ML20236Q836
| ML20236Q836 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1995 |
| From: | Blanch P AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Zwolinski J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q781 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-CO98-A-11, FOIA-COR98-114 NUDOCS 9807210077 | |
| Download: ML20236Q836 (7) | |
Text
,
/IQ y
,1 Paul M. Blanch Energy Consukant W,6 %
September 30,1995 f /
I 7-John A. Zwolinski, gJ ' '\
De guty Director Division of Reactor Projects -l/II ' .
Ofhcc of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,
Washington DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Millstone Unit i Pmpowd Amdment -
DearMr.Zwolinski:
Over the past month I have been in contact wi f
Millstone Unit 1.
Due to the nature and the sources of these comments and alleg
.requestingconfidentiali:v and request t e 15de~pendentif a5d~not tum these over to NU for resolution. I am f and limitations of this request yet feel it is extremely im x>rtant to me and my sources. Withholding of this lett us requested in accortlance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv). -
Many 6f the allegations deal withi the d determinadons made by NU and
.significanthazardsconsiderations(SHC)areassoc ate w tlicens evaluation criteria of 10 CFR 50.92.
My overriding concern is that the present spent fuel pool and supportin significant hazard to the general public in that an accident will res those specified by 10 CFRC Part 100. Approval of th h li nsee.
. events, neither of which have been analyzed by the NR ort e ce Backaroand On July 28,1995, due to, internal safety concems and allegations, No submitted a pmposed license amendment for Millstone Unit 1. His licen requested the NRC to amend the MP-1 License to allow f for a " fu normal refuelings. The requested amendment was in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.92. The timing of this pmposed amendment is to allowll core onload during the next refueh,ng shutdown presently wtition that this full schedul i 1995. NU has confirmed via its response to a pending Section 2.2061 core ofPond has been standard practice for most of the refuelings con 20 years. In ' Sat response, NU fuather maintains that full core off industry practice for BWR's.
O.AAugust21.1991NU SeniotEpaineer George Galatis and "We the
- tition with the NRC under 10 CFR206 toTake enfoRinTentaction (nowmglf andWilling 97iolatiniillicirliEc se to the NRC. Thispetition was later se statements kixiwinglf arid' willingly made l'a 10/5..To EDO for Appropriate 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv)
Action...Cpy to: Chairman, Comr j 9807210077 990707 N Shan m
amended to include Millstone Units 2 and 3 and also Seabmok as they have been conducting
- the same uniFcensed practices. This certainly wouid iHIconsistent with NU's assenion that full core offloads are the standard industry practice.
On August 30,1995 the NkC published in the Federal Register (FR 45172), notice of the proposed amendment. Contained within this FR is the NRC preliminary evaluation that there are no significant hazards considerations (SHC). The evaluation is a simple verbatim recital of the analysis of the NU submittal.
NU clearly notified the NRC that the purpose of the amendment was to allow for a full core offload to the spent fuel pool. The NRC failed to state this in the Federal Register. Instead, the NRC conveniently only discussed the changed temperatures and the fact that shutdown cooling was going to be used during refueling o wrations. The NRC failed to even mention that the amendment requested a full core off lanc . These deceptive tactics are similar to the FR notice for Yankee Atomic where the NRC failed to inform the public that the amendment was to allow for a complete disassemble of the major reactor comyosents.
The NRC was chasdsed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals for these decepdve actions in that it did not allow for formal intervention. See Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC,59 .
FJd 284 (1st Cir.1995). The public had no way of knowing the intent of the licensee change. Public hearings were denied and the NRC contended that the public was properly notified by th; Federal Register Notice and that the general public should know what the NRC means when they publish somethingin the Federal Register. Disguising this particular change has the appearance ofintentional deception by the NRC of the general public.
Contained within some of these allegation are references to Attachment (xx). This refers to attachments to the Millstone letter to the NRC dated July 28,1995.
It may not be entirely possible to arrange these comments in a logical format, however.1 ,
attempt to arrange them consistent with the three criteria as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c), that states the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a significkat increase in the probability or consequences of an scendent previously evalented. .,
- The proposed change is to allow a full core offload whereas the present license only allows one third of a core to be offloaded into the spent fuel pool. The off loading and transfer of the entire core involves three times the number of fuel elements to be removed from the core and transferred to the spent fuel pool. One of the analyzed accidents is a fuel handling accident and with these times the amount of fuel elements being transferred, the probability d an accident is increased by a factor of three.'I believe this to be a significant increase in the probability of an accident.
- NU states that a single active failure will not result in a loss of spent fuel pool cooling.
Single active failures have been identified that will result in loss d all spent fuel pool l
' coo,ing. (i.e. loss of a diesel generator or gas turbine). While this condition exists with !
the ; resect license, the consequences ofloss # spent fuel pool cooling are significantly greater than before due to the reduced time allotted to transfer the spent fuel and the significant increase in the number of curies contained in the spent fuel pool. NU and the NRC conveniently ignore the fact that a single passive failure due to,a postulated seismic event, results in loss of all spent fuel pool cooling and releases exmeding those specified by 10 CFR Past 100.
- The third paragraph under item (1) on Attachment 1, page I states that "The existing l l
accident analysis for a dropped spent fuel bundle dunng refueling bounds this situation 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv) 2 1
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rs the analysis assumed a decay time of ^4 hours." If the referenced analysis truly OD
' assumed a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> decay time, then that analysis would indeed bound the consequences of the dropped spem fuel bundle accident. Northeast Utilities has not demonstrated t the pmbability of this event is not increased. The proposed routine offloading of the entire core to the spent ft.c.' pool inherently involves features that could increase the probability of the dropped spent fuel bundle accident including:
- 1) More irradiated fuel assemblies will reside in the spent fuel storage racks during the refueling outage thus, the odds that a dropped fuel assembly strikes irradiated fuelincreases,anc
- 2) It has not been shown that the pmposed full mre offload scheme involves the same or fewer movement ofirradiated fuel aswmblies than previously considered in the FSAR. Thus, there may be more opportunities (i.e., greater likelihood) for a fuel assembly to be dropped.
- The fourth asterisked (*) paragraph t.nder Section A on Attachment 3, page I states that "The most limiting single active I ailure causes one SFPC system pump and one SCS ,
t pump to become inoperable." Can this single active failure occur during the refueling outage with the full core offloaded into the spent fuel pool? Do the Millstone Unit i Technical Specificadons require electsical power divisions (including both emergency power sources) to be operable in this plant configuration? If not, what happers when the aforementioned single active failure occurs when the electrical power division for the other SFPC system pump and SCs pump is not available?
- The final five paragraphs on Attachment 3, page 2 take credit for both SCS trains to cool the spent fuel during refueling outages. Does this explicitly require that both SCS trains, all required supporting systems (keep-full pumps, service water, contml systems, etc.) and the associated electrical power divisions will remain operable throughout the refueling outage? If not, how can such credit be realistically assumed?
- The first paragraph under the ONEPOOL CODE section on Attachment 3, page 4 states that 'The reactor building, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) is designed to maintain the buildirigtemperature between 65'Fand 100*Fduring power and refueling operations." Was the reactor building HVAC system designed and analyzed for refueling operations with the entire core off loaded into the spent fuel pool? If not:
(1) the proposed technical specification amendment represents an ==alyzed condidon in violation of 10CFR50.S9, and (2) the assumption used to justify use of the ONEFOOLcode may beinvalid.
