ML20237G897

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Applicant Exhibit A-1A,consisting of 850905 Vol Vi(J) to TMI-2 Reactor Coolant.... Vol Consists of Witness Statements from T Mulleavy,D Olson,I Porter,W Potts,M Ross, F Scheimann,J Seelinger,M Shafer,R Sieglitz & B Smith
ML20237G897
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/08/1986
From: Stier E
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., STIER, E.H.
To:
References
LRP-A-001A, LRP-A-1A, NUDOCS 8708140247
Download: ML20237G897 (629)


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                    -REACT 0R            C00LANT                                                                          I TESTING LI N V.E N T 0 R Y       B A L'A N 0-E-                                                                          l PREPARED FOR                                                                         -

GPU NUCLEAR CORP. i

                                                                                                                     ,J 1

i BY , EDWIN H. STIER INVESTIGATIVE STAFF:

                        ' FREDERICK P. DE VESA ROBERT T. WINTER SEPTEMBER 5, 1985 i

VOLUME VI (J) WITNESS STATEMENTS: Mulleavy - Smith l I

1. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

MULLEAVY, T110 MAS 3/5/85 Stier Investigation 1 1

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l l l IN RE: TMI II LEAK RATE TEST PRACTICES l l DEPOSITION OF THOMAS L. MULLEA_H  ; i l l Verbatim transcript of' deposition I held at Trailer 1108, Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania, on Tueaday, March 5, 1985 1:20 p.m.

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APPEARANCES: , l EDWIN H. STIER, ESQUIRE 333 Littleton Road Suite 102 Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 BY: ROBERT T. WINTER, ESQUIRE For - GPU Nuclear 1 C APITAL CIW REPORDNG SEINICE iown o mwa mar 4 sTATo: HAIN19ef A3 W 17108 1[LUADtk ?33 3614

l' i n fi 2 MR. WINTER: My name is Bob Winter. I

                         ,lam'workingwithEdStier.                                    We have been retair.ed by the 1

i company to do an independent investigation of leak rate test practices at Unit 2 as they existed in 1978 and 1979, up until the accident. My questionr. to you today will be primarily about your job responnibilitien , the responsibilities of people who worked under you and, more particularly, what were the practices with respect to evaluating leakage innide t.he Reactor Building. THOMAS L. MULLEAVY, having been l} duly sworn, was called as a wit-ness and testified an follows: i DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. WINTER: I Q Could you give your full name for the ' record? l A Thoman L. Mulleavy. Q What was your position, Tom, in 1978 and 1979? q i A The Radiation Protection Supervisor. ) Q What is your present position? i I C ANT AL CITY REPORTING SERVIG e n wa n ,.3w: :4 , lgA4b}P, 'A ~agp j 13 fr

                   ,                                                                         3 A     My present' position.is a Radiological Engineer.

Q With respect to your position as a Radia-tion Protection Supervisor, what did that entail? A It entailed running the Radiation Protection Program that we had at the time. We called our group the Health Physics Group. We were responsible for radiation protection i in the plant which dealt with survey work, monitoring beta gamma levels, neutron levels, alpha, contamination, providinn RWP's for the workers and monitoring their work inside of radiation areas.

                 )

Q To whom did you report? A Richard Dubiel. Q Who worked under your supervision? A At the time, we had four foremen and I believe twenty-four technicians. Q Did a Mr. Thompson work under your super-vision? A Yes. Q What was his position? A He was a Health Physics Technician. Q How about a Mr. Buckholder? I A Buckholder, I don't recall the name. c ANl AL CITY RtPORilNG SERVICE mx ne ot tu Ar svaAu stars ti %%SifC C, P A INOS

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b 4 e Il Buckholder or Burkholder? i Q On the RR- here, it could very well be Burkholder. A Ken, yes. Q Did he work under you? A Yes. Q Could you explain to me more specifically how you would monitor dosage levels received by people who had to from time to time enter the Reactor Building? A First.of all, if there was a job to go into the Reactor Building, the individuals would come to

 )    the Health Physics Department.                    At the time we called it the Health Physics Department because that was the name.

They would come down to the office and we would go over the job they were going to do. 1C a Health Physics Technician was to go along with the job, there would be a briefing with the group. The Hadiation Work Permit would be filled out ahead of time and would have been signed by the Shift l Supervisor. First of all, the Foreman would si6n it. The l Operations, Supervisor would sign it. The Operations Super-visor would keep a copy. The original copy came back to the Health Physics Department. One copy went with the 1 ( Alll AL Clli REPORilNG :,tRVICE l i DYO8 Eh At 5JU AM 5' A %" t( AF L't$Pi tk G P A l'OR

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5 j l I individuals on the , job. { l if we were going to allow them to perform I 1 l that specific work, we would set up the protective clothing ] l that was going to be required. We would set up the instru-

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ments they were going to take along with them, either per-sonally or the Technician would carry them with him. Then it would be determined at that time i whether they were going to have'a Health Physics man along with them, and then they would go and do the Job. 1 Q Under what circumstances would it be necessary for them to have a Health Physics man along with

                         )   them?

A I f it were a high radiation area. A hir.h radiation area defined here is anything greater than one 7 hundred millirern per hour, wherc 'an individual could receive greater than that. .i Q What would be the purpose of a Health Physico man accompanying the people who were going to enter the radlation aren? l l A lie would. Monitor those individ" t's to rrh sure that they didn't enter into an area that was away fron the plan that they had conc up with ahead of time, and to make sure that they didn't get busy with their own work and maybe make a mistake and get into an area that was a high ( Al'lI AL Clh RIPORTING SERVICE cos i9cs . m iut no una [il l k]W + iA i'% is F e , c 71 4 ,, ____.____________________m

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        ,      radiation area.

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      ,;                           His job was to provide the radiological 3]coveragethattheyrequiredtokeeptheirexposureslow.
          ;I Q      Was it part of their responsibility to ad-vise people how long they could stay in this specific area?

A Yes. If the stay titne was set up ahead of time, he would monitor that stay time. lie would monitor the actual tine that they spent in an area, usually with a stop-watch. Q How would a determination be made that a specific time period was all that could be spent in a parti- I l cular area? A Judging by what the individuals had left for an exposure for the week. At that time I believe we were operating at three hundred millirem per week exposure for an individual.  ; If an individual had a hundred and fifty l millirem already in his bank, he was only allowed one hundred ) and fifty more, if the area was three hundred millirem and he was going into that area, he would only be allowed a half hour in that area. The Tech would determine this ahead of time. Q What is the maximum amount of millirem ) time allowed per individual per month? I . i i CAPil At CliY REPORTING SERVICE RON I'4?S f!Dtk AL ,QU AR[ SI ATION ' l H ARRISBltKG PA 17109 I I

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lh H 7 pI i A Per month? Q Yes. A It -isn' t per month. We go along.with a

                               ' quarterly.9xposure time.

Back then in those particular days, our' administrative 111mit was three'hundred millirem per week; If an individual was goin'g.into a three

                               .hundred millirem per hour exposure area, then he would only be allowed one hour.          He would have picked up his three hundred~ millirem.

That is an administrative limit. We had

            .j                 -that'at.that time.

We had another hold point of.a thousand l millirem per quarter. There was paper work involved to L

                                . increase those particular administrative limits.                              We stayed.-

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                               ~inside administrative limits.

We also could.go outside of l i l those particular limits, but not to exceed Federal limits. Q Do I' understand it to'be the case that I it takes about an hour to get three hundred millirem? A It depends on what area you are in. You ) can't say that.specifically because there are areas of only five~MR per hour, and he could stay in there quite a long time to reach a particular limit. So, it depends on the survey the Tech takes CANTAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE FOX 11908 IfMR AL SQUARE STAllON HARRISPURG l' A 17108 T[ltrow: 711tua f

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l 8 1 :s l I 2l . ahead of time, knowing what the dose rate is in an area or l

s . the stay time in that particular area.

1 Q Are you familiar with the area inside the

, , "D" Ring at the pressurizer? l
                                   '                    A     I am familiar with that area, yes.

Q- Assuming that the plant is at basically full power or close to full power, what kind of a radiat ton area is that? A It was an area that was a high radiation 4 area, and we did not allow access into that particular area inside the "D" Ring shield wall at full power operation.

 )                                                      Q     Under what circumstances would you allow access inside the "D" Ring?

A Shutdown, the plant shutting down. Q Can you think of any circumstance you would allow access inside the "D" Ring while the plant was i at power?  ! 1 A If an individual had fallen inside or if l I there was an aceident or something, yes. Then I would go in myself and pull that individual out. Q Can you think of any plant condition which might exist that would allow access to that area while the plant was at power?

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A No. C ANT AL CITY REPORflNG SERVIC! ses m8 FEDU A. SQUAM STAitON H ARkl5 k.t'. , PA l'199 i t , ni ,,  : 1 m .i j I _ -_ .--- __- J

9 Q What I would like to do now is go through i a specific time period of the plant's operation in which it appears, based on RWP's and the writtea narrative on RWP's that Operations personnel sometimes accompanied by one of your people were in-the area of the "D" Ring. Some of the RWP's say inside the "D" Ring. It is clear from the plant anditions that the plant is at power while this is occurring. I would like to go through this with you and then ask you some questions based on the plant conditions and the activitien of the Operatior.a personnel. With respect to January 11, 1979, there is

          ')

a series of three RWP's issued. The first one is an RWP issued by Plant Foreman Sheiman, and it basically says, " Entered Reactor Building, all elevations outside secondary shield for Ops surveillance." Now, where is that and what kind of a radiation area is that? A Outside the secondary chield for Operations surveillance meant that they were walking outside the "D"  ! Ring shield wall. We are talking probably between five MR i per hour up to maybe twenty MR per hour. i Q This is an area outside the "D" Ring? APII AL CllY REPORilNG SERVKl "OX 11908 l '.Di t A' soeA; ST ATIC': liAlnTJ'i,W., I% <' p tits: >$ av

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10 )I e l 2I Q Are you familiar with the purpose of those j ii . j. i

t!} kinds of inspections on the part of Operations? I-1 A Yes. i
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    .; ;                         Q      The only thing stated on the RWP is Opera- i                                            l tions surveillance.                                                                               ,
     .:                          A      Usually they went in looking for mal-                                         i functioning equipment, listening to fans, that type of thing.

io Q The next RWP issued on that day has no .

  !!                Shift Foreman's signature on it.                The RWP request is for Mr. Ron Harmon and Sandy Lawyer to enter the Reactor Building-                                              i
      .             operating. floor outside secondary shield, entry for in-la        4 spection.

1; This RWP was voided. It, apparently, i , 10 wasn't used, i 17l Do you know Mr. Lawyer? Do you know who , 1, j 14  : he is? ll i i 1" . A Yes. j 20  ; Q What was his position, if you can recall, 21 4

                  ! back in 19787 i

22 A I don't know his title. I am trying to -; 3:3 think what he was doing at the time. I don't remember what 24 his job was at the time. I remember the name, but I don't 25 remember his position. l CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 FEDERAL SQUARE STATION HARRISBURG, PA. 17106 TELEPHONE: 233 3814 ,

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d I 11 Q Do you recall that he was working for Mr. Herbein at the time? 1 p A Yes. Q Let me show you RWP No. 114327. There is an area at the top which is filled out with various indi-cations. Can you tell me what that is? A The Reactor Building operating floor is the level above the entrance level which is on the gro md i floor 305 That is outside the "D" Ring, and we did allow access during operation up there. Q This section which is designated as

                              " Sketch," what does that mean?
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A That has in it the results of -- Let's see, it has the oxygen level. These are survey results in here. Q Are they put on there before the entry? A Yes. O And the purpose is what? A The purpose is for notification of the individuals using this HWP to show them what levels are the radiation levels. I see in here that they have oxygen levels. They have explosive gas level particulate, the radioactive gas level and I believe an iodine, if I am reading that CAPil AL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 IDM R AL b ? )Aki SI AilOf! H ARP!*.Ril < iA l'!' 1}ti m p ve > 11 14 i .

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12 s correctly. i Q Now, the section directly above that, Section 10, where it says, " Radiation levels," what is that

          - and who fills that in?

A The technician fills that in from the Health Physics Department. It gives the highest radiation level. It gives a general area level. It gives a contanina-i tion level and airborne activity level. Q Where it has the maximum radiation level, what does that mean, with the number and the -- A That is not'a radiation level. That is a i f- contamination level, and it says, "Above a thousand dis-inter;retions per minute per centimeter squared." That means that there is' particulate which is above the clean area limit.

                              "1.ess than a thousand DPM for one hur. dred square centimeters" was above the clean area limit.

Q Does that basically indicate it is an i area -- A It is contaminated. l Q It is contaminated? A Yes, that is not an exposure level. Q The next RWP issued on January 11 is

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No. 14328. Take a look at that and let me know what you think  ! CAril Al CITY REPORilNG SERVICE fa n h /US ItDlk AL 5QUARE 5' AIR  ! 6l AkRt%U% P A 17108 t r e wnnsg , a * *rv

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                           ;              A     What the number means?

Q No, the RWP. A Okay. This says, " Reactor Building i inside the "D" Ring. 1/11/79." > That particular one says, " Highest level at six. MR per hour." And the general area is one MR per hour. This particular one, if that is the case, then we could not be running at the time. The plant was not running at the time, according to this. l' Q According to this RWP, it indicates the

  )                          plant was not running?

A Yes. Q Where does it indicate that? l l-

l. A Because of these levels.

1 Q Which levels? I A The radiation levels shown here on this " r HWP reflect that the plant was not running at the tirne , be-cauce thore levels would be much higher, if it were. i O When you say not running, what do you mean? j l A Shut down, down below a ten per cent ! level. l) Q You believe that the plant would have to be CANI AL CITY REPORilNG SERVICE P0x 11908 FIDER AL 50VARE ST AT CN iMRRhlttif R T A 17108 16 ( t ri tor p '11 1914

y 1 14 below a ten percent level, ten percent power? . A Yes, in order to achieve these. Q In order to achieve that radiation level inside the "D" Ring? A Yes. Radiation levels would be greater than that, if'we were operating. h MR. WINTER: Off-the-record. (Discussion off-the-record) BY MR. WINTER: Q If I were to tell you that the plant was runnin5.well in excess of' ten percent power at the time this

         )

RWP was issued, how would you explain the fact that these i figures are placed on the HWP?' I A I can't explain it, because those levels

                   -have got.to be higher if we were at one hundred percent operating power inside the "D" Ring.

Q And the location which is indicated'on the HWI' ic " Reactor Ilu11 ding innide the "D" Ring," is it not? A That is correct. Q Assuming that in fact the plant was well in excess of ten percent of power, how do you explain the defini-tion as to location?

              .                   A     I have no explanation for it.          I can't.
                                        -(. APIT At Clh REPORIING SERVICE But n908 m1k A' w A n srA non HMW Fo     I&  1/199
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  ~)                     Q      Do you believe that someone could have j been inside the "D" Ring, if in fact the plant was at power
          }

and these figures are_ consistent with the radiation levels that were present? A A person could have,from the 281 elevation, run in and run back out in a few seconds and stay within these particular exposure levels we see that are shown here. Q Which are? A One individual received one hundred and f Tirty millirem. Q I believe that is Mr. Hoyt? A Adam lloyt. Mr. Burkholder received one hundred. Mr. McGarry received sixty. lie went in with zero and came out with sixty. l Q in it possible that all of the people were l in the same locat. ion, having received different radiation? l A Yes, it is possible. 1 Mr. Burkholder, who was the llealth Phynics ' person here, could have been behind this individual who raced in there. This is only speculation now. I don't know l this to be a fact. At those limits, you could have run in and run back out and stayed within those limits.

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Q Is it your position that assuming the plant C APli AL CITY REPORTING SERVICE Box 11908 - FEDER AL Q AM 5f AT:CN

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                 )           was at power and in fact they were in a location as described                                                  j l

on the RWP, they could have only been in there a few seconds, 1 I given the radiation levels received? l A That is correct. I Q Let me refer you to January 13, 1979, and show you another RWP which was issued on that day by Mr. j Hoyt'and signed off by Mr. Smith. This is RWP 14337. Please look at that and upon concluding your review, I will have some questions. (Handed to witness) A All right, i i Q The location called for is, again, inside j ( the "D" Ring, is it not? A Yes. Q Again, on your review of this, do you be-lieve the location called for is again inside the "D" Ring? A Yes. Q Again, on your review of this, do you believe, given the dosage levels, assuming that the plant was at power, was significantly above ten percent power, do you believe that much time could have been spent inside the "D" Ring? A Well, I see levels here circled from ten I to thirty R per hour. Depending on where that thirty R per CAPli AL CITY REPORTING SERVICE (10X 11908 - f(NE Al 501]ARE STATON l t A N:i.@ th i FA it"d

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 )    [ hour was that they have here, no.

1 Q Do you mean the radiation level section?

    ,                   A     The radiation level section.                                 It is 10-30 R -- circled. And this is under the general area level.

It also says -- and there is an asterisk here - "The air activity was going to be determined at entry time." i Q What does that mean? A I am not sure what this says here. Q You are not sure what the first line says. A "To be obtained by Health Physics . . " - . - I

                              -- " At point of entry."

') Q A I am not sure what that means. I don't j know what this says right here. l This says:"10 to 30 R per hour." Q What does that mean? A It means that the general area in the area in which they were going to go was between ten and thirty R l per hour. That is 30,000 milliren per hour.  ! Q Is that high? A Yes, it is high, as opposed to the other RWP which had six and one, I believe. Q Are you referring to RWP No. 14328?

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A Right. CAPITAL CITY RLPORTING SERVICE

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     'I 18 This one has much higher levels.                                   This makes me believe that this it inside the                  "D" Ring.
       ,                Q     At. power?

b A It is certainly much higher thari a ter, percent level, yes. I can only assume it was at power. The levels here, the highest is Mr. Hoyt agaln, which is 110, if I am readin6 this correctly. Thja is hard to read. The : technician who should have been with him and is there is Mr. Thompson, who has 65. Mr. McGarry is 50 again. ) Obviously, t'he same evolution.took place. I can only judge by the exposure they received. Again, a quick run in and out. That is the only assumption I can

         ..make here.

J Q Given the practice, I take it, of not going inside the "D" Ring at power and based on our examination of the records, it apparently was done on both occasions here.

   '                                                                                                                     l In your mind and in your experience, what kind of circum-                                                      i stance would lead to doing such a thing?

A I can only say that if Operations felt it necessary to do that, if there was something that they had to see, they did it. Q Would this be the the approval or disappro- i CAPil AL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11900 - FEDER At 50C AR! 5T A00N H ARR!5BUL P A ' 7'M titietinN! "t*

I l , 19-f; val of Health Physics, or would there be consultation about 0 why this had to be done before you would go ahead and do I

         ! this?                                                                        t A      There was a technician on duty wit.h the l

l group. I see a techniciar.'s name here, and it had to be with his concurrence. Q On January 13, George Kunder writes in his Operations notes his evaluation of the problem which was being viewed as a result of the RWP's. { I would like to show ; you a copy of taat. and then I will have some questions about it.  ! l

 }                             (llanded to witness)

A Okay. Q This note makes reference to an analyala na to whether or not this situation which was existing inside i the'"D" Ring was nerious enough to cause a shutdown, but in addition it makes a leakage analysis based on the examina-tions which were conducted as a result of the two RWP's which you have read. It states as fol3ows:"Two GPM leakage in-

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dicated on make-up tank. Find no other leakage is existing. q The RCV-133D, 1348 and 135 B leakage is identified and below tech spec. q Hoyt and McGarry say not justifiable to shut

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l duwn yet based on valve leak. However, leak rate ori mak?-up L APil AL C11Y RUORilNG $ERVKt i 1 pox n908 FtDtk At SQUARI STATION nAms.um cA ,me mrmone7n ma i l i

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         ,    4                 . tank-agrees with what we.are seeing in the Reactor' Building."

Now, this note analyzes.that the leak rate _is about:two GPM,' based on the make-up tank and' based I on.their observations in the Reactor Building as a result

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of:the entries.

                                  ,                    Based .on your experience and your evalua-tion of the amount of time that could be spent inside the "D", Ring, do you believe an accurate analysis as,to the
                     ,,          quantity ' of leakage could be made in that pei iod. of time?

A I can't answer that because I don't do

   ,                             leak l rates. I.am not qualified to say if that was ample time or not to do a leak rate.            That.'is not my position to do.
           . -) . ,
                                ;leakirates.

Q Do you:believe enough time could be' spent: to view a. leak and come up with an analysis as.to the

                                -quantity of leakage?

A I don't know, l

                        ,.                     'Q. On January 13, Hoyt writes in his Shift                                                                                                                       l Foreman log the-fo11owin6 note, which apparently was'made
                                'a rter he entered the "D" Ring area:                                                "Made inspection of Reactor Building to check leakage from RCV-133B, 134B and 1358. Total leakage from these valves is approximately the same as Thursday's 1/11 inspection.                                                 Survey of other areas                                                                            .

l

            '7 show no other-leakage.         Leakage is from body-to-bonnet areas                                                                                                                  !

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        'N of these valves and appears to be safe to operate."

Given the amount of time thac could be l I s spent, based on your review of the RWP's, what kind of an l

         '       analysis do you think could be done inside that area?                           l I

A It depends on how they did this, and I l don't know how it was done, so I am really not qualified to , say. I don't do leak rates.  ! Q In any event, it is your view that only a  : very short period of time -- and I believe you used the  ; words, a matter of seconds -- could be spent in the areas described because of the radiation factor, in that correct?

    )                         A      That is correct.

MR. WINTER: Off-the-record. (Discussion off-the-record) BY MR. WINTER: Q Are you familiar with the valves which are mentioned here -- RCV-133B, 134B and 135B? { A I have heard of them. I haven't seen l them in six years or seven years, maybe. l

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Q Assuming that they are valves on the pren- 1 I I surizer, what kind of a view physically could be made of that situation given its location? J CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOA LN08 . ItDER AL SOUARE 5f Af QM H AREBi!RG, F A 171^8 1 D [PHOW 7 31-3 4' J

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22 l A- From the Operating level? 1 Q Yes, the individual going in. < J A Up on top of the "D" Ring looking down, depending on whether they had binoculars or not -- and I j i don't know whether they did or not -- you could see. i 1 Q With respect to how long you could physi-cally 'look at them without creating a dangerous situation, how long could that take place? N A It depends on whether you were at direct l' line of sight, whether you were using something to look through so you were not in direct line of sight with the radiation levels coming up. Again, I don't know how this

          }

i was physically done. If it was done with a mirror, you could stay there quite a while, because you would be outside the "D" Hing, looking over the top, outside the "D" Ring and outside the direct line of radiation. It depends on how it was done, and I don't know that. Q Do you have any specific recollection of this problem in January which caused people to go inside the "D" Ring at power? A No. Q Do you recall any discussions in January about shutting the plant down with respect to this problem and others? i CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE j B04 11908 - IIDERAL SQUAR[ STALON l- HARRISBUEG. l' A 17108 U l f Pif0N ?" ? 914 L_________ ___ _ _ _ _ _

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                       ,I                                                                                  23 A     Oh, I recall a lot of problems that we had at the time. Specifically each one, no.

MR. WINTER: I have no more questions. 3

                        .3                               (The deposition was adjourned-at 2:00 p.m.)

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      .b I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence taken by me in the within matter are fully and accurately indicated in my notes and that this is a true and correct transcript of same.                                              i
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Marlene L. DePanfilis Court Reporter b i CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 IEDER AI % QUAE! ST AtlON HARRI%URG. f A 17'JS If LENIAN8 ' O ?c't ,

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l l l 1 OLSON, DENNIS i 10/22/84 Stier Investigation I i l l l t,

t Report of-Interview of DENNIS OLSON DENNIS OLSON was interviewed by Robert Winter and Frederick DeVesa in New Orleanc on October 22, 1984. This interview was conducted in the presence of his attorney William Marcoux. h r. Olson stated that he presently was employed at Louisiana Ibwer & Light (b . in St. Franci sville , LA. IIe had been previously employed as a licensed control room operator at TMI-2 between June 1978 and March 197 9. Mr. Olson was questioned regarding his understanding of le rate testing practices at Unit 2. IIe indicated that he learned how to run reactor coolant inventory balance tests by reviewing the procedure governing that test. Ili s recollection of the technical specification (Tech Spec) was that the plant was required to run a leak rate test at least once every 72 hours. Nevertheless, he understood it to be the practice to try to run a leak rate test at least once every shift. There was no

1 J DENNIS OLSON -

                      -Page 2                                                                                                                                                                  -

l J l specific. preferred time for running a test on any given individual shift. According.to him, the decision was left to l the operator's discretion and tests were generally run whenever there was a chance on the shift.. The practice was to try to I I keep the plant as stable as possible when running the test. When asked what reasons, other than the plant not being in a steady state, there might have been not to run a

                      ' leak rate test, - Mr. Olson said he didn 't know.

It was Olson's recollection that the CRO who ran the test was gener, J df the CRO who di'd/ the readings. 7 Ile also believed that; the CRO who was assigned to maintain the logs 33

                                                    ,)                           '

also operatsd*the control panol during..that shift. Usually the i n

                                                                                                       \                                                                                     :

operator who higned the leak $Ne test piintout was th,e same

                                                                                                                                                  .'     1 one who ran the test on the coluputer.                                         Olson emphnFjZed, h
                                                                                                                                                       \        >

however, that any operator could perform ant; of ' the assiegrad a 1 u y tasks and that there werd always exceptiar.\ oa ,to the general 4 l Y  ; practices. Thus for ex, ample, an operator assigned to the panel

                                                                                   -i might not . be the only o'rne who a'd'Es water"or hydrogen,to tha                                                                                       >

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DENNIS OLSON 'Page 3 Olson stated that it was the practice to compare the amount of water added by use- of ' the batch controller with the 'leveliindicated on the makeup tank strip chart as a result of the water addition. In addition, he advised that the operators conducting leak rate tests would ask anyone if they added water during the course of the test. If water additions were made during ' the course of a test and they weren' t accounted for, the test would be considered invalid. Olson stated that if a leak rate test result indicated unidentified leakage its excess of 1.0 gpm, sometimes the Shift Foreman would ack the shif t personnel to search for leaks. When leaks were found, they were accounted for and subtracted It was i f rom the next leak rate test result that was obtained. the practice from time to time to carry the same identified leakage from one shift to the next. If it appeared that identified leakage might be increasing, it would be measured again and a new value for identified leakage would be reported. 3 I l I When Olson was asked whether or not there was a j practice of merely estimating identified leakage at TMI-2, he i

DENNIS OLSON Page 4 stated. that he thought there was an emergency procedure that allowed for such a practice with respect to certain kinds of leaks, but was not certain of the precise wording of the procedure. Moreover, he could not recall any time period during the operation of TMI-2 when it was not possible to

                . measure identified leakage.

Olson did recall that there we:- a number of occasions when he had to run several tests during a shif t before he got what he called "a good one," that is, a test result showing unidentified leakage less than 1.0 gpm. He also remembered that sometimes it was not possible to obtain a good leak rate test result on his shift, but could not recall how this was communicated to the oncoming shif t. More specifically, he had no recollection as to whether or not the inability to obtain a good leak rate test result was placed on a status board in the Control Room. Olson was asked how individuals on shift would know that the so called 72-hour time period for obtaining a good leak rate was approaching. He indicated that a review of the log book would indicate when the last good leak rate test had been obtained, and that perhaps a surveillance coordinator I L

DENNIS OLSON Page 5 might also make people aware of this.- Nevertheless , he stated that there was no way of knowing the number of tests discarded since the last satisfactory result. Olson was also questioned regarding the accuracy and reliability of the leak rate test in 1978 and 1979. He stated that he never really thought about the accuracy of the leak rate test trying to measure 60 gallons out of 68,000 gallons and has little recollection today of how reliable it was. He consider ed it his responsibility to obtain leak rate test results below 1.0 gpm as specified by the Tech Spec. He did not concern himself with the accuracy of the test results. It'was Olson's belief today, upon reflection, that it j was not possible to determine whether a test indicating unidentified leakage above 1.0 gpm was accurate or not. Olson stated that only satisfactory leak rates were logged in the CRO log book. Olson believed that the leak rate test could tell you if there was a major leak or an unsafe condition present in the plant due to excessive RCS leakage, but that it could not, give you an accurate indication as to whether the plant was a i

l l L f DENNIS OLSON Page 6 l within the RCS leakage limit of less than 1.0 gpm unidentified leakage. For' purposes of determining whether or not the plant had a leakage problem or was becoming unsafe, Olson stated CRO's looked at other plant indicators, including the makeup tank level-and pressurizer level. Olson was asked whether he used the reactor coolant sump to measure leakage from the system. Iki did not recall thinking about the sump with respect to RCS leakage. Ie recalled that there would be a check of i sump pump starts and a record kept regarding the number of starts. Olson had no recollection of any discussion among control roota operators about inaccurate leak rate tests. l l l Olson was questioned specifically with respect to the practice of discarding leak rate test results above 1.0 gpm. It was his recollection that if a test result showing L unidentified leakage above 1.0 gpm leak rate was obtained, the l practice was to run another test. If a satisfactory result l l was obtained, the unsatisfactory one could be thrown away. 1 ( This would be done because it was the practice, based upon their interpretation of the Tech Spec, that as long as you got a test result below 1.0 gpm within 7 2-hours, there was no need l l

                                                                            )
                                                                            )

l

DENNIS OLSON. Page 7 to enter the Action. Statement or keep the intervening test results showing leakage above 1.0 gpm. Olson could not provide an estimate as to how many tests were thrown away during this period of time. It was also his recollection that there was no requirement to show the test to the Shift Foreman before it was discarded, although he believes he usually did so. Ie-believeson occasion he showed the test results to Adam Miller before they were discarded, and that either he or Miller then

       ' threw - them away. Olson also recalled that it was his practice to turn in negative leak rate te'st resultts because he considered them to be good within the definition of valid leak rate tests applicable at that time.

Olson believes the practice of discarding leak rate tests above 1.0 gpm was stopped after the Supervisor of Operation, instructed people not to throw them away any more. j He believes that the practice then changed and leak rates above 1.0 gpm would be stapled to the log sheet. Olson seems to recall that this practice began after an NRC inspector observed leak rates above 1.0 gpm were not being filed. l i i i l

I i l 1 DENNIS OLSON.

       .page'8
                            <.                                                                                                   j Olson was questioned as to the practice of adding                                                    l 8

water to-the makeup tank. He indicated that basically there were two reasons to do this: 1) to replenish the makeup tank l in order to keep it within the specific level bands and 2) to

                                                                                                                                -l 1 make sure that the control rods. were within the recommended band.        It was his recollection that there was no set procedure for , adding water to keep control rods within the band and that it was within the operator's discretion as to when thic should he'done.         It was up to the CRO to determine when and how rod position was to be changed.        According to Olson, it was his

! -practice not to consider whether a leak rate test was in l progress when water was added. He did not believe this to be a problem as long as the' water added was accounted for in the test. .It was his recollection that the person assigned to the control panel was generally responsible for adding water, although this could be done by other operators. The operator l assigned to the panel was also responsible for logging any water additions. The log entry for the amount of water added was based on figures obtained from the batch controller. Olson indicated, however, that it was his practice to check the strip L chart with respect.to the amount of water added. He indicated 2

i l': DENNIS OLSON Page 9 l he would not be looking for an exact number, but more or less

     .whether or.not the indicated level rise was comparable to the amount of water that he had added.

Olson was also questioned regarding when it was necessary to add hydrogen to the makeup tank. IIe explained that the Chemistry Department required that hydrogen pressure be maintained'within speci.fic levels. These levels were based on a determination of oxygen content and the maintenance of hydrogen pressure within a specific operating band. Olson also pointed out that.while hydrogen could generally be added from the control room, during some time period in 1978, it was necessary for the Auxiliary Operators to add hydrogen from a remote site. Olson stated that he now knew that from time to time when hydrogen pressure was changed in the makeup tank, there would be some effect on the level indication shown on the makeup tank level strip chart. He further stated that he did not know of this effect before the accident at TMI-2. He did understand, however, that water in the dry reference leg of the transmitter could cause a problem with level transmitter readings. Olson went on to say that he did know in 1978 that j i I 1

DENNIS OLSON Page 10 there were periodic problems with one of the level transmitters givingf i naccurate level readings; and that these inaccurate readings would be reflected either on the makeup tank level strip chart or the signal input to the computer depending.on which was switched to_the. bad transmitter. He recalls that control' room ope'ators r knew.which transmitter was the good one and'which was the bad 'one , and that it was their practice to use .the good transmitter for leak rate tests.

                    -Olson stated he never added hydrogen to the makeup
     ' tank in an effort to influence the outcome of leak rate tests.

He also indicated that he never added water during the course of a leak rate test in an effort to manipulate test results. Olson also denied that he ever intentionally switched makeup level transmitters or did.anything else improper to influence or manipulate the results of leak rate tests. When asked whether he added water or hydrogen during the course of a leak l rate in order to make the leak rate results more accurate or consistent with plant conditions, he stated he did not do this

       .either.                                                              ,

i l L l 1 l. { i

DENNIS OLSON. Page 11 Olson was. questioned about a test he~ran on October 18, .1978 at 1 3:21. Upon review of.the test results and related documents, Olson stated that he was most likely on the swing shift'or relief shift on that particular day. He had some recollection that when he took over on this particular day there had been a previous test which had been considered bad.

   .Olson does not believe, however, that he saw any tests other than the one he'ran. De has no recollection of being in'the l

action statement, nor does he recall any discussion of repeated. attempts to get a successful leak rate test. Olson has no specific recollection of the test that he performed and signed. When questioned about the apparent Fels correction on the test in question, he stated that he did not recall Fels being present and doing anything in connection with this leak rate test. When questioned about the round off practice that began on-October 18, 1978, Olson had no recollection of the origins of ~ the practice or its discontinuation. Olson was shown several leak rate tests he ran between February 16 and March 13, 1979. Each of the tests was i influenced by a water addition during the latter part of the i l

1 DENNIS OLSON j' Page 12 test period. He denied any knowledge of adding water at the j end of the test in an effort to enhance the possibility of getting a leak rate result below 1.0 gpm. -He denied that he even knew that the additi~on of water at the end of the test coul'd'haveesuch an effect.- Olson pointed out again that he did not know in 1978 and 1979 that the addition of hydrogen at the I end'of a test could have an effect on level indication and j i thereby affect the results of the leak rate test. He said he never discussed this phenomenon with anyone. He repeated this with' respect-to his knowledge of water additions at the end of a test. Upon reviewing. documents pertaining to tests that he ran during this time period, Olson acknowledged a number of the tests involved water additions at the end of the test period. In most cases, he could not explain why water was added during tests other than by speculating that water was added in order to change coron concentration. He agreed af ter reviewing some strip charts that water was not needed to maintain proper makeup tank level In any event, Olson indicated that he saw nothing wrong with adding water during a leak rate test as.long as it j was accounted for, and he did not recall any restrictions or pr ohibit ions governing this practice.

                                                                                                                   ]

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PORTER, IVAN 9/23/83 NRC OI i I

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1 1- , UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

 -3 IN RE:

4

           ,            INVESTIGATION Ort                                       '

i

 .3                                                                             !

T:{E OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION 6 AND ENFORCEMENT 9 8 TESTIMONY OF-IVAN D. PORTER, JR. 9 10 American Host Inn 11 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 1 i 12 Friday, September 23, 1983 13 APPEARANCES: 14 R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER, Director

            ,                 Office of Investigations, Region I 15                          631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 16
        .l                    PETER CONNOLLY, Investigator 17                         Office of Investigations, Region I                i 631 Fark Avenue                                   :

18 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 it

 '19         :'

20 SMITH B. GEPHART, Esq. JANE G. PENNY, ESQ. 21 Killian & Gephart 216-218 Pine Street 22 3:y 5EE a_ Harrist :: Pennsylvania 17103

23. ,1 On benali of Mr. Porter t

24 25 I O

1 0 . S

                                                      ~
     '.t .-

PROCEEDINGS l

     't                                                                                                                                      '(11:05 a.m.)                           ;

i 3- MR. CHRISTOPHE'.: On the record. The date is 4 September 23rd, 1983, the time is 11:05, we are in the Host  ; I 6 - Motor Inn, Room 500 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. We're here ' 6 to elicit information from Mr. Ivan Porter regarding allega-

7. tions.concerning falsification of reactor coolant' system 8 leak rate test data at TMI Unit 2.
9. Presently in the room besides Mr. Porter are 10 Keith Christopher, and Peter Connolly, Investigators from
11. the Office of Investigations, Region I; and Attorneys 13 Smith B. Gephart and Jane Fanny for the firm of Killian and r.

13 , Gep ha r t', Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, representatives for 14 f 'Ivan Porter. 15 !l Ivan, the first thing that we have to is we put I 16 you under oath and then we just go through a series of l' 17 - cuestions. l 18 , Whereupon, i 19 IVAN D. PORTER, Jr.

     ,:N          we.s duly sworn and was examined and testified as follows:

I 21 EXAMINATION 1 us-e-n:v=,. nn. = .. . : e 23 i t C Jus: is: the rerord, Ivan, would you give us 24- your full name, address, age and current position. 2 A .My name is Ivan D. Porter, Jr., my address is I

-- - -----~-----__a

s 1 Box 1496, R.D. 1, Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania . I am currently I startup'and test manager for GPU. Nuclear, Three Mile Island 3 Unit 1. l 4 Q How long have you been in that position, Ivan? 5 well, essentially, I would say October 1979. A . 8 So after the accident. Q 7 A Yes. 8 Who is your immediate supervisor now? Q I' A Tom Hawkins. I - 10 Tom Hawkins. Prior to the accident -- let's say A 11 the three, four months prior to March of 1979 -- what was you 12 position at that time? 13 A I was lead instrumentation control engineer at 14 TMI Unit 2. 15

        ,                  O   Exclusively.for Unit 2?

i 16 A Yes. 17 Who did you work for at that t i .e ? O 18 George Kunder. I A

  '18         '            ^
                                *he allegations here are f cr Harrif Eartr.an, 20              fermer control room operator.      There are more than this 1

i 81 { particular allegation but we'll only deal with the allegation; oo a

f falsift:a :: f leak ra e :es s.

4 n3 He alleges that because of varisus problems a: l .

'l'
              !     the plant, oscillating plant parameters, excessive leakages, 25 that the operators were routinely unable to comply with the                                                                 j 0

i .

1. tech spec requirement for unidentified leakage. The' .

S' , technical specification states that you have to have an 3 unidentified leak rate of 1 gallon per ninute, and an 4 identified leak rate of 10 gallons per minute every 72 5 hours or the plant has to shut down. s Are you familiar with that technical specification 7 and its requirements? 8 A Basically, yes. 9 0 .Now, you're not an operator, -- 10 A No. 11 Q -- ard so you don't actually perform the tests. 12 Is that -- ? 13 A That's true. 1 ' 6 14 Q What would be the extent of your involvement in l

                                                                                                                                                                          )

15 I the conduct of that test, if any? I , l l 16 A Normally, I would not have involvement in it. il ) l 17 i Q How would you become aware specifically of problems 18 with the leak rate testing program? 19 A It would either be they neef specific assistance M from me -- say, for instance, daily meetings or I guess ' l 21- ! just hearsay. ( 1 22  ; W3:e y:u tware -- n:. r+r= ;er,,e're 7 :ir.;  : 23 ' , speak totally of the tire period prior to the accident new. 24 were you aware at that time that they were having problems D obtaining good leak rate? Il I

[. 5

 'l                          'A    I ' t- sure I was,yes.                 -

2 , g . Car,you recall how you became aware that this l

                                                                                                                          \

3- was going on? Through discussions, formalized meetings, or ' 4 did someone tell you. informally? Can you recall how you first; 5- became aware of it? 8 A No, not first became aware of it. The record 7 shows that I attended POD meetings and stuff of that type. 8-Q So as I understand, your answer is that since the

    '                 time of the event, the allegation, including today, you have                                      l 10                  not had any discussions with any operators or formal operators 11                  or other personr.el in the company that would indicate that               .

12 they as individuals had knowledge that the operators were 13 adding hydrogen for the purpose of manipulating leak rate 14 l test results?- 15  ! 3 go, l 16 l Q Okay. And you personally never witnessed any

            't i

3 ' d operator add hydrogen to the makeup tanks for the purpose of la affecting leak rate test results? l

             !'                                                                                   l l'

x w.

    '                           Q     One of the other allegations is that besides 21        l                                                                                   '

water being added to the makeup tank, -- I' m sorry, that 1 en

                        .;d:: er was added .: - he -.sk e up t ar '- -- is -hat wa er was

! 23 j. being added to nc a%eup tank'and n t recorded in the RCS i l '1 24 inventory. The allecation is that this was done for the f f D express purpose of manipulating leak rate test results. 1 I i b .

                                                                                           --        ----________-----_J

9'. W 6 6'

                                                                                            ' '} .

1- Are you.now personally aware, or were you back 2- then personally aware that operators were adding water to i 3 .the makeup tank for the purpose of affecting leak rate test 4- - results?' i 5 A No, sir. s- Q And since that time, have you discussed with 7 anybody whether or not operators were, in fact, adding water 8 in order'to affect leak rate test results?  ; 1 9 A I've had discussions on this whole topic, as

10. everybody else has. But no, I have never asked an operator 11 and nobody has ever told me that they were aware that an 12 operator did do that.

13 Q Did any operator, by name,'ever specifically admit 14 l to you that he was manipulatingel'ak rate tests by either I as adding hydrogen or water? 16 A No, sir. N  : 17 Q Realizing that you weren't actually involved in  ! I 18 , the taking of -- performance of leak rate tests, were you 19 aware of any shift fereran, sh~ift superviser or cther M management individual, which.could be, let's say, a Jim 21 .i Floyd to Gary Miller to Joe Logan or Jim Seelinger,-those I 22 ypes 5 ing;v;3 3;3, wh fe:e away, : f 3, g3 : ,,3

- I  :

83 operators were manipulating the leak rate test results by 24 adding hydrogen and water, and either directed it or condoned l l 25 operators to perform in such a fashion? l {

b 7

  't                              A       No. Totally unaware of this until it came out.

2 Q So as far as you know, supervisors were not aware 3 that operators were manipulating leak rate test results.

  ~4                                      MR. GEPHART:   If they were manipulating leak 6                     rate test results.                                                                                  ;

6 THE WITNESS: No. 7 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: i 8 Q Did you ever have any discussions with your 9 supervisor at that time, George Kunder, Jim Floyd, about the 10 problems of getting good leak rates? Why the operators 11 couldn't get good leak rates? 12 A Possibly, probably, but I don't recall. 13 Q Are you personally familiar with the surveillance I 14 I procedure that is used to conduct the test? I think it's 15 2 3 01-3 (d ) (1) . I have a copy if you'd like to take a look l: 16 'l at it. 4 f 17 , A More or less. I understand the process involved. t

   . 18 -,                 That was not my procedure and I didn't perform,.so as far 19                    as the step-by-steps that are in there, :'n not familiar 20                    with 1 , no.

i 21 Q Were you aware in enough detail to know that the 22 pr::siure arned 3 ains; an, add; ::ns :f a:er c: rher;:a- . 23 additions to the RCS inventory during the test? l 24 . ! A I would -- yes. f I i M C You'd be aware of it but,it would not affect you l l' 4 J __-__-__-_-_-__-_-_A

t I since you did'not perform the tests. _), i

          ,, 2                      3-     Well, I'm aware -- I know that you have to, you                                                  i t

3 ' know, control stuff like that and it would upset the leak 4' . rate. Yes. 5 ]- Q Because .of the problems that they were having in 8 getting good leak rate test results, the operators -- several

7. '

of the operators we've interviewed, going back several years, 8 having indicated that there was a lot of discussion about 8 why they couldn't get good leak rate test results. Do you 10 recall any meetings or any work that you were asked to 11 perform regarding instrumentation readings? Anything that , 12 you were asked to do that would help assist to correct the 13 problem of.getting leak rate test results? 14

                       !(           A      I don't recall it no, but it's possible that it l

15 ll happened. 11 -

                       't is                      O      As an instrumentation man, you wouldn't do any II work with the computer in a computer program.                                                                -

18 A No. Not normally. Not with a program, certainly. 18

Would you ha/e done an; work en -- they .: sed ::

20 take makeup tank level readings from a voltage -- 1 21 , A '" hat 's . probably the patch panel.

            .m           >

1

'c.d a;.p a re ;n ;- there was s:..e -- at One :.mc j:u j

23 would have te manually go and read it from the patch panel. 24 Would you be familiar with how they changed that so that that i 25 level was automatically fed into the test when they changed

i 3-9 ' I In other words, they ch.anged it so that the test program? 2 the operators wouldn't physically have to go over and read the 3 levels at the beginning of the test -- 4 A I understand what you're saying, and no, I don't , recall how it.would happen. 6 Q so you don't recall ever specifically being 7

                               ' involved in any maintenance activity or instrumentation 8

calibration type activity that would have been related to 9 an attempt to correct problems with the leak rate test? 10 A I don't recall it for that purpose, but I was 11 involved in a lot of instrumentation calibration through 13 that period of time. What prompted it to happen I don't l' ~ recall. 14 O If you were going to be involved in recalibrating 15 ' equipment for that purpose, what would be the type of equip-16 ment that you would normally have expected to have to work i with, knowing the type of systems Ihat are involved in trying' 18 j to obtain a leak rate? 19 A Pressure instruments, te perature instru.ents and 30 level instruments for the most part. EI Q. And again, you don't recall any specific directior en

                                 -t research prthlems with various aspects o:. ene test :: t r-;

33 I i

                           ,i.to come up with a resolution as to why they couldn't get a                          j E'

test result? 25 A No, I don't. j ll l

1S

                                                                                           ') .

1 A .The plant has been characterized by everyone as 8 an oscillating plant with a lot of peaks and valleys. Are 3  : you aware of operators trying to perform the leak tests in 4 such a manner that they could be aware of the various plant I 5 oscillations in order to get a good leak rate test result? s A No. 7 Q_ were you ever told or was it ever explained to 8 you -- l 9 A Could I go back to that one for a minute? 10 0 Sure. 11 A You mean trying-to make an oscillation work for i 12 you' rather than just make sure that you didn't get an j 13 oscillation that upset the test. 14 Q Right. 15 A Okay. No, I'm not avare of them trying to take l 16 l advantage of an oscillation. 17 3 Q In other words, when you run the test, it has to  ! 18 be within a one-hour period of steady state operation. But l 19 i there were a lot of, ! think they're referred to as peaks N -and valleys in the plant par ame te rs . And if you get the 21  ! test at the right time, as I understand, it would have a . 22- pecitive effe:- -- r a .eyative effe:t if it; hi- :: at -he i I 23 - wrong time -- on t .e ability to get a good test. . 34 What I'm. specifically interested in is were you t5 aware of any discus .ons within the operations particularly i I i

  • l 1

i

11 I at the supervisory level, that would get into any type of' 2 instructions as to how to take advantage of those oscillations I 3 in order to get good leak rate test results? 4 A No. ' 0 Q Were you ever told, or did you ever find out why 6 hydrogen actually would affect the makeup tank level? 7 A I know now, yes. s i 8 O Based on what? How do you know that? I ' A Now -- the fact it's come up again with the l 10 And that's the routing of the reference leg in Unit 1. , II same with any dry reference leg instrument, is you get air 12 and water both in and move the water out -- 18 l Q Are you re ferring to the loop seal that -- 14 A If you want to call it that, yes. I 15 1 0 -- that could have occurred by the way the piping i

               .l was designed.

a 17 i A Yes. 10 I 0 Up until this time at Unit 1, you weren't aware , 19 Of or /02 didn't hate an understanding as to how .ydregen 20 may have affected it. j I 21 1 q A I understood how it could. I didn't understand e, 1

                       -hl     a n y b - i; '-='                                    -- =  'ly deter ;ned t-=-    -e reu e    ne 23            i i

l tubing was routed ;; h could occur, and in fact, if they ' 24 l had, did occur. But I understand the physical relationship

                                                                                                                                       }

l l 25 . j that can cause it to happen, yes, t i

        '                                                                                                                           12
                                                                                                                                                                            ,)

1-O' But back prior to the accident,, you don't recall

  't
               'any discussions as to why they were able to add hydrogen and 3                                                                                                                                                                          l affect the makeup tank level?                                                                                                                                   !

4 A Not that I recal, no. 5 '

                      -Q          Are you aware of an, supervisory individuals --

4 by supervisory I mean shift foreman, shift supervisor or > 7 above -- who actually directed an individual operator to 8 L manipulate a leak rate test result by the addition of hydrogen 9 or water? 10 A No. 11

            ;           O         And has any shift superviser ever discussed with                                                                            .

12 you the fact that he knew the operators were doing that 13 I and condoned it in order to keep the plant running? 14 i

         "                                                                                                                                                                      I A         So.                                                                          '

15 I l 0 Are you aware of any specific supevisor who was 16 lj aware that they were doing that and took.no action to stop-it? 17 l Aga;n, I'. talking about operations type individuals, t la .i l A No. It sounds like the same question, but no. to 0 Are y:u attare of the re .snes by a 10: of the 20

         / operators that there was a lot of pressure exerted on the 21    I operators to get good leak rates?                                                                                                         !

22 A

  • l O Then you're not aware of any of the operators i '

24-undergoing any type of direct management pressure -- hey, l 23 . i l you're going to get fired, or, you've got to get a leak rate J-i

4 13 1 A Absolutely not. . 2 -Q Do you feel that -- did you ever sense, back at 3 the time prior to the accident, that the operators felt 4 intimidated if they did not get this good leak test result, i 5 or that there would be some adverse action taken against them 6 if they didn't? 7 A Absolutely not. 8 Q And you're not personally aware of any supervisor 9 actually directing an individual to falsify a leak rate 10 test result? 11 A No. 13 0 Were you aware of the practice of the operators 13 throwing away bad leak rate test results? I 14 i MR. GEPHART: Now or before the accident? 15 ' MR. CHRISTOPHER: This is all before the accident. 16 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: i 17 O In other words, the plant was operating January 9 18 j up through March in a fairly stable condition, and a few 4 h 19 " months prior to that. This is durin- the -Ormal ccurse of 20 the routine. ,Did you know that the operators were throwing 21 away test results if they did not meet the one gallon per 22 -inute ? . 23 A I don't recall. I don't recall that I did, but -. 34 If the question is was I aware that they had all gone to l 25 the file, that's possible. I don't know.

g 1 Q I'm sorry? 2 A If the question is was I aware they weren't all 3 getting filed, it's possible I was aware of it. But I don't-- . 4 Q Are you familiar enough with the operators' 5 procedures requirements in terms of keeping records to know '

8 whether or not they were being required to keep all of those 7 bad. test results?

8 A I guess no, I'm not that familiar with whether 9 they were required to keep those records. I probably 10 shouldn't add anything, but I think in this regard it would l 11 depend on why they decided they'd had the bad result. i 13 Q Did you have any understanding as to what actually j 13 the technical specification required?- The tech spec states 14 that you shall.get a good leak rate every 72 hours, and if 15 you run a leak rate test that exceeds the one gallon per 16 minute, you have to run -- you have foOr hours to get a good U leak rate or then enter the action, the action statement. 18 i Do you know how the operators interpreted the 19 i technical specifi:ation requirements, particularly with 30 , respect to the one good leak rate every 72 hours? l 21 I s1R. GEPHART: Are you asking how all of the i j 52 0; erat:rs i..terpre:sf the tech 3;s:? 23 *R. CHRI STOPHE ?. : I'm asking if he has any i 24 knowledge as to how the tech spec was interpreted with

  ' 25 regard to the 72-hour requirement.

ll

3 15

    =1                                     MR. GEPHART: EDo.you'mean by indiv'iduals.or do you
    ..8
                      .mean'everybody?
3. MR. CHRISTO?HER: I'm just looking for a general 4L understanding,.what.the general understanding was of the i

5 technical specification. requirement. Since he does run'it,  ; 6' I wouldn' t expect :him to have his own personal opinion as 7- 'to what itLwould be. 1 8 .THE WITNESS: Well, I'm well aware, as I've been

      '8-                 reminded 'recently, of the LER that was misinterpreted.                                                                      So 10                  g m not sure what more I -- what more would you like me to
    'll I                          say on that.            I~ guess I don't recall,'on a daily basis, i

13 of being aware of their interpretation of it. l 1 13 BY'MR. CHRISTOPHER: I4 Q I' guess what I was really coming to that with that, 15 t _ is'there a lot.of instances where, for one reason or another, 18 whether the test was valid or not, they were exceeding the d

b. d
                          .cne gallon per minute tech spec requirement.                                                                     And I was                                     -

18 - concerned as to whether or not you snow at 'any time whether 18 it was recem. ended that they actually, prior :: the LER -- D excluding the ancident with the LER -- where it wac recommended 3 that the plant actually enter into the action statement. YU .

                                   .A         '-      n:: sware of that,       ..c.                                                                                                              lI l

D' .i O h'h s t , in your opinion, Ivan -- just an opinion, I i l 24 guess -- would be -- if the code safeties were leaking and h l M 'with PORV, what e f : .*:t would that have on your ability to get ' I t l 1 . l

pk TFtQ.:r$p ; '

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                                                                                                                                                                                              ,                              ~s "1 :                 a gooci leak rate?'                              Do you see that as having an,y effect
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 $ 2 ';                       at all?                                                          'i   s i
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3 .A- Well,.if any leakaje b47r an effeet on your a. bili'cy, 1

                                                                                                                                                                                  .                                              ~>e +

n , s '. 4 ( e' 4 in this' case. it' qdts to $the drain dank and you can qutntify ', l

                                                     ,t       ,                        ,                                               ..                     2                 i                                              '

A. 5 it.

                                                    / 3> 's+'( h-V 'i d~,a { E             -

y M 9 nt .s s. ,

              .e                            Q              I guesls ony,'of the thidg$                           a that -- and mayNe this                                                                                    i t

7 is a good time for you\ttjo#give me a little lesson. I'm

                                                          ,                 s Vu.                                              ;                                                         '

i 8 trying (to nnderstah{ '- I' understand that if you ,have lea 9 age

    ,)                                        -
                                                           .i                                                    ,                                                            t P             from the co[$ safeties, then the OORV, that is, in ef.f e ct ,
r 4 4 , 3 .( . 'k l, O
                            .vid.ontified leakage.                               'It's diL gone to the drain' tank.

30 v 1 e u - ( 4,  ; , j

                                                                                                                                                                                <                                                         l L                                                                                                           I                    '

hYes. Li '

  • A d .

I

                                't                  4
 -7 (h. -

12

                              ~'

sQ ' If ycu have leakage that continue $ to increase j ' 5

    ^kh .
     .                                                                  y                                                                    y                      ")

13 f rom one or botn'yf those sets of valves so you're han.og a I 14,y continued increase' in your identified leakage, how would that 4 4 . 4 15

                            . affect your an'iity                   i         to get an unidentified leak                                            o rate that'                                                                         !

t  ; i, e 10 met the Itech spec regiirement, or would it? I 1 l l 17 n t W wo ld scar.i like it wouldn't. But ! --

             .Q-j 1B i                   O              I realize this is more of an operational question.                                                                                                                             ]

19 A Ye s . Of course, you're asking at: t the. specific i

0) I

!?~ , , 20 one ;n quest;oa, too, and then they did have the procedure = l 21 change in regard to the drain tank and the density corrections.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          \

22 ;l I guess tha: .; 3 3. '  :, r the pr:r3durs pr:pery pr;:: :: :hs

       .f\.4       ,
          " 23 }              procedure change.

24 i O Right. That's right. I 25 A But once that problem was taken care of, I don't i,

17 1 understand why,that would create an increasing problem. I

             .2                                            Q   Well,    as I understood the TCM, it still only 3                                    corrected half the problem.

4 A I guess I wasn't aware of that. 6 o Okay. In line with that, do you recall any 8 discussions or attending any meetings regarding the continuall;y i 7 increasing tailpipe temperatures as an indication of excessiveI i a valve leakage? Either from the code safeties or the -- 9 A' We were looking at those temperatures and I -- i i

            . 10                                           Q     Who was "we"?

11 A Well, "we" is just the group of people who 13 attended PODS and stuff. 13 O POD is the -- l 14 .i A Well, the plan of the day meeting. Or just the 15 people you interface with in your daily business. I wasn't l I i 16 [ specifically responsible for trying to~ interpret the data and i i 17 l figure it out, and I can't tell you now who I discussed it - 18 with. . 3 19 1' O Who would normally attend these kind of meetings? 20  ! A Ch, they had, -- as I recall, one of the lead i i < l'  ! 21 engineers was required to go. I think they took turns. The 02 sh;f: sups.";scr I D ,' O The operations shift superviscr? 84 A Yes. 23 I Q Would the operations superintendent, Jim Floyd,  ; f I i i I l w-. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

li , 1 Gary Miller, Jim seelinger, would those type of individuals 2 usually attend those meetings? 3 A Not Gary Miller. i 4 Q Not Gary Miller. What level of management would 5 normally attend those kind of meetings? 6 A Normally, up to Seelinger and quite frequently

7. up to Joe Logan.

8 Q When did this excessive continual rise in tailpipeI l 9 temperature actually become an issue of concern prior to the 10 accident? Do you recall? 11 A If I hadn't been through this process I wouldn.'t i L 12 know. Now I understand it was starting early March or  ! 13 something like that. I 14 Q Are you aware of any individual -- probably an ,' l 15 operations type individual -- requesting that the plant be , t I 16 shut down to repair the -- identify and repair excessive 17 valve leakage, and that request being denied? 18 , A So. l l l 19 O Are you at all familiar . tith that T'. :, , th'e 2 echnical change notice? 21 A Well, I've seen it just going through the grand 22 4 :ury pr  :,,3. 23 0 Can you explai.9 what the significance Of the  ::. i 24 is in terms of how it affected the leak rate test? 25 A Well, I haven't, since I've seen it, tried to

e'  ; '< I crunch back through the numbers or anything like that. I k 2 understand it's to correct the density change between the 3 RCS system and the temperature you had in the drain tank to 4 relate the leakage back to what -- the leakage has to be 5- normalized, and it's normalizing that leakage. 4 Q The -- were you aware that this -- this TCN had 7 to go through a PORC review; is that correct? 8 A Yes. 9 Q I understand today that -- by looking at the TC:: -m to while it did compensate for the temperature and the density 11 change for the RCDT, it still had no effect on the water  ! 12 being added to the makeup tank, so we still had the same -- 13 A That TCN. 14 O That TCN. I 15- A I don't think that had anything to do with the 16  ; makeup tank. I i 17 :I ' O Basically, it kind of helped one side but not the F 1 18 other, as I understand it. 19 A What's -- M Q Ey net accounting for the density change for the ' 21 makeup tank additions. , 22 l A  : ell, : --

7;ess : :h ;;h: : .,3 : .;3s pr::3t;,

23 I already in the procedure, but I've heard that it wasn't. - l 24 O Back to the tailpipe, increasing tailpipe ) 25 l temperatures, I think the technical specification states I  !.

2 ', 1 something to the effect.that when your tailpipe temperatures exceed 130 degrees that you were to implement an emergency 2 3 procedure. I think it's specifically- 2202-1.5, Section 6.33. 4 Which requires that the discharge line be placed on the 5 analog recorder. 6 Do you recall ever or why that was never 7 implemented? We know now that that was never done. i l 6 A I believe that the B&W guidance -- are you sure { 8 that's a technical specification requirement, oraproceduresl 10 requirement? II A It's in emergency procedures. , l ' 12 O Yes, but there's an important difference whether 13 it's in the tech specs or in the plant procedures. l I 14 g re.s a plant procedure. l i Yes, but I don't think that's.a tech spec limit, 15 l  ; Q  ! 16 l: and I think it was determined that the'B&W guidance was f, II improperly interpreted. 18 Q Do you know how they arrived at that conclusion? ' [ I 18 A  ::o, n:t -- date, times and pe::lc '- '"ad, .0, 20 I :an't help you witn that. j 21 f Q In other words, in some type of contact be twee n 22 3 g, 3 3 3 3, .

                                                     , 3,,, ; ,    ,, ;, 7 3, 7 ; 3 ;, ; ,. g33 . = .. i ., e . _ , = ; , , , e ., ,; ;

i 0

     ,3 exceeding the 130                t.ney would not have been recuired to do                                              ,

24 tnat? Is that what /ou understand? That's new to me. A I t h i n <. -- as I said, I think the intent of it was l , d, .

                                                                             ,           al I          misinterpreted when it got into the procedure, but I don't
 '8' think.that's a tech spec.
 '3 Q         I think you're right, I think it's not, it's a 4'        plant procedure.
  • 5' l Along the same lines with the -- you can call it a

the EMOV or whatever, do you recall any discussions regarding 7 whether or not the block valve should have been closed? 8 This is in these couple of months prior to the accidents, 8 as these valve leakages are increasing? 10 A No. 11

         ,           Q         Were there any discussions as to the need to 12 P close block valves., do you know?

13 A I know I don.'t recall them. l'

         ;           O          Is that something you would not normally have                                      l 25 been involved with?

16 - i A It's something I might have been involved in, 17 depending on when the discussions o,ccurred, but I don't 18 " recall discussions that we should close the block valve. l A8 " 0 These ':inds cf dis:ussions wculd nc= ally ha es 20

         ,    been between the shif t supervisors and the plant management, UE or who would have :.ade the decision to actually close a
         't 22          g;;    .,3 ; .,, 7    , ., ; , 7                                 g., w
                  .f                           n3 : ng;,u n3 33 , . , , n ,s         3,7 3 1

23

          .I  that time ?

24 ! A The shif t supervisor might, or he might talk to l 25 his superivisor, or he might confer with the mechanical

22 1 engineer or it might come up at a meeting. But I don't ) ~ 2 recall those discussions. i 3'S Q As I understand, there is a period of time in i 4 l the plant that you cannot add hydrogen; you have to add 5 hydrogen during various periods. There was a period of time 6 when the operators could not make the hydrogen additions 7 l from the control room, and they had to have an auxiliary l 8 operator go down to the hydrogen emission stations to  ! i 8 actually make the additions. Are you familiar with that to at all? I 11 g go, l'* ' Q Okay, there was about a three-month time period 13 that that was the case. So you're not aware of operators l 14 I lJ having to instruct the auxiliary operators to go down and i o i 15 " make these additions. 16 A ll I don't recall --  ; 4 e , 1. O If, in fact, they did. 18 i A No.  ! I  ! 19 O How about -- Again, a let :f these ?.re tjerationa' .

 'O type cuestions, but there were I think out of 170 leak rate 21    fj tests that were identified, 39 of the test results were 22
              +;a:;.e 'saka
                       .      s2 f:r the u..;is.. f_t;.                     s:h.;:a;;y, ;t's
 '3 impossible to '. ave a negative leak    a:e s;nce you know you' re ,

24 not making water. 25 Did you ever get involved in any discussions of i O

               ,'                                                                                                              23 I               what the rational basis was for acceptir.g negative leak ratest 2               Or do you know how it was justified to accept a negative 3                 leak ra.te?

4 A If you don't have leakage, the precision of the 5 test is such that it's possible to come up slightly 6 negative. 7 Q I guess what bothers me, I would understand that 8 if we had, you know, a relatively small number of 1 to 5 or 9 something. But when you have 39 negative leak rates out of to 170, to me it just seems there's an indicator that you have 11 a test program that's invalid. And I'm curious as to whether 18 or not that large number of negative leak rates was ever 13 considered to be an indicator that the test problem was 1 14 invalid, was just not a good test program. 15 i A I don't remember discussions. I would think that i 16 f if you had a tight system and it were not leaking, you've 1"  ; got almost a 50-50 chance of coming up negative.  ! IB Q How much negative leakage would you be willing 19 to -- do you think you could rationally accept on a leak 20 rate -- ? 21 A Is this an opinion? I 22 O Yes. D: you think *ru f  : Old rat:Or. ally ar:sp i 23  ! a negative 1 1/2 gallons a minute, or cc yea think it would ~ j

                    'd I

l 34 l have to be a fraction of a gallen? How close do you think ! l l 2 you'd have to be before you would have to say this is just ' 1 a il

1 not valid? - 8 MR. GEPI'A27: You're talking strictly unidentified?

                                                                                                    .I .

3 MR. CHRISTOPl:0.1: Yes, strictly unidentified. 4 I'm trying to just understand what the rationale 5 would be to have a lot of negative leak rates. And we all 8 understand that the program is -- you know, there's going to 7 be deviations in the program, so it is possible to come out 8 with a negative leak rate of wome amount. And maybe I would 8 accept .15 or .25 as a negative leak rate. 10 y.m not sure -- and again, this is my opinion -- 11 could I accept anything exceeding one gallon per minute as i 12 a negative: leak rate. 13 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 14 l 0 As an individual with your background, could you

i 15 i in your own mind justify accepting the negative leak rate 16-
                                                                    ~

l in certain excesses? 17 ) MR. GEPHART: I think you're asking fer a lay 18 i opinion. 18 b MR. CHR~STCPHER: Yes, Ia. That's a*' 20 j asking for. And again, this is an investigative interview l 21 versus formal testimony. That's all I'm asking for, just

      ~~

ld 3r :p ;..1:r .  : l I i

      -3 j                     MR. GEPHART:     If you have one.

24 THE WITNESS: Probably, if I got greater than l 25 a few-tenths negative, I would repeat the test, myself. My l ... I 1 1 . L___________________.____.___________ _ i

       't,                                                                                       25 1,                  own self.        And obviously, if you,get more than 1, then 2                   you're -- my own opinion.              But nobody came over and asked me.

3 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 4 .Q Okay, mat's all I'm asking.. 5 How familiar are you -- you already mentioned s- that it's been shown to you a lot -- are you with that LER 7 78-62 regarding the first time that someone identified that 8 they had actually exceeded the tech spec? 8 A I've read it. 10 MR. GEPHARTL Why not separate your question into 11 how f amiliar were you before the accident as opposed to today. 12 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Yes. I understand that you've 13 been through these interviews four or five times, and I know 14 ' it's very difficult to sometimes separate what you know today 15

             !         versus what you knew back then.               I know that.      And I'm trying i

16 to deal with that time period, as difficult as it is. 17

                !                       THE WIT::ESS:      I think the meeting minutes indicate i                                                                  !

18 that I attended the FORC meeting -- 19 MR. CHRISTOPHER: It does. , 20 THE WITNESS: So at that time, I guess I was 21 familiar with it. But if this was the first time I was 22 in te r /;e.le i, I' 2 itu.I dtr': remember the - set;ng. . I t3 I don't remember the meeting, but everybody said yup, you i 24 were there, so I gu.'ss I was. l l . 1 1

                                                    --                    --     __   .___-___________--___-_________-________-__D

26 4: - - 1 BY MR. C:.'2ISTOPHER: 2 Q Okay. But you can't at this time independently 3 say I can recall entering into a discussion with the other 4 PORC. members as to what we had to do to get back into i 5 compliance or what' actions would actually ,have been taken 4 to get back into compliance? 7 A I don't remember the discussion, no. 8 Q- Or what actually led to the formal initiation of  ! 9- the LER. In other words, someone had to initially identify 10 it,that type of thing. 11 A No. i 12 Q Okay. Are you aware of how the plant got back 13 into compliance? Do you recall that? Can you recall what

                                                                                                                      )

i 14 type of actions were taken to get back into compliance? l 115 A No, I can ' t remember. 16 Normally, what would you have to do to correct Q -- 1., I i

l once you've entered into this LER and the action statement,  !

18 j cf course, you have to identify what it takes to get back i 19 ' into compliance. What normally would you expert the N -operators would do to -- 21 A What I've seen through this process was, I 22 3e;ie fe , 3 e: 3nd 3 p;p,; ar:::.- :s . A F:F: ac:i:.. ::e- , D would be a formal way of creating something of that type. 24 Q And the PORC action item identified several 25 changes that had to be made, as I recall. O

1 A Once' again, if I hadn't been up to the grand jury 2 two months ago, I wouldn't remember that PORC action or 3 anything else. But I have seen that stuff here in the last 4 couple of months. 5 Q Do you know that the basis for getting back into 1 e compliance was another leak rate test that was run, I think, 7 at 7:35 in the morning on the 18th, that that result still 8 was in excess of one gallon per minute unidentified, and it 9 was accepted based on rounding off to one gallon per minute. , 10 A I believe the LER response to the narrative had 11 that in it, but I was not aware of the value, no. 12 Q The LER only states action was taken. It states 13 action was taken to reduce the unidentified leakage to within 14 allowable limits, and this was accomplished at 0735 on i 15 l October 18, 1978. In addition, it was discovered that errors' I 16 l in inputting data to the computer indicated an unidentified , 17 l y leakage to be greater than actually was occurring. 18 It goes on, appropriate personnel would be 19 instructed under the requirements and appli:able ssetions. 20 A And having read that recently, yes, I ' .7 aware of l 21 , it, but I was not aware that that number was greater than 1. 22 "e: _ + : .s: show you -- this is f:r ~:25 :n the i 23 .orning on October 13th, and you'll see that the ne: , ! ( 24 I unidentified leak rate is 1.239 gallons per minute. And } I J 25 l it's okayed by round-off, and I believe these initials are i I,  !.

2 26 ] l i 11 those -- I believe they are Jim Floyd's. I'm not 100 percent p

                                                                                                                       .       I
  • 2 sure of that.
3. Do you recall-any discussions or any justifications 4 at that time as to what would allow them to round this off l i

1 5 to'one gallon per minute? 6 A I'm aware that that was being done for some period l 7 of time, but I really think I became aware of that af ter

         -8          'the charges surfaced.              I don't recall being aware of it 9           at the time.                                                                                          .

to Q You weren't involved in any discussions or 11 rationalizations as to what would allow you to accept or 12 allow you to make the decision to round off. 13 A Not in that timeframe, no, 14- 0 Okay. Do you know how that LER was actually 15 ! submitted, what caused it to be submitted? Whether it was 16 - licensee who identified, or whether it.had something to do 17 ll with the NRC inspector picking it up in the control room and i i 18 , asking questions about it? 19 A No. I've heard the rumcrs that it was an NRC 00 inspector but I don't recall being aware of that. - 21 MS. PENNY: When did you hear those rumors? 22 THE '..*IT':ES S : Oh, -- l 23 : MR. GEPHART: Since the accid.ent? 24 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. Yes. In fact, it was 25 fairly recently. il F '

 - --- ~

r . __i_....

____ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ , - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ = . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - --- 2 's l' O You're saying back at that time ---I kn.ow how 3 difficult-this is to go back to that time. But at that time 3 you weren't aware of what actually initiated the fact -- I 4 the LER. 6 Do you have any knowledge as to how many tests l 6 the operators were running during the shift in order'to get 1 good leak rates? Did they have -- to your knowledge, did s they have a set policy as to how they would approach the 9- getting of a good leak rate test, how many they would run? 10 A I don' t recall being aware of it -- a set - 11 number or a program, no. ,

      -12                      O    Are you aware of any specific prohibitions against 13              add hydrogen to the makeup tank during the test?

14 A No. 1 15 ' Q Would there be any reason.to prohibit it, a s f ar 16 . as you know? P 11 17 ',i A No.

18. O This is another opinion question. Would you 19 consider hydrogen as a chemical emission?

I' N_ . A Probably wouldn't, but -- 21 Q Okay. Do you know if auxiliary operators can,  ; M on their owr, take the additi:n -- and : enti:ned t: y:n 23 that there was a time period, and this is an established L 24 fact, that the operators could not make hydrogen additions 25 from the control room, so it would have to be done by i I l 1 I q

li ~ 3G 1 auxiliary operators. Do you know if the auxiliary operators 't 'were permitted to nahe hydrogen additions to the system on 3 their own by -- make their own reading from a particular 4 gauge and whatnot and say hey, I think we need to add a 5 nydrogen, or would they have been required to only act as e directed by a licensed operator? . 7 A I would think either as directed or else they 8 would at least have to call the control room and then tell 9- them they were going to do it. I'd be surprised if they 10 just did it. 11 MS. PENNY: But you are guessing. 12 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 13 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 14 i Q Yes. Again, it's an operational type issue, and 15  ! you've got a lot of experience indealing with the plant and 16 you know how the;. operate just about as well as anybody else. 17 A As I sa' , I would expect that the aux operator la would call the control room and notify them. I i 19 ' C Okay. t.'e t a lked , again, abcut it and let ce N , repeat this so I understand it, the increasing tailpipe i 21 , temperatures and increasing leakage from either the code 1 22 safeties :: the F:?.", thi:he/er  : .; a s . Ana l' still try.n; i l i 23

      ;    to understand, if it's possible, if this increasing leak rate,-                                                              l l

24 identified leak rate, had an impact on capability to get the 2 unidentified leak rate. i

     'i 31 1                       A     I',m aware that Hal Hartman charges it did. I+

2' think as we discussed before, if you're properly quantifying 3 the leakage I don't see why if it gets somewhat larger that I q 4 compounds the problem. . I

  • 5 O I really don't understand that part of it, but 6 I'm not technically oriented so I'm looking for someone who 7 can explain it to me. i 8 MR. GEPHART: Call Mr.Hartman.

9 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 10 Q We talked about this roundoff of the leak rate. 11 I saw that the order or instruction to round that off was 12 actually inputted into the computer progr am during this 13 October period. And in about I think 10 days later, it was 14 ! , reversed. In other words, the order said no longer can you 15 l round off this leak rate. 16 Are you aware of any of the circumstances 17

          ,j      surrounding why that order to round off the leak rate result 18      ,       was reversed?

l 19 A I don't recall that. if I was. j i E) , O One cf the other allegations was that the l 21  ; operators were Joguing water into the makeup tank. In other j 22 i . rerfs, ;nstesf :f -8:ing :no .arps aff;;;;.- dur;n; :ne :sst, 23 they would, in es ser re , tweak a little ::: c: water in as I i - l 24 time goes on in orJer to keep the level up. It would not 25 show that dramatic. illy in the strip chart. Are you aware of

                                                                                     . l d                                                           .

1 4' 1 I e. anyrinstances where that occurred, as an attempt to manipulate 2 the test results? 3 A .No . r 4-0 I mentioned to you earlier on -- and this was i 5 changed, as I understand it, -- that the operator usually 6 had to manually take a reading from a voltmeter from the 7 drain tank as part of his leak rate calculation. 8 A Are you sure you said drain tank earlier? O Yes. 10 MR. GEPHART: Patch panel, I think you said. 11 THE WIT:!ESS: Somehow it stuck in my mind that I ' 12 you said makeup tank earlier. l{; { 13 i BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 14 O If I did, I should have said the drain tank. I

        '5 And the program was changed so 6at they could automatically i

16 ' input the -- 1 . I.' " i A I have a feeling you said makeup tank earlier 18 I because I was thinking I was surprised that that parameter  ; I O wasr '; alread-  ; in the co puter.

       'O
       ~

Q Okay, if I said makeup tank I should have said i 21 l' drain tank.

              't.

en A  :.: 2-.. re e-ler tr.e d:scuss; n, anyway.

       '3
       ~         I C    Are there two different voltages that you could 24
                      . read off of that, at that time, that you know of?

D tEh One of the indications was that if an operator l

e O. I took a higher reading, voltage reading from the tank, it 2 would indicate that more water had been collected than what 3 actually had been. i 4 A I even designed that panel. l 5 (Pause.) l 6 I would not think the drain tank temperature, 7 however, -- I'm trying to remember if we had one voltmeter e down there. I think we had one voltmeter you could patch in,Ii 9 but -- If you can, I can't tell you how right now. 10 Q You're not aware of any directions or discussions 11 or recommendations to operators that -- to take a higher 12 voltage for that purpose, then? If that, in fact, were done? ' 13 A I'm not aware of any instructions to manipulate l

                                                                                                                 ~

14 to get a good leak rate. i 15 l Q Did you ever just recall -- again, back at that 16 time -- you worked for George Kunder I believe you said. r g' ., q', - A Yes. 18 Okay. Specifically, can you recall you and George I Q 1 19 ' discussing and trying to a rrive at a decision or a cenclusi:r 20 to the prcblem of leak rates? 21 A I don't remember discussing leak rates with 02 Oc : r ;= . Cn: :.; i r. 7 , f:r *: hat it's :rth, t r. 0 ; - h , i;i. ': 23 start working for Cecrge until December. He came d:wr fro-24 Unit I I think at the same time that Jim Seelinger went over 25 and that Jim Logan beca-a superinte,ndent and so forth. I i t

c -

      '                                                                    34 s
                                                                                                                      )

1 Q Who did George replace, do you.reca117

  • 8 A Jim. Jim Seelinger was technical superintendent.

3 George became technical superintendent. 4

                  .Q      ch. And prior to that, you reported directly to 5

Jim Seelinger? l 6 3 ye,, 7 Okay, fine. Q 8 MR. GEPHART: That was December 1979? 8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 MS. PENNY: 1978. 11 1978? MR. GEPHART: 12 - gg, PENNY: Yes. The accident happened in 1978. , 13 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Oh, that's right. In 1978, 14 re m sorry. 15 ! THE WITNESS: Yes. . 16 l BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:

        'l                                     .

I II '

        'l         Q      Unit 1 was down at the time because thev had                                                  l 1

18 l a refueling outage; is that -- during the time of the 18 accident, Unit 1 was down. '

  • A We were coming out of refueling, yes.

I 21 I O How long had they been down, do you know? g 22 A T. : :n ns? d U Approximately two months? Q 24 A Yes. M! Q Did you hear of any discussions, did you enter into I i I

t 23 , 1. any discussions with individuals at a management level whereir 2 the leakage, the valve leakage was discussed, to varying 3 degrees, as it related to a decision as to whether or not 4 the plant should shut down to repair that leakage, and the i 5 decision being that we would not shut down until Unit 1 came i 6 back on the line? 7 A I think I may have,yes, but not -- I mean, it's 8 more desirable to have the second plant up before you take 9 the second one out for maintenance. 10 0 Can you recall in what context a meeting like 11 that would have been in? Was it informal conversation, was 13 it in such as you said, a POD meeting? 13 A No, I don ' t remember that, 14 O i i Do you have any recollection of what individuals I 15 would have sat in on a meeting like that or discussed that 16 type of planning? Again, we're going back a long way, I i 17 :i know it's tough to answer. 18 A No. j But that type of thing I would say would 19 be Joe Logan and supervisory other people.

  • 20 Q And Joe Logan was -- I'm always confused about how I

81 Joe Logan fits into the supervisory chain because -- l 22 A Me's the plant superi tendsnt. l i 23

       '               Q    But he was there --

Iunderstandhewasintraininh 84 l for a good period of the time that he was actually -- i

                                                                                                             }

i 25 l A I Yes, I think approximately a year, then he assumed t a i l \ I 1

N1 I the' plant.' superintendent.'s job on the 1st of December of the 2

1st of January, something like that.

3 Q .W ould that be a unilateral decision on the part of-l' 'a plant superintendent, or would that be'a decis' ion that's

      '8                                                                                                                                  ~

I .made, you know, as an overall managemer.t decision? Do you

    '8 know?

I' A Do I know? I would think that would be the type

    '8 -            of' thing that would be discussed up and down'the chain.

8' I would think.

  ' 10 MS.-PENNY:          Do you recall hearing that discussed 11' prior.to the accident?

