discussion among the F 11 control room operators once this technique of affecting L n-12 the leak rate test procedure became known of whether or :- 13 not the addition of hydrogen would or would not be b 14 prohibited by 3.1A? 15 A No, not that I can recall.
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16 Q Why would you add hydrogen to the makeup 17 tank from the point of view of anything other than the , 18 leak rate procedure? What were the real reasons for 19 adding hydrogen? 20 A The main reason we added hydrogen to the makeup 21 tank was to provide an overpressure on that tank, so -
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22 that you keep an inventory of hydrogen gas dissolved in 23 the reactor coolant. 24 What this did was when the water went to the core,
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25 a gamma radiation flux of that intensity, it was - B ENJ AMIN R E PO RTI N" S ERVICE ___ _-m__-- _~ - _ - . - _ _ - . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - - - - - - - ' - - ' ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - " - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - " - - ' " - - - --
1 Hartman 54 2 2 intended to recombine free oxygen which causes corrosion 3 and the hydrogen. So obviously if you can step up one 4 side of a chemical equation, it is going to tend to go 5 for the other side more completely. The r e fo re , the end 6 result was keeping your oxygen leve: to a minimum in 7 the RCS, minimizing general cor:osion. 8- Q What standard would you look to in order , 9 to determine when to add hydrogen? 10 A There was a graph that was posted right on the 11 side of the makeup pressure yes -- makeup take pres-12 sure instrument, that showed you a pressure versus 13 level graph. 14 How would you interpret that? It would be Q 15 p re s s ure . What kind of pressure? 16 A It was hydrogen pressure versus makeup tank level. , 17 And by J ooking at that graph, you could Q 18 then determine whether or not to add hydrogen? 19 A Correct. 20 There was a specified minimim on that graph Q l >- 21 that you were supposed to stay above? 22 A I can't reall if there was a minimum. I believe 23 the minimum came from Chemistry, when they did their "4 chemical analysis . 25 We generally kept an overpressure, as I can recall, B ENJ AMlN REPORTING S ERVIC E
1 Hartman 55 i
)7, 3 2 around'18 pounds. That depends upon level also, but 1 3 generally it was around 18 pounds.
4 The' Chemis t ry Department would call up and say,
.r
- 5. " Total hydrogen. concentration in the RSA is a'little 6 low," and we would increase the overpressure. We 7 basically -- the only limit we h'ad as far as pressure 8 inside the tank was an upper limit. That was based on, 9 I can't even remember, LOCA, scaething to do with LOCA.
10 I can't remember. 11 Q Do I understand you correctly that while 12 you had this graph next to the makeup tank level indi-13 cator, you actually added hydrogen only.when you got a
)-
14 call from Chemistry saying to add some? 15 A Yes, generally, or we would get a band to main-16 tain it, you know, maintain it 15 to 38, or make sure 17 it is above 15, or something like that. And if we 18 observed that it was getting down to the limit, we could 19 add it and bring it up to the upper part of our operating 20 limit. 21 Q So the addition of hydrogen, apart from 22 adding it during the leak rate test procedure to affect 23 the result, would be either you saw it getting below l . 24 the band, which you knew it would normally be maintained 25 within, or you would receive a call or a note from BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE L__ __ _ 1._.
i Hartman 56 1 i l .4 2 ' Chemistry saying, "please add so much hydrogen" or 3
"Please' bring the hydrogen overpressure up to such-and- l 4 such a number"? 1 5 A Right. l
'I It could be done either way? 1 6 Q 7 A Yes. !
i 8 Q Do you recall how often generally hydrogen i 9 was added for reasons other than affecting the leak i 10 rate test procedure? I hardly ever did it. There were some things 11 A 12 that some shifts were more conscientious about and, 13 therefore, they did them. 14 One hydrogen addition might last'for days, and I 15 then they would notice it again and they would do it, 16 There was a lot o'f things that certain shif ts would a i 17 key up on and they would do them, and nobody else got ! 18 a chance to. , , i 19 Q Do you understand what e f fe ct the hydrogen 20 would have, that is, the addition of hydrogen would . 21 have -- and I'm talking about whenever you added it -- ; 22 on the water temperature in the makeup tank? Would it 23 have any effect on the water temperature? l 24 A If it did, I think it would be minimal. 25 Q And the pressure in the makeup tank? I
]
57 6 Hartman 1 A Minimal. You just have to add it, just a couple of seconds,10 seconds or so. - 3 4 Q It would have minimal pressure effect in 5 the makeup tank? - 6 A Yes. 7 Q How about the water level in the makeup 8 tank? R-9 A 1 don't even ever recall seeing any blips on the 10 chart. m 11 Q Was it clear to you in working in the control t 12 room that it was common knowledge that the addition of 13 hydrogen during the running of a leak rate test would
)
14 affect the result? e 15 A Yes, I think so. _. 16 Q And that it would be common knowledge to E I? the control room operators, is that correct? L 18 A Yes. .
