ML20236P582
| ML20236P582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1987 |
| From: | Beck J TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236P529 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711180053 | |
| Download: ML20236P582 (31) | |
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O COMANCHE: PEAK' RESPONSE TEAM RESULTS REPORT ISAP: II.a
Title:
Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cav'ity
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REVISION 1-
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wo tY k. ea" /b 4 . E 7 Issue Coordinator l Date j
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Re7Iew Team Lea'ddr' N./ A Date iohin ' ' John (A. Seck, Chairman CPRT-SRT
/C 23/47 Date l
O 8711180053 871109 ~
.PDR ADOCK 05000445 A PDR
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s Rsvision: 1 Pags 1 of 30
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[~~ } RESULTS REPORT mJ
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ISAP II.a 1 Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity
1.0 DESCRIPTION
OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC ! l Technical issues and certain allegations with potential safety ; implications were identified and communicated by the NRC to TU ' Electric. The following technical issue was described in an enclosure to NRC letter dated September 18, 1984 (Reference 9.1, enclosure page 7): The TRT investigated a documented occurrence in which reinforcing steel was omitted from a Unit i reactor cavity concrete placement between the 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2-inch elevations. This reinforcement was installed and inspected according to drawing 2323-S1-0572, Revision 2. However, after the concrete was placed, Revision 3 to the drawing was issued showing a substantial increase in reinforcing steel over that which was installed. Gibbs & Hill Engineering was informed of the omission by Brown & Root Nonconformance Report C-669*. Gibbs & Hill Engineering replied that the omission in no way g-~ impaired the structural integrity of the structure. t \- ') Nevertheless, the additional reinforcing steel was added as a precaution against cracking which might occur in the vicinity of the neutron detector slots should a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occur. A portion of the omitted reinforcing steel was also placed in the next concrete lift above the 819-foot 1/2-inch level. This was done to partially I compensate for the reinforcing steel omitted in the previous ! concrete lift and to minimize the overall area potentially l subject to cracking. The TRT requested documentation indicating that on analysis was performed supporting the Gibbs & Hill conclusion. The TRT was subsequently informed that an analysis had not been performed. Therefore, the TRT cannot determine the safety significance of this issue until an analysis is performed verifying the adequacy of the reinforcing steel as installed. In Reference 9.1, the Brown & Root Non-Conformance Report is incorrectly cited as "CP-77-6". According to Reference 9.2 (page K-52), the correct Brown & Root NCR number for this issue is C-669. The Brown & Root NCR-C-669 was addressed and disposed of under TUSI NCR CP-77-6. m
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Revision: 1 ,
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.fg RESULTS REPO,RT -(\--) ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC The NRC (Reference 9.1, enclosure page 7) identified that the-following action should be taken on this issue:
Accordingly, TUEC shall provide an analysis of the as-built condition of the Unit 1. reactor cavity that verifies the. I adequacy of.the: reinforcing steel between the 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2-inch elevations. The analysis shall consider all-required load combinations.
3.0 BACKGROUND
The reactor cavity wall is essentially a right circular annulus constructed of concrete that rests on the basemat of the Containment Building. The wall rises about 22 feet above the containment floor to the reactor vessel flange level'and supports the reactor vessel from its inside surface. A total of eight slots for the neutron detectors are equally spaced around the interior of (\ the reactor cavity wall. These slots, 9 inches wide, are recessed (,,) 2 feet 9-1/2 inches deep within the 8 feet 6-1/2 inch thick concrete wall.
.1 The concrete placement of the reactor cavity wall between the {
l 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2 inch level was made according to- j i Revision 2 of Gibbs & Hill drawing 2323-S1-0572. Subsequently l l Revision 3 of the same drawing was issued to add additional I i rebar* to the area around the neutron detector slots to provide additional assurance that cracking at the corners of the slots
..would not occur in the event of a LOCA. Upon receipt of Revision 3 of the drawing in the field, Brown & Root issued NCR-C-669 and Texas Utilities Services, Inc. issued NCR CP-77-6 to document'that the concrete placement had already been performed to Revision 2 of <
the drawing and the rebar added per Revision 3 could not be-installed. Starting at the 819-foot 1/2 inch level, Brown & Root
-installed the additional rebar called for in Revision 3 of the drawing.
Gibbs & Hill assessed the as-built condition against their original design (results forwarded by GTN-19823, Reference 9.3) and found that omission of the rebar did not affect the structural integrity i of the reactor cavity wall, because the additional rebar had been-added only to minimize the possibility of thermally-induced ! cracking occurring at the corners of the= slots. A
- The ter U Ear as used throughout this report'is synonomous with the term reinforcing steel.
Ravicion: 1
, Pcgs 3 of 30 1 ,-w ~-- RESULTS REPORT s ! i ISAP II.a j (Cont'd)
I
3.0 BACKGROUND
(Cont'd) l At the completion of the internal disposition of the NCRs issued by TU Electric and Brown & Root, and prior to the review by the NRC, Revision 4 of Drawing 2323-S1-0572 was issued to reflect design 1 acceptance of the as-built rebar condition. ! 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN The objectives of this action plan were to: Assess the design adequacy of the existing Unit I reactor cavity wall, Assess the circumstances that led to the addition and subsequent deletion of the subject rebar. Review other cases of rebar omission for proper engineering documentation, k/ s- - Review pour cards to determine if current design drawings were used during construction.
- Review installation records for major embedments to determine if current design drawings were used during construction.
- Review procedures governing design changes and verify their effectiveness,
. - Determine if it was necessary to expand the scope cf the Action Plan.
4.1 Scope and Methodology This action plan included an assessment of the design adequacy of the existing as-built condition of the reactor cavity wall and other areas within Units 1 & 2 where rebar was omitted. Also included in this action plan was an evaluation of the engineering / field design change interface. An analysis of the as-built reactor cavity wall was performed to evaluate the adequacy of the installed rebar, considering all applicable loading combinations. Engineering calculations with assumptions stated therein were completed to evaluate the fs subject wall with "as-installed" rebar between the 812-foot and the 819-foot 1/2-inch level. A third-party reviewer
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verified the adequacy of the calculations.