I8 THE WITNESS: I think I did, yes. I3 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: I' O But you can't recall specifically in what i 5 ( fashion it'was discussed -- a POD, a PORC meeting, management 16 meeting, or anything like that? j

               '                                                                                                                                                           '}
  .I.'

A Mo, it's just been too long. 18 t O But normally, that would - ormally, the l 19 ind tiduals present'a: somethin- like that w:uld be a clant

                                                                                                                                                                          -1 30 superin te nden t , possibly the Unit 1 superintendent if you                                                                                            l 8I d

were'trying to coordinate activities, those type of things. ) on A .?Os2;Oly. . 23 ' O The -- I'ea n , I realize that in the role that 84' you're in, instru..entation, that most of the questions that 25 we asked you, they were asked in an opinionated nature because i i

                                                                                                                                                                              ]
             ' ll                                                                                                                                                              l l
l :
       "                                                                      37 1            you'r9 not directly involved in that activity.       But in the f

2 position that you held, you would expect that any type of i 3 peculiar problems that they were having with obtaining the 4 RCS leak rates, good RCS leak rates as it pertained to any 5 particular system, may have ultimately fallen on your 4 shoulders, as an attempt to try and correct. 7 I'm really interested in what was the degree of 8 awareness, if you will, and concern as to what -- as to the 9 problems that they were having with getting good leak rates, 10 what kind of things were you being asked to do in support of 11 the operators in order to help them get good leak rates, if j 18 any? 13 A I don't specifically remember, but I'm sure that I 14 if you'll look you'll find that yes, we did re-calibrate l j 15 instruments and stuf f of that type. 1 16 l Q Did the -- was the feeling that the reason that 17 l you could not get unidentified leakage was because of the t 18 leakage from the code safeties and the PORV? 3 19 h A I don ' t know that I recall that. 20  !

              .        O     Do you knew of any particular reason that was                        '

I 81 l' ever assessed as to why they could not get good Icak rates?  ! i 22 I.e., ss it a t-d pr ;;s , <tas it ts:ause f the p.'an: 23 I oscillations, was 1: the operators themselves? Was there l l 24 ever a conclusion reached as to why we could not get a good leak rate, and what we had to do about it in order to get one ? 23 i l l l: , 4 I I .

I A Not that I recall, no. 2 I guess I'm just going to sum this up and pick Q 3 up with a'few questions. One, you personally were never aware 4 of the fact that -- of any operator ever adding either 5- hydrogen or. water to the makeup tank for the express purpose 6 of manipulating leak rate test results. 7 A No, I am not. 8 And you were not aware of any supervisory Q j i 8 j individuals who were aware as to whether or not that was l 10 actually occurring.  ! 11 No, I am not. A 12 Q And by supervi;ory individuals I mean shift 13 - foremen, shift supervisors, operations superintendent and i i 14 l a bove . 15 l And are you not aware of any conscious decision l 1 16 made by management to ignore the fact that the operators i l,' l

                           , were possibly manipulating leak rate test results in order                                             i 18      I   to keep the plant running?

19 li A No, I'- .ot. 20 MR. CHRISTOPHER: Pete, do you have any questions? i { 21 l l MR. CONNOLLY: No. 1 22

                        -l
                                                                             ,;; , 33,:7,37 7 23                      gg, ggpggg7                    gg, 24 MR. CHRISTOPHER:                     Okay, that concludes the inundew.

25 l Wheregen , at 12:05 p.m., the interview was l f,conrluded.)

                                                                'C,  -~T:: ATE 07 F F ; T T.              : . ,5 This is to certify that the attached proces:'.ine;s before the nac co:0!ISSION i.

l In the matter of: INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF IVAN D. PORTER I l

                                                                                                                                                       \

Date of Proceeding: Friday, September 23, 1983 Place of Proceeding: Harrisburg, Pa. 1 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission. Suzanne Young Official Reporter - Typed

                                                                                                             '* ^^^^^-
                                                                                                                       ~

OfficidG Reporter - Signature o t i t a i TAYLOE ASSOCI ATES mt:; s-r e co ==c a tssios at. a taoe tas scerot<, vinciNiA

i POTTS, WILLIAM 1/6/84 NRC OI l l i l 1 l l l l l J l i

o 3 i  !

                                                                                     )

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION 2 3

             ..........................--X 4        In the matter of 6        Investigative Interview of      :

6 WI LLI AM E . POTTS  :

             ............................X 7

8 i 9 10 11 12 Three Mile Island nuclear Plant Route 441 13 Middletown, Pennsylvania 34 Triday, 6 January 1984 15 16 The Investigative Interview of WILLI AM E. POTTS 17 commenced at 10:45 a.m., the witness having been duly 18 sworn by Barry R. Letts, Investigator, U.S. Nuclear 19 Regulatory Commission. E) 21 22 23 24 25 l t

      -O 1             APPEARANCES:

2 On behalf of the NRC: 3 Petcr J..Connolly Investigator 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 6 631 Park Avenue l King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 6 Barry R. Letts Investigator 7' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I e 631 Park Avenue i King of Prussia, Pennsylvania-19406 9 l l

                                          ,,,,c,,,.,.,
                                          <        .) .

10 11 12 13 14-15 1 16 1 1 17

                                                                                                                )'

18 1 19 20 . 1 I

                 ' 21 l

22 23 24 l l

                                                                                                       ^

3 L- . i l

- c EE9CEED1NgS j 3- Whereupon, 3 WILLI AM E. POTTS 4 was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn, was 6 cxamined and testified as follovs:

i , 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. LETTS: i 8 i Q_ Would you please state your full name and spell 8- your last name? 10 A William E. Potts, P-o-t-t-s. 11 Q Your address? 12 A RD 1, Box 420, Mt. Joy, Pa. 17552. 13 . DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 15 Q It's Ht. Joy? 16 A Yes. 17- O Could you give me that zip code again? 16- A 17552. 19 Q Just so I have it for my' records so I can send M you a copy of the transcript, it's RD Number 1, Box 4 20, 21 Mt. Joy, Pa. 17552? 23 A That's correct. i 1 23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 24: DY MR. LETTS: (Continuing) 25 ' O , Bill, before we proceed, would you please read  ! l

-)

y ,, , 4 y,i ' I

          .1-                            i=

1: l'

                                                 ~ 18l USC, -Section 1001, that paragraph right- there?

i8 A 18 USC.

3. MK. CONNOLLY: It.'s Title 18.of. the U.S. Code.

l 4 WITNESS POTTS: I understood that part. 'I'm )< 6 -trying.to remember what 18 is. ) l-6' DIRECT EXAMINATION l x 1 7 ~- BY MR.' LETTS: (Continuing) 8 'O .Do;you have any questions? l

                            '8                              A That could. elicit'a world of questions.-     I have 10                   'very little knowledge --                                             <

Do you understand that paragraph? 11 Q r q

                        -12                                 A  I understand it. I'm liable if I give you a 13                   false statenent. I'm not certain what a material false 14-                  statement ~ is .- But, yes, I understand it.

15 ' MR. LETTS: Fine. 16 ' DIRECT EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 18 O Bill,'what is your present position? 19 A I'm working at Unit 2, reactor disassembly-20 defueling group. A

                        '21                                 O What is your' job title?

22 A My job title is Manager of Project Engineering. 23 ,Q How long have you been in that position? 24 A The title has changed somewhat, but I've basically 25 been in Unit 2 since about September of ' 8 3 -- no, Seoterter I t

                ,i

i : i , 1 of '82, about fifteen months. 2 0 11ow long have you been employed with GPUS k Counting the subsidiaries of GPU, I' ve been an

                                                                   ~

8 A 4 employee since 1970, with one execption. There was a 6 couple of summers' carlier than that that I was a short 6 tern. employee. 7- O Since 1970, has your time been spent'here at 8 Three Mile. Island? 9 A Not totally from 1970. From 1970 to 1972, I was 10 employed by Metropolitan Edison at Saxton Nuclear Experi-11 mental Corporation. And also there were several summers I 12 spoke of earlier that I worked at Penn Elec Engineering 13 Office. From 1976 'til 1978, late '78 I believe it was, 14 I worked for Meted at their Reading of fice. 15 Othe rwise , I-was in TMI, make it from '72 to

   ;16         '76. From '78 to the present.

17 Q And then in '78, late '78, you came back to the 28 Island and -- 19 A Yeah, in December. 20 Q Where were you working from late '78? l 21 A From about December of ' 78 until af ter the 22 l < accident, I was working at Unit 1 as Superintendent, ' L f 23 Techn! 21 Support. , 24 Q And who succeeded you in that position? 25 A I would say -- Superintendent of Technical 4

             '                                                                                              t
   'e          I 3         Support?

0 Yes. 3 A 1 don't believe that job was filled as that 4 title. It became a directorship, and Joe Colitz --- 6 O Director of Engineering? 6 A I'n. not sure if it's Director of Engineering, 7 to tell you the truth. 8 O Joe Colitz took that position? Do you know who 9 i held that position before you assumed it in 1978? 10 A I should know, but I don't remember right now. 11 I would have to think bach on it. George Kunder. Yes, I 12 believe it was George Kunder. l 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. LETTS: ' 15 Q Would you describe what your duties were as i 16 Superintendent of Technical Support during that '78 through 17 the accident time period, '79? Is A The primary duties I accomplished was lead the 19 outage, Unit I refueling outage. There were additional 20 duties, however, I was there just a short time and I did 21 not get into it any great depth. 22 I was the Supervisor of the Electrical Mechanical: 23 Isc and nuclear engineers on site. But during the major 24 Portion of that time, we had Unit 1 in a refueling and it 25 was my job to coordinate the refueling. I

j 1 DIPICT EXAMINATION j i 3 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 3 0 What is your academic background? 4 A A B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Penn State. 6 And, of course, normal high school. i I { 6 Q Do you have military experience in the nuclear 7 field? 3 A No nuclear other than I was on a submarine for a l 9 number of years. But I had other duties. I was not a l 10 naq nue, if that's what you are asking. l 11 O Again, our questioning is going to be limited to 18 leak rate calculations, leak rate tests. And the period we I 13 are looking at is the period of April 1st, 1978 through j 14 March 29th, 1979. l 15 This was recently, this past summer, examined by 1 16 NRC inspectors. Several leak rate tests surfaced that were 17 questionable, th at appear to be similar to leak rates con-l 1s ducted at Unit 2, which is the subject of the recent Grand ' 19 Jury indictments and the upcoming criminal trial. And what 20 we are attempting to do is to find out if those -- was the 21 same problem applicable to Unit 1. 23 In your position as -- excuse me, your position 23 again was Superintendent of Technical Support. And you did 24 not assume that position until December of 1978, and the 25 prior two years you were at Reading?

                                                   . = -

6 I' A- That's correct. 3

                   .2                  0      - What was your function at Reading?.

3 A- I was the Supervisor of Licensing and resoonsib10 1 4 for the nuclear and fossil licensino at.MetEdLplants. 6 Q In that position, ano. also in the position as 6- Superintendent of Technical Support, werc you involved in

 ,                      7        leak rate calculations .from the operations . side of the plant 5              A       No.                                                      j 9-             Q       Would you have any involvement in those particu-10             lar calculations?

1 11 A; I do not' recall having any involvement in those 12 calculations. The procedure was accomplished by the 13 ' operators,;and I was not an operator. 14 O Okay. There are several maintenance memorandums

15- that have surfaced during this recent inspection. .I vould 16 like you to review these and get your comments.

17 The first one is dated 4/28/78, Work Recuest 18 Number 23660, signed by Larry Noll of the Operations De-19 partment. It states in Section Number 3: Makeup tank 20 level recorder is not responding correctly. Put in 100 21- gallons. Recorder went up 8 inches or 240 gallons. If 22 you change makeup tank pressure 4 pounds, level changes 23 1.8 inches. 24 That is supposed to be 1.8.

             .y                         A      I can only see 18.

9

l I' .- 0 Larry Noll told us this is supposed to be J.8. 3 That's why I used 1.8. on top it says: Canec1. Covered by refueling 4 surveillance, and~the initials M.T., which stand for Fike 3 Toolc. 6- Again, this occurred, this work request was 7 submitted prior to you coming back to the plant from Reading. 8 Do-you remember any discussions while you were in your 9 position as Superintendent, Technical Support regarding_the 10 makeup tank level recorder and problems with the recorder? I 11 A No. That's a lot of years ago. I i L 12 Q You don't remember this particular document? L i 13 A This document or any discussion of the level 1 14 recorder on the makeup tank. l l 15 Q. Okay. Another work request, a similar problem, 16 Work Request Number 21284, dated 9/12/77, signed by Paul 17 Chalecki of the Operations Department. In Section Number 3 7 18 it says: Added 200 gallons to makeup tank with badge 134 s-19 control and makeup tank level recorder responded with a 20 level indication of a 300 gallon addition. Suspect makeup 21 tank level transmitter. Investigate and correct. 22 Do you remember any discussions regarding 23 Problems with the makeup tank level transmitter while you 1 I , 24 were in your position as Superintendent, Technical Support? l' 25 A No, I don't. That's the same question you asked I i

    +               1 0 ,
              -l '    carlier.

3 Q Yes. 3 A No, 1 don't. 4 Q What I want to do is go over each of these work 6 rcqucsts, just to refresh your mind, to see if you have sec9 6 .them before, or recall any discussions regarding them. 7 A This was --

               '8            Q      This was in '77, almost a year and a half, almos9 8     two years before you returned, a good year and a half.

10 On top.-it says: Cancel. Covered under surveil-11 lance'1302-5.17. Do you know what that surveillance is? 12 That surveillance procedure. 13 A No. It's on the index. It could be looked up. 14 But I don't remember what 1302-5.17 is. 15 0 The next document, Work Request Number 23904, 16 signed by Paul Chalecki of the Operation Department, dated l I l 17 5/16/78, Section Number 3 states: While adding hydrogen 18 to the makeup tank received makeup tank high level alarm. 19 Level indication on console and computer about 79 inches. 20 High level alarm setpoint is 96 inches. Investigate and- f 21 repair as necessary. 22 Again, this is before your time as Superintendent 23 Technical Support. But do you remember any discussions re-24 garding this particular work request when you assumed your 1 25 position?

1 l l 3 A No, I do not. l 2 Q The next document is -- excuse me for a second. 3 This work request I was just referring to, 23904, on top say F 4 4 Cancel. Covered by Worh Request 23952. 6 23952, which is dated 5/23/78, states in Section l 6 Number 3: Makeup tank level increases 10 inches from an

   '7          addition of 100 gallons.      Should only increase by about 3 I

8 inches. We don't really know any more what the makeup tank j 9 level really is. 4 10 And the second page of the work request, Section 11 19, states: Ron Monser and Mike Hockley unclogged lines to 12 transmitter and checked calibration. Turned over to Jim 13 Freeman to calibrate transmitter, complete and in calibra-14 tion. 15 And underneath that we see the date 5/23/78, and 16 the signature of Mike Toole. And can you identify whose 17 signature might be on the lef t hand side? 18 A Ho, I can't make that out. gg O The next document I would like to show to you is 20 24843, dated 8 August '78, Section Number 3: Transmitter / 21 recorder erratic. Suspect that reference leg has moisture 23 in it. i l 23 On the second page, in the Section 19, it says: 24 Blev down low side. Got a lot of water. 25 Do you know -- can you recall any discussions in

             ,                   I    which there was mentioning of problems with water in the l

1 3 referencc leg? 8 A No, I do not. s 4 Q Do you recall any discussions in which it might h, 6 have been discussed problems with the transmitter? i 6 A No. 7 Q You were a member of the PORC and POD at that 8 time, correct? 9 A Yes, I was. 10 Q The pre-accident period. And even the post-11 accident period, can you recall any discussions in the same 12 light, of problems with water in the dry reference leg or 13 problems with the makeup tank level transmitter? 14 A No. 15 Q Were you aware of how operators conducted leak 16 rate calculations in that time frame? 17 A In general, I was aware. I f you mean by aware ,  ! 18 generally how it was conducted -- 19 Q Yes. 20 A I could not tell you now specific things each 21 operator did, but I was generally aware of it. 1 22 Q Eow was the program conducted at that time? 23 A There was a procedure, an approved procedure. 24 And what it generally required was marking or recording of 25 the level in the several tanks and doing a mass balance, i i

l r. I essentially is what it was.

             '2-            0      Was that a computer program?                              )

3 A I don't believe so. No. I think that was a 4 J J 4 hand calculation. 6 Q The reason why I asked, the operations peopic 6 indicated to us it was a computer program at that time. f 7 A It's possible it was in Unit 2, but I. thought at f i 8 Unit I we were still doing it manually. 9 Q At that time, they were doing it computer. 10 A Well, at Saxton we always did it manually, and ) 11 that's when I did more operations. At TMI I was not ever 18 in the operations. 13 0 of course, as you say, you were not in the I4 operations field and you would not have been involved in 15 the daily running of leak rate calculations in the control ) 16 room, correct? 17 A That's correct. 18 0 You would really have no knowledge of what was 19 going on in the control room regarding leak rate calcula-20 tions? l 21 A That's correct unless I had some reason to walk 22 up and ask them a question, l- 23 Q Some general questions that are the essential 24 topics of our investigation. Are you aware of operators j 25 at any time that threw away so-called invalid leak rate 3

Ja 4 1- tests? 2 A I have no firsthand knowledge of that. 3 j 3

                       . ccrtainly have a lot of secondhand knowledge, or informatio$

4

                  }

coming from newspapers and reports. But no firsthand l 6 i knowledge of that happening. 6 O Do you know if operators were adding unrecorded 7 water additions to the makeup tank to effect leak rate ( 8 l tests? I I A

               ,                     I do not know of that, nor do I believe it               .

10 happened. g Q Do you know if operators deliberately added 12 small tweaks of hydrogen to the makeup tank in order to 13 ef fect leak rate tests? g A No. 15 0 Are you aware that a loop seal has been identi-16 fied at Unit 1 in the same light as has been identified at 17 Unit 2? gg A No. I wasn't even aware that one was identified 19 at Unit 2. I'm not trying to follow that investigation i 20 very closely. 21 O Are you aware of how a small tweak of hydrogen 22 would have an effect on leak rate tests? 23 A Not really. I have not set down and tried to 24 figure out what increase or decrease in pressure would do 25 to the -- it depends an awful lot, I think, on your level i P

3L . I transmitter, whether the level transmitter is vented to 2 atmosphere or vented to tank. And I would have to go look 3 I and sec. I guess in this case it's vented -- it has to be 4 vented to tank. 6 O You don't remember any discussions in the pre-  ! 6 accident period or the post-accident period in which someonc 7 might have identified that the problem with the water in the 8 line was being caused by a loop scal? 9  ! A No. I 10 Q Do you know if any operators willfully, de-l  ! 11 liberately altered leak rate tests by either the addition i 18 of hydrogen or the addition of water during the test? I 13 A No, I do not know of any. i 14 Q Do you know if management personnel pressured is operators to get good leak rate tests during the same time 16 period? 17 A The phrase you have used is one that could be 18' interpreted in a number of ways. 19 Q Let me rephrase my question. By pressure, I me an 20 exerted an undue amount of pressure on the operators to  ! 81 i l force them to get a good leak rate, and that pressure 22 would force them to cheat or to fudge on the test itself? 23 i A I know of no management pressure to cheat or to I 24 fudge. I do know that there was manage. ment concern in 25 l meeting the tech spec. That's why I was worried about the i

               '                                                                                       4(

I c 1 word " pressure". There was pressure to, in fact, comply 8 with the tech specs; it came from. management. And the 4 1

3.  !

Icak rate tests, of course, were part of the tech spee. j 1 4

                                            .But there was none -- no kind of pressure that I                 l g
                                                                                                                )

6 would interprc t or believe would cause, or request, or in ) any way influence an operator to cheat, to lie or to modify 7 records. I guess'that's part of cheating. No.  ! 8 o Okay. Are you aware if'any management personnel i I directed operators to manipulate leck rate tests by either 10 - the-additions of hydrogen or' water? l 11 A No,- I'm not. 12 O Do you know if the operators during this time I 13 period were experiencing problems running leak rate tests?. 14 A No. 15 O Do you know if there were problems with unidenti-16 fied leakage? 17' A No. Is Q That is unidentified leakage that was exceeding 19 the 1 GPM tech spec requirement? g) A That would be tech spec violation. I'm'not 21 aware of any, no. 22 Q Or with problems with . excessive identified 23 leakage? 24 A No, I'm not aware of any. 25 l 0 During your short term as superintendent of i

Je > 1 Technical Functions prior to the- outage, were you aware if

        't'           they were having any problems with leakage at the plant?
3 A Boy, that's a hard question based on a number of-4 years. I almost have to answer from a logical standpoint, 6- that I was aware' there was plant leakage because it's e normal to have some leaky valves. And we were up for a 7 -very short period of time. It was probably the third week 8

of Februarv when the reactor was shut down for refueling, L 9 and I would guess --.I don't remember firsthand, but I 10 would. guess that there were some leaky valves in the plant , m f 11 that were on schedule for repair. ',' , 12

                    .      'O            But was a leakage a problem?

L : L_ 13 A Not'that I remember, no.

         -14                    0        some people have described the plant as being
                           . -                                                                    'l 15           a tight plant.          Would you concur with that opinion?

16 A The last several years TMI had been one of the best run' nuclear power plants in the country, and part of 18 that is , yes , it was a tight running plant. We had had 19 Very small leakage. And in general very minor maintenance 20 problems, which was why we had such a good running record. 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION i n BY MR. LETTS: L 23- 0 Were you aware of negative leak rates being l-24 calculated when the tests were run? 25 - A No, I'm not aware of any negative leak rates. 6

l JE 1

                 -1 I can only speculate. I'm not aware of any.

3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 4 o Do you'know if there were prob 1 cms with the 5 computer program in regards to Icah rate calculations? 6 A Not to my knowledge. l 7 0 What was your interface with your counterpart at g Unit 2 at this time, during this time period? g A The actual interface was very small, because 10 it was more than a full day to supervise-the refueling [ t 11 outage. Normally, it would have been more of'two Superin-12 tendent, Technical Support working closer together to keep 13 the two plants procedures closer together, and also there j 14 was a move at that time to put Unit 1 into the standardized i 15 tech specs which Unit 2 was in. And once the refueling was 16 over, the engineering effort would be largely taken up by - 17 us moving into that standard tech spec, which is a big 18 leap or would have been a big leap for TMI. 19 Q Do you recall any discussions with your counter-20 part at Unit 2 regarding problems with Unit 2's leak rate -1 21 calculations or problems with Unit 2's leak rates? 22 A No. 23 Q Do you know of any discussions with anyone at 24 Unit 2 in which they indicated that there was a -- that it 25 was a corporate decision to keep Unit 2 on line until Unit 1

19 l' was' ready to come back f rom the refueling outage? 8- A No. No. That didn't happen. 3 0- Do you have any information at all'regarding 4' methods that operators might have used to alter leak rate 6 tests in order to get good _1cah rates other thko by .the d 6 additions of. hydrogen or water that we have nc;c discussed 7 today? _g. A- No.

       ,              0-     Do you have any information.at all regarding the 10 falsification of any leak rate test data at either units, 11         Unit 1 or Unit 2?

A No. 12 O Do you know of any individuals who might have 33 14 knowledge of the f falsification of leak rate at either Unit 1 15 or Unit 2?

      '16 A      No. I doubt if they exist.

17 O Do you know of any individuals who might know of 18 someone who has knowledge of the falsification of leak rates 19 at either units?

       -20              A      NO-21              O     Prior to our questioning today, has anyone from 22       the Company discussed with you questions and answers in 23       regards to'our investigation?

24 A No. I was simply informed that an appointment was {. 25- set and that I could expect to be into a conversation with

i 1 .the Company after this interview.- And I did, in fact, try 2 to find out what kind of questions was. going to be asked but i 8: I could not get anybody to answer them-for me. j 4 DIRCCT EXAMINATION 6 BY MR. LETTS: s O Bill, I believe you stated that leak rates were 7 run on every shift, correct? I g A I don't believe I stated that. I believe that.

                                                                                                         )

e is the-practice, but I don't remember-saying that. 10 Q Do you remember what the tech specs were for leak 11 rates at the time? A I think it was 1 GPM unidentified leakage and 10 < 12 13 GPM identified leakage. 0 How of ten.was the unit required to run a leak 14 15 rate? A I think it was required by tech specs once a day, 16  ! but we ran them shiftly, if I remember correctly. 17 18 0 Do you recall the ' rationale for running them 19 shif tly as opposed to once every twenty-four hours? l 20 A No, I don't actually recall the logic that went 21 into making that decision. It was probably like many tech 22 specs. If you look -- in f act , I think if you look at all 23 of our tech specs, you will find we have just come away fron 24 the limit a certain amount in every case. f 25 For example , the instrumentation setpoints for

d. I 1 protection of the core, we did not set any of the instrument s 2 at tech spec limits, because as soon as you would have an 3 instrument drift you would automatically be into a tech 4 spec violation. You back off from those, allow yourself a 5 margin, so that your instruments can play within that. i 6 It was just a standard practice. 7 k Okay. Q And you were not aware of the existence of 8 a loop seal in the Unit 2 makeup tank ystem? 9 i A No. 10 MR. LETTS: I have nothing further. - l l 11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 12 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 13 Q You are not aware of a loop seal either at 14 Unit 1; is that correct? 15 A No. ' i 16 Q Or any discussion regarding a loop seal? l l

   ' ~ '                                                                                l 37              A      The first time I've heard the discussion is            I 18         right here.

19 MR. CONNOLLY: That concludes our questioning. 20 Thank you very much, Bill. 21 (Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m. the interview is

                                                                                        'l 22               concluded, this same day.)

I 23 24 l I i l l 25 i I

23

 . g
  • 1 l-CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS l- 2 This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the 8

NRC Investigators l 4 In the matter of: Investigative Interview of 1 { WI LLIM1 E . POTTS 6 { Date of Proceeding: 6 January 1984

                     -4 7

Place of Proceeding: ' Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant,. Route 441, Middletown, Pennsylva n 8 was held as herein appears, and that this is the original 9 transcript for the file of the Commission. 3 10 l 11 12 13 MYRTLE H. TPAYLOR Official Reporter - Typed 14 15 le N N. CA~too Of ficial Reporter - Signed { 18 19 to 21' 22 23 24 25 4 w-~ -___-_._._L---_____.-.--__- . - - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ .

POTTS, WILLIAM 3/7/85 Stier Investigation i I l l i

       .I                                                      IN RE:      TMI I1. LEAK RATE TEST ~ PRACTICES 2

3 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM E. POTTS l

      '4 i

5 . .. . 6

                                                                     ' Verbatim. report of deposition 7

held at Trailer 110B, Three Mile LIsland, Middletown,-Pennsylvania, on Thursday, 8

                                                                                  ' March 7,            1985 9                                                                               2:00 p.m.
10. * *
  • l11 q

12 13 14 APPEARANCES: 15 EDWIN H. STIER, ESQUIRE i 333 Littleton Road ,j 16 Suite 102 '! Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 17 BY: FREDERICK P. DeVESA, ESQUIRE 18 For - GPU Nuclear j f 19 l 20' 21 22 23 l j 24- ) i 25' l

                                                                        '"a.PITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE                                                            )

BOX 11908 FIDERAL SQUARE STATION HA RRI'4URG, P A 17108

2.

                                                                                                             )

1 'WILLIhM E. POTTS, having been 2 duly sworn, was called as 3~ a witness and testified 14 as follows: 5 DIRECT. EXAMINATION I-6 BY MR.- DeVESA: 7 Q. Would you give your name for the' record, 8 Pl ease? 9 A William Earl Potts. 10 11' Q Bill, were you employed by Metropolitan Edi-

                                                     ~

12 son Company around October of 1978? 13 A Yes, I was. 14 Q And can you tell me in what capacity you 15 w e employed by the company at that time? l 16 A Supervisor of Licensing. 17 Q Give me a brief description of what your lg duties entailed at that time. 19 A- I supervised the Licensing Department for 20 Generation Division. Our responsibilities included Fossil 21 and Nuclear Licensing for Met Ed's Operating Plants. 22 Q To whom did you report?' 23 A George Troffer, T-r-o-f-r-e-r, Manager of 24 Licensing. 25 Q Can you tell me how many individuals re-CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE toX 11908 FIDERAL SQUARI STAlloN HA0niW 43 PA 1710B

3

         -1    ported'to you?
        -2                      A'      Approximately seven or eight.                                                                Do you need 3

O No. I'm just trying to get a general sense 4 5 of the number of people that you would have been directly 6 supervising at that time. Was it part of your responsibility at that time to review Licensee Event Reports that were pre-7 8 Pared by various individuals in the company? 9 A Yes. 10 0 And can you tell me the nature of the re-

       .11     view that you would have performed and the purpose of that 12    review?

13 A The purpose of the review, in general, was 14 to see that it was, in my opinion, acceptable for Manager of 15 Licensing and Quality Assurance approval and Vice President 16 of Generation's signature, to send to the Nuclear Regulatory 17 Commission. Specifically, I would look at-things such as 18 wording, the clarity of the report, completeness of the report , 19 .the timeliness of the report. 20 0 What would generally occur if you found a 21 report to be incomplete or were inaccurate? What steps would 22 -you 'take? I 23 A I'd contact the island people who had writte n 24 the report; discuss it with them. It's a little hard to ima-25 gine 1~would find something inecurate, without having a reasor CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 + FIDERAL $QUARE STATION H ADMallRC, P A 17108

                                                                         -                      _ _ - _ _ _ - _ . _ _ - _ - _ _                       __ _____A

4 l 1 to ask questions. l-2 o Would this review process be something l 3 that you would become involved in personally or would one of 4 your subordinates actually review the document in question anc

   ~5   make these kinds of initial determinations?

6 A Both are actually the case. One of my 7 subordinates would have reviewed it before 'I did and then I 8 would review it before it was submitted to the Manager. l 9 Q Was it part of your responsibility at that 10 time to actually investigate whether the event in question 11 took place'as reported?  ! 12 A No, I didn't consider it part of my respon-13 sibilities, investigatory.

14 0 So, it was primarily to review the written it report and to determine if the report on its f ace was adequatc  !

16 dnd properly Written? -l 17 A Yes. 18 0 And did you also have any responsibility to J 10 determine the adequacy of the action that was taken to resolve j l 20 the event in question? I 21 A Yes. 22 Q What was the nature of that review? J 23 A That was a review to see that the action in I \ ! 24 my mind addressed the issue. 25 Q Now, was it part of your responsibility to 1 CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 FEDERAL SQUAP! STATION HAH!S6utG PA 17108

5 1 actually investigate whether the reported action, or the pro-2 mised action, had, in fact, occurred or was it merely to'ex-3 amine the writing again and'to make an assessment as to, if 4 true, the action would adequately solve the' problem? 5 A The latter is the case. We relied on being 6 informed by the action party that they had completed the 7 action that they had committed to or the company had committed 8 to. And our only. judgment was, did we answer the problem, g completely. 10 Q Let us assume that in a given case, the 11 LER that you, review is adequate on its face. Tell me again 12 what steps you would then take to see that it gets properly 13 Processed and ultimately signed by the Vice President. 14 A The Licensing Engineer, who worked for me, q

             - 15 '       had the responsibility of receiving the information from the
              '16         island, producing the LER form and the letter, that would senc                                                                      i 17         it to the Commission as well as the other legal requirements,

, 18 would produce an action item, which was a. piece of paper-that f gg started a tracking mechanism to insure that the action item l 20 was completed and to charge both the primary and the secondar) l 21 individual, as responsible to complete that action. , 22 I don't just offhand recall other actions 23 that were taken, but those several things would occur and the l 24 report then, would come to me and I would see that it containe d 25 all of those things and pass it on to the Manager and then CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 FEDERAL SoVARE STATION HUD'9U#G, PA. 17106

6 - 1 later pass it on to the Vice President. 2 O You said that you would pass it on to the 3 Manager and then later pass it on. Would you get the file bac k 4 from the Manager after his review or did you mean that he 5 wouM pass it on to the Vice President? 6 A I would only get it back customarily from 7 the Manager, if he had questions or concerns. If it met his 8 satisfaction, then he would pass'it on to the Vice President. - -- e However, once the Vice President was involved with it, if he 9 - { 10 had any questions, he would very often talk to me or perhaps 11 both the Manager and I. , 12 O So, if there were no problems with the LER - 13 as reviewed and approved by you, it would be sent -- after re-2 14 view by the Manager, it would be sent directly to Mr. Herbein? 15 A Yes. ,. 16 Of course, the Manager during this time frane O 17 that you're referring to, is Mr. George Troffer? - 18 A Yes. gg Q In your role as the supervisor of Licensing, 20 did you have any relationship with the Generation Review Com- - 21 mittee? 22 A Yes. A 23 Q And can you describe that relationship, with 24 respect to review of LERs? , 25 A My memory is very poor, insofar as the Gen-CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 . FIDERAt SQUARE STATION hat 9'54 t?".. P A 17109 4

N 7 1 eration Review Committee goes. I have during the last few 2 years, for one reason or another, recalled that I was a member 3 of the Generation Review Committee and we did have an involve-4 ment with LERs. 5 Precise involvement I don't recall. I be-6 lieve that there was a sub-committee of the Generation Re-7 view Committee, that reviewed LERs and any that were ques-8 tionable or had a question, were brought to the full Committec 9 to discuss. And any that were found to be ordinary or ac-

                                                                                                          \

10 ceptable were just reported back to the Committee as such 11 and not handled by the whole committee. 12 O I'd like to discuss one particular LER 13 with you and that is LER 78-62, IP or IT and I'd like to 14 first of all, ask you if you have arsy independent recollection. 15 of an LER that dealt with failure to invoke the action state-16 ment in October of 1978, after reactor coolant system leakage 17 had exceeded limiting conditions for operation. Do you have is any independent recollection of that particular LER? 19 A I only recall having discussed the LER with 20 you some weeks ago. I do not recall it independent of that 91 meeting. 22 Q Okay. I'd like you to take a look at the 23 LER that I've just referred to and also the cover letter, 24 dated November 1, from Mr. Herbein to the NRC and tell me 23 if you can in anyway, from looking at that, tell whether you CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE lok 11908 FEDERAL 50VAk! STATION H A M$ 310 F- PA 17108

                    .{ .,                        [l                  '.           ,

N, 8 I have seen that particular LER before? l 2 A I know that I've seen this before in our > 3 earlier conversations. I've even written on the lower left-4 hand corner some initials, which I recognize as my handwri-5 ting. 6 Q My question pertains to whether or not 7 you can tell whether you had seen it back in November of 19781 8 A Not from reading this, no. I could not an- _ g swer whether I had or had not. 10 Q I'd also like you to take a look at another -

                                                                                                                        ~

11 copy of that same LER. This one attached to some type of a , 12 memo from J. L. Seelinger to George Troffer. undated, but it 13 has a marking that it wes received by Met Ed Company Genera- s , s3 14 tion Division, on or about November 3. 3 , (/ (g */'c 15 Could you examine that for a moment. , ys-16 A 1 Examining the LER) , f) ,- ,a 1 o, 17 Q Now, from looking at that particular docu- O[/, tg ment, can you tell whether or not you had seen that document 19 or had any responsibility for reviewing that document, back 3 ,;*)[, .

z. ,

20 in November of 1978? ' g,' ) 21 A From the document, I can't tell whether I .';P'} .

                                                                                                        ~)
                                                                                                                  . ', d
                                                                                                                ,e) '

22 had reviewed it. n

                                                                                                 \% +) , ,

23 Q Based upon your role at the time, would it 'N be your impression, that you did, in fact, have soniething to f.w Od 24 ,

                                                                                                              . s 25   do with the review of this LER?

d CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERV :E Box 11908 FECERAL SQUARE STA'floN H A Mi$WG P A 171M C.

29. , \f Qa .p
 '    '      *            *      ~.
                                                                        ~ ~

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               ..                           N                                       :
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                                            .4                             n  ,

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   +
                                   .                                                                              9
      -3 A    Yes.       Based on the practices that we were
      -2    using atthat time,-I would.have most probably handled this.

3 0- 'And of course, you-do not'at this time have any. independent recollection of havin'g any' involvement with 5 this LER? g-6 A That's true.- 0 An examination of those two copies of the 7 8 .LER will demonstrate that the version of the LER submitted'to 9 the NRC'by.Mr.'Herbein, has been one: Retyped. And two: 10 Altered to a certain extent to inc12de some additional infor- l mation.. i 11 12 Can you tell me how that process might have 13 occurred'just generally based upon your recollection of the 14 way' things worked at that time? 15 A Any of the several review stages that an 16 LER went through, could have resulted in asking the question 17 that produced additional information. Once the question.was 18 raised of how the leakage was reduced, would have beer. very 19 logical for either me to send an engineer to the island to 20 get the answer by talking to the people who were involved or 21 more probable perhaps , would have been just a telephone call

     - 22   and asking questions.

23 O The form prepared by Mr. Seelinger would 24 suggest-that the LER was originally sent directly to Mr.

       .25    Troffer. How would it have gotten to you af ter receipt by Mr.

CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 FEDERAL SOUAL. STAfioN HARRi%URt". PA. 1)t08 ]

10 J l 'Troffer? 2 ^ Incoming mail of this sort, was a requiremer t

            -3   that the Secretary make four copies of, one of which was sent J

4' to me, Even though it was not addressed to me or carbon 5 copied to me, I would have gotten it by that system. 6 0 Do you recall who would have gott *. the other 7 copies f rom Mr. Troffer's secretary? 8 A One of them wouldtave been the Licensing g Engineer, who was responsible for TMI II Nuclear Licensing. 10 One of them would have been for the Engineering Manager and 11 one of them would have been for the Vice President. 12 0 Aside from your review, is it your recollec-13 tion that these other individuals would have also engaged in 14 some type of a review of the same LER simultaneously? 15 A I think not simultaneously, but other in-16 dividuals would have been involved in the review more in a 17 series process. 18 O Assuming that there were questions raised 19 about the adequacy of this LER and that changes were in fact 20' made, how would those changes be documented? l 21 A Well, the first documentation would be the 22 second copy you have here, which is a file copy of the letter ] j 93 that was sent to the NRC. There was a distribution list, a h 24 standard distribution list of all correspondence to the Nuclea r 25 Regulatory Commission and they would have also received copiet CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11909 FEDERAL SQUARI $TAlloN HA'ItiMU17., PA 17108 J_-__:-____-_--

11 1- of this.

                         '2                       .Q   I suppose.my question though is, not'docu-3         mentation of the final' draft,- if you will, but how one might 4        document.the various changes that were made, prior to the 5         issuance of the final dra2t? Changes that would have been 6         made in Reading, presumably?

7 A Those, if I understand the question correct-3 ly, should have been documented on.a Telecommunication's Form, 9 assuming that the question was raised and then the phone call 10 was made to the island. That phone call should have been do-11 cumented and I' assume was documented, on a Tel-Con Form with 12 either Jim Seelinger or PORC member such as Hilbish, H-i 13 b-i-s-h. 14 0 If a review of the PORC files and.various

                       ~15          other files at the island does not reflect any change in the 16 LER as it was origin' ally sent to Reading from the island, 17        . where else might one look to determine how and why the changes ip          were made?                                                            !

19 A I would attempt to locate the Liceneing file 20 in the Generation Division. 21 0 Do you have any idea at this time, where that 22 file might be located?  ! 23 A No, I don't. 24 Do you recall the name of the last person O 3 who would have been responsible for maintaining that file, CAPITAL. CITY REPORTING SERVICE toX 11908 FEDERAL SQUAR! $TATION HARR64URG. PA 1710A

l J 13

     -1   :back'in 1978,.1979' time' frame?

2 A Several people would tave been involved. 3 'Could have been Bob Lingel, or. Jim Stair. The secretary that 4 would have been most famliiar with that filing system would 1 5 have been Toby-Stanisslaw, S-t-a-n-i-s-s-1-a-w, I believe. 6 Perhaps, even Maureen Hoffman,. Jack Herbein's secretary, l 7 would have knowledge.of that file. l 8 0 Based upon your recollection the practices

     .9    at:the time, Bill, is'it possible that Mr..Herbein himself
   ' 10    or Mr.Troffer, might have cptten on the phone and .made a few 11   phone calls and then simply made this correction without any            ;

i

   . 12    documentation having been produced or generated?

i 13 A It's possible that assuming for the' sake of  ; 14 discussion that Jack raised, that Mr. Herbein raised the ques-15 tion, it's quite possible that he could have turned around 16 behind him on his credenza with the telephone and with he and i

     - 17   I there, called. Jim Seelinger, gotten the information.and ther, i

18 I'd have been assigned the job of changing the report to re-19 flect that.information. 20 0 Recognizing, of course, that this is specu-21 lative at this point, but is it possible that if something lik e i 22 that occurred, it would not have been some documentation in 23 any of the files, with respect to the change that was made? b 24 A It's possible that that change could have 25 been made without some kinds of documentation. I'm troubled CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 FEDERAL SQUARE STAttoN HAR?tSRURG P A 17134'

l I 13 1- by_an earlier statement, that the file copies here at TMI ) 2 did not have a copy of the one that was sent to the Commission , 3 because they,.the TMI, was on standard distribution to re-4 ceive a copy of what went to the island. l 1 5 Q I didn't mean to suggest to you that the { 6 final version of the LER had not been distributed to the is-7 land. Only that the PORC files, which demonstrated the re-g view.of that LER, still contained the first version of it and 9 not any corrective version. A It's certainly possible that that could 10 v 11 have happened, however, the PORC Secretary should have re-12 ce.ived a copy of it. 13 0 Apart from various individuals getting a y copy of the final draft of the LER as it was sent to the nRC, 15 is it possible that the corrections, which resulted in that 16 final draft, would not be documented in anyone's file, if j 17 they were made as a result of phone calls between Reading and 18 the island? 19 A It is possible that that could have hap-20 Pened,-yes. 21 O Was there some type of a hard and fast rule 22 that if Mr. Seelinger got a call from Mr. Herbein and Mr. 23 Herbein then decided that an LER should be enhanced somewhat, 24 that Mr. Seelinger would have to go back to the draft that 25 he had originally sent and make a note that it had been cor-CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE BOX 11908 + FEDER AL SQUARE STATION HAti#lsautG PA 17109 i

14 1 rected? 2 A No. Not that I'm aware of. 3 Q So it is conceivable, at least, that cor-4 rections could be made and the only evidence of those cor-5 rections would be that a final draft would come out bearing 6 those corrections and one would not find documentation in the 7 various files that those corrections were made? 8 A Not only conceivable, but perhaps, likely, 9 because the thrust at that time was to relieve the island of

  '10    as much paperwork type things as it was possible,                                                                        and to put 11     that burden on the licensing engineers.

12 So, it would have been logical to assume 13 since they were going to receive a copy and we had talked with somebody frcm the island and they were satisfied with an 14-15 additional phrase in that LER, that that was all that was done . 16 Q Bill, I have no further questions at this 17 point. I'd just like to thank you for coming down. Do you 18 want to add anything? i 19 A No. Other than the amount of time that-has 20 elapsed, it makes it very difficult to be positive about any-21 thing. ) i 22 O I understand. Thank you very much. l 23 (The deposition was concluded at 2:20 p.m.) ' l l b- *

  • 24
  • l 25 CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE lox 11908 FIDERAL SQUARE STAT!oN HARRitBURG, PA, 17108
      -.                                          __                                                                       -- _________-___-____a
      .l'
      -                           I hereby certify.that the testimony taken 2 .-   by 'me in the within matter is fully and accurately indicated 3

in my. notes and this.is a true and correct transcript of  ! same. 4 5 l 6 hfa lA o'

    .8                                                 Richard A. Frank i

Court Reporter-9 10 11 j 12 13 l 14 , 15 l 16 17 i 18  ! 19 20 21 j. 22 l 23 24 25 CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SERVICE 30X 11908 FEDfRAL SQUAki STATION j HAPR!utlRG. PA 17108

i l 1 1 i f I l l' i POTTS, WILLIAM i 4/18/85 Stier Investigation I 1 l 1 j l l i I I 1 i l I l l l

         -m-________.____.____.._

J 1-2 3 4 IN RE: THI II L EAK RATE TEST PRACTICES 5 Deposition of WILLIAM POTTS 6 Verbatim transcript of tel eph one de po si tion 7 held at the Office of Edwin B. Stier, on Thursday, April 18, 1985, at 1:00 in the 8 afternoon. 9 10 11 12 l 13 i 14 ) i 15 16 A P PE AR AN CE S: 17 E DW IN B. STIER, ESQ. 18 BY: FREDERICK P. DE V ES A, ESQ. Attorneys f or G PU N u cl ea r Corporation 19 20 21 22 23 T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG Certified Shorthand Reporters 24 10 Park Place  ! Morristown, New Jersey 07960 i 25-(201)285-0411 T A YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG _ -___-_ - ____ D

7 3

                    'l                          I N D EX 2 WITNESS                      DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS 3 WILL I A M POTTS
                   '4      By Mr. DeVesa                3 5

6 7 8 9

                 - 10.                                                                           1 11                                                                             /

12 13 14 - 15 16 17 18 19' 20 21 22 23 24 25 w. h

      .t.

TAYL OR - AN D FR IEDB ERG _

a 1 W I L' L IA M POTTS, 1 2 testified as f ollows, i 3 4 DIRECT EXAMIN ATION BY MR. DE VESA: 5 i Bill, for the record, this is Fred I 6 Q 7 DeVesa and I'm calling f rom 333 Littleton Road in 8 Pa r si ppa ny . Present with me is Ka r en Carlin., a j 9 Certified Shorthand Reporter, who is going to be j 10 making a verbatim record of our co ny er sa ti on. 11 B a si cally , I am calling because some additional 12 questions hav e a risen regarding L ER 7 8-6 2, w hi ch I 13 talked to you about a few weeks ago and I j ust 14 wanted to ask you some questions that we did not 15 cov er last time. Do you understand that? 16 A Yes, I do.  ! 17 Q Fi r st of all, Bill, did you receive a 18 number of photocopied documents f rom Bob Winter on 19 or about April 9th, 19857 20 A I received your memo da ted April 9 th and it 21 had attached to it som e do cum ent s, yes. 22 Q Hav e you had a ch an ce to r ev iew them 23 at all? 24 A Yes, I hav e. 25 Q Bav e those documents in any way i i T AYL OR AND FR IE DB ERG

i 5i Di r e ct - Potts 1 j ' i 1 ref reshed your recollection rega rding the j l 2 circumstances surrounding the issuance of that L ER? i I 3 A N o. { 4 Q I am sorry, did you say no? 5 A That is correct, I said no. 6 Q Okay. In any ev ent , Bill, if you 7 will, what I would like to do_ is j ust go ov er those 8' documents with you and understanding that you have 9 no independent r recollection a t this time, it might 10 be h elpf ul if may be you co ul d a t lea st help us 11 reconstruct what occurred ba sed upon your knowledge f 12 and y our un de r standing of general practices at the 13 time. Do you under stand what I need?

   ~

14 A Yes. 15 Q Okay. Fi r st of all, Bill, I woul d 16 like you to take a look at the letter regarding 17 repor tabl e occur rence 7 8-6 2 da ted Octobe r 19th, 1978 18 from J.L. Seelinger to Mr. B. B. G ri er. Can you get 19 that out and take a look at it? l 20 A I h av e that. l l 21 Q Now, Bill, if I understand this ' 22 correctly, this letter constitutes a prompt report 23 to the NRC rega rding some ty pe of r e po r ta bl e 24 occurrence. Is that correct? I l o 25 A Yes. l ( l ) l 3_; j 1 I T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG j l l

( Direct - Potts 1- 0 Now, ba sed upon your knowledge of the 2 practices at the time, Bill, I would like you to 3 take a look at paragraph two of the letter wherein 4 it i n di ca te s that a r epo r ta bl e si tua tion was 5 discovered on October 19th when it was de termined in 6 ef f ect -- and I am pa r a ph ra si ng i t, of course, that 7 unidentified leakage exceeded 1 g . p. m. on October 8 16th. Do you see that paragraph? 9 A Yes, I do. 10 0 Now, my que stion ba si cally is, the 11 letter seems to suggest that som eh ow this pr o bl em of 12 exceeding the te ch ni cal specifications that existed 13 on O ct obe r 16 th, but yet was not di scov er ed until 14 Oct obe r 19 th, which is som ew hat hard to un de r st a nd 15' giv en th e. f'a ct that obv i o usly an operator woul d hav e 16 run the test on Oct obe r 16 th, was there some type of , 17 a practice in existence at the time to ch a r a ct e riz e 18 the discov ery da te of a reportable occur rence af ter 19 the f act, tt at y ou know of ? 20 A I am not sure I un der stand y our q ue stion, and 21 I guess I need to do that before I can answer it. 22 Q What I am trying to understand is how 23 the letter would reflect a di s cov e ry date of the 24 reportabl e occur rence like tw o or three days af ter 25 the occur rence a ct ually took pl ace, giv en the f act

                                                                       ?

T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

7 Di r e ct - Potts 1 that the occurrence was obviously som ething that was 2 done by a CRO. And my q ue stion i s, was there some 3 ty pe of a pr actice where first there.was some 4 inv e sti ga ti on bef ore you would write in to the NRC 5 and indicate that a reportabl e occur r ence had been 6 di s cov er ed? 7 A I bel i ev e there was such a pr acti ce. It's a 8 little har d to remembe r and i t's, therefore, 9 somewhat spe cul ativ e, but I believ e what normally I 10 occurred was the pl ant PORC, or On-si te Rev iew 11 Committee would review the inf ormation that was 12 pr ov ide d by operations, i n de pe n de nt of the 13 ope r ati on's pe opl e's de termination perhaps th at it 14 was not r e po r ta bl e, to make thei r own determination. 15 0 Okay. N ow , in the ev ent that PORC did 16 co n cl u de th at the situation was r e po r ta bl e, w o ul d 17 they list as the di s cov ery da te of the ev ent the 18 time when they reviewed it as opposed to when the 19 ev ent a ct ually took place? 20 A That would be my un de r st a ndi ng, yes. 21 Q And as f ar as you can recall, that was 22 the practice at the time? 23 A' Yes. 7 cm not, perhaps, the best individual 24 to ask that, because I was not a member of th e unit 25 to PORC. TA YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

E Di ro ct - Potts 1 Q Okay. Finally, Bill, can you turn to 2 the memo -- actually it's a memo which was sent from 3 Jim Seelinger to G eorge Trof f er. It's not dated, 4 but it is a tta ch ed to a dr af t co py of the f ollow-up 5 report which has some handwritten notations and 6 changes on it. Do y o u h av e th a t in f ront of you? 7 A I hav e a co py of a memo f rom Se el in ge r to 8 Tr o f f e r ,. yes. 9 Q Does it have a handwri tten note on the 10 bottom saying Seelinger's edit of series dr af t L ER, 11 best co py ? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Okay. That's the one that I am 14 ref erring to. Fi r st of all, it woul d a ppea r, from 15 looking at this document, that the dr af t L ER had 16 been pr epared and somehow r ev i ew ed by PORC and then 17 sent to Mr. Troffer. Does that sound consistent 18 with your recollection of what the pr actice was a t j 19 the time? l 20 A Yes. l 21 Q Now, if I under stood you cor rectly the 22 last time we talked, stair did not work at the 23 i sl and, though, did he? ' 24 A I am not sure. At one time, Jim Stear worked 25 f or me in licensing and then somewhere bef ore I T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

0 9. Di r ect - Potts 1 tr ansf er red ba ck to the island, Jim Stai r was 2 tr ansf erred to Unit Two. So without going ba ck to 3 some kind of . records, I co ul dn ' t tell. you whether 4 ' Jim Stair was working f or me or working f or 5 Seelinger at the time this document was prepared. 6 Q Is it conceivable if he was working 7 for you, he would still be down at the island  ! 8 pr epa ring s uch- a document and submitting it to PORC 9 before it was submitted to you f or your r ev iew ? 10 A Yes, that's conceiv abl e. If you r ecall the 11 last time we talke d, I mentioned that there was an 12 ef f or t to r emov e f rom the island's responsibility 13 some of th e unne ce ssa ry pa perwor k. Or to state it a 14 better w ay , licensing's responsibility was to help 'I 15 out th e isl and. So on occasions, I would send one 16 of my engineer s to the island and they would -prepare 17 a report which was then subm'itted to PORC f or their 18 review and acceptance and modification, how ev er it 19 was necessary. And then it would come f rom 20 Seelinger to Trof f er j ust as if his people had done 21 it. It was an effort to pick up some of the work 22 ' load that we could pick up. 23 Q All right. Now, I know we cov ered 24 this a little bit the last time, but can you j ust

           .25        giv e 'me a v ery brief rundown of what would occur s-TAYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

1( 4 Direct - Potts i I 1 with respect to an L ER like this af ter it was sent 2 to Troffer? 3 A Okay.- The memo that Seelinger would send to ] 4 Trof f er would go sev er al pl a ce s, one of which was to 5 the licensing supervisor and myself and another co py 6 would go to the licensing engineer. An d th e. j 7 licensing' engineer would prepare a cov er letter to l 8 th e commission that would atta ch th e L ER f orm, the '

9. licensee ev ent report form that the Commission there 10 used, and then that repor t woul d come th rough me, 11- then to the manager of licensing and quality 12 assurance and f rom there to the vice-president of 13 - the generation f or signature and transmittal to the )

14 Commi s si on. 15 Q Now, in the ev ent that it was

       - 16  determined that a change ought to be made in the L ER 17   as it came f rom th e island, ge ne r ally spea ki ng, how 18   would that change be made?

l l 19 A I assume you are saying if we at licensing 20 were proposing a ch an ge ? _ 21 0 That is correct. 22 A Then we would conta ct the island, either by , 23 sending an engineer or sim ply calling them on the 24 tel eph one, discuss that change and assuming we were 25 convincing and they agreed with us, we would make TA YL OR_AN D FR IE DB ERG

11 Di r ect - Potts l l 1 that change and then it would proceed through the 2 normal route. l 3 0 The ty pi n g up of the change, wo ul d 4 that a ct ually be done at your of fice in Reading? 5 A Yes. 6 Q Would ev eryone inv olved in th e pr oce ss 7 be made aware of the ch ange ? W o ul d th ey get co pi e s 8- of it? 9 A It was the standard distribution of th e 10 inf ormation that was sent to the commission and it 11 included the island as well as some other pe opl e. 12 0 If such a change were made, wo ul d 13 there be documentation in the file that would make ~~ 14 it apparent to Mr. Herbein when he read the L ER f or 15 his si gna tur e? 16 A We discussed that or a similar q ue stion in 17 the past, and it i s my f eeling that, yes, Jack would 18 hav e bee n -- or Mr. Herbein would hav e been made 19 awar e that a change was made, and part of the 20 earlier deposition I gav e was f rom spe culation on 21 how that co ul d o ccur. 21 Q Right. My q ue sti on, though, at this 23 point, pertains more to documentation in the file, 24 Bill. In other words, if Mr. Berbein was sent the 25 f older with the documents and a pr oposed dr af t of a TAIL OR AN D FRIEDB ERG

                    '                                                                             1:

Direct - Potts 1 th e L ER' f or his si gna t ur e, woul d. y ou be a bl e, from 2 rev iewing the file, to -- woul d h e be abl e to learn 3 that there had been an earlier dr af t which you 4 ' people in licensing had amended somewhat and were 5 recommending a change on? 6 A Yes, th e f ol de r that would go to the 7 vice-president's of fice would contain the original 8 draf t sent f r om TMI corporate or -- excuse me, PORC 9 ch ai rm an, to Trof f er as well a s a ny nntes that were 10 taken in preparing the dr o't letter f or the. 11 Commie- '"o i f I recall correctly, the trav ei er 12 that was attached to the f ront of the file f older 13 asked the q uestion was' the island satisfied with our 14 report or words to that effect. An d i t co ul d h av e 15 been j ust noted on that flier that a telephone call-16 was made and agreement was made to change or add, in 17 thi s ca se, a dd a f ew w or ds t o th e r epo'r t. l 18 .Q Okay. I would like you to take a look f 19 at the na rrativ e por tion of the dr af t L ER that's in l I 20 front of you, the one that went from Se el in ge r to l 21 Troffer. And spe cifically, I would like to di rect 22 your attention to the middle of th e par agr aph wher e 23 it talks about the f act that action was taken, was i 24 being taken to reduce the unidentified leaka ge to 25 within allowable limits and this was accomplished a t I

                                                                                                       \

l k T A YL OR AND PR IE DB ERG J l 1 l ___ - ______ Q

13 Di r e ct - Potts 1 7:35 on October 18th. Do you see that language in 2 the r epor t? 3 A Yes, I do. 4- 0 Now, you will note, Bill, that the 5 narrativ e in this ca se does not i n a ny w ay in di ca te 6 or describe the action that was taken to reduce 7 unidentified leakage to within allowable limits. 8 Was it th e pr acti ce at that time or was it customary 9 at that time to discuss action of this nature 10 without describing exa ctly what was done to bring 11 the pl ant ba ck to within allowable limits? 12 A I am not really s ur e h ow to answer that 13 q ue sti on, was it customary or a practice to do that. 14 Q Well, I mean, ba sed upon your 15 experience f r om that time, was i t f elt that it was 16 not needed to hav e an extensiv e amount of detail in 17 these ki nds of na r r a tiv e s ? 18 A This is a highly spe cul ativ e answ er, be ca use 19 I j ust don' t remember whether or not it was. You 20 hav e th e f eeling, when you deal with a f orm like the 21 licensee ev ent r epo r t form, that you are expected to 22 put a minimum amount of detail, or at least I think 23 th at's how I would view it now, six years later. 24 Q But this isn' t part of the f orm, 25 ri gh t ? I mean, this is a narrativ e that is atta ch ed T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG ,

14 Direct -'Potto 1 to the' form, 'pr e s um a bly to incl ude de tail s that 2 can' t fit on the form. Is that correct? 3 A It's an a tta chment. I guess in my way of 4 thi n ki ng, when y ou say part of the form, be ca use the 5 space on the f orm is somewhat limited, the practice 6 prior to us using this LER report f orm was f or us to 7 file a letter with the ' Commission that did not use a 8 computer-gener ate d f orm. It was j ust simply a 9 letter format. And part of the NRC's encour agement 10- of us using this f orm that the Commission f ound 11 usef ul and part of the discussion was we f elt that 12 it was a little bit limiting and they encouraged us 13 then to use the form, no ne th el e s s. An d i f w e f el t 14 like attaching a pi e ce of pa pe r to it, fine, go 15 ahead and-do that. But th e f orm is, no ne th el e s s, a 16 little bit limiting. 17 I guess I will say it a noth er way , more 18 ri gh tl y. I f elt more comf ortable with the earlier 19 approach that men had adopted of writing letters to l 20 the Commission that inf ormed th em. But at some i 21 period of time, there was a new gui de or something, 22 NRC came out and inf ormed all the licensees to adopt 23 this f orm. 24 Q Do y ou think, as supervisor of 25 licensing a t the time, that if you had seen language T A YL OR AND FR IE DB ERG 4

1 i 4 15 1 Direct - Potts j s_ 2 1 .like this whi ch did not de scribe > the particular 1 2 action that was taken to reduce the leakage, that 3 would hav c ca used you any co n ce r n ? . 4 A Recognizing that this is Monday mor ni ng

5. qua r te r ba ck, ' and i t is now my opini on if I would 6 hav e read th at sentence, I w o ul d h av e pr oba bly 7- asked, how di d 'y ou r edu ce i t, how did you reduce the 8 lea ka ge.

9 Q Do y o u h av e a ny r e coll e cti on, Bill, of 10- lear ni'ng that in thi s par ti cul ar ca se , the leakage 11 was not actually reduced, but in f act, the manner in 12 which the action statement was completed was by 13 rounding of f .a computeriz ed printed test r e s ul t ?

       '14   A        N o,  the only recollection I hav e of that is 15   some prior co ny er sa ti on y ou a nd I had where you 16   identified that as what had o ccurr ed.                                But I hav e no 17   other recollection of it.

18 Q Do y ou h av e a ny recollection of any 19 situation where leakage may. hav e exceeded one gallon 20 per minute by a sm all amount, but that it was deemed 21 to be sa ti sf act ory by rounding of f the test r e sul t 22 to 1.0 gallons per minute? 23 A' N o, I hav e no recollection of rounding off as 24 a mechanism on any of those leakage reports. 25 Q Okay. Bill, if you will, can you turn T A YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG '

I 16 Direct - Potts f l l 1 next to what a ppa r entl y is the final draft of the l { 2 L ER a s s ubm i t te d by Mr. Herbein to the NRC on { 3 N ov embe r 1 s t , 1978. Fi r st of all, do y ou hav e that 4 are in f ront of y ou, Bill? 5 A Yes, I do. 6 Q S pe ci f i cally , I would like you to turn 7 t o. the nar rativ e of the final draft, following that 8 language th a t I r ea d to y ou f rom the first draft, 9 you will noti ce that .in this draft, there is some 10 inf ormati on r ega r di ng how the unide ntified lea kage 11 was reduced to within allowable limits, correct? 12 A Yes. 13 0 Basically, it indi ca te s th at, at l ea st 14 to a certain extent, the unidentified leakage was 15 sim ply identified and f ound to be well within the limits f or identified leakage. Now, o bv io usly , this 16 ' 17 change would hav e been made in Reading somewhere and 18 unde e standing that y ou do not remember spe ci f i cally 19 how it was done, could you at least giv e me some 20 insight f rom your experience of how such a ch ange 21 might hav e been made? s 22 A Recognizing that I am spe cul a ti ng, any one of 23 s ev er al indiv iduals who was inv olved in pr ocessing 24 th e r epor t would hav e a ske d himself the q ue sti on, 25 how was this r edu ction -- how did it take pl a ce , TA YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

17 l Di r e ct - Potts E , 1 proba bly either call the island or came to the i 2- island and asked how the reduction in the 3 unidentified leakage took place. . l 4 0 Do you think that i t is possible that 4 5 someone f rom licensing or someone assigned to 6 Rea di ng, would hav e ev er j ust m ade an a ssumption 7 that this action had taken place and included this  ; 8' inf ormation. without checking with someone f rom the j 9 i sl an d? 10 A No, I. don't co n si de r that's a ny pr obability 11 that a unil a te r al change would hav e been made. That i 12 would hav e been against all customs a nd practi ce s. 13 It was not th e f un ction or responsibility of f. 14 licensing to change these repor ts without ga i ni ng 15 the concurrence with the island. 16 Q Now, Bill, we hav e r ev iew ed th e 17 various files that were maintained with respect to 18 thi s L ER a n d w e h av e be e n un a bl e to l o ca te ' any 19 do cumenta tion in a ny of the files regarding the l

    , 20    change, why the change was made.               All that appears 21    is the final draft as we have it in f ront of us, but 22    there is really no explanation anywhere of why the 23   change was made or who made it, who a ppr ov ed i t.

24 Can you shed any light on why that would be the l- 25 case? k. T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG i

r 4 11-Di r o ct - Potts 1 A' N o, I ca n' t. As we di scussed in the . pa st, I 2 would think that th er e's some fil e sy stem in Reading 3- that would contain some inf ormation on that, 4 although I hav e to admit, if it was a phone call, it 5 may. only be noted that there was a phone call and 6 that the island agreed with this additional phrase. 7 Q But you do bel i ev e th a t ev en if there 8 was som e ty pe of a tel ephone appr ov ed a nd agr eed 9 upon change, there would at least be some note in 10 the file that would indicate th a t'? 11 A I am not sure there would be a note. I guess 12 I. woul d hope now in retrospect there would be a 13 note, but in order to really answ er your q uestion 14 with any kind of strength, I need to relook at the 15 t r av el er that was use d t o indi ca te the sev eral 16 signatures that occur red in Reading, of th e se i 17 pa pe r s. There was a pressur e sensi tiv e paper and it 18 had sev eral copies and one of it's f unctions was to 19 show to th e v ice-pr esi de nt, pri or to his signatur e, j 20 that the sev er al gr oups inv olved all agreed with ) 21 what was being said. 22 Q Well, that's one of the things that we i 23 are having trouble locating, Bill, but if we can

   - 24  loca te it, obv iously we will ask you to examine it 25   and perhaps she some light on what it means?

l T A YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG _____-__-_ 0

19 Diroct - Potto 1 A Well, that would help my memory, but I am 2 pretty confident that licensing would not make a 3 change by itself without ge tti ng S eel.inge r or 4 som e bo dy on the island to agree that that was 5 a ppr o pri a te. Sim ply be ca use not only was that the 6 practice and our instructions were clear in that 7 area, but th er e's no w ay we can hav e first-hand 8 knowledge without going back to the island people 9 and talking to the ones that were present. 10 0 I un de r sta nd. Bill, I am going to a sk 11 you your opinion on something. I am going to 12 explain some f acts to you which apparently are 13 pretty cl ear with respect to this incident and I am 14 going to ask you your opi nion about t h e L' ER , 15 un de r st a ndi ng, again, that you hav e made it v ery 16 clear that you don' t hav e any independent 17 recollecti on of th e se ev ent s. 18 Assume f or the moment, Bill, that all 19 of th e av ail abl e ev ide nce and documenta ti on make s i t 20 p r e t ty cl ea r th a t unidentified leakage had exceeded 21 1 g . p. m. f or a couple of day s be tween October 16 th 22 and the 18th. And that at 7: 35 on the 18th, a leak 23 rate test showing leakage in excess of one gallon 24 per minute was obtained and that ta=* result was 25 manually rounded of f so that it was altered to say T A YL OR AN D FRIEDB ERG

2( Diroct.- Patto I I 1 1.0 gallons per minute. It had been 1.2 gallons per 2 minute pri or to that. Thereafter, there were 3 continued ef f orts to identify leakage and the action

4. statement actually was entere 5 some time in the 5 early morning hour s of Octobe r 18th, leakage was not 6 reduced to under one gallon per minute until about 7 1:20 on th e 18th.

8 First of all, does m," telling you 9 th a t . i n a ny way ref resh yout recollection about what 10 you may hav e learned or what someone may hav e tol d 11 you at that time abo ut thi s incident ? 12 A N o, it doesn't. I 13 0 Assuming f or the moment that 14 ev ery thi ng I've said to you can be demonstr ated to 15 be a fact, that is that there was no action 16 statement at 7:35, but mer ely an unsatisfied test 17 r e s ul t that was rounded of f, that the action 18 sta tem ent actually took place af ter that, be ca us e of 19 an NRC inspector's presence, and that actual 20 unidentified leakage was not reduced until 1:20 on 21 the 18th, in your o pi ni on, would this L ER be an 22 a c cu r a te po r tr ay al of what occurrn6? 23 A N o. 24 Q Do y ou bel! c . . .. :. t i f y o u o r a ny of 25 your subordinates in licensing at that time T AYL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG _

      ._.                     _                           _ _ _ _ . _ _ _  _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

21 Di rect - Po t t s l I 1 under stood the f acts as I hav e de scribe d th em to 2 you, that you would hav e appr ov ed or licensing would 3 hav e appr ov ed this v er si on of th e L ER.? 4 A I would say no. And I guess now I am 5 starting to wonder how you are using the vord reduce 6 unidentified leakage. To me, it's corr ect to say 7 you reduce the unidentified leakage by th e m e ch ani sm 8 of reca tegoriz ing t o identified leakage. That is a 9 redu ction in the unide ntified leaka ge to me. j 10 0 That is co r r e ct. And what I am 11 suggesting to you is if plant records make it pretty l 12 cl ea r that that did not occur until sev er al hour s 13 af ter the time listed on the L ER and that in f act

 ~

14 th e only thing that occurred at 7:35 that day was to 15 round off an unsa tisf actory test r e s ul t, if you had 16 learned that at that time, wo ul d y o u h av e a ppr ov e d 17 an L ER with this language, de scribi ng th e ev ent s in 18 question? 19 A I don't think so, but I think in f airness, 20 you also hav e to add to that that I am viewing this 21 with six years additional knowledge that I di dn' t 22 hav e th en. But, I guess I am bother ed by rounding 23 off. 24 Q As y ou r ead this L ER, would you agree 25 there it appear s to sugge st that leakage was reduced T A YL OR AN D FR IE DB ERG

I 23 DirGet - Potts 1 by identifying a po r ti on of it at 7: 3 5 on Octobe r 2 18 th ? 3 A Yes, and until you identified to me that 4 there was some computer rounding of f or rounding of f 5 of computer r e s ul t s, any time I had read this LER ir 6 the pa st f ew years f or whatev er reason, I' ve j ust 7 read into it that th ey managed to find out that 8 th er e was leakage going to either the drain tank or 9 some oth er por ti on th at allow s them to identify it 10 and r eclassify part of that and so the inv entory 11 dif f erence was j ust a reclassifica tion or r edu ction 12 in th e unidentified leaka ge test as it is sits. 13 MR. DE VESA: Okay. Well, Bill, I  ! 14 don' t have any f ur ther q uestions at this 15- time. As I said to you, we will continue to 15 try to loca te some of the these documents 17 that may exi st and if we can, w'e will ask you , 18 to examine th em. But i n a ny ev ent , I 19 appr eci ate y our taking time out to talk to us 20 again and I th ank you v ery much. 21 22 (Whereupon, the proceedings were 23 adj our ned. ) 24 25 TAYL OR AND FR IE DB ERG

23 m 1 C ERT I FI CATE 2 3 I, KAR EN V. CA RL IN , CSR, License No. XIO1211, 4 a Notary Public and Shorthand Reporter of the State of 5 New Jersey, do her eby ce r tif y that prior to the 6 commencement of the examination of 7 WILLIAM POTTS 8 was duly sworn by me to testify theLtruth, the 'whole 9 tr uth and nothing but the truth. 10 I DO FU RTH ER CERTIFY that the f oregoing is a true 11 and accurate tr a ns cr i pt of the testimony as taken  ! 12 ste no gr aphi cally. by and bef or e me at the time, pl a ce a nd 7 - 13 on the da te her einbef ore set f orth, to the be st of my i 14 a bil ity . 15 I DO FU RTH ER CERTIFY that I am neither a relativ e 16 nor empl oy ee 'nor attorney nor counsel of any of the. 17 pa rties to thi s a ction, and that I am neither a 18 rel ativ e nor empl oy ee of such attorney or counsel, and 19 that I am not financially interested in the action. , 20 21 , 22 __ _h _ _____ l N ota ry Public of the l State of New Jer sey 23 24 25 ( TAYL OR AN D FRIEDB ERG _

l i ROSS, MICHAEL 1/25/84 NRC OI i l e

                .I i

2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 l NUCLEAR P2GULATORY COMMISSION 3 1 - t i { i 4 I............_...x  ! l  :  ! 5 lInthematterof:  : 6 lInvestigativeInterviewof  : i MICHAEL J. ROSS  :  :

                                                                                       }

7 f  : I

                 \................,                                                   ,

8 { i l 9 Processing Building ' 10 2 Three Mile Island l Middletown, Pennsylvania i 11 Wednesday, January 25, 1984  ! i i 12 l l l i I 13 i l i The above-entitled interv:.ew commencec at I 14 l9:27a.m., pursuant to notice. l 15 ggpopy: 16 PETER CONNELLY, Investigator 17 l KEITH CHRISTOPHER, Investigator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com:nission l Region I is 631 Park Avenue 19

          ,                   King of Prussia, Pennsylvania           19406 j

l 20 l / tIV 21 . 22 . Y V \ D N k 24 \ h\ i t

2-

   .,.        i U

1  ;

              ;'                         _P _R _O _C_ _E _E _D _I _N _G _S                        ,.

2  ! MR. CONNELLY: My name is Peter Connelly. I am

              !                                                                                l l

3  ; an investigator with the Nuclear Regulatory' Commission. My 4 i associate is Keith Christopher, also an investigator with the i q 5 I Office of Investigation, Nuclear Regula*ory Commission, I f e 6 , We are here on Three Mile Island in the Processing !( t i Building interviewing 1 Michael Ross. Present with Michael is 8 i his attorney, Marilyn Shaw. i 9  !  ! Mike, this investigation is regarding a suspected ' 10 falsification-of leak rates at both Unit 1 and Unit 2. We i U l' I would like to ask of you cuestions regarding that today. l E Before we begin, I would like to put-you under i 13 l cath, so at this tin.e could you please stand? 24 Whereupon, 15 MICHAEL J. ROSS I  ? 16 was called for examination andr,'having been first duly sworn,

       -U                                           '

was examined and testified as'follows: 16 _E _X _A _M _I _N _A .T_ _I _O _N 19

  • BY MR. CONNELLY: .

20 ' O For the record, could you please state your full 21 name and your current mailing address? E A My full name is Michael J. Ross. My home address L t 23 is 225 South Delta Street, Mount Joy, Pennsylvania, 17552. i 24 g Before we begin our questioning, I would like you 25 to read from Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1001, l I i

I. 3  ; .t :. 3- bregarding. statements.

               '                                                                         3 I

(Document handed to witness.) L , I' s . (Witness complying.) f 4- i 'A 'Okay, I read that, j 5  ;. O Do you understand it, Mike?.

. ]
       '6    I            A     I do.

I I 7 l O Couldyouplease'tellmewhatyour'presentoccupa-j I

8.  ! tion is? ',, i i

r i.

      ;9.                 A     My present-occupation, I am Manager of Plant Opera ,
                                                                                    -l 10 '   ' tions for TMI Unit 1.                                                   l
                                                                                             )

M O How long have you been in that position' l  : M A Since approximately April.of 1978. L la  ! O Prior to April, 1978, what was your occupation? I- l l 14  : i A I was a Station Shift Supervisor at Three Mile i

     .15     1. Island.

i l 16 0 How long-vere you in that position? l

                                                      ~

87 A Since 1970. l l 18 g As a Station Supervisor you were licensed at both  ! 19 Unit 1 and Unit 2? ... 20 A Originally licensed at Unit 1; later licensed at 21 - Unit 2 when it came along. 22 O You had then a dual license? D A Correct. 24 C As Manager of Plant Operations, what are your 25- responsibilities? l I i e

                                                                                                                                                                                           +

k 3 A Basically, I am responsible for the day-to-day l 8  ! operation of the plant, the overseeing of all licensed opera- { l. 3 j tors and rad waste personnel. l 4

                         ,         c                        In the pre-accident period you indicated that you 1

5 were Manager of Plant Operations commencing in April of 197E? ' 6 A That is.rorrect. l There was a different title at j j I 7' > that time called Supervisor of Operations.

                       !                                                                                                                                                                        I B               l 0                       Supervisor of Operations.

Wasitthesamerespon-l 9 > edb4'd+ies as you have now? i l 10 A

                     }                                   Almost the same. .In those days we didn't have the l
  ' ll               '

rad waste group underneath operations. i 12 I i O What was your responsibility in regard to leak 13 rate tests? 14 l A The responsibility was the same as it always has O. 85 been, day-to-day operation and compliance with the technical 16 i specifications; basically, the overseer for the department. 37 G What were the technical speci#ications for leak 28 rates?

                                                                                                                                                         ~.

18 A There were a number. There was allowed leakage of 20 one gallon unidentified, ten gallons identified, 30 gallons s 8 leakage plus losses, one gallon primary and secondary from 22 both steam generators. 23 g How were leak rates calculated then?. 24 A Normally, they are done by a computer calculation. 25 0 Who would normally do that calculation? 1

                                                                                                 \

t 6" i ~ t , 1 The on-duty shift took care of it. It normally i l

                   .8-    would:be a control room operator, and it would be the opera-        -

1 3 ter who is. responsible for taking readings in the control .

                   .                                                                          !  l room.
                   '4' 5  ,

O 'Normally, during a shift, how many operators would 6 there be on duty? 7 A It would vary. Normally, it would be two. i  ; 8 , O Would there be any other personnel in the opera- l

                                             ~

9 tions area? 10 A There would be a shift foreman, and at times we 11 ' would have a shift' supervisor,in the area., of course, he j

                , 12      balanced between.both units at that time.

i O For the record, at this time we are limiting our I i 14 [ questions to the pre-accident period, so there'is no confu-15 l.sion about what time period we're talking about, i 16 j A ~O kay. 17 An operator would run leak rate calculations with, O' is basically, a computer program. He would enter the data. How 18 long would that test last, generally? 20 Generally, it was an hour test.

    ,                            A Il O    How often was the test done?

22 A It was required by technical specification once j 23 a day greater'than 525, and we typically did it every shift. 24 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 25 g And you're talking about Unit 1? I i

   ~

b 1 A That's correct. 2 O Did you get involved in the same aspect in the i 3  : performance of leak rates at Unit 2? i 4

   ;         A      Virtually, no involvement in leak rates in TMI 5  j Unit 2.      Their tech specs are somewhat different in the leak 4

6 rate area. t 7 . O I guess this is a good point to clarify. Can you 6 tell us, before we go into some of the more detailed ques-9 tions on the actual points with the test, exactly to what de-l 10 gree you interfaced with the Unit 2 operations staff, speci-

1 11 fically Jim Floyd and the shif t supervisors, as they worked l l

12 l at Unit 2? t l l 33 A Jim Floyd, at some time -- and I'm not sure of the' 14 time frame -- had the job equivalent of mine at TMI Unit 2. 15 Our interface, basically, was we shared some systems. 16  ! Auxiliary boilers, for example, were shared between the units. I 27 i Fire systems were shared between the units. I 16 The shift supervisor was also shared between the 19 units. As such, we had some interface in that area. Other 20 i than that, as far as operationally, there was no interface; I 21 l he ran his unit and I ran my unit. 22 0 You didn't, as a matter of routine, make opera-23 tional decisions that affected Unit 2? 24 A I did not. 25 g Did you have any routine discussions with Jim as

i 7

~3      your counterpart.regarding problems that were occurring at i

3 . Unit 2 that may affect Unit 1, or vice-versa? l I i- l 3 l A There were some discussions, mainly limited to, j j 1

                                                                                                                                                 '   {

4 , you know, "What's your schedule?" "Do you need the auxiliary ]

    '                                                                                                                                            '      1 1

5 boilers?" l f 6  ; One of the problems, we had to share these auxil-

    ,                                                                                                                                            i 7

liaryboilers,anditwasacoordinationproblemmorethanany-; 1 8 i, thing else, i t i 9 Some of the other things is I made all the water 1 for the whole site, for each TMI unit, as I do today, and we 1 10 t I Al always had discussions about water usace and things like that. 1 We never detailedly discussed individual problems,; 12 23 operator problems, or anything like that, on a routine basis. 14 EIt may have come.up or it may not have come up. 15 g Specifically, during that 1978-79 period, did you i 16 and Jim ever enter into any discussions concerning any prob-M lems with performance of leak rate tests at TMI 2? 18 A None that I can recollect. 19 g At that time did any of those dual license shift 20 supervisors indicate or have any discussions with you con-28 cerning problems with either the performance of the test at 22 Unit 2 or with the actual surveillance procedure itself at 23 Unit'2? 24 A Nothing that I can recollect. 25 O So even though you had a commonality, in that you l- , t

i 1 supervised the dual licensed operators, you carried no f une- l 8 tional responsibility or functional day-to-day responsibility l 3 over the operation of TMI 2? I 4 L I That's correct. 5 l 0 You made no operational decisions concerning any {, I 6 t of their plant evolutions or manipulations? i t i 7 L Only to the degree where it involved coordination j l I l 6

of systems, you know, " Hey, we're going to do this." "Well,  ! j t

i 9 ( vou cuvs can't have the boilers." There was some interface '

                                                                                     ]

10 I in that area, but nothing to do with actually what the plant 11  ! did. i M j O Intermsofactualcontrolroomoperatormanipula-! i 33  ! tions, the actual performance of surveillance tests. i I 34  ! Did you ever see any of their surveillance programs' 35 joraportionoftheirsurveillanceprogramsorcompliancewithl v 16 ' \ tech soecs?