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19 Q And common knowledge to the foreman? 20 A That I don't know. 21 Q How about to the supervisor? 22 A I don't know that either. I would imagine that 23 they knew, but I don't know for sure. 24 Q Did you ever discuss the fact that it would
~) have an effect on the leak rate test with any of your 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Hartman 58
) ,.6 2 foremen or your supervisors?
3 A- No, not that I can recall. 4 Q Do you know whether any other control room 5 operator indicated to you that they had discussed the 6 influence of hydrogen during leak rate test on the 7 result with a foreman or a supervisor? 8 A No. 9 Q As between the adding of hydrogen and the 10 other techniques of affecting the leak rate test 11 results, do you have any sense as to how often you used 12 the hydrogen addition to affect the results, as 13 compared to the other ways of affecting it? 14 A On our shift, it would be -- the only thing that 15 I could think of would be probably -- well, we didn't
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16 do too many of them. The last month we kind of tried 17 to put it off because obviously we weren't getting 18 anywhere with our concerns. So we turned in leak rates, 19 at least I did, very seldom. So I didn't -- hydrogen 20 was the big thing, I guess. I don't ever recall adding 21 water or anything like that. 22 So at least with respect to your shift,
. Q 23 hydrogen was the most common technique to use to affect 24 the result?
25 A I would say so. BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1
- Hartman 59 i 2
f) 7. 7.' Q Do you kntaw when you learned that hydrogen 1 3 would affect the leak rate result in time? 4 A I sure don't. The relationship of time is very l 5 bad with me. A 6 Q Can we get any kind of ball park? Do you J 7 think you would have known about that for three or l 8 four months before the accident? 9 A Probably, yes. Three or four months sounds'like 10 that is about ball park. 11 Q So that the'latter part of the fall of '78? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Something like that? 14 A Yes, after we went up and finished power testing. 15 Q Did you have any understanding of why 16 adding it 10 minutes before the end of the test was II better or worse than any 'other time? 18 A No. - 19 Q I meant'.to say 10 minutes before the 'end 20 of the test. 21 A No. I guess really it wasn't that it necessarily 22 made it better, but that that was when I added it was 23 10 minutes be fore , and that I stuck with that, not that 24 there might not be a "better time to add it". I don't 25 know. B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERvlCE
i I 60 f Hartman 1 2 Q You indicated another way of influencing 7,8 3 the text result was by adding. water.
}
4 (There was discussion off the record.) 5 (Document described below was marked ) 6 Hartman Statement Exhibit 3 for identification , c 7 this date.) 8 Q Did you want to add anything? 9 A No. 10 Q If you want to go back at any point to add l or clarify anything, feel free,
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11 12 A Okay.
) Referring you now to what we marked as 13 Q 3, this is something that 14 Hartman Statement Exhibit No.
15 we have -- not I personally, but one of the fellows who 16 is working in the' technical analysis of this -- has put It is titled, l 17 together. It is dated April 22, 1980. 18 " Logged Hydrogen Additions versus Hydrogen, Concentration l 19 in Reactor Coolant," and then it plots hydrogen addi-tion versus days. h'e are showing basically the period 20 21 of time from February of 1979 into March of 1979, then 22 we are also showing the time that hydrogen was added of hydrogen 23 as recorded in the CR0 Log, the amount , 24 overpressure in the makeup tank and the shift on which 25 it was done, and the control room operator who recorded
, B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVtCE a-
1 Hartman 60-a
) ~2 the fact of having added hydrogen in the control room 3 log. We will get to the second page in a minute. But f
4 the record should reflect that this is a two-page
- i 5 Exhibit, and we are referring now only to the first 6 page. If- you would like to take a moment and look at 7 it, I want to ask you some, questions about it. If you 8 want to take a moment to look at it, please do, or I 9 can proceed right away.