(2) Cavate the possibility of a new or different kind of accident fewan any -
accident previously evaluated.
- The final equation on Attachment 5, page 4-5 includes heating up the makeup water added to the spent fuel pool. If the makeup flow rate exceeds the combined boil.cff and evaporation rates, then the spent fuel pool level must increase. Where does the overflow go? What type of qualified instmmentation is available to monitor the level and temperatiires? With the assumed loss of forced cooling, the SFPC pumps are out of service. Where does the excess water go? What could be flooded?
- While NU acknowledges the possibility of boiling of the spent fuel pool, the alleged structural analysis is only vahd for 150*F. None of the instrumentation or the standby gas treatment systems are qualified to operate during or after exposure to these temperatures and a condensing steam environment. ..
- The radiological effects of the boiling of the spent fuel pool and possibic uncovering of 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv) 3
op the fuel elements have not been analyzed. Con.pliance with 10 CFR Part 100 has not been demonstrated for either the existin g off load sequence or the proposed full core off load.
- The second paragrapi under Section 53 on Atrachment 5, page 5-3 contains two bizane statements: 'The rate at which the level of water in the pool will dmp,in the event of no supplemental addition of water [following loss of forced spent fuel pool coolingl, will be maximum at the beginning of boiling and will monotonically decrease thereafter (as the decay heat load burden drops)" It is true that the decay heat load contributed by the most recently omonded fuel assemblies will decrease such that the maximum decay heat load will occur at the time boiling begins, but it is also very true that the maximum mass of water in the pool also occurs at the time boiling begins. After boiling begins, decay heat will continue to be transferred into a steadily decreasing volume of water.
Theoretically, the level reduction could actually increase after boiling. "However, Millstone I limits the drop in pool level and contmis the minimum level by way of Technical Specification (3.10.C) for all modes." If this is not the most absurd statement in the history of nuclear power,it surely unks in the top five. Millstone l's Technical ,
SpeciGcation 3.10.G linuts the spent fuel pool bulk temperature to 140*F, under all modes, yet boiling (i.e., spent fuel pool bulk temperature greater mot isthan 140*F) boiling awayis the very subject of this purported evaluation. If the water in the spent fuel without makeup, Millstone l's Technical SpeciGcation 3.10.C wil control neither the drop of nor the minimum of the spent fuel pool level. Technical Specification 3.10.C simply becomes another potential violadon candidate to complementTechnical Specification 3.10.G.
(3) Involve a signinennt reduction in the margin of safety.
- Station blackout issues, previously evaluated, are not addressed and are potentially impacted because the time to fuel pool boiling is reduced to less than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> with a station blackout or with only a single active failure. The first paragraph on Attachment pl following loss of 3, page 5 states that the minimum time-to-boil for the spent fuel forced cooling is 5.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. How does this time compare to the Millstone Unit I station blackout coping duration and the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> operator response time for single active failure scenarios. A station blackout will result directly in a loss of forced cooling and a direct and unmonitored release to the environment.
Some general allegations that do not conveniently 5t into any of the above three criteria sad are listed as follows:
- The fourth paragraph 4mder item (1) on Attachment 1, page I states that 'The three new proposed technical specifications will provide sufficient controls on the movement of spent fuel into the spent fuel pool .". Since the Millstone technical wat specifications fuel previously did not permit the entire core to be routinely offloaded into icult the sto see pl during refueling outages, yet Northeast Utilities did it anyway, it is dif now any technical specifications could pmv*ule " sufficient controls." Northeast Utilities appears to treat technical specification requirements in a rather cavalier manner.
- The NRC has failed to propedy inform the general public of the proposed action as required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(2)(ii) (B).This requires the NRC to " provide a brief description of the amendment and of the facility involved."
- NU has knowingly operated Millstone Unit 1 in violation of NRC regulations and their license for more than 20 years and has withheld this information from the general public.
of
- NU has provided intentional frise infonnation a the NRC and therefore is not qualified to operate a nuclear power plant.
. The NRC has not conducted an independent evaluation of the pmposed change in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92.
a NU states in their amendment the cooling systems are designed in accordance with
" Seismic Class 11" design requirements. " Seismic Class !!" is not defined by NU or the NRC and no analysis has been conducted to assure operability during and after a seismic event. In the same paragraph of the proposed amendment, the licensee states that other cooling systems are non-seismic.
- NU has not been able to locate the original structural analysis for the spent ,fuel pool.
NU has not verified that the analysis and the assumption used in the analyms were properly subjected to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and the NU Qv:Jity Assurance Program.
- This proposed change results in a sostulated off-site dose to the general public that .
exceeds the requirements of 10 Cit Part 100.
. The second paragraph on Attachment 3, page 5 states that the required makeup rate to the spent fuel pool in the event of a loss of forced cooling is well within the capacity of the seismic makeup line to the spent fuel pool from the condensate system. Make-up water is supplied to the spent fuel pool surge tank which is not qualified for a seismic event. There is no make-up capability after a seismic event, therefore boiling and fuel melting will eventually occur. Is the condensate system seismically qualified? Will any
> umps survive a seismic event to supply the required flow through the seismic makeup ine?
- The wordit.g of Technical Specification 3.10.F r ppears to be ovedy restrictive in that
" reactor refueling operation," is generally considered to include removing the shield blocks, removing the drywell head, detensioning the reactor pressure vessel head, removing the reactor pfessure vessel head, and fuel loading the refueling cavity and removing the spent fuel' pool gates. Does T/S 3.10.F mean that none of these activities can take place within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of taking the reactor subcritical?
- "As soon as possible" in Action (2) of proposed Technical Specification 3.10.H is a subjective phrase that defies enforcement. It is recognized that the plant configuration essentially renders a traditional maximum allowable outage time meaningless, but there are other remedial actions that maybe appropriate with one shutdown cooling train inoperable, including:..
l . restoring both SFPC trains to operable status;
- 2. suspending work with the potential for disabling the remaining shutdown cooling train and its electrical power division;
- 3. mad adding another item to Surveillant Requirement 4.10,H to verify that smat own fuel pool temperature is NOT increasing once every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> when one shuts coolmg trainisinoperable.
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- The final paragraph in proposed Bases 4.10.H states that "This Technical Specification is not applicable for an abnormal fuel discharge event from the reactor." The cunent licensed abnormal fuel discharge event involves offloading the, entire core. By this license amendment request, Northeast Utilities proposes to make full core offloads the normal fuel discharge event. What is the defimtion of " abnormal fuel discharge event" 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv) 5
for proposed Bases 4.10.H? Is it the " Abnormal full core offload" as defined on
= Attachment 5, page 3-2? If it is, then " future fuel cycle uncertainties" may result in its being routinely used during refueling (i.e., deja vu).
- In the description foi Case 4 on Attachment 5, page 3-2,it is stated that the SFPC heat exchangers are aligned to the operating SFPC pump in the event of a single electdcal division failure. Can cooling water to both SFPC heat exchangers be supplied when either electrical division has failed.