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al 1 l R: vision: 1 Pag, 4 of 30 gm - RESULTS REPORT l
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ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 1 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) The circumstances and engineering evaluation that led to the provision for, and subsequent deletion of, the subject rebar in the reactor cavity wall were analyzed in light of design intent and structural integrity of the wall. All identifiable instances of rebar omissions for Units 1 & 2, as documented in Project NCRs, were researched. This research included all safety-related Seismic Category I building j structeren. Each case was reviewed to ascertain if proper i engineering evaluation and documentation existed to support I the disposition of the NCRs. Additional documentation was developed as required to insure appropriate NCR disposition. ) To provide increased assurance that all instances of rebar omissions similar to the subject case were identified, a random sample of pour cards was reviewed to determine if the current design documents were used during construction. The pour card review determined whether any revisions to the [O ( ,/ applicable drawings issued after the pour was made changed the required rebar in the selected pour. I An overall review of procedures governing design changes was performed to verify the adequacy of methods for controlling implemention of design changes during construction. Emphasis was placed on review of the Project procedures used to convey impending design changes immediately affecting ongoing construction activity. The effectiveness of procedures controlling such construction activities was verified by
, reviewing implementation of all NCRs related to rebar placement, pour cards and records of installation of major embedments. The review of installation records for major embedments to determine if current design drawings were used during construction served as another " test" of the adequacy of controls implemented by the civil discipline. The flow of activities initiated by engineering to convey impending design l
I changes to the field as well as action leading towards appropriate construction hold were identified and evaluated. The results of the review of procedures for handling rebar omissions and embedments were evaluated to determine the potential applicability to other areas within the civil engineering discipline. The results of the review of the engineering / field design change interface were evaluated to s determine if the scope of the review needed to be broadened to ! l I other disciplines. LJ
,e R1 vision:- 1 Page 5.of 30 g i
_ RESULTS REPORT i V ISAP II.a (Cont'd)' -) 1
-4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) -
Although not required by the results of the reviews discussed above, an assessment of the rebar exposed as part of the. effort associated with ISAP II,b, " Concrete Compressive i Strength" was made. The rebar1that had been exposed in each area was compared.to that specified by design. . 1 The overall process for closure of this issue was reviewed by the third party. 4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities I The organizations and personnel.that participated in this' l effort are described below with their' respective scopes of l work. l 4.2.1 TUGC0 Huclear Engineering (TNE) - Civil / Structural Discipline 4.2.1.1 Scope Reviewed Project NCRs for rebar omission cases. l 4 l - Developed additional documentation as. required to insure' appropriate disposition of rebar omission NCRs. I Reviewed pour cards for rebar placements. Reviewed pour cards for major embedments.
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Assisted in review of procedures governing design changes and control-. of construction activities. Assisted in overall engineering evaluation. 4.2.1.2 Personnel 1 Mr. C. R. Hooton Project Civil Engineer V Mr. D. G. Patankar Civil / Structural-Lead Engineer I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ o
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'4 Pags: - 6 of 30 .g g s RESULTS REPORT
- i ISAP II.a (Cont'd) l
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4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) lig J' 4.2.2 Gibbs &'. Hill. Inc. "1 p 4.2.2.1 Scope-Performed analysis / design
. calculations ai requirc6Lunder:this '
action plan, includiqh thi. required design review of. theew) calculations. ' . q y 4.2.2.2.' Personnel v .j N? vfg) Mr. E. L.;Bezkor Structural Job Engineer. " ; ,/ : \ A " Mr. A. M. Keilk're [ Structural Squad y Leader a
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->; a Mr. S. Sengupta A . S enior. Enginee r.- il U Mr. C. Zion Senior Engineer I
y , Mr. M. N. Shah- Senior Engineer 4.2.3 Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. (SWEC) j
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ProvidedoSpecific Technical Issue' l <;
, Report (STIR) to address overall rebar situation.
Provided' resolution and calculations + j in response to DIRs issued by the ,.) third party. i r , s.l 4.2.3.2 Personnel ./.7' '! 7 Mr. R. Cintco Asst. Lead Eng neer ' d, Mr..S. Malhotra Principal Civil-Engineer. T .. . Mr. D. Bhatia. ,
\ , Civil rEngineer j j. , . ,
Mr. R. Murray Ci('i Engineer; ,
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- Overviewed NCR . and',; pour , card -;
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-4.2.4.2 'Personnell ' M' '
i p, + 1 l, t r c Mr. H. - A; .. Leviro TElGRA '-~CPRT i s u . Civil / Structural
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[j, ,1 iji D ><g 261o-( Team Leader -
; 'u :i Dr. J. Honekamp' TEN 5RA - TRT. Issues 1
- i Thtnical Manager-
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. .. .. .e Mr. J. C'. Millar' .TENERA - TRT Issues. , '
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Mr.'R.LSanan , @ ' TEMELA - Structural
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_ Coordinator-j/2 y y , [j > Prof. M. H'olley- TENERA' Con'eui tant , -
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. - 1 Third-party participants in the implementation'of this ActionL ,j f', z Plan met the personnel qualificat' ion ar.d objectivity 4 l 3 ,.