                        -                                                            I l                                   . , -

E' L No.  ; 18 0 Did you spend much/t,ime at all in the Unit 2 con-18 trol room? I 20 A Very little. To maintain the cross license there 21 was some time -- I don't even remember accurately the time, 22 but it was a minimal amount of time; four hours a month or 23 l fcur hours every two months, something like that. I did that, 24 ) but that was all. I i 25 0 ) f Did you have daily or weekly-type meetings with

0

         .1                       ' Jim Floyd or with Joe Logan, people at that level, back at
        ;3'               lthattime,regardingplant' status,plantoperations?

i i

3 i O' 'I' personally had no' meetings with them on our j 1

4 l basis. l Therewerestaffmeetingsheldwheresomethingsweref , 9 discussed. .I was in some of the staff meetings. But normally I . 6  ! I they didn't get into a nitty-gritty discussion; it was an  ! 7 overalldiscussionofwherewe'regoing,whatthescheduleisl i 8 l on this unit, what the schedtyle is on that unit. t l 9 ' O Up until the time.of the Hartman allegations, did i 16 lyouhaveanypersonalknowledgeoranypersonalconcerns.re-

                      ;                                                    s                                                                       l 21                                                                                                                                            '

garding the performance of leak rate tests at TMI 2? L 12 { g. go, I 23 j g .You had no knowledge of any abnormalities or i i

    '34
                    ! improprieties that allegedly had taken place at                                               TMI 2?

l 15 A so. i l 16 0 And that was never discussed with you by either I ga' l Jim Floyd or any of the shift supervisors, shift foreman or 28 ' l o.perators? 19 y yo, 20

                          ,               O     How about after the Hartman allegations became 2a
                             'pubfic, did you get involved directly with the problems at 22 Unit 2 concerning leak rates?

23 A I don't think I was ever involved directly. The 24 i company came through with a group and I was asked questions 25 at some times, and I don't even remember the time frame. I

l

                                                                                                           )

16 1 don't remember any specifics on it, but I was asked about 2 certain items under the Hartman allegations -- mainly, was 3  ! this possible? Was that possible? -- from our own company. l 4 O So would it be your opinion that you then had no j 1 6 substantial or critical involvement in the operation of TMI 2 ' 6 at any time?

         ?                       A           Well, when I was a shift supervisor I had some i

8 # l involvement. 9 j O Excluding the snif t supervisor time period , which i -

    - 10
                       ; wen't back, I guess you said, until --

21 l A 1978. i  ! 22 l 0 You became Manager of Plant Operations in April of  ! i 13 I 1978. 34 A In reality I was assigned to Unit 1 and doing that .. 15 job since January of '78, so I was really up there a longer 26 time period than that. 17 g But that would be, in your estimation, a correct i 18 statement then, that you had no functional responsibilities at 18 TMI 2? 20 A That's correct. M MR. CHRISTOPHER: Pet, do you want to go on? I 22 i BY MR. CONNELLY: 23 O Who is your predecessor as Supervisor of Operations 24 at Unit l? I 25 A George Kunder.

Il 1 0 To go back to the leak rate tests that were being , 2 performed at Unit 1, you indicated that they were being per- l l formed by switching and tagging operators normally, correct? 1 3 l 4 l A Correct. l 0  ! O And it was a computer program. The operator would j l 6 enter the appropriate data and the test would take about an ' 7 l hour, the computer program. }

                !                                                                       l 6

l What kind of paperwork would be produced by the l 9 computer as a result of the test? Would there be a computer 10 l print-out sheet regarding the test? l I 11 l L Yes, there would be- one sheet, a computer print-  ! i 12 { out sheet, i 23  ; C What would be on the computer print-out sheet in i 14 j regards to the leak rate test? I 15 A Time, date, time interval you want, any identified 16 fleakageyoumayend. If you made up to it, you would have to i 1 ' i enter any make-up you would have during that time period. 18 Then when the leak rate was completed, all the 18 parameters that were used would be printed on the sheet: i 20 temperatures, pressures, make-up tank levels, that sort of El thing; pressurizer levels. l It also gives a leak rate calcula-tion and shows you net leak rate and leakage plus losses, EU l type of leak rate. l 24 0 Were there problems with the leak rate program, the 25 computer program itself? Were the operators experiencing ____._________a

r 12r l 3 problems with it? I g A What do you mean by " problems"? 3 .0 . Problems with negative leak rates, coming up with 4 an abnormal' amount of negative leak rates. For example, dur-5 ing the Chung analysis this past. summer I believe in May and

    '6      June of '78, out of 121 tests, approximately 48 of them were 7      negative leak rates. Would that indicate that there was a 8      problem with the computer program?

9 L No, I don't think it would indicate there was a I 10 r problem. i l 1 11 0 What does a negative leak rate mean? l

   'M             A      Well, a negative leak rate means that, basically, 23      you made water. That's what it would mean.

1 14 O Is it possible for the plant to make water? 15 A No, absolutely not. 16 0 What was an explanation for why they were coming 87 up with negative leak rates? 16 A It's an accuracy problem. You're trying to deter-19 mine the leak rate on a big system with accuracies of'certain 20 instrumentation and it all gets compounded, and it is very 21 likely you could come up with a negative leak rate. E D Were there instances where a test was deemed to be i 23 invalid for reasons that the operator would determine? 24 A I'm sure there were times that that would happen. I 25 O Those invalid tests, what were done with those

13 1 invalid tests? 1 2 A I'm not exactly sure. 7they weren't retained, not 3 froutinely. i  ; 4 0 From testimony of the operators we've talked to  ! l f I l 5 that worked at Three Mile Island in that period, they indi-l l 6

                                                  !' cated that routinely they would throw away what were deemed              l 7                           to be invalid test results.

6 What we are trying to determine is whether that l

                                                    .                                                                     i 9                      i was a practice adopted by the operators or was tnat a company 10                           I                                           ~  ~   ~

policy that the invalid tests were t'o be th'rown'away. t 11 A I don't think there was ever a clear company policy, l 12  ; at that time about retaining data as far as leak rates go. I I i l 83 think it was common knowledge and probably started from one i 14 day, if you had an invalid test,it wasn't any good and there 15 lwasnoreasontoretainit. I think that's how that all got 16

                                                 'l started.              .

I 87 0 Were there any requirements in the procedures or 18 the technical specifications prohibiting the throwing away of 19 invalid leak rate tests? 20 A Not that I'm aware of. 23 O Are there prohibitions today? l 22 A Yes. 1 23 0 When did that policy change in regards to the , t I 24 prohibition of throwing away the leak rate tests? 25 g 7,m not exactly sure, Pete. I think it's a change l l I

lY j 1 we put in maybe in the 1980-81 time frame. After some of 2 these things came to light, we as a group said, "We're going 3 !tohaveapolicy, and this is going to be it." I I 4 ! O Going again with the pre-accident period, were ,

                                                                               )

5 [..thereanyproceduresortechspecsthatwouldallow, explicit' 6 ! ly allow, an operator to throw away invalid tests? I 7 ! A yem not aware of anything that would explicitly '8 say you may throw away an invalid test, .just like there is 8 I

    ,      nothing that explicitly says you've get to retain a valid           j 1

10 test. I I l 11 i 0 You know this is an issue that has arisen in Unit i 12 2; it's part of the indictments against Unit 2, the throwing i  ! 13 l away of leak rate tests? i 14 l A I'm aware of that. 15

     !                                                                        ]

l 0 Were the throwing away of leak rate tests done at ) 16 Unit 1 an attempt to withholdrinformation from the NRC? i . 17 '

  • A Absolutely not.

r is D Was it a common pra6tice? Was it a practice that i 18 was done furtively, secretively, throwing away the tests? I 20

                ,A       I don't think it was a practice that we gave much     1 21 thought. It was invalid, and if it was invalid we didn't re-22 tain it. I can't even give you a frequency of when it was 23 done. Leak rate was just not a problem. We punched in a leak   I 24 rater we got one.

25 0 Again, I am trying to determine where the origin I t

li i 1 was of throwing away the tests. I'm trying to determine if 1 . l 8 there were any prohibitions to throwing away the tests, was  ; l i l 3 there a policy that would allow throwing away the tests,'or, ) l l 4 as you're saying, I think, by your answer, there was a prac-  : l 5 tice at the time that was commonly practiced by all the 1 6 l operators. 7 A I think something evolved; it was a practice.  ! i 1 l 6 0 And the motive of. throwing away the tests, there  ! 9

           . was no ulterior motive to deceive or to hide inforr.ation fror !

10 l the NRC? , l ! e 21 A Absolutely not. 3 l { 4 1 12 l MS. SEAW: Could I interject for one minute? 83 Pete, I'm just not sure, did we establish here that this was 14 a " practice" of discarding test results in Unit 1? i l 15 MR. CONNELLY: Well, according to the testimony of

                                               ~

36 the operators, the s'hift foremen, at we've interviewed, it

                                                  ~

17 was a practice at that time. 18 MR. CHRISTOPHER: We're trying to establish 19 whether it was a practice or not. .. 20 BY MR. CONNELLY: - l 82 g As the Supervisor of Operations at that time, were 22 there ever any discussions held with you with the shift fore-23 men or other operators, shift supervisors, regarding the 24 throw-away of invalid tests? A No, absolutely not. Leak rate was something that { 1

16 1 we never even discussed. We got our leak rates on time. s They were always within bounds. They were never a problem. 3 .It was just another routine job. 4 0- What would be a criteria that an operator would 5 use to determine if a test was invalid? 6 A I think he uses common sense. If he would have a 7 leak rate that came out End said he had 15 or 18 gallon a 8 minuteleak,hewodidgobackandlookatthatandsay" Gees,f i ~

 -9     l is that even remotely possible?"        And there are a lo                                          cf    !

i 30 l indicators that heehas in the control room that would help 81 )himdeterminethat. 12 i They would look, "Well, gees,-you know, if we made l 13 e down maneuver at the plant of 15." "Well, let's call this 14 1eak rate as invalid because it's just not possible with the  ; l. 15 make-up tank level change we've had to have an 18 gallon a 16 minute leak rate." That would have been'"X" number of gal-17 lons; it is physically impossible. , 18 At least I feel that is the logic they would use 19 under a case like that. 20 g What would be the indicators that they would use , 1 21 to. determine if the leak rate was not factual, not logical? L 22 A The main indicator is the make-up tank level; it'll 23 tell you what's going on in the plant. 24 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: g 25 g Who had the authority to invalidate a test result?

l 17 l. 1 A Here again, we didn't have anything firmly written 2 in that area, but a. licensed operator is trained. I think the 3  ; guy running the test has' some authority and ' sane responsi-4 o bility, and I think they took that upon themselves at times j 6 to do that.' , 6  : O So there was no clear-cut requirement that it had I , 7 to be bucked up to at least a foreman for invalidation? l 8 A No, not at that time. I i 9 BY MR. CONNELLY:  ; l  : 10 l g Do you know of instances where an operator might l 11- .have ran a leak rate t'est und he obtained a 1.3 positive gpm 12 unidentified leakage, ran another test subsequent to that andl 83 l it fell within the 1 gpm tech spec and threw away that first f i 14 test? 15 A I don't know specifically of any times, no. 16 0 Could that have occu'r red at that time? 17 A Anything is possible. I know of nothing 18 specifically. 18 1 guess the central issue in the Unit 1 leak rate 0 20 investigation is: were you having problems with leak rates 21 in that period? 22 A Absolutely not. 23 How would you describe the plant in terms of leak 0 24 rates at that time? 25 Right. Probably more negative than anything; A

                          ,,                                                                       I?

I g leakage-wise, very little. 2  ! BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: I 3  ! O You mentioned negative leak rates; if you could 4 f explain a little bit on that. Since we all agree that the l plant does not make water, yet we accepted certain test re-5  ; 6 suits with a negative leak rate, what in your mind makes ,

                              '                                                                         ?

7 l those a valid indicator of your plant ' leakage?  ! i 8 A The fact that in this test there are a lot of { 9 instrumentation accuracies that have to be included. They

1 l can be temperature changes. They can be anything within the  ;

to  ! l 11  ; instrument, and the fact that the plant does move around a i 1  ! little; it is not 100 percent stable and it never will be. i 13 i You have some inaccuracies built in and at times 14  ! you're going to come back -- perhaps you have a perfectly 15  ! zero leak' rate and the inaccuracies would lead you to a nega-16 tive leak rate. 17 g Did you have any limit or criteria of what type of 18 negative leak rate figure you would accept? 19 A That I'm not sure of in 1978. Today we do have. 20 g For example, if you got a negative leak rate of 21 ten unidentified, ten gallons a minute, obviously, that is an 22 awful lot of water that you would theoretically have to be l 23 making, so you know that is not valid. Would you accept that 24 as a valid test result because it is under the one gallon ! 25 per minute leak rate? e

l .- pq

    ?

l- 2. Ac A negative ten?

              '2-         !        O              Yes.

E L i 4 a i A. I would not'have accepted that, no. I 4 l' -O What would be your basis for not accepting it? i 5 A It's just too large; it is unrealistic. 6 C So you're saying it is not'a valid indicator off l l 7 p leakage? I I 6-l A Right. t 9  !- I G And if I.ran another test and got a negative one ' 10 gallon per minute, would you accept that?

            =11        ;

A~ .W ell, you're asking me for a judgment call -- i 82 l 0 Yes, I am.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                )

13 A I probably would~not have; as a shift supervisor i 1 14 I.would have rejected it.  ; 15 f O. Did you have a break-off point that you would 16 accept then in your mind on a negative leak rate? i. 17 A I'm not sure we had anything written down, but I l 18 would look at them. When they got up over a negative .6 or 19-something, we would start saying " Hey,-what's going on here" 20 and start looking at it. 21- g so you're saying at this stage that if you were

  .         22 staying in the band of -- I. don't want to put words in your 23 mouth, but it is easier to state a situation and ask you to 1

24 explain than to ask questions on it. If you received a nega- i 1 25 tive half gallon leakage, you would accept that and write 1 4

to 1 that off, so to speak, to variables in level, instruments-8 tion, that type of thing? 3 A- It's possible we would have done that, yes. 4 i O Would you make some cursory review of your various 5 make-up tank level, pressurizer level and whatnot to make 6 sure you didn't have any radical changes in water levels? 7 A Absolutely. They did -- not because of leak rate, 8 but they did that every single minute of the day. They are l i 8 cognizant of what the leak rate is in the plant without the I 10 I leak rate test. M G So in essence then, if I can summarize on negative 22 leak rates, in your own mind you would accept up to maybe a 33 negative half a gallon per minute. 14 A or more. Today we have a limit in the procedure; ,

                 '25 it is .75.
                                                             ?

16 0 I saw that. At th 4t-time you did not have a limit.I 17 A I'm not sure that se did. I don't remember any. 18 0 Wouldyousayitw$sthenlefttotheindividual I8 operator's discretion as to whether or not to accept that at that time? 21 A I'm not sure, okay, whether 'it was. But I'm saying 22 my recollection is it is pretty much discretion. In our 23 morning reports, if we saw large negative leak rates we would S4 ( start complaining about what the night shift was doing as far 25 as running leak rates. We listed that every morning on 1

                                                                                                    )

pmm 1____--___- -

                                                                                                                                            -11 j.;
             '1;                                                                turnover sheets, what the leak. rate in the plant was.               .

Did you consider'that particular surveillance pro- k

           't                                                                        0                                                                  -

1 3' cedure -- I believe that is 1303-1.1 -- to be.a. valid pro- ' 4- [cedureandavalidwayLtodetermineplantleakage? 6 A (No response.) l-6 O' Trying to separate what you know today about that [ I . 7 procedure to your operating experience at that time. l I 1 8 MS. SEAW: Is the.buestion: what did he feel was 9 l valid at'the time? l l l

      -10                                                                                  MR. CHRISTOPHER:

l 3 At the time. l 11 i BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: i 22  :

                                                                                    'O     Did you, in 1978-1979, consider 1303-1 to be a I

33 ~ valid method to calculate your plant leakage?  ; 14 A Yes. l 15 BY MR. CONNELLY: 16 Were there'any problem areas with that procedure

                                                        ,                            O 17                                         i at that time?                         Did you recognize any problem areas?

18

                                                                                                   ~

A I can't recall recogni: ng problem areas. When 19 the plant oscillated sometimes the' teak rates would come out 20 funny and you would have to look aE them. I l 81I BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 22 O Back at.that time do you recall ever sitting down

      '"                                                                     or taking time to specifically look at that procedure with an               ,

24 idea of identifying any potential deficiencies or problems 25 with that procedure? I realize that's one of thousands of l

sb g 1 procedures. But with that particular procedure, do you re-a , call making any particular effort to analyze or formulate i L 3 l' your own judgment on that procedure? l 4 A- No, I don't recollect. l 5 0 Because you had no reason to at that time? 6 A It was Never a problem; a routine job.

                                                                                            ~

I 7 0 i Can you describe, in your day-to-day activities i 8 j as an Operations Supervisor at Unit 1 in 1978 and '79, and 9 then today, can you describe, in two separate paragraphs, so l 10

                                ; to speak, how your. day went, what'you did?

i 11 A I think there is very little difference between L l 12 j today and 1978 other than the fact that we're shut down. The 83 days were pretty much the same. 14 , My job, besides insuring that we operated properly 15 a n d d i d w h a t w e w e r e s u p p o s e'd t o d o , W a s t o e s t a b l i s h m a i n t e n - I i 16 l ance priorities. In the modnings we come in and see what the i 17 plant's problems were, and we assigned priorities to mainten-18 lancethatdaybasedontheplantproblems. 1 19 i l Would that be done in the POD meetings? 0 20 A It could be. It may even be done before, depending 81 on what we had going. If we had a very bad packing leak we 22 would be out there looking at it long before POD started. 23 MR. CHRISTOPHER: For the record, POD is the plan i 24 of the day meeting. 25 1 l __ _ ___o

M c, 1 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:. T 3 0' . Were would those POD meetings.be' held? t 3' A In;a planologue room, which'is located adjacent to 4 l' the control room, outside-the control room confines. 5- . O Bow long would those meetings usually last? l .. 6' A. Usually under an hour. 7

                                         .O      What kind of. individuals would attend these 1

8- j. meetings? 9 A. Basically, depart:nent head. level people. We would [ have Health Physics,' O,6erations, Maintenance, QA. . A lot of

                                             ~

10 i 11 l times the station superintend,ent would sit.in; engineering 12 personnel. 13 Where was your office at? l C 14 A. In 1978? l

                                                                                                      .l 1 15  l         0      Yes.

16 A. It was in the service building on the bottom floor. i  ; 17 -Where was the control room in relation to that? 0 ] 18 A. I would have to walk out one door and.go up three 1 19 floors from that building. 20 I started asking questions and interrupted the 0 21 question that I asked you to answer, and that is if you could 22 describe a typical day in your life as the Operations Super- ] 23 . visor in 1978-79. 24 A. Nonna11y, my day would start with a plant . tour l 25 myself. Then I would review the turnover with the shift

                                                                                                                                                                                                    '2-Y l

3 supervisor in the morning. Typically we had the maintenance i l 2 ' supervisors, the lead people, stop in the shift supervisor's 3 l office in the morning; we would assign them so that they could' I 4 lgettheirpeoplestarted: " Hey, we need this instead of what , l i 5 lisscheduledtoday,"thattypeofthing.

                                                                       !                                                                                                                                      1 l

6 I Then I would do normal administrative duties, and  ! o I i 7 i normally I would go through the plant on an afternoon tour. s Normaladministrativedutiescanbeanythingfromdisciplinaryl i i 9 action to layinc out the next refueline, to -- anythine that  ; 10 is done administrative 1y in the department. 11 C How much time would you spend on an average day in 12  ! the control room? i l 13 A. A couple of hours a day, I think, in the control 14 room, when I didn't have the watch. There were days I had the' 15 watch myself and spent seven or eight hours in the control 16 room. i 17 0 Did you have a lot of discussions with the opera-18 tors, day-to-day discussions with them, at that time? 19 A. Ab'solutely. I see my people every day and always 20 lhave. 21 0 Do you recall, during those day-to-day discussions, 22 any concerns being raised to you regarding specifically the 23 performance of the leak rate test program, any problems in-24 volving the program? 25 A. No, m w+ i

                                                                                                                               %T 0      How closely would you, at that time, have become 2

involved in the actual performance of leak rate tests?

   )            A       Very little involvement. I guess I would be look-4 ing at what the leak rate was on the shift turnover sheet,.

3 L what we call.the Reading report, daily report, and that would i 6 normally be my extent of involvement. I look at that and say, 7

           "Okay, night shift has such and such a leak rate."                                          I would                                    '

8 be looking at the make-up tank when I'came through and say l 1  ! 9

       ', "It's okay."     I wouldn't run one myself or anything like that.

i _39 0 I was going to ask that, if you had ever run a gg leak rate test yourself. A I can't remember ever doing one. I'm sure I've 12 l 1 33  ! run one in my life or two in my life, but I can't ever remem-14 lberdoingonemyself. I 15 g The performance of the leak rate test, was that c 16 ' ~ unique or considered an important evolution at the time such I 37 l that you would pull the procedure out, 1303, and walk yourself 18 through the procedure as you ran the test, or was this a mun-19 dane daily activity that received the kind of attention that 20 anything receives when you do it every day, day after day? 21 A It was strictly a routine job. It was like taking 22 a reading. 23 0 It was not then considered a significant plant 24 evolution? 25 A No, definitely not.

             .                                                                                                 16 ~

I 1 [ BY MR. CONNELLY:

             )

i 2 i

              ;       O       I have one question regarding the POD meetings.

3 l Were minutes maintained of those meetings? l 4 , A No minutes as such. There was a plan of the day i 5 I'that was generated every day; it was a typed sheet that said I 6 lwhatthetopicswere,butitdidn'tsaywhatthediscussions 7 were. 8 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 1 9 l 0 One other question regarding this period of time.

                                                                                                             ~

10 Did Cim Floyd routinely, attend the POD meetings that you kn$w' 11 of? I 82 1 A No. Normally, they were separate for Unit 1 and - 13 Unit 2. 14 O Separate meetings for each? 15 A Yes.

   .                                              M 16 i
                    . O     There was no overley Eetween the meetings between 17                                       '

the two units? r 18

  • A No.

19

  • BY MR. CONNELLY:

20 0 How about with regards to the PORC, were you a mem-E ber of the PORC at that time? 22 A Yes, sir. 23 ' D Would each unit have its own PORC? 24 A Yes, sir. l 25 D Would minutes of the PORC be maintained? l

  • 4 I

s

23' 1 A- They were maintained, yes. 8 _D How'often would the PORC meet? 13 l A 2 don't recall.  ! I-don't think there was a fixed 1 i  ! 4 ' routine. I think it was more as necessary; a couple times a 6

                         ; week, maybe four times a week sometimes,                                                                                                           q l

6  !

                                     -Q         Who would have been the gentlemen that would have i

7 sat on the PORC? Not specific names, but what would they 'l I represent? Would they be dephrtment heads? B . i 9 A Yes; normally, yod would have a department head for ' l . "' 10 j-each of-the major groups, Maintenance, operations, Health 11-Physics, Engineering,--and an alternate. That would be the i M'  !

l. composition of the PORC.

Then there were requirements-for 13-

                    !-what the composition had to be; I think it was three' full-time 14 l

members and one alternate. There were some rules on number of - 15 l alternates. 16 C Primarily, what would the PORC do? 87 A' In those days the PO'RC was primarily a procedure la review group. They did the review 8# various procedures. 19  ; And that woul'd also include the leak rate procedure? 20 A Wall, if there was a change coming through to it, 21

                       - it would go through PORC.

22 - 0 If there were problems, let's say, with the leak 28 rate procedure in regards to the computer program, operators 24

                        .were experiencing problems with the computer program, for 25 example, that occurred, would that be discussed at the PORC?

l t _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~

28 .. 3 A Not necessarily, not unless there was a procedure 9  ! change or a reportable incident based on that, and then it l l 1 3 l would be discussed. i 4 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 5 G Would you ever have had a reason to sit in on a I .. 1 6 i Unit 2 PORC meeting? i i i 7 A I'm not sure. I may have. [ { 8 0 Do you specifically recall ever having a policy of l 9 sitting in on Unit 2 PORC meetings?  ! i 10 f A I don't, recall specifically a policy.

                                                                                              }

11 Q Or specifically sitting in on a PORC meeting at  !

                      !                                                                       I 12 Unit 2 or at Unit 1 where the subject of problems with leak 23 lratesatUnit2cameup?

14 L No, I do not recall any.

                                                             ~

15 BY MR. CONNELLY: j 16 0 We would just like to get back to the leak rate 17 tests again; there are some questions I would like to ask you 18 regarding the test. - 19 In the control room log book and also in the shift 20 foreman's log book in our review, we see that they only enter 21 the completion times of the test. Was there any reason why 22 they didn't put the starting times of the test in those par-L 23 l ticular log books?

  • A I feel it is because it was such a routine thing 25 that, you know, "I got a leak rate; here's what it was."

9

kT l 3 0 Was there a requirement that starting and comple-i 2 ltiontimesweretobeenteredinthelogbook? 3 l A I'm not sure there was ever a clear requirement. 4 I'm sure our desire was for all major surveillance to have I 4 5 the starting and stop time. ) 6 1 0 Would a leak rate be considered a major surveillance 7 l A It's just like a log reading; it's a very routine l I 8 thing. l i 9 , O of course, on the computer print-out sheet it did j i i 10 ' include the start and the log time. ' l i 11 j A Yes. - I i 12 , O And was the reason why. the start times were not 13 entered because of the recurring problem of invalid leak rates? 14 A Absolutely not. 15 0 Who would be responsible for the review of the 16 i shift foreman's log and the con' trol room's log book regarding 17 ltheaccuracyoftheirentries? 18 A The control room log is routinely reviewed by the 19 shift foreman. The shif t foreman's log was reviewed by the 20 shift supervisor. And I have a requirement, I review both 21 weekly. 22 O You review both weekly. And you would review all 23 the entries of that whole week. What would your review con-24 sist of? 25 A Verification that they have properly signed in and

b3 1 out and that, basically, log readings were not vague, they 3 were detailed enough~so that we'could tell what was going on. 3 l 0 In the surveillance procedures,.why wouldn't an 4 operator make an entry regarding an invalid leak rate test in 5 the control room log book? 6 A It just wasn't a significant event to him. 7 g In today's climate, in today's atmosphere, if I 8 ran a leak rate today and, for example, because of plant i 9 esci11ations or whatever,it was abnormally high and was deemed' 10 i to be invalid, would I enter the starting and completion times I la  ! of that particular test in the control room log book? i 12 A Probably not. Would you would probably do is SS attach the sheet -- mark it invalid -- to the shift and daily 24 [ checks and forward it to the Ops office. i l 25 l BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 36 i 0 Has that been established as a requirement now, do 17 you know? 18 A Yes, sir. It's a requirement and procedure'now. 19 l 0 We went through some of the type of things that- I 20 invalidate' leak rate tests, gross numbers and whatnot. What 3 2 type of operator actions would invalidate a leak rate test?

                                                                                                                                    )

22 A Normally, when you had one that was out of wack, {' 1 23 [ you usually did something that you shouldn't have done. 24 0 Such as? L 25 A You allowed them to draw a sample in the middle of 3 4

31 1 it,.or you-added in the' middle of it and didn't take credit 8- for it, or something like that. l'ormally, there was a reason;

3 where you made a big step change in power and the computer was
                                ~

4 in between, spit out data, as you were making the step change.

  '5                                            There are several reasons you could get an invalid I

6 leak rate. 7 g one of the reasons would, in fact, be a water addi-8L tion to the make-up tank during the course of the test; is 9 i that correct? 1 l 10 A; You had tThe option that you could take credit for l 11- what you added. 6 la O If you accounted for the addition,-you could do' ' 38 that, but not for unaccounted for additions. 24 ' A No; that.would make it invalid for sure. - 15 g If that has happened, then it becomes an invalid I 16 test. What would happen with that test? 17 A Well, typically, I'm not absolutely sure, but I ~18 believe they discarded it and said, " Hey, gees, we added 18 during this thing. Let's go run another one." 20 0 Let me read this to you and ask you to comment on 21 gg, 7.m going to read from the surveillance procedure itself. 22 This happens to be Revision 4, and the procedure used at that 23 time was Revision 7; however, there is no change between 24 Revision.4 and 7 in this particular part, and it is section 25 6.4.2.

32. 1 Let me quote it to you: " Insure that no unaccounted l I 8 l for operator action has occurred that would change the RCS l 3 l

         ! inventory."     Then it refers to Section 3.1 for a listing of                                 I 4

i possibilities, which includes additions of water to make-up 1 l 5 l tank. l I i 6 I i Back to quoting again: "If such an action has l 7 occurred, it invalidates the measurement. Enter this in the i 8

      ! ' Remarks' section of the data sheet, clearly describing the
       '                                                                                               1 9

action that invalidated the measurement."

                                                                                                   ^

10 I'm trying to reconcile that portion of this sur-11

      ! veillance procedure with what apparently was the operator i

i 12 accion. I 13 l If you would like to look at that, feel free. 14 l i (Document handed to witness.) IL l (Witness perusing document.) 16 A IguessIdon'tevehgememberitbeingthere.

                                            *F I

17 feel that most of them don't eyer remember it being there. 18 0 What would you attrCbute that lack of familiarity 19 with the various sections of th,e procedure to? 20 A The fact that it is so routine. It's like writing 21 down a log. You can go back and you punch RC on the computer 22 and you walk away from it, basically. 23 O So the procedure wasn't pulled out every time you f 24 ran a test and it wasn't walked through.

                                                                                                       ]

25 g 30, t .

f-

                                                                                                                                                   "d3 3                                     0      It was the mundaneness of the procedure then?

2 A Correct, sir. 3 0 I will ask you for an interpretation. Knat would i 4 you interpret'that as requiring you to do with that test? It 5 doesn't clearly address what you actually do with the test 6- result at that time. 7- A I-think they wanted you to mark across the sheet s " Invalid." Then what you did,with it, it doesn't say. I I 9 I think the idea is so it wouldn't be laying around and some-10 one would say, " Gee, is this'a valid leak rate?" {

                                   ,                                              a la                                          0      I was drawing my own interpretation.                                       That's what l

1 12 l it is; that if you were required to mark " Invalid" on the 23 test, it was because you were required to keep it in some 14 fashion. There would be no reason to mark it as " Invalid" 15 if you were going to throw it away. 16 MS. SHAW:- That is your'-- l 17 MR. CHRISTOPHER: That's my interpretation. 18 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: - 19 Q I was asking if you could comment on the validity 20 of that interpretation. .. 21 A I'm saying that's not necessarily the only inter-22 pretation. Clearly, we weren't practicing retaining all data 23 at that time. So I don't know why the operator would -- he l 24 may or may not have wrote " Invalid" across. I'm not even sure 25 they did that. l _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _________________._________________________________________._____.______._______..__________i

3Y l 2 0- But the mundaneness of the operating of the pro- J l 8 cedure led to a very liberal -- not a liberal interpretation 3 of the procedure, but a working off of memory and general l 4 i principles versus a detailed review of the procedure. Would 5 that be correct? 6 A Yes, th t's correct, plus the computer actually 7 did the procedure. We really didn't. 8 BY MR. dONNELLY: 1 9 . O If the operator would have had to do a hand calcu ' l1ation,hewouldhaveusedthisprocedure?

                           ~

10 I 12 A I believe he would have. It is a little more M difficult. 13 0 If you had a leak rate test that exceeded the one 84 gpm tech spec, what was the action that was required of the 85 operator? Let's say we had a leak rate that exceeded -- 16 let's say 1.5 or 2, in that area. I 17 A A couple things. If it was a. valid leak rate, the 18 first thing, you've got to identify it. Within four hours 19 you've got to judge it as being safe. And if you can't fix 20 it within 24 hours, you've got to have the unit off. 22 O I know you've answered this question before, but 22 how would an operator know that it was a valid leak rate? 23

Would there be other criteria he could look at besides what N

was on that print-out sheet whether or not the test rus valid 25 or not? 6

l'o 37 2 A Certainly.- He could look at other indicators 5 in 2 the plant and determine what his leak rate really was by 3 actual indications without having to go through a computer 4 calculation first. 0 5 0 And those other indicators would have been?- ) 6 A Make-up tank level, pressurizer-level, RC drain 7 tank level. ;C 8 0 If the operator, looking at those other. criteria, i' j

                                                                                                                                                                  +

9

                                                           ; determined that, in fact, he war having problems and tha9-10
                                                                 ~ possibly there was a leak rate, you indicated that he wofid Al have four hours-to tr? to identify the unidentified leakige, I

12  : l where it was coming from. C l l 13 A He would have to -- one, any. leakage, identified 14 leakage, we've got to judge it as safe within four houffi 15 That means it isn't coming through a pressure boundary fault, 16

                                                       ,         it's not in a location that we can't control.                                So that &6 tion 27 would have to be taken within four hours.

18 If we can't identify the leakage, it's unident'ified 18 leakage and the unit comes off. If'you can identify it ihd 20 you judge it as safe, you can run up to ten gallons a minute. 21 O Because the tech spec requirement says up to ken 22 gallons of identifiable leakage. P' 23 A Right; you can meet the requirement then. 24 ' O Can you recall any instance of that occurring in 25 this period? g .. e

                                                                                               *Uo 1           'i     In.the '78 period?

2 O Yes. -) 3 A I can't recall a single incident where we had a

                                                                                                                 )

I 4 problem where we had to do something.

                                                                                                             .j l
                        '6                    BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:                                              l 6            0     We discussed the policy of the throwing away of 7

the invalid test results when the test results'came out and i 8 were determined to be invalid. Was that a practice that was 9 limited to leak rate tests, or was it a. routine practice? Wit r. 10-regard to any particulas-technical specifications you would 11 perform, was it routine practice to throw away those that l 12 were unacceptable and only keep the ones that were good? 13 No. A. I think the practice was pretty much lir..ited i 14 - to things that were very, very routine'that you did very often. 15 ' I think our other data we retained. If we had a, let's say, , 16 high pressure injection test and we had unsatisfactory per-II formance, we retained at least some portion of it. I think l l i 18~ at some time in there we changed to where we retained every 19 piece of it, as is our requirement now. We took action based 20 on that. 21 0 was either one ever recuired or-placed in an Action. 22 Statement because of exceeding the tech spec for unidentified 23 leakage? 24 A. In the 1978 period? 25 ! g 1978-79. You stopped operating in February.

27  !

1. A. February 16 of '79. I don't recall of any specific
2. -incident where we were placed in that period.

3 O Would you have been~ required to log the actual 1 4 , performance of all the surveillance tests? ' 6 A. ' We like to think they logged all survellic.nce 6 tests. I i 7 0 I notice they recorded t.m tests, but only the 8 accepted tests were recorded. The ones that were run that { l 9 'wcre not accepted were never recorded. ' 10 I was-just wondering if there was a particular 11 rationale or policy regarding how tech spec performance was 12 recorded and documented. l 13 In other words, the only ones we ever really would l 14 ' L. know about are the good ones. We would never know about the l 15 bad ones if you took a liberal interpretation of that type of 16 ' policy. l II' A. I think that is probably to some degree true. We  ! 18 require the completion of tech spec surveillance to be re- . 19 corded. If you had invalid it was never completed, so they 20 never recorded; they never felt it was a problem. It was, 8I like I said, a routine evolution. , 23 0 You say it was never done with the intent or the 23 thought that it was better for the NRC or some other agency 24 not to know what type of unacceptable test results you were  ; t having? 1 i

L - I' 32

)7
A. Absolutely not. If that was the case we certainly 2 wouldn't have run it every shift.

3 BY MR. CONNELLY: 4 0 Were there problems with the computer' program in 6- regards to leak rates?

   ~6                A      That I'm not'sure of.      I think I answered by saying.
   '7          I'm not aware of any problems.

8 0 Do you recall any discussions.with operators where 9 .they might have discussed with you that they' wore having 10' problems with the conputer program? 11 A. Nothing that I'm aware of. 12 I talked to recently a former operator; I'm not 0 13 going to' identify'him here in the interview, but I would like 14 to read some of his transcript that addresses this problem. 15 l My question to him was: "What was causing the ' 16 negative leak rates?" g i a 3 ' *It was a simple natter of calcu-His answer was:

          ]

18 lation. I believe it is the way the' leak rate was calculated.

                                                /

19 It wa$ written poorly." It was a poor program. l 20 "Do you remember a'ny discussions" -- this is my i 21 question: "Do you remember any discussions with any manage-22 ment personnel regarding the computer program?" 23 His answer was: "No." L 24 "Do you remember if the computer My question: 25 program at any time was addressed by either the operators or "T

39 1' their supervisors?" 8  : His answer: "Other than the fact that maybe --

                !3  !: let me give you for an instance what used to happen a lot of I

i 4 l times. . I would be on the three td 11 shift and Mike Ross l- [6 I would walk in. He was the Supervisor of Operations at that 1 i 6 ' time and probably still is. And just through casual conversa-7 I tion I.would say, 'The leak. rate program is screwed up. I j t 8 gotanothernegativeleakraye,youknow, and I'm drawing 9 straight lines'and everythin,7,' and I said, 'It can't be.'

 ~

i J

               .10     And he would say, ' Yeah 7 yea'h;' yeah, I~know,' and that would 11     be the end of it."

l l~ M L Certainly. I don't recall specifically that con-D versation, but with the accuracy of the system,at some time 14 you're going to get a negative leak rate and it's not saying 15 there is something wrong with the program, certainly. 16 O This operator interpret d that the reason why they 27 were coming up negative leak rates was because of a bad com-18 puter program. - 18 What I'm just trying to determine is if, in fact, 30 people in your position and your peers in other' departments, 21 specifically in the computer department and so on, recognized 22 that there was a problem with the computer program in regards 23 to the leak rates and if this was discussed at any formal 24 meetings or informal discussions. 25 A Nothing we're aware of. Because you have a i e

4D i i negative leak rate doesn't mean there is necessarily something 3 wrong. It is within the accuracy el the system.

                                                                                                  )

3  : O Are all water additions to the RCS inventory re-4 lcuiredtoberecordedintheCROlog? ) 5 l A They should be. I 6 O Do you know of instances where they might not have : i 7 l been recorded in th'e CRO log? 8 l A Well, we would like to think not, but it probably  ! l 9 , happens. . 10 O If it came to your attention that an operator had 21 added water and it was not recorded in the CRO log, what 1 12 l would have been your action? I 83 A We would have talked to him about it for sure. 84 We 're telling them that's what we want them to do, we want

       \                                 ,                                                 e 15    lthemtologallentriessowecankee)trackofwhat'sgoing 16 l on. We also look at what our boron is doing based on that.

17 0 You're f amiliar with the Hartman allegations? 18 L Aware, not familiar. - 19 0 From what, just general reading in the newspapers? 20 A And some conversation with the company, but I've , 81 had no what I would call detailed -- 22 Part of those allegations are that operators were O 23 making unrecorded water additions to the make-up tank in 24 order to affect leak rates. Do you know -- I 25 A At TMI Unit 1 or 2? h l

91 1' O. At Unit 2. Excuse me; Unit 2. 2 Are you aware if that occurred at Unit 1 at any l I 3 j time during your term as Supervisor of Operations? 4 A With the purpose of negating -- 6 0 For the purpose of affecting a leak rate. l 6 A Absolutely not. - 7 Q Do you know if possibly an operator had made an i 8 l unrecorded water addition by mistake and had failed to record l 9 . that in the control room log book? 10 i A That is possible by the nature of the test and the 31 routineness of'it. ' i 12 I g' In that time period, if I was a switching and I 13 tagging man conducting a leak rate test, what operator would 14 have been the individual who would have added water? 15 A The console operator. Would he'have notified -- would it have been prac-

                                      ~

26 0 27 tice for him to notify the switching and tagging man that he 18 was adding water? 19 A The switching and tagging man should have notified 20 him that he had put a leak rate in. Sometimes it is possible 21 that that wasn't communicated very well; two different people; I 22 - the computer is behind the console where you enter. It's a 1 23 routine; a guy walks by and punches in RC and goes on with 24 It's possible that one guy didn't know what the his readings. 25 other guy was doing. j ps.

                                                                     .._~_______.___________-___________w

l 42-1 0 'The switching and tagging nan doing'the test, if 2 he was aware that the other operator had added water, how 3 l would he enter that? Would he enter that into the calcula-4 tion itself, or would the calculation be negated and you 6 would have to do it over again? 6 A I think most times -- and I'm not absolutely sure - 1 4 7' -- they would probably just negate it and say, " Gees, let's 8 start over here." Sometimes they would enter it. i Was there a kind of a distinctive sound when warer

                                                                                                                      ^

8 G 10 was being added'to the rake-up tank? Would there be a dis-11 tinctive sound coming from the panel area that the switching M i and tagging man could hear and would immediately know that I i 13 i i

      ! water.wasbeingadded?

I4 A Yeah, there was a batch controller which clicks 15 off. But it is kind of subtle. If you get busy and you're 16 writing orders, it's possible to miss it, but there is ' 87 noise associated. 18 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 19 0 If you were in the course of running a test and 20 an operator made an inadvertent water addition and told the 21 operator running the leak rate test, were you able to cancel  ! 22 the performance of that test and start again, or did you have q i 23 to wait for the test to run to its completion? 24 A I'm not absolutely sure. I think you had to wait 25 for the test to come out, is the problem there, because it is

                                                                       'E l

, 2 .already entered and the computer is just going to spit it out. 1 1 2 You can't go and say " Cancel,* not without knowing a little 3 more than the operators know about the program. So it would j 4 probably come out. ] J l 5 O So there would be times when you knew you had an l 6 invaJid test coming out before it came out, but you had to 7 let the program run its course. 8 A That is my recollection; it would still spit out.

                                                                                    \

9 BY MR. CONNELLY: , 10 - Is that still.the same way today? 0 31 A Yes. 12 i But, of course, today he would make an annotation O 23 to that invalid leak rate and attach it to the valid leak 14 rate. 15 A He would attach it to the shift and dailies, and 16 we may have a pack like that (indicating), I don't know; it's i U possible. 18 What are the shift and dailies? 0

 ~ 18 A    Those are the readings the guys do every day. We 20                                      He is required to attach his call them shift and dailies.

21 leak rates to that. - 22 . g Would he attach that invalid leak rate with the 23 valid leak rate? 24 A Today? 25 0 Yes.

                                                                     -_____ _ _ A

Yh 1' A. Yes. 8 G But not then? He would just go ahead and throw it

3. { away.

4 A. Or discard it. I 5 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 6 O Do you ever recall having discussions during your 7' l

                                              ;     POD meetings or your discussions with management and super-8                             visory personnel discussing these type of intimate' details of 9                             the plant, such as leak rates, with Gary Miller, Jim Seelinger, 10                                 Jack Herbein'or even Bob Arnold?

11 e l A. No. . 12 O To what extent would those individuals have gotten 13 involved in your day-to-day operations? 14 A. They were involved from the standpoint of they knew 15 what was going on. Each of them got, in the morning, what we

                                                  ,                                 .w 16
                                                  ! call our Reading report, whic) would list power level, temper-17                              ature, flow activity and the toolant lez.k rate, just a number, 18                             major ecuipment out of servi [e, planned operation for the next    !

19 24 hours. So all of them would know what the plant was doing. 20 Of course, in our management chain, any significant 21 problems were pushed up through the chain. 1 22 The unit superintendent at that time was Jim O 23 Seelinger; is that correct? l 24 I'm not sure. A. At some time. 25 For a significant portion of that time it was 0 1 i l I L _ _. J

W Lt . ' Jim Seelinger.

             -3                 A             Yes.

And Gary Miller was the station superintendent. 3 0 4 A Yes. 5 0 ~And, of course, Jack Herbein was Vice-President of

6' Operations.

7- A- Generation.

  • 8  ; O I'm sorry; Gener3 tion.

i 9 .A Right. . 10 0 Your day-to-day bontact with Gary Miller, to what ' 11 extent would your contacts have been with him regarding your 12 l unit? 13 I A Well, Gary was a very dynamic person. It could be 14 anything. It could be a phone call saying "What about this 35 . guy that ran the gate last night?" " Hey, what's going on 16 with this," or "What's going on w1th that?" 37- He was involved. -He didn't come to the control 18 room every day, but he watched what was going on. He was the 19 guy that overseed both units and elped set policies for-both 20 units. He had no problem with calling his department heads

              . 21         directly at times.

E' g Would you have any formalized meetings scheduled 23 - with Gary to update him on various plant events, plant prob-24 lems, evolutions? 25 A I don't remember anything specific. We had staff

db I 1 q meetings where items were reviewed. Gary was the type of guy 2 that never bothered to call you in special to talk about any i I l l 3- l thing that was bothering him. i l 4 i 0 -Do.you ever recall any discussions with Gary, l 5 either then or now, or since that time, regarding the per-  ! I i 6

       !.formance of leak rate tests at Unit 17 7               A     No.

l 8 1 0 Or Unit.2?  ! l  ; i

 '9               A     No.         ,                                        ,

t 10 C And the same question.would hold true for 11 Mr. Herbein? 12 A That's true. l 13 0 would you have had a great deal of contact er inter . I r 14  ! I face with Mr. Herbein? 1 l l 15 A Limited. Mr. Herbein started off with the plant 16 and was well-known by all of us. He also, if he had a ques-t 17 tion and he wanted an answer, he would call you direct at 18 times, and then he would follow down through the chain of I 18 command. But we have some contact, but it wouldn't be like 20 we have day-to-day contact. We had a morning phone call that 21 he got updated on the plant with every day. 22 Again, you recall no discussions with him regarding O 23 the problem of leak rate; at Unit 1 or discussions concerning  ; 24 indications of problems with the performance of leak rates at 25 Unit 17 ___d

I i 41 I 1 A Not that I recall. l 2 O Or Unit 27 l 3 A Not that I recall. l ] 4 'O Now, there is one level further than that, and { 1 5 that included Mr. Arnold. ) l 6 A Very limited contact with Mr'. Arnold. I'm not even i j i i 7 sure.he ever got the Reading daily report. I assume he did,  ! i 8 he.was on distribution. But our contact was less frequent  ; 8 ' with him. I dont ever recall him ever calling us directly 10 or personal contact with him. -

                                                                         ~

11 Would you consider that ar.y one of those three O 12 individuals would have had intimate day-to-day knowledge cf 13 what was actually happening in Unit I? 14 A Define " intimate." 15 g By " intimate" I mean really know what is happening, 16 what kind of evolutions you have planned for the day, what 27 kind of major tech spec milestones you have to meet during 18 that day. How closely did he monitor what you had to do to 18 keep that plant running? 20 As far as an overview, I think that both Mr. A 21 Herbein and Mr. Miller would know what overview. I'm not 22 sure about Mr. Arnold. 23 BY MR. CONNELLY:  ; 24 0 In the pre-accident period, were you aware of 25 periodic problems with the make-up tank level recorder? e  ! ____ _ __j

42 2 A. .No. L 3  : G I want to discuss with you several work requests 1 3 l that highlight this problem. The first one is work request 4 I number 23660. .It is dated 4/28/78. Under the originator's 5 signature-we see Larry No11's signature. In section number 5, 6  ! criginator's/ supervisor's signature we see Larry Noll/M. P.oss. 7 I assume that would stand for your name, correct? 8 i A. It stands for my name,.but that is not my  !

                                                                                                                                 !    I 9       signature.

i

                                                                                 ,                                                    l!

10. l C Why would Noll sign your signature at that time? 11 I- A I'm not sure how our procedure was written. I

i. I 12 i -think that was pretty standard at the time. The shift super-13 visor normally reviewed the work requests, and it would be 14 l not unusual for him to do that at that time.

I c

           -15 l        -0                               Would you see this document?

i 16 { A No. I 87 g Though he put your name on it, you would not 18 actually see the document? 29 A Not necessarily, no. 20

                    ,       O                              I want to read to you section 3 of this particular 21
                    . work request.                            It says:            "Make-up tank level recorder is not 22 responding correctly.                                      Put in 100 gallons; recorBer went up 23 eight inches or 240 gallons.                                       If you change make-up tank 24 pressure four pounds, level changes" -- it says "18 inches,"

25 but.according to the Noll testimony it is 1.8 inches.

d 'I 1 on the top it says

  • Cancelled. Covered by refuel-l 2 l ing surveillance," and the initials "MT," I believe, stand

! l 3 for Mike Toole, who I believe was an INC Tech at that time. 4 i Does this ring a bell with you? Do you recall 5 r this particular problem being discussed with you by any of l 6 l the operators, or was it even discussed with you by Larry Noll 7 A In 1978? 8 0 Yes. 9  ; A No. ,

  .            i          ~            ~

10 0 We have another one, work request number 21284, i 11 l dated 9/12/77, which, I believe, at that time you were not 12 i Supervisor of Operations; it was George Kunder at that time, 13 correct? ' 14 A That's correct. 15 l 0 You were a shift supervisor then. 16 A Rig,ht. I 87 0 It is signed by Paul Chalecki. In the origina-18

                      . tor's/ supervisor's signature I believe it is Tex Acker's 19 signature with the initials GAX, which probably would stand i

20 for George Kunder. 21 A Right. 22 O In section number 3 it says: "Added 200 gallons 23 to the make-up tank with batch controller. Make-up tank 24 level recorder responded with a level indication of a 300 25 gallon addition. Suspect make-up tank level transmitter.

Eb I l' Investigate and~ correct." On top of the page it says: 2 " Cancelled. Covered under surveillance 1302-5.17." i {'

                                                                                      /-        ..
                          -3                        Again, my question is if you recollect any df.scus-4        sions in which this specific problem illustrated in this docuH
                                                                                                         .l 5   ,    ment was discussed?                                                   '

6  : A. .Not in 1978. l 7  ; g Do you know what surveillance procedure 1302-5.17 l i . I l 8  : is? l i

                                                                                                          'a
                                                                                                         ' t.

9- A Jost<by looking at the number, it's some kin:i of  ! 10 , INC-refueling interval. s I ' 11 G The next document I would like to have you review 12 lisworkrequest 23904. It is signed by Paul Chalecki, dated l 13 j 5/18/78. Ihn originathr's/ supervisor's signature, it looks l l l l 14 l like it's Ken Bryan's signature; it is not clear. 15 l Does that appear to be Ken Bryan's signature? i 16  ; A. yes, 8 i 17  : 'O And Ken Bryan at that time was a shift supervisor I 18 ', or a shift foreman? 19 A I'm not sure. , 20 0 Section number 3 of this particular document says: 21 "While adding hydrogen to the make-up tank, received make-up 22 tank high level alarm. Level indication on console and com-23 puterJabout 79 inches. High level alarm set point is 96 24 inches. Investigate and repair as necessary." l 25 Again, do you recall any discussions about what is l 5 i L_-_L__._L.--._ _ 1

GI 2 illustrated in this particular document regarding this 8 problem? 3 l A No. 4 D On top of the page it says: " Cancelled. Covered 5 by work request 23952.* 23952 states -- well, the date on 6 this particular work request is 5/23/78, that is work request i 7 23952. The originator's signature looks like Ken Bryan's j 8 signature, and the supervisor's signature is Ken Bryan; it 9 appears to be Ken Bryan's signature. I 10

Section number 3 says: "Make-up tank level in-I 11
                ' creases ten inches from an addition of 100 gallons.                It should i

12

               ; only increase by about three inches.                 We don't really know I

13 anymore what the make-up tank level really is." - 14 Again, just to jog your memory, if you can recol- ' 15 lect any discussions with Ken Bryar,regarding this specific 16 problem illustrated in this document. 1 17 po, A 18 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: _ 19 0 I guess what is significant in that particular 20 ' document, and the reason Pete is interested in it, I think 21 you said one of your primary indicators of where your plant 22 was at was your make-up tank level.

 -r 23 A    Yes.

84 D Obviously, we would be interested in reconciling 25 the comment you see on that maintenance memorandum with the i

l j T 2s 1 l day-to-day operations. If we really don't know our make-up i l 3-i tank level, then do we really know what the plant is doing? i l I 3  ; A I'd say that if we really didn't know what our , 4 lmake-uptanklevelwas,_wewould'havereallybeenconcerned, 1 5 . because we would be worried about running our make-up pumps ) l 6 without any suction. j 7 I 0 We only know what he said in the comment. i 8 A But I'm saying that if that was true, it should i i I 9 ' have been pushed up through and we would have probably done i

                                                 - ~ ~ ~ ~          ~

10 l something immediately. ' i al BY MR. CONNELLY: l 32  ! 0 On the second page of this particular work request,- I 33 which is dated 5/23/78, in section 19 we see the entry made: i ~ 34 "Ron Mensur and Mike Hockley unclogged lines to transmitter l M j and checked calibration. Turned oveE to Jim Freeman to cali-as brate transmitter. Complet$e and a calibration.' 17 According to the testimony of.Ron Mensur, what 18 they did is they blew the line down, the dry reference line 19 down, and they came up with water. 20 Can you recollect if you did have periodic prob-21 lems where they had to go down and blow water out of the dry 22 reference leg? 23 A I can remember that being done, okay? I can't 24-remember associating it with a problem with leak rate though, l 25 0 But could you associate the blowing down of the 11

1 line with the problem with the make-up tank level recorder? l 8 A I remember it doing it, but I can't remember why. I 3 I remember getting water out of the line. 4 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 6 O Can we go back to the one signed by Ken Bryan re-6 garding make-up tank level and maybe just take a closer look 7 at it for a minute? Ken Bryan was at that time, I believe, a 8 shift supervisor -- possibly he was a shift foreman. 9 l A It could have been. I 20  ! O Possibly. In either case, he's in a supervisory 11  ; position. I'm trying to understand why an individual in that i 12 j position would make that type of comment, which, to my mind la is a significant comment -- whether right or wrong, in the 14 ultimate sense is a significant comment considering the re-15 liance you place on your make-up tank instrumentation. 16 Using that to jog your memory, can you recall him l t 37 or someone bringing to your attention any discussions regard-16 ing this type of problem? 19 A' No. 20 0 Who would have reviewed that document above him, or 21 who would have acted on it? 22 A It should have went through the maintenance chain l 23 at that time; looked at it. 24 0 Would you have expected or would you have desired 5 that kind of comment or opinion to have been made known to d 1 ' l

i I I CY 1 l . yourself ?  ! l 2 i A Oh, yes. t 1, l . 3 , O t Do you think it should have been? l l 4 j A Yes. I think if he really believed this, it 5 l.wouldhavebeen. i 6 I D We don't know why he wrote it if he didn't send I 7 it in.

  .8                A       Like I say, if he really believed that, it would 9          have been.                    '

10 BY MR. CONNELLY: 11 0 If this document was reviewed by you, would you 12 have initialed it in any way? 83 A I should have. There was no requirement to do so. 14  ! I D In your practice at that time, what would you have 15 done? Would you have put your initials on it or signed your 16 name? 37 A At that time we never routed them through the front 18 office. So we probably never even seen it. 19 0 This was not routed to your office. It was routed 20 directly to the maintenance department? 21 g yes, 8 g was there any reason for that? 23 A No, no reason, except they are the ones that have 24 to lay out the work and go. Priorities came separate. We 25 l l just said, " Yeah, you got a work request." il A

rr 1 0 Reading this document now, in hindsight do you 8 think it should have been brought to your attention, what he 3 !issayinginhere? He's apparently saying that you can't be-4 lieve the make-up tank level recorder. 6 A If he actually and truly believed that he didn't 6 know what the make-up ta$k level was, I honestly believe it 7 would have been brought to our attention. 8 g Because of ths problems with the upcoming trial l \ ' 9 l we are unable to interview Ken Bryan now, so we have to assume' l 10 j that what he is saying on here is what he meant to say. It i 11 ! clearly states that he just can't believe the make-up tank l 12 i level recorder. I 13 What troubles us is that if that is one of the 24 principal criteria to determine if you have good leak rates or 15 not, it seems that that would be a serious problem. 16 MR. SHAW: Are you asking a question? I 17 MR. CONNELLY: Yes. 16 BY MR. CONNELLY: 18 0 I'm asking: does this seem to be a serious 20 problem? 21 A If what he says there is true, it would be a 22 serious problem; if that is what he actually meant. Again, 23 7 11 say, if he actually felt that, I believe he would have 24 been yelling and screaming. 25 0 But you don't recall any discussions with him

Eb l 1 regarding the' specific problem that is addressed in this' work i i 2 l request? 1 l' i [ 3  ! A No, sir. ' l

                                                                                        .I 4

O Just for the record, that work request is 23952. i i i I have one more work request that I would like to f I 6 review with you. 24843 is the number, and it is dated August i 7 8, 1978. It states, in section number 3: " Transmitter / l

 .6 i

recorder erratic. Suspect that reference leg has moistt".c in 9 i i-it." on the second page of this particular work reques it 1 l Ib  ; says: "Elew down low side; got a' lot of water." , I 11 i You indicated 'that there was a periodic problem i 12 I where they had to blow the line down and they came up with L 13 water. I 14 A I'm saying I'm aware of getting moisure out of the i 15 line. 'I don't know how period,ic it was. 16 i 0 Do you know if thav froblem was ever -- if anybody 17 i ever stood back and tried to determine what was causing that f 18 problem? ' l l 19 A Not that I'm aware of. Not in 1978. Since then 20 y, gay,, t 21-0 Since then what has been determined was causing' 22 that problem? 23 A Since then we have run some testing. We found a l l couple things; one, that you can't determine -- when you have 25 moisture in the line you can't determine what will happen to y L ___.________________1-----A

E7 2 the make-up tank level as far as a change; it may go up or 2 it may go down, depending on the conditions. So it doesn't 3 l always go the same way is one thing we deterndned. 4 I guess the second thing we determined is that the 6 thing now is pressure sensitive to some degree if it *.rs 6 something in the legs. We've taken some steps to ce;'tet that 7 now. We've modified the instrument and put a new instrument 8 in. In fact, we've changed the leak rate to where we use a I 8 'l different instrument now for make-up tank level, as far as the' i 10 le'ak rate calculation. 11 O How about the loop. seal? 12  ! A The ciping has been modified to slope different, l 13 so we don't have any problems with moisture, supposedly. We 14 have run some testing and it looks lik,e it has worked, at I l l 15 least on one instrument. l 16 Was loop' seal part of the problem? Is that what l 0 l l 17 was causing the gathering of Ehis water? 18 It's hard for me to say; but it looks like a slope A 18 on a line, which would be a loop saal, would be part of the 20 instrument problem. - 21 When did it come to your attention that the loop 0 22 seal was part of the problem? 23 It never specific came to me as a loop seal, but it A 24 came to me that there was a problem after Dr. Chang was in. 25 You mean Dr. Chung from the NRC? 0

C1 l 1 A Yes. At that time we ran some testing to find out j i i 2 i what actually went on there, and it come back saying it could

         !                                                                                                )

i 3 go either way. 4 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:

         ;                                                                                          i l     '

5 , O Is that. the testing that you ran in conjunction l, i t 6 I with Chung when he started looking at that? I 7 A Yes. I I l B T ' 0 Prior to Dr. Chung's inspection, when he and, i 9 i believe, Henry Shipman were involved in running the tests on l 1 10 l the line, were you aware of the piping configuration and the l 31 presence of that loop seal? I i

            ~

12 A No, not specifically. I 23 l 0 Would you have expected if it was present that you 14  ! would have been aware of it? i

                                                                                                         ]

85 A No, not unless we perceive it as a problem, and 16 then we would have been aware of it. It was just never a i 8' problem in our mind. - 18 g Did you get involved in the Fa'egre and Benson 19 investigation of TMI 2, which was your company's investigation 20 into Hartman's allegations? 81 A I had very limited involvement. I believe somebod 22 l talked to me and asked me some questions. 23 0 Did you ever see the report or read the report of 24 the results of that investigation? l 25 g pg, l l e n ,

59 1 O Were you ever told of the results and the findings 2 of the company's investigation? 3~ A I don't think specifically. . 4 0 Do you recall being advised that the company's l 6- finding at that time was that there was a loop seal in Unit 2 6 reference leg and a detailed explanation as to why the water 7 in that reference leg caused-the loop seal and thereby affected 8 the make-up tank and ultimately the leak rate tests if certain I I 9 l -l other manipulations were done? 10 A I' don't recall a specific reference.to that or a 12 specific knowledge of that. 12 g- So you can't recall back -- I think the Faegre and 13 Benson report came out in 1980, late-1980. You don't recall 14 being made aware of its findings regarding loop seal? . 15 A No, 16 So between that time,up until the time of Dr.

      ,       O l

37 Chung's activities, you were never made aware of that possible 18 effect? 19 A No, not specifically. l 20 0 Were you tasked after the findings of the Faegre 21 and Benson report in any way to examine the same problem at 22 TMI 1? 23 A Not that I'm aware of. 24 BY MR. CONNELLY: 25 0 Do you know if anybody was tasked to determine if

bo 1 you had the same problem as with Unit 27 2 A I had no knowledge. t 3

     ,               BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:

4 l 0 Do you recall any rationale or reason why no one f 5

     ! chose to look and see if you had the same type of problem i

6 , with Unit 1 -- 1 A i No. I l 8 0 - given the higM profile of the Hartman allegations l 9 at that time, and given 'the fact that the company's investi-10

     ' cation accarently identified the source of why the hyd[ ogen 22
     ,  effect could affect the tank level and the leak rate test?

12 A Idon'tknowthat'somebobywasn'ttaskedtodo l 13 j that. I'm not knowledgeable of any task to do that, and I 14

     ! know of no reason why.

15 g Did you ever initiate any actions to determine, or 16 i feel that it was necessary to initiate any actions to deter-r' lmineifyouhadthesametypeofconfigurationanddesignat i l 16

    > Unit 1 that could have resulted in duplication of the same 19 problem you had at Unit 2?

l 1 20 A No, I never had any emphasis to do that. 22 O Is there a reason why you didn't? Did you feel it 22 was not necessary? l 23 A I just wasn't knowledgeable of it. l 24 , 0 Tou didn't feel it was necessary to look at the i 25 Unit 1 design to see if you had the same problems as at Unit 2? a t

                                                                                         ._____._____a

bl 1 A I wasn't aware of the problem in Unit 2. There-8 fore, I wasn't aware of anything. 3 Are you saying -- let me clarify. O You were not 4 aware then of the findings of the Faegre and Benson report? 5 A Not specifically, no. 6 f BY MR. CONNELLY: I 7 l 0 Mike, going back to the pre-accident period, did l I 8 you specifically ever address the problem with the water in 8 the dry reference leg? 10 A No. - 11 0 Whose responsibility would it have been to address 12 that problem? 13 A Either engineering or INC. 14 0 And you don't recall any discussions with those 15 l people in those sections regarding the water in the dry refer-16 ence les? 27 g pg , 18 0 In the pre-accident period, were you aware of how U the addition of hydrogen would affect leak rate tests? 20 A No. - 81 O What circumstances would exist for an operator to 22 add hydrogen? 3 A Reduction of make-up tank pressure, reduction in 24 hydrogen concentration in the RCS. 25 0 How, physically, would they add hydrogen then?

6L 1 A A pretty si=ple operation. For the control room 8; operator, he just pushes a button. 3 0 That would be on the console? 4 A Yes, sir. 5 0 Would it be required for an aux operator to go 6 down to where the bottles were to turn on the bottles before  ; 7 the addition of the hydrogen?

                      ~

8 A. Normally, depending on the usage, we would nor:nallyl l

  • I 9 have it valved in.

i That may or may not be necessary. If we j l M~  ! ne'eded' a bottle , he inigrit' have 'to go down; if we had low I U l pressure or something lik'e that. I M SY MR. CHRISTOPHER: l 13 0 What were the parameters an operator would actually 14 respond,to in deciding when to add hydrogen? 15 A. A chemistry report yof low hydrogen concentration le would be one, or a make-up tank ~ pressure that was out of.the 87 normal control band.

              .                            /                                    4 18 l-                    BY MR. CONNELLY:

I 18 D Wha 1! would be the n'ormal control band?

  #           A      Normally, like 15 to 25 pounds, in that area, is 21 what he would be looking at maintaining pressure.

I 22 g And an operator, would he have any reason to add l 23 pressure under a pound per square inch? i i

  • A. Under a --

25 0 Under a pound. Would he have any reason to add i

63 I 1 under a pound? i 19 i^ :A No. Gee, - I wouldn 't even know how you . would do I 3 that. i i 4 How much -- j 'Q 1 5-l A' I~ understood the question finally after 2 thought i .

   -6                                                                                                                              1
          , about it.
    '7               g-   I believe on the chart that'the lowest pressure 8'  ! level.is two pounds.-                                                                                                         !

i  ;

   '9                A                                                                                                           '

I think it is two-pound increments. i 10  ! O Two-pound increments. So it wouldn't register if 1 81- you added under two pounds. l-12  ! A I don't think you can'open and close the; valve

  '23 that fast.                                                                                                                 j i
 '34 O     The problem I have is Dr.-Chung, in his analysis,                                                          '

l ' 15 he indicated,.by his experimentation, that if you open and 16 close the. valve within. seconds, there would be a distinct 17 signature on a strip chart indicating a small tweak addition I 18 of hydrogen, which would be a fra tion of a pound.- And what  ! 19 we are trying to determine: would'there be.any rational 20 explanation for an operator to add"that kind of pressure at 21 any time? 22 g yo, 23 0 Would there be any reason for him to do it during 4 leak rate? i

  "                A     No.

bY 3 0 If he did it during a leak rate, do you understand 2 how that would affect the leak rate? 3 . A Today or then? I 4 0 Today. 6- A l I'm not sure how it would affect it today. It may 6 lgouporitmaygodown. I think since we modified the 7 transmitter, I don't think it would have much effect at all. 8 g

                                   '                                With the knowledge of the loop seal, would you 9

understand how that small addition of hydrogen would affect 10 the leak rate? 1 l 11 , A Only if we had moisture in the leg. I 12 O Could you. explain, if you had moisture in the leg, 13 l how it would affect it? 14 A It would give you a different reading, because as 15 you increased the pressure,'you would' tend to move this water 16 slug and you would end up with more weight in one leg than in 4 27 the other, and it would give a little di#ferent reading. 18 This is something we learned after 1978.- 19 0 You, yourself, were not aware of this in the pre-20 accident period; is that correct? 21 A No, and I don't think anybody.was. 82 BY MR, CHRISTOPHER: 23 0 When after 1978 did you learn that? M A I learned that during the Chung investigation, j 25 l

                                                                                                                                          *  ]

r LC 1 BY MR. CONNELLY: 8' , O The reason why I'm asking these questions is be- l l 3 i cause this is a critical issue; the allegations at Unit 2 are 4 whether the operators were aware that there was a loop seal l l 5- and they could have added hydrogen and that it would affect l 6 the leak rate. That's part of the allegati~ons at Unit 2. 7 We're trying to determine if, in fact, the people 8 l fatUnit1wereawareofthesamesituationatUnit 1 and, if,- 9 finfact, had the opportunity or even did add hydrogen to 10 l affect a leak rate. - - - - L 21 Are you aware of any instances where an operator  ! i 22 would have added hydrogen in ords: to affect a leak rate test?. , I i 13 A No. 14 0 Do you know if operators at Unit 1 would have had i 15 knowledge that an addition of hydrogen would have affected a 1

                                                                                            ?

16 leak rate? 17 A If they had knowledge it certainly wasn't common 18 knowledge. 19 0 I would like to read to you again from -- E MS. SEAW: Could we go off the record, Pete? 28 MR. CONNELLY: Yes. 22 (Whereupon, a discussion off the record was held, 23 commencing at 10:44 a.m., returning to the record at approxi-24 mately 10:47 a.m.) { 25 MR. CONNELLY: Back on the record. I t

o: 1 BY MR. CONNELLY:

2 t

0- Mike, I again would like.to read to-you from the 3.

                                                   . transcript regarding a former control room operator who is'no
     .' 4                                               longer employed here.          He recently was interviewed, and we 5

specifically asked him questions about the hydrogen effect. 6 We would just like you to make a comment'regarding his'testi-7 . mony, what.he provided 'to us. 1 8 My question'tc him was: "Do you know how adding 9

                                       ,                hydrogen to the make-up tank during a leak rate test would t

10

                                       ! affect the results?" ~ '

a 11 His answer: "Sure it would."

12 Ey question to him was: "Could you explain how it 13 I.would or why-it would?"

14 His answer: "I can only guess. I never gone down 15 to a tank to look at it, but what appears that happens is the 16 instrumentation derives a level from a DP cell in the make-up 17 I tank; it's reference leg is dry. I think what used to. happen 18 is, I think moisture used to collect in that line and there l i 18 was a natural loop sealibetween that dry reference leg as it 20 came down from the top of the tank, turned around and came up

                                                                                     \

21 l to the DP cell. As moisture would collect in there, you would 22 1 form a loop seal. So if you would make an instantaneous i 23 change or a very rapid change in pressure in the gas space, i you would force up a column of water in that reference leg,up 25 into the DP cell, which would give you -- which would alter

l h7 1 the level reading momentarily." l 2 So by his answer he explains the loop seal. And  ! l 3  ! he goes on in his testimony to indicate that he had this 4 knowledge in the pre-accident period. l 5  ; I'm just trying to elicit from you if you're aware i 6 I if any operators at that time were aware of the existence o' < 7 a loop seal? 8 A I'm saying that I don't think it was common I 9 knowledge at the time on any,of our parts, including contrcl 4 10 room operators. 11  ! O Mike, again, my question specifically was to him: 12 "Were you aware of how hydrogen would affect the make-up tank 13 level during the '78 and '79 time period." 14 His answer is: "I think if anybody was a good 15 operator, they all knew the effect of what hydrogen would do 16 to the level. They might not have known why, ~but' they knew j 17 that it had an effect. 18 "I don't think there's anyone in the Unit 1 con-18 trol room that did not realize that by varying gas pressures 20 to the make-up tank, that it would temporarily alter make-up 21 tank level." 22 A Again, I don't think it was common knowledge. And 23 the other thing is he's talking about make-up tank level and 24 not leak rate. I don't think an operator would ever make the 25 tie, " Gees," -- you know, even though it is an indicator of

p bE , i l' i leakage.-- " Gees, I've affected the leak rate." I'm saying 8 it's just something we never made a tie'to; never. He ma,v . 3 have been aware when you added hydrogen that you seen a little

        '                                                                            ,i   l j
  '4       pressure change and then it came back to normal.                               '

That'swhat{ i 5 he looks like he's saying, _to me, there. So that may not I I I 6 even alter the leak rate; it depends when it printed out. j i l  ! 7

        !              BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:

8- [ 0 Is* make-up tank. level one of the factors considered

                          '                                                        i 9

in the computer calculation for leak rate? { l 10 A l l Yes.

       ,                                                                                  l 11 0'   Se it would seem fairly easy to draw the conclusion'        '

i 12

       , then that if you had a change in make-up tank level, then it i

13 would have a direct impact on the leak rate. 14 i If you had a temporary change in make-up tank 15 1 level it may not be that simple, plus I'm not sure, a guy 16 lsays, "Well, I add something. 'I_see this; then it goes away." I i 17 i He may have thought it was a transient thing. 18 0 But you're saying t5gt at that time you didn't see 18 thr.t the operators made that direct correlation between the 20 change in make-up tank level and the effect on leak rate tests? 21 A No; right. Nor am I specifically aware that they 22 thought there was a long-term effect on make-up tank level. I m I > I'm not even sure I was specifically aware they thought there 24 was a short-term effect. 25 O The reason it is so much of interest is because he l l i l e

eat 49 1 seems to have hit right on the h'ead everything that it took 2 everyone several years to learn.

         '3.                             A. He may have read 'it someplace too.

4 0 Anything is possible. We don't have any reason to

         .6                         believe that at this point, but anything is possible.

6 BY MR. CONNELLY: i 7 g He is under oath'and he says he knew this prior to 8 the accident. That's what he says, and I have to go by what 9-  ; he says'. l 10 I asked him -- my question to him was: "It's very 11 important for us to determine when it became--who was aware 12 that there was a loop seal." In fact, as I told him, "You 1 i' 13 are correct; that was causing the problem. But the individuals I 1

   - 14 we've been interviewing are telling us that they were not                                            ,

15 aware of~this until it was pointed out to them by Dr. Chung 16' of the NRC during his inspection in the summer of 1983; and 17 they indicate that beforehand they were not aware that a loop 18 seal was causing this problem." . 18 His answer was: "Who are you considering?" 20 - I said: "I'm talking about people such as Henry

 . 21 Shipman and Mike Ross."

22 His answer is: "I think they are lying." 23 My question to him says: "Why do you say that?" 24 His answer: "I think they were aware of it." 2 My question: "Do you know if they were aware of it? i

70 1 l His' answers. "Not absolutely. I think they were

       }

2-l aware of it." i 3-  ; "Why do you think they were aware of-it?" l 4 L His answer was: "How could two people in their

  .5       position, as closely related to' operations, not know that 6  I   that was happening?"

t 7 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 8 0 We realize that is an opinion made by an individua1l.- r  ! 9 j But itfis certainly a rational opinion and'a logical cuestion 10 that I would ask if we had an individual in that position as a. I 11 1, control room operator at that time, if he in fact understood' 12 lthatconcepttothedetailthatheseamstounderstand'it.

  '13   I Why is he the only one that did?        I guess we're searching for 14 i

an answer somehow as to how we could come up with that detail 15

        ! of an explanation from this individual who was.an operator, 16 and to supervisory, day-to-day people close, hands-on to the 17
          . plant, and'with a superior knowledge of the plant, why they                               ;

1 18 wouldn't have picked up the same thing?

  • 18 A The only thing I can offer, he may be a disgruntled 3D type person at this time. I don't know; you haven't offered 21 who he was, so I can't comment on that. It's always easier 22 when you're not involved to have a very distinct opinion, and 28 maybe you've read it someplace and you no longer know.

l-I would ask you: what are our people telling you, 4 25 our control room operators? 'l m-i 9

7/ 1 O We have a mixed - it would take a while to go 2 through the various -- I-3- A I'm saying that it wasn't common knowledge; I'm 4 sure it wasn't. 6E BY MR.'CONNELLY: 6 F. O Again, Mike, repeating the question: But you were 7' not aware of.the loop seal prior to the 1978 accident?

   '8.               A
          ,                 Not specifically. I didn't sit down and say, " Gees, 9           there's a loop seal there."     I heard there was some moisture.

10 i

         ;      We never thought anything about moisture being there.                                                    A guy                                j l

11 l drained it out, took care of any problems there were, and U went on to the next job. I, ( 13 0 There was never any importance put to the fact 14 that they were getting water in that dry reference leg? 15 A No. 16 0 Or there wasn't anyone who stopped back and said U what was causing'the water in the dry reference leg? 18 A Not that I'm aware of. 19 0 We understand, from talking to the people in INC, 20 such as Harold Wilson and Gordy Lawrence, that it was a j 21 periodic problem that they were required to go down and drain 22 that particular dry reference leg. 23 We were just trying to determine if, in fact, some-l 24 one had stepped aside and said, "Well, hold on for a second. 25 What's causing the probler.?" And from your testimony you i 1 e

                                                                                       ~72-I'.
           , indicated-that that was not done at that time, o
   '2

{I A. At least I have no knowledge of it if it was. 3-  ! BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 4 l 0 One quick question on that make-up tank level. 5 lI'mreferringbacktothedocumentthatPetementioned i 6 earlier, 23660, the originator, Larry Noll, and the origina-i I 7 [tingsupervisor'ssignatureisLarryNoll,anditisthoone. 8 where your name is att'a7hed afterwards and apparently written l .9' by Larry. .

  '10       l             In the codne'nt in the " description
  • section there a

11 is someone's initials "WJF" or "WTF." Is that Bill Fels' 12 , initials? l l 33 A. Can we go off the record a minute? l 14 0 No; we had better not go off the record. l-15 A. Let me answer it then. The problem is.it's a l 16 colloquialism. It means: What-the-four letter word after it; 37 that's what that means. It's a standard phrase they use 18 throughout the power plant. I 19 O The standard Old English phrase for intercourse? 20 A. Yes. 21-BY MR. CONNELLY: ) ' 22 g There were some problems earlier on in the inves-23 tigation that -- 24 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 25 O That is not someone's initials? i l l

6 )

                                                                                      ?.3 3;              .A.          .No.
     .'2                             BY MR. CONNELLY:

s' :D There was an earlier problem in the Investigation 4 fthat'possibly that stood for Bill Fels'Lsignature. But that 6, is just a' colloquialism. l.

      '6                A'           Yes.

l 4

      -9                             BY MR. CHRISTOPHER:                                        i 8                0           .We did want t6; clarify for the record that you I

I 9 ;didn't have a different interpretation of what those initials 10 ' stand for. -

   .10                  A-           No, I do not.

Nd- BN MR. CONNELLY: 13 ' O- Mike, was pressure exerted on operators by yourshif , 14' . shift supervisors and shift foremen to get good leak rate 15 : tests on a daily basis? 16 A To get leak rate tests, I'm sure we exerted pres-17 sure -- that'was our job -- to see that they carried out the

   - 18         surveillance.            To get good ones?

19 0 What I'm saying with leak rate, I'm saying, the 20 pressure is put on the operators that: you will get good f

  - 21          leak rates.            Was there pressure so that an operator would
  - 22
               . cheat or be-deceitful in conducting a leak rate because he 23 felt that if he did not get a good leak rate, his position l

24

               .would be in~ jeopardy?

35 A Absciutely not. Plus if he's very aware of the l: ' c

79 1 Part 55 requirements, any dealings in op plant makes him 2 liable for civil action against himself. There is no way you 3 can exert a pressure on someone to do that. That is 4- licensed, 6 l

                                     'O    Do you know if operators were directed by shift

( 6 foremen and shift supervisors to manipulate leak rate tests  ! 7 by additions of hydrogen or water? 8 A No. 9 i O Would there have been any motive for an operator i i 10 to alter a l'eak rate test'by the additions of hydrogen'or 31' water?

                                                                 ~
                                                                                                                                                !    l 12                             g    . Absolutely not.        We were running them three times                                                 !

M a-day and having a very easy time getting-them. It wasn't 14 like it was something that you had to work to get, " Man, am ' 15 I going to get a good leak rate?" It was something that you 16 * ~ just did. It was done. ' 17 = BY Fa. CHRISTOPHER:

                                                                    ?
   . 18 g

As compared to Unit 2 and the continued problems  ! 18 with obtaining acceptable leak rates. A Well, I'm not sure what the problems were in Unit 2 . 21 0 You're not aware of what their problems were? 22 A No. ( 0 Would you describe Unit 1 as a tight plant as far as leakage goes? 4 25 A Oh, absolutely. ( ,

                                                                                     ~7 5*
        ~11                   O     If you had a leakage problem, how did.you go about 2-      documenting -- obviously, there are' periods you 're going - to                 i 8       have a' valve leak, a packing leak or something like that that'              s 4       going.to give you a problem.            How do you document-the identi-5       fication and repair of leakages, particularly in the' primary
       .6        system?