- The final paragraph on Attachment 5, page 5-2 states that the spent fuel pool bulk temperature remains below 140*F for Cases 3 and 4 as shown in Table 5. 3. According to Table 5.1 (Attachment 5, page 5-6), the SFPC pump flow is assumed to be greater than design Gow in Case 3 and the SCS pump flow is assumed to be greater than design flow in Case 4. How can a conservative analysis rely on flow rates that are higher than design flow?
- The first paragraph on Attachment 5,page 5-4 states that the " pool boiling scenario is
' completely hypothetical." What about a postulated stadon blackout event initiated with the spent fuel pool bulk temperature at 140'F7 What about a seismic event that causes a -
loss of the spent fuel pool surge tank and the associated piping due to non seismic design?
- The current licensed normal spent fuel pwl cooling configuration during refueling outages relies solely on the SFPC system. The configuration proposed by Northeast Utilities in this license amendment request relies on one SCS pump and at least one SFPC Pump. However, the license amendment request is silent with respect to the {
instmmentation used to monitor spent fuel pool temperature and level. The NRC's l SRP 9.13 (as invoked by Attachment 5, page 1-1) acceptance criterion (h) requires that the Spent fuel cooling system design include " monitoring systems provided to detect conditions that could result in loss of decay heat removal, to detect excessive radiation levels, and to initiate appmpriate safety actions." Northeast Utilities' license amendment request contains numerous statements of operator actions (e.g., responding to single active failure by initiating alternate SCS pump or aligning operating SFPC pump to both SFPC heat exchangers), yet no mention is made of the instrumentation that tdggers i
these necessary safety actions. Is the instmmentation available following the single active failure of either electrical power division?
- Northeast Utilities states in its license amendment request that it intends to install a cross-tie line with an isolation valve between SCS train B and the SFPC system. Is this valve to be included in the in-service inspection program?
- According to the secEnd paragraph on Attachment 5, page 1-1, "In 1993, NU notified the NRC via LERs P93-011-00 that a revision to Amendment #40 was required to accommodate a full core offload as a ' normal' refueling mode."
. In the last paragraph of their letter dated July 28,1995, transmitting the license amendment request, Northeast Utilities asks the NRC to conduct an accelerated review", j I
lt would appear that Northeast Utilities failed to -sercise due diligence by preparing and submitting a license amendment request in July 1995 that it knew was necessary as long l ago as 1991. Therefore, the NRC should not feel obligated to conduct a superficial review of this amendment request simply to conform to NU's self-induced schedule '
constraints.
- The design of the back now dampera in the Standby GasTreatment System (SGTS) is !
deficient in that with a single failure of one system, proper flows could not be maintained. NU planned to replace the dampers and modify the contml system to irctify 10 CFR 2.790 (7) (iv) 6 i
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I these defic'.encies. It was determined that this rudiGcation would result in an unreviewed safety question, and NU has now decided not to replace the deficient Qg dampers.
NU now has filed a response to the Section 2.206 petition of We the N.,L L People an in which it admits essentially every documentation and equipment error alleged in the @
petition. Given the numerous errois which NU has been forced to admit exist in the design and construction of the SFP,it would be improper to assume that other representations about the design and construction of the pool are accurate. At the very least, a finding of no
%d .p 8 LA* [
JJ significant safety considerations by the NRC would be both negligent and premature.
Given the number of deficiencies and allegations related to the spent fuel pool, the NRC Ch
- must order NU not to commence the next refueling presently scheduled for October 27, 1995, until all of these issues are addressed and properly resolved and all investigations #
completed by the NRC Staff, NRC Office of Investigation and the NRC Office of the \
Inspector General.
'l fomully request the NRC provide me with an analysis of both the probability and the l
consequences of all spent fuel pool accidents including loss of cooling, and loss of spent '
) fuel pool water. This information is requested prior to the commencement of the next
< refueling of Millstone Unit 1. 1 Sincerely, 1 M. Blanch e I
1 l
cc: Emest Hadley SenatorUeberman Senator Dodd Representative Gejdenson Mr. leo Norton !
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le CFR 2.790 (7) (iv)_
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October 19, 1995 NOTE TO: Chairman Jackson FROM: Michael Tschiltz '
COORDINATED WITH: Annette, Kath , ,
Subject:
Meeting with Paul Blanch
, This meeting was requested by Mr. Blanch in a letter dated May l 26, 19951 Mr. Blanch asserted in the letter that he had two l major concerns regarding the NRC's failure to fulfill its.
obligation to protect the general public. In the letter Mr.
Blanch criticized the NRC's handling of whistleblower issues as .
well as the NRC's portrayal of the risks of operating reactors to the general public.
Mr. John Zwolinski is the staff point of contact for Mr. Blanch and plans to attend the meeting. On Friday, October 20, 1995, Mr. Zwolinski received an E-mail message8 from Mr. Blanch which listed the issues that Mr. Blanch intends to cover during the meeting. The issues are outlined below.
DISCUSSION TOPICS and POu.nilAL ISSUES NRC's Mission Economics vs. Safety - Balance Mr. Blanch asserts t$l$at economics not safety are the overriding concern of the NRC. Mr. Blanch c6ntends that the NRC's reaction to concerns is based on the financial impact of backfits.
Mr. Blanch has asserted that the NRC will not enforce any regulation.or take any enforcement action that could negatively impact the economic viability of more than one nuclear plant or utility. Mr. Blanch contends that less serious violations'that pose no threat to the economic viability of plants are acted upon swiftly and severely by the NRC to dupe the general public by presenting an " Illusion of Action."
. Blanch wIa contacted
~ '
ower operatiorresused af ter a recent outhge with
- h. k i an i of the work undpne. The concern was raised that theeconomicpoliciesofthegew~torpstateandlocalregulatory agencies may have an adverse impact on the safe operation of the gg facility.
2 footnotes indicate the tab in which the reference document is filed.
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Mr. Blanch's Perception of Major Issues '
Steam Generators - Mr. Blanch is. skeptical of the sleeving of SG tubes being performed at Maine Yankee. He believes that sleeving is not a proven method for dealing with SG tube cracking. In the past he has raised concerns regarding SG tube cracks at Haddam Neck.
Spent Fuel Pool - Mr. Blanch is concerned about the adequacy of spent fuel pool designs. He believes that spent fuel pool accidents pose a significant hazard to the general public. Mr. Blanch has voiced concerns about the offsite
~ dose associated with a postulated spent fuel pool accident.
Certainbeyonddesignbasisspentfuelpool/ccidentsresult in offsite doses greater than 10 CFR Part 100 limits.
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Due e ongoing NRC reviews Mr. Blanch has indica that he will not pursue discussion of this subject at the meeting.
Motor Operated Valves - After the industry identification of )
the MOV pressure locking issue Mr. Blanch questioned the operability of MOVs at several plants. His concerns were reviewed and determined to be without basis. A year prior to the problem identification at Millstone pressure locking had occurred during testing at EPRI and the industry was ir. formed . Mr. Blanch feels that the industry response to resolve MOV issues has taken too long.
Responsiveness to Public vs. Licensee's Mr. Blanch has been displeased with the C's response to g- concerns raised by the general public, letter to Mr. Zwolinski he wrote, " Wha his March 29, 1995*
fail to understand is the many methods devised by the NRC to avoid responding to a direct pest, question or statement from members of the generali public. Hr. Blanch contends that the NRC allows many nuclear l power nts to operate in violation of NRC regulations.