10 A Go ahead. 11 (Continued on following page.) 12
)
14 15
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16 17 18 , 19 20 21 + 22 4 23 24 l ) > 2s B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
A,Y g- 1 Hartman 62 '? ; w 2 just an opinion. 3 Q I recognize that. ; 4 A Based on that information that Ted IIljes does -- N" i
.5 I hate to use the term " clutter," but he does tend i
6 to overlog things, and he logs every little thing. 7 I would imagine that if hydrogen addition.would show 8 up as a C Shift thing, you know, that is probably why 9 the NRC came up with that conclusion. 10 Q Do you have any reason to believe that 11 C Shift used hydrogen during Leak Rate Tests, in fact, 12 any more often than anyone else? 13 A I wouldn't know. I would have to really know I
) 14 a ratio of how many shifts got good leak rates. '
15 Q Let me ask you this. The NRC analysis ' 16 said they found,' based on the record, eight times when l Does that 17 hydrogen was added during a Leak Rate Test. 18 strike you as the actual number of times that hydrogen 19 was added during Leak Rate Tests? I 20 A Boy, that sounds awfully low.. -] 21 Q Would it be your sense it was much higher? 1 22 A I would say it would be much higher. 23 Q Is the explanation the fact that it simply 24 wasn't logged other times when it was added during
) 25 tests?
B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERvlCE
. . gi er
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l 1 l l 1 Hartman 63
) ? A I would assume so.
3 Q Is there any other explanation that you
)
4 i can think of? 5 A No, except that it is just very hard to sift 6 through that and get-that information without'having 7 something concrete in a log book. i
)
8 Q Is there any other way that it would be 9 possible to detect the addition of hydrogen, other 10 than by going to the log book, to your knowledge? 11 A Not and get a definite time, I don't believe. I 12 I am not sure what the daily station logs show. I 13 don't-think makeup tank pressure is on there, but it
.)
14 might be helpful if you could find a copy of the 15- station daily log that comes out of the computer.and 16- see if makeup tank pressure is there. I don't think 17 it is, but then it might be wrong. 18 Q How do things get recorded in,the station 19 daily log? 20 A It is a computer printout. 21 Q Who records it or is that something that 22 is read by computer? 23 A Well, it is a program that they have in there, 24 that every hour it says to printout the following 25 parameters. What we would do at the end of the day BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE l I
61 Hartman 8 1 Q There also is a line here shown as . f 2 3 15 pounds of overpressure, which is designated here as the mininum hydrogen concentration by the procedure. 4 5 A Okay. Q Then this plot shows the hydrogen going 6 down below that and up and down and then it is parted , 7 8 against various shifts.. One of the allegations or one of the conclusions that the NRC has tentatively ad-9 vanced its investigation is that there was a high 10 correlation between the addition of hydrogen and 11 the C Shift during Icak rate tests. If you look at 12 13 this, you will see that there was a high correlation to C Shift. We are wondering if you can help us 14 15 shed any light on whether, in fact, C Shift was the or 16 only one adding hydrogen during Leak Rate Tests, 17 whether it may have been that C Shift was the only 18 shift logging it as being added? . 19 A I don't know whether I can answer that because I know Ted 111jes and what he logs, and he logs 20 21 everything, I nean absolutely everything. Maybe it : 22 would just be that he has got Joe conditioned to 23 record all the stuff also, and it is possible that 24 it could just be that these fellows were logging it 25 more frequently than others. I don't know. That is
*i B E NJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVIC E
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h?h 2 1 Hartman 62 tif just an opinion. YI 2 3:
). Of?
3 Q I recognize that. - 4 A Based on that information that Ted 111jes does -- 5 I hate to use the term " clutter," but he does tend 6 to overlog things, and he logs every little thing. 7 I would imagine that if hydrogen addition would show 8 up as a C Shift thing, you know, that is probably why 9 the NRC came up with that conclusion. 10 Q Do you have any reason to believe that 11 C Shift used hydrogen during Leak Rate Tests, in fact, 12 any more often than anyone else? 13 A I wouldn't know. I would have to really know
) 14 a ratio of how many shifts got good leak rates.