7 A If the leakage would ever have got bad enough, it 8 would be documented because we shut the plant down to repair

             !                                                                              i 9                    A work request is one way.
             ! . it.                                        If the leakage would have
                                                   ~             '

10 ever exceeded tech's'p cs,~O'e'would document it w5th a left-la hand entry and say what we were doing. 12 g If I look at, let's say, the Unit 1 sump data for

   ' 83         a time period and the reactor building entry survey log or
     .14 the radiochemistry results, would that give me any indicators ,                  l
    .15 as to whether or not, during a particular period, we had a                      1 2

16' period of time where there was some leakage problem or some l 17 excessive leakage, something a'bove normal?

                                                            .-                                   l 18                    A-     It might. If we had sobe leakage above normal, you i

18

               'may be able to look at R2 sump samples and see a lot of boron so in it or something like that; it might.
   .22 BY MR. CONNELLY:                                              ;

22 O Would there be any other indications, besides what 23 Keith just mentioned, that we could use to look at to deter-84 1 mine if there were a leak rate problem? ' 25 A I think you could look at the leak rate data, and l l l e

76

                          ~

1-

                    .you could also;1ook at make-up tank-level. charts at plant
 < ,            i
                  . stable conditio...
           .2 l                             If.you.look at the-slope overall you can
           '3-pretty much'tell pretty cuickly what the plant leak rate is;.

4~ { you can look at 24 hours, i . l 5 i BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 6:  ! O' Independent of the make-up tank, we can look at the I 7 sus.p data, we can look at the particulate monitor, the radio-l 8 - L chemistry result data, which would give us certain airborne l 9 H indications, if we had a significant leaker during that period. 4 10 Yes. l A. j i l> M. D Would those be the primary sources? l I

         ' 12 .

l-A  : believe they would be the primary ones. 13' O Independent,' of course, of make-up tank -- I 14L A. Yes. 15 .i BY MR. CONNELLY: { 16 : .I O I have one question regarding strip charts, since 17 the Chung analysis regarding the leak rates is heavily depen- l 18 dent'upon the interpretation of the strip charts. 18 Would you review the strip charts? l 20

                                                                                             'i A        Not necessarily.

21 O Would the strip. charts be periodically reviewed by lu anybody? l 23 A Well, I don't think we ever had a check-off that I l" i says, "I. looked at all the charts today." But when you go l 25 around and look at the plant, you're looking at all the  !

                                                                                           =

77 3 parameters, so someone would have looked at them. 8 g What would the review consist of when they would 3 look at it? 4 A A cursory check to see whether it was going up or I 5 down or what its trend was, something like that. 6 , O Would the times on the strip chart correspond with 7 the times that were actually performed on, let's say, a leak 8 rate test? Would there be a difference on the times on the 9 i strip chart and what actually the time was of the test? 10 A Probably. The chart itself is a course instrument. l 11 We time them at midnight as close as we can. They're not a i 12 precise instrument you can rely on_to be within five minutes 13 cr anything like that. They were never designed to be; they 14 were trending; not an exact timed instrument. 15 O What was the type of pen that was on the instrument

                                        ' ~ ~ '

16 at that time that used to make'the signatures on the strip 17 chart? i 18 A It was an ink sac driven pointer, is what it was. 19 0 Is the same pen on it now as then? 20 A Yes, pretty much so. 21 DY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 22 O Did the operators as a routine operate with the 23 strip chart pulled out or did they have it inserted; do you 24 know? 25 A We've done both. Unfortunately, one of the e

l l I /W I

                 .1        problems that come along with strip charts is that sometimes 8  l they get bound up on the side.         If an operator is having
                '3     .

trouble with the pen getting bound up, you'll see him pull I 4

the chart out and maybe move it up and down a little bit.

r> 5 i l G Should it return to its proper level after these 6 ! fluctuations ? ' - I' 7 A l Yes. - 8 EY P.R. CONNE,LLY: { i 9 0 Are you familiar with the Chung analysis? 10  ? A Net totally. l ' D ', O Are you familiar with the licensee's response to 12 Chung's analysis? I believe they did their own independent i I 13 l analysis based on the material that Chung; reviewed. Are you

         =14 f amiliar with that particular information?

I 15 A A little, yes. 16 0 Do you know what were the findings of the licen-17 see's investigation? 18 A I think the bottom line was that we do not have a 19

                          . problem, TP.I 1. We had several unlogged make-up additions.

20 And we went back to those people and said, " Hey you guys did 21 this." 22 g was there any indication in that analysis that I

            'M hydrogen was added during certain tests?

M A I don't recall any specific mention of that in i r" the report. There may or may not have been. n

y - m

                            ,g,
                       -y 79 1                           3Y MR. CHRISTOPHER:                                        l n,                                                                             .
2. ny, C/ Is there' actually a prohibition against the addi-1 3 tion of hydrogen during make-up tests -- then, in 1978-79. l a, '

4 A 'Notito my knowledge, f 5 0 .I.ask this question in this vein. Under

  • Limits ,

6 andPrecautions"ofthehrocedure,beyondtheavoidingthe 6 .

7. addition or removal of water from the reactor make-up systems' l i i 8 l during the test, one of the sub-topics was avoid make-up or ,

I l 9 j.chegical: addition tc the maks-up. system. 8 10 I My question is: would hydrogen fall within that I s' M exclusion, or is hydrogen considered a chemical, I guess? I 28 A. I think the thought there was we were talking aboat. II [thechemicaladditionpumps, the liquid, is what our thought

              'jII
               .q Uould have been at that time, v      .

C +q 25 g So you would have, at that time, seen no prohibi-16 tion to adding hydrogen during the course of the test? 1 A. No. 18 BY MR. CONNELLY: 18 0 Was an addition of hydrogen required. to be recorded 20 in the CRO log? 21' A No. Here again, a routine item. l 22 l' BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: I'N ' D- But we do see many times where they have recorded 84

   ..,              the additions.

25' A We encourage it. We ray: Yes. put as much as you p. D m

  • u

ED 1 i can into the log. I'm sure that sometimes it was logged. t 2 l. BY MR. CONNELLY: 3 0 Do you know if operators jog water into the make-l l 4- l up tank? By " jog" I mean-adding small amounts of water during 5 l a test period in order to affect a leak rate test.  ! l l 6 A I do not know. In fact, my thoughts are that the l i 7 l answer is no, definitely not.

                            '8                 0      D     you recall any discussions with any of the 9       people in the computer program, such as Bob Washic or Bill 10 l Fels, regarding the leak rate calculation in regards to com-l
                       'll
                                      ! puter programming problems, potential problems that might I

22 have been experienced at that time with the computer program? IS A No. 14 0 Are you aware of any other method an operator 15 might have used to get a good leak rate besides the water or 16 hydrogen addition that was not th compliance with regulatory ' 17 ' requirements? r 18 A I'm not aware they ever added water or hydrogen, 18

  • okay?

so O I understand. 21 g yo, 7.m not aware of any other way. Bere again, 22 leak rate was not a problem; a routine, mundane evolution. 23 0 Do you have any information at all regarding the falsification of leak rate test data at either Unit 1 or 25 Unit 2? j I \ .

 ~ _ - - - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _                      _                                                     '

1

81 l' 1 A No. 8- ~Q You're not aware of any operator deliberately and I 3 I willfully adding hydrogen or unrecorded water additions in  !

                    .4       order to affect a leak rate?

I 5 l A No, sir. 6 0 .You're'not aware of any instructions by management 7 personnel instructing an operator to do so? 8 A Absolutely not. I i , 9 l @ Would there have been any reason for an operator i' I. 10 i to do so? , I 22 i A No. I don't know what his game would be. I 12 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 13 g Has anyone, since the time of the Hartman allega-14 tions up to today, admitted to you '.nat they either attempted 15 to manipulate a leak rate test or had knowledge of individuals

                                                              ~

16 who did? 17 A No, sir. 18 g Did the findings, as they have developed and con-18 tinue to develop at Unit 2 regarding the problems with the 20 leak rate test -- has that initiated any management discus-21 sions or any management decisions relative to looking at the 22' same problem at Unit 1 prior to when Chung and Shipman -- 23 A I'm not sure. I'm sure management always had an i M intent that the leak rate would have to be straightened out

                                                                                                                      )

25 since the Hartman allegations. I don't know what the actions

l l i i 62 i 1 l were. We had looked at changing our procedures. Sure, some 8 lactionwastaken, absolutely. I'm not aware of any hardware 3 actions other than after we did the test for Chung. 4 l @ Again, subsequent to the Faegre and Benson report, l do you recall any discussions with Bob Arnold, with Gary 6 l Miller, Jack Herbein, or subsequent management today, up to I i 7 l and including Hank Hukill, recardine any actions or reviews I' 8 that would have to have been taken at Unit 1 regarding a po-8 I tential similar problem at Unit 1? 10 A Well, there are discussions that our leak rate 11 wi31 have to be very, very concise and above reproach. That I l 12 discussion is clear to us. That's why you'll see the changes 23 that we put into our procedures. 14 0 I think one of th'e comments that drive me to that I 15

                                  ! is, and one of the questions that is probably going to be 16 asked from a management point of view is we had such a sig-                                          ,

17 l nificant, highly-publicized problem at TMI 2. We all know 18 that; details being identified, details of the actual root of 18 the problem being identified by the company in 1980 in the 20 Faegre and Benson report. Why did it take,four years later, 21 an NRC inspector to come to you at Unit 1 and show you that 22 you had the potential for the same problem? 23 A I'm not sure that's the only reason we've taken 24 that action. I'm convinced there was some action going to be 25 taken on our procedure previous to that. I don't know what s

83 1 the emphasis was to it. I'm not sure that was the only 2 reason, I'm saying. Chung was a big . emphasis, because here he 3 was. Now he was a priority. 4 0 But you can understand my statement and the ques-5 tion? It did take four years and it did coincide with an 6 NRC inspector's coming in and actually looking at it to iden-7 tify for you, the licensee, that you had exactly the same 8 piping design as Unit 2 did, and therefore, exactly the same 9 l potential for the same problem. l _ _ 10 l A Yeah. I'm not sure that was the only emphasis I 11 though. 12 g I understand that. So with that thought in mind, 13 you recall no discussions or decisions regarding whether or 14 not Unit 1 should or should not have been looked at subsequent - 15 to the Faegre and Benson report and to what degree it was, if 16 any? 17 A I don't recall anything distinctly. I'm not sure 18 where we fell under Chung, but there was a time when we said 19 that we'd have to revise our procedures and make sure they 20 were absolutely correct. I think that was done once before i U Chung. Then I think it was done once after Chung. So, I'm 22 not sure how that fell. There was some emphasis to make the i 23 procedures "more distinct, more exact" prior to Chung. N O I understand that in terms of the procedures. I i 25 guess what I am specifically referring to is that particular ,

                                                             ,                          1 s

i

  ,                  a 84 i

1 l piping design. o { 1

     .3              i                 A.-

I.can't recall anything specifically, because I 3 quess-we felt the problem never was up here. 4 i i O But you wouldn't know unless you actually looked 5 )atthatpipingdesign. I 6 A ' Yeah.

  • i 7

i O And again, i.;.regardless of that, your testimony is 6 that you were not provided with the results of the Faegre and 9 i Benson investigation Whi~h c identified this loop seal? ' 10 A Not specifically that I recall, no. I 11 i O So you don't know what, if any, decisions were made-l 13 regarding -- above you -- regarding the potential for the same 13 4 problem at Unit 1, and you don't know why someone didn't 14 choose to look at the Unit 1 configuration to see if you had 15

                   ) the same thing?

16 A l \ That's true. I don't know that anybody was not l U ' assigned to look at it. It may have been in tech functions 18 someplace. 19 > O Would there be any way of finding out now if some-20 one in-the company had, in fact, identified the loop seal at l 21 Unit 1 prior to the Chung analysis? 8 A I'm sure the,re is probably a way. I think just a l 23 specific check with the tech functions engineering group to 24 see if they had any action and what their time frame was. 25 0 Who is the individual there that we would go --

k. . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . .. .
                                                                                           - '       ~-~~-

35 2 A I think you would go into maybe the systems group 2 I down there. I I 3 BY MR. CONNELLY-4 0 Rick Barley? 5 A No, that's our on-site guy. Rick is a good place 6 to start. He would tie'you -- we have an on-site engineering, 7 which Rick is. He's our mechanical engineer. And the tech 4 8

                                                                               ' functions have various groups, including analysis.                   I'm not 9                          i sure any of them were or weren't involved.                  They may have 10 lbeen.               Rick would give you a starting point.

i 11 l B Y tiR. CHRISTOPHER: 12 O Tech functions? 13 A Our home office engineering. 14 G That's from Parsippany? 15 A Yes. 16 0 Who in Parsippany would that fall under, do you 17 know? 18 A Mr. Wilson is the Vice-President for that group. 19 0 Do you recall, in 1.078-79, any discussions, manage-20 ment decisions, relative to a decision being made to attempt 21 to keep Unit 2 on line irrespective of the continuing in-22 creasing leakage that they were having, at least until you 23 could get Unit 1 back on line from refueling? 24 A No. 25 O Several individuals have testified that it is their - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - . _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- --- ^^

86 I ' recollection that a meeting was held anc a decision was made l 2 that even though Unit 2 was increasing leakage, that an ' 3 attempt was going to be made to keep the unit on line until 4 you could bring Unit 1 back up. 5 A I have no knowledge of that. l 6 l 0 No knowledge of that? 7 L No~, sir, l S Q No reason to believe that occurred? I ' 8 l A No reason to believe that's true at all. 10 I

        !                       O    I realize from.the company's standpoint you don't i

11 want to have two units down at the same time; that's from a 12 - I practical standpoint. My question is not that so much as: 13 was a decision made that the reasons Unit 2 didn't come down 14 i

                       -- were they related to bringing Unit 1 specifically back up 15 at that time?                         .
                                                         *F 16 A     I have no knowledgei l

17 I O Were you aware of afy,particular shift supervisor 18 requesting permission to shut the unit down to repair the 18 excessive leakage and that request being denied with the 20 caveat that Unit I has got to come back up first? 21 A No. 22 0 Has any shift supervisor ever recommended to you or 23 mentioned to you that they recommended Unit 2 to go down be-cause of excessive leakage and that was being denied? 25 g gg, t

87

                ..                 0    How many aux boilers do you have?

2- A Two. 3 0' . What is their capacity?  ! j l-4- l A 122,000 pounds per hour each. 4 I 5 g Is that capable of ' generating sufficient steam for 6 two units down at the same time? 7 A It depends. -The'only problem is you can't clean 8 up the feedwater.and heat the feedwater in both units at the 9' fsametime. Once the unit is all the way off, he has no need 10 for that aux boiler, so it is available. So if you're in 28 cold shutdown you don't need it. If you're coming up, you U will need to heat the feedwater using the auxiliary boiler. 13 So it's only a conflict during an up or down stage, which-is ., 14 one or two days. Other than that they're available. 15 O So you would not want -- I want to try to under-16 stand that explanation. You would not want one unit coming 17 down the same time you had one com[ng up -- 18 A Right.' .. 18 g

                                       -- because it would stress your steam capacity.

20 A Right. ' 21 l D I have to think about it for a minute to make sure 22 I understand. 23 A We're talking about a day period is all; we're 24 talking about a 24-hour period where it is a conflict. So 25 all you do is you schedule around that; that's a short period. m_________ _ _ . _ _ . .

i 88  ; l' j O Lut if you had both units in cold shutdown, then 2 l you would have no problem? 3 A The boilers probably wouldn't even be around. 4 O How long would it take you to get to cold shutdown?.' 6 A 1 Twenty to 24 hours. l 6 [ r O Is that after you started -- l 7' A l After.you started down: 20 to 24 hours you're done.l 6 i O You get to cold shutdown in 24 hours, i I 9  ! A Yes. i

                                                         ~ ' ' '
     ,10  l        0      So that wou3d not have been a consideration in i

31 f terms of whether to have both units down or not? 12 L No, I don't think so. The only time'I can ever 13 see a consideration is if you were trying to bring them both 14 up at the same time, the same day; I'would see that as a 15 problem. 16 O Is there any one particular m4nagement or super-17 visory individual at TMI 1 in 1978-79 who would have been in 18 the position to have intimate knowledge of the actual workings 18 and performance of leak rate tests? 20 A You mean the computer program? 21 D That being part and parcel to the performance of 22 leak rate tests. A day-to-day working understanding and 23 knowledge of the intimaces of the actual performance of the 24 testing. 25 A If you're talking computer program, the operators i l ' s

89 2- wouldn't have that knowledge. It would be the computer folks. 8 The engineering people that wrote' the procedure and designed 8

it would be the other folks who would have intimate knowledge 42 of that.

5

g. The individual who wrote --

6 l A. The engineering people. That procedure wasn't 7-

         'normally written or generated by us.      That would be an            i 8-
       !engineeringprocedure.

8

                 'O    But there was no on-site daily superv.isory or 10 management individual that could be classified as having a U

detailed, intimate knowledge of the actual working and per-U formance of a leak rate test? And differentiating from having 13

         . an overall understanding and awareness of what your plant is       .

14 doing. O A. I still don't understand. Is there anybody on-16 site that understands the working of the computer program? .17 Yes. 18 0, I understand that. If there was a supervisory or I' manage' ment individual -- I'm trying to characterize this 30 properly -- who actually knew beyond your day-to-day aware-21 ness 6f keeping up on plant status, knowing that you have a i 22  ; leak rate test required -- was there an individual responsible. l 23 for or by his nature particularly involved in the intricacies 34 of the leak rate test program such that he could have or i 26 should have identified any of these inherent problems that

90 1 we've identified today? 2 A I still haven't got it. The shift supervisor is 3 responsible for seeing the test is done, and done on time. l I 4 1 The hardware and the computer is the responsibility of the l 5 lcompu_ergroup. The procedure is the responsibility of the 1 6 : engineering group. ' They are all on-site. i 7 0 Inotherworgs,oneoftheproblemsthatwerun 8 l into, the computer peop,le only set up the program for the ' i 9 l computer based on -- th'ey take the procedure, don't question l i

  • l 10 l the adequacy of the procedure; that's out of their field of 21 I expertise. They merely program the computer to do that 1

18 i program, l 13 L I understand. 14 O So they would not be individuals who review and 15 identify deficiencies in the procedure. They would merely 16 mirror on paper what you want in the computer. 87 The operations staff merely accepts a procedure 18 from whoever wrote it, which I guess is your engineering -- 18 A It's reviewed by the PRG, which is multi-20 disciplined, so there is some check on it. 21 BY MR. CONNELLY: U { O PRG, for the record, would you identify it? I 23 A PORC. A different name now; the same people, a 24 f different name. 25 l l l l t

S1 1 BY MR. CHRISTOPHER: 2 g so the operations staff accepts a procedure and 3 says, "All right; this is how I'll run_the procedure. This 4 is what it says I will do." 5 Somewhere in -there there was never one persen who l 6 really tied all these aspects together, who really would have 7 sat down and said, "I think we've got a problem here." That 8 was the kind of answer I was,looking for. 9 A. Yeah, that's true. The shift supervisor has the 10 lknowledgetosay, " Gees, you know, this can't be right," that I M l type of thing. He has that type of knowledge. 12 O But given he's got hundreds of procedures, this 13 would not be one that he would -- 14 A No, this would not be his top ten. 15 g To recap our earlier discussion regarding your 16 involvement in Unit 2, I want to make sure that that's clear. 17 Your discussions with Jim Floyd and operations and supervisory 18 staff at Unit 2, would you, one more time, characterize the 18 extent of your involvement with those individuals? 20 A Mainly a coordination function more than a direc- l l 21 tion function or a technical function, in that area. Coordin-22 ation being shared systems, shared people, what-have-you. 23 0 By shared systems, what do you mean?

  • A. Auxiliary boilers, fire systems, availability of 25 personnel, whatever that may be.

s

92 l 1 .  : i O But never to the extent, your involvement, to being 2 i involved in the day-to-day operation -- 3 A No, I would not review the day-to-day data on that 4 unit. I 5 i O And you did not enter into any discussions with l 6 any of the. dual licensed shift supervisors who routinely were : 1 7 lbackandforthbetweenthetwoplantsregarding,particularly, r i i 8 i problems specifically regarding the leak rate test program ar 9 l Unit 2? 10 A None.that I'm aware of. 11  ! c' So you were never made aware of any problems at i S2 l Unit 2 at that time through -- 13 A No, sir. 14 0 -- the dual licensed shift supervisors or even a 15 - i shift supervisor or a shift operator from Unit 27

                                                            ~

7 16' l A 30, 87 0 And your interf ace ti,th them was very limited? 18 The operators; I'm referring to,the shift operators. 19 A The shift operator was non-existent. I never went 20 down there. The control room operators were totally separate. 31 They reported down there and never came through the unit. 22 L They never walked through our spaces, so there was no 23 communication. I S4 O And Jim Floyd, specifically, or a shift supervisor, 25 never approached you with this leak rate problem that they

93 1 were having at Unit 2 to make you aware of it, so that you 2 could have the opportunity to look at a potential for the 3 same problem at Unit I? 4 A Not that I'm aware of. 5 g In your management meetings, operational meetings, 6 that you would have that would involve, let's say, Jim Floyd, 7 Gary Miller, the unit superintendent I think was Joe Logan 8  ! at that time, Jim Seelinger, discussions that you would have l 9 l of that nature would not get into that detailed of a discus-10 sion about the individual plants? , 11 A There would be detailed discussions as they related, u to scheduling, "We've got to take Unit 2 off because it has a 13 leak in the feedwater line A," something like that. But I 14 never remember anything on leak rates. - 15 0 Never in those discussions was there any discus-16 sion concerning leak rates? - 17 g 30, _- 18 0 Do you have any reason to believe that any manage-19 ment individual, such as, at that time, Gary Miller, Jack 20 Herbein, Bob Arnold, were aware of the f falsification of leak 21 rates at Unit 27 22 g 30, 23 0 It was never communicated to you by any of those 24 individuals that they had any awareness of any problems of 25 that nature?

94 1  ! A No, sir, f 2 j G Do you have any reason to believe that any of 1 3 those same individuals were independently:in some. fashion made-4

        , aware of any potential problems of that same nature at TMI
   -5   ! Unit 1?

i i

    .6          A     No.
   -7   ,

O And you personally were not aware of-any such 8; ; problems at Unit 17 9 , A No, sir. 10 ( MR. CHRISTOPHER: I don's think I have any more. 31 EY MR. CONNELLY: 83 0 Just a couple concluding questions. Prior to you 23. coming today and answering questions, did anyone from the

                  ~

14 ~ company brief you in regards 'to the qu'e~stions that are being l 15 asked during these interviews ~? 16 A From the company? No. . 17 0 Did anyone brief you from the company regarding 18 t1e appropriate answers to provide to our questions? 19 A No. 20 MR. CONNELLY: That concludes our questioning. 21 Thank you very much. 22 (Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m. the interview was . 23 concluded.) 24

 - 26 e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         -c :.    : -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          . ;. :3 . . . a t

l

                            ,                          This is t                                                                                                                                     cert fy tha: the at:cche:i procesi.in ,s 1:ciere the
      .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               I i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,i
                                                       .. .. r.. .. . .s....                                . . . s. .                                                    .m             --i s..

l

                            ;                                                                                           In the matter of                                                                           Investigative Interview of Michael J. Ross I

Date of Proceeding: Wednesday, January 25, 1984 Place of Proceeding: Three Mile Island, Middletown, PA i e were held as herein appears, and that this is the original l transcript fer the file of the Commission. I Judith A. Toberman Official ileporter "'yped Li . A n-rw Officiadi Reporter - Signature :

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .)

I I i. i . I l T A Y t.OE ASSOCIATES d I

i SCHEIMANN, FREDERICK 4/28/82 l Excerpts from B & W Transcript 1 i

724 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

                  ---------------------x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and                :

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, . Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683

(R.O.)
                                  -against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC.,                  a Defendants.            :

__ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - - . . . _ _ . _x Continued deposition of Plaintiff GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION by FREDERICK J. SCHEIMANN, taken by Defendants pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esgs., One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, on Wednesday, April 28, 1982, at 9:35 o' clock , in the forenoon, before Nancy A. Rudolph, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York. p DOYLE REPORTING, INC. CERTIFIEo STENOTYPE REPORTERS f 369 Lt ulN GTON AvtNur WALTER SH APIRO. C.S.R. New Yoax. N.Y. 1C017 CH ARLES SHAPIRO, C S.R. TELt*HcNE 212 - 867 0220

1 725 2 APPe a ra nc e at 3- KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS. A t t o rr.e y s for Plaintiffs 4 425 Park Avenue New York, New York By s ' ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ., of Counsel 7 8 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, EbQS. 9

                                                                ' Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 10 New York, New York 11 By:     WILLIAM E. WURTZ, ESQ.,

of Counsel 13 I4 KILLIAN & GEPHART, ESQS.

                                               ,                Attorneys for Frederick         J. Scheimann-I, Box 886 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 By:     JANE G. PENNY, ESQ.,

gg of Counsel 19 Also Present: 20 JONATHAN QUINN 22 23 . , , i 24 l 25 a

I ScheimGan 841 2 Q Did you understand before the accident 3 that the 227 radiation monitor was also used as a way 4 of making sure that you were within the leakage 5 limitations set forth by the tech specs for the 6 reactor coolant system? A As best as I can recall, sir, there was 7 8 a tech spec dealing with reactor coolant system 9 leakage, and one of the several detectors they had d 10 you look at was the HPR-227. 11 Q In fact, I have here as Exhibit No. 602, 12 two pages from the Unit 2 tech spec, which I will 13 show you. 14 Have you seen that part of the Unit 2 15 tech spec before? 16 A As best as I can recall, yes, sir. 17 Q In the top in paragraph 3.4.6.2, it 18 states that " Reactor coolant system leakage shall be 19 limited to..." and then it gives the lim'its, A through 20 E. And then, down at the bottom, paragraph 21 22 4.4.6.2 st&tes, " Reactor coolant system leakages 23 shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above 24 limits." 25 And then subparagraph (a) states,

      /'

I Scholmann 042 2 " Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate

                                                                            ]

3 radioactivity monitor at.least.once per 12 hours." l 4 Is the monitor referred to there the 227 '

                                                                            )

5 particulate monitor? j 6 A As best 2:can recall, yes, sir. , 7 Q Did you understand that this part of the 8 tech' spec for ' Unit 2 required you to check the 227 9 monitor every shift to assure that the leakage limits 10 of the tech spec were not being exceeded? 11 A Sir, as best I can recall, what our 12 shiftly check amounted to was to check and see that 13 the monitor was functional as what would be put out 14 in the shift and daily check sheet. 15 g Well, do you want that question read 16 back, Mr. Schelmann? I think we'd better have it read 17 back. 18 (Question read) 19 A Sir, by verifying that the HPR-227 was 20 operable, that was one of several things that would be 21 checked in relevance to the leakage rates. 22 Q Well, my question is, did you understand i l 23 on the day of the accident that there was a tech spec  ! I I 24 that required you to check the 227 particulate monitor 25 every 12 hours to assure that the tech spec leakage Y V" '

scheimann 843 I 2 limitations were not being exceeded? 3 A Yes, sir, I understood that there was a 4 tech spec that required us to check HPR-227 once a 5 shift. 6 Q Did you understand that the reason you 7 were supposed to check it was to assure that the 8 leakage limitations defined in the tech spec were not 9 being exceeded? 10 A sir, that was one of the indications we 11 had available for that determination. 12 Q Well, Mr. Scheimann, what I am asking 13 is whether you understood that every shift when you 14 checked the 227 particulate monitor that the reason 15 you were checking it was to see whether you were in 16 compliance with the tech spec leakage limitations? 17 A Sir, as best as I can recall, when we 18 checked HPR-227 on a shiftly basis, we did check it 19 to comply with the tech spec. 20 g Did you check it to comply with the 21 tech spec leakage limitations that are defined in 22 Exhibit 602? 23 A That was among the things that we checked 24 to make sure that we were complying with leakage 25 requirements.

                                                                            /

1 Scheimann 844-2 Q Now, this tech spec is very specific. It 3 says, reactor coolant system leakages shall be 4' demonstrated to be within each of the above limits 5 by monitoring the 227 particulate monitor every 12 6 hours. 7 Do you see that it says that? 8 A No, sir, I do not see that it says that. 9 What that spec tells me is that you monitor each of 10 those components within a given period of time to 11 insure that you are within your leakage requirements. 12' MR. WURTZ: Could ycu read that answer 13 back? 14 (Answer read) 15 Q Well, Mr. Scheimann, do you see that the 16 leakage requirements appear as A through E in the top 17 Paragraph of this exhibit, 6027 , A Yes, sir.  ! 18 19- Q Those are the leakage limits that applied, l F 20 did you understand that? l 21 A Yes, sir. 22 Q Were you familiar with those leakage 23 limits? 24 A Yes, sir. 25 Q You knew what they were? l P' _____ _ _ a

11 Scheimsnn 845 i

                           ~2                A      Yes, sir.

3 Q Did you have them memorized? 4 A I had studied the tech specs. I don't

                           -5        know that I had them memorized.

6 Q . Well, every shift, did you get the tech 7 spec out to see what they were or did you know what 8 they-were? 9 A I did-know what they were. I also knew

                          '10'       what my shift and daily surveillance sheet told me
                          -11        to check, s

12 Q So you.did not get the tech spec out 13 every time you checked the monitor. You felt that 14 you knew them well enough without doing that, is that I 15 it? l 16 A I did know the tech spec requirements.

                          '17'       I did not take the tech spec out each and every time 18        I reviewed the monitor. I had information as necessary  l I

19 on the shift and daily checks. 20 Q But you understood before the accident 21 that the tech spec required that RCS leakage be 22 limited to one gallon per minute of unidentified  ; 23 leakage, for example, is that right? 24 A Yes, sir. 25 Q Did you further understand that the tech )

1 Scheimann 846 2 spec specifically required that every 12 hours it be 3 demonstrated by checking the 227 particulate monitor 4 .that that leakage limit was not being exceeded? 5 A Sir, the HPR-227 monitor was one of several 6 things that were checked to insure that the leakage 7- . limits were not being exceeded. It was not the only 8 thing.  ! 9 Q But did you understand that pursuant to 10 this tech spec you were required every 12 hours to 11 see that you could demonstrate by the 227 particulate 12 monitor-that reactor coolant system leakage was not 13 greater than one gallon'per minute unidentified l l- 14 leakage? l I 15 A sir, as I had said, one of the things 16 that were checked were HPR-227. There were also other 17 things that were checked as also stated in tech specs. 18 Q But you understood that the 227 particulate 19 monitor had to pass the test every 12 hours? 20 A The HPR-227 monitor had to pass the shift 21 and daily checks every 12 hours. 22 Q It had to be consistent with, and it had i 23 to be possible to demonstrate from that monitor that the 24 leakage limits,and to take one for example, one gallon l 25 per minute of unidentified leakage into the building h /

                                                                      ~

1 Scheimann 847 1 2 was not occurring, is that right? 3: A As best as I can recall, the shift and 4 daily check for that particular monitor was to be 5 observed that it did have indication that the monitor

       '6          was operable.         I don't recall what more it might have 7     required as far as a shift and daily check to verify 8     that we were operable on that monitor.

9 Q what do~you mean by " operable," that it 4 10 was turned on? 11 A Sir, by tech specs, a system is operable 12 if it is capable of performing its intended function. 13 Q What is its intended function in the 14 context of what we are talking about here? 15 A Its intended function would be to show i 16 an increase in radioactivity level in the r eactor 17 building. 18 Q Did you understand that the monitor also 19 was to tell you whenever you had more than one gallon l 20 per minute of unidentified leakage? 21 A Sir, that monitor as well as several other things were involved with telling what your l 22 23 leakage requirements were. 24 Q Mr. Scheimann, so as to not to complicate this unduly, I am talking about this monitor. I can 25 , f l

I' Scheimann 848 i 2 only talk about .one thing at a time, so I would 1 3 appreciate it if you could direct yourself to this i I 4 monitor,and what I am asking is whether you understood I 5 beforts the accident that one of the functions of this-6 monitor -- and I am talking about the 227 particulate

                                   - p.

7 monitor -- was to demonstrate to the. operator every 12 8 hours that you had less than one gallon per minute of 9 unidentified leakage? 10 A Sir, in this particular case, you had 11 more than one thing that was used for detection of 12 leakage. You cannot say that one was strictly used to 13 detect all your leakage as opposed to all of them 14 together. 15 Q Now, Mr. Scheimann, I am not now trying to i 16 imply that you didn't do other things. What I am trying l to determine is li' you did this and if you understood I 17' 18 you were required to do this, O.K.? And by asking 1 19 that questiot., I don't mean to suggest that you did not { 20 do other things, O.K.? I 21 Do you understand what I am saying? 22 A I still don't think I am seeing where you l 23 are coming from, because as far as I am concerned you j [ I

                                                                                                          /

24 got to do more than one thing just to verify a given 25 situation.

    <                                   )*

i

f7!? i.'a ' ,

                                                                                            '849   J Scheimann P'

l il , 1

        .2                                 d        'I am trying to see.what the things are 3           that yo.u; understood you-ha hto do.- Whath7lamasking w

1 4- you Lis, was -one of' the things that' you understood y ou"

         .6            .had to'dkwas3to look'at this 227 particulate monitor; 6            every112Lbours and demonstrate from that monitor that 7           you had less than one gallon a minute of unidentified                    .

y 8 leakage? 1 9' [MR. MacDONALD: Let me.just' attempt to 10 try and.see if.I understand it also. 11 Are you asking'him by.that alone, he was j 1

                                           .to identify 1whether it was?      In other words, if 13                               the requirement in here, reactor coolant system.

14 leakage shall be limited to be within each of 15- 'the'above limits, and it lists monitoring and l 16 performing A through D. 17 Are you asking him by doing A alone,he-

          - 18                              was to determine he was within the one gpm 19'                             unidentified leakage or by doing all of those           J 20                               he was to determine whether it was within the
          -21                                gpm unidentified leakage.      I think that is the 22                               problem if you are looking for just A alone,             ,

23 tell him that, of if he was to look at A, B, C ] 24 and D. .I think that is where the problem is

           .25.                              arising.

s l i l l l

e

       -1                                                       Scholmann                      850 2             BY MR. WURTZ:

3 Q I guess the clearest way I can put the 4 question is, did you understand that at minimum, you 5 had to pass the 227 particulate monitor test every

6. 12 hours?

7 A Sir, I understood that by shifting daily, 8 you did have to pass the HPR-227 criteria. 9 Q And that at the minimum, that had to 10 be consistent with all of the leakage limitations, is 11 that right, the' reading onthat monitor had to be 12 consistent with all the leakage limitations defined in 13 the tech spec?. 14 A No, sir, that would not be true. For 15 example, in the case of condition E, you would not 16 measure condition E with HPR-227. 17 Q Which conditions would you measure with 18 that 227? 19 A sir, conditions that you would measure 20 HPR-227 would be items that you saw inside the 21 containment. 22 Q Leakage into the building, in other words? 23 A Yes, sir. HPR-227 would not tell you 24 anything about leakage at another point in the coolant 25 system. p< l

Scholmann 851 1 2 Q Leakage that did not go into the Reactor 3 Building? 4 A Yes, sir, that's correct. 5 Q Did you understand that you had a limit i 6 of one gallon per minute of unidentified leakage into 7 the Reactor Building? 8 A No, sir, I did not understand that it was 9 one gallon a minute leakage into the Reactor Building. 10 what I understood was that it was a one gallon per 11 minute unidentified leak from the reactor coolant < 12 system or one of its auxiliaries, namely the makeup 13 and purification system. I thought that is what I said. I said 14 Q 15 " unidentified." Maybe you didn't hear that. 16 You understood, then, that the limit was 17 one gallon per minute of unidentified leakage from the 18 reactor coolant system into the building, is that it? No, sir, I did not understand that. It 19 A 20 could be outside of the reactor coolant system. It , 21 could be outside of the Reactor Building by means of  ; 22 the makeup system.

                                                                                        )

So you would add to that the makeup 23 Q i 24 syatem. My statement was right, but you would add 25 something else to it?

    ,p'
                                                                   - - - --_-__________a

I Scheinann 852 ) I 2 A What I am saying, sir,.is it would not i 3 necessarily be .in the. Reactor, Building s it could be in 4- the makeup _ system out in the Auxiliary Building, and 5 you could still get a one gallon"per minute unidentified 6 ' leakage. 7 (Recess) 8 BY MR. WURTZ: 9 Q Mr. Scheimann, I would like you to look 10- at what has been marked:as'EsW 2xhibit 308. l l- 11 Can you identify these sheets that make 12 up Exhibit 3D87  ; 13 A Sir, as best as I can recall, they appear 14 to be sheets from'the shift and daily checks with the 15 exception of the last one, and I. don't have a 16 recollection of that one. 17 (continued on next page) 18 19 20 l 21 22 23 24 l 25 9 l

i i 1 I i I f l SCHEIMANN, FREDERICK 6/8/82 Excerpts from B & W Transcript

l- . UNITED' STATES' DISTRICT COURI 888 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ___ - _ --__________ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC. UTILITIES CORPORATION, a JERSEYm CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and  : PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Plaintiffs, a

                        *against-                                     80 Civ. 1683
(R.O.)

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDE RMOTT & CO., INC.,

  • Defendants.  :

_x Continued deposition of General Public Utilities Corporation by FREDERICK J. SCHEIMANN, taken by Defendants, pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esgs., One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, on Tuesday, June 8, 1982, at 9:55 o' clock in the forenoon, before Harvey B. Kramer, RPR, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York. i DOYLE REPORTING. INC. CERTIFIEo STENoTYPE REPORTERS 369 LexlNGTON AvcNut WALTEpH APIRo, C.S.R. NEW Yom ac. N.Y. 1o017 CH ARLES SH APIRo. C.S.R. TELEPNoNE 212 - 867 8220 j

1 889 2 Appe aran ce as 3 4 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS. Attorneys for Plaintiffs j 5 , 425, Park Avenue New York, New York 6 By: ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ., 7 of Counsel 8 9 10 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS. Attorneys for De fendants

 . 11                  One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York                                               ,

By: WILLIAM E. WURTZ, ESQ., 13 of Counsel 14 15 16 KILLIAN & GEPHART, ESQS. Attorneys for the Witness 17 Box 886 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 18 By: JANE G. PENNY, ESQ., 19 of Counsel 20 21 Also Present: 22 JONATHAN QUINN, Law Assistant, Davis Polk E Wardwell, Esgs. 23 24 25 5 f

f l 1 Scheimann 960 2 A Yes, sir, they appear to be my initials. 3 Q In your handwriting? 4 A Yes, sir. 5 Q , I would like you to look at what has been 6 previously marked as Exhibit 665, which is a copy of 7 the SOP that we have been discussing. I would like 8 you to look at this and tell me whether you recognize 9 your handwriting in this document. 10 A No, sir, I don't recognize my handwriting 11 on this document. 12 Q You have looked through the entire

 ,13       document?

14 A Yes, sir. That does not appear to be my 15 handwriting. 16 Q Do you recognize the handwriting? 17 A No, sir, I do not. 18 Q Now, I note on the last page, the data 19 sheet, though there are lines for somebody to sign 20 indicating they performed the test or approved the test 21 and put the date there, these lines are all blank. 22 was it the practice to fill these data 23 sheets in in the course of doing the testing? 24 A Sir, as best I recall, we would, we did 25 fill in data sheets as we performed testing.

      , lP

Fd t SEELINGER, JAMES 10/21/81 Excerpts from B & W Transcript s

006

39. Y 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORX 4 3
                                           - - --     - --- - - - - - - - -               ---x 4

GENERAL.PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, a 5- JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and 6 PENNSYLVANIA' ELECTRIC COMPANY, i 7 Plaintiff;s, 80 CIV. 1683

(R.O.)

8 ,

                                                             -against-9                         THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC.,                            s
              - 10 Defendants.           :

11

                                            . . . . - -.. . - . . . .                _ _ _ _       x 12 Continued deposition of JAMES                L.

13 SEELINGER, taken by defendants pursuant to 14 subpoena and adjournment, at the offices i 15 of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,

               - 16 Esqs., 125 Worth Avenue, Palm Beach, Florida, 17 on. Wednesday, October 21, 1981, at 8:52 18 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles 19 Shapiro, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 20 Notary Public within and for the State of 21 New York.

82 , 23 24 - 25 DOYLE REPORTING. INC. CERTIFIED STENOTY PE REPORTERS 369 LEXINGTON AvtNVE WALTER SH APIRO. C.S.R. N g,w yon sc. N.Y. foot 7 CH ARLES SH A PIRO. C.S.R. ygg , wear 212 - 867 8220 m____________________ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _

250 2 Appe a r an c e s : 3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4 125 Worth Avenue Palm Beach, Florida 5 By: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ., 6 of Counsel 7 8 LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE, ESQS. Personal Attorneys for the Witness 9 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 10 By: MICHAEL F. McBRIDE, ESQ., 11 of Counsel 12 13 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS. Attorneys for Defendants 14 One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10005 15 By: ROBERT F. WISE, JR., ESQ., 16 KARON WAGNER, ESQ., and ANN MacDONALD, ESQ., 17 of Counsel 18 19 Also Present: 20 JULIE JOHNSON 21 ) . . . 22 23 24

25 o *v

t :t seelinger 360 1 1 i i 2l However, I stated, yes, sir, there was, . To'the best of j and "vi lated" is too strong a word. 3 t 4 my recollection, the action statement associated with , I 5 that particular technical specification was entered 6 and complied with and as long as the action statement 7 was being complied with, the specification was being 1 8 complied with. a 9 Q- What is your recollection of what the action 1 I 10 statement required? 11 A I don't recall. Do you' remember whether there was some 12 Q 13 ' provision in that. technical specification that if the 14 _ level of water'in the pressurizer dropped below a certain 15' point, as a matter of fact the pressurizer was totally 16 emptied of water, that Met-Ed would be required to 17 undertake additional procedures as a result of that l 18 condition? . 19 A I do nct remember any such provision in that 20 technical specification.

           .21              Q      Mr. seelinger, are you aware of any requirements in the technical specifications that if 22
           - 23      level in the pressurizer dropped below a certain point, J       / 24        that Met-Ed would be required to perform an analysis 25 -   concerning.certain stresses on the reactor coolant system?

____.____________________________a

SEELINGER, JAMES 10/22/81 Excerpts from B & W Transcript

i l

                                                                                .. 414 2  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 3                                                                                     .

1

     - - - - - - .--- - - . - ---- -                           x                                   l 4

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, 3 5 JERSEY CENTRAL POWER E LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and  : 6 PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, )

)

7 Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.) { 8 -against-9 THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., a 10 Defendants.  : 11

         . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . - - - - - - -                   x 12 Continued deposition of JAMES             L.

13 SEELINGER, taken by defendants pursuant to 14 subpoena and adjournment, at the offices 15 of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 16 Esgs., 125 Worth Avenue, Palm Beach, Florida, 17 on Thursday, October 22, 1981, commencing at 18 9:30 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles 19 Shapiro, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 20 Notary Public within and for the State of 21 New York. ) 22 l 23 24 / 25 DOYLE REPORTING. I NC. 1 CERTIFIEo STENoTYPE REPORTERS 3p L s v .r - , Ae ut:z

1 . 415 2 Appe a ranc e s : 3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS. 4 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 125 Worth Avenue 5 Palm Beach, Florida 6 By: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ., of Counsel 7 8 LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MachAE, ESQS. 9 Personal Attorneys for the Witness 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 10 Washington, D.C. 20036 11 By: MICHAEL F. McBRIDE, ESQ., of Counsel 12 13 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS. 14 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 15 New York, New York 10005 16 By: ROBERT F. WISE, JR., ESQ., . KARON WAGNER, ESQ., and 17 ANN MacDONALD, ESQ., of Counsel 18 19 20 21 22 23

               / 24 25

1 Seolingsr 444 2 agreement, whatever it was. For one thing, I am not sure that I understand what it was, we 3 4 will abide by it with respect to Mr. Faust. 5 Mr. Fiske, my partner, entered into that agreement 6 and he is not present today. I am not willing 7 to enter into that agreement with respect to Mr. 8 Seelinger's testimony. 9 BY MR. WISE: 10 Q Mr. Seelinger, are you familiar with 11 something called leak rate? l 12 MR. McBRIDE: I objeet to the question and

                                                                  +

13 instruct the witness not to answer. 14 'MR. WISE: What is the ground of your i 15 instruction? 16 MR. McBRIDE: The ground for my instruction 17 is that we assert the privilege with respect 1 ( 18 to matters sought to be discovered in this i 19 deposition as they pertain to matters now pending 20 before a federal grand jury in Harrisburg, 21 Pennsylvania.

 .22                 MR. WISE:   What is the basis for the 23          privilege?

24 MR. McBRIDE: The basis for the privilege j 25 is that matters pending before a grand jury are t

g Seelinger 445 2 matters within the province of the grand jury and the matter having been referred to a grand 3 4 jury, it is improper to seek testimony with respect to . 5 MR. WISE: That's ridiculous, I must say. 6 7 Mr. McBridge, you certainly are familiar as a 8 lawyer with the concept that civil litigations proceed in parallel with criminal ones and there 9 10 is no privilege, simply because a matter is under it investigation by a grand jury, to instruct a . 12 witness not to answer in a civil litigation. 13 If y ur privilege is based upon the Fifth Amendment, I will accept that. If it is not, 14 15 I think this witness should answer. 16 MR. McBRIDE: Mr. Wise, this litigation 17 which you may be unfamiliar with, that took place ig before the Federal District Court in Harrisburg, 19 Pennsylvania, last year with respect to matters similar to those now being discussed. The thrust 20 f the District Court's ruling was that, had a 21 22 substantial factual nexus been established between 23 matters pending before the grand jury, then 24 subpoenas issued to witnesses who may also have been called r were t be called before that 25

1 seelingar 449 2 System Leakag# requires the reactor system coolant 3 leakage to be demonstrated within-tech spec limits by 4 the performance of a reactor coolant system water 5 inventory balance -- 6 MR. McBRIDE: -Is that the conclusion of 7 the question? 8- MR. WISE: No, there is more. 9 Q -- a t least once per 72 hours during steady 10 state operation? l 11 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question ] 12 and instruct the witness not to answer. k3 MR. WISE: What is the ground of your 14 objection? 15 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection. 16 MR. WISE: Could you just state it? j 17 MR. McBRIDE: The witness has certain i l 18 privileges with respect to this matter. We have 19 discussed them at length and I see no reason to elaborate on them again. l 20-21 MR. WISE: You are relying on what privibge s l 22 you discussed earlier? 23 MR. McBRIDE: I am relying on all the  ; j 24 privileges Mr. Seelinger has, as I said a few 25 questions ago.

1 Seelinger 450' 2 Q Mr. Seelinger, are you aware of a 3 surveillance procedure 2301-301, labeled "RCS Inventory" ? 4 MR. SELTZER: What was the number? 5 MR. WISE: 2301-3D1. 6 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection, the 7 same instruction. 8 Q Mr. Seelinger, have you ever performed any 9 surveillance procedures pursuant to surveillance 10 procedure 2301-3D1? 11 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection, same 12 instruction. 13 Q Mr. Seelinger, are you aware that the 14 surveillance procedure calculation require s determinat:bn 15 of leak rates in terms of gallons per minute during 16 reactor coolant system operation? 17 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection, same 18 instruction. 19 Q Have you ever personally performed a 20 leak rate test? 21 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection, the same 22 instruction. 23 Q Have you ever supervised the performance j 24 of a leak rate t e s t.? 25 MR. McBRIDE: The same objection, the same

Seelinger 451 1 2 instruction. MR. WISE: I would like the reporter to 3 4 mark as B&W Exhibit 299 --

                                                                                                                         " " ' " ~

5 MR. McBRIDE: Let's deem it marked. MR. WISE Very well, we will agree that 6 ,

                                                                        ' Exhibit 299 will be deemed marked.      It is a 7
8. portion of the papers that were produced to us 9

yesterday morning by counsel for Mr. Seelinger. 10 The exhibit consists of six pages, the first page of which.is a photocopy. It contains handwriting, 11 12 it is an 8{-by-11 piece of white paper. I 13 On the front page circled,about three-quarters i 14 of the way down,is the notation "2301-3D1 Data." 15 The remaining five pages of the exhibit appear J 16 to be photocopies of a computer printout, 17 each of them is headed with the title " Reactor l Coolant Leakage Test, SP 2301-3D1." These 18 l 19 particular sheets indicate that they were taken i for the dates of October 18, 1978; the first 20 L ' one at 8:59, the recond one at 7:35; the third 21 f 22 one is illegible at the top because the top has ] been cut off,apparently in the photocopying the 23

                       / 24                                                 fourth page indicates it was taken on 10/17/78, 25 at the time 13:27, which, if I am reading the          ,

i l

1 Seelinger 452 2 military time correctly, would be 1:27 in the 3 afternoon; and the final page indicates it was 4 taken on 10/16/1978, again the time, if I am 5 reading it correctly, is 19:35, which to civilians 6 would be 7:35 in the evening. 7 (Doc ume n t above described deemed marked 8 B&W Exhibit 299 for identification, as of this 9 date.) 10 MR. WISE: Let the record reflect that the 11 witness is consulting with his counsel, Mr. 12 McBride. 13 BY MR. WISE: 14 Q Mr. Seelinger, have you ever seen what has 15 been marked or deemed marked as B&W Exhibit 2997 16 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 17 and instruct the witness not to answer. 18 Q Was Exhibit 299 from your personal papers, 19 Mr. Seelinger? 20 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 21 and instruct the witness not to answer. 22 MR. WISE: What is the ground for your l 23 objection?

    / 24                                          MR. McBRIDE:    The same objection.

25 MR. WISE: Mr. McBride, Mr. Seelinger has

i 4 g Seelingor 453 ) i 2 produced these papers. Are you telling me he j 3 will not now testify about papers he has produced ' 4- to us? ) 5 MR. McBRIDE That's what I am telling you. 6 I will stipulate we produced them. 7 MR. WISE: Can I see Exhibit 299, please? 8 (D oc ume n t handed to Mr. Wise.) 9 BY MR. WISE: 10 Q Mr. Seelinger, is Exhibit 299 in your 11 handwriting, the cover sheet? . 12 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 13 and instruct the witness not to answer. 14 Q- Mr. Seelinger, on the remaining pages there 15 are handwritten notations at the bottom following the 16 computer marking " Net Unidentified Leak Rate (," there 17 is a symbol meaning less than, "1 gallon per minute)." 18 Are those notations in your handwriting? 19 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 20 and instruct the witness not to answer.

                                                                                       )

21 Q Mr. Seelinger, were you aware that during j 22 1978 leak rate calculations were performed which l L 23 violated the tech specs? j 24 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 1' 25 and instruct the witness not to answer. l'

1 Seeliaper 455 2 A Yes, sir. g Mr. Seelinger, are y u aware f any leak 3 rate calculations that were destroyed by licensed 4 5 Perators at TMI? MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 6 7 and instruct the witness not to answer. g -Q Mr. Seelinger, are you aware that there g was a practice of destroying bad leak rate calculations 10 at TMI? 11 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 12 and instruct the witness not to answer. 13 Q Mr. Seelinger, do you choose to follow your 14 counsel's instruction? 15 A Yes, sir. 16 Q Mr. Seelinger, are you aware of 17 administrative procedure 10127 18 MR. McBRIDE: Before I object -- 19 MR. WISE: It's in the same area. MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 20 21 and instruct the witness not to answer. Q Mr. Seelinger, are you aware that all 22 23 periodic tests must be recorded in the control room log according to administrative procedure 1012? p 34 25 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question

1 Seelinger 456 2 and instruct the witness not to answer. 3 Q Do you choose to follow your counsel's 4 instruction? 5 A Yes, sir. 6- Q Are you aware, Mr. seelinger, of any instance 7 in which the licensed operators at THI-2 failed to-8 record the results in the control room log of a leak 9 rate test? 10 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 11 Q Do you follow your counsel's instruction, 12 Mr. Seelinger? 13 A Yes, sir, I do. 14 Q Isn't it correct, Mr. Seelinger, that there. 15 were times at TMI-2 when test results were rejected 16 without a valid reason for doing so? , 17 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 18 and instruct the witness not to answer. 19 Q Do you follow your counsel's instruction i 20 on that? 21 A Yes, sir. 22 Q Was Met-Ed management aware of any practice 23 of repeatedly taking leak rate tests so that the rate je 24 within a tech spec limit would be obtained? 25 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question i l

Seelinger 457 1 2 and instruct the witness not to answer. 3 Q To your knowledge, was the supervisor of 4 operations aware of any such practice? 5 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 6 and instruct the witness not to answer. 7 Q Do you follow your counsel's instruction? 8 A Yes, sir. 9 Q Are you aware of any instance in which leak . 10 rate results were deliberately recorded incorrectly? 11 MR. McBRIDE: I object t.o the question 12 and instruct the witness not to answer. 13 Q Are you aware that on March 16, 1979 14 TCN-79-070 changed the calculation procedure for leak 15 rates? . 16 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 17 and instruct the witness not to answer. 18 Q Do you follow your counsel's instruction? 19 A Yes, sir. 20 Q Are you aware of the reason for that change? 21 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 22 and instruct the witness not to answer. 23 Q Isn't it correct that the Technical Change

    / 24   Notice-79-070 made corrections to the calculation 25 procedure at TMI-2 by correlating inventory in the

Seelinger 458 1 2 reactor coolant drain tank to reactor ' coolant system 3 Operating conditions but failed to make a similar 4 correction for additions to the make-up tank? MR. McBRIDEs I object to the question 5 6 and instruct the witness not to answer. 7 Q Do you agree to follow your counsel's 8 instruction? 9 A Yes, sir, I do. 10 Q were you aware that the effect of this 11 mehnical change notice was to result in an erroneous 12 calculation of the unidentified leak rate? MR. McBRIDE: I o,bject to the question 13 14 and instruct the witness not to answer. 15 Q Do you agree to follow your counsel's 16 instruction? 17 A Yes, sir, I do. 18 Q Did you ever discuss Technical Change 19 Notice 79-070 with anyone? MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 20 21 and instruct the witness not to answer. l l l 22 Q Are you aware of any actions ever being 23 taken, the effect of which was to deliberately create

 # 24             an incorrect leak rate result?

MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 25

1. Seelinger 459 4 i
   '2            and instruct the witness not to answer.

3 g Do you agree to follow the instruction of 4 your counsel? 5 A Yes, sir, I do. 6 Q Have you testified before the grand jury 7 in Harriburg? 8 MR. McBRIDE: I object to the question 9 and instruct the witness not to answer. .I1 10 MR. WISE: I would be curious what the 11 ground on that is.

   .12                   MR. McBRIDE: . Pardon me?

13 MR. WISE: I would be curious on what the 14 ground of that is since presumably the grand jury 15 is aware, presumably, whether or not he has 16 testified. 17 MR. McBRIDE: Assume they are, but the fact 18 of the matter is that he has not. 19 Q Have you ever received a subpoena from the , l 20 grand jury in Pennsylvania? ) 21 MR. McBRIDE: Again I will object to the 22 question and instruct him not to answer, and again i 23 I will tell you that he has not.

  / 24             Q      Do you agree to follow your counsc1's                                                    i 25   instruction?

l O J i 1 SEELINGER, JAMES 4/4/84 NRC 01 l I i L________.__._

m+

 ~

ORIGINAL L*NITED STATES OF AMIR!cA NCCLEAA REGULATORY Commission l l In the matter of: INTERVIEW OF JAMES SEELINGER Docket No. 4 1 Location: Palm Beach Garden, Fla,p, 1 - 39 Date: Wednesday, April 4, 1984 6 TA Y t.o E ASSOCIATIS cce w Ie;! I Seren. .M* Samas1024

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           ~1'                        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION
           '8'                          -

REGION I 4 6-

            '6-7                              INTERVIEW OF 6                            JAMES SEELINGER 9

10 Wednesday, April 4, 1984 l 11 Holiday Inn, 4431 PGA Boulevard 1' 1 12- Executive Suite B 13 palm Beach Garden, Florida

14. The interview was commenced at 10:00 a.m.
           '15      ,

parsggT, , i 16 PETE CONNOLLY, In ve s ti ce t o r , Region I, Office of i Investigations, U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Cor. mission, l 17 631 Park Avenue, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania l' 19406 18 l BARRY LETTS,-Investigator, Region I, Office.of 19 INVESTIGATIONS, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 631 Park Avenue, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

            . 20               19406 21               MICHAEL F. MC. BRIDE, Esq., LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby
                               & Ma:Rae, 1333 New ilampshire Avenue, N. W.,

22 Washington, D. C. 20036

             .23               JANE G. PENNY, Esc., Killian & Gephart, 216 - 218 Pine Street, Box 886, Harrisburg,
             'M'               Pennsylvania 17108

2 l 1 PRESENT (Cont'd): , 2 JAMES L. SEELINGER, 2745 Omega Place, North Palm Beach, Florida 33408 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 f 11 12 l l 13 l l 14 I ll 15 !! k 16  : I I . 17 18 19 20 21 22 l 24 . l 2b l 2

3

   '          1                                                               CONTENTS                     ,
           .2          / WITNESS                                                              EXAMINATION 8          James'Seelinger                    -

3 - 38 4 8 ~- 6 l 8 9 I

          . 10                                                                                                              ,

S1 1 13 1 1 15 ll , 16  : 1" 18 19 20 21 . 22 23 (' 34 25 M .

3 4 i 1 PROCEEDINGS l 2 Whereupon, 3 , -JAMES L. SEELINGER -l

                '4       having first been duly sworn by Investigator Letts, was 6       examined and testified as follows:

6 EXAMINATION i

7. BY MR. LETTS:

I 8 Q Please state your full name and spell your last 9' name? 10 A James L. Seelinger, SEELING E R. 11 Q Your address? U -A- 2745 Omega Place, North Palm Beach, Florida f 13 33403. f 14 Q Jim, before we continue, would you please take a l i 15 , me. ment to read 18 U. S. C. Section 1001 dealine wi:5 L I i 16 statements? 6  ! 17 (Pause) i 18 A Yes, I do.

                ~19                  Q  Jim, by whom are you currently employed?

20 A I am employed by Pratt & Whit'ney Aircraft, a l 21 . Division of United Technologies Corporation. i 22 ' Q And in what capacity? 23 A- My capacity is the Manager, Utility Operations 24 and Environmental Affairs for the Government Products 25 Division of Pratt & Whitney Aire' raft.

l 5 1 l l 1 Q How long have you been so employed? 2 A I've been in the employment of Pratt-Whitney 3 Aircraft since November of 1979. 4 Q And prior to that, who were you employed by? 5 A Prior to that I was employed by Metropolitan Edison 6 Company. 7 Q Would you please recount your employment historv 8 with Met Ed-GPU, giving approximately the dates and the 9 positions that you held during those time periods? 10 A I Ment to work for Metropolitan Edison Company 11 in June 1974; from June of 1974 until roughly September 1974 12 my position was Training Engineer. 13 From September of 1974 until approxir.atelv the end l l, 14 of 1975 -- or somewhere in 1975, near the end -- I held the l a lo y position cf Superviscr cf Traininc.

                   !i 16  9                These positions were at Three Mile Island, as were                          t I
  • e I

17 ' all my positions at Metropolitan Edison Company. j l 18 From that point until the end of 1976 I held the 19 position of Engineer Senior-1. 20 From January 1977 to approximately the end of 21 November of 1978, I was the Unit 2 Superintendent, Technical 22 Support. 23 And from that period until the end of -- excuse -- ) 24 from that period until approximately mid-October of 1979, 25  : was the Unit 1 Superintendent. 1 u_______.__.__

6 1 Q As the Engineer Senior-1, 1975 to 1976, was that 2 at Unit-1 or'2, or in between both? 8 .A I was involved with Special Projects reporting to 4 the manager -- Manager of Operations, Nuclear; most of the 5 projects, the projects dealt with both units but principally 6 concentrated on Unit 1.

                         '7 BY MR. CONNOLLY:

8 Q Why did you leave TMI? 9 A I left for family reasons. 10 ) Q What is your academic background, Jim? ' 11 A I graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree from M the United States Naval Academy in 1967. I received a Master's ( i 13 Degree in Mathematics in March or April of 1968 from the 14 , United States Naval Post-Graduate School. l l  ! 15 l t-I went through the Neval Nuclear Power Procrat in i I 16 1968 to 1969, the training phases. Also I attended six- f' 17

                             ,    months submarine school in the late 1971, early 1972, time i
                             ~

28 frame. 19 BY MR. LETTS: 20 What is your date of discharge from the United States Q 21 Navy? 22 A I don't recall the specific date, but it was -- to 23 the best of my recollection it was in April of 1974. 24 Q There was no other employment between your leaving 25 the Navy and going with Met Ed in June of '75?

     .    ,                                                                                                   7 L            1                                 A     There was none.              -

2 Q Would you describe your duties and responsibilities 1 3 first, when you were the Unit 2 Superintendent of Technical 4 Support; and then follow that with your responsibilities 6 as Unit 1 Superintendent? 6 A As Unit 2 Superintendent, Technical Support 7 the engineers assigned to Three Mile Island Unit 2 reported 8 to me. We were principally charged with the writing and 8 approval of the procedures associated with ooerating Three 10 Mile Island Unit 2. 11 As Unit 1 Superintendent I was -- excuse me -- l U backing up to Unit 2 a second: - 13 I was also Chairman of the Plant Operations f , 1 14 Review Committee. l I l 15 In Unit 1 -- l i 16 Q Excuse me a second.  ; i 17 Who did you report to during that time period? l 18 A During that time period I reported to Gary Miller. I 19 And his capacity at that time was? Q 20 A His capacity at that time was that of Unit 2 l l l 21 ' Superintendent and Station Manager, or Station Superintendent; r 22 I don't remember which the title was. 23 Relative to Unit 1, I was in charge of the 24 operations and maintenance and site engineering effort for M Three Mile Island Unit 1. l 1 l* l . _ _-__ - _-_ -

8 1 Q Also reporting to Miller during this period? 2 A Yes, sir, I also reported to Miller during that

                                        ~

3 period. 4 Q And in that position of Unit 1 Superintendent

                                                                                    ~

5 who did you replace? 6 A I replaced Jim O'Hanlon. 7 Q Your successor as Unit 1 Superintendent was? 6 A When I left Unit 1I don't know how the organiza-9 tion changed. I have reason to believe that Ron Toole 10 at some point in time functioned in a position similar to 11 what I was in. 12 Jim, concentrate on the period -- we'll be concen-Q 13 trating on the period at Unit 1 from April 1st, 1978 until 14 the accident in 1979. 15 , How would you characterize the olant so far as l 16 f leakaga' l 17 A Relative to Unit I? f 18 Q To Unit 1, acain, trying to concentrate on that 19 time period, again, I realize you were at 2 during ' p art of 20 that time period? 21 A I don't have any specific knowledge relative to 22 leakage in that period of time. 23 No problems with excessive or unidentified leakage Q 24 during that time period? l 25 A No knowledge relative to that, at all. 1 l l

9 ' I ' Q Do you have any information'regarding operators 2 having difficulty getting valid leak rates during that time 8 period? , 4

                              .A   Could you' ask that question again, please?

5 Q Do you have any knowledge of operators having 8

                     . difficulty getting valid leak rates, test results, during that 7

t'ime period at Unit 1? 8 A I have no direct knowledge of operators getting

           ..8 j

having difficulty -- with leak rate tests during that 10 time. 11 Q How were the leak rate tests run at Unit 1 durino 12

                       - that' period?

13 I don't know, other than to the best of my knowledce,, A 14 they were-run on the computer. 15

                               .Q   Were there eter any problems during that ceriof 16-with the corputer      program so far as the leak rate II surveillance testing?

18 A During that period I know of no problems t ith the 19 computer program in Unit 1.

             #                      How   often were the leak rate surveillance tests Q

21 run? 22 A During that period, I don't know. l 23 BY MR. CONNOLLY: M Jim, what was your responsibility in recards to Q l " the leak rate rest surveillance procedures there?

10

   =.

1 A Relative to the surveillance procedures as a whole, 2 because I was the Superintendent and.in charge of the 8 overall operation of the Unit, that was one of the things 4 that fell under my cognizance, tiered down several layers. 6 Were you -- did you take active involvement in the Q

      -6       leak rate program?

7 A On one occasion during t$he period at Unit 1I i I, 8 took active involvement in the leak rate program. 8 - Okay. Q 1 10 Would you elabocate on that, please? l 11 A Yes, sir, I would: 12 In a Plan of the Day meeting shortly after I 13 lbecametheUnit 1 Superintendent -- excuse me -- let me 14 rephrase that. 15 [I In a Plan of the Day meeting, one of the firs: 16 lPlanoftheDaymeetingsIattendedafterbecomingUnit 1 I I I 17 Superintendent, I asked a question about leak rate tests. 18 And the question that I asked -- I don't remember the exact 18 words -- but the thought behind the question and the gist  ; i 20 of the question was: I asked either the Shift Supervisor 21 or the Supervisor of Operations, or both, in the Plan of the 22 Day meeting, if you get a leak rate test that does not meet 23 the acceptance criteria within the technical specifications, 1 24 I assume you enter the action statement; is that true? 25 That was the gist of the question. l { L l

11 1- That was the state of my involvement with leak rate 2~ testing in Unit 1. 8 BY MR. C6NNOLLY: 4 What was the response? Q 5 A The response to that question was, yes,-that is

                        .6                  true; that is what we do.

7 Why did you ask them that specific question regard-Q . 8 Was that an outgrowth of the LER problem ing leak rates? i 8 involving Unit 2 in october of 1978? 10 Yes, it was. A l 11 Q Could you elaborate on the circumstances surroundinej l~o that October 1978 LER at Unit 2? 13 What was your involvement, and what knowledge de 14 you have of that LER? l 15 A I was involved with the circumstances which l

i lj 16 g,nerated that LER, and was involved in the discussions l >
                            "                 concerning the LER.

18 What -- could you, just for the record, describe Q 1 1 18 the circumstances that led up to that LER at Unit 27 20 A Yes. 21 l In Unit 2 in approximately early october, I became 22 aware of the fact that Unit 2 was apparently not entering i E3 ' what I initially considered to be the action statement when 24 a surveillance test was not meeting the acceptance criteria. l I l f 25 In the particular Plan of the Day meeting, l- l

                                                                                                                                                                           .l u

t . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

12 1 we analyzed that situation; and analyzed that in light'of 2 comments that were made relative to Unit No. 1, and tried to a make a determinate 6n of if we were interpreting the technical 4 specifications -- if my initial inter'pretation of the 5 t'echnical specifications -- was correct. 6 In entering into this dis =ussion, it appeared that 7 there were different, at least two different ways of looking 8 at the situation. We elected to look at that different than 9 my initial interpretation until such time -- I should say, 10 I elected to look at that different than my initial interore-11 tation -- unti) such time as I could get the Unit 1 Plant

                  '12    Operations Committee to determine how whatever specification i

13 Unit I had relative to the situation was interpreted. 14 I left town to go on a business trip shortiv thereafter 4 15 and did no: get to Unit 1 to a:Com lish that. Uron returnin:, r 15 Unit 2 was down for an outage and that was not a priority l l 17 i item, because Unit 2 was not operating at the time. 18 Approximately -- a few days before the generation 1 19 of the LER' Unit 2 came back up on line, I had still not gotten 20 to Unit 2 -- excuse me -- to Unit 1, to discuss the matter, 21 as it had not been a priority. 22 And prior to my getting to Unit 2 -- Unit 1, again, 23 excuse me -- to discuss the matter, the,NRC became involved M in the interpretation that we had given the technical M specifications; and told us that we were incorrect in the

     '.                                                                    13
5. l'
               .way that we had interpreted the specifications in Unit 2.            4

). 2 I then called the Unit 1 Superintendent, Jim  ; 3 O'Hanlon, told Jim -O'Hanlon the way the NRC had told us to 4 interpret the specifications in Unit 2; told him that 7 didn't l 5-know how Unit 1 interpreted the specifications, that I had 6 not gotten -- or words to the effect that I had not gotten 7 to Unit 1 -- and recommended to him that he look into that 8 matter because of how this initially came up in Unit 2. 9 The LER was subsequently generated, and where it 10 was put it out by me to shifts in Unit 2-on various occasions 11 as to how the specification was to be interpreted; and that  ; 12 was consistent with what the NRC told us. 13 Q In the same light, were you aware of ooerators 14 throwing away what vere deemed to be invalid leak rate tests 15 at Unit 2 and Unit I? ' i 16 A In Unit 1 I was no: aware of any operators throwin: , 17 away leak rate tests.  ! l 18 In Unit 2 for the brief period that I just describe 19 I was aware of operators throwing away what were deemed to be s 20 invalid leak rate tests, during that period. 21 Q What was the criteria that operators at Unit 2 l 22 used to determine if a test was invalid? 23 A During the period in question that I am aware of N this practice, roughly it was a few operating days, seven or I 25 eight days in which the plant operated, to the best of my l I

14 1 recollection; the leak rate tests after being run, were 2 -- if they did not meet the acceptance criteria -- were set 3 aside; say, and a subsequent leak rate test was run. 4 If a subsequent, if that next subsequent er a 6 follow-on subsequent leak rate rest.was run and did meet the 8 acceptance criteria,'the other tests were discarded if it 7 could at all be reasonably assumed the plant was not in 8 steady state operation: where steady state may involve very 8 small and virtually not easily perceptible changes to plant l i 10 operating conditions. l 11 Did you consider that an incorrect procedure on Q M2 their part to" discard those tests? l l I3 A I'm sorry, could you restate that question? I 14 Q Did you consider the practice of discarding those  ! 15 j tests to be incorrect? 16 'I Not during that period of time in early Octo' er A ' l r' l that I've Just discussed when those. tests were considered to  ! la be invalid tests. 18 Q And in subsequent deliberations did you consider 20 that to be an incorrect procedure? 21 A When we were given the interpretation by the N?.C I I Z2 that once a person decided that the plant was in steady state j 23 operation to run the test, that if one did not satisfy the 24 acceptance criteria, he was in the action statement; then 25 the test in my judgment would have been a valid test; and had , i I

i

                             .                                                                                                    15                             1 1

to be treated as a valid test. a 2 Q So, therefore, that would preclude the possibility j q 3 if'you'ran a test that exceeded tech specs, doing another l l

                                                                                                                                                                 )

4 one, and if the second test was within tech specs' require-5 6 ments -- originally what you said they werejdoing was throwinq , { 6 i

       ,                              away that first test; but with the interpretation of what 9

the NRC told the licensee, Met Ed, that they would have to 8 keep that first test; and that's an action statement. 9 Is that correct? 10 A I'm not sure that in the discussions that keecing or 11 discarding of_the first test, as such, came up. It may well ut have, I just don't recalltheshecificsrelativetodiscardinc,, 13 i or the not discarding, given the new interpretation. l 14 Given the new interpretation it was clear to me 15 that a person had to consider -- excuse me -- if a person i . 16 set up the conditions to run the rest, ran the rest, that i I 17 i l the results that came out were results that were valid result ; 18 and you'd have to proceed accordingly with valid results. 2 Q Are you aware of any operators in Unit 2 deliberately  ; 20 making either water or hydrogen additions during leak rate 21 tests to effect the leak rate test? 22 A No, I am not. 23 j Q Are you aware of any operator altering a leak rate 34 test -- let me rephrase my question. i The scenario was this: you run a test that exceeds f

                                                                                                                                     .______a

16 1 tech specs. 'You run a second test, you " fudge" the leak rate 2 test by making hydrogen and water additions on the second I test; accepting thal second test as being valid? 4 Are you aware at any time of that circumstance 5 occurred at Unit 2?

    '6 A    No, sir,  I' am not.

7 You indicated before you are not aware of Q 8 Correct? operators discarding tests at Unit l? 8 That is correct. A 10 BY MR. LETTS: 11 Jim, you said you did ask a queition at the period Q 12 shortly after becoming Unit 1 Superintendent regarding if an 13 action statement would be entered if the tech soecs were  ! 14 exceeded. I i 15 You don': remember who actually resocaded chat the-b 16 were following the procedure? 17 A I asked the question to the coerations peccle 38 present at the meeting; and the operations people that 18 typically attended.the meetings were the shift suoervisor 20 and the supervisor of operations. 31 I don't have a specific recollection of which one 22 of those, or both, were in the meeting. 23 BY MR. CONNOLLY: , 1 24 Q Excuse me, the supervisor of operations then was 26 Mike Ross; is that correct?

17 l

                             .'.-                                                                                                                i l

e l' A He was the supervisor of operations at the time, 2 yes, sir. 8 And aftef they-responded affirmed an action statemer Q t J 4 would.be entered should they exceed tech specs, did you ever 6 do any follow-up to confirm that this was done? 6 A No, sir, I didn't. I was told that was the 7 practice. 8 Q And you accepted --  ! l 8 A I accepted the answer. l 10 Q Pelative to Mr. Ross and the supervisors and other l 11 operations personnel, did anyone having discussions with you U indicate they were having problems with leak rate surveil-13 lance tests at Unit'J? 14 No, sir. A No.: during that period of time that I 15 was Un; 1 Superintendent; no, sir, f 16 Q 3efore you assumed your position as Unit 1 Suoerin-i l 17 1 tendent what was your involvemen: regarding Uni: l? l, 18 A Tracing all the way back to 1974? Is that the 19 question? 20 Q Let's stay with the period 1977 up till the time 21 you assumed your position as Unit 1 Superintendent? 22 Did you have any responsibilities or duties at Unit 23 ' 1 during that period? u A During that period I may have been involved in 25 } some joint plant operations and review committee meetings . l . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ i

18 ' (f 1 with' Unit 1 in.such items as emergency pl.anning. Other than 2 that I don't recall any duties relative to Unit 1. I also 3 -perhaps was involved in' emergency drills relative to Unit 1 4 where the emergency drill was in the scenario of site - 8 emergencies and so forth. 6 Before you assumed your position as Unit 1 Q 7 Superintendent, do you know of any information that would 8 indicate they were experiencing difficulties with leak rate 8 surveillance tests at Unit l? 10 As I mentioned earlier, when the matter came up in A

                                                                                               .l 11                  it was brought to my attention, and I initially Unit No. 2, 12 interpreted this specification, asking why we were not in the                  -)

13 action statement; that if that same interpretation were to be , 14 applied to Unit 1, that that would give Unit 1 a problem. 15 . Tha 's the only thing I can recall, sir, that would d 16 l fit into the category of your question. l 17 l Q But you are not aware prior to your assuming Unit , 18 1 Superintendent whether or not operators were experienci.q 19 problems with unidentifi.ed leakage exceeding the tech

         #      specs in Unit I?

21 Not other than what I just mentioned to you, sir. A 22 BY MR. LETTS: 23' Do you recall any instances of operators obtaining Q M negative leak rates at Unit 1 while you were Unit 1 1 26 Superintendent?

    . .                                                                                      19
  • 1 A I don't recall any such instances that I knew of 2

the circumstnaces. , 1 3 Q Were negative leak rates acceptable as valid leak l l 4 rates during that period? 5 A Sir, I don't -- I 6 Q Was there a policy? ,1 7 A Sir, I don't recall if negative leak rates in Unit 8 1 during that period were -- came up or not; so, I really 9 don't know relative to Unit 1 if there was a policy relative  ;

                                                                                                                         )

10 to negative leak rates or not. t l' i 11 Q Um-huh. 12 Was there a problem at Unit 2 with negative leak 13  ! rates? i 14  ! A I have a vague recollection of possibly beine aware , , 1 ~* I i of that, but I can't state for sure. I just dor': recall.

              '6 BY MR. CONNOLLY:

l 1-l Q Do you know what the difference was betweer. the . 1 I surveillance procedure at Unit 1 and Unit 2 recarding leak 19 rates? l 20 A At the time, sir, that I was involved with Three 21 Mile Island I did not know of any differences be ween the 22 respective procedures. l Q Were you involved in preparinc, writing a crocedure 24 for leak rate at Unit 2? I  % i A Sir, I may have been involved in reviewing that

  , - . , .                                                                                                       20 I'     procedure in the capacity of plant operations and review 2-     committee; I was not involved in writing the procedure.

8 I don't know if-I was involved in -- I don't recall if I 4 was involved in the reviewing of it; but I may well have 5 been. 6 Q Were you involved in the development of the computer 7 software program in regard to RCS leak rate surveillance. 8 tests at Unit 2? 9 A I was involved peripherally so far as it affected 10 the LER in Unit 2. I 11 Q Did you know the difference between the computer 12 program at Unit 1 and Unit 2 in regards to the leak rate 13 l surveillance test? 6 14 A No, sir. l l

                               ,                                                                                        i 15 !i                                 C What was your relationship with Mike Ross as Uni: I h

16 hSupern:enden:? b  ; li y n Mike Ross worked for me, directly. He was the i f 1 la supervisor of operations for Unit 1, and I was the Unit 1 1 19 l Superintendent. 20 Q Do you know if in any way he has been tainted or 21 had knowledge of or was involved in any of the Hartman 22 allegations regarding Unit 2? 23 A I have no knowledge of whether was involved in M the Hartman allegations relative to Unit 2. J Q How much time, if you know, did Mr. Ross spend in j i L k

                  ..                                                                                                                                          21 i

i 1 1 I Unit 2. operations while he was Unit 1 supervisor of 1 i 2 '. - operations? . 3 A In gener'al, sir, very, very, little; starting, 4 however, on the date of the accident, he was heavily involved 5 in Unit 2. 6 Q. Prior to the accident? 7 A Prior to the accident and during the period of' time i 8 that you said this concentrates on, to the best of my recol-8 lection, assuming that that's the time that he was transferred 10 to gni 1, i y don't recall that exact. timing.-- I did not  ; 11 see Mr. Ross in Unit 2 frequently at all. 12 l Q This is when you were assigned to Unit 2? I i 13 ' A When I was in Unit 2, yes, sir. 14 Q And when you assumed Unit 1.as Superintendent, you , I i -4 15

                                                         , are no: aware of hir spe., ding much time at Unit 2?

I

                                                      #                                                                                                                                        I 16                 i           A      Tha: _s ccrrect.                                                                                                           ,

17 ' i Q Up until the accident, is'that what you said? j d 18 A Yes, sir, that is correct. 19 Q Okay. l 20 Do you have any -- in your mind, do you have any l 21-questions abou: Mr. Ross' integrity? 22 A No, sir. l 23 Q About Mr. Ross' competence as supervisor of opera-24 tions? j 25 A None at all, sir.

o a

e . I 22 1

Q One other individual I'd just discuss with you 2 briefly: Brian Mehler, who I believe was a shift -- dual -- 8' supervisor in this period;-do you have any questions about 4 Mr. Mehler's integrity and competence? 8 A Sir, I know of'-- I have no direct knowledge of 6 anything that would question Mr. Mehler's integrity and

     -E         performance.

8 Q Do you know if Mr.-Mehler in any way was implicated i.

      '8        in the Hartman allegations?                                                                                                !

10 A Well, sir, I'm not really sure what'"imolicated" 81 means? 12 A number of people have testified before the 13 Grand Jury, and I don't have direct knowledge of what the Gran M ~ Jury concluded, or how, what decision the Grand Jury 15 , gacygg, l

              !                                                                                                                     i
    .16                   So, therefora, you nave no xnowledae of whether or Q

l IE not Mr. Mehler was implica ei at all in the Harman allegations,?