Response to Letters - Mr. Blanch has requested numerous ,
specific questions be answered / analyzed. In order to manage l the regponse to Mr. Blanch's concerns Mr. Zwolinski was :
assigned as the staff point of contact to coordinate response to Mr. Blanch's concerns. '
ot all of Mr. Blanch's
([g' j' demands are always satisfied base n1 ted staff resources and commensurate safety benefit '
r License Ame.sdment Requests vs. Safety Concerns 2.206 vs. NOED's - Mr. Blanch strongly disagrees with the Enforcement Discretion process and fundamentally believes
s -
that the licensees should always confom to their Technical Specifications.
Integrity and Public Perception of NRC Operability Determination OIG Investigation Mr. Blanch asserted in a letter dated September 9, 1994, that Mr.
William Russell falsely stated that "The staff did not review any formal operability determinations." In a reply letter dated March 9, 1995*, Mr. Zwolinski stated in error that the IG had investigated Mr. Blanch's concern when it had not. Mr. Blanch questioned the reply and was later informed by Mr. Zwolinski that the statement was incorrect and that the IG had not investigated the alleged false statement. Mr. Zwolinski later informed the IG and the IG chose not to investigate.
Allegations Mr. Blanch asserts that the NRC' has failed to investigate significant allegations and that this creates a chilling effect at plant sites. Mr. Blanch has questioned, "If the NRC refuses to investigate serious violations then why would any individual risk his career and bring any allegation to the licensee or NRC?"
Jean Lee Survey - refers to 5 question survey
- response to the survey is included) regarding a ega that was generated by the NRC (Ed Baker not Jean Lee).
(
The 3'
< usefulness of the survey has been criticized. /
O ~
h(</ Letter of 9/28/95 8 i
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Chilling Effect' < r. Blanch (mayl refer to the .NRC's handling
\ of allegations at where# numerous allegations were turned \
/ over to the TVA employee concerns program by the NRC thus in part revealing the identity of the allegers. J_ iL WhibtleblowerProtection Mr. Blanch contends.that retaliation frequently occurs and'the NRC abrogates its responsibilities to the Department of Labor and to the Courts. Mr. Blanch has asserted that the NRC refuses to j enforce its own safety regulations and endorses retaliation '
against those individuals requesting compliance by its inaction.
April 30, 1993 Letter to SECY' - Mr. Blanch has voiced his disagreement with the NRC's draft statement of policy, Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation , which encourages 5
employees voice their concerns through licensee employee
! concerns programs.
t DOL Process - The length of time to resolve issues of l harassment and intimidation is too long (3-5 yrs) . l i
l
i Whistleblowers can not survive in the interim during the process.
Generic spent Fuel Pool Issues Mr. Blanch is concerned about the adequacy of design of the spent fuel pool and associated supporting systems. He believes that the design basis events are not sufficiently bounding and that the NRC should require more extensive design features to mitigate beyond design basis events. Mr. Blanch contends that there have been several recent precursors to an event involving uncovering spent fuel and that it must be considered a credible accident.
10 CFR Part 100 - Mr. Blanch believes that Part 100 only applies to the licensing of new plants and that the agency should have operational limits. Mr. Zwolinski has informed Mr. Blanch that the NRC staff does use the Part 100
- guidelines in evaluating issues that may affect design basis dose consequences at operating reactors. The staff does not perform or expect the licensee to perform a revised design basis accident dose consequence analysis for each issue, however, it is expected that the licensee will compare the potential safety issues with the assumptions in the initial analysis to ensure the initial analysis remains bounding.
In addition, since Part 100 is incorporated into the design basis whenever the licensee performs a change to the facility it must be evaluated (10 CFR 50.59).
. Risk Based Regulation Population Density - When considering risk Mr. Blanch has noted that the, risks associated with the operation of a nuclear facility located near a large metropolitan area are much greater than a plant located in a remote area. This difference in risk is not accounted for in the regulations.
Public Property Damage Not Considered - Mr. Blanch has contended that the value of the damage to property has not been adequately considered in the event of an accident involving a r'elease. There are estimates in NUREG-1353, Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools," which estimate property damage in the event of an accident in excess of 20 billion dollars. Mr. Blanch feels these estimates are unrealistically low.
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,, It UNITED STATES efh
- 2 S . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,E E WASHINGTON, D.C. 2004H001
.....! February 22, 1996
Dear Mr. Blanch:
l l I am replying to your letter of December 26, 1995, to Chainnan Jackson in
! which you expressed concerns that (1) the NRC does not fully enforce its regulations concerning the harassment and intimidation of, and discrimination against whistleblowers, (2) the NRC's inaction creates a chilling effect on .
potential whistleblowers, (3) the NRC's approach toward its current review of employee concerns at Northeast Utilities is not appropriate, and (4) the time allotted for your meeting with the Chairman was insufficient for meaningful ,
discussion. The following information is being provided to address your {
concerns.
As you are aware, the responsibility for responding to employee claims of discrimination is split between the NRC and the Department of Labor (DOL). If an individual wishes to pursue a personal remedy under Section 211 of the ,
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, he or she must file a complaint with 00L. .
Only 00L can provide a personal remedy for discriminatory acts. 2 I If someone files a complaint of discrimination with the NRC, our procedures require that the individual be informed that if they wish to pursue a personal remedy, they must filg a complaint with DOL. Whether or not a complaint is filed with DOL, the individual will normally be interviewed by an investigator from the NRC's Office of Investigations (01). Based on the information provided in the original complaint and the interview, a decision is made regarding whether the investigation should be pursued. Because of O! resource limitations and competing investigatory needs, a priority system is used to assist in determining which investigations should be pursued.
On October 12, 1995, the Executive Director for Operations issued a revision to the priority system that raised the priority for investigating a,llegations of discrimination. On.a scale of high, normal and low, allegations of discrimination are a~ssigned a priority of either high or normal.
Discriminatory acts that are considered a high priority include discrimination as a result of providing information directly to the NRC, discrimination caused by a manager above the first-line' supervisor, discrimination where a history of findings of discrimination by the NRC or DOL or settlements suggests a programmatic problem, and discrimination that appears particularly blatant or egregious. All other allegations of discrimination are assigned a normal priority.
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- Mr. Paul Blanch -
2 If an allegation of discrimination is assigned a high priority, it will usually be investigated by 01. If an allegation is assigned a normal priority, it may not be investigated by the NRC, depending on the investigative workload at that time. While an NRC investigation may not be conducted in every case, especially if D0L is investigating the matter, the NRC will monitor the D0L process. This is consistent with the working arrangement under our Nemorandum of Understanding with 00L that provides that the NRC will not normally conduct an investigation if DOL is conducting one.
If either the facts developed in an NRC or DOL investigation meet the standards of evidence necessary to substantiate that a discriminatory act occurred or discrimination is found as a result of the DOL adjudicatory process, the NRC will initiate enforcement action against the licensee. *
, Decisions on appropriate enforcement actions have been, and will continue to l be, considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. In addition to actions taken under the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.7 are also referred to the Department of Justice for its consideration for criminal prosecution.