requirements of.the CPRT Program Plan.and its-implementing 1j 3 ' procedures. j
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Rsvisioni 1 4 Peg 2 8 of 30 i
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RESULTS REPORT _e s , l ISAP 11.a. (Cont'd) j 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) Other participants were qualified to the requirements of the CPSES Quality Assurance Program or to the specific requirements of the CPRT Program Plan. Activities performed by other than third-party personnel were gotarned by the applicable principles of Section III.K, " Assurance of CPRT i Program Quality", of the CPRT Program Plan. 4.4 Procedures ! i Calculations and evaluations performed by TNE Civil Engineering, Gibbs & Hill, and SWEC were performed in accordance with the procedures normally applicable to those activities for CPSES. 4.5 S_tandards/ Acceptance Criteria Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, ACI-318-71, and stipulations of Section 3.8 of the FSAR form r" the basic standard / acceptance criteria for calculations (_,N / performed under this action plan. When documentation supporting "use as-is" rebar omission approvals was found to be insufficient, it was supplemented as required to provide complete justification for prior engineering judgements. 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
'The principal concerns surrounding this issue are the adequacy of the existing Unit I reactor cavity wall and the circumstances that led to the addition of and subsequent deletion of rebar in that wall. These concerns and the third party assessment are addressed-in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Five additional tasks were established to determine if similar situations exist elsewhere in t
the plant and to assess any problems found. To accomplish these objectives, the third party investigation included: Review of other cases of rebar omission, Review of pour cards for rebar placement, Review of installation records for major embedments, r \
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R; vision: 1 4 Peg 2 9 of 30
,-s ~_ RESULTS REPORT
\ ) ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) Review of procedures, and Determination of need to expand Action Plan scope. These tasks are addressed in Section 5.3 through 5.7 respectively. Section 5.8 describes out-of-scope observations. 5.1 Assessment of the Design Adequacy of the Existing Unit 1 Reactor Cavity Wall l As described in Section 3.0, the thickness of the reactor ! cavity wall is 8 feet 6-1/2 inches. This thickness is dictated by biological shielding requirements. Structural. ; load carrying capabilities are then assessed to assure the ' designer that the design is adequate. In accordance with the scope of this Action Plan, Gibbs & Hill prepared calculations (Reference 9.4) to investigate the
<) adequacy of the as-built rebar in the cavity wall between the
(_,/ 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2 inch level. Three separate approaches were used in evaluating the as-built vall condition. These approaches are described briefly as follows: Approach 1 The reactor cavity wall was analyzed assuming ic to be a thick-walled concrets cylinder i{ without any rebar. This simplified analysis I
, demonstrated that when subjected to the most critical loads the unreinforced concrete cylinder is still capable of sustaining the l load without loss of structural integrity. j i
Approach 2 The reactor cavity wall was analyzed as a ring with outside face hoop reinforcement ; alone carrying all the load. The ' calculations showed that the stress in the rebar was well below the yield strength of the steel. Therefore outside face hoop reinforcement alone is adequate to resist the hoop forces. Approach 3 In this approach the reactor cavity wall was
,s analyzed as a beam spanning from the base mat
( ) to a ring at the 819'-0 1/2" elevation where the rebar added per Revision 3 of drawing
R; vision!' 1 Piga 10 of 30.
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- RESULTS REPORT
! l ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) 2323-S1-0572 was subsequently included. This calculation demonstrated that there is approximately four times as much vertical rebar specified as would be required for the '
postulated loads. Based on these calculations, as reviewed by the third party, it was concluded that the Unit I reactor cavity wall, as constructed, is adequate to resist the most critical load combination as required per FSAR Section 3.8, Article 3.8.3.3.2. The rebar that was the. subject of the NRC's concern had been added by the Structural Job Engineer to minimize superficial cracking at the corner of the slots. However, the third party concluded that even if cracking were to occur at those locations, it would be of no significance to the shielding function of the wall for the following reasonas iA; (_/ - The cracks would normally remain closed due to the presence of the circumferential rebar near the outer edge of the cavity wall. Cracks from the corners of the slots wculd tend not to be perpendicular to the surface of the cavity wall and thus would not represent a radiation streaming path. Most of the cavity wall in the subject area has j
, additional shielding provided by concrete buttresses i located outside the circumferential rebar.
{ 1 Considering,the above assessment, it was concluded that the I as-built section of the Unit I reactor cavity wall meets the structural and shielding design requirements. 5.2 Assessment of Circumstances That Led to the Addition anG i Subsequent Deletion of the Subject Reinforcement Steel Based on professional experience, the Structural Job Engineer '; concluded that minor cracking of the concrete at the corners j of the slots provided for the neutron detectors could occur in j the event of a LOCA. The Structural Job Engineer therefore < estimated the additional quantity of rebar required to )
,-s minimize this thermally-induced cracking. No backup ,
( x_
) calculations were prepared by the engineer to substantiate
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-Ravisiont l1)
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C RESULTS REPORT
'ISAP II at (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSIdN OR RESULTS (Cont'd);
this decision since the onlyl purpose for the additional rebar-
- was'to contro1' superficial cracking. Structural-drawing s 2323-SI-0572, Revision 2 was' modified to includet the addit 1onal rebar.
1 After receipt.of the drawing in the field,, Brown & Rootj determined that the pour had already been made.and issued NCR C-669.to document the discrepancy'between Revision 3 and the-as-built condition. The~ Brown &, Root NCR was dispositioned under TUSI NCR CP-77-6'. The disposition of: the NCR involved a review by Gibbs & Hill and TU Electric' that' concluded - that the addition of the rebar was discretionary and.thus did not-t affect the structural integrity of the wall. Revision 4 of: l-the rebar drawing was subsequently issued:to reflect the. actual as-built' condition. At that time,'no"further action in'- the disposition of this NCR was taken by Gibbs.&' Hill or..TU-Electric, nor was' any required, since the: design Lealculation' of record' supported Revision.2, which was identical to
/ Revision 4.