           'l 18            A    That's correct, sir; because I have no knowledge 18         of what the Grand Jury specifically concluded.                                                                      3
      #              Q    Not only with the Grand Jury, but with the subse-81        quent developments since the Unit 2 accident and the numerous U         investigations and. interviews, conversations with former M         employees, did you get any information at all implicating 24 Mr. Mehler in the Unit 2 allegations?

25 A Well, again, sir, I guess I would have to --there

 ,    9            ..                                                                                                                                                       23 1                             have been a number'of people who have been interviewed; there 2                              have been a number of people-talked to; and I don't have 3-                            -- I don't have any' facts that would be' implicating.
                                   '4                                    Q    Were you aware of any operators making deliberate 6                             water additions to the makeup. tank during leak rate tests at 6                            Unit 1 to effect the leak test?

7- A No, sir. 8 Q Are you aware of any operators making wa' tar i l

                                  '9                               additions and failing to account for that in the leak rate 10                             tests?

11 A No, sir. 12 Do.you understand, or are you aware that water Q 13 j additions, unaccounted-for additions, were made on leak i i 1  : 14 li rate tests; and would invalidate the tests?

j. '

i 15 Would you ask that cues: ion a:ain, clease? p: A. i t' 16 Do you know if according to the surveillance f .Q l 1 17 procedure if you added water, unaccounted water additions, i  ! 18 during a leak rate test, if that would have invalidated the 19 - tert? 23 A Sir, I have reviewed the procedures since I've 21 left Three Mile Island; and to the best of my recollection 1 2 in reading the procedure, if a person is -- adds water during l 23 the conduct of a leak rate test, he must log the amount of f 24 water added. I r 25' If he didn't log the amount of water added? Q { 1 j ______--__________J

 '*                                                                                                                                                            24 1         A    It would not be a -- go ahead, I'm sorry.

2 Q That would not be a valid test? 3 A That would not be a correct test; yes, sir. 4 Q Do you know if any operator mistakenly added water 5 and failed to make account of the addition in the control 6 log book and also in the computer during a test; and that 7 test still being accepted as valid? 8 A No, sir, I know of no such instance. 9 Are you aware of any instance where an operator 3 Q 10 might have made jogging water additions, adding small 11 increments of water during a test, in order to effect the 12 leak rate test? 13 A No, sir. { l i 14 BY MR. LETTS: I 15 Jir., woulf it Q I jus: want to go back a second: l i 16 ! surprise you that a number of operators at Unit I during 17 the '77 to '79 period were, in fact, discarding invalid leak 18 rate tests? 19 A As I mentioned, th'e -- when I was in Unit 2, 20 when I initially made an interpretation, the inference was 21 given that Unit I would have a problem. I, af ter associating l , 22 with the LER, called Mr. O'Hanlon and told him of the 23 interpretation that we had been given by the NRC; and 24 recem. mended that since I had been given that guidance by my U supervising Station Manager to keep the Units' interpretations

  • i I
          '.:  -o                                                               25     g i

i m I together, that the matter be. looked into on his part, that is, 2 the interpretation. 3 I don't Rhow whether I would say " surprised" or 4 not. I.did not investigate the matter, myself, other than , 5 I previously mentioned to you here today. J I 6 In the course of our investigation we have inter-Q

                                                                                        ]

7 viewed basically all ' eurrent and past operators at Unit 1, 8 and a number of them have admitted that during the '77 to l 8 '79 time period they did, in fact, discard invalid leak 10 rates, for whatever reason they, in you know, deemed the 11 test invalid. 12 I But discarding tests was a general policy. i 13 ' Do you know where they would have received tha l 14 direction or impetus that that was the policy that was in l 15 ' ' l effect at the time? 16 A If such a policy was in effect I don't know out of  ! 17 what that policy grew. I 18 Do you know how the operators at Unit I would have Q 19 known to take it upon themselves to discard an invalid leak 20 rate test? 21 A As I said, sir, I don't how that policy would have 22 come about. I have no direct' knowledge of that. 23 Do you know if Mike Ross had any influence on Q 24 the oeprators' discarding invalid leak rate tests? 25 I don't know, sir. A l

 .       'e ..        ]                                                                                                26
               'I Q     Okay.

2 For a minute switching back to Unit 2, do you 3 ~ recall, again, how often the leak' rate surveillance tests 4

                        .were run at 27 l

5 A Sir, I don't know what frequency we specified in 6 Unit 2. I just--I don't recall the frequency we set up to 7 run the tests. 8 I do know for the brief period of time in early 9 October that when, as I previously mentioned to you today, 10 that additional tests were run when an initial test did not

             -11                                       .

meet the acceptance criteria. G An additional test or tests. Q Again, do you recall what the requirement was so_ f i 14 far as how often a test had to be run? j i h 15 l A Yes, sir, I de. I've looked at the technical 16 l specifications, and I know that a leak rate test-tha me: l l 17 the acceptance -- at least the acceptance criteria, the la technical specifications, was required once everv 72 hours I' in steady state operation. j 20  ! Q And the rational for running tests more often than 21 the 72-hour requirement, what was that to the best of your 22 understanding? 23 A Well, sir, I'm not sure that we totally sat down and 24 thought-through all of that at the time. I think that a couple 23 of items could enter into that, and maybe even more than a

  .   .                                                                        27 l

1 couple: 2 One, more frequent performance of the surveillance

         '3     is more conservative than is required by the technical 4     specifications.

6 Two, at the time I don't know if I was directly 6 aware of what the frequency was in Unit 1 technical specifi- ] 7 cations, how often it was required in Unit 1 or not; I just 8 don't recall if I was.

      \

Y9 I since have become aware of at least what I think 10 it is: I think it's 24 hours. 11 And the thought could have been to have, since 12 particularly our supervisory personnel in Unit 2 originated 13 out of Unit 1, a carryover, if you will, practice could 14 have been some of the impetus for the frequent, or more l l 15 g , z .; , n perg-._,--a *han, say, once every 72 hours. 16 l A third thing would have been simply the extension I l 17 d' of the interval in time wher the surveillance woud1 again 18 be required. 18 Going back  : Unit 1, then, 24 hours was the Q 20 expected format at that time; and many operators have testified 21 that as a routine procedure they were run almost shiftly, 22 not necessarily every single shift, but certainly, you know, 23 more than the 24-hour tech spec required. Speaking, you 24 know, about Unit 1, why thnt would have been the case? E A Well, again, I don't have direct knowledae of why. l l l-t

   .o 28 4,(                                                                                          ,%

3 3' I think it was a practice that was developed. I 9 I I- don't know what the time frame was in terms of develohlfig

                                                                     ~
            +3             that practice.             T 1

4 Again, seine of' the same reasons for that I just 1 t' .0 5 gave you to the previous question.  ! 6 Okay. Q

                    \

7 Sy.MR. CONNOLLY:  ; 8 g Are you aware of operators making hydrogen addi-

                '9          tions during leak rate tests to effect the leak rate test 1
              .10            in Units 1.or Unit 2?            ,    ,
                                                          ;       4k 11                          I have no knowledge of that practice; no, sir.

A

     ?.

1 Q T4egh.rding hydrogen additions, do you know how that

  • 4 II effects makeup tank level? f 14 No, sir, I do not.

A i I,  ! 15 ( , Q Were there any discussions that you're aware of i 16 '. as Superintendent cf Unit 1 about problems with the makeup

                                                        's 17 ftankle'relrecorder?                      '

s l 18 A I recall no such discussions. 19 Q In your position would you have' reviewed work , l 20 request forns regarding problem with the makeup tank level q i 21 recorder? 1

               .22                  A        During my stay in Unit 1 I would say it was                                                                    i U'           unlikely that I would have reviewed such forms.

24

                                   'Q        Generally what supervisory level would have reviewed I

such a documer.t? l

29 11 A Five years downstream, sir, I just don't remember.

        '2             Q     Are you aware now how hydrogen would effect the i

8 leak rate test? - 4 A Sir, I've read portions of the Faegre & Benson 6 . report'. .That, also, has been some time ago. And I could 8 not report to you what I've read in the Faegre & Benson 7 report how hydrogen affected leak rate level and do it right,. 8 sitting here~today. 9 Q Do you know if anvene in the pre-accident period 10 at Unit 1.was aware of a loop seal on the makeup tank level 11- instrumentation system? U - A Well, sir, if such a system exists -- and I, 1 13 frankly, don't know if such a system exists or not -- peo le I 4 14 in Unit -- there would certainly be some people in Unit 1

             .I 15-j[tha:wouldknow su:h a system exists.                                                                :

li i 16 , I don't know by name or position who those oecple  : I 17 directly'are. I could only postulate. 18 Q That's a postulation on your part? You don't know 19 in fact if individuals in Unit 1 were aware of the existence 20 of.a loop seal in the pre-accident period? 21 A Sir, there are -- one, I don't know if there is a M loop seal. So, it's difficult to say if I knew people knew-D that there was a loop seal, when I don't know that there is 34 a loop seal. M Q I just want to clarifv a little bit what you just l L - 1 .

   .i
      #: ,                                                                                                   30 L.

I said, so there's no confusion in the record whether or not 2 you were aware of individuals who might have or'did have 8 knowledge of the loop seal? 4 See, the loop seal has become a critical issue 5 in the leak rate investigation; because this loop seal is 6 one of the fundamental reasons why hydrogen would affect 7 the leak rate test; because hydrogen would affect the makeup 8 tank level recorder; thus, with knowledge of that it could 8 affect the leak rate test, i 10 And what we're trying to determine is if oeople at 11 Unit 1 or Unit 2 were aware of the existence of a loop seal U in that per-accidedt period? t 13 We have testimony from management personnel they l E I 14 were not aware of the existence of a loop seal in the pre- , l 15

                 '. accident oeriod.

We do have testimo..'. fro: Unit I contrcl t I 16 ' room operators that they were aware of the existence of the t { l 17 loep seal; and they were also aware of the effect of hydrocen{ 18 edditions during the leak rate test. 18 And we're just trying to determine if people in 20 management positions were also aware of those circumstances? 21 A (Witness nodding) 22 g Jim you nodded before; did you mean to indicate that 23 you were not aware of any management had knowledge of the M loop seal? 25 A Right. I think my answer was somewhat universal: 1 1

   . *      .                                                                                 31 1-       Not knowing about the loop seal myself.
             't Q            Do you know if there was an atmosphere at Unit 1 8        that would cause an operator to cheat on a leak rate test?

4 An atomosphere which supervisory personnel pressured operators 8 to get good leak rate tests? 6 A Sir, the guidance that I had-from mv management 7 that I worked for, the Station Manager and his supervisor, 8 was that the' tech specs should be held in high regard, in 9 the highest regard, in the operation of the clant. 10 I know of nothing that I did that would convey any- , l 11 thing other than that. And that was certainly in the cir:les! 1 12 that I dealt in, the atmosphere that I saw. l 13 Q Were you aware of an atmosphere at Unit 2 that l i l 14 would cause an operator to cheat on a test? l t 15 A Sir, the same .ranegeme..t relative to ec..cliance

                                                                                                                     )

16 with the technical specifications was involved, the same .,

                                                                                                          .          t 17       shift supervisor with dual license between the respe::ive 18       units.

19 BY MR. LETTS: 30 Q Jim, how about a possible atmosphere among the l 21 operators, themselves, of possibly competition between shifts 22 that would sort of encourage one to manipulate leak rates 23 if there were in fact any problem, you know, that type of h- , 24 -situation might have existed? l 25 I knew of no situation that fit the description you A

                                                                                              .-____________________J

32 l1

                                                                                                             )

1- have described. j

2. Q Do you know if operators at any time were~ directed
                                       .                                                                      j i

i 8 by supervisory persbnuel to manipulate leak rate tests, to l 4 make water or hydrogen additions at Unit 1 and Unit 27

                                                                                                              )

5 A I know of no such occasions. i 4 gy.MR. CONNOLLY: { 7 ,Q Are you aware of any discussions at manacement I 8 level that by keeping Unit 2 on line until Unit I was readv l l 1 i 9 ' to come back from its refueling outage? 10 A Please ask that question again, sir? 11 At your level of management, are you aware of any Q , 12 discussions in which there was a decision made by the Company 13 to keep Unit 2 on line until Unit 1 was ready to come back l l ' 14 from its refueling outage in the spring of 1979? l 15 I recall no such discussions, sir. A

        'lo               Are you aware of any operators -- ex use me -- any Q

17 shift supervisor requesting the plant to,be shut down because ; i 18 of excessive leakage, and that request being denied? i 19 That's at either Unit 1 or Unit 2?  ! 1 20 A No, sir, I know of no such occasion. 81 Q Did the shift supervisor have the prerogative 22 to shut the plant down if he was experiencing problems with  ! 23 excessive leakage? h A Yes, sir. 15 Q What was your reaction to the plea-bargainin;

 .. e 33 i

I agreement made by the Department cf Justice and Met Ed? 2 A~ My reaction-was that I was pleased that that phase 3 of this proceeding 'and matter was over. Q- Is that your only reaction, that you were pleased 5 this was finally over?  ! e The question that comes up is that apparently 7 the GPU, by its agreement in the eyes of the public has 8 more or less said, yes, we did; we were involved in 9 falsification of records and so on. Th,ough, those were not 8 u 1 lactuallytheconditionsoftheplea-bargaining; but to the 11 general public, GPU has admitted culpability; Med Ed has 12 admitted culpability. 13 As being a member of that organization at that time, U i what is your reaction about that public perception that the I 15 company was culpable in the Hartman allegations?

l. ,

16 - 3 7.m sorry, sir, you'd better ask that question ' lagain; my mind wandered towards the end of your question. 18 Q I'll make it a little simpler: 19 What is your reaction about operators cheating on 20 l tests, making hydrogen and water additions in Unit 2; and 31 apparently this did occur at Unit 2, if one intercrets the 22 p agreement made between Department of Justice and the Company? 23 t 1 MS, PENNY: Si,r, that fact was not admitted to by E4 the Company, s 25 MR. CONNOLLY: I'm not talking about the fact, 1 1 __________i

. e e 34 1 whether or not the public perception that this occurred, 2 that operators did, in fact, -- not in fact -- but operators 3 cheated on tests by making hydrogen and water additions? 4 What is your reaction to that? Let's eliminate 6 the agreement and so on. 6 What is your reaction to the allegation that 7 operators cheated on tests at Unit 2 by making hydrogen 8 and water additions? 9 THE WITNESS: What is my reaction to the allegation?! I 10 i BY MR. CONNOLLY:

           .I 11            Q     Yuh?

12 A By the Justice Department that -- , i 13 Q 'No. By the operators, themselves, by Mr. Hart an, i 14 and by other operators, and indicating tests -- that hydrocen ! l 15 ll and water addi:;ons were made to af fect leak rate tests? li 16 A And what is my reaction to Mr. Hartman's allegation?, 17 g Un-huh? j 18 A Well, sir, in light of my involvement in Unit 2, 19 and in light of what I tried to do in Unit 2 subsequent to the

       %)       time of the LER, and I'd have to say that if those practices 21       went on and went on outside of supervisory knowledge, without
        '2      consulting supervisory personnel to get a determination as to U       the propriety of such things, I am disappointed.

24 BY MR. LETTS: M Q Do you feel in regards to the plea-bargaining i

35 1 _ agreement,-do you feel the Company did the right thing, took 2

                   .the easy'way out, or sold out?

8-Or, aga'iri, trying to rephrase what Pete was trying 4 to ask you?

           '8            A      I'm one person in an investigation that involved 8

a great number of people and a great number of time - .or, I excuse me -- a great deal of time. I don't have facts laid 8 out in front of me. I assume that the Company had a lot of 8 facts-laid out in front of it, and that it chose the position 10 that it felt was the most supportable position and the best 11 position for it, given the circumstances. 12 I no longer, work for the Ccmpany. I don't feel that

            '3 I'm in a position to question their judgment.
            "             Q     Jim,..how do you explain the fact that operators 15 l at Unit I had admitted to the knowledge of how hydrogen would '

16 in fact affect makeup tank and, consequently, the leak rate II test, itself? 18 How would they come to know that? Would the  ; 19 supervisory personnel be aware of that fact as well?

             #            A     Well, first of all, I don't have any direct 21 -

knowledge of operators knowing how hydrogen additions affecte 22 the makeup tank. L 23 Q And you stated that you did not, yourself? , l M A And I didn't have any knowledge of that. D Can you rationalize or conceptuali::e how Q I 1

                                                                                       't

l .

 , .,                                                                         36-1       how they_ knew it and yet, you, yourself, on ycur level of 2        supervision, did not know?

8' A- The only thing I can rationalize f, cm having A read the Faegre & Benson report, which, to the best of my 5

             . recollection dealt just with Unit 2, the add i r. ion of hydrogen as ab.lyzed by-Faegre & Benson was quite com;. ex of how it 6

7 would affect level in the makeup tank.' 8 And for an operator to have unders. .od everythinq 8 that_Faegre'& Benson analyzed and have hit i' righ: on the 10 head, I feel would not have been likely for a good understand- j 11 ing of what was going on. i U Q When did you, in fact, review port i~,.s of the Faecre, 1 i 13

              & Benson re.cor ?                                                      i 14                                                                             ,I A     To~the best of my recollection, in ' e spring of I

l-15 [ .. in early 1963. , s t it i 10 i Q Again, at any of the POD meetings e, PORC meetings, i 17' was there ever any discussions of problems wi n the makeuo 18 tank level or the possibility of existence of the loop seal 18 back in '78 and '79 period? N This could be at either Unit, reall/? 21 A I don't recall of any such discussi"ns relative ) 22 to loop seal on the makeup tank on either uni' that I would 23 remember. 24 Q During '78 and '79, was there ever any theorizina 23 .about the possible assistance of hydrogen, wbsther anyone

 ,O's                                                                  37 i

i 1 understood how that should work or.not? Was there any l

      -2     discussion of does it or does it not, is there a possibility a    it would affect the leak rate?
       '4               Again, I'm saying without anybody saying, yes,-
      .6     this does?

a .A I don't recall any such discussions. 7 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 8 Let me just ask you some concluding questions, Q 8 Jim: 1 10 Are you aware at all of any falsification of 11 leak rate surveillance tests at either Units 1 or Unit 27 12 A I am not aware, personally, of any falsification 13 of leak rates in Unit 1 or Unit 2. 14 Are ycu aware of any motive for operators to cheat Q l .15 on leak ra e tests in either of the units? I  : i 4 16 A I think I've answered a similar question before j i 17 relative to such motivation, and the motivation--how I 18 perceived the responsibility; and I can only say that what 19 I perceived is what I tried to convey, sir. 20 So, therefore, you were not aware of any operators Q 21 that cheated on tests at Unit 1 or Unit 2? 22 A Not any motive that was conveyed by management. 23 Prior to your discussions with us, did anyone from Q i 24 General Public Utilities brief you in regards to the answers 25 to give to our questions?

a-38

     .c ,

l' A No, sir. 2 MR. CONNOLLY: I believe that concludes our 8 questioning; right7' l; 4 Thanks a lot, appreciate it. -

l. 6 (Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., Wednesday, April 4, 1

6 1984, the interview was concluded.) 7 8 9 50 11 I . 12 33 l 14 i 15 . 16  ; I 17 18 19 20 i 21

                                                                                                                     '1 i

23 24 1 i

                                                          ._.____________.______ ______________._ _ ._ _ _ _ _ w

C,ERT!?ICATE OF PROCT.EDI!:G3 39 l

        , ,5 ,     ,

2 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the

                 ,   :RC COMMISSION         _
                 ,        In the matter of:    OI. INT.ERVIEW, JAMES SEELINGER 1
                 ,        Date of Proceeding:   Wednesday, April 4, 1984 Place of Proceeding:    Palm Beach Garden, Florida 7

were held as herein appears, and th'at this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission. 10 James R. Burns, Jr. b 11 Official Reporter - Typed iz , q

                                                             ?fif j.           l{'7//A    .._
              ,,                                      / JOf ficiad Rephr:er - Signature
                                                     'J 15 16 17 io l9 2o 21 22 23 24  l 25 TAYLO! ASSOCIATES MEGISTERED PROFESSION AL REPC ATCRS NOR rQLK. VIMCINI A

I e l SHAFFER, MERRILL 11/16/83 Statement to NRC

                                                                                                                              )
  ,                                            Report No:    1-83-010 i

REPORT OF INTERVIEW Merrill Ray SHAFFER was interviewed on November 16, 1983 connencing at 0950 by

    -NRC Investigator R. K. CHRISTOPHER. The interview was conducted in the office Gf the law firm'of Killian and Gephart in Harrisburg, PA. Present during the                              ~1 interview at SHAFFER's request were his personal attorneys. Smith B. GEPHART and Jane PENNY. Ms. PENNY was present during the latter portion of the interview and not during the initial phase of the interview. SHAFFER stated that he is currently employed at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station as a startup and test engineer at TMI-1. He said he has been in that position since October 1982. Prior to this position SHAFFER said he was the staff assistant for the Director of Startup and Test who he identified as Mr.

Gary MILLER. He also advised that during 1978 and the early part of 1979 he cas a staff assistant to the Unit 2 Superintendent. He said this position was first held by Mr. MILLER who was in an acting capacity and later by Joseph LOGAN who took over as the formal Superintendent of TMI Unit 2 in the latter ' part of 1978. SHAFFER described his duties as receiving all incoming and l

    -ou2goinc correspondence for both MILLER and LOGAN in their respective                                       l
j. positions, maintaining of certain personnel folders, and the preparation and recording of staffing reports and the significant events of reports. SHAFFER was questioned as to whether or not Gary MILLER attended the plan-of-the-day (P00) meetings during which plant operational events were discussed. SHAFFER stated that it was his recollection that MILLER did not rcutinely attend the ]

POD meetings. He said that MILLER, on occasions, attended these meetings but he was unable to recall with any clarity the actual number of times or l frequency in which PILLER attended the meetings. He said that he never I attended any of the POD meetings with MILLER and as such did not know what the subject of any conversations were during those meetings. He also stated that he never prepared any notes, files or memorandums for MILLER as a result of any concerns or thoughts MILLER had as a result of the POD meetings. SHAFFER did state that there was a weekly staff meeting which was attended by Gary MILLER when he was the station superintendent. He said this meeting was held approximately once a week and would last for one or two hours in duration. He said that the purpose of this meeting was to provide MILLER with a weekly , (1) __ - ___ ___ a

1-83-010 status report from each of the various departments in the plant. He said that attendees of these meetings would usually include the various department heads such as: Joe LOGAN, James SEELINGER, Dan $HOVLIN Michael R055, Jim FLOYD and Dick SIEGLITZ. He said there were at times other individuals who attended in place of these individua'1s and there were also occasions when some of these l individuals would not attend the meetings at all. SHAFFER explained that an agsnda was prepared for these meetings in advance by himself. He said that he prepared this agenda by contacting or being contacted by the various L department heads who would advise him of what topics they wished to discuss at th? staff meeting. He said this agenda would then be prepared and distributed to the attendees and the items would be discussed in their order by the various department heads. He said MILLER also provided agenda items for this meeting. SHAFFER said at the conclusion of covering the items on the agenda they would also have a "around the table discussion" regarding any other items of interest. SHAFFER said that there were no formal minutes recorded of these meetings nor any type of sunenary, formal or infonnal, prepared subsequent to the meeting to document what discussions were held or what if'any decisions were made. He ] l stated that to his recollection these agendas were filed in the station superintendents files. He said any notes that were taken would have been

    " scribble" type notes that were put on the agenda as various topics were discussed and would be very limited in detail. SHAFFER also stated that while he attended these staff meetings he had no recollection of any discussions concerning problems being experienced with the Unit 2 leak rate test sur-veillance procedure. He also stated that he was aware of no similar dis-        >

cussiens regarding any similar problems being experienced at Unit I regarding the surveillance p*ocedure. He also stated that irrespective o# the procedure, he did not recall there being ary discussions or concerns being stated that indicated there was any type of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage problems at either Unit 1 or Unit 2. SHAFFER clarified at this point that he was not a licensed individual and had no personal er technical knowledge of the actual perfonnance of the leak rate test surveillance procedure or nf it's requirements. He specifically denied that he recalled having any discussions with Gary MILLER which would indicate that MILLER was aware of or concerned about problems with RCS leakage or the RCS leak rate test procedure at either TNI Units 1 or 2. (2)

1-83-010 In response to questions about any other meetings attended by MILLER, SHAFFER - stated that he had no recollection of there being any formal meetings between

 . Gary MILLER and Jack HERBEIN. He stated that he was aware that MILLER and HERBEIN spoke frequently in telephone conversations but he was not a party to th se telephone calls and he did not know what the discussions were. He said' it was.his understanding that these topics usually centered on the day to day plant status. He also stated that he had no knowledge of MILLER routinely                          '

talking to GPUN President, Robert ARN0LD, about the plant status including any problems with the RCS leak rate test for TMI Unit 1 or 2. He conjectured that he would have known if MILLER and ARNOLD were meeting or talking on a routine basis and for this reason he said that he did not believe that this was-occurring. i SHAFFER did deny that he had any personal knowledge of operators at either TMI-1 or TMI-2 attempting to manipulate the RCS leak rate test results by the addition of hydrogen or water to the makeup tank during the test. Further he stated that he did not recall any discussions or concerns raised by MILLER, HERBEIN or other managers which would indicate that they were knowledgeable with respect to the what the operators were actually doing to get good leak i rate test results. SHAFFER also stated that MILLER had an open door policy during his tenure at the plant end that he would talk to any individual who .j felt he had a concern and who wanted to discuss any problems that he was having with the way the plant was being run. SHAFFER said that in this regard he did not recall any particular individual going to MILLER to discuss any particular individual problems.

 .SHAFFER went on to explain that in terms of the management reperting chain at TPI, Gary MILLEP at one tire reported te Fr. Lawreece LAWYER wtc was the Manager of Generation Operations for both fossil and nuclear plants, Pe said during the early to mid part of 1978 LAWYER's responsibilities were changed to
  .only fossil plants and MILLER tock over the duties for all nuclear operations.

He said from that time on MILLER then reported directly to HERBEIN regarding TMI matters. p .SHAFFER went on to state that he had no recollection of being involved in the drafting of any memorandums or instructions to plant personnel regarding the RCS leakage procedure or any recommendations or indications that a problem had i I (3)

1-83-010

 .been. identified at that level. SHAFFER stated that he was not personally aware of the fact that leak rate test results were being thrown away and has no knowledge of as to whether or not Gary MILLER or any other plant supervisors were aware of the fact that leak rate test results were being thrown away. He said he^had no recollection of overhearing any discussions among the plant managers regarding this particular topic.

SHAFFER stated that he could not recall any particular discussions that took place between plant management in any of the staff meetings or daily meetings regarding particular problems with RCS leakage at TNI- 1 or TMI-2. He stated that he does recall hearing general conversations among various engineers that l TM1-2 was going to be brought down for repairs as soon as TMI-1 came back on line from the refueling outage. He said that he only recalled this as a general topic of discussion among plant personnel and he had no specific knowledge as to what the reasons were for the plans to bring the Unit down af2er Unit-1 was back on line. SHAFFER denied having any knowledge relative to the initiation and review of Temporary Change Notice (TCN) 2-19-070 regarding a change in the calculation me2hodoly for RCS leakage. SHAFFER also denied any knowledge of Licensee Event Report (LER) 78-62/IP, regarding a technical specification violation ccreerning RCS unidentified leakages and any knowledge of management decisions or actions taken in response to it. SHAFFER concluded by denyinc that he had any knowledge of alleged falsification at TF1 Unit 1 or 2 ard denied having any information or knowledge as to whether plant or corporate management were aware of the alleged fe'sification. The interview then concluded at 11:05 AM. This interview was recorded from the investigator's notes at 4:00 PM on November

 , 16, 1983.

Reported by: - O. M R' ! " ' E. K. Christopher, Director Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I (4)

SIEGLITZ, RICHARD 1/4/83 Excerpts from B & W Transcript l l l i l l l i 1

4 th t1 57@ 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  !

   ~7{

2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK I

                     --------------------------------------x h                 3
                    -GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, 4   JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY and 5   PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, 6                              Plaintiffs, f          7              v.

80 civil 1683 (R I 8 THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and I J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC.,

         ,      9 Defendants.

10

                     --------------------------------------x 11 January 4, 1983 12 10:15 a.m.

13 14 - - -

             ,15                  (Trial resumed.,)
            /

16 R I CH A R D S I E GL I T Z, resumed. 17 MR. SELTZER: Your Honor, I just have two or 18 three more questions. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 THE CLERK: You are still under oath, sir. 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 22 BY MR. SELTZER: 23 Q. Mr. Sieglitz, in the examination of Mr. 24 Frederick, counsel for B & W showed Mr. Frederick two Log 2f entries for some testing that was being done on the pilot g

jbp t2 Sioglitz-cross 5774 1 good seat.

   '2                           9.      You don't have any knowledge that B & W was 3              involved in that request?

4 A. That I don't recall. 5 9. When you prepared the work request procedure, I 6 take it you would have at the time' read th'e problem report 7 which initiated the request? i 1 l 8 A. I may or may not have. A job ticket.would have i 9 been written identifying probably that this was required 10 and this document itself does not in and of itself initiate I 11 work to be accomplished. 12 Q. You are speaking of the problem report itself? I 13 A. The problem report itself, yes. 14 Q. But in any event you were aware, during October 15 1977, were you not, that the PORV et TMI-2 had been tested 16 and had failed the Leak rate test, whether you read it on i 17 this particular document or whether you had heard about it 18 through some other channels, at the time you approved that 19 work procedure, you were aware that upon its reinstallation 20 at TMI-2 the valve had failed a leak rate test? 21 A. I don't know about reinstallation but I know the 22 valve in place in installation had a leak and maintenance 23 was requested to repair the Leakage. 24 j r i Q. Did you know as reflected on B& W Exhibit 4033 25 the manner in which the Leakage was tested was manipulation

th t3 Sieglitz - cross 5809 1 run into operating procedures. Operations runs into ) 2 procedures which has temperature Limitations. 3 Q. Without knowing the specific procedure, you knew 4 generally speaking that those tailpipe temperatures were 5 supposed to be down in the 130-degree or below range, is 6 that right? 7 A. I know that when we tooked at our leak rate and 8 we didn't have a leak rate and we had 180-degree 9 temperatures, that this we felt to be normal. 1 10 e. Yhat wasn't my question. My question was, you 11 knew in the fall of 1978 that the temperature that you were 12 supposed to be seeing according to procedures, 13 specifications or whatever, the temperature that at least 14 the writings indicated you were going to see in that 15 tailpipe would be down around 130 degrees or so, isn't that 16 true? 17 A. No, because in the fall of 1978 I wasn't 18 specificalLy looking for a specific temperature up on top 19 of the pressurizer. 20 e. You had no idea in the fall of 1978 what the 21 TMI-2 procedure, specifications, limits and precautions, 22 whatever you want to call them, what the various writings 23 about the plant -- what those writings indicated should be 24 the normal temperature for the PORV tailpipe temperature,

                                                        , v' 25       thermocouple?
                                                                                ,-           ,. ,.    .. c. .

thft3 Sieglitz - cross 5810 l 1 A. No, because that was not my job. Maintenance's ' 2 responsibility is to repair and keep operable in monitoring 3 the parameters of the plant, an operations function. 4 e. Did you know at that time what the symptoms of a 5 Leaking PORV were? 6 A. Yes. 7 e. Was one of the symptoms an elevated temperature 8 in the discharge pipe? i 9 A. That's a symptom of Leakage off of any of the 10 valves in the RC system into the drain tank, yes. 11 e. So you knew in the fall of 1978 that an elevated 12 temperature was a symptom of a leaking PORV? 13 A. One of many symptoms, yes. 1 14 e. When I say elevated, what was your understanding 15 of what an elevated temperature was in the fall of 1978? 16 A. You just can't use one symptom by itself. If l 17 you have -- 18 THE COURT: Please, stick with his question. 19 Read it back. 20 (Record read.) 21 A. In the fall of '78 I was not involved in that , 1 [ 22 thought process. I first became aware and started looking ) l 23 into detail in the beginning of February of '79. i 24 e. In the fall of '78 did you have any i i 25 # understanding of what the symptoms were for a leaking PORV g e. ,, P. 7 - s ,y.% gea e*( ri s _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ E

th t3 siectitz'- cross 5811 ' 1 or did you not learn that until February 19797 2 A. Any leaking valve wilL have certain sympt'oss, 3 yes, and one of them -- 4 e. In the fall of '78 you knew that one of the 5 symptoms for a leaking PORV was an elevated temperature in 6- the discharge pipe? . 7 A. That would be a symptom, yes. 8 4. Now alL I am trying to get at, Mr. Sieglitz, is, 9 at the time you thought that, what was in your mind as to. 10 what an elevated temperature would be? l 11 A. Here again, it depends where the component is, ' 12 based on the thought process I explained yesterday. 13 e. Isn't it true that during the f alL of 1978 . 14 temperatures that were seen on the PORV discharge pipe wero 15 substantialLy higher than 130 degrees? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Did you ever make any effort to go and ask 18 anybody who did know about the procedures or the 19 specifications, " Hey, is this normal? Is this what the 20 procedures and specifications say we are supposed to have?'2 21 Did you ever do anything like that? 22 A. Nn, I did not, because there was no leak rate 23 that was being monitored back to that area. 1 I

          !  24                               e. Excuse me?
        /                      j r i

25 A. You are looking -- like I said before --

l l l th t3 Sieglitz - cross 5812 l 1 THE COURT: He said there was no leak rate being 2 monitored back to that area. 3 Q. Let me perhaps show you Exhibit 4009, which is 4 similar to one that Mr. Seltzer used with you. I want to 5 use this one because I am more familiar with it. This is a  ! 6 summary of temperatures seen during the period December 1, , 1 7 1978 through January 15, 1979 which we have taken from the 8 daily plant status sheets, or whatever they are called. 9 They have been marked as Exhibit 4009-A, I believe. You 10 had some of them which you used with Mr. Seltzer yesterday. 11 WilL you take a look at that exhibit and in 12 particular the temperatures shown for the PORV. Do you see 13 that? 14 A. Yes, I do. l l 15 Q. You note that the temperatures there range from i 16 a Low, I believe, of 176 on December 1 to a high of 187.5 { l i 17 which occurs on January 3, 1979, and that in general most 18 of the temperatures are in the range of 180 to 185 degrees 19 during that period? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. In fact, during that entire period there are 22 only two temperatures that are below 180 degrees, isn't l t 23 that right? s I see three right off the bat, but in that f (. 24 A. 4 ,g ' l 25 magnitude. _ _ _ ______-_ - - _ _ _ D

th t3 Sieglitz - cross 5813 1 e. ALL right, three. December 1, December 18 and 2 December 19 when they were at 176 degrees. 3 A. And the 29th and the 30th -- l 4 e. ALL right, we wiLL add those in. One at about 5 160 and one at 1777 6 A. Yes. 7 e. Other than those,.att the rest are 180 degrees l 8 or above, is that right? 9 A. That's correct. 10 e. During that period, December 1 through January 11 15, did you take a Look at what the code safeties were 12 showing as far as the temperature in the discharge pipe l 13 Leading away from those valves? 14 Take a look at code A, for instance. Subject to 15 being corrected again, I believe with perhaps three 16 exceptions, as I count them, they are atL below 120 degrees 17 for that period, isn't that right? 18 A. For the most part they are in that range, yes. 19 I am not counting them. 20 e. Take a Look at code B. Again, subject to being 21 caught on my addition here, I believe that they are aLL 22 below 120 degrees, with four exceptions. 23 A. Yes, they are basically in that range. j 24 Q. Let me ask you this. During that period of time, 25 December 1 through January 15, you were supervisor of

i l Lh-t3 Sieglitz - cross 5815 l

i c

1 weeks, isn't that right? December 1 through January 15. 2 A. Yes. 3 e. And on or about January 15 or the next day, I 4 don't have the exact date, the plant was shut-down, isn't 5 that right? i 1 6 A. That's correct.

   -7          e. So there were no more temperatures for the rest 8   of January?                                                                                                                      q i

9 A. That is correct. 10 e. At any point when you were seeing-the daily togs J 11 showing these temperatures as they are outlined here, did i 12 you ask anyone, "Is 180 degrees or 185 degrees a normal 13 temperature for the PORV? Is that what the procedures say 14 we are supposed to see on that discharge pipe?" Or 15 anything to that effect. l 16 A. No, I did not ask anyone. 17 Q. And you didn't have any knowledge at that time 18 as to what the procedures said? 19 MR. SELTZER: Your Honor, hasn't this been asked l 20 and answered twice already in the cross examination? 21 THE COURT: I will permit it. _ Go ahead, you may 22 answer.

 . 23            A. I hed no reason to read the operating procedures.

24 Q. You didn't hear anybody at any of these meetings 25 even discuss the issue, did you? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER 5. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791 1020

th t3 Sieglitz - cross 5816 1 A. No, because there was no increased leak rate.

 '-     2        e. The answer to my question is, you didn't hear 3  anybody discuss it?

4 A. No. 5 e. There was no discussion at that time of any 6 theories by which the PORV temperature might be -- that 7 sight explain the higher temperature for the FORV than the 8 code safeties, is that right? 9 A. I don't recall any, no. 10 Q. People in fact just said nothing about it, so 11 far as you are able to recall today? 12 A. As far as I can recall, no, there was no 13 discussion because there was no Leak rate. 14 Q. Let ut shift for a moment before we come back to 15 the PORV to the code safeties -- 16 THE COURT: See, what Mr. Wise is asking you is, 17 anywhere -- I am not quite clear on whether you go to these 18 meetings twice a week or every day. 19 THE WITNESS: Every day. 20 THE COURT: Every day, okay. Nowhere in the 21 course of six weeks while you are sitting there did -- you 22 say nobody said, "Look, the PORV is running high, but we 23 have got the leak within acceptable limits?" Did nobody

    --  24  say that at any time at any meeting over six entire weeks?

I 25 THE WITNESS: I do not recall anyone saying that f SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.5 COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YOR.K. N.Y. - 791-1020 l

i th t3 Sieglitz - cross 5817 i l , 1 THE COURT: Becau;e if you are saying you are l l 2 within the Leak rates so you didn't have a problem, 3 somebody might very well have said, "WeLL, the thing is 4 high, but we don't have a problem because we are within the 5 teak rates," because you don't get to considering the Leak 6 rates unless you art considering whether the thing is high. 7 You are saying to me nobody ever mentioned that 8 the PORV is high but the Leak rate is okay so don't worry 9 about it? Nobody ever said that? 10 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 11 THE COURT: Is it possible somebody said it and 12 you don't recall it? 13 THE WITNESS: It is possible, but I don't recall 14 it. 95 THE COURT: Go' ahead, counsel. 16 THE WITNESS: If I ma y, your Honor, the point I 17 was trying tot make, one symptom by itself does not -- 18 THE COURT: No, I understand. But this l 19 gentleman has been asking you for about four or five 1 20 minutes as to whether you knew that this temperature was 21 higher than normal. It might have occurred over six weeks 22 of going to these meetings where you say you didn't pay any l 23 attention to the temperature because the Leak rate was l-24 acceptable, that somebody might have therefore gone at this 25 from the other end and said "we can accept the higher i SOUTHERN DISTRICT KIPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y. - 1931020

                                                                                -----------------------_a

T i [3. ~ < ( L Lh't3 Sieglitz - cross 5818 L 1 temperature because the Leak rate is normal." l- 2 THE WITNESS: I don't recall.

                   <,                                 s .

i- 3 - THE COURT: That's something that in the great 1 n J .{% .;, 4 scheme of this world might very logically have happened. 3

                                      $?   You are saying it didn't happen.                  You don't recall it
h. 16 happening?

b 's 7 THE WITNESS: That I do not rec;s t L happening. 8 BY MR. WISE: i, ' We wilL come back to the PCRV temperatures in a 9 .. Q. 10 second, but let me shif t-f or a moment to the code safeties. 11 You testified on your direct, I betieveg that 12 pose time after the plant started"up again on the 1st of s ,3 s 13 February or the end of January it-vet noticed that the 4 14 temperatures on the code safeties were aizo elevated, is i 15 that right? That came to your attention? r 1 16 A. On the 1st of February, yes. 1 17 Q. At that time consddoration was given to whether' 18 there was a leak past the code' safeties, is that right? 19 A. Yes.

                               . 20            Q.      It is correct, isn't it, on this pressurizer i                                                                                    .

21 schematic that we have drawn or had someone draw there is a

                                                                                              ~

22 so-celled loop seat on the line.that Leads from the top of

                           ,         23       the pressurizer to the code safety valve?

24 A. That is-correct.

  ,       I 25            Q.      And normalLy I take it there would be water in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U1 col'RTHOUSE FOLEY $QUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y. - Tnl020

Lh t3 Sieglitz - cross 5819 l-l 1 this Loop seat? l 2 A. 'Yes. i 3 e. And that is supposed to provide a barrier 4 between the steam that is rising up through the piping in 1 5 -the pressurizer and the code safety valve?  ;

                                                                                                                   )

6 A. It would, yes. 7 4. So that normalLy there would be steam at the 1 8 interface of the lefthand side of the Loop seat as we have f 9 drawn it on this particular diagram -- there would be steam i 10 interfacing with the water there? i 11 A. That's correct. j l 12 Q. And then there would be water in the Loop seal 13 up to the code safety valve? Would there be a little space l 14 in there, or something? 1 15 A. Depending on how high they fitled it, it could 16 be up to it or just below it, I guess, yes. 17 Q. 'During a shutdown is it correct that this Loop 18 seal may be Lost? l 1 19 A. Could be Lost? I 20 Q. May be lost. Is that something that may happen l 21 during a shutdown? 22 A. If you do something to the system, if you blos-23 down the Lines, you might, yes. 24 Q. Do you know whether during the shutdown that 25 occurred from mid-January to the end of January -- if in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y. - 7'el.1020

Lh t3: Sieglitz - cross 5822 1 PORV running in the 180's and you come out of it with the

           )     2      PORV runn'ing closer to 190, which is not much of a change, 3       Some change, but not much.

4 You.go into it, curiously enough, with the code 5 safeties-running, give or take, 110 to 120, 105, 110, 120,-

               ' 6. you come out of a two-week shutdown and th,ey are running a
               .7       Little under'200 day in and day out.

One would have 8 thought that after the shutdown you would have had more 9 efficient operation than going into it. 10 But, in any event, didn't anybody in these 11 morning meetings start saying along about February 3, 4, 5, 12 6, let's get up to the 20th, "How come we had code saf eties:

      ~~

13 that were running 115 before we shut down and now they are 14 running 205, 195, 188?" Did anybody say that at any of 15 those daily meetings? 16 THE WITNESS: We looked at the temperature and 17 also our identified Leak rate was up, and at the time to us 18 it was apparent that because of the increased leak rate, 19 which is a symptom, and the temperature increase, which is 20 another symptom, that the two related one to one. Because 21 you had Leakage, you would have an elevated temperature. 22 THE COURT: Bu+ is there any question as to why 23 you had apparently lower temperatures and no leak before i i 24 the shutdown -- you should alL of a sudden after the a , e' 25 shutdown have higher temperatures and a leak? Was that the

th-t5. Sioglitz - cross 5864 t i i maintenance at TMI-2 had himself been a supervisor of 2 maintenance at TMI-2, isn't that right? 3 A. That's correct. 4 4. Did you keep Mr. Shovlin advised of what was 5 going on at TMI-27 i 6 A. From time to time, yes. 7 Q. Let me show you an excerpt which we will mark as t 8 8 & W 4043 from the deposition of Mr. Shovlin taken in this 9 case earlier this year. Would you look at the first page 10 of the exhibit, which is page 149 of the transcript. Look l

                                                                                                            \

11 at line 4 there. 1 12 "Q. Did your maintenance department have any 13 responsibility for identification of leakage from the 14 reactor coolant system during power operation? 15 "A. No. 16 "Q. Was it ever brought to your attention 17 before the accident at the end of March 1979 that there had l 18 been an increase in the unidentified leakage at TMI-2? 1 19 "A. No." 20 Looking over at page 150, the following page, 21 Line 8: 22 "Q. I am speaking about events that occurred l i l l 23 in January 1979 through the end of March 1979. You don't 24 recall anything during that time frame? 25 "A. No.

                                                            -------------m-      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

jbp t6 Sioglitz-rodirect 5896 1 , THE COURT: Let's just hang on and see what thG 2 next question is. - 3 ALL right. 4 Q. After you had sent it along tc engineering, did 5 anybody discuss with you whether this communication from 6 Dresser indicated that there was a defect in the original 7 valve? 8 THE COURT: Sustained. 9 MR. WISE: Objection. 10 THE COURT: Sustained. 11 Q. You were being asked on cross-examination about 12 why you didn't conclude that the 180 degree temperature in

 !  13    the discharge Line behind the PORV indicated leakage and 14    you testified on cross-examination "There was no leak rate 15    being monitored back to that area".

16 What did you mean by that? 17 A. What I meant to say is that we had no identified 18 Leakage from the PORV based on leak rate calculated -- 19 identified Leak rate in addition to an elevated temperature. 20 The elevated temperature was there for some time 21 but the Leak rate also during the same time was, for atL 22 practical purposes, negligible. Therefore, we concluded 23 that we had no leakage from the PORV.

  ,  24         Q. Counsel for B &W showed you some daily plant 25 /4'tatus reports for mid April, from April 10 through April
                             $OU TH:?. N DISTRICT RTPORTFPt If.5. CotJRTHOUSE
                               ,                . v.   ,;          v  -

th t7 Sieglitz - rocross 5908 1 PORV, would it not? 2 A. It would. When the valve stopped cycling, 3 though, it would not maintain the temperature at that 4 height. 5 Q. You also said in respect to a question that Mr. 6 Seltzer just asked you that the Leak rate for identified 7 Leakage during the fall of 1978-early 1979'was, and I think 8 I copied your word as you said it, negligible. 9 It is a fact, isn't it, Mr. Sieglitz, that 10 during the fall of 1978 and early 1979 up to the January 15 11 outage there was identified Leakage at TMI-27 12 A. Oh, yes. 13 Q. And some of that Leakage was coming from the top l 14 of the pressurizer, isn't that right? 15 A. We first felt that we had the leakage from the 16 top of the pressurizer on February 2 when it was first 17 brought to my attention. 18 Q. No, that's not my question. Before February, 1 19 you agree with me that during the fall of 1978 and the i 20 earty part of 1979 up to this January 15 outage, you agree 21 with me that there was identified Leakage at TMI-2? 22 A. I agree there was Leakage, yes. l 23 Q. And you have no way of saying to this Court 24 today that that Leakage could not have been coming from the 25 ,, top of the pressurizer? l l $OUTHERN Di$TRICT REPORTF Rt U S. COURTHOUSE

                               ,, , s. . .

me y 3.- ey _ n . , t, 1

I l l 1 l SIEGLITZ, RICHARD 2/15/85 Stier Investigation i i I l __________O

                  ~ IN RE:   TMI II LEAK RATE TEST PRACTICES DEPOSITION OF RICHARD EDWARD SIEGLITZ 4

eea

                                                                                                                                           -i
                      . Verbatim transcript of deposition j

held.at Trailer 110B, Three Mile  ! Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania,  ! on Friday, February 15, 1985 10:00 a.m. l eae , t APPEARANCES: l EDWIN H. STIER, ESQUIRE 333 Littleton Road Suite 102 j j Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 BY: ROBERT T. WINTER, ESQUIRE  ; For - OPU Nuclear - KILLIAN 4 GEPHART 216-218 Pine Street  ;

                                                                                                                                                    .i Post Office Box 886                                                                                                                    j l   Harrisburg, Pennsylvania              17108 l

l BY: SMITH B. OEPHART, ESQUIRE i And JANE 0. PENNY, ESQUIRE 4 i ' For - Richard Edward Sieglitz  ! l l CAPITAt CW REPCRTING SEfNICE

                            !y:- c,* v v FL W atL'cx ts? 5'tur?.

HI M SS PC. FA 17tri J TE'.FMfJE 233 Sala , I - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i 1  ; I 2 ( l I

j. MR. WINTER: - My name is Bob Winter. I have been retained by GPU and I am working with Ed Stier on an ,

independent investigation. The company'has requested us to i i i look at the practices and examine the leak rate practices in Unit 2, in 1978 and 1979. t My questions today will pertain to your know]cdc.c of those prnetices and relevant issuen that relnt<; to actlyitien of the Dperationc Department durdnc that r 7tiod of tin;e. HICliARD EDWARD SIEGLITZ. 1n"inr tmen rhely a trn, wan enlled na a witness and l [ tectified an follown: c l

   ',                                         DIRECT EXAMINATION l                       .

LY MR. WIllT) li: I O Would you give your full name for the i record? A Richard Edward Sieglitz. l

                                 'O  In 1978 and 1979. up until the accident,                                   l what war. your pocition at TMI?

l , A 1 Imlieve at that time. I wnn Superricor i I

         } o f flu.intenance .      There were several title chances in there.

1 b o n ,'n m n ti v tab at 1, your nonitian? l l r./Pil" Tm/ tTrn? TING SEINICE l  %  % g i

                                                         +
                                                             ..s 4

i i 3 A Manager of Plant Maintenance. r' Q- Would you tell me what changes occurred , during 1978 and 1979_with your. position, and what responci-bilitics each of those changes entailed? A From Supervisor of Maintenance, I was f- -nromoted to Corrective Maintenance Manager. Most of that war nromotion'. jn order of nromotion. 1 i , An Corrective Maintenance Manager, I wan frenponniblefor.repairsofeauipmentinutility,electrica).

         .V i    i. I and C and mechanical areas.

l- 'l<ollowing that, I wa.s Manager of Plant Maint.cinnr< , wh1 ci? toch place in August of 1983, at vnich point I was also respencibic for the administrative portion b D c r the denartment .

         .t

[ Q What were your responsibilities in Januar.7

          'l of 19797 A     I was Sunervisor of Corrective Maintenr w.

li

            ' nnd 1 had thono Tour disciplines I ,just mentioned.                                                                                          They werr:

reportinr: to me through some supervisors in that particular area. As problems in the plant were identified as needing work, I would coordinate the work activities with Operationa and with other goings-on in the plant in order to get the work nchedulto crepared. ) , } l 0 DJ'i Mr. McGarry report to you? f I

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4 John was responsible'for the mechanical  ; i maintenance activities in the department. He had the.re- l sponsibility for that fourth of the department. i Q When you say mechanical, what does that i enta13 7.

   !                                 A       Basically, it would consist of- machini r'

[ t ype wori . whr.t. might be considered millwright worl:, pipe; r i t,1. c r 1.y po wo rl' . weldinr,, that type of work. t' llow would you supervise thit sncai fLic

        ,,ren?

i J /L The snncific area was pretty much under i o ! 1 i .l .lo n 1 : 11:o Meantiy, who would handle the technten! r nnnecta, of i' I unn in an overview situation, coordina t f rr-b f i he 1v " r. , , u n d t.b, t. type of thing. C Who in Dan Shovlin?

                                     /       Dan had overall responsibility at                               TMI.
    ; He handled the Unit 2 side.

I

    ;                                Q       If you can recall, what would your day-te-i i
    ' day activities be?                        How would you conduct your day-to-day
       .activitics?

I A. Well, we would have a Plan of the Day meetine, a meeting of different departments, looking at dir-Terent activities, different needs that had come up to plan our activition along with other groups activities no we didn't., E l CNRL CITY 9ERDRTING SEfMCE

                                                 ..,,       e t : , . rw #::., j ,                                  ,

i,/. % D i/ OiDe l i  !!:F40rJ 233-3914

l 1 4 5 l-l have conflicts in the schedule. We would receive job tickets, , which were a means of identifying items in need of repair. , We would review those, some would be re d wed at the Plan of i i i the Day. Priorities would be set, for example. 1 Q You would attend the POD meetings? j A Usually. l l Q Would you describe what the purpose of the TOD vmn? ' A There were several purposes, one of wh1ch

          ' wan.the evne I won really concerned:with and the main reason il1 wcn thare.jr that an problems were identified, they would
          . be brourL' u t,     nW discu.med there, saying that thin was n prob 1cm and hon we.found the problem in some caron.                    Sched"-

I j linc or "c L i ni. i wan discunned. There mir,ht be discunn$cn-I

          ' of survei))nnom t hat might be coming up, as a reminder that thjn war duc, r u ri that type of thing, and any other general information that needed to be disseminated.                                                      l f

Q Do you recall discussions of leak rate , tests at POD meetings? A Yes. Q Could you tell me about those discussions? What do you recal) of the content of the discussions con-cerninn Icak rate tests? i A 1,cak rntec were one of many rur"e111 onces i l l [ AIT!/d )(, IY hNilI. 7 kb!

                                            -.. , u . p:.; g r z 5 S'p otJ j                                      nm,een t - n, w i' mt.                                j i-u .- : m u                                           1
                                                              - --          - - - - - - - ~   - ~ ~ - ~ ~ -

i

                                                                                                               ,i 6

8 3 1 that were run. ( Here again, I was interested in my own , area. I' heard things-that were going on, but didn't pay l i attention to everything. I know if you didn't have a good l J i r leak rate, there were certain actions that had to be taken.

  • I don't recall specifically on one occasion having anyone cay thic, that or the other thing, but that was an item or
   ;  dincnnnion at the meetinr,s.

i [ Q You just indicated you know when you I i didn't have a r, cod leak rate, there were specific thinr,c th M had to take pince. I assume that is the kind of discussion

   ; that occurred nt the POD meetings?

A It did. If you had leak rate, was it Jdentifled leakar.e or nonidentified leakage. I f it wa s i j l- not idc u t.l f t ed , 1:ow can you determine where it wan comf or I

 ;    f re:-

i O Do you know if whether a good leak rete wan obtained o" not obtained was kept track of at the POP l meetings? A They would have had to have good leak rates within the parameter of the tech spec. If you didn't there was a tech spec action that had to be followed up with. 1 If there were problems, they would be discussed to see whet mirht ha needed to help out. 0 1 e snocif'ically talkinc, about reecto-aqi. . cn QEOWING SE7/CE g / t;t ~. j /

  • f
  • T 1 l 'll ' ~ If

1 l 7 l g I coolant leakage. I know there are leak rate tests for other , areas-of the plant. What I am asking you about is reactor i coolant leakage. Is that what you are referring to? A Yes. , Q Who conducted these meetings? Who kept  ! the agenda and more or less controlled the meeting? i

   ;                      A      The Operations Department generally led t h' i                  ]t usunlly would be like the Suoervisor of Opere-
   ! noctinr.

tinne. T r he unn not. nround , generally the Shi f t Supervise r l or the :'h t. f t, Foi eman . Sometimes it was Mr. Locan. llo waa l l the Pinnt Superint.endent. It was basically an Oncrations

   ; w:! i u; . idth luvut Trora the other departments.

0 T T you can recall, in January of 1979, whn i would hnve bor n invr? ved in thJ s croup? l l A Do you mean by name?

    ,                     0      Yes.

A Jim Floyd would have been. The shift fore-men or shift supervisors. They were on a rotating basis, and they would have changed depending on what week it wac, whoever wac on daylight that week. I don't remember all of the namec. They changed so many timcc. I would be generally there from Maintenance. Sometimes Lee Rogers would be there. l Denendinr: on whnf. unn coinr, on in the plant, he would stop l lincometime.n. , I l AJ p. rlw nrrncT4 l^ G7 m^F

                                                           . .(.

ar ;9 f*' ' j i 6 _-.-___._-___.--_-.--__w

i 8 h Q' Do you recall Gary Miller being present at POD meetings in January of119797  ! I A I. don't recall.  : Did I say the Plant Superintendent, Joe-LoF;an . lie would be there. In most. cases we usually had an

                     ,        engineering ienvenentat.tve alno.

O So, you do not recall that Gary Miller we I t re::.c nt cr would have been nronent? A Unry unually was not Dresent. no. liern n erd u , Jt'unnn't a set individual. It usually worked out ' '-

                              !" "         et i n cl i c t ri t a l , b u t           r-      lone an there wan renres ent.n'. 5 em i

I- c,.,,.- ..c.,. ,p n . . a . ,, g t . t h ' <muld addrer., the itenn of w,'

                        , thnt vcor det ~' I'1ent uns responsible for, that was the P ty i 1. wo rk mi .

0 ln a short while, I am roint te show you nome l'DI' mi nuto: . There in handwriting on them. I call the~ l

                                 ,1 r o h :  .       Tlu y nore,nr to be an acenda, and there in hane!.
                        ! writ ini on them.

Who, in your mind, having attended thone , i meetin.~n uou]d be rennonsible for making those handwritten l ninuter? A 3$te Oncrationn ran the meeting, a", d v "-

                          )

i more or lenn nrnvided inuut. Either Floyd or the Shift

                               'ma
                                                ,       . .,               h ,..' :: '-

t h , c e- ntnu+-r, n.3 t h e n e h n.n n h 1

                            !                                                                                                                              i
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                                                                                           . . - . ., n -.                                                  ,

L._i_J_i_________._

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I I

9 l:  : u ., m. . percon who went to that meeting had our own copy there too,

                                                               .                                                                                                                      ..                    I
                                                      .and we. wrote our own notes'that were pertinent to us                                                                                  that you may want'to bring back to.the depa tment.

Q Do you recall'any discussions about pro-l- blems in performing the maintenance procedures because of the di ffi cttity in cet tinr, F. cod lenk rates? j

j. A No.

O Ilow would , if at all, the Maintenance ro-l part ru. n1 F.et involved in evaluating reactor coolant 3cakagr? A Operations in the course of operating the-1

                                                   ;.pinnt performed chift and daily inspections.                                                                                    In the course of thei r tou rr. . i f th"v i dentified any problems , they would i
                                                   ! cali down, depenoltig on who the individual was.                                                                                    In rome
                                                   ; carca, they r.mv have uanled to come back and get sancone i

clno uho har n.c)J lulouledr.c in that particular area and thr-

                                                   , would come becl: to un on occasion and say they have this i

l tyne cf a prrblem, and can we send someone down to look at 1* l and givc us an opinion on the problem, that kind of thine. Q Did Maintenance get involved in evaluatinc t.he cuanti ty of J eakage? l. A Usually not. Usually it was handled direct-- ly wi thin Onorati orm . 11 0 may have been asked to aarena cor,m. I thinc or to help them make come sort of a decision. l

                                                   ,                   e   nni er u,              orenoce. n n - t v o u c , .,
                                                   !                                                                                                                                                                l 4 , p , , r n; 1   otm,.ryerg                                                                                                      j
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                                                                                                                    .i' 10 1

recall, for Maintenance to look at a leak? j A The first thing would be to take a look. l  ! i Is it something you can fix right now. Identify the kind of  ; leak it is. If it is something you can't fix right now, .

                                -when could'you fix it. What kind of condition would the plant I have to be in, in order to fix it.                                                                I We would check the warehou: > to see i f we had t he partc we might need or even order the parts we mi rh' tmed, ir it was something not in stock.                       Any obstacle that mirbt be in the uny that would make it harder to f1r.

Thnce are the kinds of things we would look ut. O Would Maintenance offer opinions ac to l whether or nrt th^ plant was safe to operate or whether er i int t v nroq ] cola r instrument war. safe to operate? A Yen. We could, and we did on occasion, if i I j it wan redour. y Do you recall ever gettinr: 4.nvolved in l l discussions with Operations and other plant supervisory people about whether or not the plant shon1d shut down? A I don't recall specifically ever being l asked point-blank should we shut down the plant because of this or that. In reneral, at POD these kind of things would i be dincunsed. Operations had heavy input as to what they i j I, felt. Many times if we were asked. we would be asked do su i I c,miti C'TY RERDRT!NG SEr// ICE l v v= :, a, _,q , . m m *.; :;5v.r:3: L 1l* - M !.'  ?.0 Jf14

1 l 11 think the component would hold up? It would be from an i I equipment type of. standpoint.

                                     -Q    Ifpeop.leyouwerNNukervisingbelieved after an examination'of plant conditions that the plant wan                          i unsafe to operate and that it should be shut down, how would-that information. flow through your department?

A If it got to that degree of seriousness where someone felt we need to look at the operation of the i i plant, generally those individuals, whoever that mir,ht be, would go through me. l And at the POD -- In many cases, I would i take an individual to the POD on a specific problem. I  ! q would allow thone individuals to directly express their l-concerns at the POD, and in turn they would be able to re-spond to any cuestions that might be asked. Q Mr.-McGarry reported to you? l A That is correct. Q How many people, if you can recall, did he supervise at that point in time? j A It would have to be an approximation, but ', i i it was in terms of roughly two dozen. .  ! Q In your opinion, would it be the normal > { 1 4 thing for Mr. McGarry to evaluate the seriousness of a leak j l or would it have been more of a normal situation to have CAPITAL CIN PEPORTING SEfNICE  !

                                              ' W/,T C i   LE[I4 3C/O{ $?A?t N                           +

HA7G3JG L e 17106 V , K N%f ? y '3 1.d 0

I l 12 I i him assign someone to do that? ,

                                                                                     ;       I A    It could be either consideration.            He_may         I have on occasion gone to'the specific area or one of:his                         ,
                                                                                     ,      i individuals may have been assigned.                                                     l I

If Operations came to me and said: we need f' l your input or need your advice, I normally would have told i John to take.a look at the situation or'have one of his people take n.look. Q How-often would you get involved directly in evaluating.a safety problem? I A It wouldn't be all that often. Several I i time a month m&ybc.  ; Q What considerations would lead you to be- j come directly involved in it? j i A If it-was an item of that kind of concern, J, l usually the item would be discussed at the Plan of the Day. , l That would be the place where everybody would have a concern.i ~ j l How serious is serious? Is it something  ; we can live with?. If we can live with it, how long can we live with it? Wnat would be the determining factors that l would say that something has to be done right now. That l .l l typc of thing would be discussed at the Plan of the Day.

                                                                                     !         1 (Brier Recess)                                              ,       j l                                                                                              I L

CAPli AL CilY PEPO 7 TING SErNCE n n , irs .. m:n.c s.dem sTc>, HAr.chien F% 1713;

                                   % Pod 233 3*1.d                                       ,

I

l l l 13 BY MR. WINTER: Q Dick, I am going to show you a job ticket. The number is C0452. It was signed on 52/29/79, by Adainn. I ask you to look at it. Look at the description of the , i i j nroblem, and what appears to be the date, the completion date. f, and then on the lant page, it is marked " Cancel 3cd." I would like you to interpret, if you car.. for i " wb it hanpened with thic particular .iob ticket,

    ,                                         For the record, let me read the dcceript' m.

l of the rrob3cn: "RCV-133A has a body-to-bonnet leak, II p ern .u Izer level in ..

                                                         " -- and it looks like. "OI, Valve fu t runn 1 t.e . "
                                        /s    Thir. one here?

O '3 0 . [ ti Thnt. is 1450. You want me to 3cok at li S 0 ? C Y c r, . Why don't you start reading 450.

      !                                 A     450 is for RCV-133A.           The job ticket foti..

in the pieces you have given me here, there are several pare:',

      !, to this ticket                    form.       There is Page 1, Page 2, naturally l

l there are three or foui pages associated with it. I Each paFe han different information ane' is torn off at different pages in the review and approval i cycle cf the 09eksne. Thnt in why I am ]ooking at the to'.r' s ca..,<'in Ma.Wng:y?/CE

7. . ~.
     ,                                                      v.   :~.

t

                                                                                                                                              ]h        _
   .      . package.

The completion date is identified as I 3/8/79, with a sign off code of 2. .Usually 2 would mean { that the job was cancelled, or was not worked. That could be for a number of different reasons, one of which at thj., point in time there were sometimes multiple ,1ob tickets i

       ! written to do the same-task.

i

     /*                                     What would happen during the course of S.

workinc a ,1ob or in the planning stages, they would find dl's a forent documentr and, say, I have more than one. There in l I no need to orocens more than one piece of paper to do the

     " none ,ioh,                 Thnt, is one reason for cancelling.

Specifically, on here there is no reno 1"- l

1. i e n v' t i t t c n . m- I can't, tell from thir document clone wb?

i h thi n no rticebr one vmn cancelled without Icokinr; at othe" records 1 0 I would like you to look at 451 and adrjra 1 1 j l me what you can tell from that document. 1 l A This job ticket also, as in 450, says there l is a specific' valve leak, and this one is RCV-135A, a body-to-bonnet leak, pressurizer, level tap and the same Furmanite. ,

                                                                                                                                                          )

Here again, that would have been written b" l l l a Site Operations individual. Normally they would not re- )

       ! cnrmend the n'e thod for firing.                 They would just identify                                                           th.

I

,.: , n, mma.
                                                                               . . ~

i l _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________J

15 l identify that there was a problem. 'Furmanite would be a

specific way of fixing the problem. That may or may not r

E have been the reason that this was . cancelled. I don't know. L l I would have to look further. 1

    -(,

This also shows-a close-out date of l- 3/8/79, Code 2. Here again, I would have to look at other l

                            ' records to see specifically why that was cancelled.                                                 It l-doenn't nay, based on thin document-alone.
                          ,                                      O        If work was done on 12/29, due to the lnatureeftheproblemdescribed,shouldtherebeacorren-
                         ! pondjnc, RWP to,Jndicate that some kind of work was done on those valven?

I A If the individual went in under this job

                                                                                                                                                 .i i         ticket , there vould probably be an RWP to go in and innpect.

h or perform the work. MR. WINTER: Off-the-record. -l 1 l ll I (Discussion off-the-record)  ! 1 BY MR. WINTER:

                                                                                                                                                 .1
                                                         'Q         Dick, I am going to show you the POD --

again, for purposes of this deposition, I'am going to call

                                                                                                                                               -1 H

them minutes -- the POD minutes for January S. I am goinr, to ask you to look at the work item list on these minutes. l Describe for me what the purpose of thin section in. You i j' (, A:U /. nTy IMO? TIN.') SFP/ ICE

                                                                                                 ,   , m ,   -
                                                                                                                 .y S   e j'                                                                               ,.usy                                j

16 = . - - . . - . - . . . - - - - . . will note that there is handwriting at the end of the work items. There are names next to certain problem descriptions. , Some of them are crossed out 'and some of them are not. There is a short narrative at the end, which I would like you to j read and then I will ask you some questions. I

     !                                     (Handed to the witness)

A Okay. Q The work item list, what is the purpos^ h I of thatI section? h A Normally at this time frame, we were w g prohnbly P.ettinc. I would say probably in the neighborhood of rraybe a hundred job tickets a week. Obviously, not nil b i 1 D of them are on thc lirt but those of imoortance or of need- ^ C t o roother depMm^nt , for whatever reason, were generally i i denti fi ed . Here again, that was only a percentage of tha 1 4 l itein:; t ,ri wer" identified during the cource of the week. Thoue itcma would make the work list, and those were iter,n I that specifien13y Chemistry, it could have been Operationn, 1 l it could have been my own department to put those components back in service- so that we could continue doing whatever we

                                                                                                                 '^

had to do. 1 0 So, the typed portions of that list were thinrs that had been identified earlier and, of course, there I wac tirro enourh to put them on the list? , ny PEmqT iNg SEWICE

                                                                                   ,'" l gl
 .c                                                 ,
                                                                                    ~~a

l 17 i i 1-

             '                            A-    Ye ah '. If you notice, there is a typewritten l

date. The typewritten date is the date on which this iterr. was' included on the POD minutes.  ; l

                                                                                                           -          1 There is a handwritten date above that,                               i and that would have been the date of the meeting.                                                  l The reason I' notice that is because these l

nre my minutoc. They are.not official minutes. These are j

             ! my ncrsonal noten.                                                                                   -l i                                                                                                       ,

O The handwriting, on here is yours? j A Yes. 1 j Q Now, there in a name, a typed in name neYt j to f lie typed .in probicm descrlotion. What di7s that ind:1 - cate? A That would be the individual or the orr~ [ fr,ationinUndt2thathadtheresponsibilitytoresolvethe

            !.problen.                                                                                                i l-4    With reference to the last page of the                                1 l

work list, there is a series of handwritten work items? A Correct. Q With handwritten names next to it. This jc your handwriting? A Yes, it is. L O Let me refer you to the comment immediately  ! before the Jant handwritten note. I believe it says , "If l C/J1its C!riFUO7 TING SEfMCE j

r. - c: - c' . ' ^c l rr, .w
                                                              .         :n u .                                  i

surveillance out of spec, keep old sheet and prove de-f$ ciency, and not that test was missed."  : l , Do you recall what you were referring to i l 4 then? I

                                                   <A         I don't now recall what the speci finn were behind me making that note.                 I did have within the Maintenance l

l Pmnrtinant some surveillance which fell under Mainteun ine vnnnnnnihility. Mont nurveillances were performed by Oncrn-tienn, but. thorr were a few that were maintenance denendent. Normally what I would do is when the FDD

                  ! won over. I would not with each of my departments, go over 1

I any neu $tems which *!ere identifled on that day to give the I

                   .                  suncrvicorn in that area a heads up, knowing that here in
                .                     nnot her probleri ' bat it going to be coming down they rond, they may want to do some preliminary investigation, neopinc crit the ,iob . or at leant make them aware that when the .iob l

l L  ; tickct comes, it is marc important, let's say, than one of )  ! the other hundred that we get in that week. l As I mentioned earlier, sometimes there were r'eneral notes, general things that I wanted to be l disseminated and I would just take notes on here, and I

                                 .vould use that also when I sat down with my .ead foreman
                      ! or nupervicoro and would advise them of that.                              It would be I

t an informational transferral method, really. I i r AF1TM CIN REPOQTING SErMCE

                                                                   ,,.              q     -..,s l                                                                       .w<.:s:. e,.: r/ pi;4
                       !                                                'p p..   . ?33 p -

i N.

l- 3 .. ( i' i 39 ) Q So, you are not certain as to what you , were referring to, when you put down " surveillance" there?  ; l You are not certain whether it was an Operations'surve111ance l or Maintenance surveillance? l A Anything,I-wrote here,.I probably wrote for' purposes of relaying it to my people, and my people vould have been performinc maintenance surycillances.

             !                  O     So, it is most likely that that stateren' I
             ! rarcrn to a Maintenance surveillance?

I A Correct. I might add that part of that POD there q nhow, nurvej ll: tore s. The last part of that centence says.

            ;   " net that tha tent.wan missed."

i

          ,                           Whvt. was the iten of concern there jr th" i-
             , fact that you want ed to know that we in fact did do r nu
            ! vr.111ance, rath"r than say we forgot about it, or we didr-

I i nchedule it or d$dn't plan it. The concern was whether you i did one or not. That is what I wanted to empha;ize back tc my people, t Q You seem to recall then what you were rcTerring to therc? A Well, one of the purposes of the POD befor= i

            ! this war a listinc of surveillance                        and the scheduled date                                   !

l l l and a into dat e. Th$s would be none over so as to remind , l r 'r:il,v cliv pinDRilN9 SEfNIG

                                               ,...ujos                 - '
                                                  . . . . nya - t s  Tr id.8 + f/ .' / ."
      !,                                                                                             i i

i i [ 20_ .. i lind$vidualsorreminddepartmentsthatyouhaveaspecific i surve113ance that needs to be done in a certain time frame, and it was critical that you didn't miss a date. To me, that is what this would mean. Proof that the test wasn't . missed. We didn't miss it. I i i If there was a problem, obviously, you wou3d neod to go to the Control Room and let them Irnow thnt. there in:rt a problerr. b'It j ust don't say "I missed j t ," be-l ca": ' thal wnn loL the case. I o On Paco 2 of the minutes of January 5, I thern 1.n a 1irt of what appear to be test spt:c nurveillancen. > l

             ^94 rM v 9 on Ubi rl- *hav were performed, and a not-t4
                                     ,                                                t. t.n t o
        ! " ) < - t " r. " they rere performed in the absence of a notatJon or
t. hey weren't }^rfrrned.

Do you recall specific discussions et "OD l moet.in w about each one of these surveillance? i l A Usually we went down -- we being the  ;

        !                                                                                                  I collective POD group -- each item, item for item.                       It may have been just a statement, especially in the beginning when i

you have shifts and dailies, that they are being performed

          ' or that they have been performed.

l l T didn't take any minutes or any noter on l that, since that was an area I wasn't involved in and had no rrocini interrst in. I was more concerned with the CtAT/' CW r;ErcmNG SErMCE g , . ,. et

  • l' y [, * ' '(t@ j l

f 2 M ,'E M L_ _ _

23 Maintenance activities and what we were responsible for.

                                            -Q       Is it your recollection that each one of                ,

1 r those<itemsw$rediscussedatthemeeting? -

                                   ;,    1:;

J -A ' Generally, yes. t. Q I am going to show you another group of minutes'fror. 0ctober 23, 1978. . This, again, is the work I

                                                                                 ~

I item area of the minutes. I am going to ask you to look at it and let me know whether or not you recognize the handwriting?

                    !'                               (Handed to witness) i-l
                                           .A        Yes. That is also my handwriting.
;-Q Let me refer you to a note written on the p top of that- par c. I believe it says , " All -- notify SS and h i DF vhan findjn; W n or E's AS AP when found perforrtin.c cit"-

l Veillance." Above that.is written " Ops-2-021-0665." ' I i l Do you know what you were referring to when I

                    ! you wrote that?

A The number that you just read -- the Ops-2 . 1,. T 021-0665, that is not my handwriting, so I don't know what

 -.m
 <q, that is for; or who put it on, or when it was put on, but $t
    ^

i is not mine. I think it was put on sometime since. 3 1 The rest of the note though - "All - l , I notify SS.." in your shift cupervisor, "..and SF.." would ba f l l c enu. aiv penmoc, struce

                                                                                       . m ....
                                                             ,,i            "f^.   ,
                                                                                     *14  O

{ t. , 7s , , 733or.3 4 -

7 ' P, - :y 22 p - J. shift foreman - "..when finding D's or E's.."1would be deficiencies.or exceptions, as soon as possible, or " ASAP - when found performing surveillance." That would have been a generic-note that I gave to, here again, the four dis- 'I l' I ciplines that reported to me, since we did also perform surveillance. The Control Room had the responsibility 1: [ for' runniur; the plant and if anything was found to be othc1 r

          !       than what was expected, they needed to know so they could nehe any determinations as to what-further action needed to il be tal:en.

Q Do you know -- and this r,oes for the notr

                 . on January 5 n]no. Do you know whether that handwriting,and h handwe t tten not ntion applien exclusively to Maintenance er uan it, if you can recall, a discussion about all E's and (b                                                                                          !

[a D's and, ar,ain, for January 9, all surveillance, and the note you put dnun to specifically instruct your people abrW. I what they were to do when their surveillance needed an E or D application? i j-Do you understand my question? A I think I do. 1 An exception or a deficiency on a sur-veillance, it doesn't make any difference whether an cicetricien find

  • it, or a mechanic , a:10 I a) assuminr.
                                        .  .one & vt AmN; 9r.vu n: s -                               ;

o . 1 "u t!'

                                                      ""       ~4 f. j
  • f

) 23-2TI l' l-that Operations ~too, the person in charge, the shift super-vjuor or foreman'should be made aware of it as soon as nos-sible so he can make a determination if'there is a tcch rpec deficiency that needs to put us'.into an Action Statement. l L> Q Why would you have made that note? In it. , an instruction coming from someone or just something that 1' would come up in general discussion that you decided to make a note of it? A At-that point in time, I would say some-

          ,   body brought jt up in discussion -- and I don't recall the circumstances surrounding it, but it was something that
          ., nould'be app'Jierbic to my people.             As I said, I use thin ar
          ; a mechni 1nn. to imt, back to my people to make sure the com-
          , muniantien wan passed through the ranks.

i-Q So, you don't know whether it was an in-struction that this was to be done on all maintenance sur-veillances or that this is an instruction that all surveil-lancen are to have E and D's and you wrote it down because you wanted to make sure that your people knew it? { A Surveillance as a way of identifying pro-blems in with an E or a D check sheet, and that is applier.h.1r to anyone that does a surveillance. I would assume it would i address Operations'or Chemistry or anyone else who may have jnurvell)ance. l l CMHtt CRY RErOQTING SETMCE i

                                                                                                                                                  ]

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25 i l Q The note on January 5, the handwritten  : note that you made pertaining to surveillance, do you be-lieve also that that was something which came from someone I i else in conducting the meeting or at the meeting? I

                               'A   It would have'been sometding that was dis-
           , cussed at the meeting.            I generally try to take notes to keep my people up to speed and keep them out of trouble.
           !                    Q   Let me refer you to the POD minutes or i 1/9/79        Again, will you look at the handwriting and let me 8

l know if you recognize it. l > f' I am going to refer you to a problem J deceription at t he bottom of the page with McGarry's name next to it, and nnk you what that means to yo..

          .I
          .!                     A  Okay.        The note says, "McGarry 1/2.." which I

would bc January 2nd. "

                                             . . Valve 380 body-to-bonnet, RCV-1355 It
          " HCV133A, into Engineering for Furmanite."                          And then I have
          !      a handwritten note saying, "135B, 134B still leaking."

l Q That is your handwriting? A Yes. , Q Now, what does that mean? Had McGarry been assigned specifically to examine that problem? 7 l A When we perform Furmanite, which is a lprocenebywhichyoucanstonmanytypesofleaksonasystem j! that is ct313 under prennure, stil] at temperature, it van 1 , j r /.N rt'_ eh'lfil'Y? TING SErl/ ICE e , . . , a .14 17 #4 , I w o u ,- s..o 3= u l

I 26 handled by a support group, with the mechanics supporting the contractor. Furmanite is a contracted process. You , call a vendor in and he parforms this work application for I you, but you would assign individuals to support them and help them out. Those individuals would have come from the Mechan.ica] Department, which is under McGarry. That is why 1 hin name would be there.

   !                                                                                                                                   l When we did perform this process called l Furmanite, it dJd require Engineering approval and that ir, fwhy t he 1 c rerence there is "into Engineering for Furmani t.c. "                                                                 (

l I l 'Inov would have to rive approval to do that. I i I l , O After it wan done on 1/9, would thnre no'. l' I l~ ' be o correnpentilnr PWP for tho people who had to go In ard ric 1 hat ? A 'lhere chould have been, yen. l 1 O What is a. body-to-bonnet leak? i l i A The way most valves or many valves are I constructed is the bottom portion of the valve, which is  ! l ' actually in line, is called the body. You have a gasket and

                                 ^

then a top, called a bonnet, which is bolted onto the body.

                                                                                                                                       )
   , ] f* you ever need t o do renairn to the valve , that in how
   ' you ret int orna ! to the valve to replace parts.                                          And what tbrm nic n ev i n c- i n t.bn f the ranket that ;toinF thorc two ni ~ e                                                -*

rum cmemns stwcs

                                   ,              a ,                ye-
                                         ,.:f;#w ( **' , $ >f    ** -

I n ,'%8*d,{ [e *J f J L *

  • l.

l' l 27 4 ... .. - . . . - - . . . - . . - l together was leaking. Sometimes gaskets erode or they get-  ; !

        ! worn away or if there was dirt initially, when it was put together, there are a lot of different causes which wou]r) l                                                                                                                       !

l cause you to have a leak. If the failure is at that juncture, l they call it a body-to-bonnet leak. 'It is basically a nacket failure of some sort. n f Q In that from a maintenance point of viev.' l [ a :mrjoon probl"n or in it so"lething which occurs on ti l

      'I I' reru]ar barin?