You indicate that the NRC has created a chilling effect by its inaction on allegations of discrimination. The NRC has issued civil penalties to licensees and enforcement actions against individuals found to have committed acts of discrimination against those who have raised concerns. The NRC i believes that appropriate enforcement action has been taken consistent with our Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600) to emphasize the importance of l identification and prompt comprehensive corrective action. _0ur enforcement '
actions are intended to emphasize the need for licensees to improve their performance through lasting corrective action.
You also presented your views regardi'ng the December 12, 1995, tasking of the NRR staff by the Executive Director for Operations. Specifically, the staff was tasked to conduct an independent evaluation of the history of the licensee's and the staff's handling of employee concerns and allegations related to licensed activities at the Nillstone station. NRC staff members met with you on January 22, 1996, and discussed the scope of this activity.
Our prime regulatory authority is contained in 10 CFR 50.7, " Employee ;
Protection." While past reviews focused on Northeast Utilities' basic '
administration of its-Employee Concerns Program as one means for employees to raise issues to management, the current NRC review will probe deeply into a few selected cases. The NRC will be examining selected concerns in depth from the time that the concern was first raised until it was considered closed. 1 The staff will, in particular, be looking for common causes and lessons ;
learned from past licensee and NRC handling of employee concerns and !
allegations. The common causes and lessons learned will be used to assess the need for revision of licensee and NRC procedures for handling employee concerns and allegations.
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_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . - - _ _ _. l
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[ Mr. Paul Blanch 3 You have stated that the current review should be conducted by the NRC's Office of the Inspector General, and we note you have provided Mr. Norton with a copy of your letter. The NRC staff has taken steps to ensure the objectivity of its review by selecting personnel who have no prior involvement with any activities at the Millstone station.
With respect to your letter of April 30, 1995, in which you comment on the NRC's draft Policy Statement on the " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without fear of Retaliation," the, NRC staff is considering your comments in its review of the draft Policy Statement.
With respect to your broader issue about NRC enforcing its regulations, the staff has communicated its policies to you in the past. Licentees.are required to meet all applicable regulations and requirements regarding their .
licenses. NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," states that the NRC recognizes that there are violations of negligible or minor safety or environmental conceras that are below the level of significance of Severity Level IV violations (the lowest level violation). These minor violations are not the subject of formal enforcement action, and may or may not be described in inspection reports. To the extent such violations are described, they are noted as noncited violations. The ,
purpose of exercising this discretion is not to minimize NRC findings or ,
reduce the number of enforcement actions. The purpose of this discretion is i to encourage licensees to identify and correct violations and, at the same time, reduce the NRC's efforts in addressing less significant issues that have been correr.ted, so that efforts can be focused on more safety-significant issues. However, the NRC reviews potential violations before deciding on a course of action. Whether or not formal enforcement action is taken, the licensee is required to take corrective action.
The staff has undertaken a number of-laitiatives in recent months which are related to NRC enforcement of its regulations and license requirements. One initiative, which is now complete, addresses changes to staff guidance regarding the issuance of Notices of Enforcemer.t Discretion (N0EDs). In accordance with the revised guidance, the staff will apply criteria similar to those in 10 CFR 50.91 for emergency ud exigent license amendments specifically whether the condition for which an N0ED has been requested was reasonably avoidabli or was caused by the licensee. If so, the NRC would normally not grant an N0ED. Granting an N0ED does not preclude taking 1 enforcement action for the underlying root causes of the conditions for which I an N3ED was granted.
Another ongoing initiative is our development of a database to identify all exemptions granted to power reactor licensees. On the basis of the information derived, the staff will consider and make recommendations, as appropriate, to change or modify existing regulations to remove unnecessary requirements so as to minimize the need for future exemptions; the thrust being that NRC expects licensees to conform to all rules and regulations. The NRC will continue to assess the licensee's conformance with the rules and regulations through our inspection program and the asso.cjated enforcement 1 process.
_ l
I Mr. Paul Blanch 4
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c You also commsnted that you have not received a response to your May 1995 letter to the Chairman. No formal written reply has been sent to you because your letter was viewe,d only as a letter of introduction to the Chairman, and the only specific action that you sought was a response to your request for a meeting with her. In this regard, you noted in your December 26, 1995, letter that a meeting had been scheduled. However, when the time allotted'for the meeting was limited to 30 minutes, you cancelled the meeting. The Chairman's office believed that the time allowed was reasonable, especially in light of your continuing dialogue with the staff and other constraints on the Chairman's schedule.
I recognize that you have worked with the staff, especially Mr. Zwolinski, in raising issues for consideration by the Commission and the NRC Inspector General, although all matters may not have been resolved to your coinplete satisfaction. I believe the avenues you have been using to raise issues have been effective in having your concerns addressed. Concerning your request to I meet with the Chairman and discuss certain issues, it would seem prudent for you to prioritize your proposed agenda topics so that they could be easily ,
discussed at a meeting of forty-five minutes' length with the Chairman. If you wish to schedule this meeting, her staff will work to arrange a meeting with you.
In closing, I want to assure you that the NRC takes very seriously the issues that you have raised. I encourage you to continue to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through the pre-established NRR management contact, Mr. ,
Zwolinski of my staff. ,
Sincerely, Original signed by R. Zimmerman for: I
,^
William T. Russell, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: Senator Joseph I. Lieberman Senator Christopher J. Dodd Representative Sam Gejdendson Leo J. Norton, NRC Acting IG DISTRIBUTION:
See next page DOCUMENT NAME: ED0932.GRN # Approved with changes per Comm. 2/16/96.
- See Previous Concurrence To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" - Copy without attachment /enclospre "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" - No copy OFFICE DRPE:DD g l E DRPE:D lE NRR ADP lE 0(TgfRpgWJ lE TECH EDITOR lN NAME JZwolinsb4\/ SVarga* RZissuerman* JGrKj' '
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Me@mee eddmEs@meum 0 04 E NAME Jmoore* wus..tt Ic JT.ytor* s;.ct.one DATE 2 / 6 /96 1 2 S l/96 2 / 8 /96 2/16/96-y Offic'al Record Copy
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December 26,1995 The Honorable Shirley Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Dear Chairman Jackson:
In May 1995, I wrote you requesting a meeting to discuss some vital issues that affect t overall safety of nuclear power plants in the United States.
While I never received any formal response from your office, I did work with Mr. John '
Zwolinski of NRR to schedule a meeting with you. This meeting was initially scheduled for October 24,1995, at 3 PM. I was informed by Mr. Zwolinski that you had left the mmaining portion of that day open such that we could discuss all the issues I had proposed. On F October 20,1995, Mr. Zwolinski requested I send him a list of topics I proposed to discuss with you. The proposed topics (copy attached) were transmitted via e-mail the same day to Mr.
Zwolinski.
After receiving a list of topics, Mr. Zwolinski informed me via e-mail that my time may be I then phoned Mr.
limited due to your schedule. I received this e-mail on October 23,1995.
Zwolinski to inquire what amount of time I was allotted for the meeting. I was informed that I was limited to 30 minutes.
When I was informed that my time was to be limited to thirty minutes after I transmitted the topics for discussion, I believed that your office had little or no interest in engaging in any meaningful discussions about nuclear safety with members of the public. l ittle has transpired the last two months to change my opinion.