This assessment of the circumstances led to a conclusion:by j the third party that the documentation of the circumstances j regarding the subject omitted rebar was consistent with Project. procedures. 5.3 Review of Other Cases of Reinforcement Bar Omission-A computerized and handwritten listing-of' civil / structural NCRs that noted reinforcing steel omissions was obtained from' j the permanent plant records vault.- Review of this listing 'j indicated 21 cases of rebar omission.in Units.1 and'2' J safety-related Category I building structures in addition'to the subject case. 'A complete' listing of these'22 NCRs and- -4 their resolutions is provided in Appendix A to..this' report.- ! Review of these cases indicates that, except for the subject ./ case, all of the omissions were due to errors in-placement of. I reber. They were not caused by failure of the j engineering / field design change interface to convey impending. design changes. , Thirteen of these NCRs pertained.to missing dowels. Dowels ;: ; are generally used to start additional rebar in the next' pour,:
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or to start rebar'at different spacing. . The. function of the
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.f, dowel is to provide continuity-of a new bar into'an'old pour., j
.. t The industry accepted practice is'to r(place missing dowels j
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Rsvision: 1 Pigs 12 of 30 RESULTS REPORT I )
\- / ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) by drilling and grouting in the donels. This practice was followed at CPSES and meets the intent and purpose of '
applicable ACI Codes. Six NCRs pertained to missing vertical or horizontal rebar and two NCRs pertained to missing shear ties. Each of these NCRs j was dispositioned by the Project. ' The original NCR dispositions were based on engineering i judgment in 11 of the 21 cases. Supplementary calculations I were prepared by the Project to verify. these judgments. In l all cases the supplementary calculations confirmed the original judgements. The most common judgement involved estimating the length of rebar to be grouted in place for the l repair of concrete with missing rebar. This is a simple l calculation which was included in the disposition for some of the other 11 NCRs. r~N In one instance of an NCR involving a column where a ( j)' calculation previously existed, a review of that calculation revealed that an incorrect assumption had been used in the original disposition (the dowel placement was accepted use-as-is based on a calculation which assumed symmetrical dowel placement when the dowels were actually arranged asymmetrically). DIR-D-0692 was written to document this error. Reanalysis of the column by SWEC using the as-built asymmetrical reinforcement demonstrated that the use-as-is disposition was acceptable. The third party reviewed the
, analysis and concurred with the results.
The third party reviewed all 22 NCRs and concluded that they wer:e appropriately dispositioned. 5.4 Review of Pour Cards for Reinforcement Bar Placement Pour cards are maintained to document the installation of rebar and other embedments, the date, location and quantity of each concrete pour, the field drawings used to establish the pour requirements and the documentation of inspections l performed. Over 7,600 pour cards exist for Units 1 and 2 and all safety-related Seismic Category I buildings. Each of these pour cards contain documentation of inspection for verification of any rebar installation or major embedments. A 7_s random sample of these pour cards was selected to verify that: l v) l ___._-a -
Revision: 1 Pega 13 of 30 f- 1 RESULTS REPORT s
!d ISAP II.a (Cont'd) l 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
I 1 the reinforcement steel drawing revision number and any ' design change documents referenced on the pour card match the applicable design documents; or that any discrepancies between the pour card and design l drawings with respect to rebar had been appropriately documented by Brown & Root and/or TU Electric NCRs. I In all cases reviewed, the rebar placement documents ' referenced on the pour card were in agreement with the applicable design documents. ! 5.5 Review of Installation Records for Major Embedments A review of NCRs and pour cards for major embedments was performed to determine if current design drawings were used during construction. This review was similar to the review for rebar (Sections 5.3 and 5.4) except that it examined the I f'~N NCRs and pour cards associated with the placement of the major ,
,) embedments in the Unit I reactor building. However, in this case the number of NCRs and pour cards associated with major {
5 embedments was considerably smaller and therefore a 100% 9 review was performed. A major embedment is defined as a support or~ support bracket whose location was predetermined by the fixed location of the component attached to the support or bracket. The embedment types reviewed included: t I Valve isolation tank supports, j l Equipment hatch cover supports, ' Reactor vessel supports, j i Polar crane support brackets, j Rotating platform support brackets, Reactor coolant pump tie supports. l Steam generator lower lateral supports. l l
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Steam generator upper lateral supports, ( ) Fuel transfer tube supports. l l
( 1 Rsvision: 1 l Pcgm 14 of 30 i I
, ._s _ RESULTS REPORT i \~ 2 ISAP ll.a (Cont'd) l l
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) i These nine major embedment types represent a total of 124 embedments. All 124 of these embedments were reviewed. The-NCR review did not identify any deviations associated with the < placement of these embedments. { The pour card review confirmed that the drawing revision ( j numbers and change documents referenced on the pour cards were j in agreement with the applicable design documents. I i 1 5.6 Review of Procedures . i 4 A two-step process involving a review of the procedures and a j determination of the effectiveness of those procedures was ! I used to assess the adequacy of the controls governing the j placement of rebar and other major embedments. The procedure ] review was based on identifying the extent of administrative 1 l controls related to the issuance of design documents, including design changes, and the installation and inspection
/~' of embedded items prior to concrete placement. The results of
(,,)) this effort are discussed in Section 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 below. The determination of the effectiveness of these procedures was based on the results of the NCR review (Section 5.3), the reinforcement pour card review (Section 5.4) and the review of NCRs and pour cards associated with major embedments in the Unit I reactor building (Section 5.5). 5.6.1 Document Control Procedures
, During the initial phases of the Project through May 1976, design changes were issued exclusively by-revising the appropriate engineering drawings. Proj ec t procedure No. DCP-5 then became the document control procedure for all design documents, including changes, and remained in effect until August, 1980. At that time it was incorporated in DCP-3, Revision 10. DCP-3 is currently in effect.
Provisions were made in DCP-5 to issue design changes either by issuing revised design drawings or by design { change documentation generated either by site engineering or by Gibbs & Hill. At the time of incorporation of DCP-5 into DCP-3, Component Modification Cards (CMCs) and Design Change
,_ Authorizations (DCAs) were the exclusive means by which
( ) the design could be changed.
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1 Rsvision: .1 Pegs 15 of l i s RESULTS REPORT:
'f%\' i ISAP'II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION.OR-RESULTS'(Cont'd) !
All design change documents were reviewed and approved by Gibbs & Hill. 5.6.2 Installation and Inspection Procedures j The current procedures governing the activities prior to the placement of concrete are: 35-1195-CCP-14 Generation'of pour' card, pour number assigned to particular pour, concrete pre-pour inspection and pour-card 1 sign-off (construction. procedure), ]
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QI-QP-11.0-2 Reinforcing steel, l miscellaneous steel and-embedded' item placement O inspection (Quality
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- k_,/ ' Control Instruction),
QI-QP-11.0-3 Concrete and mortar placement inspection ! (Quality Control ' Instruction). These procedures require that rebar and other-miscellaneous / embedded steel that is to be included in
, a particular pour, be checked and verified against the applicable design drawings prior to concrete placement.