0 A That in a very common mode of failure for valves. A valve in junt a mechanical structure. In not on]y the nuc lear indust ry but jn any industry, paper mills or any i<inil of a pirnt or factory. that is a ver, , very commn L,

      !-     tyrr of icoi:

0 Now, on 1/9, the shift, the morning shift, there were two sump pump starts, reactor coolant sump pumo l starts. Are you familiar with the sump at Unit 27 o

         .                            A  Somewhat.       It depends on what the question
         .I is.

l Q The next question is: If I were to tell you that the sump pumps increased between January 9 and, say, January 33, and there was this leak which has been described at the l'OD meeting, would that piece of information have any lmeanin~.tovru? c"v repumNg sgrNCE h{ ' : ',

m.  :.. ,

j ? 'r

                                                            -) , , .                                                           )
                                                                                                               'l 28
                    ;                    MS       PENNY:          Which piece.                                   ,

MR. WINTER: That there was an existing  ! l 1eak that had been described at the POD meeting and that , the sump-pumps increased daily _over that period of time. l THE VITNESS: If you identified a valve as j leaking, it would probably be a prime suspect, but not necessarily would it be the only suspect. That would be a l ntart,$nr noint, but you would still want to look and see if there were any other sources. S BY MB. WJMTElt: 3 0 Now, do you know, based on a descripticri rir t.be prohlem ut t h thone valven. where any leakare venid r' from thone valves? l: A Those valves are located on the pressurfrar (insidethe"D"Rinrandifyoudidhaveleakagefromthere, hitwouldeventuallyworkitswayintothereactorcoolant

                 ; sump, i

Q As a premise to my next question, I want to provide you with some information. On 1/10, the sump pump starts increased to four pumps a shift. On the last shift of 1/10, they were up to six. On 1/11, there were a serien j o f FFT ' n , which in a moment, Dick, I will show you end enk lyounomeouestionnabout

                 ;                                        them.

i r.' /J III. n!v TSTO? TING SEfMCE o r i i .- l , ji . > u: . e - r

l. ]

L i  ! 29  : I i f RWP-14326 is the first one that we have a i record of, issued on 1/11 on the 0700. shift. [ I ask you to Irok at it and if you can  ! tell me, give me an idea of what you believe the purpose of this RWP would be? I i (Document handed to the witness) , THE WITNESS: Ask your question again. I BY MR. WINTER: i l I Q Having looked at that RWP, what do you believe went on? , A Based on this RWP-14326, it is defined l l for Reactor Building, all elevations outside of secondary . i l l shield, which means they can't go inside the "D" rings. It is also listed the purpose of this is j an Opc surveillance and the individuals they have named to go in 3ocks like Miller and Dougherty (phonetic). 2 At that time, I believe they were both I operators. This would allow them to go in and do an Ops  :

                                                                                                                         .I surveillance for whatever specific surveillance, or whatever                      i they wanted to do. But it gave them certain restrictions.

They had to stay outside the "D" rings. Q Could they, based on those restrictions, view the leakage from the valves that we have talked about? 1 l . CADli4 CIW REPORTING SErMCE l l ~ - w m nx

                                                                           ,,  *'.G R o::. ft. 111'?
                                                                             'D TN J JC 233 3C,14

I L 30 A They could go to the top of the "D" ring. Depending on what obstructions are in the way and how far l ' down the pressurizer those valves'are~1ocated,--they may be able to see them, but I doubt it. If they did, it would be from some distance.

                           !                     Q    Is it your opinion that it would be unliknly they could quantify the leakage based on the restrictions rot forth on the RWP?

I A I think it would be difficult, unlc..n 15 I was, you know, a very drastic leakage. It would be di ff 3 cu]t l l l to qunnri fy , yen. t BY IE. GEPH A!!T: i O Do you mean to estimate? A To estimate the leakage, yes. i At best, you would probably be abic to l say it in drippjng, or it looks like it is a stream, or it .1 - l runh? hr, or comet.hinr. In that kind of terminology, rather than say it is se many gallons a minute, or so many drops a i minute. l py 13.UINTER: O The next RWP for 1/11 is 14327. I am

                           '          t  ank you t e look at that and let me know what you believe occurred an a result of the RWP.

t ll tuit/J CiN phrOZING SEfNICE m -. , r ty [ 1 ' I I1 l' s I ) ', j

l 31 (Document handed to the witness) A l In looking at this particular RWP, someone initiated an~RWP. It looks like KercBurkholder, who was an ,  ! operator, for two individuals, Ron Harbin and Sandy Lawyer. It was initiated but it was never' completed. There is no signature saying the shift supervisor or the shift foreman approved for the work to take place, nor wac j 1't ever signed nfT that the work was completed. l

                   !                         It is also marked " Void" across the ")= P'                                          f j and the General Description just says, " Entry for inspectJor, l

i outsido of the accondary shield" -- again. And it says, l "l or lier.ctor 14u] j dinr; Operating Floor."

                   ;                         liere again, it sort of limits where you cn" i

cn rna rimt f on enn T r'olt at, but it does not look as if it van ever impleniented. Q 13nsed on the description of the location. l i

                   ; ir 11 in the sama area as the first RWP-14326?

A This second one you gave me, 327, is actually a little bit more restrictive, since it says, .

                          " Reactor Buildinn Operating Floor."

326 says, "All elevations outside of necondary shield."

                     !                       So, this second one you just showed me is t

i actua) J v more rost rictive , allowing you to go to less placon l I ('/J'IT4 Cliv QEPORTING SEINICE '

                                                       ,, -     n
,;.s : v m r

a

                                                                      . rt 1'ipu j                                       *irn?$ 9 9 2                                                   i

32 , to look:at anything. . i Q Based on your experience, is it possible  ; I i that-the description' indicated on the second RWP would have l l allowed, if an entry had been made, a viewing of a problem with those valves? . A If in fact they were limited to the. Opera-i ting Floor, they would not, in my interpretation, been ab]e l to r,et to the top of the "D" ring to look at that. l In a broader sense, somebody mir:ht have interpreted that, but I would not have. Q Do you know what position Sandy Lawyer j _ held in January 19'/97  ;

        !                A     I don't recall specifically his title.                He i

held neveral ponitions. He was in a management or middle or I upper middle management position. At one point, he was on l the island arid at another point, he was off the island. On that specifj e date, I don't know what his title was, or his position. I Q In your mind, is there any reason why he l would be coming to the Reactor Building to look -- to go  ; I inside? A I don't recall. I don't know why, no. Q The last RWP we have for January ll, is 14328.- Again. I am going to ask you to look at that and l car'ITR CITi PEPOQTING SEf7/CE rex /.n . rey a vyr,:r rf 47 pa'h *R ! , f 'J W

        ;                                  Itti n U - ;?3 3' u                                     i

l 33 l w j describe-for me what you believe happened as a result of the'RWP7 (Handed to the witness) l A This was a specific RWP-14328, which allowed three individuals -- Mr. Hoyt, Mr. Burkholder and  ! l Mr. McGarry -- to go inside the "D" ring in the Reactor j Buildin,; to check for a leak at the pressurizer. I l Thic, in fact, based on what I see here, l l was accomplichd, cince the individuals did receive some  ; exposure. It unn nir,ned off both by the shift supervisor l and also by the jcb foreman, that in fact they had completed the task. It was initiated on the lith and'it was i

  ; cloecd out on th" lith.

1 O Under what circumstances do you feel it would have been necessary for McGarry to go in, rather than lassignoneofthe people that worked for him? l- A Here again, that would have been a choice that was up to him. I would be speculating if I would say l why he went versus somecne else. t One of the considerations that all of our I supervisors look at is radiation exposure, both for themselvec' and their men. We don't always send the men out to inspect l

    , the j ob. beenur" we need their exposure to perform the work.

i i l I/l'PR ClN DEPO?IING $EINICE se m. ., di'T):; i Cf' N. 9

  • 1*;a i p > > v . f, i

34 So, in many cases the supervisor will go in, make an in-i spection, plan a ,1ob, since when it comes m .,-m to actually doing

                                 .-,,-                           a the work, they may or may not be in the area.

l i Generally, she supervis55s have more , exposure that can be used for these types of purposes. It may have been the case -- and I am i speculating now -- that his expertise, either his or one of his foremen's was requested to help evaluate, one, the t condition of the problem or, two, how could we fix it, either !  ; i now or at a later date and do planning so that in fact when l l

   , it did come time to fix it, we really knew what the com-l
   ' plexity of the problem was.                                                                j Q   Have you ever had the experience to go                                ]
   ! into the same area to look at the leakage problems yourself?                       l l                                                                                    I
   !                 A   I have been in Containment.                I don't             j i

recall if I was in looking at leaks in the pressurizer. I i really don't remember.  ; Q Based on your background and your knowledge i of the structure of the plant, do you believe it is posrible , to quantify with any specificity a leak from that area, from j the valves, a steam leak from those valves?

  !                 A    You can quantify.            If the fluid is coming I

out as a lig,uid, you can build some sort of a catch arrange- l

  ' ment, either put    e. bucket underneath it or a funnel or                        ;

CAPITA'. CITY IdPORTING SErMCE l

  ;                         ervv.r'a W :' 5:N: s ~

l H:Jn s.rG PA 17106 TERN,W 233 39M

  ]                                                                                         ,

__-____a

                               ;                                                                          35         i l

y I

                               ! somehow control the leakage to some sort of a container                            l so we know the volume, allow that leakage to collect for a
                                                                 - . . .             -v known period of time, using a,.--watch 'or stopwatch and based                   t on that you can determine a leak-rate.               That is how you have       i to do it.                                            -

j Justwalkinguptoitandwithyoureyeballl seeing how much water is coming out and say that is so many  ; gallons a minute, you cannot do that. If it was steam and going up, it makes it i I a lot more difficult as far as how much you are losing, unless; you really encapsulate it or bag the whole as,embly, and

                              ! that is harder to do.          -

Q Oiven the area and the manner in which you ' described the leakage would have to be measured, is that possible while'the plant is operating, to set up that kind i I

                             ; of a leakage measurement system?

A If the plant is operating, you do not want to spend much time, if any, in the "D" ring. I notice on the RWP, there was a note that neutron badges would have been { issued, which is another concern you have when the plant is . I  ! operating, which is another form of radiation, which usually 1 you don't want to get. 1 [ So, any investigation in the area, you l

lwouldwant to get in and get out very quickly. ,

t CAPITAL CdY PEPCRTING SEfNICE

                             .                            m.m.m mms-                                                     ,

HN.'as P3 PA 17102 l

                                                                 's t 'Ry 4 733 ?'14 i

I Q Again, on that shift on 1/11, when these entries were made, there are three pump starts. j On the next shift, the same -- three pump. I starts. On the next shift for 1/12, there are , four pump starts. I I I am going to show you another POD meeting work item list for 1/12/79, and ask you to look at it and advise me whether.it is your handwriting. There is reference i [toTtCV-130Arepackonthebottom. Let me know what you i i believe that in referring to. I l (Document handed to the witness) I i A In answer to your first question, yen, l thin is my' handwriting. l A repack of a valve is another mechanicni i l way that a valve can leak. I mentioned body-to-bonnet be-fore. The second area where you have a method of leakage  : 1 out of a valve is with the valve stem, which is what attaches to the handle on a valve and goes into the body of the valvo, and that is made of packing which comes in several different types. It is similar to what you have at home on the faucet on your sink. It sometimes leaks. In time packing wears out and it becomen consumed, and you have to replace it, sometirer I

                                           !                                    C AMIAL CITV REPORTis SErNICE
                                           ;                                                   , m:      u,s -,          ,.

7

                                                                                      .      i                 '7'i
                                                                                        't,                         *
                                                                                                        ?
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l 37 i l 3 -- l l just because it is being compressed for a period of time, j and leakage develops by that.  ! Hereagain,thisisadiffefenttypeofa

                                                                                    ~

1 leakage. That kind of a fix . depending on the type.of valve i i and the circumstances, under the circumstances by which the y system is working, sometimes that can be repaired on line l and sometimes you have to shut down. l Q What does that refer to -- RCV-130A7 A I don't know specifically which valve that is. It would be a valve on the reactor coolant system some-where, and it was identified that there was rater or fluid I coming past the packing on that valve.  !  ; i 0 Giveri the number of sump pumps that I have I l just describ( d to you and the described leakage in the POD  ; minutes at the POD meetings, what do you believe would be the source of that leakage? i A As I mentioned earlier, if you have identi-l fled something, here again you would have to quantify it. > l The repacking leak could be nothing more l 1 than a drip every couple of minutes to an out-and-out i i spraying of water, depending on how far gone the packing is. j l This particular valve may have contributed  ! I to that increase in water level tr it may be of a lesser i l

                                  ,   degree but if your sump level is coming up, the first thinr CAPITAL CW REPORTING SErMCE                                           l l                          a:    ,

s w a cau,rs si w ;; j HEQ5Kf'C, f A i 7 99 i Tr.r:um'c 2p 30 y 11 - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______o

38 l l - , l Operations would do is try to identify any possible sources. ' If in the course of investigating they found another valve,

                                                                 .n. -      . . . .

they would identify it and, obviously, 130 is one that was

                                                                             f{
          . identified.

Q The description of events that occurred from 1/9 through 1/11, based on that and what occurred at the ' POD meetings, do you believe that the Valves 133B and 134A ] were leaking during that period of time? i A I believe they are leaking, because later on, we replace them. To what degree, I can't say. Whether that was the total source of the surrp leakage, I can't tel) I by just that. - 1 I O I am going to show you a copy of a Daily l j Report, dated 1/13/79, signed by Brian Mehler. Attached i i to this Dai]y Report is what appears to be a copy of his I shif t supervisor's turnover n otes. Item 17 says as follows: "If we have tc, we have permission to go and isolate pressurizer leak (valve).4 I don't think this can be done at power."  ! l  ! Would you tell me,what you believe he is j saying there? l j A Just reading that one sentence, I am not , sure exactly which pressurizer valve he is talking about. l There are nurwrous valve:: on a crenruricer. Obvjously, if i

        ,                       Cmmt Cny RETOTNG SE7/ ICE
        \

L.;t.:,p u FDim nye rwJ~ HN.OG%G Pt ' ? '0? .

        ,                              e, i g n e , : n w a

39  : v there.is.more than one in a line, you may be able to isolate ! I it. It looks like it is his opinion, depending on what valve they are talking about, that he does not think it can ' be done at power for one of two reasons.  ! Either there is no other valve to isolate it or, two, he might be considering the fact that it is  !  ! l Inside the "D" ring and there were certain concerns about I roinr,in there when the plant was running at power. j . i i But just from that statement, I don't knov

            ! what he was thinking, i.

i

            !                              0     Ori 1/13 on the 0700 shift, there wan nn DWl' $ s wad . !!c . 14337.                                                                                                   j T ask you to look at that and tell me ubet I

q 7;r..i t .- i t e v < h n,...,,

                                                 "d an a result of the RWT?

(Document handed to the witnens)

                                          /. Based on this particular RWP No. 14337, l nerrirsion was granted to go into the Reactor Building incide i

the "D" ring to check the leak on the pressurizer. , The fact that there is exposure written  ! 1 down for indivjdualn leads me to believe -- I know that peop1d .

                                                                                                                                                   -l did go in on the RWP.                          It was signed, authori,ed and closed 4

J 1 out. l i l l Pourindividualsarelisted--Hoyt,myself,l i l l 1 l Mr. Thomncon and Pr. McGarry l l .l

             !                                                                                                                              i l-                                    r. AM1A! C0Y RE:U? TING SEfMCE                                                           '

v:;. . . e wt. v:A sm . ' i j mmm  ;

rre ru 3et - l L_-___-_______ J

40 There is zero exposure, after my name, which would tell me I probably_didn't_go,in the building. If you went in the building, you would have picked up some e xposu're . It is the-case many times to put more names on a RWP, in case you need to send more people to look at comething. Whether you go in or not is dependent on how the job progresses.  ; Q Why do you believe your name is on there? A Well, the purpose of the RWP, as listed, is to check the leak on the pressurizer. That being the case, I would have been asked to go and examine it and give my opinion as to the status. Q Under what circumstances do you believe you would become directly involved in a situation like this? A I could be involved under any circunctancer. If I wanted to, I could go and look at any job in the plant, , The fact that this was a follow-up to another one,-when Mr. McGarry went in -- as I said earlier, Mr. McGarry did work for me. If for whatever reason he  ; didn't go in or if there was someone else needed to go look j i at the situation, I was available to go in and make an in- j spection also. , I Q Why wouldn't it have been one of the CWM CITv r/EPCGilNG SEP/ ICE ro.w.n u rEDEm somE s'Mm WJhGBJ.1 IA i71 7

l I 41 I

             . numerous people that work for Mr. McGarry, as opposed to his !

I boss?' A Hereagafn71fyou"a@Tookingataleak

              -- Most of the time we..look.at a. leak, we look-for a change v-               1 in the status of a leak.       Any leak, if it stays status ouo in_a leak rate, as long as you are comfortable with it, thnt         !
         ! is fine.       Generally, you look for changes in a. leak rate I

I becauseitisasignorwarningthatthesituationiscettinnl j worse and you need to re-evaluate your stand on whether you , need to do work on it, or not. { l I If Mr. McGarry had gone in earl $ er, as we l had seen, it makes sense for the same individual to nn in  ! l the next time becausd he is looking at relative terms. He i t i can describc it to me in words how bad it was leaking but his judgment or information or words to me how bad a leak  ! is, it is alwayn best if the same individual makes the same lchecka,un]essyouaredoingsomethingthatcanactuallybe quantitatively measured.

                                                                                 ,      j l

O I understand that. n 1 This is the shift which I just read to yo's  ; I a daily report where Mehler writes, "If we have to, we have  ; permission to go in and isolate pressurizer valve. I don't ' f think this can be done at power." l Now, is it possible that this entry wan > i l cwm aTv rarnormNS S:WCE  ; { m um se.m stJ&lM<f.3 i'i 17 G Yp r t:g, t r ' 439 ' ' i

42 made to make a judgment as to whether or not the plant should be shut down because of the nature of this leak?

                                                          ~

A Itcou1d'Ver7TeifidFd]$edn. l Mr. Thompson,.I believe, was an Operator. He is no longer around but if that was the case, he,would have been the individual who would have isolated -- an Operator would have been the individual who would have iso-lated the valve. That could have been the reason for this entry. l Here again, there are no other details on here to specifically say that for sure. Q Do you have any specific recollection in January of 1979, of getting involved in this? Number one, do you have any recollection of that? l A Obviously, I was involved because for them to have my social security number, I would have given it to i them. Any more specifics than what has already been mentioned l I don't recall. i Q Do you recall or was it your practice to get involved in decisions that may very well mean shutting l down the plant? A I would be. As a head of a department, if i an individual had a concern that says, I believe the plant { should be shut down, I would be in the circuit somewhere, yes. CAP:TAL OTY PEFO7 TING SErMCE cn.w.in e cEDEw soumi si:x]. HM9sk f G I A IPCC Tre {4sDPf 233 3R *A

[ 43 I 7. Q You have no specific recollection, however, as to why you were involved at that point in time, on Janu-

                                               ~~

ary 137 v'~vt e i A 'Just based on the RWP,'which says check on f 1 the leakage, I would.say that is probably.why.I am on there, l to look-at the status. Q Approximately at the same time that RWP wan l issued, which wan'12: 45, on January 13th, Hoyt writes in his shift foreman 11og: "Made' inspector in Reactor Building l-l to check leakage of RCV-133B, 134B and 135B. Total leakage i from these valves is approximately the same as Thursday's 1/11 inspection. . Surveys of other areas shows'no other-leakage. Leakage is from body-to-bonnet areas of these valves.and appears to be safe to operate." Now, do you recall being present.for any t discussion about leakage from these valves and an. evaluation  ! i of whether or not it is safe to operate? l t A I don't recall a specific discussion. I l would assume I was probably there, the fact that McGarry went in'and that was the purpose of this. Here again, Mr. Hoyt was a knowledgeable individual. In looking at that last part of RWP, he did come up with the most exposure of all of the individuals that went ! CAPITAL CIW REPORTING SErMCE FiccE U . FEDE74 SQUA?E PATl7: HATOG3tTG PA 17108 1ELEPHONE 233 38u

i 3 i 44 'f in, which leads me to believe he got closest to the valve i or in that' area, because the exposure levels would have been '

                      '                                           . m m._.._.~2,.nm,y.

higher'in the "D" ring the closer you.get to it tha.n in the i other' areas. - . - -- " ~ - - r l So, based o7 his say-so and the fact chat j' i Mr. McGarry was also in there, i .;culd concur, since thev  ! are both knowledgeable individuals. I l 0 I am going to show you a copy of an Ops Note which was obtained from Mr. Kunder's file. It is dated 1/13/79 I ask you to look at it and let me know what you believe it means and whether or not you recall any discussion , about its contents. l (Document handed to the witness) j i A I have never seen this note before. It i looks like it is'his personal records or logs or diary, or , whatever you want to call it, addressing the status of RCV-1358, 133B and 134B. It looks like this is basically a recount of what transpired with Mr. Hoyt and Mr. McGarry's inspection, and the recommendation that it is not justifiable to shut down yet, based on the rate at which those valves were leaking l Q The words "not justifiable to shut down yet," what do you believe that refers to -- a safety conditior.IJ CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SEfMCE cm.v.Ee t - FEotw sesA E sTA o2 HATr$ROG PA 1710B TELEfHONr 233 3814

45 l H J. i the structure of the valve or do you believe it pertains to the quantity of leakage? I would say al1 of th'e above.

                                                                                   ~

A They would j all be factors in.whether you shut down or not. ..Any one of them could be a determining factor, but none of them seem I i i to be a problem.  ! Q Now, the note refers to Mr McGarry and Hoyt making this evaluation. Would it have been Mr. Mc-Garry's practice to discuss that with you prior to giving that kind of an evaluation or making that kind of a statement?, A It would have been about in the same time-frame. When you come out of the Reactor Building, you are all l dressed up and you have to undress. You wear protective i  : clothing. There may have been someone right there at the j door waiting when he came out to find out what his observa-1,  ! tions were. So, they may have gotten him before I did, but j shortly thereafter he would have discussed his findings and , I l I would have been involved at that point. t l Q You do not recall discussing this problem with anyone who supervised you or any other supervisors? { l A Not with my supervisor, I don't believe so. j l l BY MS. PENNY:  ! 1 [ Q Do you actually recall discussing this with ! l CAPliA' CITY REPOQTING SErMCE t a-W e SE GessovA?EST m i HicesspG PA 17105 ' TE9 v 5 T 233 V1A

46 McGarry, when you say you would have? i A I would have probably. I don't recall I a specific meeting with John. Q It would be likely?- A Yes, it would be likely. BY MR. WINTER: Q I am going to show you three RWP's all dated 1/14. The first one is 14339 I ask you to take i a look at it and let me know what you believe occurred? (Handed to witness) A In looking at this specific RWP, it looks as though no work occurred. -! It was voided. It was never authorized to start work and no work was performed under it. Q Based on what occurred on 1/13, and what the situation was inside the "D" ring, do you believe this i l particular work request could have been performed without also having cured the situation, cured the leak inside the "D" I ring? A This particular job as written does not reference the other problem with the valves. This is a l different purpose for going in the building. You are going , l CAPITAL CRY REPOQTING SErMCE Enz G V FE?EM SQJA7E STAON HAare c", Pt- 1710A RENONE 233-3514

It 7 into a different area, in fact. I r Q So, on the face of this RWP, you cannot ' tell why it was voided? A No. .

                                                                                                                                .l Q    You indicate you believe it calls for going into a different area.

I believe it says, " Location outside "D" l ring and inside "D" ring by hot leg of "A" loop." That is a i different. location? A You would not have gone to that area l looking for a leak on the pressurizer. That is the basement j of the Reactor Building. "Inside "D" ring by hot leg of '

    "A" loop" would have been inside the same "D" ring that the                                                                  ,
  ; pressurizer is located, but the first part of that is a                                                                      ,

different arca of the plant.  ; i Q The second part is the same area, is that correct? I A That is correct. If an individual went to a 280 foot ele- l vation, he would have gone from the basement looking up. ' i The normal way to get up there would be l to go to the "D" ring and go from the top on down. ( Q So, do you believe it would have been pos-I cible to do everythinr; called for in the locations with the C@lTAL CnY REPORTING SErMCE l tovwrv.' cEtE% som: Swoa umw. m mm

                                 ' PEND'S 233 3d I.                                                                            _-    .___-________.-_______-_-_a

~_9 i 48 existing problem.inside the "D" ring, described by the RWP's?' ' I

  • A With which problem? With this problem l or the -- - - 4- - - - ~r
  • j
                                                                                                     . . . .. r
                                                                      . . . . .                        *ddi                              )

Q With this problem. The problem described (

                                                                                                                                         \

by Work Request 14339 --  ! A RWP. Q I am sorry. RWP. . . calls for going, as you i indicated, into relatively the same area for a portion of it.. Do you believe it would have been possible, given .what- has been described in the previous RWP's, to do this worx, given the condition that existed? A Yes. If the concern is frc ,that valve leaking, you probably could have gone in the area, based on  ; other recommendations. You could probably go in the same l space.  ! MR. WINTER: Off-the-record. (Discussion off-the-record) BY MR. WINTER: Q Please look at 14340, and let me know what you believe occurred as a result of the RWP. l (Handed to witness)  : A This specific RWP is identified for work to-furmanite reactor coolant valves on pressurizer. It says, i CAPR AL CITY REPORTING SErMcE (D.W? U - FEDEM SCJA0E STATON n.WayfG PA 17105

, 49 i

    "And feedwater valve 35."          Location -- Unit 2 Reactor Building inside the "D" ring by the pressurizer.

i

                                     ..,..,...e*ae.w+.            *.

There are a n, umber,of indi.v,iduals who are approved or authorized to._go.in,.under this RWP,-some of which received some exposure. For Mr. McGarry, there is no exposure .I listed after his name. i It was implemented and it was closed out. l By that I would have to assume that that particular task was at least worked on. Whether it was completed or not, I can't tell by this document. This just allows you to go into a

 ; radiation area.                                                                                    i Q    And RWP-14341?

(Handed to witness) A RWP-14341 was marked " void." Here again, f i there were a number of individuals who initially were put on , the list to perform a job. It was never signed on to allov the task to take place, and likewise never signed off as being completed. It is marked " void." This was to look at reactor coolant flow transmitter tubing. Work description of isolating and re-  ; I pairing leaks. In flow sensing lines, it says. l

l Based on this, I would say no work was l accomplished on this. Why it wasn't accompli-hed, you can't l

i CAoiTt4 CITY REPOQTINC, SErMCE i i te.v.tr> u rotr>e.; rcueE s cm sare53urG et.1710e Trnns ?i3 ?c v

                                             .t..

50 l tell from this document alone. l l Q Now,flet me show you RWP-14348. I ask ll I _you to look at it.and describe for me what you believe oc- l

                                                                                                                         ^--~#""

curred as a result of it. - - -

                                                    !                  r                                                                                                       ,

(Document handed to the witness)  ! i r

                                                        '1                     A   This was an RWP written on 1/15/79.                                       I                i l                                                                                                                   '

can't tell when the entry was made. It is hard to rend the coph here. It-looks like it was closed out on 1/24, which means 'the,' entry could have been made any time in that time , frame. It is listed to inspect pressurizer leak. l The individuals listed there . I don't recop .e. Some of  ; jthemareOperatorn. There was minimal exposure, so if they did in fact go in to inspect that, they were probably there a very short period of time. Only two people got exposure. The other two probably did not go in the building. The fact that it is signed off and there , is some exposure, I would assume from this document that an - inspection wcs made, a quick inspection. Q Can you tell from that document whether . the pressurizer leah they are referrin- to is the one which p I f'Al'lTAL CliY QEPORTING SErMCE I

m:.=:. ; mau, ic:wu swa'.

HY;M5h3 2.;e i? G m ,,m., ,,,,... .

                         \

51  ; _..o I was furmanited on 1/14 or . called for furmaniting on 1/147 ' A It does not specifically address that.- I

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .l would assume, based on the timing of these other documents,                                                                                                                        [

it would probably be the same. l Q Based on this documentation, do you have - { any specific recollection today of this time period and this j particular problem inside the "D" ring? l A Other than the fact that there was a leak > on the pressurizer, some attempts were made to resolve the i deficiency, and it appears it didn't get completely solved , because there war still some leakage. One of the documente

                                              '                                                                                                                                                                                   i
                                              ,  said the lenhnte had been reduced, but there was still somo leakane.

I Later on another event occurred, when thesa {

                                              ! valves were replaced, rather than repaired.

O What do you recall about that? f A I believe it was the next day, the 15th,i l when there was another problem in the plant which caused the. i unit to be shut down, at which time we actually went in and  ! I cut out those valven and replaced them. i. That is probably why you did not find a l l

                                              ' job ticket for 3 34B and 1338 to refurmanite.                                                                                                         If I am going t

to replace them, I am not going to do a temporary repair. . l 1 l ('/MTAl IIIY I?[Q2IAG 5$/ ICE

r. f.a t. . c p . n :g rom l m -
                                                                                                                  -' - t ' re ih' ' ;t py3 pid                                                                                                            .

_-.___.--__-w

52  ; u Q I am going to show you a morning report, , with a copy of the shift supervisor'sme-turnover + notes, dated 1/15/79, and ask you to look at Item 3 and tell me what you believe Mehler is referring to. These are his turnover i

                                                       . notes.

(Document handed to witness)

                                                                                                                                                                                            ,        I A     Let me try and read this and make cure I i

am reading what it says. ' l I i  !

                                                  ;                           It looks like, "Furmanite at RCV-133B, I

j 134B and 335B. RCV 134B and 135B still leaking approximately;. i i rif t een dropn a minut.e. Do not . .. " comethin,; " . . . any tor?.

  • MM.."

which wou30 be mechanical maintenance .." make con- , tainer to catch leaking and pipe it to "D" ring door so it can be meanured. Plan to go back.." something or other. 3 l l can't read the words here. Something was down again.

                                                                                                                                                                          "Re-I place valve."

Fifteen drops a minute is very low leakene. That is not much in terms of leakage. i. I would assume in order to get a quantita- l tive amount -- and we have done these types of things before , i

                                                      -- we would make some sort of a device, like I mentioned                                                                      i i

before, to ec11ect the leakage. It would get to a point that is easier accessibic. You wouldn't have to go into a high  ; radiation field or higher radiation field in order to make a , conal Cnv PEPORTitG SErucE

                                                                                 < w.. .n c . resw sces s'co,                                                                     '

u,vrgw ;;r, p/ 1 ? m., v r cv t ps t it a a

I 53  : determination. It looks like he is recommending that somewhere down the line, let's do so'ething.. m In other words.- 4 t replace the valves. Instead. of just trying to fix them, ' 3et's cut them out and put new ones in, which in fact is what 4 I 1 we did. i MR. WINTER: I have no more questions. Do t you have anythinr,you would like to add, Dick?

                                                                                                                                            ,I I                                                                                                                                         .

TIIE WITNESS: No, not specifically.

  ,                       (Discussion off-the-record)                                                                                      i
   , in' IF . Wil!TElt :

1 I . { 0 Just so I fully understand what you were nnyinr. in ref'erence to the POD minutes of 1/5/79 and , 2 j 20/19/78, specifically the reference in those minutes, the handwr$tten noten. which I believe are yours, and the state-l' ment, "If surveillance out of spec , keep old sheet and prove deficiency plus not that test was missed," I take it that  ! you believe this was a comment made about sulveillances in t i general, which you took down to make sure your people were i instructed? l A I believe that to be the case. It gets back to a question of how much you document something. If I define something to be a problem, you need enough words CAPITAL CW REPORTING SEfMCE j  ; U;.v.o . trm:... sr..m: swo',  ! W@.afG re, Mia!

   .                                Cin .." .E 233 32 :
  • L i

54 . L down so other people can, you know, read your words later  ! on.and understand what the problem was. -l  ! i

                                         .__.._m.s...---                               l It is also my understanding that you do 1

Q i not believe this was a conunent-directed to you directly about 1 Maintenance surveillance, but one about surveillance in l genera 19 A Yes. I I believe it was a generic or a general l statement. I don't recall that it was specifically addresne? to anyone. O In reference to the 10/23/78 POD minuten, i j the handwritten note, which I believe is yours, which staten, "All -- not$fy SS or SF.." -- I believe that would be Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman? I A Correct. Q . .when finding D's or E's ASAP when founr3 performing surveillance, " is also a comment which was generje in nature, as you indicated? A I believe so. l Q And not one directed specifically for  : Maintenance surveillance? i I I believe that to be the case. A You are talking seven years ago here, but I q don't recall it beint; a specific problem that I had. i That CAPIT AL CITY REPORTING SErMCE  ! i :n.w u nrE?r sc.'a?E sw& NWSE. S kA 17106 l trj rP,4"/ fr 713,10 j ! l , 1

55 i, i t: why I assume it to be a generic statement. . MR. WINTER:,,,.Thank you. i 6 _ .. . m-  ! (The' deposition was concluded at'12: 50 p.m.)

                                                                                                                                                                 ,   i I

l' i i i i l-I hereby certify that the testimony taken i by me in the within matter is fully and accurately indicated in my noten and thic is a true and correct transcript of the l l came. l , I I n % dc . ,t. D. fdl~. Marlene L. DePanfild.s Court Reporter i 4 I i CtNL CI1v FEUTING SErMCE f.r a. n:m saueE smo: n e uss<< ,t1 17108

                                .i..r,.e   yp 3et.

r i i

                                                 )

i l l i SMITil, BERNARD 3/27/80 NRC IE

E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  • A/d
    .    -l      ..                                   .

I NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i

          $           In the Mattar of:

2: IE TMI INVESTIGATION I re.RVIEW

         $              of                                     '

l 44 Bernie Smith

  • Shift Supervisor 5 i!

l 1 Si i I .  !- Si N Trailer #5 ' l;

         !!                                                      NRC Investigation St a                 !,

TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10i Middletown, Pennsylvania l E i March 27, 1980 t 12! (Cata of Intarview)  !. 131 Acril 15,1980 1 (Data Transc:1p Typec) , 11  ! 2  :. 15i (Tape Numce($)) ,, 15i ,

                                                                                                       ,i .

3 .;

      - 1Cl 191                                                                                            :

l 201  ; I 21! l

NRC PERSONNEL: l 22! li Keith Christopher, Investigator 23: Themas Martin, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3  !

Don Kirkpatrick, Nuclear Engineer  : 24-  !

              !                                                                                      l 2=:

i f

1:. l \ l il i CHRISTOPHER: The data is March 27, 1980, the time is 0905. Again this !2! l is Keith Christopher and I am an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear '3! l Regulatory Commission assigned to Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. - '41 i This morning we are located in Trailer No. 5 at the NRC Office complex 9 - at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. This interview is to '6i . ,; be conducted with Mr. Bernie Smith who is an employee with the Metropolitan 7 ' Edison Company. I wil.1 ask the other personnel in the room to identify themselves by name and also identify their position.  ; ii  : @l l, MARTIN: Tim Martin, Section Chief, Reactor Project Section 3, Re'gion  ! I, USNRC. i $! i $l l KIRKPATRICJ: Don Kirkpatrick, Nuclear Engineer, IE Headquarters. .

@s                                                                                                                            '

WILSON: John F. Wilson, Attorney, Metropolitan Edison Company. l

 @i 7i l;            CHRISTOPHER:            Bernie, just before we turned on the tape, we as a mattar                              j l

of record we went through a couple of documents explaining to you the i parameters of what this investigation was for, what the scope of the  ; I ${. investigation was and also to the extent what the rights of the individual , h' were who is being interviewed. l For the record I will just, you know,  ; restate a couple of questions to you and ask you to answer them on the tape. No.1, did you understand the two page memo which you read. SI f 1

     .i l l, 2

1 lj

                        ' SMITH:  Yes.

2; . 31

            ;            CHRISTOPHER:- Okay, and the second question reads do we have your 41
           ;             permission to tape the interview.
 ' 5i                                                                                               '

l

  • 6l SMITH: 'Yes, you do.
  '71 8

CHRISTOPHER: Thank you. And thirdly do you want- a copy of the tape. 9I 101 SMITH: Yes. E g; .

                      ' CHRISTOPHER:     Okay, and for the record as soon as the tape can be r
'31 copied, it will have to be done back at the region, we will forward-you
'4
*                                                                       ~
                       .a copy via mail or courier as they come back here.      So you will get that. Okay let it also be noted that Mr. Wilson is a representative
.6;                                                                                                     f with Metropolitan Edison Legal Devision.       Okay. All right Bernie if you would just quickly give us a little background. Do you know Harold A'                                                                                                     f Hartman.                                                                       ,
@                                                                                                     i I

O! SMITH: .Yes I do. If  ; f 2 1 CHRISTOPHER: Okay could you give us a brief description under'what 3I circumstances and how you know Harold. 41 - t .Si i

1. , -

3 SMITH: Well he is a CR0 on my shift. l CHRISTOPHER: For what period of time would we be talking about. 1 Roughly, one year, two years? -I i 1 SMITH: At least two years I don't recall, you know, because he was an cux operator then he became a CRO.

                                                                                                                                                     /i i

CHRISTOPHER: The shift foreman would have been who. t SMITH: At that time Dick Hoyt. , l l CHRISTOPHER: Dick Hoyt, okay. l'

                                                                                                                                                   ,       i
                                                                                                                                                   ?

MARTIN: Tim Martin, I have four areas I would like to explore.  !; The (\ first is relative to the emergency feedwater surveillance test. Mr. i l1 Hnrtman has indicated a concern how the test is performed and the need - l. to frequently- change the reference values. The particular test he is I j t referring to is 2303M27A and B, the surveillance procedure for motor l driven' emergency feedwater pumps and he informs us that the test never l [ t

      .could come out, never came out the same twice.                         He also indicated that finally.when they were unable to meet the acceptance criteria that it                                                                   '
      -wsuld be forwarded down to the ISI coordinators who would analyze the problem away and the procedure would be changed, they would have new                                                                  .

I

                                                                                                                                   )

3 , l 1 l reference values and this continually occurred. . Are you knowledgeable

    '2 l    of this? Was it discussed with you by Mr. Hartman and do you have any 31 l   'other comments about it.
     #                                                                                                                             \

l l SMITH": Off the top of my head I don't know the particular surveillance. 6i I don't recall G.ging the referenca data. You would have to look, 7' you know, we have all the data sheets up there in the file from 77, 73, 8 79, you know, I would have to go back and look at the reference, say you know, the ISI evaluates any pump valves stroka. If it doesn't meet

  '^01 t

acceptance criteria, that is an the procedure at the time, it then goes 11 I to the ISI department and they evalusta the data and maybe the procedure 9W 7 is changed, not saying that can't be done, nothing wrong with that,

 -,~ q still within the scope af the pump, you know, the pump is suppose to 14:

pump 200 gallon a minuta, you know, they have a cartai11 safety margin

. 3 s;
  ~;            either way they can go, you know, there is tolerances on every thing.

95 I don't know if that particular one they changed. We have, you know, we have ree t in rwa contral room to justify that. 18: MARTIN: Bernie for those that you noticed that reference values had 20! been changed were you ever offered T'ogical explanations for why they

21) were changed.
22. -

I ..23! SMITH: On the Emergency feed pumps. 24 25! MARTIN: Specifically, but you may have some other examples.

5 SMITH: I would say no to that. l MARTIN: No that they were not logical or no you weren't provided eglanations. I SMITH: I was not provided explanations. MARTIN: Keith, do you have any other areas. f' CHRISTOPHER: Would it be pnusual for you not to be provided an explana-tion. Would that be something that you would expect to be received by ' somebody in a position such as Ken Hoyt who was your shift foreman. i I l! SMITH: No I don't think he'd do that either. Okay, it is sent to the ,f TSI depart:nent'who, you know, have all the books and data and, you know, the margins and stuff like that. I never, you know, unless there , was a big discrepancy, you know, I wouldn't question it. f i CHRISTOPHER: I don't have anything else. l i li WILSON: Bernie, excuse me, what was the procedure reference number.  !

t' { 6 L l MARTIN: The procedure reference number would have been 2303-M27A and 8, 2! l Rev. 5, and that's what I happen to have but early revisions are also 3r the same. The next area I would talk to you about is the RCS inventory 41 test which we are informed is run a minimum of every three days. Mr. 5l l Hartman has expressed a concern that the leakage ratas .were increasina 6i l with time, particularly during the last three months and that it became 7' increasingly difficult to get a acceptable leak rate. Do you have any comments on that. ,t 9I r L L0l

     ,           SMITH:       Well, when this all started, okay,              I also went back and enecked                                                                               I CL                                                                                                                                                                                        f all the surveillance 2303301, I think that's the number, is it.                                                               Yea, l'

[

2301 okay in that procedure we checked all our files up there and we L j-

"~' s have never exceeded one gallon a minute in the three days. We have ', '4 ! always complied with the Tech Specs, less than one gallon a minute l

c. I

~" every three days. 6 l .S. l 2 MARTIN: Bernie, it is my understanding that the computer would c me i SI out with unacceptable results and when those results were found they l i-SI were, they were crumbled up and thrown in the t: ash. l O! l' E SMITH: That is true. 2! l 3! MARTIN: What is the basis for doing that? 41 Si  ; l 1 o

7 SMITH: Because you were looking for a leak rate of 1 gpm in a 80,000 gallon system. Parameters of the plant enange all the time, computer .o only knows one calculation and it goes through all the parameters, j comes out and if we have, greater than 1 gallon leak rate, what we would do is recalculate cause we run leak ratas every shift. {i l y MARTIN: All right Bernie, I've got in front of me a copy of the Tech- l; d [ nical Specifications 3462, which one of the leakages was the one of j; y, e concern, which one was causing the problems in passing.  ! ) - [ k SMITH: B, okay that's one ' gallon a minute,, only thing that's on the b l 1eakage here. ' 4 MARTIN: All right, given that that is the Technical Specification, }  ; what gives you 72 hours to get a good one.  ! SMITH: I can't answer that. What gives me 72 hours. f l MARTIN: 'You get an unacceptable leak rata on the computer. ll i SMITH: That's right. i

  • MARTIN: Why don't you have to immediately leap into the action statement.

4 l 4

   )

8 l , SMITH: The action statement here is (pause refers to Tech Spec) cause l l Section 0 of the surveillance which that 301 is, tells me I have 72  ! hours. I MARTIN: Okay, read those words specifically that you see right there.  ! SMITH: Performance of a reactor coolant system water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours during steady state operation. [ MARTIN: Now let's go to the basis for surveillance procedures. I want I to call your attention to 403. I I SMITH: (Pause) Okay I read it. f I 1. MARTIN: And that's the thing that gives you the 72 hours? f i. SMITH: ' Yea. l

                                                                                              \

l i MARTIN: Okay, I'll show you the basis now 403 and I call your attantion to the last sentence in the paragraph. Given that last sentence which states -nothing in this provision is to be construed as defining equipment systems or components operable when such items are found or known to be inoperable although still meeting the surveillance requirements. Given that last sentence, what justification do you have of throwing away l' r:; cords which show unacceptable leak rates.  ! i

), , i 9' SMITH: My interpretation is the Tech Spec for leak rate is you have 72 1 l hours to find a good leak rate. You know, and that was reviewed by our " PORC, you know, that's their job is Tech Specs, 4 MARTIN: Let me provide my explanation. This is an incorrect interpre-tation. Onca you find a' system wrong even though you are within the 72 hours, that last 72 hours, the one you said is good is gone, that's no longer important. You're now in the action statement, you're not doing something within that six hours that shows an acceptable leak rata, than you must take the required action and you have the references now. Okay, let's go on with Mr. Hartman's concerns. He indicates that there tere. (! i, I: WILSON: I was talking to Bernie Smith yesterday on behalf of the company to try to understand Mr. Hartman's comments. At that time Mr. ' Snith gave me a narrative description of the evolution of getting a bad f leak rate from the computer and the meaning of that and I think it Gight be better than a question and answer method here, if he could  : explain 'in narrative what he sees as a meaning of a bad computer leak  ; rate because of the computer deficiencies, as whether or not that really is a bad leak rate. CHRISTOPHER: Mr. Smith, do you want to lead into that? l l,

1 . l 10 , 1 l SMITH: I guess I don't understand the questions. 2t

    !                                                                                       i 3l l   MARTIN:     Bernie, let ne clarify.        What would happen that would invalidata 4!

i one of these leak rat 6s and would allow you to throw away one that you 5-felt was not correct. . 61 . 7'  ; SMITH: Since we are looking for such a small amount of leakage, okay, ' 8I

 .I     temperature changes and pressure, secondary side and the generator, 9t i   turbine, you know, can invalidate a leak rate very easy because, you L0h
    ;   know, one degree change in the primary system is worth, as I remember W        like, a hundred gai ons         of water and, you know, the plant really doesn't i                                 l run that stable to ma'ntain a constant temperature all the time at a

@l a constant pressure. That's why we just don't accept every leak rate. L4) You could run a leak rata, you know, and you could get a 45 gallen a ^ sinute leak rate, okay, 45 gallon leak rate is very easy to see because it is a closed system, you can see down the makeup tank, you know, so of course we threw away because we knew it wasn't, you know, the computer, &I the guy had made up to the system or something, you know, it just wasn't real. So at that time, of course, we would run another one. !Ol i k MARTIN: Okay, I would like to go on with some of Mr. Hartman's statements. In fact, let me now pull one out of his interview with Mr. Ira'Rosen, a S3 New' York reporter. In there he states, and I've got to find this. !b Okay, in here he states that he actually tampered with a leak rate 15f , I l

                -              --_m-                                            .e

11 L test results. T.here were certain things we could do to make it less than 1 gallon per minute. The reporter asked him what did you do? And he says "like something simple, like adding hydrogen to the makeup _i tank." And the reporter subsequently asked him "did you fix the statis- i tics?" Hartman says "I didn't do it very often. I did it only if I J was watched very closely and I was told I had to have one by 6:00 in the morning. It was a dire situation and I avoided it." Do you have  ; any comments on this? SMITH: Well adding hydrogen to the makeup is a normal evolution, in j other words, makeup tank pressure has to be within a certain, I don't , rememcer the numbers off the top of my head, but you know, we got a bad  ! operative and if the pressure was low you could add hydrogen to makeup Il tank which would change the nactor coolant system inventory. I

                                                                                                          ,I MARTIN:      Why would it change the reactor coolant system inventory, since that is a differential device of Bailey BR Differential Meter, i

i there are two LT1, L'T2, they are switch selectable, they feed recorders ' in the control room which Mr. Hartman says never moved. They also feed ' I the computer in parallel. Why, why would just changing the pressure in the makeup tank effect RCS inventory? i 1 SMITH: It presses the water, you know, it looks like it has less water i' in it, it could change the temperature.  ! 1

                                                                                                 .             I

1 , .  ! l l 12 j l 11 - MARTIN:. What kind of pressure range are we talking about? l 2: l I r l 3t - SMITH: I knew you were going to 'ask that. I think the band is 10-30 4:

             ;                                                 pounds, I mean you can't quote me on that.       I don't remember.

l Si l Si MARTIN: Okay, but it is c'ertainly less than a hundred pounds. i 7! l SI

SMITH: The makeup tank pressure, yea, definitely.

91 ' 101

                                                                                                                                                                          -(

l-MARTIN: Okay, given that it is that kind of pressure, is water that  ! F compressible? L2i I' i

   '3' SMITH:   Sure, you are only looking for one gallon a minute.                                 You can
    't change anything you do to the primary system, to change the leak rate.                                        [

U!i [' I won't pursue that. Let me go on into some of Mr. Hartman's I MARTIN: [ statements.

   .8[                                                                                                                                                                    '.

I; 9' KIRTPATRICX: Tim, I would like to comment. If you compress the water

0( in the makeup tank, would that not appear to be an increased leak rate b since you reduced the volume?
2!

3l

  ' 4;                                                                                                                                                              ,

5 i

l i 13 ) l ! SMITH: I don't remember the equation, okay, the equation, they probably I have it here, okay, you got to look at what the computer 1caks at, ckay, you know, cause it looks at the makeup tank level, pressurizer level, you know, drain tank, temperature, you know, the T hots, T colds, I don't know the equation that well. ' MARTIN: Let's go back into. Mr. Hartman has stated that that was one ji l technique that was used, another technique that was used was to' add ' demineralized water, starting the transfer pump and cracking the valve ' l during the running of the test. Another technique that was used was i then the RCDT levels were not hard-wired into the computer, apparently l, there was a requirement to provide the millivolt readings to the computer at. the beginning and the end of the test and one of the ways to get a  ! lower leak rate was to overstate the final millivolt value such that l;' ' i you had an indication of higher identified leakage than you really did. He indicat.as that he did all three at one time or another and that j others did it. Were you aware of this? SMITH: The only way he could have used that is if he was doing hand j calculation, okay, cause the computer, the equations alreacy in the  ! computer, you don't have to feed the computer anything to 855 for a leak rate, you just, whatever that code is, you know, it does some I calculation to make what he says, you would have to go through the hand calculation.

14 MARTIN: Okay, I have a copy of the RCS test here, in fact I have copy of the computer printout. There are one, two, three, four, five entries thn operator must make. Some of them can be backed up by paper work.

                                                   ~

SMITH: He don't make those. ~ MARTIN: He doesn't make this entry, this entry, that entry, that entry, that entry? SMITH: (Unintelligible) Boy, it's been so long. Yea, I guess in Unit 2, okay, you do, we was using the digital, you have to, that's true. MARTIN: Okay, so I have to agree with Mr. Hart: nan, It is a technique that could be done. SMITH: That's right. he could MARTIN: He states he has done it. I am asking you, were you aware that your operators were doing it. SMITH: No, definitely not. b

15 I j CHRISTOPHER: Bernie, do you know of any instances where any of the shift foremens or supervisors encouraged any of their personnel to take any actions such as described by Hartman in order to get acceptable readings. SMITH: No I don't. MARTIN: Was Hartman under pressure to get good leak rates? SMITH: Mr. Hartman always felt he was under pressure, all rignt, no matter what it was. i: ti MARTIN: I Was his job in jeopardy for not getting the good leak rates?

                                                                                                    .        l.

I SMITH- , No, that was my responsibility, you know, his job was not in jeopardy.

                                                                                                           ,I I

MARTIN: Do you have any other questions on that area? l t KfRKPATRICK: What do you feel was the accuracy of the temperature j distribution as measured by the the temperatures during normal operation? SMITH: As I remember it's plus or minus 2 degrees. l i

  • l 16 l!
             }                                              KIRKPATRICK:   Okay, so it would be possible to have a couple hundred 2!
             !                                              degrees variation in the amount of water in the reactor just due to the 3t
inaccuracy in the temperature measurements.

41 5 SMITH: Yes, yea I believe that, yes sir. Si . 7 KIRKPATRICX: Now the leak rate was measured over an hour period, 8 right? ! Si 90i

 ~

i SMITH: That's true. 11! i KIRKPATRICK: So a 6 degree deficit of water would give you one gallon N , per minute leak rate. 14: E SMITH: Say that again now. 16; 17l KIRKPATRICK: It would take a loss of 60 gallons of water over a period 13I of one hour to give you one gallon per minute leak rate. 20i SMITH: That's true. 21{ 22{ KIRKPATRICK: However, the. temperature variation could easily give you 23l 200 gallon loss just due to the inaccuracy measuring the temperature. i 24! 2Ni r 3

                                                                                                                                       ,1 I

l

s 17 . ) SMITH: This is true. 1. KIRKPATRICK: . All right, thank you. l i CHRISTOPHER: Let it be noted that the last four questions were asked by Mr. Kirkpatrick. ' { t MARTIN: Okay I would like to move on to the next area which is related to the handling of safety concerns expressed by Mr. Hartman. I am i going to give you a list here. Mr. Hartman states that he informed his supervision of problems with the primary system leak rate, problems with the conduct of procedures for amergency feedwatar, failure to satisfy the appruach to criticality requirements on the. day that you weren't there, Brian Mehler was actually relieving you, repeated items of noncompliance of operators with procedures and this information was pcssed to his ' supervision orally and not in writing. Are you aware of I any of .these -issues? SMITH: Not at the present time, no. I would have to have more'in-forsation than 'that, ' MARTIN: If Mr. Hartman had brought to you a concern, how would you h have handled it?  ! 4 I! _ _ _ _ . - _ . - - . _ _ _ . - _ - - _ _ - - _ - . - - a

     .t l*

i ( H . l i 11

SMITH: Well, you know, just depends on what concerned, are you talking 2!
               !   about procedures?

31

               !                                                                                   l 4                                                                                            i MARTIN:   Let's say he brought you a s 'ncern that had safety substance          '

n* l to it, what would you do with it? Has he ever brought you such concern? 61 . I 7 SMITN: Mr. Hartman brought me a lot of concerns. I would have to have 8! some specifics, you know, I, my job is, you know, I would correct them or have them corrected, you know, it just depends on the circumstances, 10t "l 15L procedures, you know, I would make the proper paper work, the TCN, you know, things like that. MARTIN: Do you remember an instance where Mr. Hartman brought you a L4! safety concern and that you took some ac+. ion on it. LE! 6 SMITH: No I don't. bT l t di CHRISTOPHER: You mentioned that Hartman was always coming to you about 4 b something. By something, are you talking about everything frem <ai'ety l j % concerns, operations concerns, personal concerns that you are cate-gorizing him, that he spends a lot of time with you it would seem. What context are you talking about? 1 j SMITH: Everything. !51

19 l  : CHRISTOPHER: Everything. SMITH:- Yes, you know, I just felt that, you know, Harold, you know, .

                                   .cverything, especially towards the end, everything bothered him,'you know, too many, I think really the job was too big for him,-yet he was
                                   . technically competant but'under stress, you know, I don't think he performed very well.                                                                                         i
                                                                                                                                                 ?

l'

                                                                                                                                                 '1 CHRISTOPHER:    Did he ever give you any indications that whether they were being asked to or not, they were fudging calculations and records                                       ::

I to get the, to get acceptable readings on these various problems. Did i i you ever have any indication that he was not, you know, inputting ' accurate data into these various programs he has mentioned. ' l\ 1

                                                                                                                                               .      )

i SMITH: No, because I don't.think_Hal Hartman would do that. .In'other

                                                                                                                                            -l words, what he is talking about, the numbers, like that, I don't think                                    Ij he would do that.- I don't know-anybody that would intentionally do it, but Harold I don't think would do it, you know, he just absolutely, if                                    l        ,

I told h'im to write down a number that wasn't right, I don' t think he i. would, even though I wouldn't ask a man to do that, you know, we don't cperate that way.

1 20 gARTIN: All right, another question. Apparently Mr. Hartman surfaced a large number of concerns. Was his job in jeopardy because of the neber of concerns or because he was surfacing concerns.

                                                                                                                                          \

SMITH: No. His job was in jeopardy probably because of his ability to j work up there. Not because, you know, he complains, the guy's got a legitimate complaint, you know, that's not, you don't jeopardize your job that way. s CHRISTOPHER: Do you know of any indication where anyone indicated to

                                                                 ~                                                                        l him, this is prior to his actually leaving, that his job was in jeopardy                                           l

[ 6 because of his emotional stability in the control room. Was he aware ,1 t that this was viewed as a problem from management standpoint? [. [l SMITH: Yes, Mr. Hartman was aware of that. I O r I b How would you say that he was made aware of that. CHRISTOPHER:

                                       ~

SMITH: Because we, I had talked to him more than once about his attitude j toward the job and things like that. Of course, there was a couple l times that I think Brian Mehler was involved, that we actually had his relief brought in because he absolutely refused to do a job. That was , port of his job, you know, just part of his job.

i s. E'

        ,                                  U CHRISTOPHER:

ganyoucitausacoupleofinstanceswhereyouactually u had to have relief brcught in for him under circumstances you described. SMITH: I only know about them, okay, I wasn't involved in that, okay.

CHRISTOPHER Could you just give us an overview of what these involved.

i b

  . SMITH:

No, because you quote me on these, you know, I might not really  !

            ~                                                                                                         ,

know tne full details of them. i

               ,             3
                                                                                                                .l!  t k

CHRISTOPHER _: Well'let me specifically ask you about one and if you can li quota.on this. One of his, if you read the transcripts, there is a  !. I reference to the fact tbat he had better shut up or be fired. This-is j

  - in the Rosen transcript of the TV program and that is stated by Mr.                                            l l

Rosen and not stated by this individual, Hartman. But he relates that' j incident to a specific occasion involving Brian Mehler. The background ,

  ' is that they, he was in the control room on a panel during startup, that they were having a prolonged problem with continuous nuisance f

alarms going off, that as a result of 'that, Hartman asked Brian Mahler I to do something about the alarms because he couldn't concentrate and he-was apparently dissatisfied with Brian Mahler's response to that and stated that to the best of my recollection, -- if you can't do anything abo t it, get me a relief. And continuing the response, according to i

                                                                                   ,mm_.m.___.__-__-2._------

hfj.}; V

                    \ l0 4     .
                                        'g                           g e
          !             Hartman by Brian Mahler was -- that if you want a relief, you may as 2i j            well get your lunch bucket and go home.              Does this particular incident 31               -

l come to light in your 4,t I' ' I'll anma. r, that's true. 'And I think it was not going critical._ W FMITH: 6f I think we was going from'0 to M power, like I say, I don't want to be 7' quoted on that,- 8b i sf

   ;, ;1
              '        CHRISTOPHER:        I understand.
 '.0}

i SMITH: And like that's a pretty normal evolution, I mean it's ne big. j thingy okay and of course, big power plants I forget we have 1400

 $                     alarms, whatever.            We do get a lot of alarms anc there was ser.etning          i
 .41                                                                  '

like you real'1y don't set in the eentrol room all the time, okay, as E far is shift supervisors, and I think the order was given and like. ho l

 .Sl                  heats 'later when Brian 'came back, h* hadn't done anything but mean and 7

groen, I guess, and I think that is what it is all about. I think it 8 was the increase from 0 to 3 power as I ramemoer. St O! CHRISTOPHER: Did you get the indication that Brian did tell him or did 1 indicate to him that he could be fired, I'm using my words now, not 2 anyone else's, that indicates that he could be fired or that he should 3

    ,                 leave the plant if he wasn't going to do the job.              Is that how Brian e.xplained the incident to you or iid he not go into that kind of detail.

Si i

23 -. f 1 l SMITH: Well he didn't go into detail as far as being fired, you know, 21 .

      }

you normally don't use that term, but as far as being relieved on the 3 job, yea I believe that. In fact I think they did relieve him. " 4 I; li 5  !! CHRISTOPHER: Along this same line there was another incident during a , Si .. plant startup. Again this is according to Mr. Hartman, when the reactor , 7  : went critical below the estimated critical position and as he started, 8 a shutdown which to him was according to procedure, Brian Mehler cor- , 9l l rected his action and there was a dispute between them over that. Did DI l l Brian discuss that incident with you and whether that led to any type j i l of warning or disciplinary action or any*.hing like that. l I l SMITH: I read that statement, okay '. hat he has made in his testimony, 4l

   ,    and I think he's confused, okay, in fact he admits it at the end of it                    '

I t

   ,    as I recall.            But I don't ever rememoer going critical on Group 5, TMI        f 6i                                                                                                I And Brian Mehler you know, that's the first I heard it, 2, not ever.

i l when I read the testimony, okay, I just don't recall that incident at Of all.  ! I I 1 O! CHRISTOPHER: You are not aware of any time when Brian Mehler corrected I M an action he was taking in regard to a plant startup in elation to the 2 I critical position. 3l l 9 SMITH: No. l 5: l l

    ,      n 24'

, 1 . CHRISTOPHER: Okay. 2

         }

3: MARTIN: I have no further question. Mr. Kirkpatrick? 4 5 XIRKPATRICX: I don't have any more. 6i . 7' CHRISTOPHER: Bernie, we've. covered, these various areas related to 8 this man. Again none of us have any questions. Do you have any parti-91 cular comments that you would like to bring up, we would open the floor 10 j to you and to John at this point about this incident or anything else ll! i that you want to discuss. L2!' I L31

      ,          SMITH:    Well probably one of the things that bothers me about the whole
 '43 thing is, I don't know if this is applicable here or what, did the
 .5(

television: interview set up by some reporter institute all this, as far as you guys going back through this deposition made to tne NRC a year

 *71 ago or whenever it was.
 .S !,

9 CHRISOPHER:' The depositions made -- a year ago, originally. 0l MARTIN: The information that is available that was discussed by Mr. 2I R'osen in his TV program largely comes out of the May 22, i.e. investi-I 3! I gation transcript, subsequent deposition from a special inquiry group 4 and a tape. Each document supports the other, there's a common thread 5l I

1 25 1 b; { that goes through them. The early look at some of his concerns was to my knowledge initiated as a result of Mr. Rosen's inquiry to IE what was being done about the concerns raised by Mr. Hartman. It is my - L understanding that as NRC gets around to it, all the concerns and all - L the tapes will be looked at, but I don't.know that for.a fact. L i i 1 SMITH: The TV interview brought this to light. i - 1 CHRISTOPHER: It would appear that many, there were many areas at some l p I point, may or may not be looked into that were looked into today because  ! they were not related to the initial accident and that I think the .- scope of the investigation was confined to the problems surrounding the  ! i ] accident and items such as these which weren't related to that were put on a holding pattern until they could be gottan to when this TV program , obviously expedited to a certain degree. )! SMITH: It just seems funny to me, you know, you take an irate man, you l { know, he make a lot of statements to Rosen, I don't see how they justify l ' that, th'at's all, \ i d CHRISTOPHER: Okay, I don't have any further comments. L l l 1 MARTIN: John, any comments you would like to make, any further Bernie. e

       .        l v.

26 1 l SMITH: No. 2: i 31

                !    MARTIN:  Okay, at this time we'll conclude the tape of, again I remind 41 l     you that I will get you a copy of the tape as soon as we can get it 5

reproduced and get it back to you. We'11 ' conclude, the time is 9:46. Si , 7 8 1 9i i 10l C.! L2l l Cl L4 2,

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The purpose of this ing' airy by the U.S. 'Nclear Regulatory Ce:missit:n is to investigate the concerns and allegations of a former control rocm operator from Three Mile Island, Unit s2, regarding safety and operational , activities at this unit. You are asked to provide information in as much detail as you can regarding these allegations and provide any recommendations you feel may be useful. The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission was given the responsibility and authority by the Congress of the United States in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, to licensee nuclear power plants and to see they are operated safely to protect the health and safety of the American Public. It is from this Act and Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Inspection ar.d Enforce-ment is conducting this official investigation. You have the right to refuse to be interviewed. If you consent to an interview, you may have someone of your choice present. To assist in obtaining every comment, exactly as it is given, and to expedite the interview, your permission to tape record this interview is requested. You have the right to refuse to have the interview tape recorded. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commssion investigators will prepare a written record of your statements and request you to sign it. You have the right to refuse to give a signed statement. In the absence of a tape recording or a signed statement, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators will, to the best of their abilities, write your comments for inclusion in the investigative report. Upon your request you will be given a copy of your tape recording or signed statement. You have the right to request that your identity be protected and not used in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigation report. However, because of the deep concern over this incident by the American public and government officials, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot assure you that we will not release your name and interview contents if we receive official requests and requests by the public through the Freedom of Information Act. If specifically requested, all attempts will be made by the investigators to keep from disclosing to Metropolitan Edison or other parties specific information. You must recognize that this is not an absolute guarantee. Federal law prohibits your employer from discharging you or discriminating against you because of your interview with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

  . . + .

2 70ur holp niid cooperation in previ; ting information to the !'ucl.ur Recu14 tory Cc..aission will be appreciated. Questions

1. 00 ycu und.wstind the above? yes /? no /7
2. Do.we have your permission to tape the interview? yes W no 2 /
3. Do you want a copy of the tape? yes { 7 no {/

NW_ 5IGNATURE 3kv/rJ CATE 8904 NITNESS /.M/*A u h J b , 5 3 r)..s,. O- a9 a .) SIGi:ATURE ~ / OATE

                 >> m neur.<<-

TITLE NITNESS WW2 3/17/te cys y.- 31GNATURE ' OATE AA MJ TITLE f l l l l l

  *o R. i:oti.h Chcimp':.'r has intensified himself to rae as an f ovestigator of the fluclear Regulatory Cor..nission, an agency of the United States, which is performing an investigation authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.                I understand that any false statement made by ce during this                                      1 l

investigation may subject me to criminal prosecution under 18 USC 1001.

                                                             /
                                                               &W                    3 2.7 (interviewee signature) 8 C hf*
                                                   '"" * /*.K                f/a fjJC Yk             3/17/d7J 18 USC 1001                 Fraud and False Statements 1001.               Statements or entries generally Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than 510,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 749.

i SMITH, BERNARD 3/26/84 NRC 01

APit g 1994 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: Investigative Interview of BERNARD.G. SMITH Docket No. Location:Middletown, PennsylvaniaPages: 1 - 93 Date: Monday, March 26, 1984 l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l Coun Reporten j 16251 Street, N.W. Suite 1004 j

                                        % ut: g ce. D C 2%>                                                       l 1
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                   'l                                       UNITED STATES- OF AMERICA -
                   '2.

HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 .. ------------ ---.- X 4= In the Matter of: x X

6 Investigative Interview of x BERNARD G.. SMITH x 6 x
                  '7 Processing Center
                 '8                                                              General. Conference Room Three Mile Island 1 9                                                          Middletown, Pennsylvania l

10 Monday,' March 26, 1984

                'll                               The above-entitled interview commenced
              - 12         at 1:50 p.m. . pursuant to notice.

13 BEFORE: 14 PETER J. CONNOLLY,. Investigator BARRY R. LETZ, Investigator 15 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue 16 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 17 APPEARANCES: 18 JANE G. PENNY, Esquire Killian & Gephart 19 216-218 Pine Street . P. O. Box 886 20  !!arrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 (For Mr. Smith) 21 11ARRY H. VOIGT, Esquire 22 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae I 133 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 23- Washington, D.C. 20036 (For Mr. Smith) 24 25

          ._                                                                                              2 1                                 P ROCEED1NES 2          MR. CONNOLLY:    I am Peter Connolly.      .I am an Investigator 3    for the Nuclear Regulatory _ Commission Of fice of Investigation.

4 My ' associate is Barry Letz. 5 We are investigating for the Commission suspect 6 falsification of leak rates at Unit 1 in the pre-accident 7 period, and we would like to ask you a few questions about 8 that. 9 Before we begin, Mr. Letz would like to put you under 10 oath.  ! 11 Whereupon, 12 BERNARD G. SMITH 13 having been duly sworn, testified as follows: 14 DIRECT EXAMINATION i 15 BY MR. LETZ: l 16 0 Will you please state your full name and spell your 17 last name? 18 A Be rna rd George Smi th , S-m-i-t-h . 19 0 Your address? . 20 A Box 103, R.D. 3, Hummelstown. I 21 O And the. Zip Code? l I 22 A 17036. l l

                   .23          0       Before continuing, will you please take a moment and 24     look at 18 USC, Section 1001 dealing with statements?

25 ( Doc ume n t handed to witness.)

p '._ _ 3 ) 9 1 Os Do you understand that? 2 A .Ye s . 3 0 By whom are you currently employed? -l 4 A. GPU Nuclear Corporation. s' O In what capacity? 6 A Rad Waste Operations Manager. 7 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 8 0 For which unit? 9 , A Unit 2. , 10 0 Unit 2? l 1 l' 11 A Yes. l l 12 0 How long.have you been in that capacity? 13 A Last ye ar, Janua ry. 14 0 January of 1983? l 15 A Yes. l i 16 , O And before January of '1983, what was your position? l 17 j A Shift Supervisor. I 18 0 Which unit? 19 A Well, when you say "which unit," really, I was 20 assigned to Unit 2, you know. I don't know how long, but 21 basically it was for both units. 22 0 You were dual licensed then? 23 A Yes. 24 0 How long were you a dual licensed shif t supervisor 25 A I really don't know. I really don't remember the _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - _ ._ -I

[' 1 r4 l' 4: l l 1 date. 2 0 Not the date, just the approximate time, I 3 approximate year you began.  ! l 4 A Probably four years, I guess, we were dual licensed. 6 O From 1978 that would have been? j 1 6 A I don't know when we took the exam to tell you the 1 7 truth. 8 Q So, from approximately 1978 up until January of 9 1983 you were a dual licensed shift supervisor? 10 A Yes. 11 0 Before you became a dual licensed shift supervisor, 12 what was your position? 13 .A Shift foreman. i 14 0 Any particular unit at that time as shift foreman? 15 A Yes. , i 16 l 0 I came here as a shift foreman in Unit 1. i 17

          ,        o   When did you come here as a shift foreman?

l 18 A January 1 of 1968. 19 0 And prior to January 1 of 1968, where were you , 20 employed? 21 A I was employed with the same company, only, of 22- course, Met-Ed, and then-I was at another power plant, 23 Portland Station. 24 0 What is your date of birth, sir? 25 A June 14, 1936 j i i

t.7 5 1 0 And what is your academic background? 2- A Just high school. 3 Q How many years have you been employed with Met-Ed/. 4 GPU Nuclear? 5 A 25. 6 O Did you have Navy nuclear experience? 7 A No, I didn't. i 8 O We'are going to try to limit our questions to 9 the pre-accident period, specifically the area we are looking 10 at in.regards to Unit 1 is the. time frame of-April 1, 1978 11 through March 29,.1979. 12 You indicated that during that time period you were a 13 dual licensed shift supervisor, is that correct? 14 A That's correct. 15 , O Could jou please explain to me what your j i! 16 responsibilities were as dual licensed shift supervisor? l 17 lI A My responsibility was, you know -- well, that's a 18 hard question. Responsibility of both units, you know, on 19 shift. All people reported to the shift supervisor. , 20 0 When you were a shift supervisor, you covered both ' 21 units, is that correct? i 22 A That 's true . 23 0 Did you spend any more time at any one particular 24 unit than the other unit? 25 A Overall average, I probably spent more time in

(-

 . r8                                                                                                                                                1 l

1 Unit 1. b 2 0 Was there any reason why you spent more time at l 3 Unit 17 4 A No, not really. 6 0 What were your responsibilities with regard to 6 RCS leak rate surveillance tests? 7 A My responsibility was just, you know, eve ry thin g , 8 you know; people follow the tech specs. 9 0 What was the document that instituted tech specs 10 for RCS leakage? What was the particular surveillance 11 procedure? Do you remember the number for Unit 1? 12 A No, I don't remember that. 13 0 How was the leak rate test run in that time period 14 at Unit l? 15 A On the computer. I 16 ; O And the same for Unit 2? l 17 A Yes. j 18 0 Which operator would perform the tests? f 19 A Any of the CROs. , 20 0 How often would the tests be run at Unit I? 21 A Once a shift. 22 0 What was the tech spec requirements? How often 23 had that been run? 24 A As I remenbe r , e ve ry 72 hour s . 25 0 I believe the 72-hour criteria was for Unit 2. Do

ur9- 7 l 1 1 1 you know what the criteria was for Unit I? j 2 A No, I don't remember. 3 O Was there any rationale behind running a test every 4 shift? 5 A No; it was just administrative procedure we done. 6 O Do you know the reason why it was run every shift? 7 A No, I' don't know that. 8 0 You are familiar with the tech specifications 9 limiting conditions for operations which places. limits on the 10 amount of RCS leakage during operating conditions, is that 11 correct, on both Unit 1 and Unit 2? I 12 A I don't remembe r the numbers anymore , no. 13 O Are you aware that unidentified leakage, according 14 to the tech specs was required to be below 1 GPM? 15 A Yes. 16 0 And if this 1 GPM unidentified leakage was excee. ; i 17 l what action was an operator required to take? 18 A Do you want me to quote that , or what? l 19 O To the best of your memory. , 20 A I know you go in an action statement, and it was 21 different for the two units, I believe. I don't remember what 22 t he n umbe rs we re . 23 0 Did you, yourself, perform leak rate tests? 24 A No. 25 0 The leak rate tests were performed by the control

F, rio >

                        'l_.

i F I 1 room operator? 2; A That's correcs. 3 0 Generally, during a shif t, how many control room 4 operators would be in the control uroom? A Probably on the average of two. That's each unit. J 6' l 6 0 one operator would work the console, is that.correc t?ll 7 A Yes. I 3 0 And the other operator would be known as a switching g and tagging operator? A Yes, that's correct. That's just a term we use. go 11 0 Of,those two operators, who normally would perform 12 theileak' rate test? 13 A .Normally, I probably would say the switching and 14 tagging men. 15 0 In .the physical presence, where did he run' the We are talking about 16 leak rate tests in the control room? t 17

                              ' Unit 1 right now.

ja A I don't remember where the computer was anymore. He used to run it off the Belly 855. That's right in gg Yes. 20 the center of the control room. 21 0 It is in the center of the control room? 22 A Yes. 23 0 When you say the " center of the control room," 24 you mean right where the console is? A No. You know, the console is here and the Belly 25 i

9 f 21 1- '855-sits right here, just about six feet-back or something 2- like that. 3 O' Is there any obstructions'that would block the 4: individual running the control room console and from the 6 individual' who was running the computer program? 6 A No. 7 O Could both individuals see each other? l l 8 -A Yes. l 9 O Do you know if operators were experiencing problems 10 obtaining good leak rates at Unit l? 11 A No, not to my knowledge. 12 O Were there problems with leakage exceeding tech' 13- specs at Unit I? 14 A- Not to my knowledge, no. 15 0 Do you recall any specific problems with unidentified: l 16 leakage at Unit l? 17 A No, I don't. 18 0 How would you describe Unit 1 in terms of leakage? 19 A I d0n't understand the question. 20 0 Some people we have talked to described Unit 1 in 21 terms of leakage as being a tight plant, that they had 22 minimum problems unidentified or identified leakage. 23 Would you agree with that statement? l 24 A Yes, that is probably a true statement. 25 0 Do you know if all surveillance tests that were l

                         .I

10 r18.

                         '1 conducted were required to be recorded in the control room 2   log book?

3 A As I remember, yes, they are required to be 4 recorded. j 6 0 Do you know of any RCS leak rate surveillance 6 tests that were deemed to be invalid and thrown away in Unit I? l 1

                                                                                                                            )

7 A It wouldn' t be unusual. 8 0 What criteria would an operator use to' determine 9 if a leak rate surveillance test was invalid? 10 A The criteria had to be less than one gallon GPM. 11 You mean if it was invalid? 12 O Yes. 13 A Well, say you got a ten-gallon-a-minute leak rate 14 or something like that or a minus-eight or whatever. Really, 15 I don't know what the cutoff was, t 16 Q As you know, this has become an issue in the i l 17 leak rate investigations both at Unit 2 and Unit 1, which was -i i, 18 the throwing away of the tests. I. 19 Are you aware of any tech specs that prohibited the , i 20 throwing away of what was deemed to be invalid leak rate l 21 tests? ,, 22 A No, I don't know of any that said you couldn't. l' i: 23 O And do you know if tests were thrown away? l N 24 A Yes. mi O Who would make the determination of the tests that ll l' _.-__..--__-..______..___.________________j

r4 3 31 3 1 could be thrown away? f i 2 A I would say the shift fore man . 3 Q Was the shift foreman generally the one that would j 4 make that decision, or would the control room operator 5 individually make'the decision? 6 A 1 think he probably talked to the shift foreman. 7 Normally, that's how it was. 8 0 Did anyone ever discuss with you the throwing away 9 ef the tests?. 1 A Yes. 15 0 can 'you ' remember any specific incidents in which k 12 the discussions were held-with you? 13 A No, I can't remember that. 14 0 Was this a company policy at the time or just a 15 practice that was adopted in the control room? 16 A Probably a practice, i 17 , O Reading the surveillance procedure with regard to 18 RCS leakage; this is surveillance procedure 1303-1.1 which was 19 in effect as the time in the pre-accident period regarding , 20 leak rate surveillance procedures at Unit 1. 21 In Section 6.4.2, it states, " Ensure that no unaccounted 22 for operator action has occurred that would change the  ! 23 RCS in ventory (see Section 3.1 for listing of possibilities). 24 "If such an action has occurred, it invalidates the 25 me a s u re men t . Enter this in the ' remarks' section of the data

                                                                                                      '32 rt 4 1'   sheet clearly ' describing the action that invalidated the 2    measurements."

3 Reading that particular paragraph, could you interpret 4 .that paragraph to mean that the invalid tests should have

                              .5   . been kept on file and that the comment should have been made 6    in the remarks section regarding why the test was invalid?

7 A I don't think it says that. It says -- because 8 when you go to Section 3.1 ---I don't know what 3.1 says, 9 but it probably says something about changing power levels l 10 or adding water or something. 11 0 3.1 is limits and proportions. 3.1 says: " Avoid 12 addition and removal of water from the reactor coolant and 13 makeup systems during this test. The following operations 14 snould be conducted during this test: makeup or chemical 15 addition to makeup system." We have here A, B, C, D and E. 16 A' So, if you do any of those, then it becomes 17 invalid. 18- Q But the surveillance procedures require that a l 19 comment be made in the remarks section of the test? . M A Yes. 21 0 Stating why it was invalid? 22 A That's right. l 23 0 was that done at that time? i 24 A Yes, sir. 25 O But to your mind and to the knowledge of the other

rl 5-; 33 1- operators and shift foreman and shift supervisor, it was not 2 a requirement that the invalid test results be kept? 3 A That's right. 4 Q Do you know if other surveillance procedures 6 besides RCS leak ~ rate surveillance procedures were thrown 6 away when they were deemed to be invalid? 7 A No, I have no knowledge of that. l 8 BY MR. LETZ: , 9 Q Bernie, would an invalid leak rate result -- would 10 that generate an E and D or a deficiency report? I 11 A No. 12 O What would the E and D report be used for? 13 A For all normal other surveillance, okay, other 14 than the shift surveillance. E and D sheets are attached 15 right to the procedure. l 16 Q For other than shift -- 17 A Other than leak rates, yes. 18 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 19 Q Why wouldn't they be attached to the leak rates? ' 20 A Because the leak rate comes out of the computer, j l 21 It is just a green piece of paper. There was no requirement ! l 22 to attach the E and D sheet to them.  ! 23 BY MR. LETZ: 24 0 You stated that it was a practice that invalid 25 tests results would be discarded. Where did that practice  !

              $" ~                                                                                         J4 1   originate?

2 A I would imagine Unit 1. I don't know whoever 3 originated this. This is where we started business , you know. i 4 O How about at what level as far as chain of command 6 or management level? 6 A Probably on our level. 7 0 On the shift supervisor level?

8. A I would say so, yes.  !

9 0 It was towards that from higher management that 10 you can recall? i 11 A No. . 1 12 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 1 13 O But it was a common practice at the time to throw 14 away the tests at Unit 1 and, likewise, at Unit 2, is that i 15 correct? 16 A That's right. 17 0 In regard to Unit 1, was the throw away of the tests l 18 an attempt to prevent the NRC f rom reviewing derogatory f 19 information about leak rates? . 20 A No.