- 4 I recently received a copy of a letter from Mr. Taylor to Mr. Russell requesting yet another investigation to determine why there are so many "whistleblowers" at Northeast Utilities. I bel this same type of investigation took place in 1991 and also earlier this year. 'Ihe outcome of t investigation will likely be the same, and the problem is ". . caused by the attitude of the !
management of NU." While this may be partially correct, the root cause of the problem lies wl Mr. Taylor's organization. NU will continue their systematic process of " Ethic Cleansing" as lon '
as the NRC actively enc'ourages this process by their inactions by failing to enforce the most significant regulations. NU's and other utility's whistleblowe.r problems are the direct res NRCs failure to enforce its regulations.
An investigation led by Mr. Russell's or Mr. Taylor's organization can not be objective l
because the problem is within his organization and Office ofInvestigations. The only way to l
obtain an objective assessment is through the NRC's Office of the Inspector General or some consulting organization with the integrity and total inde;= hm from the NRC.
Rather than spending more of our taxpayer and ratepayer dollars on on- more investigatio I suggest you review my letter to SECY dated April 30,1995. Within this letteis the solution to the whistleblower problem nor only at Northeast Utilities but throughout the country. 'Ihis letter
. was sent on behalf of the National Nuclear Safety Network (NNSN).and reficcts the opinions of numerous "whistleblowers" from around the country. The consensus of our organization is that if the NRC was willing to enforce their regulations, the number of allegations of harassment and ,
intimidation would decrease sig scantly. The " Chilling Effect" is created by the NRC itself.
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One of the primary problems with the Commission historically is that it views its constituency as licensees. Past chairmen have failed to realize the tme constituency of the NRC the public that they were appointed to serve. Such service only can take place if the public is included in some significant way by the Commission in its deliberations. I hope that, under your watch, the Commission can begin this process of inclusion and I suggest that a staning point would be to set aside adequate time for a meaningful discussion of the important issues I proposed to discuss with you in October.
L Senator Lieberman Senator Dodd Representative Gejdedsen Mr. Leo Nonon OIG Mr. Richard Kacich NU ee
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- Topics for Meeting with Dr. Jackson
- NRC's Mission .
- Economics vs. Safety - Balance
- Dr. Jackson's perception of major issues Reactor Vessel Integrity Steam Generator Spent Fuel Pool biotor Operated Valves
- Responsiveness to public vs. licensees Response to letters License Amendment Requests vs. Safety Concer~ .
2.206 vs. NOED's
- Integrity and Public Perception of the NRC b
- Operability Determinations OIG Investigate Letters of 3/29 and 9/28/95
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- A_llegations
.ean Lee Survey4()e Letter of 9/28/95 ,
Chilling Effect
- Whistleblower Protection April 30,1995 letter to SECY
- DOL Process
- Generic Spent Fuel PoolIssues !
10 CFR Part 100 Only applies to new plants
. Risk Based Re'gulation MU i 3, Population Density EyS Public Property damage not considered r* '
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. Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant W M a
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- March 3,1996 The Honorable Shirley Jackson Chauman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Dear Chauman Jackson:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter recently sent to Mr. John Zwolinski of the NRR Staff. This letter is my final summary of many issues relating to the various means the NRC Staff avoids requiring compliance with NRC Regulations. I understand this is the topic of an ongoing investigation being conducted by the NRC's Office of the Inspector General.
This investigation was initiated as a direct result of a letter sent to Mr. I2o Norton from Attomey Hadley dated May 19,1994. Mr. Norton has recently confimied our contentions and is quoted in Time magazine stated: "We shouldn't have regulations on the books and then ignore or wink at them." My enclosed letter and previous communication provides many examples as to how Mr. William Russell's organization " ignore [s] and wink [s]" at
, the regulations and if confronted, states that the law does not apply to the largest pcential sources for radioactive releases to the environment.
I In the Time magazine article I find it incredible that Mr. Taylor would infer that the i radiation doses to the general public am only analyzed when the pool is empty and the law "does not contain a provision for rereview." This legal position taken by the NRC's Office of General Counsel is in direct conflict with the NRC's mission of" adequate prcection of the public health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment in the use of nuclear materials in the United States." Mr. Taylor's statement seems to defy conventional logic and wisdom. Why are licensees required to analyze one reactor core contained within six inches of steel surrounded by a three foot thick concrete containment yet not required to analyze up to ten reactor cores in an open pool located above ground with no containment and no backup safety related cooling systems.
You have agreed to meet with me on April 9,1996, and I desire to discuss this and other related topics at that time. While there at numerous potential topics for our dis:ussion, I would like to prioritize the topics to include regulatory non-compliwe, the NRC's-whistleblower protection policy and radiation doses to the general population during accidents.
I am looking forward to our meeting.
Since ly, h
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Attorney Emest Hadley ER &
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. April 8, 1996 ,
Note To: Chairman Jackson From: Brian Holian M Coordinated With: Kath Anne e, M e
Subject:
Meeting with Paul Blanch (4/9/96)
BACKGROUND:
o Previous visit - October 24, 1995 - cancelled.
TAB C has briefing notes prepared for that meeting.
e TAB B has more extensive notes on the Whistleblower paper. .
e TAB A has significant correspondence in the last 5 months.
- Notes: 1) On the evening of April 8, a public meeting (was) held at Millstone to discuss 10 CFR 2.206 issues.
- 2) Mr. Blanch is att the Reg. Info. Conf. ,.
- 3) {
h, (, Te response g duc dctc was ccheduled for 4/4/96 7 h t h&& & lipped SHW Y' A as<ex. ,a s m ..e v. I. b's ca, d um -r.uv nm w ou 5. 5 m e' Mr. Blanch's Suggested Discus h, 7 s' /c)i W m%. 5s rom : gjf; e s, Reculatory Non-comoliance ^"'M pee e Mr. Blanch stated in his 12/26/95 letter that Northeast MY-Utilities problems (and other whistleblower problems) are the direct result of the NRC's failure to enforce regulations, o His 3/3/96 letter reiterates again his feeling that "every" MOV should be verified to satisfy acceptance that safety systems are'. capable of performing their functions. He also desires to kn'ow if certain operability determinations have been completed at ",every" plant regarding instrumentation questions (condensing pots).
- h.
[ On certain issues the staff does perform an "every" type ofQ
/ inspection or review. But, resources (and safety /
significance) most often dictate an audit type inspection, <
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o NRC's Whistleblower Protection Policy 564 TA8 B e Mr. Blanch's 4/30/95 letter, sent on behalf of the National Nuclear Safety Network, concludes that if NRC would enforce the regulations - the number of H&I allegations would decrease significantly. This letter submitted comments on the Draft Policy Statement -
Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation.
Their conclusion was that a policy statement is not necessary; rather, a change is required in the will of the NRC to enforce present regulations.
e The policy statement was faxed to Mr. Blanch.
Analvois: The staff believes that the policy statement and other improvements in the agency's response to. allegations are of value. The staff strives for consistent application of enforcement, commensurate with safety significance.
Radiation Doses to the General Population Durina Accidents b'$
He also finds it illogical (as stated in the TIME article) that there is no " provision for rereview" after licensing.