As noted above, construction procedure 35-1195-CCP-14 l requires that a pour card be generated with a pour number assigned for the particular pour. For all Category I structures the following pour card sign-off is mandatory prior to concrete placement: I - Field Engineering (Surveyors)- responsible for the correct location, line and grai'.e of all items that constitute a pour, Brown & Root Construction' Supervisors - responsible for 100% inspection of all items concerning the pour, I - TNE Civil Engineer - responsible for conducting spot-checks and monitoring ove'rall activities involving the pour, l __.___.___.__________n
Revision: 1 4 l i - Psga 16 of 30
,s _ RESULTS REPORT IS AP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
QC Inspectors - QC inspectors of civil, mechanical and electrical disciplines, responsible for verification per QC procedures in their particular discipline. Verification of proper signoff by other responsible parties. Construction procedure 35-1195-CCP-14, Rev. 0 was introduced in March 1975. The procedure's basic requirements regarding pour card signoff and inspection j (pre-placement) have remained essentially the same j since its inception. 1 } Quality control inspection of concrete pours involving I rebar or other embedments was performed in accordance with Quality Control Instruction CP-QCP-2.4 until July, 1978. Per this procedure, QC inspectors were required to signoff a checklist for rebar and embedded items () inspection prior to concrete placement, in addition to is,/ signing off on pour cards. After July 1978, quality control activities performed under QC Instruction CP-QCP-2.4 vare split into two separate instructions, j QI-QP-11.0-2 and QI-QP-11.0-3. l 5.6.3 Construction Hold Procedures l In addition to the review of procedural controls described above, the third party reviewed the flow of activities init1ated by engineering to convey impending design changes to the field. In March 1977, a Construction Hold Notice (CHN) form was instituted by Project memorandum TUF-2731 (Reference 9.5). The Project instructed G&H in New York to inform the field via TWX of any pending changes to drawings previously issued to the field and to follow up wit! the CHN form. Although not formally proceduralized, the CHN process was instituted as a construction management tool to minimize rework through this advanced notifiestion. It was not instituted as a QA program requirement for control of work activities. The process was proceduralized in February 1980 by incorporation into Procedure CP-EP-9.0, " Construction
,-m Hold Notice Procedure". \' l Since March 1977, 451 CHNs were processed, although none was issued for the subject case.
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K. N- RESULTS REPORTu j ISAP II.a r ,
'(Cont'd); ,
g . "l 1 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION. OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
.5.6.4 Procedural Adequacy.
' Base'd on'thisireview of the procedures, aud.on the
. determination of the effectiveness"of the proceduresjas'; ,j evidenced by the discussions in Seetion 5.3,~5'4 and.
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, .i 5.5, it was concluded.that:the controls associated with i concrete pours,'. placement of rebar and/or.'other' major. '
l embedments'were adequate to require that installations: '/ are in accordance with the design documents' released' i for construction.- , , I .
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! Although the existence of a formalized CHN_ procedure . l and the processing'of'a CHN for'.the subject casa might, .( have forestalled the problem that became the issue.of j this ISAP, the fact that a CHN was not processed does. 1 not constitute a violation of.the QA program as it' :' relates to docume't n control or installation and' - inspection procedures. 5.7 Determination of Need to Expand the Action Plan Scope , In order to develop further confidence inithe' accuracy of the ' placement of rebar<at.CPSES,' the third party elected to assess the actual placement of'rebar that had been exposed as- j part of the; effort associated with"ISAP.II,b. " Concrete. .
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Compressive Strength". There weree87. such exposed' areas.; The ') Project generated as-built sketches of the f areas exposed. . The third party verified the as-built sketches and compared the
, rebar in the areas exposed to the dpsign.' requirements. A .;
number of discrepancies were' observed and :were documented via l DIRs. These discrepancies are discussed;below.L 5.7.1 Detailing' Changes / Errors ..) i Two of the discrepancies were. determined to have been. .( caused by rebar being installed differently from that specified by the design because.of the different g detailing by the supplier oflthe rebar (Bethlehem Steel ' Corp.). In both cases the Project ' evaluated the change and determined that the change did not affect the- " ability of the-structure to perform its' intended function.- l !*b ' ! u
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RESULTS REPORT-IS AP L II .'au
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5.0- IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR'RESULTS (Cont'd). DIR D-473: As -Built Fiel'd Sk' etch FE-8181 The design. drawings specified.C-type shear ties at 12e inches on center horizontally'and 6' inches on center vertically. The. exposed area.as-built did not'show shear ties placed.per design drawings. .A review of the , detailer's drawing revealed that the ' detailer; had l fabricated two L- shaped ties to' replace each'.C-type l shear ties. :Further review' revealed,that.this ! substitution was. instituted by.the detailer without-i engineering approval'. The Project performed I calculations,to. qualify this= substitution. 'A generic
'DCA 31557'was'then issued' authorizing this change in all areas'of the plant.