                                                                                                                  )

21 0 There was no ulterior motive in throwing away the 22 tests? Z3 A No. 24 0 Did you personally have a responsibility for 25 reviewing control room operators' 1ogs and shif t foremen's logs

i 15 i T17 i ) 1 and attesting to their accuracy? 2 A As I remember, the supervisor of operations was 3 required to do that once a week. , f 4 0 The supervisor of operations at Unit I would have i 5 been Mike Ross' i 6 A It depends. When are we talking about, April of 7 1978? 8 0 April, 1978 through March of 1979. 9 A Yes. 10 0 And Jim Floyd would have been at Unit 2? j 11 A That's true . 12 Q Is there any reason why the starting times were' , l l 13 not entered for surveillance tests, RCS leak rate surveillance; ) i 14 tests in the log books? 15 We have reviewed the log books for the test and we note 1 16 that completion times are listed but not starting times. i l 17 A I . think our requirement was you have to list the 18 surveillance completed as satisf actory or unsatisf actory. > 19 Q Yes? , 20 A I don't know if there is anyplace that says you r 21 have to log it at the start of the surveillance. 4 22 o You are not aware of any requirement in the 23 Administrative Procedure 1012 regarding that? 24 A I know about 1012, but I don't know what it says. 2 O Was there a motive in not recording the starting

l r F0 '

                                                                         *6 I

j g times of the test because of problems obtaining valid leak 2 rate tests? A No, no. 3 ( 4 0 When would a surveillance test be recorded in the j i s" log book? Would it be cone immediately af ter the tests or at 3  ! 6 the end of the shift? 7 A Normally, immediately after you complete an evolution , you know. You write it in the log book in a 8 g reasonable amount of time. 10 0 Was it common practice in either Unit 1 or Unit 2 11 to discard surveillance tests that came out unacceptable such 12 as RCS leak rate tests? A You have to repeat the question. 13 Q Was it common practice to throw away surveillance 14 15 tests other than RCS leak rate surveillance tests?

                    ^      O' 16 37 0     Again, can you explain the rationale why leak rates 3g were thrown away and not other surveillance tests?

A The rationale is because it was an invalid number, gg y u know. We don't just keep invalid information. The re 20 21 w uld be no sense to it. 22 O Are you aware of any operator obtaining a leak rate which exceeded the tech spec, doing the test over by making 23 w ter additions or hydrogen additions and coming up with an 24 25 acceptable leak rate, and thus using that test as a valid leak

! z.19 17

                                                                                                                                                               ~

1: rate test and throwing the first one away? 2- A No, 'I have. no knowledge' of that. 3 0 That is'either at. Unit'l or Unit 27-4 A No.

6. O What was supposed to happen with test results'that 6- did not meet tech specs? 'If you had a test that exceeded 7 the 1 GPM tech-spec, what was the procedure? What was the next.

8 step? 9 A Beyond 72 hours? 10 0 If I ran a test -- and let's limit our questioning

11. to Unit 1 right now, l'

12 A Okay.

                                 -{

I 13 O If I ran a test, let's say, on the midnightsshift-14 and.I came up with a leak rate test exceeding l'GPM, what 15 'was I required to do?- 16 A Well,'I don't know what the-time limit is in' Unit 1. 17 ' Evidently, you know. Was it 48 hours? 18 0 Unit 1 is 24 hours. 19 A And it is beyond the 24 hours? m) O No, within the 24-hour timeframe. 21 A The operator would probably run another leak rate. 22 0 And if he came up with a leak rate again exceeding 23 the 1 GPM, what would have been the next step? 24 A Probably run another one . 25 0 Do you know of any instances where an operator ran

W80 ' )g l: 1 a leak rate- and he did exceed the 1 GPM tech spec at Unit 17 3 2 A Af ter 24 hours? 3 0 Within the 24-hour clock. 4 A I have no knowledge of any one particular. person 6 doing thatl no. l 6 0 Is it your understanding that if I am within the L 7 24-hour clock and run a leak rate surveillance test that 8 exceeds the 1 GPM, I have until the end of that 24-hour clock 9 to. come up with a good leak rate? 10 A That's right. 11 I Q Do you know any prohibitions that prohibited that? 12 A I don't recall of any, no. 13- 0 Do you know where it states in'the procedures'that 14 you could do that? 15 .A It doesn't say you can't do it either.

   .t                      16-            0                 Are you saying it was left to the discretion'of the<

1 0 17 individual operator? 18 A Yes. 19 0 I asked you this before, but I would like to ask, i m) it again: how would an operator determine if an RCS leak

21. rate surveillance' test was valid or not?
22. A In other words, you are saying it was greater i

23 m than 1 GPM?  ; 24 0 Sure. 25 A I am sure he would look at the plant parameters,

                        .          .a.

. r3 L ' yg 1- you'know, the makeup tank, pressurizer, power level and be 2' sure it wasn't, you know. If he suspected it, it becomes a 3 dif ferent ballgane. j 4- O Did operators experience problems obtaining 5 satisfactory leak rates at Unit l? 6- A No, not normally. I~can't recall of any.

                     -7             BY MR. LETZ:

8 0 You mentioned that the rationale for discarding

9. tests was there was no point in keeping invalid' test data 10 ' aroun d? l 11 A That's true.

12 Q Is-it possible that in any of the other surveillance 13 tests that they would come up. with invalid data for any number 14 of reasons?- 15 A Yes, that's possible. i 16 0 But you did' state that those othe r tests , excluding i 17 the leak rate tests, were retained. Leak rates were the only. 18 ones that were discarded? 19 A Well, because we had another nechanism. We had, i E) E and D. In other words, if you couldn't meet the exceptions  ;

                                                                                                                )

21 criteria, there were things to be done.about it.  ! 22 O By attaching the E and D repo'rt to any other tests? 23 A Right. 24 0 But they were, in fact, retained. Only leak rates 25 were discarded?

  .i
-    -.-__----_.---a      -

20 1 A That's right.-

      .2       BY MR.' .CONNOLLY :
3~ O .Did_ you, yourself, ever throw away any invalid ,

i 4 leak rate tests? th A I don't recall. I wouldn' t know why I would have  ! 6 any reason to do that. 7 0 Because of your position, you did.not run leak rate 8 tests yourself? 9 A That's right. 10 0 You also indicated that you are not aware of 11 problems with excessive leakage or unidentified leakage in 12 Unit 1 in this pre-accident period? 13 A I don't recall of any. I 14 0 Do you'know what level management was involved 15 in a decision to invalidate leak rate tests? ' Who made that 16 decision? You. indicated.it was a shift foreman earlier. 17 Did you, as a shift supervisor, make that decision at 18 times? 1 19 A Yes, I would have, yes. , 20 0' Can you recall any specific instances where you 21 might have made that decision? 22 A No.

23. 0 . hat was your relationship in regard to the 24 Supervisor of Operations at Unit 1, Mike Ross?

25 A I don't know. He was just my boss. Socially? L I

r2T . 21 l 1 O We will leave it on the business purpose basis. 2 But what was his responsibility or responsibilities with 3 regard to you and the individuals in the control room shifts? 4 A His responsibility.was to see that, you know, 5 the plant was in a safe condition at all times, you know. 6' He was 'just the boss. 7 O -Did Jim Floyd and Mike Ross have collateral duties 8 at both units?  ! l , 8 A Yes. 10 0 By collateral duties, I mean did they at times 11 both work at Unit 1 and Unit 2? 12 A While they were Supervisor of Operations?

                                             ' 13                          0     Yes.
                                              '14                         'A     I would say no.              They had no reason to.

15 O Were they required by their license to spend any l 16 time in the other's control room? , 17 ~A I' don't recall of any, no. 18 0 This is a specific question regarding Unit 2:  ! 19 I don't know what you testified in the Grand Jury and so forth , 20 but are you aware of falsification of leak rates at Unit 2 by 21 operators? 22 A Yes. 23 Making water or hydrogen additions? 0 24 A Well, that is an accusation. 25

g-  ?? ]

                                                                                                                                                              )

l 1 BY MS. PENNY: 2 O Are you aware of the accusation? 3 A oh,.yes. .Okay. 4 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 5 0- You are aware of the accusation? 6 A Okay. 7 0 But my question is: do you have knowledge of an 8 operator falsifying any records? 9 A No, I do not. 10 0 We are trying to determine if Mike Ross was 11 involved in any way with Unit 2 in this pre-accident period. 12 Can you remember any instances where Mike Ross would have 13 been involved in Unit 2 operations? 14 A Prior to the accident? 15 Prior to the accident. O' 16 A I don' t recall of any, no. I don't know why he i I 17 need be. 18 O And. vice versa, do you know if Jim Floyd was 19 involved in Unit 1 operations? , f 20 A Like I say, I wouldn't know why they would be I 21 involved. 22 O Pretty much their responsibilities was to their 23 respective units? 24 A Sure. 25

                 ._ r25-                                                                                                                                  23 4

i 1 BY MR. LETZ: 2 Q Although each one was responsible for their own-3 unit, did Mike Ross spend any time at Unit 2 during the pre-4 accident period? I t 5 A I don't recall of any, you know, significant amount  ! 6- of time. I don' t remember that.

                               -7            0     Would Jim.Floyd have any occasion to have regular                                                             I 8     dialogue between the two, comparing problems of the two units?

9 A I.am sure they did. 10 0 The professional type exchange of information type 11 of thing?

12. A Yes.

13 BY MR. CONNOLLY: i i 14 Q Are you aware of negative leak rates being obtained  ; 15 at Unit I? 16 A Yes, I am sure there were . 17 Q Do you know what was causing the negative leak 18 rates? 19 A Well, it would probably be the computer , N- ' calculations that would cause them, you know. It is just 21 the software.. 22 0 Were there problems with the computer sof tware 23 with regard to leak rate surveillance procedures in Unit I? l t 24 A None that I know of.

                                  %5           0     Do you know of any discussions on operations

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - .a

rib 24 , I 4 1- management would have had with regard to prob 1 cms with the 1 2 leak rate program? 3 A I don't recall of any specifically, i 4' Q In Unit 2, do you recall any problems with the I I 5 leak rate computer program? 6 A Yes. We did have software problems in Unit 2 on 7 the leak rate calculations. 8 0 What were those sof tware problems on Unit 2? 4 9 A It is beyond the scope of my knowledge. I don't 10 know that. 11 0 Did you have similar problems in Unit 1 with regard 12 to their software? 13 A I would say no, not that I know of. 14 BY MR. LETZ: 15 0 would Mike Ross have been aware of the policy of I 16 discarding invalid leak rates? 17 A I am sure he was, yes. 18 0 Was that something you discussed with him? 19 A Well, I don't know if I discussed it with him. , ; 20 I don't recall that, but he was the shift supervisor at one l l I i 21 time before he was promoted. i 22 C And you believe he was aware of that policy? 23 A Yes. 24 0 But was it a policy that he directed you at your 25 level to do?

l l

 -                                                                                                                                                                              25 1                              A                                        No.                                He wouldn't do that, no.

2 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 3 O Are you aware of any instance, either at Unit 1 or 4 Unit 2, where a shift supervisor requested the plant be 5 shut down to repair a leakage and that request being denied? 6 A No. 7 0 If, as a shift supervisor, there was excessive 8 leakage, did you have the prerogative to shut the plant down? 9 A Yes. 10 0 Did you have to get anybody's permission before 11 you would shut the plant down? 12 A Not permission , you know. I would have to notify 13 a couple people, Supervisor of Operations. You have to justify 14 it with the superintendent. 15 O But you don't recall any particular incident at i 16 jeither Unit 1 or Unit 2 where this might have occurred? 17 A No. i 18 0 If you went to the plant and found leakage , how 19 was that documented? , 20 A Wait a minute. The question isn't very clear. 21 Where are we? 22 O You are in Unit 1. If there is a leakage prcblem 23 and it is identified as exceeding tech specs, unidentified 24 leakage, how is that documented? 25 A Your first statement said it was identified and i

i B -- y, l

1 then you changed and said unidentified. 2 0 ' Excuse me. Identified. If you found an identified. 3 leakage, identified leakage was discovered, how was that 4 documented?

        '6           A     I don't remember that anymore, to tell you the 6    truth.

7 0 Likewise, unidentified leakage, if you recall? 8 A I don't know where'we logged that. 9 0 Do you recall any discussions in the pre-accident to period in which it was mentioned that they would keep Unit 2 11 on line until Unit 1 was ready to come back from its refueling 12 outage? 13 A No, I don' t recall any statement like that. 14 0 or any conscious management decision to keep Unit 2 15 on line until Unit 1 was ready to come back? 16 A No. 17 O Are all water additions to the RCS inventory 18 required to be recorded in the control room operator's log bouh' 19 A I would say yes. , 20 0 Are you aware of any instances where an operator 21 would have added water during leak rate tests and not record 22 that in the control room log book? 23 A No, I don't recall. 24 Q If an operator added water during a leak rate test, 25 how was that to be documented? Would an entry be made in the

27 Lr }9 - 1 computer program that water had-been entered? 2 A Yes, you could do that. 3 0 Can you recall any instance where an operator 4 might have added water and then af terwards found out that 5 water had been added and still accepted the test as being 6 valid? 7 A No, I don't. recall anything like that. 8- Q The mechanism of adding water at that time , who

9. Would make a decision on the water?- First of all, where would l

10 the addition of water be made in the control room? 11 A In the control room on the console. , 12 O So, would it be generally the console operator 13 that would make the water addition? 14 A Yes, sure, u 15 Q Is it a possibility that'at that time the console l L 16 l operator could have made a water addition without informing-l 17 i the operator who was performing the leak rate test that water il l 18 l,was added? 19 A Yes, definitely. , 20 0 Do you know if any of those instances did occur? 21 A No, I have no, you know -- I couldn't put my finger 22 - on one. But I am sure it happened. 23 Q If that did occur, would that have invalidated the 24 leak rate test? 15 A Yes. i 1

j 3 6- ' gg 1 0 And would it . require that the test be done over? 2 A Right. 3 Q. Are you aware of any instance where that might. have 4 occurred, but the test was still accepted as being valid? 1

6 A No, I am not aware of that.

6 -- O. Are ,you aware of any instance where the leak tech 7 spec for an unidentified leakage was exceeded and the operatorE

         .8    conducted another test, made an unreported water addition and 9   the leak rate test fell within the test spec limit, and that 10    ' test being accepted?

11 A No, I am not aware of anything like that. 12 0 Are you aware of any operators deliberately 13 adding water to the makeup tank in order to af fect a leak 14 rate test? j 15 A No. 16 0 Or where operators jogging water additions to the l. 17 makeup tanks during the leak rate tests? By " jogging," I mean 18 any small increments of water during the leak rate tests. 19 A No, I am not aware of that. , 20 0 Would there have been a motive for an operator to 21 ' cheat at Unit I with regards to the leak rates? Motive is i 22- that they were having problems maintaining tech specs. 23 A No, no. -{ 24 0 Was there any pressure exerted on operators to 25 cheat on leak rate tests by management personnel? l I i

'r3P 29 1 1 1 A No. 2 O Do you know of any operator specifically directed 3' to manipulate a leak rate test by any. managenent personnel? 4 A Well, I don't know what you menn by " directed." 6 That was just part of your job, I mean. 6 0 When I say " manipulate," I mean in the connotation l 7 'that-to wrongfully change a leak rate test. 8 A No. l l 8 0 Are you aware of hydrogen additions being made l 10 to the makeup tank during leak rate tests in order to affect 11 leak rate tests? 12 A I don't really recall of any instances, no. 13 O Do you understand how an addition of hydrogen 14 would affect a leak rate test? 15 A I don't understand, no. 16 0 Were you aware at that time if hydrogen was 17 added, the leak rate test would be affected?

    - 18             A   I have heard that rumor.                                  !
    ' 19             O   But you, yourself, were you aware of that fact et 20     that time?                                                            !

f 21 A That's true. I never believed it. 22 O So, you are indicating then that you did not know 23 the effect of hydrogen on a leak rate test? 24 A I don't think it af fected leak rate tests.

25. O How was hydrogen added?

f

_r32. 30 l 1 A From the console. 2 0 And was there a button pressed, or what was the 3 mechanism?

                         .It is just opening.the nitrogen valve into the              !

4 A

    ;6       makeup tank.

6 Q How often was hydrogen added?- 7 A I have no idea. You just follow the graph that was 8 on the console. I have no idea how of ten. 9 0 It was added to maintain a steady pressure, is that 10 correct? 11 A Right. 12 Q- Do you remember what that pressure ban was? 13 A I have no idea. 14 0 Generally, it would be the console operator who 15 would make the hydrogen addition? 16- l A Yes.  ! l 17  ! O And the same operator would make the water additions? 1 18 A Yes. 19 Q If I was an operator conducting leak rate tests,and 20 the other operator added hydrogen while I was conducting the , 1 21 test, would that invalidate the test? 22 A I would say no. I 23 0 Why do you say no. 24 A No one has ever proven to me that hydrogen af fects 25 leak rate tests. I always felt that the leak rate would go up l

, T33-3) 1 instead of down. 2 0 Were hydrogen additions required to be recorded ,

                                                                                                             )

3 in the CRO log book?  : 4 A I would say no. s' O Would hydorgen additions be considered a chemistry 6 addition? 7 A No. l 8 Q Why not? 9 A Because hydrogen is.not a chemical. I don't think 10 that was required to be logged in the log book, as long as 11 you stay within the pressure boundaries. 12 O Did you ever witness any hyodrgen additions that 13 did affect leak rates? 14 A. No, I didn't, no. 15 BY MR. LETZ: 16 . Q You say no.one has proven to you that hydrogen I i l 17 additions would affect'the leak rate tests? 18 A Yes. 1 19 Q But if anything happened, you think it would , 20 actua11y'make the leak rate increase? j 1 21- A Increase.

                                                                                                               )

22 O Why? <

                                                                                                               )

23 A Because you put more pressure in the tank, and 24 you know, water leaks out. 25 O So, by putting more pressure in, you are going to

3? r34 1 force more water out of the system?  ; 2 A Yes. 3 0 And, consequently, actually obtaining a larger 4 leak rate? , 6 A Right. That's the way I always felt. 1 1 1 6 O And you still believe that? 7 A Yes, I do. 8 BY MR. CONNOLLY:

       .9            0      Were you aware of problems with Unit 1 makeup tank 10      level recorder?

11 A No. 12 Q Are you aware of INC personnel periodically 13 blowing the dry reference light down on the makeup tank instrumentation and coming up with water when they blew the. j 14 l 15 line down? l 16 A I don't recall that. 17 0 I have several maintenance memos that I would like 18 to have you review that highlight this specific problem 19 with the makeup tank level recorder. , 20 The first one I would like to show you is work request 21 number 23660 dated 4/28/77 and signed by Larry Knoll. i 22 In the comment section, it says, " Makeup tank level 23 recorder is not responding correctly. Put in 100 gallons 24 record one up eight inches or 240 gallons. I f you change 25 makeup tank pressure four pounds, level changes 1.8 inches." J

             .                                                                                         1 1

I

~ rM 3.1 1 And the initials'"WTF,"'which I believe is an anachronism 2 for -- do you-know what WTF stands for? 3- A Yes.

     '4-         0-     Go ahead and say it.

5 A What the fuck. 6, MS. PENNY: Off the record. 7 (Discussion off the record.) i 8 MR. CONNOLLY; Back on the record. 9 BY MR. ' CONNOLLY :

    .10          0       On top of it, it says, " Cancelled.                                                              Covered by                 q 11  ' refueling surveillance."     Then "M.T."            Do you know.whose 12   initials ?!.T. are?     Could it be Mike Toole, maybe?

13 A- Yes, it could be. 14 0 The next one I would like to show you is work 15 request number 21284 dated 9/12/77 and signed by Paul 16 Schleckey, control room operator. 17 Section Number 3 says, "Added 200 gallons to the makeup'

                                                                                                                                                       ]

l 18 tank with batch control makeup tank level recorder responded

                                                                                                                                                       ]

I 19 . With the level indication of.300 gallon addition. Suspect, 20 makeup tank level transmitter investigating correct. " 21 On top of the document, it says, " Cancelled. Covered 22 under surveillance , 1302-5.17," which I believe is a maintenance 23 A Maintenance surveillance to blow down re ference 24 light. 25 0 I think there was a surveillance procedure for

r 36 34 l 1 instrumentation for calibration? 2 A Yes. 3 0 The next document I show you is work request 23904 4 again signed by Paul Schleckey dated 5/16/78. 5 Section 3, "While adding hydrogen tt the makeup tank, 6 received makeup tank high level alarm. Level indication on 7 console and computer about 79 inches. High level alarm set 8 point is 96 inches. Investigate and repair is necessary." 9 On the top of the page, it says, " Cancelled. Covered to by work request number 23952. " 11 And 23952 which is dated 5/23/78 signed by Ken Bryans 12 states in Section 3, " Makeup tank levei increases ten inches from an addition of 100 gallons. Should only increase by about 13 14 three inches. We don't really know anymore what the makeup 15 tank level really is." 16 On the second page of the work request in Section 19, it 17 states, "Ron Mensrum, Mike Cockley unclogged line transmitter 18 and checked calibration, turned over to Jim Freeman to calibratc 19 transmitter, complete in the calibration." , 20 In the testimony of those individuals, we ascertained 21 what they did was they blew down the dry reference light to l 22 correct the problem. 23 I have one additional work request. It is number 24843 signed by Gordie Lawrence. He was an INC foreman, I believe, 24 at the time. It is dated 8 August, 1978. It states in 25

6 ~1 M k 1 Section 3, " Transmitter / recorder eratic. Spec reference

    -2     light has moisture .in it. "                                                                                  o 3          The  second page of Section 19, "Diew down low side.

4 Got a lot of water." 5- Why I show these documents to. you was apparently ,they 6 were experiencing problems with the. makeup tank level 7 recorder, and they periodically had to go and blow the dry-a reference light down. g My question to you is: were you aware of this problem 10 in this period? I 11 -A No, I don't recall any of those. 12 O Would something like this' problems with the-13 makeup tank level recorder, would that have been discussed 14 - 'with shift supervisors? For ' example , on the May 2 3, 1978 15 document--I believe it was 23952 work request number and signed 16 by Ken Bryans -- originated supervisors' signatures also, 17 '- . Ken Bryans' signature. 18 Ken Bryans was a shift supervisor at that time? 19 A I will say yes. , m BY MS. PENNY: 21' Q Do you know? 1 22 A No, I don't really know. 23- BY MR. CONNOLLY: , 24- 0 Would this be discussed with other shift 25 supervisors?-

~'                                                                                                 3f 1              A       Yes.    'I am sure-it would be.

2- 0 So, if this problem did occur, the probability was

   '3      it'was discussed with you at that time, but you just don't 4      recall?

6 A I don't recall. Things like that would be in your 6 shift turnover. 7 0 The reason why.it is becoming an important issue 8- is because apparently it was causing the collection of water 9' in the dry reference light and also the problem with the 10 makeup tank level recorder was due to the existence of a 11 loop seal in the instrumentation system. 12 Are you' aware of the existence of a loop seal? 13- A No,;I am not. 14 Q Do you know if any individuals were aware of the 15 existence of'a loop seal in the pre-accident period? 16  ; A I don't know any specific person, no. 1 1

    -17               o      Did any control room operators indicate to you                                    l 18       'during discussions that they were aware of the existence of                              f-j f

19 a loop seal? , 20 ~ A No. I don't recall that. 21 BY'MR. LETZ: 22 0 Were you aware of a loop seal with reference to M Unit 2? 24 A No, I am not. I don't reme mbe r . i, l l' i 25

rW 37 1 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 2 Q Did you have the opportunity to review the results 3 of the Fagory and Benson Report regarding the Hartman 4 allegations in Unit 2? i l 6 A No, I didn't read that. , 1 6 0 Thare was no discussions among management personnel 7 regarding the results of that investigation at Unit 2? } l 8 A Which investigation?  ! 9 Q The Fagery and Benson Report which was a licensee's 10 okm investigation into the Hartman allegations. 11 A No, I don' t .cecall any talking about that. 12 O Because in t'r at particular report, they did 13 identify the existence of a loop seal at Unit 2. 14 But the loop seal does allow a small addition of hydrogen 15 which will affect the leak rate because of existence of this , 16 ' loop seal?  ; 17 A I don't know. I don't recall any of that. 18 O As a dual license shift supervisor in this 19 pre-accident period, you indicated you spent time both at , A) Unit 1 and Unit 2? 21 A Yes. 22 0 Do you know if the operators and the shif t foreman 23 from both units also spent any time in each other's contro) 24 rooms? 25 A No, they would have no need to. h I

e40 38 I I i 1 Q What was the relationship of the operations 2 personnel with Unit 1 and Unit 2? What was the- relationship 3 of.those folks? Was there a business relationship with them? 4- A No, not really. 6 Q A professional relationship? 6 A Because, you know, both units just run by.themselven There is no reason to bother the other guys in the other- unit. 7 8 0 The common factor would be the dual licensed shift 9 supervisors, though, since they worked at both units? 10 A Yes. 11 Q 'What was the rationale at that time of having

     -12       dual licensed shift supervisors?

13 A The rationale? We were no different than anybody 14 else. 15 0 Why wasn't there a shift supervisor for Unit 2 and 16 a shift supervisor for Unit I? 17 l A Not required. You would have one senior person . { l. : 18 on site, and he was it. 19 0 Physically, where would you be located during a, 20 shift? 21 A Either unit. We had an office in both units. 22 Q And you would go back and forth between both units? M A Yes. 24 0 Did you spend any specific amount of time such as o 25 the first four hours of your shift at Unit 1 and then last four 3

r 44 39 3 .at' Unit 2? 2 A It was usually broke up because we relieved in I 3 Unit 1 in that shift supervisor's office. So, you would always. i

    .4   be there.for, say, the first hour.                                                                                                                    It. depends on what is 6  acing on.

6 If we were 'in the middle of a startup, or something 7 like that, I night spend a whole eight hours in Unit 1. 8 -O Or vice versa? 9 A 114, or vice versa, to 0 Is there a way that we - can determine how' much time 11 you spent at either unit? Did you record the time that you 12 spent in each control room? 13 A No. 14 0 There wasn' t any clock to punch or anything like l 15 that? 16 A No. Just went where the action was. 17 0 As the shift supervisor, were you a member of 18 PORC at that time? 19 ,A No, I was not. 20 0 Did you then attend. POD meetings? 21 A Yes. We go to POD. meetings if we were on dayshif t. 22 0- Do you know if any discussions were held at POD n meetings regarding leak rates at either Unit 1 or Unit 2? i 24 A I don't recall of any, but I am sure there were. 25 0 How often woula an individual such as Mike Ross

r42 40l t 1 spend in the control room during the shi f t? 2 A That also depends on what is going on. A normal 3 day evolution, you know, nothing going on, probably two hours. 4 0 Yos? 5 A Like I say, if he was having a startup, you know, he 6 would be there eight hours probably. 7 Q Where was Ross' office physically located in terms 8 of the control room at Unit l? 9 A On the turbine deck. i 10 0 So, he would not be physically in the control room 1 l 11 itself? 12 A No. 13 Q His office would not be in the control room area? 14 A No. 15 Q L ewise, in Unit 2, where was the supervisor of 16 operations' office? 17 A In the trailer. 18 Q In the trailer. So, he would be outside the l 19 building totally? , N A Right. 21 Q If Mike Ross cane up to the control room, you say 22 sometimes for two hours and other times longer, what would he 23 do? Would he oversee? 24 A Oversee what I was doing, yes. 25 0 Would he oversee what the operators were doing?

 . 94 J                                                                                                                     1 43 i

1 A Definitely, yes.

           -2.           0-    How often would the strip charts for the makeup 3      tank be reviewed?

4 A It is under continuous surveillance by the CRO. 5 1 don't know what you mean. 6 0 Okay. Management review, supervisor review? 7 A Probably never unless, you know, we were having 8 some kind of problem. 9 0 Did you review the makeup tank, the strip chart? 10 A I don't remember ever sitting down and reviewing 11 it, no. 12 Q Was the strip chart calibrated at the time? 13 A Well, our rules here, as we said, all charts and 14 recorders have time on them. Okay? What they do is adjust i 15 them all at midnight. If it is ahead or behind or if it is

          -16      richt on, all you do is mark the chart, stamp it and put the 17     time and date on it.

18 0 Do you know if Mike Ross had any knowledge of 19 problems with the leak rates at Unit 2? g) A I am sure he knew what we were doing in Unit 2. 21 I don't know what you mean by " problems." 22 0 .Did you have problems with leak rates at Unit 2? 23 A I think we had a few more invalid leak rates in 24 Unit 2 than we did in Unit 1. 25 O Do you know what was causing it?

  • 1 C -
          ^
                                                                                                            'd (rI4 ~        I.                                                                                             q l                                                                                              ,J 11 A     We had sof tware problems wi th the com.) uter in-l l                                           -

i L '2 Unit 2. I L ,3 ;0 Do you know if Mike Ross was aware of that? l' 4 .A I am sure he was. , 1 6 0 How would he become aware of that? Would he be i 6-involved in those problems himself? 7 A We]1, you know,'we all' talked. We all work at the  ; 8 same place. -1 don't know, you know; like Jim could have 9

                  'said something to him.

to 0 ~' This is a presumption on your part? i 11 A Right. I have no knowledge, really. 12 BY MR. LETZ:  ! 13 0 Do you ever recall discussing specifically with 14 11i 'e 'Ross the problems at Unit 2 regarding leak rates?- 15 A No. 16 0 Would you have had any discussions -- again being

         .17' dual licensed -- any discussions with the shift foreman even 18 at- Unit' l regarding problems experienced at Unit 2?

A I am sure I have, yes. 19 . 0 You would be aware of both plants? 20 21 A Ri ght . 22' O And you would discuss those with the shift foreman 23 , at Unit l? 24 A Yes.  ! 25 Q Specifically with regard to the leak rates, do you

4.* . 1 r4 5 43 1 recal) any discussions-2 A No, I don't. 3 liY MR. CONNOLLY: - 4 0 Did the shift supervisors have any periodic meetings 5 witn the supervisor of operations? l l 6 A You mean on a one-to-one basis? j 7 0 As a group? , 8 A As a group? 9 0 Yes. l l 10 A Yes, we used to have shift supervisors meetings , 11 yes, l 12 O How often would that occur? , l 13 A Once a month. 14 Do you know if minutes were maintaine.d at those 0 15 reetings? 16 A Yes, they were. 17 0 Do you know if they are still on file? 18 l A I have no idea. 19 0 Who would maintain the minutes of those particular 20 meetings? 21 A fie , 22 O You would. What would be done with those minutes 23 a f ter the meeting was completed? - 24 A It was sent out for distribution, you know. We had - 25 action items on there and we would send them out to whoever had

r eb s 1 the action item. You know, there were certain things that 2 had to be done. 3 0 But you don't know if those particular minutes 4 are still on file, though? , 6 A No. 6 0 You don't know if they are on file or do you know, 7 in fact, that they are not on file?  % 8 They are not on file. A { i 9 0 In those particular meetings, what would be the - 10 topics of discussion? 11 A You know, plant problems, personnel problems, i 12 you xnow, the whole bit. Everybody on the same level talks, 13 you know; the superintendent would be there. ' 14 O The superintendent at that time would be Mr. Mehler, 15 or the superintendent for each unit? 16 A It could be all three of them. 17 O So, it could have been said for the period under 18 discussion that Mr. Mehler, Mr. Silinger, Mr. Ross, and there n 19 are still the licensed shift supervisors? , 20 A Yes. 21 O And the topics would range from actual operations 22 to a personnel action?

        %3            A     Yes.

24 0 Do you know if any discussions were held in those 25 neetinos with regard to leak rates at Unit l? I s

                                                                                ,s 14 1 -

1 A I don't recall. , 2 0 Likewise, discussions at the meetings with regard 3 to Unit 2 leak rates? 4 A 1 don't recall. 5 0 In those particular meetings, would there be a 6 crossover from Unit 1 to Unit 2? Would Unit 2 personnel , 7 attend the Unit 1 meetings? Was it strictly shift supervisors e and Unit 1 personnel? g A No, 1 and 2. 10 0 They would be together? 11 A Right. . i.- 12 0 You are not aware of any discussions in wnich - 13 either problems of leak rates with regard to Unit 1 or Unit 2 , 14 were discussed? 15 A I don't recall of any, no. , 16 0 In regard to the recent plea bargaining agreement 17 between Met-Ed and the Department of Justice in which it was 7 18 admitted that leak rates were falsified, did that surprise you? 19 A Yes. , . 20 0 You were not aware -- had any information prior 21 to that that leak rates were falsified? 22 A No. 23 MS. PENNY: Excuse me. Wasn't it admitted that the leak 24 rates were falsified? I think that was part of the nolo plea. 25  ?!R. CONNOLLY: Okay. Part of the nolo plea.

4 a.. ., ., J4 11 46 I ) 1 BY MR. L' ;NOLLY : 2 0 Did it surprise you.then that leak rates were 1 falsified in Unit 1 -- excuse me, Unit 2. 4 A Yes, the whole thing surprised va. ... 6 0 What was the~ motive for operaters to do that at' . 6 Unit I? What we are trying to determine is if there was a ~... 7 motive. Was there a motive at Unit 1 for operators to cheat 8 t on leak rate tests? , 7, . ,

                                                                                                            *+

d' 9- i A Not to my knowledge, no. . At Unit 2, was there a motive for operators to \ 10 Q A.  : 11 cheat on the leak rate tests? 12 A No. x I ., 13 i O Was there a perceived problem with leak rates at ..

                                                                                                                                   }

14 Unit 2? . I A I think we had a software computer problem. That 15 q,

                                                                                                ?                   '

16 is a known fact, but as far as falsifying, I don't know 17 i anything about that. 18 Q Therefore, in summary then, you were not aware of .

                                                                                                                              ?

19 any ope rator at Unit 1 deliberately altering a leak rate test 20 by making hydrogen or water additions? gg A I am not aware of any, no. 22 O Or aware of any motive that would cause an operator ,

                                                                                                                #         ,)

23 to do so? -'" j , 7 24 A No. 25 Q Or aware of any management pressure exerted on . ,,

                                                                                                                  ]N J                                                                                                 'N..

N ,'.' > ,' ' e

            'j d 9                                                                                                                                1 47      l l

1 operators that would force'them to cheat on tests? 2' A No. . 3- 0 Or any managenent direction for an operator to 4 manipulate.a test by the hydrogen or water additions? _ 1 6 A No.  ! 6 O Are you aware of any instances where feed and 7 bleed operations would occur in the test and still be , 1 8 accepted as beine' valid? 9 A No, I am not aware of any , no. 10 ' O If a- feed and bleed operation did occur during the i 11 ' leak rate tests, would that have invalidated the leak rate 12 test? 13 A Yes, j 14 0 But you are not aware of any specific instances j I 15 where that occurred? l 16 A No, l i 17 0 Could it have occurred without the knowledge of 18 ltheoperatorwhoranthetest? 19 A I am sure it could hove , yes. 20 0 That the feed and bleed operation would be l 21 generally performed by the operator manning the console? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Are you aware of any other method an operator 24 might have used to obtain a good leak rate test besides water 25 : or hydrogen additions?

            '                                                                                4F 45.0                  '

L l' A No, I ' a F: not. L -2 O Do you have any information;at all regarding 3 r aisification' of leak rate test - data cither Units 1 or 2 that 4 you haven't discussed with us today? A No, I don't. 6 O Has anyone admitted to you that they have knowledge 7 of the f falsification of the leak rate tests at either Units 1 8 or 2? 9 A No. 10 Q. Has anyone admitted to you that they know of someone 11 who has knowledge of_ the falsification of leak rates at either 12 units? 13' A' No. 14 BY MR. LETZ: , 15 0 Was there much general discussion between the 16 CROs , between the two units , as far as problems they were 17 experiencing? 18 A I would have no knowledge of that, you know. They 19 probably did, you know, if they were personal friends or , 2 something like that. But they had no reason to call from 21' one unit to the other. 22 O You, as the shift dual licensed supervisor, would 23 have been the person who would have transmitted common  ; 24 problems between one or the other? 25 A Yes. Every morning or every af ternoon we had a

f ,. 49

      .IL meeting,.or whatever.       It depends.

2 Q But' to the best of your knowledge, there was very 3 little daily communication?

    '4          A      Right.

6 Q On a CRO level? i l 6 A Technically, anyway. 7 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 8 Q How come you left the Operations section? Why did 9 you leave Operations? 10 A Well, I am in the rad waste business, and I also 11 gave up my license. 12 O Is there any reason why you did that? 13 A Yes. The hassle; I am getting too old. 14 0 You we ren ' t -- 15 A I went over to Unit 2 and I got permanently assigned 16 there, you know, and then they made the job come up. I never 17 ws:t ted t'o go back to Unit 1. 1B Q That was a voluntary decision on your part then? 19 A Yes. , 20 Q Before coming here today and discussing with us 21 these questions, did anyone from GPU brief you in regard to 22 the questions and answers? M A No. 24 O Did anyone from the conpany instruct you on the 25 answers to provide to our cuestions?

1 l152 ; :L 50 1: A No.

2 O In your current position, you have no dealings L

a with Unit-1, is that correct? 4. 4 A That is not really true. They have a rad waste

              . 6'     operation manager in Unit 1, also.

6- Q Th'at is Brian Mehler?

      .                         A     Yes.

7

                ,               0     What 'is your. relationship with Mr. Mehler?

A There are two rad waste operations, but there is

              .g.

nly'one shipper. The shipper is the guy who brings in the lo u 3g gas and uses.the crane. So, we both use him, you know, hand  ! in hand. So, basically, our dealings are just scheduling 12 and' things like that. 13 0 Did you, yourself, have any dealings with 34 the Operations Department at Unit'1? 15 A *

             - 16 l

r Q In regard to the Operations Department in Unit 2, 37 . what is your relationship to the Operations Department? 18 A e , becaus the operators perform all my work for 19 me -- I mean the shift operators -- so, I have a lot of 20 dealings with the shift foreman and the shift supervisor every

             . 21 L

l 22 d a." .

                                               ~

0 W uld that be the same thing in Unit 1, also? 23 A No. They have their own people in the Rad Waste

             - 24
              ;g        Operations Department.

rj3: 53 1 'O I am talking about the individual, Mr. Mahler. 2 .A Right. 3 0 What is his relationship to the Operations Departmer.t 4~ in Unit 17 5 A Not quite as much as mine, because he has his own < 6 staf f of ' people. He uses utility people instead of operators. 7 0 Whereas, in Unit 2, you use operators?

         -8            A      Right.

9 BY MR. LETZ: , 4 to 0 I have two last questions, Bernie: you believe 11 that all the leak-rate problems associated with Unit 2 were 12 the' result of the sof tware problem with the -computer? 13 A .Yes. l 14 - 0 And you did not feel a similar type problem existed l

       .15      in Unit 1, is that correct?

16 A That's right. 17 BY MR. CONNOLLY: 18 O Was that problem ever addressed, the software 19' problems, in the pre-accident period? Were attempts made to 20 correct the software problem? 21 A Yes, definitely. 22 0 LWas it finally fixed, the software problem, before E 23 the accident, or were you still experiencing difficulties 24 right up to the accident? 25 A- Yes, .right up to the accident.

                            '                                                              5;:

I 54 ' 1 Q Again, what was causing the software problems? That is beyond the scope of my knowledge. I am not 2 A 3 ' in the computers too much. 4 0 But'that was not discussed at any shift supervisor I 5 meeting or anything? 6 A I am sure it was. I am sure it was. 7 0 But you just don't recall, is that correct?  ; 8 A Right. 9 O Who would have been the responsible individual in 10 regard to the software? Would that have been Bill Fels? 11 A Him and Washick. 12 O Bob-Washick? 13 A Yes. 14 0 Bob Washick is assigned to Unit 1, I believe, right 15 now? t 16 A That's right. 17 O And so is Mr. Fels? 18 A Yes. 19 O Can you compare the leak rate tests performed a,t 20 Unit 1 versus Unit 2?  ! 21 A No. Were they compatible? Let's put it this way: did 22 O 23 you consider the leak rate surveillance tests at Unit i to be I 24 a valid surveillance procedure, to be a believable surveillance 25 procedure? W--_-__________ _,

~" r5S 53 l 1 A Yes. 2 Q At Unit 2, did you believe that the surveillance 3 procedure was valid and believable? 4 A The procedure, all right, but I am saying the 6 sof tware problem is the problem, not the procedure because 6 the procedure, all you do is walk up to the typewriter and 7 type it in. It does its thing. 8 0 So, then there was some doubt about the credibility 9 of the leak rate surveillance test at Unit 2 because of the 10 software problems? 11 A That's right. 12 O But there was no similar doubt in Unit 1 about the 13 tests because there was no similar problems with the sof tware? 14 A That's right. 15 MR. CONNOLLY: Do you have anything else? 16 MR. LETZ: That's all. 17 MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you. That concludet our questioning. 18 Thank you very much. 19 (Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the interview was concluded.,) 20 21 22 23 24 25

r5p 1 CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDING 2
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 3 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation 4 In the matter of: Investigative Interview of Mr. Bernard G. Smith 6

Date of Proceeding: Mor. day , March 26, 1984 6 Place of Proceeding: Processing Center, General Conferenc :e 7 Room, Three Mile Island 1, Middletown, Pennsylvania l 8 was held as herein appears, and that this is the original 9 transcript for the file of the Commission. 10 l 11 A. J. Plese i 12 Official Reporter - Typed 13 14 l 15

                                                                          ,_  ff Q Official G@orter - Signed 16 17 i

18 19 . 21 I 22 n 23 24 i

t SMITH, BERNARD 4/25/84 Stier Investigation O

April 25, 1984 DEPOSITION OF BERNARD G. SMITH: Taken at Three Mile Island Middletown, Pennsylvania Time: 2:35 p.m. Concluded: 2:45 p.m. APPEARANCE: ROBERT T. WINTER KIRSTEN, FRIEDHAN & CHERIN 17 Academy Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 t I i SMITH B. GEPHART, ESQUIRE ' j KILLIAN & GEPHART ' 216-218 Pine Street Box 886 I Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108

                                                                         'i l

t l I i i CAPITAL OTV pEgpTING SErNCE DwcE u eEw so#4 s Aio. HAM %V sPA 17108

                                                                       .____-__i    _

4 2

                                         -INDEX TO WITNESSES
                -Deposition of Bernard G. Smith l

l. i I I l l l 1 .. I  : l l I l CAPI'At OTY RE@ TING SErNICE CWA AE7 v FEDEM SQJA"4 S'ATOs HADQt$&M, PA 17108

3'  ; BARNARD G. SMITH, called as a witness, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1 i BY MR. WINTER: Q Berncrd, could you please give your full name for the record, please? A Bernard G. Smith. G for George. MR. WINTER: For the record, my name is  ! l Bob Winter. I'm an attorney and working with Ed Stier. My firm has been retained by GPU to take a look at some of the  ! questions that the NRC has raised in respect to the operation I of Unit I and more particularly problems with the Leak Rate l Tests that were run at Unit I. l I I suppose a good way to. start, Be.rnie,  ; I' would be for you to give a brief work history up until say the accident in 1979. l A I was assigned to the project January 1, 1968 as a Shift Foreman, Unit I, and I got promoted to Shift Supervisor. I really don't know that date. It was probably '72. Then there was duel license sometime in '74 for i both units. Q Now, in '74 Unit I was operational? l A That's true, yes.  : CAPITAL CITV QEPORTING SErMCE

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I 4- I I Q Of course Unit II was not?  ! l h That's right. l

                          -Q-    So I assume, therefore, that you spent                    ;
           .obviously most of your time working Unit I?

A Yes, I did. Q Did there come a time when you did spend a substantial amount of time at Unit II? j A Yes, during the early part of testing i and of course the hot functionals testing of Unit II.

                                                                                   ,    l 0     Would that have been a substantial portion !           ]

of 1978? A Yes.  : I - Q Have you had an opportunity to review your transcript from the NRC7

         !                                                                              I A     Yes, I did.          I read this morning.              j Q     I've had an opportunity also and for the               !

I

         ; most part my questiens are going to be limited to the areas I

that were covered by the NRC. I probably will not go through i much of what they discussed with you, but I have some questions , i about some of those areas.  ! What I would like you to do if you could is explain to me the process or the course of action that the CRO's and the people under your supervision would follow in , , respect to running a Leak Rate Test, and perhaps you could CAPITAL CITY PEPCGTING SErMCE D? awe 4 U FEDER SQJGE STATION HATDSfd5 PA 17108 l

5 I start from the beginning when you were at the Unit I. I A well, we run a Leak Rate every eight hours. That was every shift, to meet the tech. specs. That was an administrative limit that we run it every shift instead . of every day. . i { It's more conservative to do it that way. i The CRO would just basically just type into the Bale 855 typer. I forget the code name to turn the Leak Rate. If the number was bogus, invalid he would run another one. If the number come up true, greater than one he would check all the plant parameters and make sure we didn't have a leak and he would also run another one. l  : O Let me take a few steps back. The CRO j l would run a Leak Rate? I I  ! A Yes.

       !                    Q      Basically on the computer?                                              4 I

i A Yes. O And he would get a result--let's deal  ; i in hypothetical. Suppose the result that he obtained from the first Leak Rate was above one g.p.m. , what. step would he follow from getting that first piece of data which was above j one g.p.m.? A He would check all the plant parameters.  ; CAPiiAL OTY REPORDNG SETNCE cnAws u FEDEw scuAM s Anon HIMSR.rc. PA 17106

6 That's power level, make-up tank level, drain tank level, ox .i building sump level, and the complete plant parameters were checked and if he saw nothing wrong he would run another Leak Rate. In the meantime, he could also have ox i operators which is'the people out in the plant check for leaksi around the plant. O And then he would get the result of the second Leak Rate, is that correct? A Yes. Q What would happen once the result of the second Leak Rate was obtained? I A When it was a good number? Q Assume it was a good number. What would he do with the two pieces of data he had at that point in j j time? A Keep the good one and throw the old one i I away. , O When you say the good one, how would he i i make that determination; how would he know which one is good? l A I would say the Shift Foreman would , probably make that decision. He would make it for him. l 0 And that would ba based an evaluation that I

         )

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7 he would make?. A Yes, sir. O Could you explain that evaluation? A He would go through the same thing. He'd check with the ox operators as far as did they find a leak j or where were they in the plant at that time. Did they walk the whcje make-up system down in the ox building and things like that. Q Let's assume that the first result was a I negative Leak Rate, would this process be followed for the most part with negative Leak Rate? l A No. O Then the process you just described was for Leak Rates that primarily were above one g.p.m.? A That's true. Q Let me give you another hypothetical. Let's assume that there was a Leak Rate Test result, first result of .8. What are the possibilities in terms of what 1 l a CRO would do with that? A He probably--everytime you run a Leak Rate there are certain things you can and can't do. I don't remember right now, but you still go through looking at the J plant, the plant parameters to check certain things, did he f CAPR OTv PEPORTING SEfNCE ] CGAWE0 V CEDEM SQUARE STATION hap?$6 TG PA 17108

I 8 f I add water to the make-up tank or did he do this or that.  ! i l If not, this is a valid Leak Rate. Q Were there times in which Leak Rates were e obtained below one g.p.m..in which second Leak Bater, were ) run in order t6 determine whether or not the plant was leaking  ; or what the true leakage might have been? A Were there times you say? Q Yes. A Yes. I wouldn't see anything wrong with that. I don't remember if there were any, but I'm sure-- there's nothing wrong with that, substantiating the data.

                   ,                                        Q                                        We have been talking about Unit I.                                                      At Unit I were there occasions in which this process of
                    , examining the plant for plus one g.p.m.'s.was entered into                                                                                                                     !

I 4 j landafterasecondtestandadeterminationastothe vslidity of the second test, the first test was thrown away? l A I guess you have to repeat that question. . I missed the first part. O Were there times in which there was a Leak Rate Test run. , A Okay. , O And the result was a one plus 9.p.m. The j second test was tegun and the evaluation made of the plant l I l CAPITA Ciiv REDOQTING SErMCE DQAWIQ U TEDEW SQJADE STATION sA7? % PG &A 17106

l- @ ( .. i 9 conditions, and the second test came back which was below one g.p.m., and a determination made that that second test l was valid and the first test which was above one g.P.m. be thrown away? A I don't remember any particular incident. I'm sure that was done, yes. O Do you recall how this course of action, this policy, developed? Do you recall a specific point in time'when this course of action was followed or was there a i different practice per se early on? A No. It was always done that way. We don't keep invalid data. , .

                                                                                                                                       ;       i 0      Since you were there basically from the I

beginning, do you recall a discussion or anything like that j lthattalkedaboutthisisthewaywe'regoingtodoLeak l l l Rates and this is--  ; I A No, I don't remember that, i i O You talked a little earlier about doing one every eight hours, which I assume is every shift? . A Yes. O Do you know how that got started? i A No, not really. I don't know. We are alwayr moru conservative when it comes to tech. specs. It  ; probably was easier to set up and run it every shift then say CAPITAL CITV pdPORTING SEfMCE DGt.v.tp p FENGet SQUA?! STAiiON HAIMtS(kDG PA 1710E

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10 every other shift. You_have administrative control on every i shift so you don't have to skip one. It's easier to control. O Some people reca11'and some don't a parti-cular event where Unit I early on for a 24 hour period was missed or almost missed, and Mr. Herbein as a result of that formally set.the policy although it's not written, where one every shift would be done so that this problem wouldn't  ! l occur. A That sounds like him, yes. I wouldn't deny that. He was the boss. Yes, that probably did come from him. O You don't recall that specifically? A No. O In terms of it coming from him? , 1 A No. O I know you mentioned a few moments ago some of the things that a CR0 would do in checking plant I conditions. Could you try to elaborate a little on that for me? A Well, to run a good Leak Rate you have to have a stable plant. I mean really stable so that things I mentioned before that would say the plant was not stable. Make-up tank level, sump level, power range indicators, you CADTA. t C& QEPORTING SENCE DM/,U U :EMR $QUADE STA?@ HAT &$8tDG PA 17108

O 11 know, the whole gamut. Q There came a time when you were spending more of your work day at Unit II, and of course I assume that i the Leak Rate you were supervising at times when Leak Rates  ; I l were run? A Yes, I'm sure. O Could you give me an idea what you observed with respect to the results of the Leak Rates at , Unit II as :3mpared to Unit I when you were spending more  ; time at II? A There was more invalid Leak Rates in l Unit II than there were at Unit I. O In what respect, when you say invalid, j j t were there substantially more negatives, more positives, or I both? f , A Both. It was harder to get a Leak Rate t in Unit II then Unit I. l O The practice of discarding invalid Leak Rates and the decision that would go into that, was there a sort of a standard evaluation process and a standard value that was practiced by everyone or was it more of. a haphazard decision making process in terms of who would make it and what i standards would be used? l l l - k 1 l CAPITAL OTv REPORTING SErMCE or; Ave u FEDE% SOUAM STATO. j HArs%DG PA 1710A l l

D 1 12 A Well, I don't know what you mean by haphazard. In other words, all Shift Supervisors feel the same way? Q Yes. Did they use the same measure as to what would be discarded and what wouldn't be discarded? A Generally the same, yes. O By same, what do you mean? A In other words, if you had a minus three Leak Rate you would run another one. If you had a minus point or a minus 1.6 you would probably keep it. I'm just using ballpark numbers. If you had anything greater than one of course I you would always run another one. i O Do you recall anyone bringing a plus one '

  .l g.p.m. to you in sort of indicating he thought that this was a '

serious problem and that perhaps the plant ought to be shut down, or that some measures ought to be taken to take care of  ; i I the problem of these constantly one plus g.p.m.'s at Unit II? A No, I don't recall anyone doing that. O Do you recall anyone doing that at Unit I? . A No, I don't recall. No. O Did you or do you know of anyone who o CAPITA CITv r<EPORTING SErNICE DGAWEP V FEDE% SQUAM 5'A'O, HADQ%rG PA 17108

13 thought that Unit II should be shut down because they were getting repeated plus one g.p.m. 's, and they thought there was ~ a problem with leakage and having this request turned down by management? A No. Q Did anyone bring a Leak Rate Test result to you and have you advise them you didn't want to see this

       " shit" anymore?

A No. I don't recall any incident like that. O Did you receive or did you put pressure on anyone to insure that they were providing good Leak Rate

     , Test results?

A No, other than doing our normal job. } That's just normal routine work.  ! i O Would you discuss with your CRO's and l l with your Foreman their responsibilities in respect to getting a Leak Rate every shift? i A Yes, I would. . Q What kind of a discussion would you have i I with them? l A Especially when it was getting late in the l

     ] shift and we didn't have a Leak Rate whether invalid or                 i valid. You would have to sometimes remind them, because a             l l

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14 Leak Rate, you know, it only takes two seconds to do. Just punch the computer and it takes an hour for it to spit it out. The guys get busy doing things, you know, and they forget about it. It's just normal routine that you have to bang them on the head. O Do you remember ever having a discussion with anyone about keeping Unit II on line until Unit I came back? A No. O Do you know of any CRO's who added hydro-gen to the make-up tank in an effort to affect the Leak Rate Test results? j A No, I don't. O Did you ever allow this on your shift? A I really wouldn't have any control over that if the operator-- I O Did you know at that point in time at Unit II of any operator who was adding hydrogen in order to affect a Leak Rate Test result and get a favorable result? A No, I didn't. O Do you know of anybody who added water to ) i the make-up tank in an effort to get a favorable result on the Leak Rate Test? . I CAPITAL OTv PEPORTING SEfMCE j DGAWEG U FEDERA SQJARE STATCW j spSBJG PA 17108 l l I

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15 j j A No, I don't. l 0 Were you aware at the time of the effect of hydrogen, the addition of hydrogen, on the make-up tank

                                               . . .                                         1 indicator, and that it would indicate an increase in water in the make-up tank?

A Was I aware of that? 1 Q At that time. I A No, I was not. MR. WUTTER: Okay. That's it. l l I hereby certify that the testimony taken by me 1 in the within matter is fu31y and accurately indicated in my notes and this is a true and correct transcript of.th_e same. x '

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                                         ,c k me.        2.. . f . _ha_( L ~ -

Kimberly hhallin, Court Reporter , i I l i CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErMCE [DAWER U - FEDERAL SQUARE STATION HAppsrG PA 17108

1 1 i i 1 t l SMITH, BERNARD ) t ( 2/8/85 j l s Stier Investigation 1 1 l 1 l l l 1 i l i

i Ili RE: T!!I II LEAK ltATE TEST PRACTICES DEPOSITION OF BEltNARD G. S!!ITil l-l

                   ;                          Verliatin transcript of deposition

. I held at Trailer 110B, Three !!i),e Island, !!iddletown, Pennsylvania,

                   ,                         on Friday, l

I I Pcbruary 3, 1983 11: 13 a.rt. 4 l l ! l APPEA1:AFCr.S: l lEDWI!!11. STIER. 1::iQ!! IRE l i 333 Littleton Ro::d

Sttite 10?

l Par::1ppriny, lieu Jer:tey 07054 l P : Fill.DERICP P DcVESA, ESQUIllE l Tot- - GPU Uuclear KILLIAN 6 GEPilAPT i 216-21P, Pine Street l Post Of fice Box P!m j l Harrisburg, Penne; h ania 17108 l BY: JAFE G.. PE!El", ESQUIRE i N ,'D l' I I C@rta CITV REPOQilNG SErMCE re<.vxi : - rE:xM soumE reoJ  ! u e r.n c n. ca

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l 2 . i

                                                                                 ;       1 APPEARANCES:          (Continued)                                      I l

LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. i ! Washiri3 ton, D. C. 20036  ; i I BY: HARRY H. VOIGT, ESQUIRE I 1 l l l For - Bernard G. Smith j I l l l i i

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, i l i 1 3 2 MR. DeVESA: Bernie, my name is Fred DeVesa 3 and I have been retained by Ed Stier to assist GPU in its ! 4 investigation of leak rate testing practices at TMI II. i ! 5 Before we begin discussing these practices (i with you today, I would like you to be sowrn in by the 7 reporter. 8 BERNARD G. SMITit, being duly fi sworn, testified as follows: 10 DIRECT EXAMINATION. I 11 BY MR. DeVESA: l I l 12 Q Bernie, were you questioned previously about I in l your knowledge of leak rate testing practices at TMI II? I li A Yes, j i 1, Q Specifically do you recall that you were j j i in questioned on March 26, 1984, by investigators from the Nu- l 1 17 clear Regulatory Commicsion? 1 j l i I 18 A Yes. . j t in q And do you lcnow if a transcript was made of l i 20 that interview? I 21 A Yes, it was. i 2-2 Q llave you had an opportunity to recently re- , 23 view that transcript? I i y i 24 A Yes, I did.  ; 2:, Q After having reviewed the transcript, are 1 l CAPITAL CRY RUGilNG SEfMCE i I J nW : ;J lil 41.'A' */ f IAfd ST A1V If j I i le ' ? " l f . I '/ 1/ ie )!, 2 j ____ )

t 1 4 2 you satisfied that the information which you provided to the a NRO at- that time is accurate to the best of your recollection?' 4 A Yes, r, Q Were you also interviewed by Mr. Winter ti from the firm of Kirsten, Friedman & Charin on April 25, 1984?j 7 A Is this one? 8 MS, PENNY: You had reviewed that the last i 9 time you were here. I 10 THE WITNESS: Pardon? j 11 MS. PENNY: You had reviewed that the last-1 12 time you were here, i l 13 Tile WITNESS: Oh, the last time I met with is them here? l  ! 4 ir, MS, PENNY: Yes. l f

in TIIE WITNESS
Yes. Okay, I n BY MR DeVESA 1

i 18 Q And you were questioned about leak rate 1 w practices by Mr. Winter at that time? I I , 1 20 A Yes. ] 21 Q And did the information you provide to i 22 Mr. Winter comport with your best recollection of thesnrents in  ; l l 23 1978 and 1979 at TMI II? 21 A Yes. y

    .,                                 MS     PENNY:               I would like the record to re-CAPilAl C11Y PffmTING SFfNICF i v N e o t114f>At 9 / Wei r,1A W o liAIA/Fh fC PA 1 ?ifR 4 'l i t e .18
  • s t it 14

1 L 1 1 5 2 flect that those interviews were primarily about W I Unit I, 3 is that not correct, leak rate practices? 4 MR. DeVESA: That's correct. There were  ; r, questions about TMI II and some of the questions were appli-6 cable to both units. 7 BY MR. DeVESA: , x Q Bernie, what were your duties back in 1978 9 and the early part of 19797 l in A I was shift supervisor. 11 Q As a shift supervisor, did you come in con-  ! 12 tact with control room operators and shift foremen at TMI II7 ; la A Yes. is Q Approximately how much of your time did.you spend in the control room at Unit II during 1978 and early 1., it; 19797 17 i A Forty percent. Forty to sixty is probably is a fair number. 19 BY MS. PENNY: You mean at the Unit II control room? 20 Q 21 A Yes. j

 , .2    BY MR. DeVESA:

l 3, Q Were you generally kept advised of major 24 activities and major plant evolutions by your subordinates at' l 2.~, Unit II during that period of time?

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1 6 2 A Yes. 3 Q Were you the highest level person working 4 on a shift basis at TMI during 1978 and 19797 5 A On my shift? 6 Q Yes. 7 A Yes. 8 Q And to whom did you report at that titne? 9 A That would have been Jim Floyd in Unit II to and Mike Ross in Unit I. 11 Q In Unit II who reported to you during that j 12 1978 and, against, early 19797 n A Well, at all titnes, you know, my -- the . l j is entire shif t. That would be the shift foreman, the CR0s, the j l i r, A0s plus on nightshift everybody else reported too,you know, ,

18. the maintenance, the !!Ps, everybody.

17 Q Do you recall who the shift foreman was that 1 18 reported to you at Unit IIT  ; m A Yes, Dick Hoyt, , 2n Q Now, while you were shift supervisor in 21 1978 - early 1979, was it part of your responsibility to in- . 22 sure that surveillance testing that was being conducted at [ 23 Unit II was conducted in accordance with the technical speci- l 21 fications and the approved procedures? l. g

   .,                                A      Yes, it was.

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1 7 2 Q And among the various surveillance that a was conducted, was leak rate testing considered to be a part 1 of these required surveillance? 5 A Yes. I 1 ti Q Were you aware at that time what the require- 1 7 ments were with respect to leak rate testing at TM1 II? 8 A The word requirements, I don't -- per tha 9 tech, specs.? 10 Q Well, were you aware, first of all, that 11 leak rate testing was requ' red at Unic II? in A Yes. ia Q And do you recall now what the purpose for la chose requirements were? ir, A To comply with the tech specs., yes. 16 Q Were you aware that there were limiting 17 conditions of operating which dealt with reactor coolant system i la leakage at Unit II? 19 A Yes. 20 Q Can you describe what you thought those 21 limiting conditions of operation were at that time? 22 A Do I have to recall the tech. specs. from 23 mem ry? As I remember, it's greater than a gallon per minute 21 every 72 hours unidentified, greater than ten gallon a minute g

   .,            identified leakar.e.                                      Af ter that I don't recall exactly what CAPITAL CITY PEPORTING SFWICE t s  /ft 1 Il lll Iler ! ' A y Mt.1
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I i 8 l l 2 the tech. specs. say. ! l l 3 Q Now, when you say greater than one gallon l 4 per minute unidentified every 72 hours, what do you mean by a that? n A Leakage has to be less than one gallon per , ! 7 minute. ' l x Q And what does the 72 hour time period refer , 9 to as far as you know? to A Seventy-two hours you have to go -- I think l l I l 11 you have to start shutting down -- go to hot shutdown if you ' l ie l haven't met the leak rate conditions in those 72 hours, u Q Was it your maderstanding at the time that i: l if the reactor coolant system leakage exceeded one gallon per i., minute of an unidentified type of leakage that you could 16 !continuetooperatetheplantwith,let'ssay,leakageof 1 iT three gallons per minute for 72 hours? l I is A That's true. That was our understanding at l l in the time. In other words, we had 72 hours to get a good leak 20 rate less than one gallon per minute. 21 Q Well, I am not referring to the frequency l t 2'2 which you were required to obtain a successful leak rate test l l

           ,,      at this point. What I am asking you is what in your view at 2,3     that time -- what action would be required if you obtained a 3       leak rate test which showed that you were in excess of one CAPITAL CITY DEPORTING SEfNCE I dt/ # D 11 Ill W W.! SQIN4 STAlfXJ lt/11A*h ts . t/. 111ti
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l 1 9 2 gallon per minute, let's say two g'allons par minute, what 3 action would be required by the technical specifications in j 4 such an event? 5 A I am not so sure the tech. specs spell it 1 6 out. Of course, you know, we perforta inylant tours. in check-i 7 ing for leakage and things like that as long as we was within 1 8 the 72 hours. ]

                                                                                                                     )

O Q So your view is that at that time you were  ! to operating under an interpretation of the technical specifica- l 11 tions which allowed you to operate the plant for as long as l i 12 72 hours even if the leakage exceeded one gpm. during that l 1:1 period of time? 11 A Yes sir, i t ri Q And you were not under the impression at  ; , I

in that time that if you obtained a leak rate .tsat in excess of j i l

17 one gpm. that you would have four to six hours to reduce the - is leakage or shut the plant down? I l  : 19 A Like I say, I don't remember exactly the i 20 tech specs. -- exactly what it'says. The only number I l 21 remember is the 72 hours. You say four to six hours, I don't 22 know what that -- I don't recall what that means, j o Q Well, I am asking you whether or not you re ' 24 call that if you exceeded one gallon per minute unidentified 27, leakage thst you had somewhere betwee four.and six hours to , I C&llAl Clw RUORING SEfMCC u w u e rmua own r,wr v s I q/.t vrjy l * . l'A 1714R ll i t in v .f 11 '/ t 1 PM

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2 reduce thc.t leakage or to proceed towards hot standby? l l i

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  'l                    A      That's true, if it's a valid leak rate                                                               ,

I ( 1 greater than one gpm. as I remember. t . Is that what you thought at the time? l .5 Q si A Yes sir. l' } i 7 Q Let's see if a can go back now and try to l l 8 clarify this. "?ehavearequirement,accordingtoyou,wh! 1 l 9 says something to the effect that you must obtain a good leak I ! l l 10 rate at least every 72 hcurs. Is that correct? l l l I i l 11 A Yes sir. l l 12 Q Now, does that requirement in your view per- l I la tain to how frequently you must run a leak rate test? j 11 A No, i i ., . Q What does it pertain to? il in A In pertains to -- you have to have one every; j 17 72 hours. As far as when we run 'them, how ofcen we run them, in had nothing to do with the tech. specs. l 19 Q But the frequency of 72 hours was a minimum l s 20 requirement -- I I 21 A Yes. Q -- you must have run a leak rate tect at 22 I 33 least every 72 hours? g A Yes sir. j 2.5 Q But according to your recollection of the , CN1 tat OfY RUO?IrG SERVICE 8iMVA11U Tf f(DAl 901Arg 91A10J W. tut'h iV'.1% 171fy) g i none'1 , ; w ta ,,

l , 1 11 2 practice at the time., you could run a leak rate test more 3 frequently if you chose to? ( I t 1 A Yes sir. 5 Now,.in the event that you did, in fact, run Q 6 a leak rate test more frequently and,the result exceeded one 7 gallon per minuta of unidentified reactor coolant system leak- , 8 age, what was your understanding of what the technical specifipl 9 cations required you to do? 10 A As long as I was within the 72 hours, I was i I 11 okay and what we would do was run another leak rate,  ! l > 12 Q When you say you were okay, what do you mean i la by that? It A Well, we had a valid leak rate at sometime 15 within the 72 hour span. You know, I don't know what time it 16 is now, but we had a good one, we satisfied the tech specs. 11 at this particular time. 18 You satisfied one aspect of the technical Q 19 specifications which required that you obtain a successful or 2a satisfactory leak rate test at least every 72 hours? l l 21 A Yes sir. I 22 Q I understand that. My question is in the  ; i 23 event that you elect to run another leak rate test more fre-  ! 21 quently than what is required -- i i' 2s A Okey. CAPITAt CITY RECTING SEINCE s w.u v u n u r>n comot anm IIA!X?f18 77, PA 17108

I 1 1.2 i l 2 Q -- and that leak rate test tells you that 3 you have exceeded one gallon per minute unidentified leakage, 4 sy question is what was your impression of what the require-

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5 monts required you to do at that time? e A I would run another leak rate. 7 Q And assume that unidentified -- that second l 8 leak rate test showed that unidentified leakage still exceeded 9 one gallon per minute and that you were not able to reduce the to leakage to below one gallon per minute for a ten hour period l Il let's say, what did you think you were required to do at that is time? m , A As long as I had satisfied the tech. specs., ii I would run another leak rate. l i r, Q Well, if you received a test result in in excess of one gallon per minute, was it your view that you 17 weresatisfyingthetech[calspecificationsbygettingatestj 1 is result which exceeded one gallon per minute? l m A If I thought the leak rate was valid, I 2n went into the action statement. 2i Q And what do you mean by going into the 1 22 action statement? - j

 ,                    A     Well, I forget what the numbers are.                      If I 24 e uld see the tech. specs., I would know.                       You know, you have g
 .,      to be in the hot shutdown and whatever it says there.                       I don't.           !

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i 13 2 know. 34,62 3 Q Bernie, I ask you to take a look at W.4.6 4 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Specification and ask you to

    .s     look at that and then you can tell me whether that refreshes c      your recollection with respect to what you were required to do) i 7                   A     Yes.                                                                                                              ,

I 8 Okay. You haye six hours to be in cold 9 shutdown. You have to be in hot standby in six hours, cold i to shutdown within the following 30 hours. j 11 Q Youarereadingfromthetechnicalspecifi-l I 12 cations that pertain to reactor coolant system leakage Unit IIJ in My question, however, is were you aware of that requirement ii In i 1978 and 19797 i r, A Yes.

                                                                                                                                                }

in i Q So you understood that if you obtained a  !

                                                                                                                                                \

17 leak rate test result in excess of one gallon per minute and j t is you felt that that was a valid result, that you had approxi-l io mately ten hours to reduce the leakage below one gallon per 20 minute or to begin to proceed toward hot standby. Is that 2i correct? A Yes sir. 22 Q Now, were you also aware at that time that if'

 .g      you exceeded a limiting condition for operation, that you we.re
    ,,   required to report that fact to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-C&lTAI CITY PfPCDilNC, SfrMCE w.m,.o m wn u m c,ssuen i tAl.t'I'J U l v l 'A i lif R h                                    'i n t I s e .' il / ' ' op,1

l I 14 2 sion and through your superiors? I 3 On an LCO, yes. A 4 Q And you understood that one of the limiting n conditions for operation was operating the~ plant in excess of n one gallon per minute for more than the ten-hour period?

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7 A Yes sir. 8 Q Now, I want to be clear about that because 9 initially you seemed to be suggesting that you thought you 10 could operate the plant for as much as 72 hours with leakage 11 in excess of one galbn per minute. Now, what is your recollec - l l 12 . tion of what you thought at that time? l 11 i A If I had a leak rate greater than one gallon! ti per minute -- believable leak rate -- I would go into the la action statement,  ! In l Q Nou, can you tell me what it is that you i l 17 mean by going into the action statement? l 18 A Well, whatever it says here. Okay. You got 19 to reduce the limits within four hours or be in hot shstdown 20 -- hot standby within the next six hours. Thrt's what'it says, 21 Q And you also were aware at that time that,  ! 22 in addition to going into the action statement if leakage 33 exceeded one gallon per minute, a report was also required l 24 that would advise ultimately the NRC that that limiting con- l 25 dition for operation had been exceeded? CAPITA! CITY PEPORTING SEfMCE i

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I 15 2 A Yes sir, a Q Now, you indicated earlier that as a shift 4 superviser it was your responsibility to insure that surveil-

  ,5   lance testing was, in fact, done according to the technical 6    specifications and the approved company procedures?

7 A That's true. x Q Can you tell me back in 1978 and early 1979-9 how you as a shift supervisor went about doing this job of to insuring that surveillance testing, specifically leak rate l I l it testing, was, in fact, done according to technical specifica- ' ia tions and approved company procedures? n A How I woulddhaure that that was done? I ii i Q Yes. In other words, as part of your job n as a shif t supervisor, you were to see to it that individuals l n; j working under you or perhaps yourself for that matter engaged l_ i n in leak rate testing as required by the technical specifica-m tions in a manner that was required by the technical specifi-in cations and the company procedures. Correct? 20 A Yes. 21 Q And you were to oversee and insure that the testing was done when it was supposed to be done. Correct? 2-2 A Yes. g , Q And that your subordinates responded properly ,3 to test results, they did what they were suppose to do as the CARIAL ON PEfORTING SEfMCE l DA'/41/ lj ll[f t//4 *iQIIfJ4 $f AtfCf) t il 'M'jn ( = .' IV 1 ? Vf ll .1, > ;f a * ;t .14

5 1 16  ! 2 results of getting certain information, right? l 3 A Okay. 4 Q How, what I am asking you in kind of laymen' a 5 terms tell how you did that? I mean, you came to work in the 6 morning and one of your jobs -- I guess you worked. You came 7 to work at other times too. x A Yes, a lot of times. i 9 Q But one of your jobs was to see that the to people who worked for you did what they were supposed to do 1 li with respect to leak rate testing. l 12 [ A I physically probably didn't do anything, I: ) ia okay, based on the fact that, you know, the only time I would I it probably get involved if they didn't get immediate surveil- , I i:, lance, like a leak rate, but as far as the routine job of doing m j the surveillance, you know, they would be put out at the l n beginning of the shift, the operatore knew if they couldn't l is get to it, then they would report to me. You know, say they 19 couldn't finish this survei31ance or things like that and we i j i 20 would pass it on to the next shift, something like that. 21 Q Well, let's scart from the beginning. There i 22 was a responsibility to make sure that reactor coolant system , 23 leakage did not exceed one gallon per minute, Is that correct? 24 A Sure. 23 Q Now, what was done by anyone at Three Mile CADliAl CITY 1.fPOf? TING SErMCc r o^va u q u uAt so iAm swoo mIAaw sa . PA 1 PDF,

I i 17 2 Island to insure -- to keep an eye on reactor coolant system 3 leakage, to monitor it and to insure that it did not exceed 4 limiting conditions for operation, what was done? 7, A We run a surveillance once a shift or three 6 times a shift, which was to perform a ' leak rate with the com-7 Puter, g Q So one of the things that was done was to 9 run a leak rate test at least once a chift if that was in possible? ii A That's true, m Q Well, was anything else done to measure or 33 quantify or monitor reactor coolant system leakage besides y running a leak rate test? m A Idon'tknowofanyotherwayyoucouldtellf m unidentified leakage because once you identify it, you know, n you either see it, steasure it or something to that effect, but' m unidentified the only thing we done was run it on the computerj in Q Was there a containment atinosphere radiation 2n monitoring system in place at Unit II while you were assigned 21 there as a shift supervisor? l A Yes, sure.

                 ,                    Q      Do you recall that?
                 ~

A What's the name of the system? g Q Containment atmosphere radiation monitoring 1 ( .N un city RUomtG SErMCE

                                                '"* LlNh1','N.*CU"*                           ,1

t 18-2 system. 3 A I guess eight was containment radiation 4 monitor. Yes, thay had a system like that.

       ,s                        Q     I don't want you to guess, I want you to a            tell me if you can remember whether such a system was in place ?

7 A There was a radiation monitor in the re- I g actor building. That's a true statement. 9 Q And do you recall whether it was operable  ; in or not? it A Oh, I would say yes. 12 Q Do you have a recollection that -- ia A No. n Q -- that system was operating? i r, A That was probcbly an assumption on my' part. _ In You know, I was sure -- I'm sure it was operating. t i; Q Okay. Well, I don't want you to make is assumptions now. This is important. Do you have a clear i in recollection that that system was operating at the time? i l 20 A No. 21 Q Do you have a recollection that you relied on the information that you received from that system in 22 23 order to help you monitor reactor coolant system leakage? 24 A No, I don't. 2, , Q Was there a containment sump monitoring CAPITAL CITY REPOpilNG SEfMCE i I f < AWI f/ Ii 6[f A I/A1 ',r y 4AR[ $1AleOr J s i/.' '"J i F.= , f / 111'IT'

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1 19 2 system in place at THI II during 1978 and 1979? 3 A Yes. 4 Q And do you recall whether you relied on the 1 5 information that was produced by the containment sump monitor- l 6 ing system in order to quantify or monitor reactor coolant i 7 system leakage? I

                                                                                               \       1 H                    A      Well, the reactor building sump, you know,   l       l 9       wouldn't give you a very good indication on small leakage.               l 10       You know, it's one thing you could look at I am sure, but you 11       couldn't say if you had 1.2 gallon or, you know, 2 gallon. I I2       am sure you couldn't differentiate between the two.

I la ' Q What type of information would it provide 11 you with if you can recall?  ; l I:> A It would give you gross leakage very easily. , I i I" l Q .dd as far as you can recall, the contain-l 17 ment sump monitoring system was not an effective method of i 18 quantifying unidentified leakage? l 19 A That's true. I 20 Q Was the leak rate test then the primary 21 source by which you measured and quaritified unidentified 22 reactor coolant system leakage? 23 A I would say yes. 24 Q In your experience with that particular test , 23 did you find it to be very reliable? l l CAPITAL CllY DEUTING SEfMCE ! u w:n u stina.s vna wavy s t y ' se r .l f

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1 20 2 A Ho, I didn't. a Q Now, getting back to your role specifically 4 as a shift supervisor, you indicated that you did not run leak

              .5    rate tests yourself?

fi A That's true. 7 Q You indicated I believe that you rarely had 8 anything to do with leak rate tests yourself? 9 A That's true. 10 Q Now, as a shift supervisor, did you play 11 any role in making sure that the individuals who were running 12 i leak rate tests were running them when they were supposed to  ! 13 be running them? l 11 A Well, I don't really think I had a role -- in you know, it was just a normal every day evolution, you know.  ! 16 You don't have to tell people every day, you know, run a leak 17 rate, run a leak rate, run a leak rate. You know, that's just 18 something to do when they come into work. You know, the , 19 shift foreman had a little more control over that. You know. , 20 he's more on the detail and of that than I would be. l 21 Q Well, what would have happened if one 22 particular shift working under you decided that they didn't 23 vant to run a leak rate test for two weeks? Were there any

       .24 systems in place at that time to allow you to find out about 2.s       that and to take appropriate action?                                         1 l

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1 21 2 A Yes, because I am sure it's logged on the l a shift and dailies every shift that you had a leak rate or you a rur, a leak rate and, of course, the shift foreman or I would  ; j 5 sign the shift and daily log. It has to appear on there.  ! l 6 Q Did you customarily review the shift and I 7 daily logs on a daily basis? 4 s A No, I didn't personally. No. 9 Q Do you know -- in A The shift foreman would, 11 Q Did you review any other type of operating j i2 log which would have allowed you to know whether or not people  ; ia on your shift had successfully obtained a leak rate test?  ! ii A Yes, we would always' review the CR0 log and 4 - i t, the shift foreman's log. in Q By the way, who was reappnaible for running j 17 leak rate tests at Unit II? You did'not personally run them,. I < is who did run them? 8 19 A The CR0s. 2n Q And wl.o was responsible for approving those 21 tests? 33 A Normally the shift foremen would approve them, , l l 34 Q And do you know what it was that the shift 23 foreman would look at and look for before he approved a leak CAPCAL CITY REPCGING SErNCE imvpo ritm nME SWm iIMOm fX'. IV 171Go, it t t t 4 > .* 1: ? i , ti 14

22 I1 l 1 1 2 rate test? 3 A Yes, he looked at a computer printout. 4 Q And what information does he look to see s before he approves the test? 6 A I think it gives you gross leakage, identi-7 fied leakage and unidentified leakage on the printout and 8 that's what he would look at. 9 Q And if those numbers were there, what would  ; l in he do? l n A If they was in spec. , he would sign it and 12 file it. ja Q To your knowledge would the shift foreman i; et that time iitvestigste the test results. make some inquiry  ; I i., to determine whether those numbers were accurate or whether l l in the information that was contained on the computer printout 17 was accurate? } l 18 A No, I don't think he would do that. 19 Q His role was limitad primarily to making 2n sure that the numbers demonstrated that leakage was within 21 technical specification limits? A I would say yes. 22 g Q I take it then that the shift foremen relied g upon the operators to honastly and accurately place that infor-3 mtition before him? CAPRAL CITY R KJMING SEfMCE m,.ra, om, si,o it/J Ur.f*f , 11 1)1 M s

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1 23 2 A True.

i Q And he did not take steps to go out and
   .i      ascertain for himalf whether the information was accurate?             i
   .,  j               A      I don't think on a routine basis he would do        1 o        that, no, because basically the shift foreman is in the con-7       trol room all the time.      You know, he knows what's going on, s       you know, as f ar as where the plant is , you know, and the leak 9       rates and things like that.