- In the staff"e 9/28/95 response to him on this issue, we stated that "the NRC staf f dpes use the guidelines of Part 100 as acceptance criteria in evaluating issues that may affect design basis accident dose consequences at operating i reactors."
Note: Following are several pages with highlighted information specifically on his Part 100 issue.
1 .
gj n Ur(AC%d EX, b parr May 13,1998 CHAIRMAN JACKSON'S SC'HEDULE Tunsday - Aoril 9.1996 7:30AM Depart via NRC car 8:30 A M 9:15A M Opening Speech at the Regulatory Information
. Conference - Capital Hilton, 100116th Street, N.W. g Presidential Ballroom (Contact: Anna May Haycraft,415-3075) .
9:15AM 9:45AM Meet with Anitti Vuorinen, Chairman of .
Finland's Nuclear Safety inspectorate, at the Capital Hilton - Agreement with Finland will be signed during the meeting 11:30AM 12:15PM Meeting with Paul Blanch f/, Q j 2:00PM 2:30PM Chairman's Morning Meeting l ..
3:00PM 3:30PM Commissioner Rogers NOTES: (GJD-Travel) l G
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File Note To:
From: Brian Holian Coordinated With: Kathryn. Annette. Marylee .. y
Subject:
Meeting with Paul Blanch (4/9/96)/
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Following his request, the Chairman met with Paul Blanch on April 9,1996.
The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes: attendees included members of the Chairman's staff and John Zwolinski, NRR (the staff's primary point of contact for Mr. Blanch). Mr. Blanch had three key points that he discussed:
- 1) Forthcoming Policy Statement on " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation": 2) Timeliness -
in addressing and resolving generic issues': and. 3) Spent Fuel Pool drainage and Part 100 consequences. Recent Millstone-specific issues were not discussed.
Mr. Blanch stated that the major problem with the draft Policy statement is that it places the responsibility for ensuring fair treatment of whistleblowers on licensees Each employee therefore has the burden to work within the framework of t-hem specific company (and/or the Deat. of Labor).
The bottom line is that NRC has abdicated its responsibility )y not aggressively supporting whistleblowers, where appropriate. Mr. Blanch states that NRC ruh; 1re adequate (e.g. 50.7) ad the Agency can take severe actions, if it chooses. Simply stated the agency doesn't have the willingness to enforce its regulations uniformly. And when the process works, it takes several years, thereby creating a " chilling effect" (nuclear workers will not take on the associated expense to get through the arduous path that exists).
Additionally. Mr. Blanch stated that of the over 600 H&I cases reported, only 49 were investigated.
Mr. Blanch also discussed issues that he has taken to 0IG. In particular, he focused on generic issues and related operability determinations. He commented that often when the NRC becomes aware of an o>erability concern, the staff refuses to demand that other utilities perform lice operability determinations. Mr. Blanch stated that when the staff identifies a Generic issue, licensees await the results of the staff's activities (in effect, licensee's trasfer " ownership' of the problem to the NRL). Als'. the time it has taken the staff to bring closure to generic issues (such as GL 89-10 on Motor Operated Valves) is a real concern. He stated that he agrees that
)lants should not necessarily have been shut down; but, that schedules should lave been negotiated to assure quicker conformance with the Generic letter.
He mentioned the February 1995 concern at Millstone Unit 2 (that the containment isolation valves might experience pressure locking and fail to open) as an example of an event which could have catastrophic results. Mr.
Blanch again stated that licensees don't adhere to all regulations as some "are ignored."
Regarding spent fuel pools. Mr. Blanch suggested that fuel in a reactor vessel is extremely safe (i.e., only one core present sturdy containment, available safety systems etc.). However, spent fuel pools often have as much as ten
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" cores" worth of fuel, and the safety equipment does not compare with the equi) ment available.to maintain the fuel in the reactor vessel. He supports quiccer adoption of dry cask storage and supplementing existing spent fuel pool cooling systems with more robust cooling systems. He elaborated that a drain down event (similar to what he terms a precursor event at Haddam Neck in 1984) could lead to a radioactive release far in excess of Part 100.
Additionally, he stated that the industry does a poor job in assuring that Part 100 is met when design changes are implemented.
The meeting was cordial and Chairm n Jackson invited Mr. Blanch to visit again, possibly in a year's time. Mr. Blanch did mention that he felt a lot of the problems at Millstone could have been avoided had the NRC taken proper enforcement at the time. He also volunteered that he believed the strong staff reaction to the Millstone affairs could be an over reaction by the staff.
Follow-up -
None of the issues discussed included new information or allegations.
Summaries of follow-up items are listed below:
- 1) A re-review of the draft policy statement. " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation", was performed by the Chairman's staff. It was determined that the policy statement is necessary since it reiterates the importance of the subject issue. However, the Comission, in an SRM to the staff, stated the NRC should exercise its authority by independently ir.vestigating high priority cases to determine whether retaliation occurred, and take the appropriate enforcement action in a timely manner. The staff was directed to devote the necessary resources to address high priority cases of alleged retaliation. In addition, to better identify that the policy statement is only one piece of improvements being made, a press release was drafted highlighting other actions w11ch have been undertaken. ,
- 2) The NRC staff issued GL 89-10 in response to concerns regarding poor performance of some MOVs at nuclear pcwer plants. When the staff issued GL 89-10 in 1989, the staff considered the proposed schedule of 5 years or 3 refueling outages to be reasonable to verif.) MOV design-basis capability considering the available information on specific robl. ems at that time.
Li roblems with /
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licensees were epected to a ress.the opera ility of MOVs a concern' regarding thetWapability was~ identified l In Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 (dated June 13. 1990), the staff stated on page 40 of the enclosure that, if a licensee found that an M0V within thegGL 89-10 program would not operate under design-basis conditions, the licensee must declare that MOV inoperable. The NRC staff monitored the licensees
- actions regarding operability decisions during GL 89-10 inspections. Further, the staff has taken regulatory action on a generic basis (such as issuance of sup)lements to GL 89-10 or information notices) and on a >lant-specific basis (suc1 as enforcement) as appropriate when MOV problems lave been identified. With almost.90. reactor units having com)leted their GL 89-10 programs to verify MOV design-basis capability and wit 1 the staff completing the GL 89-10 close'out inspections for'nearly
.s'
. 40 reactor units the staff considers that licensees have substantially l reduced concerns regarding MOV performance.
.- n
,Regarding Mr. Blanch's philoso)hical question of whether (it appears) the NRC ina ropriately assumes owners 11p for generic pro this issue will be l f r discussed with the staff (WBR periodic). EY. [
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- 3) Mr. Blanch also stated that he wasn't certain that the guidance recently given to Project Managers for reviewing spent fuel pool plant soecifics included ensuring compliance with the licensing basis. During the caeting, the Chairman's staff stated that the guidance was intended for that purpose. -
and that they believed it was explicitly stated. The guidance was reviewed and it indeed does cover three aspects: A. System Design: B. Sumary of ;
Current Licensing Basis (CLB) Requirements: and C. Summary of Compliance with CLB Requirements and Commitments.