DIR-474: As-Built Sketch FE-8226-l The design' drawings specify the; vertical reinforcement t to be #9 rebar.' The exposed area;was found.to contain-
#11 and #9 rebar.. Project review of . the deta11er's.L l
drawings showed #11 dowels /rebar (embedded in the foundation mat) to be spliced with #9 rebar. Therefore rebar in the exposed.-area appear to be properly installed in accordance with the detailers drawing. j
! 7.2 Spacing / Installation Discrepancies Three discrepancies involving. spacing requirements were
, identified. Two' of the discrepancies were related to l non-uniformly,placed rebar and one discrepancy involved i
exceeding the ACI code spacing requirements for-non-contact lap splices. . These discrepancies have been evaluated by the Project. The Project. performed calculations that' demonstrated the adequacy'of the as-built conditions. DIR D-475: As-Built Sketch FE-8226 j Shear' ties in the exposed area were found'to be present l butcplaced non-uniformly. Per design drawingsk shear- j L ties should have been installed at 12 inches 'on- 1 I. center horizontally and 8 inches on center vertically., Because some of the as-built. spacings exc'eed the design J"
, spacing, a DIR was generated to document this q O' deviation. The Project analyzed"and confirmed the- j
! adequacy of the as-built' condition. -) J I 1 qi
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-. _ RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) l DIR D-476: As-Built Sketch FE-8137 An area that was exposed did not appear to.have rebar per design drawings. Additional chipping was performed to expose the adjacent vertical rebar. As a result of additional chipping, it was determined that vertical rebar was present but not uniformly placed. Calculations performed by the Project demonstrated the adequacy of the as-built condition, j DIR D-477: As-Built Sketch FE-8151 FE-8151, Rev. 1 and FE-8151, Rev. 6 l During field verification of the exposed area the spacing of two vertical rebar appeared to be in excess j of ACI code requirements. To resolve this concern, the Project chipped additional area and produced as-built sketch FE-8151, Rev. 1. The enlarged chipped area
(N (_,) revealed a condition that appeared to be two rebar missing and two non-contact lap splices in excess of the ACI code requirement of 6 inches. This concern was documented via DIR D-477, Rev. 1. In order to understand the actual situation fully, the Project chipped additional area as documented in as-built sketch FE-8151, Rev. 6. The additional chipping revealed that the number of vertical rebar specified by design are present, but are installed non-uniformly, and at 4 locations the non-contact lap splice spacing is in excess of the ACI code requirements. Evaluation of this condition by the Project (Reference 9.6) demonstrated that the as-built condition has no effect on the structural integrity of wall. The evaluation of these lap splices makes use of calculations that are based on the strength of the splice. Testing currently being performed at Cornell University is focused on the relative strength of non-contact lap splices of different spacing and will be used to support these calculations (Reference 9.6). The third party has reviewed the Proj ect evaluation and concurs with the conclusion pending completion of the' tests at Cornell. (Reference 9.7) y-~\
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,RESULTS REPORT '
LISAP II.a-(Cont'd)" > 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION , PLAN ' AND _ DISCUSSION ' OR RESULTS . (Cone 'd)- . i t
- 1 5.7.3 .0ther Discrepancies. , l 1
Three instances wherein. minor discrepancies ~were
- l. identified were also investigated. .Th's Project
- . evaluated these discrepancies and. confirmed the-l adequacy of the as-built condition.1 ;
p DIR D-2357: . As-Built Sketch FE-8220, FE-8171 and FE-8206 Field engineering.as-built sketches i reported the rebar
' diameter:to be 1-1/16 inches'versus 1-1/8 inches-(#9;
'l rebar)'specified in the design drawings. Based on a- ,
more precise measurement it was concluded by;both SWEC a and the third party that.the subject'~ bars are~actually-
#9 bars as~ required by design.t DIR D-2358: As-Built Sketch FE-8169: J q .
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'In.the as-built sketch,. column reinforcement was 1abeled to be #11 rebar'instead of the '#10 specified by . i o design.- From a strength point'ofl view, #11 rebarLis better than #10 rebar. Installation ofl#11 rebar in.-
this case is therefore acceptable. Goused Bar FE-8173
- a During verification of.the "As-Built"' sketches,a3 column iebar was ' found gouged. ItLis considered-probable that the gouge was made.during the chipping operation. . The Project analyzed the column "without .
taking credit for the rebar. The' analysis confirmed ! that the column is' adequate to perform its design function.. ' 5.7.4 Conclusions Regarding Action Plan Scope. '! i Based on the breadth of the original Action-Plan,-the. satisfactory conclusion from.its investigation;and.the. '
.j acceptability of the as-built conditions-observed" l
whenever rebar was exposed during the CPRT: ;
. investigations, the: scope of the Action' Plan as. '
completed was' concluded to be acceptable.
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b RESULTS REPORT O, ;ISAP'II'a L(Cont'd)- 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS:(Cont'd)- 5.8: Out-of-Scope observations Since the action plan.was' initiated, a number.'of. instances
.have arisen in which'rebar was exposed. In each case', the..
observed >rebar,was compared;to the design requirements. In most instances the'rebar-conformed to those' design
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. requirements. TheLfo11owing discussion identifiesifour discrepancies.that wereiidentified:--
DIR D-478: Condensate Tank, Reactor. Water Make-up, Refuelina i Water Tank Tunnel Walls'for Unit 1 and Unit 2 The Refueling Water Tank-Tunnel' wall' corner. at~the interface - of the refueling' tank of Unit 2,:was' i damaged when aitruck backed into the wall. At that time it was' discovered:that-the t extended corner of the wall, o'ver its' entire height, had no reinforcement *.'. Further investigation into pipe. tunnel. walls indicated that the extendedLcorners of condensate water-g storage tank-and the refueling water. storage l tank' pipe walls have similar discrepancies.r These; walls were evaluated for-L postulated missiles' (Reference FSAR Section 3.5.6.' 4) . hitting the walls and pot'e ntially -dislodging the unreitiforcedy sections. The Project evaluation, based. on SWEC Topical Reportf(Reference 9.8)~, demonstrated that the unreinforced' i sections have sufficient strengthito withstand these l postulated missile loads without failure. Thist evaluation'wa's reviewed'and concurred.'with by the third party (Reference 9.9). ~ Fuel' Building East Wall' During the seismic gap cleaning operation (ISAP II.c), the y chamiered edge of the wall at EL 860'-0" cracked and was l-partially dislodged. The east f ace' of tha' wall was chipped. cleaned'and. repaired. During the' chipping and cleaning E operation, it was'discoveredithat'a #4 face rebar was present but placed farther from the' face than"specified'by the' design drawing. .NCR C85-101778 was" issued and dispositioned:
"use-as-is" based on a Project evaluation. . This evaluation was reviewed and. concurred in by the' third party.