15 Q Let me ask you this. The NRC analysis 16 said they found," based on the record, eight times when 17 hydrogen was added during a Leak Rate Test. Does that 18 strike you as the actual number of times that hydrogen 19 was added during Leak Rate Tests? 20 A Boy, that sounds awfully low. . 21 Q h'ould it be your sense it was much higher? 22 A I would say it would be much higher. 23 Q Is the explanation the fact that it simply 24 wasn't logged other times when it was added during
) 25 tests?
i BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
Hartman 63 1 ) 2. A I would assume so. 3 Q Is there any other explanation that you 4 can think of? 5 A No, except that it is just very hard.to sift j 6 through that and get that information without having 7 something concrete in a log book. i 8 Q Is there any other way that it would be j 9 possible to detect the addition of hydrogen, other 10 than by going to the log book, to your knowledge? 11 A Not and get a definite time, I don't believe. 12 I am not sure what the daily station logs show. I 13 don't think makeup tank pressure is on there, but it } 14 might be helpful if you could find a copy of the ! 15 station daily log that comes out of the computer.and f 16 see if makeup tank pressure is there. I don't think l 17 it is, but then it might be wrong. f 18 Q How do things get recorded in,the station 19 daily log? I 20 A It is a computer printout. , i Who records it or is that something that 21 Q is read by computer? 22 I j 23 A Well, it is a program that they have in there, i j 24 that every hour it says to printout the following
)
25 parameters. What we would do at th'e end of the day B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTf N G S ERVIC E
? Hartman 64 1
)- 2 w'ould be to renove the package, so to spenk, and 3 staple it together and send it down to the nucicar A 4 engineers, who would then go over the data. I don't I
5 know what they did with it, but they reviewed it and 6 got whatever. data they required from it. f 7 Q And the suggestion you are making is that 8 it is possible that the station daily log was pro-9 grammed to read makeup tank pressure? 10 A Right. That could be observed every hour as I 11 long as the computer was working. 12 Q And if it was programmed to make that reading?
} 13 14 A- Right.
15 Q Do you know whether it was? 16 A I don't kn6w for sure. I know you could read 1 17 makeup tank pressure on the computer. It was one 18 of the things that the computer looked at,, but whether 19 it logged it in the station log, I don't know. 20 There were two sets of logs that came out 21 of it. There was a long set that came out at midnight, ( 22 and it contained a 24-hour period, and I can't remember 23 if this particular log just made a synopsis of the 24 station daily log as it was recorded, or whether 25 there were additional parameters associated with this B ENJ AMIN R E PO RTING S ERVICE
f Hartman 65 I
) 2 extra midnight printout. I don't know.
3 So if you just look at it, one whole 4 complete day and see if makeup pressure wculd be 5 found on there, then you could, if it was, at least l l 6 narrow it down to the closest hour. 7 Q And do you think that you would be able 8 to tell, or soncone who was knowledgeable about these 9 kinds of things would be able to tell from the station 10 daily log if it were recording makeup tank pressure 11 each hour that hydrogen had been added? 12 A I think so. 13 Q It would show up? 14 A Yes, I think so. 15 Q What kind of a pressure chain would you 16 be looking for? " 17 A Kell, like I said, when I added it, I saw very little, but that was my technique. You know, perhaps 18 19 another guy might increase it a pound or two pounds, 20 and that would definitely be able to be detected and 21 shown. 22 Like I said, I don't know if it is on 23 there or not. I guess it is a long shot, but I can't 24 think of any other place where you could find it. 25 Q Going back to this NRC analysis of 8 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S E RVIC E
4 1 Hartman 66 2
) correlations that they have made between the addition 3
of hydrogen and the running of the leak rate test, 4 with respect to your shift alone, which is not 5 C Shift, correct? 6 A Yes. 7 Q h'ould you say that hydrogen was entered 8 at least eight times and perhaps many more times 9 during a leak rate test during your. shift a]one? 10 A h'ithin what period of time? Il Q The whole period of time when hydrogen 12 was being added. 13
. A Yes, probably eight.
14 Q Do you have any information one way or 15 the other as to what other shift, besides yours and 16 C Shift, would have been doing? 17 A No, not really. 18 Q Do you ever recall talking about the 19 frequency of using hydrogen to affect the Leak Rate 20 Test with anybody on any ot}}