In Q And, of course, you did not go out and 11 independently take steps to determine whether or not the infor-1 i2 mation being reported in the form of a leak re:e test printout i:i was accurate? 11 l A No. I Q Were you familiar with the leak rate test ir, ij in procedure in effect at Unit II during 1978 and 19797 i: A With the procedure itself? ix Q Yes. 19 A At that particular time I was. 20 Q Do you recall that the procedure required 21 that a shift supervisor evaluate identified leakage to deter-32 mine if there were any safety implications to that leakage 23 when identified leakage war discovered? g A No, I don't recall that sentence. No. 2, Q Bernie I would like to direct your attention

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l 1 24 2 to Section 6.4.4, Paragraph No. 4, and ask you to take a look 3 at that particular -- that's of the leak rate procedure -- 4 take a look at that particular paragraph and let me know if r, that in any way refreshes your recollection with respect to

               ,;    the shift supervisor's role in evaluating reactor coolant 7     system leakage?

x A Yes, 1 can believe that. 9 Q Well, 1 understand that you might be able to, I in believe that that's what the procedure says, but my question ii is does that refresh your recollection with respect to what l t l 12 your duties were at the time? , l n i A Yes, ii Q Now, can you tell me from a question of , I l I i;,i practice how the shift supervisor would come to evaluate ' i u; l identified leakage that was discovered as a result of search-I i7

                  ! i ng for leakage?

A i l m A Well, this paragraph don't imp 1/ ment -- I i ( l i m don't think they are really talking about identified leakage, ! go they are talking unidentified leakage. Q Well, how would -- 21 g A There would'be no safety implications then. 1 you know, what In other words, if you have a leak rate of .8 24 w uld I evaluate? Q Well, that's my question. 25 CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErMCE ie,w v o irran som swm HMUNV ##, PA 1710R n . '. n e / Ji '/ : Wid f

i 25 2 A I don't think I would evaluate anything, a Q Were you able to evaluate unidentified a leakage? 5 A I could evaluate it by sending people out in vi the plant and look for it, yes, sure. Then when we come back ' 7 and brought all the data, if we found it, you know, then it 8 would be easy to identify -- or evaluate it at that time. 9 Q But if you did, in fact, find the source to of the leakage, wouldn't that mean that the leakage was not , it identified because you could determine its source? I I 12 A That's true, that's what I would do, right. i ta Q Sooncehavingdeterminedthesourceofthell l l ii I leakage, it would become identified leakage? l 1:, A True. I 10 l Q If you could not determine the source of the r 17 leakage, it remained unidentified leakage? f I i 18 A True, 19 Q Now, getting back to identified leakage, the 1 20 procedure requires that you as the shift supervisor evaluate 21 the safety implications of identified leakage. Isn't that so?

                                                     '22                     A     Okay,                                                         ,

1 33 Q Now, my question is how would you as a shift' J 24 supervisor undertake this responsibility? 23 A We are talking about identified leakage? C Arm Al civ RErCOTING SEfNCE I

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I l I 1 26 2 Q Yes.

   'l              A     I would evaluate it to insure the plant was 4   in a safe stable condition.               In other 'words, if the leak was 5  going into a tank that was contained or wherever it was going 6  and, you know, if it goes into a sump, ptsuped into a normal 7   tank, there is no problem with that.

8 Q Procedurally how would it come to your 9 attention? 10 A Well, the operators would get me involved. 11 Q Is that what occurred? 12 A Sure. , la Q In other words, once an operator determines 11 some how that there was leakage and they could identify its n source, they would advise you of that fact? I" A Yes sir. 17 Q And then you would evaluate that" leakage to l 18 determine the safety implications of it? 19 A I would personally go out in the plant or 20 wherever it happened to be and check the leakage out. That's 21 true. 22 Q Now, you recall doing that? 23 A Not a particular incident, no. but I am sure 24 I have. )

                                                                                         )

es Q But I mean you remember that that was one of ) i l CAPilAl CITY REFORTING SErNICE l WNNA D il fIDI pal #f)i)ATV STAtlf74

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1 l 1 27 2 the jobs that you did as a shift supervisor? 3 A Yes sir. 4 Q I realize we are not talking about any j r, specific day, but I am saying you have a clear recollection s; that one of the things you did as a shift supervisor was to ' i learn that there was identified leakage, to take a look at it s somehow and to make a judgment as to whether that leakage was f 9 safe or not? 1 ! l l 10 A Yes sir. ) l l l 11 Q Now, let's talk about that judgment for a is moment, What would you be looking for in order to determine l

      !                                                                                             i     i ri   lwhethertheleakagewassafeornot?

is A If it was contained. i r, j Q And what do you mean by contained? in A In other words, if it's not spilling out on . 17 the floor. You know, if I can contain it inside the plant, it

                                                               .                                     I is     don't get out to the public and the plant is still in a safe in     condition, that's what I look for.

20 Q Now, would there be an attempt when identi-21 fied leakage was discovered to sneasure it or quantify it?. 22 A Sure. 2, Q And who would be responsible for that a particular function? y, A I would probably have the A0s do that, yes. CAPIIAL C11Y RDOillNG SErMCE m^wi u o su Uu1 VJUADE STAT @ ni t ern t , U/ 171r A ts a g ts t .* il . s t t%A e _._________m

i 28 , 2 Q Ilow would they'do that? a A With a beaker, pail, gallon jug. You know. 4 we measure and time it. r3 Q And after having measured the leakage, would l 6 that identified leakage then be added into the leak rate test? I 7 A Yes. s Q Do you remember how often that would occur? I 9 A No, I have no idea on that. No. 10 Q What test would the identified leakage be { 11 entered into? 12 A What test? l ia ) Q The test that was just run, the last test I is l or the next test to come? 1., A Oh, the next test to come I would say, yes. in Sure. 17 Q So it is your recollection that there was is not an attempt to take the test that had just been run and to 19 go back and correct that test by adding a number for identified 20 leakage? . 21 A I don't think we'd do that, no. 22 Q- But you do believe that identified leakage l g was quantified and that in future leak rate tests the ntsaber 24 that you had obtained for identified leakage would be added to 2r, the test and built into the test equation? i cal'ilAt City r&KR11NG SErNICE  ; I DA\M le iI l((IIld/( $Qt1/I4 SIAllON 4 l/ l.1<f j;l f.a , i1 1/if JT; It t li t r if H / t t 17:14 1

I l. I 29 2 A I would believe that, yes. j 3 Q Now, how often would there be an attempt to l 4 continue to measure this leakt s A Well, it would probably depend on what type c of leak it is, okay, because more leaks get worse and not  ! 7 better. Okay. In other words, you would attempt to. fix it, ) s slow the leakage down and it really would depend on what type ) l 9 of leakage it was, wherever it was coming from I think. l u. 10 Q If there was a leak that was not possible to I 11 measure, either because you could not get at it or because of 12 the nature of the leakage spraying out, let's say, in the la form of steam or something like that that it could not be 11 measured, what action would you think would have been required?  ! 1.3 A You'd probably make an educated guess on to the amount of leakage it was. IT Q. Would that' kind of leakage -- leakage that is could not be measured -- ever require that the plant be shut  ! I 19 down? 20 A You have to say that again. 21 Q If you reached a point where you found leak-

 ,2 2    age that could not be measured, would you ever believe that 23   that type of leakage would require that the plant be shut down?

24 A I don't know that. If I had an identified

 .25  leak that I couldn't measure, would i shut the plant down?

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i 2 Q Yes. j 3 A Is that'the question? I I 4 Q Yes. r, A No, because I think we would make an edu- j l e; cated guess on how much it is based on acke-up tank level and j 7 we would probably not shut down the plant at that time, s Q Was it your view at the time that the tech 9 nical specifications and the procedures gave you that kind of in latitude? ii A I would say yes to that. l ia Q So you feel that you were allowed by the t la jtechnicalspecificationsandtheprocedurestoestimatesome is ntstber for identified leakage if you could not precisely - i r, measure it and then take action according to what your esti- j l In mate was? 17 MS. PENNY: Do you mean then or now? 1 i is MR. DeVESA: Then. l l-in THE WITNESS: I am not so srie that would l i 2n be my call even as a shift supervisor.. I 21 BY MR. DeVESA: 22 Q Well, can you explain what you mean by that?  ! Todt.c. Well, I am sure, you know, the 30RK-would ! A 23 get involved in that. In other words, you know, because that ' 24 y, was their job to interpretthe tech. spect. I tell them my CAPilAL CITY ITcPORTING SErMCE n {;;;;jf 1,. ;; g(rgotg cp;Arg yAigar.g I s u t w p p , s q. S t1r g H illit 4 d / t t .itt14 s. f

1 31 Po Rc.  ; 2 situation. Between the BORK and the station superintendent i 3 I am sure would evaluate that and say yea or nay to that. 4 Q By the way, was there a test coordinator -- l t 1 5 surveillance test coordinator assigned to TMI II during 1978 j j 6 and 1979? 7 A Surveillance test coordinator? 8 Q Yes. 9 A I would say yes. 10 Q Do you remember who that individual was? 11 A The title doesn't ring a ball, but I think 12 Bob Beeman used to work for him. I don't remember what his

 !a   name was.

1 Q But you do seem to recall that there was , l

1. , someone working as a test coordinator in Unit II? i  ;

in A Yes. 17 Q Do you remembor what that person did with  ! l 18 respect to surveillance testing, what his role was? I A r ms y + dc. s , 19 A He would insure all the surveillance deem 20 and plus he would also check all the data and make sure that 21 we was within the tech. spec. limitis. l 22 Q Did he have supervisory authority over con-33 trol room operators and shift foremen? 21 A No.

2. , Q Was it his responsibility to order them to CAPITAL OTY REPORTING SErMCE f ('AWi l ' l l f(lIll/Al TylAf.T 91ATMJ l t/.lL"' j a f * , l */ 1/1f v;
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i 32 2 conduct a test at a certain time or in a certain manner? 3 A Well, there would be no orders. In other 4 words, they issue computer printouts in other words. These I s surveillance have to be done a certain day, you know, and its ti the CR0s and my responsibility to get them done. It would be 7 no -- not as orders go. x Q Now, when leak rate test results were ob-  ; 9 tained by means of a leak rate test, was there any vehicle by ] 10 which you could report the results of those tests to your l 11 superiors? 12 A I don't remember that. I mean, you know, la as far as the procedure saying, you know, it has to go to the l 11 station superintendent or whatever, no, I don't think we had l 13 a procedure to do that. I'; Q Did you prepare something known as a Daily  ; i ! 17 Plant Status Report as a shift supervisor? - l 18 A Yes. 19 Q And how often did you prepara such a report? 20 A Every morning at 7 o' clock. 21 Q But you as a shift supervisor how often 22 would you prepara such a report? 23 A One week out of six. 24 Q So you didn't -- in other words, you didn't 23 work every morning? r Al'llN MTVIM(CGifO SFINCF t v.vw In ei t n s.ss 'n ewi '1MV s t s ll I AW)* f * . \ <l 11991

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   '                                                                                33 2                 A      No, no, the 11:00 to 7:00 guy done that.                              l 3                 Q      So the individual who war working.11:00 to 4     7:00 would prepara a daily status report?                                                j r,                A     ~Yes sir.                           *                                !
  <;                Q     And would leak rate be included in that 7     report?                                                  .

8 A I knew that was the next question, but I 9 don't recall if leuk rate -- we used to give the plant status I to  ; as far as power level. -1 don't recall everything that was on j l u , that morning report. It wouldn't surprise me if it was. l 12 Q Do you recall that attached -- first of all, i l' l l n do you recall who that report was sent to? l I ii A Distribution for that. The station super-n intendent for sure because he was the one who signed it and, in of course, he looked at it. I signed it for him. 17 BY MS. PENNY: Who was that?  ! 18 Q 19 A That would go to Gary Miller. Gary Miller 20 would get a copy and I think a copy was telecopied to Reading. 2 Q To whom in Reading? 22 A I don't have no idea. I don't remember the 23 names on the bottom. If you have one there, it's -- 24 BY MR. DeVESA: 2,, Q Do you recall that there were notes -- hand-

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j l 1 34 2 written notes prepared by shift supervisors which were also 1 3 attached to that particular report? j 1 4 A That would not be normal. '

  .s                Q      It would not be normalt 8                  A      No.

7 Q You do not -- a A As best as I can recall, I don't remember j l 9 doing that. You know, I tnink there was a section for re-10 marks there or something like that, you know. We -- but as li far as another sheet of paper, I don't recall that. 12 Q Now, getting back to what you did with in respect to your supervisory role over leak rate testing, did ii you attend plan of the day meetingo as a shift supervisor?

, A Sometimerl, yes. ,

in Q And if there were problems with plant leak i 17 age or leak rate testing, would that kind of a problem be 3 i is discussed at the plan of the day meeting? 19 A I would say yes, yes. i 20 Q Do you recall whether or not problems regard-21 in}, leak rate resting were ever discussed at the plan of the

                                                                         ~                        !     !

72 , day meetingt47 . a

3 A No, 1 don't recall that.. Plan of.the. day 24 really is -- that's not -- that wasn't its function for prob-lems, 3.3 r m1At CITY PEFORIING SEfMCE Iddd.4!'ll 11 l A !.'Al 'd ) BAIM bl AIF y J I I/ 'Ur f
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1 35 2 Q What was its function? 3 A Plan the work for the day. In other words, i 4 if we didn't have any -- in other words, every department was r> represented there plus the day shift supervisor, relief shif t  ! H (i supervisor plus the superintendent, all mechanics and what we l 1 7 would do was plan the work. You know,.if we wrote a work 8 request, you know, to fix a valve, you know, that would be 9 discussed and stuff like that, but that wasn't really the 10 meeting to discuss problems. 11 Q Now, who else would attend this meeting be-12 sides the shift supervisors? Pob la A BOR? Il Q Yes. la A There would be the hea d mechanical man, you 16 know, the electrical, the HP. 'You know, all departments wouldi i 17 have one representative there.' 18 Q Now, if there were leakage problems which made it necessary for someone to fix something or correct the' 19 20 p articular problem before a leak rate test coul'd 'be run, would 21 that be discussed at the plan of the day meeting? 22 A Yes sir. 23 Q Were minutes kept of those meetings? 24 A No, because you basically worked off the com-2ri poter printout. That was issued every day.

                           - CAPliAL CITV REPCDTro SErMCE nAwrr> u tri mN 'o va stAtm t vaxe,iv e . iv.1/irp; 16 1 s t t ' .p    i i V: 1.1
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i l 1 36 l 2 Q Now, give me an idea of whr.t would occur? 3 Let's say an individual would advise the indivi. duals at the 4 plan of the day meeting that no leak rate test had been ob-

    .s     tained -- no successful leak rate test or satisfactory leak fi    rate test had been obtained for tw6 days and that there was 7     an absolute need to obtain a leak rate test that day.                                 What 8     would happen?                                                 .

9 A It's got nothing to do with POD. 10 Q That kind of subject would not be brhught up? 11 A Ho. 12 Q In any event, ycu do not recall that ques-la tions or problems regarding leak rate tes. ting or ' excessive 11 leakage were discussed at the plan of the day meetings? I i 1.; A I don't recall of any. Like I said, POD ' i 16 wouldn't be the place. In other words, we probably -- if we , , 17 had serious problem with a leak rate, okay, we 'would have a l 18 meeting in the shift supervisor's office with the interested i l 19 parties. You know, a mechanic, that's he carc about it, you 20 know, and those typa people. We would have a differsat -- j 21 you know, we would have the ens!.ncers, tha nuke engineerr, 22 you know, the superintendent, the shift supervisors, those I 23 type people. 24 Q in addition to the plan of the day meetings, 2.s did you attend shift supervisor meetings? OvlTAL CITY RERDRTING SBMCE I PAWf is O Ff I W W4 TO lAf4 GTAf ryj j s u ! *>"J:' f a , l '/ 1/1f #: s i: H e .' r '.' i t + 14

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l i 1 37 l i 2 A Yes sir. l i i 3 Q And how often did you attend those asatings? l 4 A They generally run there for about every J 5 month. - j

                                                                                     'l 6              Q     Now, minutes were made of those seestings,                    1 7 weren't they?                                                                    I 8              A     Yes sir, i

9 Q What was generally discussed in those meet- ] 10 ings? i 11 A All problems. In other words, plant prob-1 12 lems, personnel problems, the whole works. la Q And if thereware problems with surveillance 11 testing not being done properly, would that be discussed at 13 shift supervisor meetings? 16 A Sure. i 17 Q Whatwouldbethegeneralcourseofaction?l 18 I mean, let's assume someone brings a problem to the attention. 19 of those in attendance, what happens next? l 20 A There would be action items, you know, 21 addressed to certain i~ndividuals to make this problem go away. 22 Q So someone would be given the responsibility 23 to take care of that? p A Yes sir, i 23 Q I would like to direct your attention to I~ CARTAL Cin' REPORING SErMCE fDAVKP(i f[D[Q/4 SQJAf4 $1All(yJ s i/10t/t f v PA 1710P, ottar/p /s t v14 a L.

1 38 2 Shift Supervisor Meeting Minutes of July 11, 1978, and a specifically Item 6 of the unresolved items. 4 MS. PENNY: Could you state for the record 5 who took those minutes? o THE WITNESS: Probhbly me. 7 MS. PENNY: Well, he has the documsnt. Is j 8 it stated? 9 MR DeVESA: According to the document, the in minutes were submitted by G. R. Mits. 11 BY MR. DeVESA: i l 1a Q In sny event, would you tako a look z.t Item l ia 6 in the unresolved items. I i la Gan you tell me, first of all, whet that 1 l l 13 seys? l i 16 A Recently three surveillance were missed in  ; I , 17 Unit II throeg,h the ' fault of the Operations Department. There i lx is no reason for thf.s. ' 10 $o that would mean that the superintendent 20 had got word from the surveillance coordinator, you know, that 21 we had fallen down on the job and was t't insuring timt surveilf a lar.ce Was getting done. 23 Q Do you. have any recollection of that partic-21 ular meeting and thia discussion about surveil. lances not being 2, Ill done on time? h C^PTAL CITY REPORTING WMCE rumr> u rtrma roer st^trya iIATDtC B ff, OA i7i(8 ji uitlir,p /tiVM4

l l l 1 39 l 2 A No. lj l 3 Q Do you know whether or not that problem { l 4 with surveillance being missed referred to a leak rate test { l 1 l r, or :::ot? 0 6 ,j A Ho, I don't recall if it was or not. I am 7 sure it wasn't. 8 ] q Well, I don't understand that. Do you re-9 call whether it perwained to leak rate tests or not? l l 10 A No, I don't.

1) Q Then you said you are sure that it did not. l n' Is that true?  !

i 1:1 , A Obtaining a leak rate? I. 11 Q Yes. Is that true? I A 1:s Right. 16 Q Why are you sure that it did not pertain to j i i 11 leak rate testing? j j 18 A Because there wculd be a lot more action l , i 19 than that document right thcre because, if you missed a leak 20 rata which happens to be a limiting condition for operation, , I \

 ?!       that's very serious because that's a tech. spec. violation               j l

22 and the wordsprobably would have been a little stronger than i 1 23 that because I don't recall ei<er missing, you know, tech. j i 24 spec, surveillance, i 1 2, Q But that is an assumption on your part? < C APITAL C11Y PEPCGilNG SErMCE IDAW R U FEIV.P4 DJADF $7ATQN l i/ l bi S 4 p , i t 1/18 h ti ll is t ,t d *: 'f:14 L

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i 40 2 A Yes. 3 Q You don't really have a recollection of what a this pertained to?

    .s                          A       That's true, c                           Q      Was there an attitude that leah rate tests 7            were not to be missed?        I mean, was there a serious attitude 8

aboutrunningleakratetests'withinthetimelimitsrequired?l 9 A Sure, to Q I would also like yo,u to take a look at an ii Operations Memo dated December 23, 1977, to Unit II Operations l l 12 Deparement. I will read this to you for the record. It says: n " Good operating practice dictates that the u operator believe his indication. This is true except where i t, there may be reasonable doubt that the indication is correct. In " Examples of when the correct operation of 17 ' instrumentation may be in doubt are after the instrumentation is has been put back into service after having been worked on for 19 any reason, when first putting a system couponent in service," 20 etc. 21 "Any time the operator feels there is rea-22 a nable doubt about his indication, he should investigate 73 prior to proceeding with any evolution requiring that indi-24 cation." 27, And thi.e is a memo which at least on its CAPITAL CW PEPOQTING SEfNICE umwioo atiw sauer swoa iINUfA fC PA 17109 tsilier # n y n y;14 h

1 a i 1 41 2 face indicates that J. J. Chwastyk prepared it for J. R. Floyd. 3 Can you take a look at that memo, Bernie, and tell me whether l 4 you recall ever seeing that? 5 A I don't recall ever seeing this, no. 6 Q As a shift supervisor, would you customarily i 7 receive operations memos that were sent to the entire Opera-t l { 8 tions Department? 9 A Yea, this would be a document -- this would 10 be in a book. We had a book called, you know, ops memos. l t i 11 Q Is that how ops memos were distributed, only 12 to the book, or were they -- 13 A No, ii Q -- sent to each Litdividual? I i; j A I am sure each individual would get one, 16 but it would be kept on record in that book. 17 Q But you don't have a recollection of ever lx seeing that particular ops memo. Do you have any recollection 19 of a problem which caused such a memo to be written? 20 A No. 21 Q Then why would Jim Floyd be writing a memo 22 that tells operators that they must believe the instruments-23 tion that they have? inc.sAem t-24 A Well, some incience must have brought -it 25 on. You know, that's what the operators are supposed to do, CIPITAL OTY PEPORTING SErMCE ronwroo trnrrw som $fAim WmPh t.v . f% 171rg tillite /lI i l ti!14

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1 42 2 they got to believe their instrumentation. That's all they. 3 have to go by. 4 Q Well, was'that the operating philosophy at i r. TMI II at that time in 1978 '797 ! s A Believs your instruments? 7 Q Yes. l 8 A Sure. 9 Q I mean, this memo -- this is not some kind I m of a isolated instruction? 11 L No. 12 Q This kind of attitude prevailed at that j 13 time? 11 A To believe'your instrumentation? ! t r, Q Yes. i ! 1 l In A Yes sir. .I 17 Q And this was a standard operating philosophy? l 18 A Yes sir. 19 Q And you don't recall what incident triggered; l 2n this particular memo?

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21 A No, not at all. ,  ; I 22 Q I assume then that you don't recall discuss-23 ing this with your subordinates and advising them to believe 24 their instruments? 2.s A Ho, CAPITAL CITV REPORTING ErNICE IiMWiD U IflTPA' SOIADE CAflCN i I^lvi'a f ( . fM i7 tm te il te r .# # yn 'p.M

l 1 43 2 Q Had you ever done that? 3 A Yes sir. 4 Q Do you recall evet- doing that? 5 A Yes sir. l c Q Would this operating philosophy also apply l l 7 to leak rate tests if you can -- in your opinion? j i s A No. l l l I 9 Q And why would that be? in A Well, he is really directing that to the , l 11 indications on the console. You know, the computer -- the 95C 12 Bailey (ph=c:-ic) 55 is not a tech. spec. item. That has

  • i:i nothing to do with the plant. We would just get data out of l

i .1 it. t r, Q Well, doean't t.he computer that does leak in rate tests get information from the instruments on the con-17 sole? 18 A Either there or the NI cabinets, yes, that'a 19 true. 20 Q So that the instrumentation that is being 21 referred to, that instrumentation, in addition to showing an 22 operator something, is also being forwarded to -- is also for-3

 .,   ' warding inform 3 tion to tha computer that ruts a leak rato testo 24    Is that correct?

2.s A That's probably - 'that's true. CAPilAL OTv REFORTING SEfNCE cf>AV4D U FMQ4 WJADE STATIOr4 nNxam fr, rA 17,08 H i l t 4 * # 18 / i t 9:14

l 1 44 2 Q And so the leak rate test results are based ,

l I a upon the instrumentation? j

                                                                                    ,                    i 4                                A      That's true.                                        )

5 Q But you don't believe that this phisolophy l l 6 applied to leak rate tests? 1 7 A Not the cociputer printout, no. i You inc~1cated before thet leak rate tests 8 Q 4 9 were run alinost on every shift if conditions permitted them? f l 1 in A Yes sir. ! 11 Q What types of conditions would make it not l l 12 possible to run a leak ratc teat? l ia A Change in power either increase or decrease, i 11 rod movemente, e.dding water, you know, feed and blsed opera- l l la t. ions , things of that nat tre. 1 in Q If these kinds of conditions existede is it i 17 your opinion that leak rate tests were not to be run at that is time? 19 A That's true. 2n Q IAak rate tksts werS, in fact, Itn occas-21 icnally when some of thase conditions existed, were th3y not? i 22 A Oh, I don't knov that. l 23 Q You think that there was never a leak rate 21 test run when, let's say, water was cdded during the test? 2, A Ch, I am sure they were. CAPITAL CITY PETU? TING SFfMCE roAwrou rFD(% so; ape STA104 6iAt.wJe fr, rw 171m

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1 45 2 Q Do you think that perhaps a leak rate test 3 or two was run during a po ser escalation or a power descala-l l 4 tion? t 5 A They could have been, but, you know, I don't vi know. I don't know why you would do that. It just makes the 1 leek rate invalid. , 1 8 Q How did plant personnel keep track of when 9 they had run a leak rate test and what the last leak race test l l l 10 result was? l 11 A The CR0s, they would be in the log book. j i 12 Q So the CR0s would put in the log book the la results of all leak rate tests? . 1 11 A No, just the valid ones. 15 Q And what kind of information would they 16 include in the log book with respect to the valid leak rate 17 tests? 18 A Just a statement saying, you know, a satis-19 factory leak rate some number and, of course, they give the 20l time.

2. Q What time would they p'ut down?-

22 A The time they done it.

 .a                  Q     Would that be the time they completed it?

24 A Yes. 25 Q Would theyinclude a time that the test was CAPITAL CITV REPORTING SErNCE IONMRU IEDEuAL SOJARE STATION iINA#4914., lW i11(M H l f H D # 11 P l') 1814 I P.

1 46 2 started? 3 A No. 4 Q You were aware of the fact that at that r, time that they did not include the starting times of those  ! t; leak rate tests that were logged? 1 7 A Am I aware that they didn't log the starting ! a time? l l 9 Q Yes. l 10 A Is that what you said? . l 11 Q Yes. f 12 A Yes. l ia Q Were you aware at that time that an admin-it istrative procedure required that the starting time of any i r, surveillance test as well as the completion time be logged in ic , the control room operator log book? 17 A I don't recall that statement. Okay. I, , j  ; ix Q You mean you don't recall it now or you did i l 19 not recall it then?

                                                                     .                                                            l 20                A     Neither.                                                                                           l 21                Q     You were not -- you don't think that you were aware back in 1978 that the starting time of all leak 22 7,

rate tests had to be recorded in the log book toger.her with 24 the completion time? y, A No, I don't recall that.

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CAPITAL CITY REfCOTING SErMCE Ivwnoanwnv>m utno il/ i tt JV P . I'/. 171(M tl i t t e r / it '/ n viid

1 47 2 Q Were tests recorded -- test results re-a corded anywhere else besides the control room operator log ' 4 book? iI 5 A Shif t' foreman's log. l 6 Q Do you know whether the test results of the 7 last successful test were put on a blackboard or anything in l 1 a the control room for people to'see? 9 A I don't recall that, no. In other words, 10 logged the leak rate? 11 Q No. Put on a blackboard like the blackboard' ) 12 in thic room so that one could just visually look over and see i i 1 i n when the last leak rate test was and what the results were. ' 11 Do you recall any such blackboard at the control room at  : I is Unit II?

  • 4 l

l In A There is one now, but I don't recall if that; 17 was there in '78 or not. 18 Q Well, primarily then individuals would refer ! 19 to the log to determine when the last leak rate test was run? 20 A (The witness indicated in the affirmative.) 21 Q Now, some leak rate test results' were thrown t 22 away? a

 .                 A     That's true.

21 Q Correct? 25 A That's true. CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErNICE I 6AWI f> U lil#(#4 SQtMWI. STATION t t/ fM19 IJ , Il< 1114% It iI e $ e .I 1: .* g ) W 14 a

1 48 l 2 Q Was any record of those tests that were j 3 thrown away maintained or kept? i 4 A No c l l 5 Q Were you as a shift supervisor aware at the l l 6 time that some leak rate test results were thrown away?  ! 7 A Yes' sir. 8 -Q And were you svare that those results were i 9 not recorded or documented in any way? 10 A Yes sir. l 11 Q Were you aware that there were requirements l 12 which mandated that the results of all surveillance tests be la recorded and documented in various ways? l it A Yes sir. l la Q Did you as a shift supervisor do anything to'- I l'; prevent control room operators from throwing away leak rate 17 test results? 18 A No. f 19 Q Can you explain why you did not do anything 20 to prevent them from throwing away, test results? l 21 A Because they was invalid leak rates. 22 Q And was it your impression of the requirements

  .,,;3 that if a leak rate test was invalid that no documentation of 24    any sort regarding its existence had to be maintained?

25 A Yes, that was my opinion. Yes. CN1W CITY DEf0RTING SEfMCE l DAVAl>l) Iil X I/ft 'd JIlA!/l $1 Afif.V i i l/ l i.C.H P , l'/. 1/1'p!

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1 49 2 Q So you believed as a shift supervisor that , 3 if a control room operator determined that a leek rate test a result was i'n valid that he was not required in any way. to 5 maintain doctanentation or any records regarding that test? n A Yes sir. 7 Q And he could simply throw it away and there 1 x would never ever be any evidence that it bad ever been run? .l 1 A I 9 Yes sir. to Were you familiar at the time with pro-Q 11 visions of Administrative Procedure 10.107  ! l 12 A At that time, yes. la Q That procedure called for the making of an l u exception and/or deficiency list when there were problems 1 1 la encountered during surveillance testing, did it not? in A Yes sir. 1 17 Q Was it your impression that those provisions ) 18 in Administrative Procedure 10.10 did not apply to leak rate 19 tests? 20 A Yes sir. 21 Q Can you tell me how you came to believe that s 22 those provisions did not apply to leak rate testing? g A It was just a carry over the way we done 24 business from Unit I. 2n Q You were a shift supervisor at Unit I also, CAPITAt. CITY PEPORTING SETMCE mAwro u rcr4% SQUADE STATCN 1 HADQlSRtI?G PA 17108 )

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i 50 2 were you not? 1 A Yes sir. t Q And can you tell me how this practice -- A this interpretation of Administrative Procedure 10.10 came n into effect? 7 A No, I can't recall that. H Q I mean, do you remember anyone directing l l 9 you that this was the interpretation that was to be followed? l l in A No, not any one particular person. You It know, that's the way we done business. 12 Q Do you remember ever seeing anything in m writing, any kind of an operations memo or directive which j i it indicated that leah rate tests were not covered by the pro- i I < n visions of Administrative Procedure 10.107 16q A No, I don't. - 17 Q Did you ever give it any thought? . tx A Probably not really, no. f to Q One of tha purposes for writing an exception i 20 or deficiency with respect to a problem surveillance was that l 21 the exception and deficiency would require some further actionI I 22 correct? 23 A Yes sir.  ; g Q And so if there were problems with a particuI 23 lar surveillance, the shift supervisor would have to investi-CAPITAL CITY PEPOrmNG SErMCE j l I/4M 11 ll Ill>( W4 '(J IAI4 $IAIO j g e l/44 A'Jy I/ , 1 % 171rP. I illl 616 d if ' t i 141.1

1 51 l 2 gate those problems and resolve those problems and then see 3 that the surveillance could be done properly? I 4 A Yes sir.

  .5 Q      Is that your understanding of why we have 6   exceptions and deficiencies?                                                             !

i 7 A Yes sir, i 8 Q Now, if there were problems with leak rate i 9 testing and exceptions and deficiencies were deemed not to 10 apply to leak rate tests, how would these problems be cor-11 rected? 12 A By a work request. i la Q And what would an individual do with respect 11 to submitting a work request? ta A He just fills out, you know, a work request l Ic and submits it to whoever the guy is that handles work re-l 17 quests and goes through the channels. We would make an 18 attempt to repair the problems that we was having. l 19 Q And so your impression was that exceptions 20 and deficiencies were not required and the reason that you felt 21 that way was because they had never been applied to a leak 22 rate test? 23 A That's true. 24 Q Do you rannamber what year you became a shift 23 foreman? I am sorry. Shift supervisor? CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SEfMCE l [WAW[D U FED (Q/4 $QUARE STATKyJ l n/wmfr, rm 17108 till19 e .8 11 '/ t t 'J:14 ,

l i 52 > l 2 A I was a shift foreman in 1968. It was a probably I would say '72 I 4 a Q Were you a shift supervisor in Unit I in 5 1973 - 1974? 6 A Yes. . 7 Q Were you a shift supervisor when Unit I 8 began commercial operation? 9 A I would say no, but I am not really sure. 10 I was either a shift foreman, you know, or a shift supervisor. 11 I don't remember the commaercial date on Unit I. 12 Q But you recall that you were some type of l ta a supervisor? i n A Yes. 15 Q In the Operations Department? in A Yes. ( 17 Q At Unit. I when Unit I began commercial 18 operation? 19 l A Yes. 20 Q Do you recall that at that time exceptions 21 and deficiencies were, in fact, submitted with the early leak 22 rate testing at Unit I? 3 A No, I don't remember that. 24 Q You have no recollection of anyone avery l 25 submitting exceptions and deficiencies in connection with a CAPITAt CITY PEPORTING SETNCE iDAWTp V FECXI?AL SOUAf4 STAllON IWA/Nt fr. lw 17108 tillit e / p / !! 9314

i I 1 53 1 2 leak rate test at Unit I? i 3 MS. PENNY: Are you talking about start-up 4 mode or during -- while the plant was coissercialt 5 MR. DeVESA: Just prior to comunercial opera-6 tion. 7 THE WITNESS: No, I don't remember that. l 8 BY MR. DeVESA: 9 Q In any event, you are certain that your 10 interpretation of Administrative Procedure 10.10 in 1978 was 11 that it did not apply to leak rate testing? 12 A Yes sir. l i 13 Q What type of training did you receive on ) 11 these administrative procedures as a shift supervisor? 15 A You mean class room type training? l 16 Any kind of training. Q 17 A I am sure the Training Department went over 18 the admin. procedures at one time or another because it's re-19 quired to know them. You know, for you RC exam,.sure, they 20 probably -- you know, we went over them in class I would say. 21 Q Dc you think you were trained on the pro-22 visions of Administrative Procedure 10.10 prior to 1978 - 19792 23 A Oh, I am sure I was. 24 Q Do you think that or was it your view that 25 other shift foremen and shift supervisors applied this same CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SEfMCE IWA'M 4 U flDUML SOJADE SIATON Hr.fWJy iV'. P/. 17108 14 o t a r / p 2 3 3 1.9, t 4

1 54 2 interpretation of this administrative procedure? 3 A Yes. 4 Q So that this was not just your interpreta-5 tion? 6 A That's true. 7 Q As far as you know, no one submitted excep-8 tions and deficiency lists in connection with problem 1erik 9 rate tests? 10 A That's true. 11 Q How, you indicated that operators could 12 throw away invalid leak rate tests without making any records l 13 pertaining to the same -- without documenting them in any way. 11 How was it determined that a leak rate test result was in-in valid? IG A If it was greater than one gallon per minute _ i 17 plus, you know, the minus number differed -- was different j i 1 i 18 amongst each shift. You know, some guys would take a minus  ! 19 two and some guys wouldn't. It just depends. 20 BY MS. PENNY: You are referring to the negative leak rates l 21 Q 22 there? 23 A Yes. That was up to the interpretation of 24 the shift supervisor or shift foreman. If it 7 greater than 23 one and the plant looked to be in a steady state, we would CAPITAL C11Y PERDRTING SFfMCE lI/AWI R IJ lIl W f#4 $Q JAf# $1MOf J tvHirns",II 1/1t t, n i s in .e n / t eta ,,

l J J l 1 55 2 claim it would be invalid.  ; I i 3 BY MR. DeVESA: i 4 Q So the definition or the characterization , l 5 of invalid was that either the test result was greater than 1 1 6 one gpm. or some high negative amount that teicher a shift 7 foreman or a shift supervisor determined was too much in the 8 negative r,ide?  ; 9 A Yes. In Q Do you have any idea how that particular 11 definition of invalid test result came about? l l 12 A No, I don't. , i

                                                                                                                        ~  i 13                                               Q   Do you recall when that definition of in-                     l 14                             valid testing result first became applied?                                          !

I r, ifs. PENNY: Is that a definition or a in practice? l 17 THE WITNESS: 1973'or whenever it was. Is BY }fR. DeVESA: 19 Q So as long as you could remember any test 20 result that exceeded one gallon' per minute was thrown away? 21 A Oh, I don't say all of them was thrown away, 22 no. 23 Q Well, do you recall any that were kept? 24 A I don't recall of any, no. 2, Q Do you have any knowledge that any were kept? CAPITAL OTY REPORTING SErNCE IDAVAl>II i1 Di'fMi V,) VJ# StAticyJ n/A8.ar J o P , l '/ 1/ifyt tr i t h e ,' it j g t tstia g

1 1 56 2 A No. 3 Q Do you have any reason to believe that test j 4 resulta exceeding one gallon per minute unidentified leakage is were kept or recorded in any way? 6 A I think if it was deemed valid, it would be 7 kept, yes. I wouldn't see anything wrong with that. 8 Q Well, how would it be deemed valid if by 9 definition anything above one gpm. was deemed invalid? l 10 A Well, that's not a definition. Okay. That 11 was a practice established at Three Mile Island I guess or I i 12 whatever in the Operations Department. I I l 1:1 Q Well, let's talk about the practice. If it 14 was the practice that any test result greater than one gpm. 1 Ir> would be thrown away, what might occur that would create an j l 16 exception to that practice? You said that you thought maybe l l 17 not all test results were thrown away. Okay. Now, -- 18 A If the shift supervisor deemed it was, you 10 know, a vel.id leak rate based on the fact he did have a leak l 20 that he couldn't control that was greater thar., one gallon per 21 minute , i 22 Q How would that leak rate test result be i g; brought to the attention of the shift supervisor? A Because he would be the guy who would say, s you know, we got to go in -- you know, we got to go find a CIW REFOQTING SEfMCE ww>o nreim cowar swm a iM.9N,I9 I ( , l% i/VA flille r / Il '/ t i Vtill _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __.m ._ _ _ _ . . . _ _

l 1 57 l 2 leak, we got to shut down or socieching to that effect. l 3 BY MS. PENNY: 4 Q Let me interrupt here. Are you talking 5 about practices at Unit I or Unit II? fi A They are both the same. I didn't do any-7 thing different in Unit I than I did in Unit II. , 8 BY MR,DeVESA: l 9 Q You indicate that it was a practice to , l 10 throw away leak rate tests greater than one gpm., correct? t 11 A Yes. 12 Q Now, you have also indicated that somehow j i ta the shift supervisor would sometimes make a determination as 13 to whether or not the test result ought to be kept or thrown

1. > away?

Ifi A That's true. 17 Q Now, is what you are saying that control 18 room operators before they could throw away a test result had l 19 to seek the approval of the shift supervisor? 20 A No sir. 2j Q Would they have to seek the approval of the ! 22 shift foreman? l 23 A I w uld say no. I think it would depend a 24 lot on the individuals. You know, we had a lot of different 2, type people. I don't know how everybody worked. I don't know CAPITAL CITY PEPOrmNG SEfMCE (WAWID U f EDEDAL SOJARE STATICN HAfXh%TG PA i7,108

                                       'f ilit e 411 /15 1P 14                             ,

y L 1 58  ! 2 that. 3 Q So at least sometimes the control room j 4 operator could throw away a leak rate test without consulting j r, with anyone? fi A Yes. , 7 Q Now, how would a control room operator 8 determine whether or not a test above one gpm. was valid or i 9 not? i in A By looking at the plant parameters. < 11 Q And what would he louk for? i 12 A Make-up tank level, change of temperature, j n change of power, anything that would change RCS inventory. I li Q Now, do you recall ever being consulted 1.r, regarding a test result above une gpm. whether or not it was 1st valid or not? I 1 l 17 A Ho, I don't. 18 Q Do you raccll that upon receiying a test m result above one gpm. that anyone on your shift would go out l 20 and search for leakage? 21 A Not an individual, you know, incident, but 22 I am sure we have, yes. 23 Q And what makes you sure tha't this has l. l 24 occurred? i l 25 A That it did occur? CARIAL CITY REPORTING SEWICE

rom o o rsorrm sova swioN l IV.lM)# 7 * . I'/ 1/11 M niner . a m mu ,_

I 1 59 I 2 Q Yes. 3 A I am sure if we got' consistent leak rates. I 4 you know, greater than one or whatever, you know, high leak 5 rates, we would send the A0s out. No big deal. H Q Do you remember that occurring? 7 A Hot at any one time, no. 8 Q No, but do you remember that occurring as a 9 matter of fact? 10 A Sure. Yes. 11 Q So if a test result was obtained that showed j 12 leakage in excess of one gpm., individuals would be dispatched i i:t to go out and search for leaks? l it A Yes sir. I i r, BY HS, PENNY: i in Q When you said there were a number of high ! 17 leak rates consistently, you don't mean if just one were t ta received? 19 A No, that's what I said before. If you got I 1 consistent high leak rates, you know, we dispatched AOs out. 20 21 BY MR. DeVESA: 22 Q If you nly g e one, what would you do? 23 A I probably wouldn't do anything. You know, 24 besideo through the shift foreman, you know, you check over 2e, the plant as far as what you can see in the control room attd CNUAL CITY REPCmlNG SEfMCE l d/AVA (> ll llf d (JA1 */JIAf/( $fATIOJ l l/.li 'l' .l ? f * . I '/ 1710ft It ii t 9 e of li / t t 11:14

T i i l 1 60 2 probably run another one. 3 Q And would the first one be thrown away? l 4 A Yes sir. 1 5 Q And the reason that it would be thrown away e; would be? l 7 A I didn't believe it. 8 Q And what would cause you not to believe it? 9 A They didn't believe it because the plant to looks stable and safe. 11 Q So it is your testimony that the only time 12 a leak rate test would be thrown away is if an operator or a i:i shift foreman looked at the test result and concluded that it a was not believable? , I i., A Thae's true. in Q Are you saying that a test result in excess n of one gpm. was never thrown away if it was believable? l is A Yes, I believe.that. l 19 MS, PENNY: Bernie, I think you are getting 20 your statementa confused. What was the practice with leak 21 rate tests? MR. DeVESA: Can we take a break for a second.- 22 I

 .g                        (Brief recess.)             .

g MS, PENNY: Bernie would like to be able to y, clarify. I think he was getting to the point where he was CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErMCE ' (OAWLR U FEDEQt4 SQUARE STA104 4W.Wh W If 111(Y. l . i n * .* g att m u +.

i i 61 1 j l 2 making some confusing statements there. 3 LY MS. PENNY: 4 Q Would you tell Mr. DeVesa what you believe 5 the practice was as far as leak rates?  ! o v e. \ 6 A The way eue shift operated, okay, if we got l 7 a consistent lot of leak rates greater than one gallon per 8 minute, we would send AOs -- dispatch A0s to the aux. building l ! i 9 to look for leaks, other than that, if we got a leak rate  ! l l 10 greater than one gallon per minute, just normal, the CR0 would 11 throw it away by the direction of the shift foreman sometimes 1 12 and sometimes probably not. I basically, you know, wouldn't la be involved at that point. 11 BY MR. DeVESA:  ; in Q How, what purpose would be served by throw-tu ing the test results away? I mean, for what purpose would 17 they be thrown away? 18 A Because we did not believe the data. 19 Q Did -- explain to me why particularly with 20 an operating philosophy that required control room operators 21 to believe the instrumentation they were working with unless 22 they had reason to doubt it, why one would choose not to believe a a leak rate test that showed a result in excess of one gpm. qm 24 A Basically 1 don't consider the computer and 25 instrument even though the instruments feed the computer. Com-CAPITAI OTY REPORTING SErMCE tnAw.9 u itomAt souAr4 $1ATO4 HArn%IG PA 1710A 11 t i n * / if /13 V,14

i 1 62 2 puter program in Unit II was inconsistent from day one. I- l 3 Q What do you mean --  ! 4 A And I don't think -- including myself, I 1 i s don't think that most people had put much faith in that calcu- i i e lation, j ) 7 Q So that if someone received any particular i a leak rate test result, they would be of the impression that ) 9 that result was not ver y reliable and not really anything that l l 10 was worthy of being believed? i 11 A That's true, u Q Now, did that cause anyone to throw away i:i test results that were under one gpm., let's say .5 gpm.? 1 it A Probably not, no, Why would those test results be not thrown i3 Q in away, weren't they just as unbelievable as the ones that said , 17 1.5 gpm.? is A That's probably true. in Q So what caused people to throw away the test 20 results that were above one gpm and,ktep those test results 21 that were under one gpt% ? i y A Because that w u rha practice of Three Mile j i g Ittland and, if the plant looked steady, stable, you got a high ; 1 24 leak rate, you would throw it away. Q But weren't there times when the plant did 23 CAPliAl CITY REPCWTNG SEfMCE i v^wi u n sir mN co mm swtrJ HMhNt M;. f V i 7109 l

                                       ' '!st / ,! ) t J'14                                   ,,

1 63 2 not look steady when, in fact, leakage was discovered, when. 3 in fact, leaks were . repaired, didn' t -- warm't ther,e times 4 when operators were sent out to find leaks and they did, in 5 fact, find leaks? 6 A Sure. 7 Q And they repaired those leaks? 8 A Yes, I would say so. Yes. 9 Q And weren't the test results that were ob-10 tained just prior to that chrown out anyway if they exceede.d l 11 one gpm.? 12 A I don't know that.  ! la Q Well, were any test results ever kept that 14 showed leakage above one gpm.? 13 A I would say yes to that. I mean, I don't in know for sure. I am sure you wont through all the data. I 17 don't know that, is BY MS. PENNY: i in Q Speaking for youself, did yott ever keep any? 20 A No. l 21 BY MR. DeVESA:

  • 22 Q Do you ever reme:nber working as a shift
 ,3 2   supervisor when people under your supervision went out and                         i 24  found leakage?                                                                          i 25                A      Not any particular incident.

CNHAL CITY TSO? TING SEfNCE f DAWI U lf ff[Yf#4 SCW4 $TAlO4 e v 4.1J1 p * . 5 / 1/ if v:

                                      't fterJJ      ' ' - t:14                            ,

q

                                                                                           !    -1 i

t 64 l l 2 Q No, but, you knos, just generally do you

                                                                                           .I t

3 recall that people working for: you would go out and search i 4 for reactor coolant system leakage end would, in fact, find i, a leaking valve or some type of a leakage problem? l 6 A Yes, I can believe that.. l 7 Q And what would ha done in resgnse to that? j 8 What would they do after finding the leak? 9 A They would either notify -- they would i in notify the shift foreraan, we try to correct it. Valve pack-l 11 ings are easy to correct. You know, you would get a mainten-12 ance man, you write a work request and you go fix it and, if l l ia you can't fix. it, you measw a it. l is Q Now, if just: prior to the time they vent i., out and searched for the leak they had obtaint i a leak rate 16 test in excess of one gpm. , what do you believa would have 17 been done at that time? 18 A They would ha re throwed it away. 19 Q Would they have gone out and measured the 20 leakage and then went back to the old test sad recalculated 21 t it taping into consid wation that. there was this leakage or i 2-2 Would they simply throw the old test away? A They would throw the old test away. 23 24 Q And perhaps they would run another leak rate?

  ,2,,,                       A    True statement.

CAPITAL CITV fiEPOrmNG EfMCt IJiAWI U U ll(XDAL SQJME S1ATON l st/forh p . IS 1/1TM r! G I4 r .i II ? n 'tt.M _25-mmA_

I i 1 65

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2 Q So isn't it fair to say that no matter what 3 plunt considitions revealed, that any test result above one l J 4 gpm..was ultimately going to be thrown away?  : I 5 A Yes. .  ! l 6 EY MS. PENNY: l ) 7 Q And you know thct based on knowledge today, ! i 1 ( e right?  !

J 9 A Yes, because we didn't have any over one 10 gallon per minute I guess. l l 11 BY MR. DeVESA L

12 ' Q Now, do you remember how the practice of  ! 13 throwing away 2.eak rate tests in excess of one gpm. got 11 atarted?

1. > A No, 1 don't.

1h Q It was always the practice as far as you , 17 could remember? 18 A Yes sir. 39 Q Do you remember whether anyone> ever ques-20 tiened that practice while you were a shift supervisor at 21 , linit II? l 22 A No, I don't recall of any. 2a Q Do you recall of any subordinate of yourn 24 raising questieno about whether or not they should be throwing i 25 away leak rate tests? CN'nN CITY REIORTING SERACE wtwo. u lumt rown swoa n/ M r.f a f t . PA ' 71GP, ti ' ' ' t & .' J +!t ',414 s-

l l I 1 66- , l 2 A Wo, I don't. j 3 Q Did ar.yone come to you and cocplain that it i 4 lwaswrongtothrowawayleakratateatrsandi.heydidn'twant

             .                                                                                 ]

r, to throw away leak rate tests? l l 6 A Noe i 7 Q Do you recall any of your superiors direct-x ing you that in all cases leak rate tests had to be thrown I \ n away? la A My superiors -- 11 Q Yes. 12 A -- directing me to throw out laak rates? ia Q Yes. 11 A No. l i i r, Q Anyone ever direct you t0 do that?

                                                                                           )

3 l'i A No. 17 Q The only light that you can shed on why this 18 was done is that as far as you can remeinber it had always been, 10 t the practice? 20 A Yes sir. 21 Q Now, you indicated that there were varioch 22 problems with leak rate test results which caused thsm to be 4 23 viewed as not entirely reliable, Is that correct? 24 A That's true. 2r, Q Can you, describe some of chase problems? CARIAt CITY RETOOTING SEINCE (WAVA D U l((Xf#4 $QUATM $1A1(yJ lt/l.0Ga f V , TV 17108 H il 4 4 r / if 7: s m14 .

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1 67 I 2 A Not really. The only thing I htow is the I a sofcware -- the con:puter. That's the problem I kneu.

       .:                    Q     1riow did you cone to believe that the com-3        puter Was a problesnT

, r. A 1 guess it was just comunon knpwledge. You

                                                                                                            )

7 knw, I know the computer people were working on it anny, i 8 'many months on that program itself. i 9 Q Do you know if they ever. corrected the leak in rate test in a way that made it aceurate and reliable?

) 4 A No, I don't.

12 Q Do you kr.cw whether or not there were any n calculation errorn in the procedure? n A For the hand calculations? i n Q Well, okay, for the hand calculations. j in A Whether there was errcra in it? n Right. Q is A No, I don't know that.

          $                                                                                                 l in '                  Q      Do you know whethe:r there was --                                     !

I g A I know they worked on it quite a bit, but -- 21 Q Do you know whether there were any calcula - 22 ti n errors in the computer program? g A ilo, I aon't know that.  ; g Q Were you aware at the time that r.here was a y, problem with the make-up t.ank level instrumentation that would ; CADITAL CITV REPORTING SEWCE [YnWie U EEDEM SO/WE Swov w m @ OG PA 17108 blil"t W JI 731 Mid

b 1 68 2 cause inaccurate or false make-up. tank level readings? 3 A No,-1 don't know that.. 4 Q You unre not aware that that was part of -

             .s        the problem with the lash rate test?

6 A Make-up tank leve2.7 7'l Q Right. 3a A I am sure it would Et, yes. 9 -Q Rell, my question is were you aware at the 3 10 tifne -- li A No. . t 12 Q -- that one of the things that was causing la the leak rate test results to become inaccurate was faulty l

                                                                                                                     ;    1 it           make-up rank level instrumentation?

i t

       .t r,                          A    No.

m , Q You had no idea that make-up tank level 17 instrumantatica was causing the leak rate test to come out I is inaccurate? ' m A No sir. l 2n Q Were you aware that make-up tank level. instru-l 21 mentation played .a part in the leak rate test calculation? I l 2-2 A Yes sir. g i Q So you knew that one of the numbers that the! 24 leak rate test took into consideration was the make-up tank 3 level number? CANAL CITY REPORTING SEfMCE I MWl b it ll!1ll#.! 'it)llADf r, lay yj 6 f/ 1.4 'I',f ? I * . l '/- 1/if M te il:1 t ' #t f i t **** e 4

i 69 2 A Yes sir. 3 Q But you were not aware that there were l 4 problems with that instrtamentation? 5 A No. l fi Q Now, this feeling that the leak rate test 7 was not very reliable, was this shared to your knowled e Eby x everyone? 9 A Yes sir, 10 Q Individuals that you came in contact with . 11 that you worked with pretty much all believed that the leak l I 12 rate test was not completely reliable? l 13 A That's true. 11 Q How many test results would you say were l l 13 discarded on the average in a week let's say? j i in A Twenty. l 17 Q Were more tests thrown away than were kept? 18 A That wouldn't validate my number 20 then.  ! 19 Q Excuse me? 20 BY MS. PENNY: 21 Q Are you quessing? i 22 A Yes, I am guessing, 23 Q Do you have any idea? ) l l 24 A No, I have no idea reelly. 25 BY MR DeVESA: 1 CAPITAL CITY REPCRTif G SETMCE r)GA%10 U FEC(RAL SQ'JARE STAllON H/.0QSIG PA 17108 D s i l1 r .5 p y t t 1814

   !                                                                 70 2                 Q     Well, do you have a sense that it was 3    necessary to run two or three tests before one could obtain 4     a satisfactory test result?
   .s                A     Yes, that's believable.                             ;

i 6 Q So that it wasn't that one test out of every 7 hundred had to be thrown away at Unit II? 8 A No. - l 9 Q Tests were thrown away quite fraqttently? ] l  ! l ' i l 10 A Yes sir, l t1 Q In some cases two or three tests were 12 ' thrown away before a valid test or a satisfactory test result la could be obtained? 14 A I believe that. 1.s Q Now, when a good test result was obtained, in e test result under one gpm., did anyone feel that that was l 17 any more believable than the test results that were being is thrown away? 19 A I would think so, yes. r 2n Q Why is that? l l 21 A Because the plant -- the plant did not re-22 flect esty leakage. 23 BY MS. PENNYL , 1  ! 24 Q You have learned since then t. hat that assumpa 1 2s t.Lon of yours is inaccurate? 1 1 CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErNICE I (1MWl4 U FEDERet M STATKyJ tiero79fe,tw 171m sisiser / p ;# n v,14 I

I i 1 71 2 A Pardon? 3 Q You have learned since then that you be-  ; j t 4 lieve that the plant did not reflect leakage is inaccurate? 5 A Since then, yes. We are talking cbout '78 l 6 I would think.

                                                                                                                 )

7 BY MR. DeVESA: 8 Q Are you suggesting that back in 1978 at the 9 very same time that tests were being thrown away employes to assigned to Unit II were not aware that there was leakage in 11 the plant and, in fact, were trying to correct it? l 12 A I guess you have to reword that one. I 13 Q You are saying that test results under one

                                                                                                                ]

i la gpm. were kcpt? I l 15 A Right. 16 Q And that's because they were believed? 17 A That's true. l 18 Q And they were believed because there were 19 not indications of leakage at Unit II during the time that l 20 these test. results were run? . j i 21 A All right. ._ 1 22 Q And I am asking you are you certain that t 33 employes at Unit II were not at the very same time they were 24 turning in test results under one gpm., going out and dealing 25 with leakage that showed that leakage could, in fact, be CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SEfNCE lWAV41/ U FEDlD/4 SQJADE STAllON 1 HAppS(G PA 17iOR l 11 H Ii t W lI ? U Y,14 7 ,

1 I l

;                                                                      72 2    higher than one spm.?

3 A At certain times I am sure we did have leaks a that amounted to greater tman one gallon per minute that we s went out and fixed. 6 Q So did it really -- was thera any connec-7 tion between the test results that were thrown away and the 8 leakage? I mean, did it matter what the leakage was? If you 9 had leaks, you were going to go out and try to fix them, cor-l 10 rect? 11 A Yes. 12 Q And no matter how long it took, you w6uld 13 try to fix those leaks? is A That's true, in Q Now, did the process of going out and fixing in leaks have anything to do with whether or not you would throw 17 test results away? B is A No. 19 Q Wasn't it simply a question of you were goint; 2n to throw away all tests above one gpm. and keep'all tests un-1 21 der one gpm.? Wasn't that really the practice? j A That was a practice, but I am sure if we 22 23 had -- I am sure if we had greater than one gallon per minute 1 24 leakage, okay, that we wasn't working on, you'know, we would 3 25 have went into the action statenent. CNUAL CilY REFORTING SErMCE ODAWTQU F[DFDAi SO Aff STAT O 4 lu t brh s" . iv.1/trA tititu / H .* : t mia , l

I i 1 73 2 Q Well, let me ask you this. You have indi-3 cated before that as far as you knew at the time the leak 4 rate test was pretty much the primary way which reactor cool-5 ant system leakage could be measured. Isn't that correct? 6 A True. . 7 Q You have now indicated that because of com-8 puter problems and perhaps other problems that you and your 9 colleagues at Unit II believed that the leak rate test was 10 pretty unreliable -- 1 11 A That's true. l i2 Q -- and those test results were not believ-l ia able? i is A That's true, i r, Q If that were the case, then how would you 1 in ever be able to determine whether leakage did exceed one gpm.  ; i 17 or not? j 1 is A Make-up tank level; 19 Q Could the make-up tank level tell you pre-20 cisely whether you were over one gpm. or not? l 21 A No. 22 Q Could anything that you had avai).able to you 73 at Unit II tell you precisely whether leakage exceeded one 24 epm. or not? y, A No sir. CAPflAL CIIY PEIOPTING SEfMCE i ow p o unr om nm swm alNA/fn fx', Pt 1/1f)R 1l it le r d ji */ 14, Tit 14

i 74 i

           .2                      Q     So that you really had no way to compare                                      l 3         the -- you had nothing to cespare the leak rate test results a        to?                                                                                               i
            .5                    A     That's true.

6 Q So that it would not be possible to take a 7 leak rate test result'above one gpm., let's say 1.5 spm., i a okay, and look around and determine with precision whether 9 that test result was accurate or not? i to A That's probably true. , il Q Isn't that true? is A That's true, ia Q Now, given this state of affairs,_were you 14 really able to satisfy the technical specification require-  ; ir, ment that you keep unidentified leakage under one gpm. for q in any four to six hour period? i: A For 72 hours, is Q Well, originally I thought you had indicated i

                                                                                                                      -)

in that 72 hours was the minimna time frequency that a test had 20 to be run? j 21 A True. 2-2 Q Is that so? 2, 3 A That's true. , 24 Q And then you also indicated, however, that  ! 2, if leakage actually exceeded one gpm. for ten hours that you CAPITAL CiW PEPORTING SEfMCE

                                           'o^ms o mnw somr swrn                                                    l
                                                ,ww ~ , nv                                  ,

11

  • 1 I i * .' d ,* 1' 9:14

i I 1 75 2 had to go into the action statasaant -- 3 A True. 4 Q -- shut the plant down, correct? 5 A Right. 6 Q What I an asking you is was there really 7 any way that you could know for sure whether leakage exceeded 8 one gpm. during any ten-hour period?

9 A No.

10 Q I take it then that insofar as that require-l 11 ment was concerned, that is to keep leakage under one gpm., 12 you were not really able to satisfy that requirement? 13 A That's true. 14 Q Now, did you take any steps to correct this 15 situation? l 16 A Me personally? 17 Q Yes. ! 18 A No. 19 Q Do you know if anyone else took any steps to 20 correct this situation? 21 A Well, you can say that, you know, they 22 spent a lot of time working on the computer program. I know 23 that. Management did. That would be the only guy who would 24 be involved in that. 25 Q So you know that at least there were efforts CAMTAL CITY PEPCOTING SErVCE t mye o u ruxw souA9c stAtou it/l'1'J9 8 V . I'/ 171(f m i n .r p v e t v.q

) i 76 2 made to improve the accuracy of the computer program and the 3 accuracy ultimately of the leak rate tests? 4 A Yes sir. 5 Q But at least prior to the accident in March 6 of '79 the leak rate tests were nevertheless still felt to be 7 inaccurate? 8 A True. 9 Q . Now, didn't anyone believe that that was a 10 serious problem? . 11 A I am sure they did believe it was a serious 12 problem because the operator was basically, you know, flying n blind or hcvever you call 'it. Sure it was a serious problem. 11 Q Why do you think that you continued to I

1. , operate the plant without being able to precisely determine j m whetherornotyouweresatisfyingtherequirementofstayingl 17 under one gpm.7 is A Because we were operating the plant safe as w far as we was concerned.

2n Q Well, okay. Let's talk about that for a 21 moment. The technical specifications require that the plant 22 be operated with leakage that.is less than one gallon per 23 minute. presumably because that number has been agreed upon g as a number which reflects some level of safe operation. Is 27, that correct? CAPITAt OTY REPORTING SEIMCE I dsAWI f) 1I f f (F IJAt V)!JAD( STAllCf J is/ f.s/r t* rp .1/ 1/ity; ri il n e .' it / t 't 'ta u

I I I i 1 78 j j 2 with some degree of certainty that you were under one gpm. or 3 not? 4 A Your eyes. 5 Q You could see whether you w ce under one 6 gallon per minute? j 7 A No, I say out in the plant. In the control 8 room you couldn't tell. I l 9 Q All right. ] 10 A But operators walking through the Aux and I l 11 fuel b611 ding -- i 12 Q All right. 13 A -- or reactor building could tell'if they it had a leak or not. l 15 Q I understand they could tell if they had a in leak or not. Could they tell whether throughout the entire 17 reactor coolant system there was leakage greater than one gym., tx by looking somewhere? 19 A They couldn't tell the number, but they know-20 if they had a leak. 21 HR. DeVESA: We will take a lunch break. 22 MS. PENNY: Do you went to complete the 23 train of thought. 24 MR. DeVESA: Why don't we stop there and I wil: 25 think of a better question. CAPITAt CITY REPORTING SErMCE roAwt p ij rifVDAl SOJARE STATK74 ivrn nois.tw 171fM n s I I n v A If '/\\ V11A e

i i 1 77 2 A Yes, I believe that. a Q Do you agree with that? 4 A Not really, no. 5 Q Well, not being able to determine et that 6 time whether you were precisely under one gallon per minute 7 or not, how did you satisfy yourself that the plant was oper-s ating safely insofar as reactor coolant system leakage was l 9 concerned? l 10 A Because I didn't -- you know, I just -- I 11 didn't believe we had any leaks greater than that, that's all, 12 aven though what the numbers showed me. ) 13 Q But what did you do to insure that leakage l u was not unsafe? 15 A Because I didn't believe we had that much l l l In leakage. l 17 Q What made you come to that conclusion? 18 A Because I spent a lot of time in the plant 1 19 and so did my operators. 20 Q But you indicated before .that nothing that 21 was available to you in the plant could tell you with any 22 degree of real securacy -- l 23 A That's in the control room.  ; 24 Q Okay. Are you suggesting that there was I 25 some other information available to you that could tell you  ; CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SEfMCE DRAWER U FEDEDAL SQJADE STAllON H/ Torn fri DA 17108 ti l t it r # 11 '/n V.14 ,

1 79 I 2 (Luncheon recess.) a BY MR. DeVESA:  ; 4 Q The limiting condition for operation was 5 established at one gallon per minute. Isn't.that correct? u A Yes sir. , 7 Q Without being able to tell what the number a or the amount of the leakage was, you could not tell whether 9 you were within the limiting condition for operation. Isn't to that correct? 11 A That's true. 12 Q Now, not being able to arrive at a precise la amount of leakage, what was it that you were looking fer which n allowed you to determine whether the plant was operating t r, safely or not? 16 A Without knowing the exactly number of leak-17 age gpm.-wise? l l 18 Q Yes. We have already established that you l 19 could not establish the precise amount of leakage. 20 A If I didn't measure it. 21 Q Right. A If I could measure it, I could do that. l 22 g Q Right. We have already established that at 24 lease the legal requirement was that you stay within one gallon 25 Per minute. You indicated that despite your inability to do , l LAhl/V. CilY l&Of?llNG SEfMCE l t ditwA P u I[(4 pt4 SamDF STATOJ n/ H f.v s. . IS 171rg: l nion . p ,m via

I l 1 80 l l~ l 2 that, you still felt you were operating the plant safely? i 3 A Yes sir. ) i l 4 Q My question is by what standard did you { 1 5 measure the leakage to determine whether it was safe or not? , 6 A By looking at it. l 7 Q And what was it that you tried to see when l ) 8 you looked at it? 9 A How much it was leaking. The only way you 10 couldn't measure a leak would be an inaccessible area or a 11 steam leak that condensed in the air instead of dripping to 12 the floor. 13 Q But if you were looking at it with no 11 ability to tell precisely how much the total laakage was, the i 1.s total unidentified leakage was at any given point in time, l 1 16 what would you look for to satisfy you that the plant was ! 17 still operating safely? 18 A Where the water was going. ' 19 Q And what would that tell you? , 1 20 A That would tell.me whether I was operating l 21 safe and the leak was contained inside the plant. 22 Q Is it your recollection at this time that 23 back in 1978 you monitored leakage primarily to determine 24 whether or not it was under control and whether it was con-2.s tained and not to determine precisely whether it was under one CAPITAL CiN REPORTING SEfNICE I Des WI R U IEDERt4 V)UAQ[ STATIOf 4 is/.f M.19 7 . Pt. 1710e l 't

  • 114 e > p */ t3 'tst id

1 81 2 gallon per minute? 3 A True. t 4 Q Did you ever reach a point in time where you-5 felt that leakage was out of control beyond your capacity to ti contain it in which you still operated the plant? 7 A No. 8 Q So at all times when you were a shift super-9 visor assigned to TMI II you were always satisfied that, des-10 pite your inability to measure the precise amount of.unidenti-11 fied leakage, that the leakage was always under control and it 12 was at a safe limit? 13 A Yes sir. 11 Q I would like you to take a look at a leak 13 rate test dated October 15, 1978, which appears to be a test l 4 16 that you had something to do with. Take a look at that test, 17 Bernie. 18 Do you have any independent recollection of 19 having participated in that leak rate test?  ! 20 A No. l 21 Q From looking at ths leak rate test computer 22 printout and the corresponding documents, can you reconstruct i l 23 whether or not you had anything to do with that test? 24 A No. 25 , MS, PENNY: Look through them. CAPITAL OTY PEPCDTtG SErMCE i s/AW P t i Iliif/4 SCRIADF GTATIOrJ ( WJAliNK fri Iw 171M l ti i i t i . > li ;m wu

1 82 2 THE WITNESS: Okay. You mean go through 3 these papers? 1 4 MS. EENNY: Yes.

   .s                           THE WITNESS:                  Well, of course, I signed it 6         there, and, you know, that's --

7 No, I don't r.ecall having anything to do witb 8 this. 9 BY MR. DeVESA: 10 Q But that is your signature-- 11 A That's true. 12 Q -- on the portion of the leak rate test la marked approved? 14 A Yes sir. I r> Q So does that lead you to believe that you in at least approved that leak rate test for submission? l 17 A Yes sir, ix Q Now, can you tell me what the leak rate test w results reveal with respect to gross identified and unidenti-20 fied leakage? 21 A It says -1.5 and identified -1.2 22 Q And unidentified? l 23 A Unidentified .35.  ; 24 Q Now,,from looking at those numbers,.does.it 2.s appear that that is a valid leak rate test, it accurately re-I CAPITAL CITY RERDRTING TIMCE q I DAV4 fJ t! l[DID/4 7XfN( $1ATCtJ , ilhtMWh Vo TY 1710ft n i i t o .< p ,', t t vt u

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i . - - _ _

I 1 83 l 2 flects what leakage was at that time?  ; 3 A The numbers add up. Yes, I wouldn't know  ! 4 why not. 5 Q Is it poanible to have negative leakage in l 6 all three categories like that? 7 A I would say yes. 8 Q How could you have negative leakage in all 9 three categories?. That would suggest -- 10 A Well, you couldn't really have it in any of 11 them, okay, because we don't make water. 12 Q So in this case it is clear that that leak l l l 13 ' rate test is inaccurate on it's face, is it not? ' 11 A That's true. In Q Now, why would you as the approver sign that 16 particular leak rate test and approve it for submission? 17 A Because we accepted minus numbers. 18 Q Now, there is a number for identified leakage 19 that's reflected on that printout. Can you reconstruct from 20 looking at those records, the test result and the correspond-21 ing records, where that number came 'from? 22 A Identified leakage or unidentified leakage? 23 Q Identified. 21 A No. 2s Q Do you have any idea where it would come CAPITAL OTY REPORTING SErMCE t u.w p o irrmA! soiApr twm s v: A.1 )v 0 " 11 1114 p$ fl : 6 : t P / ll 711141tj

i 1 84 2 from? 3 A No. 4 Q All right. Can you take a look at the 5 strip chart for a moment, the strip chart that corresponds vi to the time that test was runt 7 A 19:28. Okay, that muust be where it was run 8 I would assume. 9 Q Now, you wil1~ notice that the make-up tank to level slope flattens out during the course of that particular 11 test and, in fact, results in the make-up tank level being 12 higher at the end of the test than it is at the beginning of 13 the test. 14 A Yes. i In Q Do you see that -- , i l 1(i A Yes. l l 17 Q -- condition that I am describing? 18 A Yes. 19 Q Can you explain -- l 20 A The printout also tells you f.he same thing. 21 Q Correct. Can you explain how something 1.ike 22 that might occur? a

 .                 A     Change of plant conditions.-             It looks to me I

24 by looking at this log that's what they was doing. ' 25 Q Well, why don't you study the log for a CAPITAL CITY REPORTING SErMCE COAWI P ll FEC(DAL SQUAQ(. 7ATICYJ l 4t/l.WJff C PA 17if6 n o u m ;, mm ,

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i 1 85 !- 2 moment. 3 Q Because 20 : 28 they place feed water -- 4 yes, they are going up in power because they are placing feed 5 water in the main and the valves and the B ptsap and stitomatic. 6 That means you are increasing power at that t M . That's what - 7 it means to me.

  • 8 Is that your opinion from looking at the Q

9 records as to what caused the make-up tank level slope to 10 flatten out and reverse its course during the tiest? 11 A Yes. The plant wasn't even stable at that 12 tin e . I would say they are' increasing power to set -- they ( 13 relieved the shift at 40 percent power and somehow they are j 14 going up because they had all the feed water in the mains in and valves and pumps and manual. They was probably going up 16 in power. The plant definitely oscillates when you do that , 17 trick. That happened right during the middle -- the center 18 -- the middle of the leak rate. Well, not in the middle, to-t 19 wards the end. Juat about where the peak is on the make-up l 20 tank level, in fact. . 4 21 Q- If you were increasing power at the time -- 22 A No, we could have been increasing power, 23 okay, but any time that you put the major part of ICS in hand , 1 24 -- in auto, the plant does move and it indicated here it did. 25 It could have went up or down. CAPITAL CITY PERDQTING SErMCE mawrou notor sosw swoa n/mG980 PA 171C6 4 d h e ,' r,  : mia ,

1 86 2 Q I am not sure I understand your position, 3 Bernie. Can you tell from looking at the records whether 4 there was an increase in power during the time of the test 5 which caused that particular make-up tank level change in c direction? 7 A By looking at this log, okay, I can say 8 that the plant would move during this evolution and it shows 9 here that it did. That's about where it peaked. 10 Q Now, was it common knowledge at the time 11 that that type of evolution would cause a plant oscillation q l 12 like you are referring to? { i:1 A Sure. I1 Q And was it not the practice at that time to q 1.; run a leak rate test during times when such an oscillation in was not present? j 17 A You are not supposed to run a 3.eak rate dur-1 18 ing plant oscillatiolts, that's true, but it looked to me like ' l 19 -- I don't know who the operator is here. Different operator 20 run the leak rate I would presume,than the' guy doing the f l 21 manual situation at the ICS panel. 22 Q Isn't that leak rate test signed by someone 23 else? 24 A Germer, but I don' t know who done this be-2.s cause you don't have the next sheot. CAPITAL CITV REPORTING SEfMCE i (OAMI/Il lilif#4 TQhf4 STATOJ l t/.IAYjd s " . IV. i11M lt ellir / H / t ; Viid

I 1 87-l 2 What I am saying is I don't know who wrote 3 this. Yes, I do too. I don't know who that is. I don't e know, but I would say the plant went into an oscillation 4

                           .5  there.

i 6 Q But based on your early statements, this-  ! 7 would then ha an invalid leak rate test? 8 A Yes sir. 9 Q And it should not have been submitted as 10 the official leak rate test for that particular shift? 4 11 A That's true. 12 Q But it nevertheless was? 13 A That's true. l 11 Q And you approved that as a shift supervisor? 15 A Yes sir. IG Q Now, at that time -- now, be careful. I am 1 17 going back to 1978 - 1979, specifically in this case to Octo-  ! 18 ber, 1978. Were you aware that the addition of hydrogen to  ! 19 themake-up tank could cause that kind of flattening out of 20 the make-up tank levsl trace? 21 A Ho. 22 Q You had no idea that adding hydrogen to , 23 the make-up rank could cause that kind of result? 24 A That's true. 2.s MS. PENNY: Are you saying you had no idea CAP 11AL CITY PEPCGilNG SETMCE l idW 1/ l1 fil A DAl V71Alf STA1()f j slil u f?f.= 11 i /1'stt ti ?Ila r A d / t i titi.1 l-

l 1 88 1 2 in October of '787 l l 3 MR. DeVESA: Right. l i 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, right. l l 5 BY MS. PENNY: 6 Q Do you know when you had an idea? 7 A Well, you know, I -- it was comanon knowledge 8 or common statements to say adding hydrogen to the make-up 9 tank changed the leak rate. That was never proven to me -- me 10 personally, ti BY MR. DeVESA: 12 Q Was it common knowledge in October of 1978 1:i were these statements made? 14 A Oh, I am sure. I t ri Q Did you ever direct your subordinates not to ic add hydrogen during a leak rate test just to be cautious? 17 A No, not that I recall. 18 Q Were you under the impress at that time thati 19 hydrogen was -- that the addition of hydrogen was prohibited , 1 20 during a leak rate test? . j 21 A I am not sure it was. 22 Q Are you familiar with the language in the l 23 leak rate test procedure which prohibits the adding of chemi-21 cals to the make-up tank during a test? 2, A If you tell me it's there, I believe that. CAPilN CI!Y1/UOPillG $EIMCE t mu u o su wn scarn straoa

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f i 1 89-2 Q Were you aware that that language was in the-3 leak rate test procedure at that time? 4 MS. PENNY: Do you understand the question? 5 Were you aware then that you couldn't add chemicals during a a leak rate. 7 THE WITNESS: It's probably in there. 8 MS PENNY: Were you aware -- 9 THE WITNESS: But hydrogen has got nothing 10 to do with chemicals. 1I BY MR. DeVESA: 12 Q So it would have been your opinion at that j 13 time that the addition of hydrogen during a leak rate test was 11 not prohibited? 15 A True. 16 Q And you, therefore, never directed your 17 subordinates not to add hydrogen during a leak rate test?  ; 18 A That's true, in Q I would like you to take a look at the morn-20 ing report of October 16, 1978,- Bernie. 21 A All right. 22 Q First of all, do you recognize the handwrit-23 ing to be yours? 24 A Yes, that's mine. 23 Q Now, I would like you to, first of all, look, CAPITAL CITY REPCOTING SEfNICE rnaw p o rroron souAr4 s Atoa 3Arnnte rr. PA 17108 u it t e r /11 '/ t 1 'iD 14 i,

i l t 1 90 i l 2 at the second and third page of that report and I would like I 3 you to explain what those handwritten page represent? 4 A This is just a normal turnover that shift 5 supervisors done to shift supervisors. 1 don't know how it 6 got -* I am sure it wasn't attached to this report in the 7 beginning. Yes, it just gives you the plant status. In fact, " 8 both units. 9 Q Okay. Well, is it your testimony that those l l 10 two handwritten pages are not part of the -- three handwritten 11 pages are not part of the daily status report? 12 A I know it wasn't. 13 Q What are those handwritten pages? 1.s A They are turnover from, you know, my shift 15 to, you know, my relief. Okay. In other words, every shift i 16 we wrote them up. IT Q Every shift or .fust the shift that was pre-18 paring the daily status report? 19 A No, avery shift . l 2n Q On every shift there was handwritten turn- ! 21 over notes? l 22 A Yes sir. Maybe the guy'wouldn't elaborate o

    ,      --   in other words, if he done this job, he would cross off that                     ,

1 21 cross off that, cross off that. Het might not rewrite the 23 whole thing, but, yes, that was normal practice. CAPITAL OTY REPORTING SErNCE DDAWEDU FID(DAL SQUADE STATION t(Af0f/V fr, PA 1710R

1 ' t i a / / ,* t t 1914

1 91 1 2 BY MS. PENNY:

3. Q Are you saying you kept them and passed '

4 them from shift to shift? 5 A Yes. 6 BY MR. DeVESA:  ! 1 7 Q But the original series or set of handwritten j 8 notes was prepared by the individual who prepared the daily 9 status report?

                                                                                        ]

10 A No. This was inade ' by the 11:00 to 7:00 guy. l 4 il Q Right. That's correct. Now, the handwritten 12 notes -- 13 A Were done that -- 11 Q In this particular case you prepared that i 1.5 daily status report? IU A Okay. 17 Q Correct? 18 A That's true. 19 Q And those handwritten notes are also in your 20 handwriting? . 21 A That's true. 22 Q And they pertain to events of that same 23 particular shift that the daily status report refers to? 24 A Okay. 25 Q Is that correct? CN11AI CITY D[lOpilNG SEINICE vavAvn fitnM'JDAM STA1VJJ n/ lofR F. f% 11108 tt i t t e r .! H ,' t t tit 14

l i 1 92 2 A That's true, yesu-3 Now, you are saying that those notee are l Q 4 not really a part of the daily status report? 5 A That's true. 6 Q What is the purpose of those notes?

7 A To tell my relief, the shift supervisor 8 coming on duty, the plant status oth4r than, you know, orally.

9 Q And each shift superviser would prepare l in notes like that?  ; l 11 A Yes sir. l 12 Q Ott every shift? 1 1:1 A Yes sir. ti Q His own set of notes to be turned over to in his relief crew? l l 16 A Yes sir. 17 Q Can I ask you to -- excuse me. And those 18 notes would not in your opinion at least have been turned in l 19 for distribution with the daily status report? 20 A That's not my opinio'n, that's a true state-21 ment. 22 Q You know that for a fact, thet those notes

  ,a  were not meant to be turned in attached to the daily status 24  report?

25 A That's true. CAP 11AL CITY REPORTING SErMCE rnawrr o etten som sinoa HAfDt% F, PA 17108 - li tlis t J ii V i t W14 (. _ . - . - . _ _ _ _ -

i 1 93 2 Q Would those' notes have been distributed to

   '3         anyone other than the relieving shift supervit2r to your 4        kncwledge?                                                .

5 A No.

  '6 4     Just one more question on those.                                Can I-                  l 7        direc.t your sctantion to item 11 on those notes and can you.

8 tell r.e what type of problem you are referring to on Item 117 i j 9 A No. Just said having problems getting the 10 ,

         )

hydicogs9- into the usake.-up tank again. Can't find problem. l 51 Q Do you have any recollection of a problem l 12 f.tivolving addition of hydrogen to the make-up tank? 13 i

                           /. No. I knew at one time we went to mannEl.

la You know, A0s added it or something. , 15 Q Well, does this seem to -- does this entry j 16 of yours seem to pertain to the same probler47 17 A Yes, I would think so. Yes. 18 Q But you don't have an independent recollec-19 jtionofthatproblematthispointintime? 20 A}}