*' Because the wall abuts a round tank wall,'the end of.the wall does not have 2-90*' corners.- One.of.the corners is extended'and' ends,in.
i an acute angle.- s
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,V ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.9 Summary of DIRs s
Nine DIRs were written to document discrepancies identified during the implementation of this ISAP. These DIRs were related to five areas. , DIR-E-1054 and E-1223 identified the subject case. Because the structural integrity is not affected and ) because Project procedures were followed, these DIRs were closed as observations. l
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DIR-D-0692 identified a discrepancy involving the ' assumptions used in dispositioning an NCR. 'Since the third party review concluded that the NCR was properly -' dispositioned, the DIR has been closed as an ' observation. . I DIR-D-473 and D-474 identified discrepancies between p the as-built condition and the design drawing caused by (~') 3 changes made by the rebar detailer. Since the rebar i specified by the detailer were equivalent to or larger l than that specified by design, these DIRs have been ! closed as observations. DIR-D-475, D-476 and D-477 identify discrepancies related to spacing of rebar. Each of these instances j has bcen evaluated, and it was confirmed that the ! load-carrying capacity of the structure was not
, affected. However, since the discrepancies involve the )
failure to meet ACI code requirements, they are j! classified as deviations.
'i DIR-D-478 documents a discrepancy wherein the rebar specified by the designer could not be bent as sharply {
{ as specified. This resulted in the rebar not extending j into the extended corner of the wall as far as called i for in the design. Evaluation demonstrated that the I wall still retained sufficient strength to withstand
- postulated loads. Therefore this DIR was closed as an .
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, s RESULTS REPORT (U) ISAP II.a (Cont'd) j 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
DIR-D-2357 and D-2358 documented apparent discrepancies. .Both were closed as observations when further evaluation revealed the presence of equivalent or larger rebar than specified. The three DIRs involving rebar spacing were classified as i deviations. However, on the basis of the calculations l performed, the as-built condition was demonstrated to have no effect on the structural integrity of the walls involved. Therefore the deviations are not safety significant and DIRs D-475, D-476 and D-477 are closed. The existence of these DIRs suggests the existence of a trend. However, since the DIRs in each area involved discrepancies in different categories and because none of the discrepancies affected the integrity of the structure, such a trend is not adverse. The number of discrepancies found and the nature of the.se discrepancies are not considered unusual occurrences at large l (~'} (_,/ construction sites. However, the lack of any Project documentation identifying or authorizing those discrepancies, indicates a potential weakness in the Quality Control Inspection program at CPSES. As discussed above the structural integrity was not affected in any of the instances and the original design margin remained. Thus, further investigation of the issue of rebar placement is not necessary. The results of this ISAP investigation have been submitted to the QA/QC Review Team for evaluation.during the collective evaluation phase of the QA/QC Adequacy Program. l
6.0 CONCLUSION
S l The technical issue identified by the TRT involved the omission of rebar from a Unit i reactor cavity concrete placement. During the investigation of this issue it was determined that the rebar in question does not affect the structural integrity of the reactor cavity wall and that all applicable Project procedures appear to have been properly followed. l [N j us l 1
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ISAP II.a
- (Cont'd) ', a w;j 6.0 ' CONCLUSIONS:(Cont'd)L j The investigation of this issue also revealed that:
The reviewfof NCRafand pour. cards. involving rebar placement and major'embedment placement-did not identify any. circumstances similar to'the subject. case. 1
' . Project procedures for control .of concrete pours and placement, of.rebar were adequate to assure'. proper. installation.~
Although some'rebar elements identified in'expbsed areas'were:
',not in accordance with' design, none1 of the situations affected structural integrity andlno adverseVtrends were' identified. 1
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'Therefore, the' administrative controls'and the resulting placement of'rebar is adequace'to meet or exceed design requirements. q
.. j 7.0 ONGOING-ACTIVITIES
\ / 5 The tes*:ing of non-contact lap;splicas at Cornell University'is' . t ongoing and'is expected to provide confirmation of the validity'of: d assumptions made in evaluating the spacing of non-contact lap- ,j splices. This' activity is-' scheduled lfor completion in October
'1987. The third party will review the'se test results and issue a supplement.to this. report, if' appropriate.
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' 8.0 ' ACTION TO' PRECLUDE REOCCURRENCE OF THE ISSUE' '
No further action'is required.
9.0 REFERENCES
i 9.1 USNRC letter to TU Electric. Company Dockets #50-445'6 50-446, dated September 18 -1984. 9.2 NUREG-0797 Supplement No. 8 " Safety. Evaluation Report Related-to the Operation of' Comanche Peak Steam' Electric Station' Units a 1 & 2", Appendix K. Page K-52,1 February,1985.
'9.3.'GTN 19823, R. E. Hersperger to H. C. Schmidt. " Reactor Cavity
- Rebar", July 11, 1977.