- 4) Relating to Part 100 he staff has been asked whether that rule should be clarif'.ed to show it is Wultimate limit for not only siting, but for operating reactors and postulated events. This issue will be addrmsed during g-["
discussions of SECY 9A<-194 (Commission meeting scheduled forgpe
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/ Energy Consultant August 25, 1997 Dr. Shirley Jackson, Chairman USNRC Washington DC 20566-0001 Dear Chairman Jackson As you will recall, we had the opportunity to meet in your office on April 9,1996. I trust you found our discussions mutually beneficial, as i did. More significantly, my perception is that the regulated industry is changing, especially in certain key areas such as treatment of employees raising safety concems. I feel your insights and leadership are bringing diange to the NRC as well; however, much remains to be accomplished.
As we discussed, the treatment of nuclear whistleblowe'rs continues to be an area of great -
importance to the industry and of high interest to me. You may be aware that in the spring of this year I agreed to assist Northeast Utilities in their efforts to address issues affecting the workplace and employee concems specifically. Thus, while I am a consultant to NU, I am writing this letter solely on my own behalf.
During our meeting you extended an invitation to me to retum in about one year to discuss the whistleblower issue and any other issues of importance.
I have recently transmitted to you my August 17,1997 letter to Senators Lieberman and Biden related to the recent GAO report on nuclear regulation. While I am inclined to generally agree with your most recent position related to compliance, I would appreciate an opportunity to share some of my perspectives related to implementation of that position. I would also be interested in discussing some of the other topics of my letter such as the effectiveness, of the NRC's enforcement process and the NRC's identification and resolution of potentially significant safety issues.. ~
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[ - I understanduquerque NM you will be attending on November 17,199]el-likewisethewilfbe American Nuclear in Albilquerque Society winter n e n scheduled jg/ n[ to pa 'cipate-in a panel-disc 0iisT6ti aft 6r yo0r presentation on the moming of the 17th.
(b;<g ) If possible, for convenience and subject to your availability, I would like to suggest that we meet at a convenient time at the ANS meeting. Should this not be feasible in light of other s . ,, v [x ( , , commitments you may have, I would be more than willing to come to Rockville MD to meet with you and your staff sometime Unis fall.
$.IJfThank you for your consideration.
Sincerely
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l cc: Mr. John Zwolinski l'
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., te 14li W September 17, 1997 in m Note to: Chairman Jackson 4 q From: Laban 0
Victor % h [ j Via:
Re.: Letter from Paul Blanch In the enclosed letter, Mr. Blar.ch requests to meet with you at the'ANS winter meeting in Albuquerque this November. He wants to talk about (1) treatment of nuclear whistleblowers, (2) implementation of your position on compliance, (3) effectiveness of NRC enforcement, and (4) NRC identification and resoluticn of I safety issues. He also states that, in your April 1996 meeting, you invited j .
him to return in about a year.
i Obviously.Mr.BlanchismisinformedaboutyourattendanceattheAN5 conference. The question remains, however, about whether you would. agree to 11y agreeable time. g i
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I' November 13, 1997 Note To: Ch'ai m n Jackson l
From: Brjan Holian jf M Wij Coordinated With: Karla. V1ctor Marty
Subject:
Meeting with Paul Blanch (11/14/97: 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.)
T BACKGROUND Following his request, you mety with Paul Blanch on April 9.1996. The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes: attendees included members of the Chairman's staff and' John Zwolinski, NRR (the staff's primary point of contact for Mr. Blanch).
Mr. Blanch had three key points that he discussed:
- 1) Forthcoming Policy Statement on " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation"
, 2) Timeliness in addressing and resolving generic issues
- 3) Spent Fuel Pool drainage and Part 100 consequences.
Recent Millstone-specific issues were not discussed.
A highlighted meeting sumary is attached (along with background notes for that meeting).
THIS MEETING At the end of the last meeting, you invited Mr. Blanch to stop back in about a year's time for a further discussion.of his issues.
Mr. Blanch introduces himself as a "past whistleblower" - and his prime message is that NRC should do everything possible to protect whistleblowers.
He is currently an NU employee (hired back on with them in the Spring of this year, following a 3 year absence). He is assisting in the employee concerns area. ~.. -
He is visiting as a member of the public.
9:\BHolian\Bilnch97'.Nov i L k}L i IKON}O90
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Comments / Questions d
k elcome Back Mr. Blanch. Similar to the last meeting. I am here to listen to i pourcommentsandconcerns.
/ y I understand that you are here as a member of the g,(
public, and you do not plan (nor do I) to discuss Millstone-specific issues.
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%W6 During our last meeting you commented, primarily, on three issues:'
- 1) Forthcoming Policy Statement on " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation" f
- 2) Timeliness in addressing and resolving generic issues
- 3) Spent Fuel Pool drainage and Part 100 consequences _ ,
~.g What are your impressions of the Policy Statement in the final form and its k impact in the industry?
Did you also note that the Comission. in its Staff Requirements Memorandum oh X the Policy Statement. stated that NRC.should exercise its authority by independently investigating high priority cases to determine whether , @. [
i retaliation occurred, and take the appropriate enforcement action in a timely,
/q manner? .: X Were you also aware that the Comission.' in response to SECY-97-147 (Re-evaluation of SECY-96-199 Issues: Plan to Better Focus Resources on High Priority Discrimination Cases), took a number of actions: v (see highlighted SRM. dated Se)tember 10. 1997) ^
audgets, expanding 01 and OE staffsf to k .'..deal including, in this time with harassment. of shrinking intimidation, and discrimination issues?,
/
- K I am interested in your comments on the Commission's paper on " Safety and gompliance." ,
h What is your assessment of the NRC's "rebalancing" of design and operational I
N '.
/ inspections?
What is your assessment of the changes the agency is making in:
N -
Plant Performance ssessments
/ 50.50 '
- Risk-informed initiatives
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'a Paul M. Blanch
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l Energy Consultant December 13,1997 '
[ Dr. Shirley Jackson Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Dr. Jackson,
I very much appreciate your willingness to meet with me on November 14,1997.
As I mentioned during our discussions, my p imary concems are the safety of the nuclear plants and the hesith and safety of their employees and the public. As professionals concerned about the future of nuclear power, we must all work together on the challenging issues which face us.
I would like to stress several points we discussed, as I feel they affect the public's con 6dence in the safety of nuclear power and the perception of the NRC on its performance ofits health and safety mission:
+ 1 am pleased that the NRC continues to make progress on addressing whistleblower issues. I still believe the NRC must take more prompt and vigorous enforcement actions when violations of 10 CFR 50.7 are identified.
+ The NRC, the public and the industry should work at arm's length, yet cooperatively, to strike the proper balance between accident prevention and eccident mitigation. For nuclear pir.nts to operate safely and m a cost-efficient manner, a shift of emphasis towards accident prevention must be achieved.
i
+ 1 attended the recent NRC workshop on Public Communications held on December 11,1997. As I discussed at this meeting, the NRC needs to look at NU and how they have progressed in the re-establishment of public tmst. Communication alone l will not succeed until the basis of the mistrust is recognized and addressed.
+ It would benefit the NRC's public image if you could visit Millstone in the near future. As part of your visit, spending some time to meet with members of public and local citizen groups would be particularly beneficial. It would demonstrate to the public the NRC's commitment to address issues and meaningfully involve the public in the restart process.
Again, I thank you for your openness in considering these issues. I look fonvard to our ongoing discussions and to observing your leadership of this important federal agency.
Since ly, gm c u .
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