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9.0 REFERENCES
(Cont'd) ! 9.4 Gibbs & Hill Calculations No. SRB-1150, Set. 5, Rev.'0, "R B ;
#1' Cavity Wall Between Elevation 812'-0" to Elevation 819'-0".' '
9.5 TUF-2731,.C.'H. Gatchell to H. C. Schmidt, " Construction Hold Notice", March 1,_1977. , f 3 9.6 .SWEC's Calculation, 16345/6-CS(S)-238, Rev.' O. 9.7 Memorandum, M. J..Holley, Jr. to'J. Miller,."SWEC Calculation, 16345/6-CS(S), Rev. O, ' Structural Adequacy of-the L-A Wall in Rm. 189 of' Aux. Bldg. Based-on As-Built Condit!cus'", 09/21/87. l 9.8 SWECO 7703/EMTR-801, Appendix B, " Empirical Design for Local Response",' September 1977. 9.9 Memorandum, M. J. Holley,'Jr. to J. Miller, "S&W Calculation- j , #16345/6-CS(B)-117, Rev. 0,' Technical' Justification for the 1 Disposition of DIR #D-0478'", 09/21/87. u i 1 - 1 l 1 I e l l I
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SUMMARY
OF REBAR OMISSION CASES SR. NCR SUPPORTING NO. NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS ( } 1 C-669 Reactor Building #1 Use As Is TUF-3339 Calc. Book No. (Subject Reactor Cavity Wall SRB 115C i ( Case) Between El. 812'-0" and Set 5 ! 819'-1/2" NC l 2 C-267 Auxiliary Building Use As Is DC/DDA-112 Calc. Book No. Mat at El. 790'-6" SAB-113C, 6-#7 Shear ties Omitted Set 1, OC I 3 C-735 Fuel Building at EL. Use As Is DC/DDA-361 No calculations 810'-6" vertical dowels were required r"' not installed for to resolve the (_,) equipment pad. NCR, (These dowels were not required as equipment mounting details were to be issued later reflect-ing exact dowel require-ment) 4 C-763 Auxiliary Building Wall Use As Is 'DC/DDA-216 Calc. Book No. 4'-4" South of 7A Col. SMI 102C 2-#8 Horizontal Rebars Set 2 omitted from wall. NC 1 5 C-789 Fuel Building #1 Repair DC/DDA-679 Calc. Book No. Column at 4-F/D-F (drill and SFB 1341 2-#11 Dowels at El. grout) Set 2 l 810'-6" Omitted. NC l /"'\ t A
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\-- ISAP II.a (Cont'd)
APPENDIX A (Cont'd) SR. NCR SUPPORTING. 'I NO. NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS ! 6 C-792.R1 Aux. Bldg. Repair (Drill GHF 2743 No' calculations Elevator Wall & grout & cut required to rebars at E-A Wall misdrilled resolved the El. 831'-6" dowels NCR 1 7 C-806 Auxiliary. Building Use As Is DC/DDA-486 Calc. Book No. 12-#8 Wall vertical SAB 124 Cl rebars at column Set 1 locations E-A/4-A, OC l E-A/3-A, E-A/6-A and I E-A/7-A were omitted. l 8 l l C-809 Auxiliary. Building Use As Is DC/DDA-558 Calc. Book No. i ()s8 i construction opening No.-1342 ) between column lines Set 8-6-A & 7-A on column OCNL line K-A 6-#10 additional NC i rebars above opening at EL. 810'-6" omitted. I 9 C-810 , Reactor Building #1 Repair (Drill DC/DDA-477 Calc. Book No. Elevator shaft wall, and grout 9-#9 SMI 102 C, 9-#9 and 2-#4 dowels dowels. 2-#4 Set 3 omitted at slab EL. to be NC 832'-6". installed from EL. ' 832'-6") 10 C-811 Reactor Building #1, (Repair) Drill DC/DDA-696 Calc. Book No. 46-#9 Dowels (Vertical) and Grout SMI 102 C, omitted at S.G. Set 2 - Compartment #1 Wall EL. OCNL 832'-6" #HCP 32039 NCE MW
Rsvision: l' Page' 28 Hof.30 RESULTS REPORT LO ISAP II.a (Cont'd) APPENDIX A (Cont'd) l SR. NCR SUPPORTING l NO. NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS (1)- 11 C-815 Safeguard Building #1, Use As Is GHF 2186 No calculations I 10-#8 dowels for required to horizontal rebars running resolve the NCR. across construction '(Construction opening in wall on 7-S opening ~re-between C-S & D-S ] located to l provide enough embedment length-for #8 bars, eliminating the need for dowels.) .; 17T~'g C-858 Fuel Building, 1-#9 Repair GHF 2287 Calc. Book No. ( ,/ vertical wall dowel (Drill and SFB 1341, omitted at Mat EL. Grout) Set 1 810'-6". NC i 1 13 C-974 Safeguard Building #1, Repair DC/DDA-1734 Cale. Book No. I 6-#8 dowels for slab (Drill and SSB 108C, at EL. 841'-6" were Grout) Set 1
,omitted. OC 14 C-1155 Auxiliary Building, Repair Items DC/DDA-2250- Calc. Book No.
Following column dowels 1&2, (Drill SAB-125C1 were omitted: and Grout), Set 6-
- 1. Col.at 7-A/G-A,8-#10 Use As Is for OC
- 2. Col.at 8-A/G-A,4-#10 Items 3 & 4
- 3. Col.at 7-A/H-A,4-#10
- 4. Col.at 8-A/H-A,4-#10 15,- C-1168 Auxiliary Building, Use-as-is DC/DDA-2250, SWEC Calc.
Column'7-A/G-A Rev. 1 # CS(S)98 Elv. 873'-0" NC
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RESULTS REPORT ! ISAP II.a j (Cont'd) APPENDIX A (Cont'd) 1 SR. NCR SUPPORTING , NO. NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS (1) 16 C-1275 Safeguard Building #1, Use As Is for- For Item 1 & Calc. Book Nos. Following' dowels for wall' Items 1 & 2. 2 DCA-3247, SSB-115C OC l on column line 2-S were Repair for For Item Set 1, and omitted. Item.3'(Drill 3 DCA-3581 SSB 1343
- 1. 3-#10 per dwg. S1-0656 and Grout) Set 11
- 2. 6-#8 & 6-#4 per dwg.
SI-0625, Sect. 19-19 NC !
- 3. 32-#8 per dwg. SI-0624 Section 16 17 C-1534 Reactor Building #2, Repair CPP-A-2386 Calc. Book No.
Compartment #1 Wall 11 (Drill and ' SRB 1342 l l 11-#9 vertical dowels Grout) Set 8 i omitted. NC b.O 18 C-1653 Reactor Building #2, Use As Is DCA-5536- Calc. Book No. 3 rows of additional and DCA- SRB 122C I shear ties omitted 5632 Set 4, between EL. 991'-6" OC and 997'-6". 19 C-2221 Safeguard Building Use As Is DCA-7358 Calc. Book No.
#2, EL 813-4" roof SSB-2368 slab between SET 12 13-S & 14-S and NC (
l F-S & E.5-S ' 8-#10.rebars missing i 20 C-81-0243 Reactor Building #2, Repair Procedure Calc. Book No. Compartment Wall (Drill and CCP-12 SRB 1342-4-#7 dowels omitted. Grout) Set 10 NC 1
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#9 U Shaped devels for DCA-14261 required to Reactor Coolant pump resolve the pad omitted in NCP. (Omission Compartments 2 & 3. was not of structural significance.)
( LEGEND: OC - Original calculation NC - New calculation OCNL - Original calculation not located LJ _}}